



MIDDLE EAST RECORD

1961

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THE REUVEN SHILOAH RESEARCH CENTER

MIDDLE EAST RECORD

VOLUME TWO • 1961

Editor: YITZHAK ORON

MIDDLE EAST RECORD (MER) presents factual information on current Middle Eastern political affairs. MER is the first reference work of its kind in the English language, and is more comprehensive than any other publication in its field.

MER is a fully documented chronological record, arranged according to topics, based on extensive research. In compiling MER, more than 200 newspapers, periodicals and official publications in Middle Eastern and other languages were regularly scanned, and many additional publications were consulted.

Care has been taken to present all relevant viewpoints on every question.

The material is presented under three categories:

1. A record of political developments in the region, comprising quoted material only, and including official interpretation of these developments and comment from within and without the area.
2. Views and Policies—as expressed by government leaders on both internal and international affairs.
3. Factual summaries of the above categories, correlating the different aspects and outlining the pattern of developments, while refraining from judgment.

Many topics are presented in maps and tables. Extensive background notes, cross references and indexes have been included. The area covered extends to Turkey in the North, Iran in the East, Cyprus and Libya in the West, and in the South, to Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.

While the scope of Volume II is the same as that of its predecessor, a number of innovations have been introduced.

A detailed subject index has been added for both the first and the present volume. In addition to the more obvious subjects, the index encompasses such themes agitating the Middle East as Democracy, Social Equality, Welfare Society, Classes, Leadership, Ideology, National Unity, the Enemy, Peace and War, Subversion.

The economic surveys have been expanded to include more statistical information, in some cases covering demographic and social subjects. The voting record of ME countries at the United Nations General Assembly has been prefaced by a synopsis of voting behaviour and analytical tables. The chapter on the Arab-Israel conflict has been extended to include a section on the arms race.

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by



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TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
THE REUVEN SHILOAH RESEARCH CENTER

The Reuven Shiloah Research Center was established in 1959, as a research institute for current Middle Eastern, Asian and African affairs. In December 1965 it was attached to Tel Aviv University. The Center conducts its activities under the auspices of the Israel Oriental Society.

THE ISRAEL ORIENTAL SOCIETY
PRESIDENT: ELIAHU ELATH

The Israel Oriental Society, founded at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1949, is an independent, non-political society whose aims are to encourage research on the Orient, disseminate information concerning such research, and further cultural ties and friendship with the peoples of the East.

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PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE

MIDDLE EAST RECORD (MER) is an annual account of the politics and international relations of the countries of the Middle East. It is a development of the survey that has appeared during the past 13 years in *Hamizrah Hehadash* (*The New East*), the Hebrew quarterly of the Israel Oriental Society.

There is now an extensive and ever-growing coverage of Middle East affairs. In addition to the numerous books, there are specialized periodical and other factual surveys—particularly on economic affairs, oil and education. In the field of politics, however, systematically presented factual information is not easily obtainable. The student of Middle East politics has at his disposal a wealth of analysis, comment and judgment, but singularly little sober fact is readily available by which to check them. In order to construct even a skeleton framework for research, the analyst or historian has to conduct a preliminary survey of numerous and varied sources which are not always easy to come by.

It was this state of affairs that prompted the Israel Oriental Society to enlarge the political section of *Hamizrah Hehadash* and make it available in English.

The aim of this work is to present the facts in full detail and from the widest possible variety of sources. Where the facts are disputed—and that happens frequently enough in the Middle East—all available versions are quoted, precedence being given to official statements. When it is a matter of underlying motives and causes, or the significance and consequences of events, both official statements and unofficial comment are treated as facts to be recorded.

In compiling MER, over 200 newspapers, periodicals and official publications have been regularly scanned and many additional publications consulted. As far as possible, official publications have been used, but the overwhelming majority of items included are press reports and monitored broadcasts. For maximum accuracy, these have been cross-checked as far as possible and early reports have been corrected by later, more accurate ones.

MER comprises three categories of material: a general record; views and policies on internal affairs and international relations, as formulated by government leaders; synopses and economic surveys.

The general record is arranged according to topics, with extensive cross-references. Dates are prefixed to headings to establish the chronological sequence. The record consists of quotations from, or summaries of, specified sources. Where background notes have been found necessary, they are indicated by square brackets. Sources are as a rule quoted for each item separately. In translated material the original terms for institutions, parties, etc., are generally added in parentheses.

"Views and Policies" have been compiled on the basis of all published pronouncements of government leaders during the year. Care has been taken not only to present all relevant views but also to present them in proper balance. To avoid the risk of quoting out of context, passages have often been given at considerable length. As far as possible, English translations issued in the country concerned have been used. These have generally been compared with the text in the original language, but so long as they convey the general meaning they have been left unchanged. Where exact terms might be of importance or interest, the words concerned have been given in the original, in brackets.

The synopses are based solely on the source material given, to which they serve as a guide.

The economic surveys are intended to provide the necessary background for the understanding of political developments.

The area covered extends from Turkey in the north and Cyprus and Libya in the west to Iran in the east and Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan in the south. It has not been possible to include special sections on Ethiopia, Iran, Libya and Somalia, which are treated only in connection with certain aspects of international relations. In the case of Turkey, international relations have been only partially covered, and internal affairs have not been dealt with in the section on Israel. It is hoped to correct this in future volumes. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are included in the survey of inter-Arab relations.

MER, though continuing a well-established tradition, is a new venture, and as such can no doubt be improved upon. Criticisms and suggestions will be most welcome. The lessons learned in editing this first volume will be applied in the next one, now in an advanced stage of preparation. In particular, the publication date will be progressively advanced.

A major test of a work of this kind is its objectivity. The editor hopes that MER reflects the efforts made in this respect.

Although MER is the work of many hands, the responsibility for its contents rests entirely with the editor.

PREFACE TO VOLUME TWO

While the scope of the present volume is the same as that of its predecessor, a number of innovations have been introduced.

A detailed subject index has been added for both the first and the present volume. In addition to the more obvious subjects, the index encompasses such themes agitating the Middle East as: Democracy, Social Equality, Welfare Society, Classes, Leadership, Ideology, National Unity, the Enemy, Peace and War, Subversion.

The economic surveys have been expanded to include more statistical information, in some cases covering demographic and social subjects. The voting record of ME countries at the United Nations General Assembly has been prefaced by a synopsis of voting behaviour and analytical tables. The chapter on the Arab-Israel conflict has been extended to include a section on the arms race.

Several changes have been made at the suggestion of readers: "Views and Policies," which appeared separately in MER 1960, have, in most chapters, been incorporated in the general record of events; they have, however, been given special attention in the synopses and may be located with the aid of the index. Relations between Middle East and Communist countries have been included under country headings.

Because US policy statements on the ME during the year related principally to the Arab-Israel conflict, they appear in this chapter instead of in the chapter on The Western Powers and the Middle East as in MER 1960.

Many additional sources have been utilized in this volume, in particular African and Asian newspapers. More extensive use has also been made of official documents.

It is regretted that because of various temporary difficulties the publication of MER 1961 has been considerably delayed. Every effort is being made to ensure the timely publication of future volumes.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Synopses, background notes and all items indicated by square brackets have been provided by the editor.

Where no year is specified, the date is always 1961.

In the indexes and cross-references, the letters a and b after the page-number indicate the left-hand and the right-hand column respectively.

In the synopses, references are generally given only to sections other than the one immediately following.

The spelling of place names is that of generally accepted English maps.

In quotations the spelling of Arabic, Hebrew and Turkish names has been changed, where necessary, to comply with the system adopted by MER. Likewise, in some cases terms have been abbreviated.

Because of the sometimes contradictory and fragmentary information available on trade and economic aid, complete accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

NOTES ON transliteration

Arabic: The transliteration is meant to aid the reader who has no knowledge of Arabic to arrive at comprehensible pronunciation. Currently used names have been rendered in the form generally accepted, e.g. Gamāl Abdel Nasser. For the pronunciation of other names some simple rules should be observed:

1. A vowel above which the sign $\cdot$ appears is pronounced long, e.g. Rafiq = Rafeeq.
2. In the case of a double consonant both consonants are pronounced, e.g. Muhammad = Muham-mad.
3. The sign $\cdot$ preceding a consonant and the sign $\cdot$

preceding a vowel are pronounced like a catch in the throat.

4. Pronounce *dh* as *th* in 'father'

gh as the French 'r'

kh as the Scottish 'ch' in 'loch'

(In indicating the sources the long vowel is not marked.)

Hebrew: There is no accepted transliteration; we have adopted the one used by *The Jerusalem Post* daily. Generally, the last syllable is stressed.

Turkish: The Turkish standard spelling has been adopted; it should be noted that *ç* is pronounced as *ch* in English, *c* as *j*, *ğ* as *ih*.

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- NOTES: (1) Radio broadcasts are quoted from the BBC and Itim-Mizrah (Israel) monitoring services. (See also Note (3) under Abbreviations of Sources.)
 (2) Occasional sources, including books and documents, are not included in this list.
 (3) Where there are several Arabic newspapers with the same name, the place of publication is not indicated when the paper is quoted in the section dealing with its country of origin; in other sections it is indicated only where doubt might arise.

Abidjan Matin	Daily	Abidjan	
Actualités Africaines	Weekly	Leopoldville	
Aden Chronicle	Weekly	Aden	Representing the "Aden for the Adenis" circles
Afrique Action		Tunis	
Agence De Presse Sénégalaise		Dakar	
Al-Ahli	Daily	Baghdad	Organ of National Democratic Party
Al-Abrâm	Daily	Cairo	Owned by National Union; editor Muhammad Haasanein Haykal
Al-Ahrâr	Daily	Beirut	Organ of National Liberal Party (pro-Western)
Al-Akhhâr	Daily	Baghdad	
Al-Akhhâr	Daily	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Al-Akhhâr	Weekly	Beirut	Organ of Communist Party
Akhhâr al-'Usbû'	Weekly	Amman	Independent—but subject to political censorship
Akhhâr al-Yawm	Weekly	Cairo	Owned by National Union; editors Mustafa and Ali Amin
Akhir Sâ'ah	Weekly	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Akşam	Evening	Istanbul	Independent
Al-Anal	Daily	Beirut	Organ of Les Phalanges Libanaises
Al-Anbâ'	Weekly	Beirut	Organ of Progressive Socialist Party (pro-UAR)
Al-Anwâr	Daily	Beirut	Pro-UAR, anti-Communist
Arab Observer	Weekly	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Army	Monthly	Washington	Published by the Association of the US Army
The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal	Quarterly	London	
Al-Ayyâm	Daily	Aden	Independent
Al-Ayyâm	Daily	Khartoum	Independent, leftist
Al-Ayyâm	Daily	Damascus	Rightist (after Sept 28)
Aziya i Afrika Segodnya (Asia and Africa Today)	Monthly	Moscow	
Al-Bayân	Daily	Baghdad	Organ of National Progressive Party (Hadid group)
Beirut al-Masâ'	Evening	Beirut	Pro-UAR
Al-Bilâd	Daily	Jedda	Supports King Saud
Al-Bilâd	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-government, leftist
Al-Bilâd	Weekly	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Independent, but subject to political censorship
Al-Binâ'	Daily	Beirut	National Social Party (NSP) Organ
Binâ' al-Watan	Monthly	Cairo	
Bureau Arabe de Presse et de Publications (BAPP)	Weekly	Paris	
Burma Weekly Bulletin	Weekly	Rangoon	Published by Department of Information
The Christian Science Monitor	Daily	Boston and London	

SOURCES

Le Commerce du Levant	Three times a week and monthly	Beirut	Pro-French
The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries		Belgrade	Proceedings and documents of the Belgrade Conference, Sept 1-6
Courrier Soudan		Bamako	
Le Courrier d'Afrique	Daily	Leopoldville	
Cumhuriyet	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
Daily Express	Daily	London	
Daily Graphic	Daily	Accra	
Daily Mail	Daily	Freetown	
Daily Star	Daily	Beirut	Published by Al-Hayât publishing house (see below)
Daily Telegraph	Daily	London	
Daily Telegraph	Daily	Lagos	
Dakar Matin	Daily	Dakar	
Davar	Daily	Tel-Aviv	Official organ of General Federation of Labour (Histadrut), Mapai influence
Department of State Bulletin	Weekly	Washington	
La Dépêche Tunisienne	Daily	Tunis	Liberal
Ad-Difâ'	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Independent—but subject to political censorship
Direction of International Trade	Monthly		Statistical papers of the United Nations
Divrei Hakhneset		Jerusalem (Israel)	Records of Knesset (Parliament) proceedings
Dünya	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
L'Economie et les Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes	Monthly	Damascus	Published by Centre d'Etudes et de Documentations Economiques, Financières et Sociales
L'Economie Libanaise et Arabe	Monthly	Beirut	Organ of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Beirut
Economic Bulletin	Quarterly	Cairo	Published by the National Bank of Egypt
Economic Review	Quarterly	London	Published by the Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.
The Economist	Weekly	London	
Egyptian Economic and Political Review	Monthly	Cairo	
The Egyptian Gazette	Daily	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Egyptian Mail	On Saturdays	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Eleftheria	Daily	Nicosia	Independent, National Liberal (Greek)
L'Esoor	Daily and Weekly	Bamako	Organ of Union Soudanaise Party
Ettela'at	Evening	Tehran	Pro-government
Export-Import Bank, Press Release		Washington	
Al-Fajr al-Jadid	Evening	Baghdad	Nationalist, anti-Communist, criticizes government but praises Qasim
Falastin	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Independent—but subject to political censorship
Fatât al-Jazirah	Daily	Aden	Representing the "Aden for the Adenis" circles
Le Figaro	Daily	Paris	
Fileleftheros	Daily	Nicosia	Right-wing pro-government (Greek)
The Financial Times	Daily	London	
Flight	Weekly	London	Official organ of the Royal Aero Club
The Gbanaian Times	Daily	Accra	
The Glasgow Herald	Daily	Glasgow	
The Guardian	Daily	Manchester and London	
The Guardian	Daily and Monthly	Rangoon	

SOURCES

Al-Gumhuriyah	Daily	Cairo	Semi-Official, owned by National Union
Ha'aretz	Daily	Tel-Aviv	Independent, Liberal
Haboker	Daily	Tel-Aviv	Organ of the Liberal Party
Al-Hamishmar	Daily	Tel-Aviv	Organ of the United Workers' Party (Mapam)
Haqā'iq	Weekly	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Haravghi	Daily	Nicosia	Left-wing (Greek)
Ratzofeh	Daily	Tel-Aviv	Organ of National Religious Party
Hatzofeh	Weekly	Beirut	Pro-UAR
Al-Hayāt	Daily	Beirut	Independent, Western leanings
Hedim U'teguvot	Sporadic	Tel-Aviv	Irim Mizrah News Agency, Summary of Trends and angles on the news in Arah broadcasts and press
Herut	Daily	Tel-Aviv	Organ of Herut Party
The Hindu	Daily and Weekly	Madras	Independent
Al-Hurriyah	Daily	Baghdad	Nationalist, anti-Communist, pro-Qasim
Hürriyet	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
Hür Vatan	Daily	Istanbul	Independent, editor Ahmet Emin Yalman
Indian Express	Daily	Bombay and New Delhi	
Intelligence Digest	Monthly	London	
International Affairs	Monthly	Moscow	Published by the Soviet Society for the Popularization of Political and Scientific Knowledge
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Annual Report		Washington	
ICFTU Press and Radio Service	Weekly	Brussels	
ICFTU, Free Labour World	Monthly	Brussels	
ICFTU, Information Bulletin	Bi-monthly	Brussels	
ICFTU, 7th World Congress Report (1962)			
International Development Association, Annual Report		Washington	
International Financial News Survey	Weekly	Washington	Published by International Monetary Fund
Israel's Foreign Trade	Annual	Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by the Central Bureau of Statistics
International Monetary Fund, press releases		Washington	
Iraq News Agency (INA) Bulletin	Daily	Baghdad	Semi-official
Iraq Times	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-government
The Israel Digest	Fortnightly	Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by Israel Digest—the Jewish Agency
Israel Government Year Book		Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by Government Printer for Central Office of Information, PM's Office
Al-Istiqlāl	Daily	Baghdad	
Ittihad ash-Sha'ah	Daily	Baghdad	
Izvestia	Evening	Moscow	Organ of Soviet Government
Al-Jaridah	Daily	Beirut	Independent, Western leanings
Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah		Amman	The Official Gazette
Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah		Cairo	The Official Gazette
Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah	Daily	Damascus	The Official Gazette
The Jerusalem Post		Jerusalem (Israel)	Independent, Mapai influence
The Jerusalem Times	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Same ownership as Al-Jihād (see below)
Jeune Afrique	Weekly	Tunis	

SOURCES

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review	Weekly	London	
Al-Jihād	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Considered as the Court organ
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution	Quarterly	London	
Kayhan	Daily	Tehran	Independent
Keessing's Contemporary Archives	Weekly	Bristol	
Al-Kifāb	Daily	Beirut	Pro-UAR
Kim	Weekly	Istanbul	Independent
Kitvei Amanah		Jerusalem (Israel)	Israel's International Agreements, Published by the Government Printer
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)	Daily	Moscow	Organ of Soviet Forces
Kul Shay'	Weekly	Beirut	Pro-UAR
Lamerhav	Daily	Tel-Aviv	Organ of Achdut Ha'avoda Party
The Liberian Age	Bi-weekly	Monrovia	
Ma'ariv	Evening	Tel-Aviv	Independent
Al-Mabdhā'	Daily	Baghdad	Organ of Iraqi Communist Party (led by Da'ūd al-Sā'igh)
Al-Manār	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Unofficial organ of Muslim Brethren
Al-Masā'	Evening	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Mid-East Commerce	Monthly	Beirut	Independent
Mideast Mirror	Weekly	Beirut	Review of ME news prepared by Arab News Agency (ANA); Western leanings
Middle Eastern Affairs		New York	
Middle East Economic Digest	Weekly	London	
The Middle East Economist	Monthly	Cairo	Owned by National Union
The Middle East Journal	Quarterly	Washington	
Military Review	Monthly	Kansas	Published by the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Milliyet	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
The Mizan Newsletter	Monthly	Oxford	A review of Soviet writing on the ME and Africa; Central Asian Research Centre and St. Anthony's College, Oxford
Le Monde	Daily	Paris	
Morning News	Daily	Khartoum	Same ownership as Al-Ayyām
Al-Musawwar	Weekly	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Nacak	Weekly	Nicosia	Organ of Rauf Denktaş (Turkish)
An-Nahār	Daily	Beirut	Western leanings
An-Nasr	Daily	Damascus	Moderately rightist (after Sept 28)
An-Nasr	Fortnightly	Ta'izz	Published by the Government
Nasser's Speeches		Cairo	President Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews 1961; Information Department, Cairo
Nation	Daily	Rangoon	
Near East Report	Fortnightly	Washington	Washington letter on American policy in the Near East
Neue Zürcher Zeitung	Daily	Zurich	
New Times	Weekly	Moscow	Published by Trud (see below)
New York Herald Tribune	Daily	New York	
The New York Times	Daily	Paris	
News Bulletin	Daily and Weekly	Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by the Israel Government Press Office
Nigerian Outlook	Daily	Enugu	Published by Eastern Nigeria Information Office

SOURCES

Nigerian Tribune	Daily	Ibadan	Published by Action Group of Nigeria
An-Nil	Daily	Khartoum	Organ of Ansār sect (Ummah Party)
An-Nida'	Daily	Beirut	Organ of Communist Party
Observer	Daily	London	
Öncü	Daily	Ankara	Unofficial Organ of New Turkey Party
Operations Report		Washington	Published by the Agency for International Development
L'Orient	Daily	Beirut	Published by Al-Jaridah publishing house (see above)
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)		London	
The Petroleum Times	Fortnightly	London	
Pravda	Daily	Moscow	Organ of Soviet Communist Party
Problemy Mira i Sotsializma	Monthly	Moscow	Same as World Marxist Review (see below), in Russian
Problemy Vostokovedeniya (Oriental Studies)	6 issues per year	Moscow	Published by Agency of Sciences
Publications of the Israel Foreign Ministry		Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by Foreign Ministry Information Division
Al-Qalam al-Adani	Weekly	Aden	Representing the pro-British "Aden for the Adenis" circles
Al-Quwwāt al-Mustallahah	Weekly	Cairo	Organ of Armed Forces
Ar-Ra'y al-Amm	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-Government, Leftist
Ar-Ra'y al-Amm	Daily	Khartoum	Independent
The Recorder	Weekly	Aden	Independent
Ar-Risālah	Monthly	Khartoum	Islamic paper
Rūz al-Yūsuf	Weekly	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Saba	Weekly	Ta'izz	Pro-government
As-Sahāfah	Weekly	Beirut	Organ of Ba'ath Party
Sawt al-Ahrār	Daily	Baghdad	Communist
As-Sayyid	Weekly	Beirut	Pro-UAR
The Scotsman	Daily	Edinburgh	
Ash-Sha'ab	Daily	Baghdad	
Ash-Sha'ab	Daily	Cairo	Owned by National Union
Ash-Sharq	Weekly	Baghdad	Nationalist
Shekpendeh	Daily	Freetown	
As-Siyāsah	Daily	Beirut	Pro-UAR, presents opinions of Sunni Muslims of Beirut
Soldier	Monthly	London	British Army Magazine
Son Havadis	Daily	Istanbul	Unofficial Organ of the Justice Party
Sovremenniy Vostok (Modern East)	Monthly	Moscow	Published by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences
The Spectator	Weekly	London	
Statesman	Daily	Calcutta	
The Statesman's Year Book		London	
Sudan (Bulletin)	Monthly	Khartoum	Governmental; published by Central Office of Information
The Sudan Daily	Daily	Khartoum	Government organ
As-Sudan al-Jadid	Daily	Khartoum	Formerly organ of National Unionist Party
Sudan News	Fortnightly	London	Published by Information and Press Section, Sudan Embassy, London
Sudan News Agency Bulletin	Daily	Khartoum	Published by Modern Press and Publicity House
The Sunday Times	Weekly	London	
Summary of Arab Broadcasts	Daily Review	Tel-Aviv	Published by Itim Mizrah News Agency, Independent
Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV: The Arab World and Israel, Non-Arab Africa, Greece, Turkey, Iran	Daily	London	Published by the Monitoring Service of the BBC. Political subjects

SOURCES

Weekly Supplement of above	Weekly	London	As above, economic, cultural and military subjects
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Far East broadcasts, supplements on ME	Sporadic	London	As above, political subjects
Syrian News Agency Bulletin	Daily	Damascus	
At-Taqaaddum	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-Communist
Ath-Thawrah	Daily	Baghdad	Nationalist, anti-Communist, pro-government
Ath-Thawrah	Daily	Khartoum	Organ of Military group; published by Ministry of Information
Time	Weekly	New York	
The Times	Daily	London	
Times of India	Daily	Bombay	
Trud	Daily	Moscow	Organ of Soviet Trade Unions
Ulus	Daily	Ankara	Organ of Republican People's Party
Umm al-Qura	Weekly	Mecca	Government Organ
United Nations, Records of Debates 15th and 16th sessions: General Assembly, First Committee, Special Political Committee; Security Council; UN Documents; UN Year Book		New York	
UN Special Fund Report	May 1962	New York	
US Information Service Publications		Tel-Aviv	Published by US Embassy
US Naval Institute Proceedings	Monthly	Annapolis (Maryland)	
Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations		Washington	US Senate, Committee on Appropriations
Vatan	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
La Vie Economique et Financière de la RAU [from Nov-RAS] et des Pays Arabes	Monthly	Damascus	Published by Bureau des Documentations Arabes
Al-Wahdah	Daily	Damascus	
Al-Waqā'i al-Falastiniyah		Gaza	Official Gazette for the Gaza Strip
Al-Waqā'i al-Iraqiyah		Baghdad	Official Gazette
Washington Post	Daily	Washington	
West African Pilot	Daily	Lagos	
World Marxist Review	Monthly	Toronto	The Canadian edition of the Prague publication, Problems of Peace and Socialism
World Today	Monthly	Canada	Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
Al-Yaqazah	Weekly	Oxford	Pro-British
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics		Aden	UN Publication
Yediot Aharonot	Evening	New York	
Yeni Gün	Tel-Aviv		Independent
Yeni Sabah	Daily	Ankara	Independent
Yen	Daily	Istanbul	Independent, Conservative
The Yorkshire Post	Weekly	Istanbul	Socialist
As-Zamān	Daily	Leeds	
	Daily	Baghdad	Independent, pro-Qasim

ABBREVIATIONS OF SOURCES

NOTES: (1) The definite article —"the", "le" and "al"—has been omitted in sources in brackets.		Eg. Gaz.	The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo)
(2) When no year is mentioned, dates refer to the year 1961.		Eg. Mail	Egyptian Mail (Cairo)
(3) Where no other source is indicated, broadcasts are quoted from BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV (The Near and Middle East). The figure in square brackets which appears after the date of the broadcast indicates the date—day only—of the Summary from which the broadcast has been quoted e.g.: (R. Cairo, Nov 3 [5]). The abbreviations EE, FE, SU stand for: Summary of World Broadcasts, supplements to (respectively) Eastern Europe, Far East and Soviet Union—broadcasts on the ME. W—stands for Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, Weekly Supplement. Thus, e.g. (R. Moscow, Jan 1 [SU 3]).		FE	See note (3) above
		Fat. Jaz.	Fatât al-Jazîrah (Aden)
		Hansard	UK Parliamentary Debates Record (C= House of Commons)
		HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London
		IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Annual Report (Washington)
		IDA	International Development Association, Annual Report
		IFNS	International Financial News Survey (Washington)
		IFT	Israel's Foreign Trade
		IGPO/DNB	Israel Government Press Office, Daily News Bulletin
A/GI/PV	United Nations General Assembly, First Committee proceedings, Provisional Edition	IGPO/WNB	Israel Government Press Office, Weekly News Bulletin
Aden Chr.	Aden Chronicle (Aden)	IGYB	Israel Government Year Book
ADN	Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtenagentur (East Berlin)	IMB	Itim Mizrah News Agency, Monitoring Service, Summary of Arab Broadcasts (Tel Aviv)
AFP	Agence France Presse	IMF	International Monetary Fund, Press Release (Washington)
ANA	Arab News Agency (Beirut)	IMH	Itim Mizrah News Agency, Hedim Uteguvot (Tel Aviv)
AP	Associated Press	INA	Iraq News Agency Bulletin
APS	Agence de Presse Sénégalaise	INASS	Iraq News Agency Bulletin, Special Supplement
A/PV	United Nations General Assembly, General Debates proceedings, Provisional Edition	IT	Iraq Times
A/SPC/SR	United Nations General Assembly, Special Political Committee proceedings, Summary Record	Jer. Post	Jerusalem Post (Israel)
Arab Obs.	Arab Observer (Cairo)	Jer. Times	Jerusalem Times (Jordan)
AWA	Arab World Affairs	Jew. Obs.	Jewish Observer and ME Review (London)
BAPP	Bureau Arabe de Presse et de Publications (Paris)	Journal of	Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (London)
BBCM	British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV (The Near and Middle East).	RUSI	
CDL	Le Commerce du Levant	LLT	L'Economie Libanaise et Arabe (Beirut)
CTK	Ceskoslovenska Tiskova Kancelar (Czechoslovak Press Bureau) (Prague)	MEA	Middle Eastern Affairs (New York)
		MEC	Mid-East Commerce (Beirut)
		MEE	The Middle East Economist (Cairo)
		MEED	Middle East Economic Digest (London)
Dép Tun	La Dépêche Tunisienne	The ME	The Middle East 1961 and 1962, Europa Publications Limited, London
Dept of State	Department of State Bulletin (USA)	Europa	
Bol		MEJ	The Middle East Journal (Washington)
DIT	Direction of International Trade (UN)	MENA	Middle East News Agency (Cairo)
Doc. Belg.	The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, 1961	MER	Middle East Record
		Mid. Mir.	Mideast Mirror (Beirut)
		MTI	Magyar Távírti Iroda (Hungarian News Agency)
Ec. Rev.	Economic Review (The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.)	Nasser's	President Gamâl Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, Jan-Dec 1961, Cairo
EE	See note (3) above	Speeches	
EFSPA	L'Economie et les Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes (Damascus)	NCNA	New China News Agency

ABBREVIATIONS

NE Report	Near East Report (Washington)	SU	See note (3) above
NYHT	New York Herald Tribune	UNSF	United Nations Special Fund Report
NYT	The New York Times	Report	
PAP	Polska Agencja Prasowa (Polish Press Agency)	USIS	United States Information Service publications (Tel Aviv editions)
R.	Radio Station	VEFRPA	La Vie Economique de la RAU (from Nov 1961—RAS) et des Pays Arabes (Damascus)
S	Security Council, documents, proceedings	W	See note (3) above
S/PV	Security Council, proceedings, Provisional Edition	W. Marx. Rev.	World Marxist Review (Toronto-Canada)
S. Daily	Sudan Daily	YITS	Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (UN)
S. News	Sudan News		
SNA	Sudan News Agency		
SNA	Syrian News Agency		

ABBREVIATIONS

NOTE: For special abbreviation and signs used in the Voting Record of ME and North African Countries at the UN General Assembly, see p 42.

AA	Aden Association	EC	Economic Council (Arab League)
AAPC	All African Peoples' Conference	ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UN)
AAPC	All African Peoples' Organization	ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
AAPSC	Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference	EDO	Economic Development Organization (UAR)
AATUF	All African Trade Union Federation	EEC	European Economic Community
ADC	Aide-de-Camp	EOKA	Ethniki Organozis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants)
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission (Israel)	EPB	Economic Planning Board (Iraq)
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labour—Congress of Industrial Organizations	Ex. Imp. Bank	Export-Import Bank of Washington
AID	Agency for International Development (USA; replaced ICA, Nov 4)	Exec. Com	Executive Committee (National Union, UAR)
AKEL	Anorthotou Komma Ergazomanou Laou (Reform Party of the Working People—Communist Party of Cyprus)	FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
APG	Algerian Provisional Government (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne)	FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria)
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company	FM	Foreign Minister, Field Marshal
ATUC	Aden Trade Union Congress	FY	Fiscal Year
BOC	Basra Oil Company	Gen.	General
CAR	Central African Republic	GA	General Assembly (UN)
CGS	Chief of the General Staff	GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
CIF	Cost, insurance and freight included	GDR	German Democratic Republic
C in C	Commander in Chief	Gen. Com	General Committee (National Union, UAR)
Col.	Colonel	GFLU	General Federation of Labour Unions (Iraq)
Congo (B)	Congo (Brazzaville)	GFPS	General Federation of Peasants Societies (Iraq)
Congo (L)	Congo (Leopoldville)	GFR	German Federal Republic
Cons	Conservative (UK)	GFS	General Federation of Students (Iraq)
CP	Communist Party	GFTU	General Federation of Trade Unions (Syria)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union	GMT	Greenwich Mean Time
D-Day	Day of beginning of military operation	GOC	General Officer Commanding
DBE	Development Bank of Ethiopia	HP	Homeland Party (Turkey)
DLF	Development Loan Fund	HQ	Headquarters
doc.	document	IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
DP	Democratic Party (Turkey)	IATA	International Air Transport Association
DPK	Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
DZ	Demilitarized Zone	ICA	International Cooperation Administration (USA; replaced by AID)
		ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization

ABBREVIATIONS

ICATU	International Confederation (or Federation) of Arab Trade Unions (also IFATU)	para	paragraph
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile	PCC	Palestine Conciliation Commission (UN)
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	PDP	People's Democratic Party (Sudan)
ICP	Iraqi Communist Party	PE	"Palestinian Entity"
ID	Iraqi Dinar	PL 480	Public Law 480 (USA)
IDA	International Development Association	PM	Prime Minister
IDF	Israel Defence Forces	FNU	Palestinian National Union (UAR)
IFATU	International Federation (or Confederation) of Arab Trade Unions (also ICATU)	pream	Preamble
ILO	International Labour Organization	Prep Com	Preparatory Committee (National Union, UAR)
IMCO	Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization	PSP	Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon)
IMF	International Monetary Fund	quot	quoting
IPC	Iraq Petroleum Company	quot in	quoted in
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile	RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
IRFED	Institut International de Recherche et de Formation en vue de Développement (France)	RP	Republican Party (Iraq)
IS	Ittihad ash-Sha'ab (Communist Party, Iraq)	RPNP	Republican Peasants' National Party (Turkey)
ITF	International Transport Workers' Federation	RPP	Republican People's Party (Turkey)
ITU	International Telecommunication Union	RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic
Iv. Coast	Ivory Coast	SAC	Strategic Air Command (USA)
JD	Jordanian Dinar	SAL	South Arabian League (Aden)
JNF	Jewish National Fund	SC	Security Council (UN)
JP	Justice Party (Turkey)	SCL	Somali Confederation of Labour
		SG	Secretary-General
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union	Southern R.	Southern Region of UAR (Egypt)
KANU	Kenya African National Union	SR	Saudi Arabian Riyal
Lab	Labour Party (UK)	STRAC	Strategic Army Corps (USA)
Legco	Legislative Council (Aden)	SWA	South West Africa
LG	Local Government (UAR)	SWTUF	Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation
LP	Liberation Party (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon)	TAC	Tactical Air Command (USA)
£E	Egyptian Pound	TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
£I	Israeli Pound	TD	Tripartite Declaration
£L	Lebanese Pound	TU	Trade Union
£S	Sudanese Pound	TUC	Trade Union Congress (Aden, see ATUC)
£S	Syrian Pound	UAM	Union Africaine et Malgache
£T	Turkish Pound	UEF	United Educational Front (Iraq)
MAC	Mixed Armistice Commission (Arab-Israeli borders)	UK	United Kingdom
Maj.-Gen.	Major-General	UNC	United Nations
Mapai	Mifletet Po'alei Eretz Yisrael (Israel Labour Party)	UNC	Uganda National Congress (Party)
Mapam	Mifletet Ha-po'olim Ha-me'uhedet (United Workers' Party, Israel)	UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
MATS	Military Air Transport Service (USA)	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ME	Middle East	Union of Saf	Union of South Africa
MK	Member of Knesset (Israel Parliament)	UNR	Union pour la Nouvelle République (France)
MNC	Movement National Congolais (Lumumbist)	UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
MP	Member of Parliament	UNSF	United Nations Special Fund
NA	National Assembly (UAR)	UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned officer	UPC	Union des Populations Camerounaises
Northern R.	Northern Region of UAR (Syria)	UPL	United Professional List (Iraq)
NPP	National Progressive Party (Iraq)	UPU	Universal Postal Union
NRP	National Religious Party (Israel)	US/USA	United States of America
NSP	Nationalist Social Party (Lebanon, Syria)	USAF	United States Air Force
NTP	New Turkey Party (Turkey)	USAFE	United States Air Force, Europe
NU	National Union (UAR)	USAM	United States Aid Mission
NUC	National Unity Committee (Turkey)	USOM	United States Operation Mission
NUP	National Unionist Party (Sudan)	WAP	Western Aden Protectorate
NYU	National Youth Union (UAR)	WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions (includes Communist TU)
OC	Officer Commanding	WHO	World Health Organization
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation	WZO	World Zionist Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries	ZNP	Zanzibar National Party
		ZOA	Zionist Organization of America

PART ONE
THE MIDDLE EAST
IN
WORLD AFFAIRS

VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

EXPLANATORY NOTES

(1) *General.* This section comprises:

(a) The detailed voting record of ME and North African countries at the second part of the 15th session and at the whole of the 16th session of the UN General Assembly. The votes recorded are all the roll calls at the plenary, the First Committee and the Special Political Committee. (For the voting record at the first part of the 15th session, see MER 1960, p 14 ff.);

(b) Tables of summary and comparison, accompanied by a synopsis.

(2) *Tables of Summary and Comparison.* The purpose of these tables is to provide a quantitative survey of the voting patterns of ME and North African countries during the two sessions (Sept 1960-June 1962).

The system employed is as follows. The subjects voted on have been categorized and the UN members classified into politically meaningful groups. The coincidence has then been established of each ME and North African country voting with the great powers and with the majority of countries in each group of countries, both in regard to the various subject categories and in regard to the general voting. (The keys to classification appear immediately below these notes.)

The general voting record covered in this survey totals 270 votes of which 220 have been categorized under these five headings: cold war issues, colonialism, the Congo question (15th session only), disarmament, and the Arab-Israel conflict. The remaining 50 votes dealt with a wide variety of issues which could not be meaningfully grouped under comprehensive subject headings.

The UN members have been classified as follows: the three Western powers; other NATO, pro-Western Commonwealth and European countries; Communist countries, Latin American countries; African and Asian countries excluding ME and North African countries; ME and North African countries in general; Arab countries; non-Arab ME countries.

The ME and North African states have been excluded from the Afro-Asian category so that their voting might be juxtaposed with that of the majority of other Afro-Asian states. The Afro-Asian majority appears in two additional columns—once with the USA and once with the Communist countries. This threefold classification is designed to gauge: (a) the impact of the great power orientation upon the voting coincidence between the Afro-Asian countries on the one hand and the ME and North African countries on the other; and (b) the impact of the Afro-Asian orientation upon the voting coincidence between the ME and North African countries as a group and each of the two great powers.

Both the subdivisions of the ME and North African countries (Arab and non-Arab states) add up to even numbers (12 and 6), and on altogether 14 occasions

the votes of either one of these subdivisions were equally divided. Since it was the object of the computation to correlate the voting behaviour of individual countries with that of a "majority" of other groups of countries, all these instances have been excluded from the two columns: Arab and non-Arab ME countries.

(3) This presentation of political facts can be no more than a rough quantitative guide to the political attitudes of the countries concerned towards the various questions which occupied the two UN sessions. It disregards qualitative differences among the votes, attaching equal weight to each vote, whether given in a Committee or in the Plenary, or whether dealing with a relatively inconsequential procedural point or with a major policy issue. Also, the need to condense the statistical information to manageable proportions has necessitated correlation with simple "majorities" only, without any indication of the size of the "majority" in question.

The synopsis below reviews the main characteristics of voting behaviour; the material presented in the various tables will enable the researcher to establish independently its intricacies.

KEY TO CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECTS VOTED ON

(The numbers given are the serial numbers referring to the subjects voted on as listed in the General Voting Record, below.)

Colonialism:

15th Session: 38 votes. MER 1960, p 16, all subjects: p 17, first-sixth subjects. This volume, subjects nos 1-4, 6, 8-12, 14-16, 18, 20-25, 31-32, 61-63.

16th Session: 38 votes. This volume, subjects nos 3, 4, 41-46, 48-59, 71-74, 102, 103, 105-107, 117, 121-126.

The Congo Problem:

15th Session: 28 votes. MER 1960, p 15, sixth-ninth subjects; p 19, third and fourth subjects; p 20, sixth subject. This volume, subjects nos 26-27, 29-32, 34, 36-42, 79.

Disarmament:

15th Session: 8 votes. MER 1960, p 14, seventh subject; p 15, first subject; p 19, fifth and sixth subjects; p 20, first-third subjects.

16th Session: 34 votes. This volume, subjects nos 5-8, 10-39.

Other Cold War Issues:

15th Session: 37 votes. MER 1960, p 14, first-sixth subjects; p 15, third-fifth subjects. This volume, subjects nos 66-78, 86-100.

16th Session: 22 votes. This volume, subjects nos 1, 2, 65-69, 78, 96-99, 101, 108-116.

The Arab-Israel Conflict:

15th Session: 8 votes. This volume, subjects nos 53-60.
16th Session: 9 votes. This volume, subjects nos 81-88, 127.

KEY TO CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES

Western Powers: USA, UK, France.

Other NATO, Pro-Western, Commonwealth and European Countries (18 countries):

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Union of South Africa.

Communist Countries (15th session: 10 countries; 16th session: 11 countries):

Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia (from Oct 27, 1961), Poland, Rumania, Ukraine SSR, USSR, Yugoslavia.

Latin American Countries (20 countries):

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El-Salvador, Gua-

temala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

African and Asian Countries, excluding ME and North African countries (15th session: 32 countries; 16th session: 34 countries):

Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Rep., Ceylon, Chad, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Malagasy Rep., Malaya, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone (from Sept 26, 1961), Tanganyika (from Dec 14, 1961), Thailand, Togo, Upper Volta.

Middle East and North African Countries (15th session: 16 countries; 16th session: 18 countries):

Arab Countries (15th session: 10 countries; 16th session: 12 countries):

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, (from Oct 27, 1961), Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria (from Oct 13, 1961), Tunisia, UAR, Yemen.

Non-Arab ME Countries (6 countries):

Cyprus, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Somalia, Turkey.

SYNOPSIS**VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

The ME and North African Countries in Relation to the World Powers. As is seen from Tables 1 and 2 below, the ME and North African countries as a group voted more often with the Communist countries than with the US at both UN sessions. At the 16th session, however, voting coincidence with each of the two world powers dropped in roughly equal measure. In the case of the US the decline was largely due to a fall of approximately 50% in the voting coincidence on colonialism. In addition, at the 15th session the Congo vote, on which the average voting coincidence between all ME and North African countries and the US was almost 7% higher than the average for all issues, served to raise total voting coincidence with the US to some extent; at the 16th session the Congo was no longer a major voting subject. On the other hand, at the 16th session, the average voting coincidence with the US on disarmament increased nearly twofold, and on cold war questions by one-third. Voting coincidence with the Communist countries decreased at an approximately equal rate on the three issues of colonialism, disarmament and the cold war. On cold war questions at the 16th session, the rate of voting coincidence with the Communist countries was below that with the US.

As to individual countries the vote of Turkey, Israel, Iran and Cyprus at the 15th session and of the first three only at the 16th session coincided more often with the US than with the Communist countries. The vote of all other countries, including all the Arab countries, coincided more often with the Communist vote. The highest coincidence with the latter was recorded by Morocco, Iraq, the UAR and Yemen at both sessions.

Turkey and Iran. The two CENTO states showed a considerable divergence in their voting records. Turkey of all ME countries maintained the highest voting coincidence with the US; Iran voted much more often with the Communist, Afro-Asian and Latin American coun-

tries. At the 15th session Turkey's voting coincidence with the US was (in round figure) 75% of the total votes cast as against 34% with the USSR, while for Iran the figures were 47% as against 42%. Also, on over half of the subjects on which Turkey voted with the USSR, the latter and the US voted identically. The divergence was even more considerable at the 16th session when the figures for Turkey were 81% as against 17.6%, and for Iran they were 52% as against 32%. The divergence was especially pronounced on the issue of colonialism, when Iran's vote coincided more often with that of the Communist countries than with that of the US. Iran's rate of voting coincidence with the Communist countries, however, was the same as her rate of coincidence with the vote of the Communist countries + the Afro-Asian majority; in other words, this was primarily an "Afro-Asian vote." On straightforward cold war issues and disarmament, Iran's pro-Western alignment reasserted itself and the divergence with Turkey almost disappeared.

At both sessions—though in a different order—Iran's highest voting coincidence was with the majority of ME, Latin American and Afro-Asian countries; Turkey's highest voting coincidence was with the US and the majority of NATO and pro-Western and Latin American countries.

Israel. Israel's highest voting coincidence at the 15th session was with the US (63.5%—second only to that of Turkey), closely followed by non-Arab ME, NATO and pro-Western, and Latin American countries. At the 16th session, Israel's highest voting coincidence was still with the same groups of countries, though in a different order: first place was taken by Latin America, followed by NATO and pro-Western countries, the UK, the US and the non-Arab ME countries.

At both sessions Israel's voting coincidence with the Afro-Asian majority fell just short of half the total

UN VOTING RECORD

votes—47.6% and 47.4% at the 15th and 16th sessions, respectively—and was in excess of her coincidence both with the Communist countries' vote (29% and 17.6%) and with France (40% and 44.8%). Generally, there was a considerably higher voting coincidence with the majority of Afro-Asian countries when they voted with the US than when they voted with the Communist countries. This tendency was especially pronounced on cold war and disarmament questions, and the Congo. But while Israel's voting coincidence with the US on cold war issues remained relatively stable—59.4% at the 15th session and 63.6% at the 16th—her coincidence with the Afro-Asian majority's vote rose from 40.5% at the 15th session to 59.1% at the 16th session, when it exceeded that with France, which was 54.5%. On colonialism, on the other hand, Israel voted considerably more often with the Afro-Asian majority as well as with the Arab states—and at the 15th session also with the Communist countries—than with any of the Western states.

The only issue on which Israel found herself largely isolated from the Afro-Asian majority at both sessions was the Arab-Israel conflict. Here too, however, Israel's vote with the Afro-Asian majority increased from one out of eight at the 15th session to two out of nine at the 16th, while the average vote of the Arab countries with the Afro-Asian majority fell from six out of eight to approximately five out of nine. At both sessions Israel's main support on this issue came from the Western states, whereas the Arab countries recorded their highest voting coincidence with the Communist countries.

Cyprus, Ethiopia and Somalia. The voting coincidence of Cyprus, Ethiopia and Somalia was predominantly with regional and wider Afro-Asian groupings; Ethiopia and Somalia, however, were aligned more often than Cyprus with the Eastern bloc.

Cyprus' highest voting coincidence at both sessions was with the non-Arab ME majority, followed by the Afro-Asian majority and the Latin American countries; the world powers came far behind.

Cyprus changed her voting from a slight alignment with the US at the 15th session to a similar one with the Communist countries at the 16th. The higher voting coincidence with the Communist countries was most pronounced where the Afro-Asian vote coincided with that of the Communist countries, notably in regard to colonialism. At the same time there was a considerable fall from the 15th to the 16th session in the coincidence of voting with both the US and the Communist bloc on this subject. On disarmament, too, Cyprus voted more often with the Communist countries than with the US, but there was a substantial increase in the pro-US coincidence at the 16th session. On cold war issues Cyprus voted more often with the West than with the Communist countries at both sessions, but the preponderance of the Western alignment was substantially reduced at the 16th as compared with the 15th session.

Ethiopia's highest voting coincidence at both sessions was with the ME majority, followed by the majorities of Arab, Afro-Asian and non-Arab ME countries. These groupings were followed after a considerable gap by the Communist countries while the Western and Latin American countries fell far behind. Voting coincidence with the Communist countries was relatively high on issues on which the two world powers were brought into direct confrontation. Thus, Ethiopia voted 17 times with the Communist countries on cold war questions at both sessions

as against three times with the US. On colonialism, coincidence with the US fell by more than half from the 15th to the 16th session.

Somalia's highest voting coincidence at both sessions was with the majorities of Afro-Asian and ME countries. Like Ethiopia, Somalia voted predominantly with Communist rather than with Western states. While voting coincidence with the US dropped from 31.7% at the 15th session to 20% at the 16th, voting coincidence with the Communist countries remained stable at 51.7% and 51.2%, respectively. Within the ME, Somalia voted more times with the Arab than with the non-Arab majority—on cold war issues more than twice as many times. The sole exception to this pattern was the Congo vote at the 15th session which constituted also the only issue on which Somalia voted more often with the US than with the Eastern bloc.

The Arab Countries. At both sessions all Arab countries recorded a higher voting coincidence with the Communist countries than with the West. Average voting coincidence of the Arab countries with the Communist countries was 63.6% at the 15th session, falling to 56.3% at the 16th session; with the US 24.3% at the 15th and 20% at the 16th session.

Three Arab groupings can be distinguished along the East-West continuum, with Morocco, Iraq, the UAR and Yemen showing the highest voting coincidence with the Communist countries, Tunisia, Jordan, Mauritania and Lebanon voting relatively often with the West, and Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria and Sudan placed approximately half way between the two extremes.

At the 15th session Morocco had the highest coincidence with the Communist countries (109) and the lowest coincidence with the US (28) of any Arab state. Yemen shared the lowest coincidence with the US (28) but voted ten times less often with the Communist countries than did Morocco. At the 16th session the picture changed somewhat. Yemen still showed the lowest voting coincidence with the US (17), but highest in the frequency of voting coincidence with the Communist countries was Iraq (88), with Morocco (80) dropping to third place behind the UAR (84).

At the 15th session Tunisia had the highest voting coincidence with the US (51) and the lowest with the Communist countries (76) of any Arab state. Mauritania had the highest alignment with the US at the 16th session.

At the 15th session all Arab countries voted more often with the US than with either the UK or France. At the 16th session, however, while the coincidence rate between Arab and French voting remained more or less unchanged, that between the Arab countries and the UK rose; in some cases it equalled the voting coincidence with the US and in others (Sudan, the UAR, Yemen) exceeded it. With the exception of Mauritania, however, the Arab states voted more often with the other NATO and pro-Western countries than with the US at both sessions.

The highest voting coincidence with the Afro-Asian countries at both sessions was that of Tunisia (108, 89), the lowest at the 15th session that of Jordan (86) and at the 16th of Mauritania (69). Generally, the Arab states showed a far higher voting coincidence with the Afro-Asian countries when the latter voted with the Communist countries than when they voted with the US. There were, however, some divergencies from this pattern on individual issues. Thus at the 15th session Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Lebanon and Jordan all voted on the Congo more often with the US+Afro-

Asian majority than with the Communist countries+Afro-Asian majority. On the other hand, as regards disarmament, at the 15th session no Arab state voted with the US+Afro-Asian majority save for a single vote by Sudan; at the 16th session all Arab states cast some votes in alignment with the US+Afro-Asian majority, but all retained a considerably higher voting coincidence with the Communist countries+Afro-Asian majority. Iraq and the UAR recorded a higher total coincidence of votes with the Communist countries than with the Afro-Asian majority at both sessions; Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen recorded such a coincidence pattern at the 15th session only.

The coincidence of the Arab vote with the Afro-Asian majority's vote—some 65% at both sessions—dropped substantially in respect of cold war questions to 44.1% at the 15th and 50.8% at the 16th session. At the 15th session Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the UAR and Yemen voted on cold war issues more often with the Communist countries than with the Afro-Asian majority; at the 16th session Iraq alone did so.

On the Arab-Israel conflict, too, the Arab vote coincided more often with that of the Eastern bloc than with that of the Afro-Asians, especially at the 16th session.

Inter-Arab conformity was high with exceptions. At the 15th session Saudi Arabia had the highest rate of conformity with the Arab majority, with 133 votes out of a total of 145; she was closely followed by the UAR, Yemen, Libya, Sudan and Iraq. Morocco and Lebanon followed farther behind while the lowest rates of conformity were recorded by Jordan (109 votes) and Tunisia (96). At the 16th session Yemen had the highest rate of conformity with 107 votes out of a total of 125; she was closely followed by the UAR, Sudan, Syria, Morocco and Libya; Iraq and Tunisia were not far

behind (97 votes each), while Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon—the last with 88 votes—closed the list. A certain correlation could be noted between voting coincidence with the Arab majority on the one hand and with Communist countries on the other. Thus Jordan and Lebanon had a relatively low coincidence rate with both the Arab majority and the Communist countries while that of the UAR, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Morocco was relatively high with both. Tunisia, which at the 15th session was last in voting coincidence both with the Communist and the Arab countries, preceded Jordan and Lebanon in both aspects at the 16th session.

On individual issues certain Arab countries recorded a higher voting coincidence with non-Arab states or groups of states than with the Arab majority. Thus, on the Congo issue at the 15th session Tunisia voted twice more with the Afro-Asian, and Morocco five times more often with the Communist countries than with the Arab majority. Tunisia also voted 21 times with the Afro-Asian majority as against 12 with the Arab majority on cold war questions. At both sessions the voting of the UAR, Morocco and Iraq coincided on colonialism one time more with that of the Communist countries than with that of the Arab majority. At the 16th session Tunisia and Mauritania voted more often with the Afro-Asian than with the Arab majority on disarmament; and on cold war questions Mauritania's voting coincidence with Western countries was four times higher than with the Arab majority. Jordan, too, voted on cold war issues more often with Western powers than with the Arab majority, while Lebanon voted more often with the Afro-Asians. The inter-Arab alignment was complete, or almost complete, only on the Arab-Israel conflict; only Jordan at the 15th and Iraq at the 16th session failed to cast their vote with the Arab majority on one occasion.

Table 1

**AVERAGE VOTING COINCIDENCE OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES
WITH THE US AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES**

Issues	VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH THE UNITED STATES			VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES		
	15th Session	16th Session	Increase/ Decrease 15th Session = 100	15th Session	16th Session	Increase/ Decrease 15th Session = 100
	%	%		%	%	
Colonialism	55.0	27.9	51	87.6	68.4	78
Disarmament	11.3	23.3	197	48.7	36.8	76
Cold War	24.1	32.3	134	34.3	26.4	77
All Subjects	33.6	28.4	84.5	56.8	45.5	80

Table 2

UN VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES
IN ORDER OF COINCIDENCE WITH THE US AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH THE UNITED STATES					VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES								
15th Session: 145 Votes					16th Session: 125 Votes								
Country	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Country	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Country	Number of Votes	% of Votes	% Relative Incr./ Decr.				
Turkey	109	75.1	Turkey	101	80.8	107	Morocco	109	75.1	88	70.4	95	
Israel	92	63.5	Israel	74	59.2	93	Iraq	107	73.7	UAR	84	67.2	94
Cyprus	72	49.6	Iran	65	52.0	111	UAR	103	71.0	Morocco	80	64.0	85
Iran	68	46.8	Cyprus	46	36.8	74	Yemen	99	68.2	Yemen	76	60.8	89
Tunisia	51	35.1	Mauritania	39	31.2	—	Saudi Arabia	97	66.8	Syria	75	60.0	—
Somalia	46	31.7	Tunisia	35	28.0	79	Libya	95	65.5	Saudi Arabia	71	56.8	85
Ethiopia	40	27.5	Jordan	35	28.0	101	Sudan	93	64.1	Sudan	71	56.8	88
Jordan	40	27.5	Libya	30	24.0	91	Ethiopia	85	58.6	Libya	70	56.0	85
Libya	38	26.2	Lebanon	29	23.2	93	Lebanon	85	58.6	Ethiopia	70	56.0	95
Lebanon	36	24.8	Ethiopia	28	22.4	81	Jordan	77	53.1	Tunisia	69	55.2	105
Sudan	36	24.8	Somalia	25	20.0	63	Tunisia	76	52.4	Somalia	64	51.2	99
Saudi Arabia	34	23.4	Sudan	23	18.4	74	Somalia	75	51.7	Jordan	63	50.4	94
Iraq	31	21.3	Syria	19	15.2	—	Cyprus	67	46.2	Lebanon	56	44.8	76
UAR	30	20.6	Saudi Arabia	19	15.2	64	Iran	61	42.0	Cyprus	51	40.8	88
Yemen	28	19.3	Iraq	18	14.4	67	Turkey	50	34.4	Mauritania	44	35.2	—
Morocco	28	19.3	UAR	18	14.4	69	Israel	42	28.9	Iran	40	32.0	76
			Morocco	18	14.4	74			Turkey	22	17.6	51	
			Yemen	17	13.6	70			Israel	22	17.6	60	
Average	48.7	33.6	Average	35.5	28.4	84.5	Average	82.5	56.8	Average	56.9	45.5	80

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Table 3
UN VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES
ALL SUBJECTS

ME and North African Countries	VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH COUNTRY OR MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES													
	16th Session: 125 Votes													
	USA	UK	France	Pro-Western Countries ¹	Communist Countries	African and Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	USA + Af-As Countries	USSR + Af-As Countries	Middle East Countries	Arab Countries	Non-Arab ME Countries	No Coincidence with maj.	
Cyprus	72	59	48	76	67	102	85	53	58	80	76	113	8	
Ethiopia	40	28	17	46	85	101	52	39	70	112	108	91	19	
Iran	68	57	39	76	61	92	81	49	55	77	72	111	11	
Iraq	31	16	20	36	107	92	45	29	76	121	127	73	1	
Israel	92	74	58	86	42	69	84	51	36	50	45	89	15	
Jordan	40	31	22	48	77	86	50	30	63	107	109	80	16	
Lebanon	36	24	17	41	85	91	48	34	67	117	114	85	17	
Libya	38	24	16	44	95	103	52	36	75	131	130	86	2	
Mauritania	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Morocco	28	14	16	34	109	88	44	27	75	115	118	73	6	
Saudi Arabia	34	21	20	39	97	95	48	32	72	125	133	78	4	
Somalia	46	30	22	47	75	106	57	43	67	101	98	93	19	
Sudan	36	23	24	42	93	101	50	34	73	124	129	83	3	
Syria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Tunisia	51	37	24	57	76	108	61	46	68	99	96	97	14	
Turkey	109	89	77	106	50	81	107	60	44	55	51	93	2	
UAR	30	16	23	36	103	95	46	29	76	124	131	75	—	
Yemen	28	16	24	35	99	93	46	27	73	123	130	75	3	

¹ Other NATO, Pro-Western Commonwealth and European countries.

Table 4

UN VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES COLD WAR ISSUES

		VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH COUNTRY OR MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES													16th Session: 22 Votes												
		15th Session: 37 Votes																									
ME and North African Countries		USA	UK	France	Pro-Western Countries ¹	Communist Countries	African and Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	USA + Af.-As Countries	USSR + Af.-As Countries	Middle East Countries	Arab Countries	Non-Arab ME Countries	No Coincidence with maj.	USA	UK	France	Pro-Western Countries ¹	Communist Countries	African and Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	USA + Af.-As Countries	USSR + Af.-As Countries	Middle East Countries	Arab Countries	Non-Arab ME Countries	No Coincidence with maj.
Cyprus		27	27	27	29	2	19	28	14	2	3	3	26	4	12	13	10	11	5	9	11	6	3	5	5	14	5
Ethiopia		1	1	3	1	9	12	1	1	5	17	17	4	18	2	4	4	1	8	11	1	1	4	17	18	7	3
Iran		23	24	24	27	3	15	25	11	1	2	2	23	5	20	17	18	21	2	9	21	8	1	1	1	10	—
Iraq		1	1	3	2	23	16	1	1	10	29	32	4	—	3	5	5	2	12	11	2	2	4	13	15	7	1
Israel		27	23	23	23	1	15	25	12	1	2	2	24	9	14	16	12	15	2	13	15	8	2	5	5	11	2
Jordan		7	8	6	10	9	10	7	—	5	17	17	5	8	12	9	12	11	4	13	11	7	2	10	10	7	2
Lebanon		2	2	4	2	16	12	2	1	8	23	24	3	10	6	7	8	7	3	13	7	5	2	9	9	6	5
Morocco		2	2	2	3	18	18	2	1	10	29	31	6	2	7	7	9	6	6	11	6	4	3	12	13	7	2
Saudi Arabia		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	9	11	13	—	12	13	8	—	3	3	6	4
Somalia		1	1	3	2	26	16	1	1	10	27	29	4	—	2	4	4	1	8	11	1	1	4	18	20	8	1
Sudan		1	1	3	2	19	17	1	1	9	29	33	5	1	3	4	5	2	8	10	2	2	5	15	15	8	4
Syria		6	6	6	4	8	19	4	5	6	16	18	8	10	2	5	4	1	8	12	1	1	5	18	19	8	2
Tunisia		3	3	5	4	18	19	3	3	9	28	31	6	2	2	4	4	1	8	11	1	1	4	18	19	8	2
Turkey		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	4	3	1	8	8	1	1	4	15	17	7	3
UAR		11	11	11	7	21	11	9	5	10	12	14	10	—	4	6	6	3	4	10	3	2	2	14	15	8	3
Yemen		33	34	34	34	2	14	37	13	1	1	1	24	—	20	17	18	21	2	11	21	9	2	2	11	—	—
		1	1	3	2	21	17	1	1	10	30	34	4	—	2	4	4	1	9	11	1	1	4	17	19	7	1
		1	1	3	2	21	17	1	1	10	30	33	4	1	3	5	5	2	8	12	2	2	4	17	19	9	1

¹ Other NATO, Pro-Western Commonwealth and European Countries.

TABLE 5
UN VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES
ISSUES OF DISARMAMENT

		VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH COUNTRY OR MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES														16th Session: 34 Votes													
		15th Session: 8 Votes																											
ME and North African Countries		USA	UK	France	Pro-Western Countries ¹	Communist Countries	African and Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	USA + A/-As Countries	USSR + A/-As Countries	Middle East Countries	Arab Countries	Non-Arab ME Countries	No Coincidence with maj.															
		USA	UK	France	Pro-Western Countries ¹	Communist Countries	African and Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	USA + A/-As Countries	USSR + A/-As Countries	Middle East Countries	Arab Countries	Non-Arab ME Countries	No Coincidence with maj.	USA	UK	France	Pro-Western Countries ¹	Communist Countries	African and Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	USA + A/-As Countries	USSR + A/-As Countries	Middle East Countries	Arab Countries	Non-Arab ME Countries	No Coincidence with maj.		
Cyprus	1	4	1	5	5	7	5	5	1	4	5	5	6	—	9	10	6	14	13	27	15	6	12	28	27	30	1		
Ethiopia	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	7	4	11	13	29	11	6	12	29	28	27	2		
Iran	2	5	2	6	4	6	6	1	4	6	6	8	—	—	16	17	11	21	9	22	25	10	8	17	16	24	—		
Iraq	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	5	6	19	21	7	1	11	23	23	19	1		
Israel	4	3	4	4	3	4	4	1	3	3	3	4	1	—	19	22	14	25	3	16	31	10	2	11	10	18	—		
Lebanon	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	8	3	12	12	23	14	4	11	25	24	25	4		
Jordan	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	9	4	13	12	23	15	5	10	27	26	25	2		
Libya	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	5	3	9	14	26	10	4	12	28	28	24	5		
Mauritania	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	12	7	15	8	19	16	6	8	15	14	16	—		
Saudi Arabia	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	4	6	18	21	7	2	12	25	25	21	3		
Morocco	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	5	3	9	16	25	9	4	12	26	26	23	1		
Somalia	—	2	—	2	3	3	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	5	1	8	13	23	9	5	11	26	25	23	5		
Sudan	1	4	1	5	5	6	5	1	4	7	7	7	—	—	5	6	3	10	14	28	11	5	12	30	29	26	2		
Syria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	4	7	14	21	9	2	11	27	27	21	3		
Tunisia	1	2	—	2	3	3	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	9	6	13	14	28	13	7	12	27	26	28	1		
Turkey	7	4	7	3	1	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	3	—	28	31	23	29	2	12	23	10	1	7	6	14	2		
UAR	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	4	5	8	17	24	9	3	12	28	28	23	—		
Yemen	—	3	—	4	5	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	4	7	15	24	8	2	12	28	28	23	1		

¹ Other NATO, Pro-Western Commonwealth and European Countries.

Table 6

UN VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES ISSUES OF COLONIALISM

		VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH COUNTRY OR MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES																								
		16th Session: 38 Votes																								
ME and North African Countries		15th Session: 38 Votes																								
		USA	UK	France	Pro-Western Countries ¹	Communist Countries	African and Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	USA + A/-As Countries	USSR + A/-As Countries	Middle East Countries	Arab Countries	Non-Arab ME Countries	No Coincidence with maj.												
Cyprus	21	5	6	18	30	33	29	21	30	30	30	35	—	9	7	5	11	19	24	15	8	19	23	23	28	3
Ethiopia	20	5	5	17	36	35	26	20	34	35	35	30	1	8	6	3	9	34	34	13	8	30	35	35	25	—
Iran	22	6	7	19	30	32	30	21	30	30	30	36	—	14	12	10	15	15	19	22	9	15	18	18	26	4
Iraq	21	5	6	18	37	36	27	21	35	36	36	31	—	8	6	3	9	35	33	13	8	30	34	34	24	—
Israel	23	8	9	20	27	28	29	20	27	27	27	32	1	16	13	14	17	14	20	23	10	14	18	18	25	2
Jordan	17	5	5	14	30	30	21	17	29	30	30	27	6	8	6	4	9	30	32	13	8	27	35	35	27	1
Lebanon	19	5	6	16	31	32	25	19	30	31	31	32	2	8	6	4	9	24	26	15	8	21	29	29	24	4
Libya	21	5	6	18	36	37	27	21	35	36	36	31	—	9	7	4	10	32	34	14	8	29	36	36	27	—
Mauritania	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	10	6	13	22	26	15	9	20	28	27	22	5
Morocco	21	5	6	18	37	36	27	21	35	36	36	31	—	8	6	3	9	35	33	13	8	30	34	34	24	—
Saudi Arabia	20	5	5	16	35	33	24	20	33	34	34	29	3	8	6	5	9	25	28	13	8	23	30	30	24	5
Somalia	21	5	6	18	35	38	28	21	35	35	35	32	—	11	9	5	12	30	32	17	9	27	32	32	26	—
Sudan	20	5	6	17	35	36	26	20	34	35	35	30	1	11	9	6	12	30	32	16	9	27	33	33	26	—
Syria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	6	3	9	31	33	12	8	28	36	35	24	—
Tunisia	20	5	6	17	34	37	27	20	34	34	34	31	1	11	9	8	12	29	30	16	8	27	32	32	24	1
Turkey	28	12	13	26	25	26	29	21	25	25	25	30	—	31	26	23	32	7	13	23	10	7	11	11	16	1
UAR	21	5	6	18	37	36	27	21	35	36	36	31	—	8	6	3	9	34	33	13	8	30	33	33	24	1
Yemen	19	5	6	17	35	34	25	19	33	34	34	29	2	7	5	4	8	31	35	12	7	29	34	34	25	2

¹ Other NATO, Pro-Western Commonwealth and European Countries.

Table 7

**UN VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES
THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT**

		VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH COUNTRY OR MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES														16th Session: 9 Votes																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
		15th Session: 8 Votes														16th Session: 9 Votes																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
ME and North African Countries		USA	UK	France	Pro-Western Countries ¹	Communist Countries	African and Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	USA + A/-As Countries	USSR + A/-As Countries	Middle East Countries	Arab Countries	Non-Arab ME Countries	No Coincidence with maj.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																												

¹ Other NATO, Pro-Western Commonwealth and European Countries.

UN VOTING RECORD

Table 8

UN VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES
THE CONGO ISSUE

VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH COUNTRY OR MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES

15th Session: 28 Votes

<i>ME and North African Countries</i>	<i>USA</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Pro-Western Countries¹</i>	<i>Communist Countries</i>	<i>African and Asian Countries</i>	<i>Latin American Countries</i>	<i>USA + Af-As Countries</i>	<i>USSR + Af-As Countries</i>	<i>Middle East Countries</i>	<i>Arab Countries</i>	<i>Non-Arab ME Countries</i>	<i>No Coincidence with maj.</i>
Cyprus	17	16	9	16	16	22	13	14	5	19	15	24	1
Ethiopia	12	11	3	13	13	20	9	12	7	26	22	20	—
Iran	14	13	2	15	4	17	8	12	4	18	13	20	4
Iraq	5	4	8	6	16	13	5	5	7	18	21	11	—
Israel	20	19	6	19	6	13	15	12	3	14	9	19	1
Jordan	11	10	7	12	9	18	9	10	6	20	22	18	1
Lebanon	11	10	3	12	9	19	8	11	5	23	19	21	3
Libya	11	10	4	12	12	19	10	11	7	25	22	18	—
Mauritania	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Morocco	2	1	3	3	18	7	2	2	7	12	13	6	6
Saudi Arabia	8	7	7	9	14	16	9	8	7	21	25	14	—
Somalia	14	13	3	13	10	19	10	12	6	20	15	25	2
Sudan	8	7	8	9	11	16	7	7	7	21	23	15	—
Syria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tunisia	15	14	1	16	9	19	7	12	7	21	16	21	1
Turkey	26	25	12	25	4	18	18	16	—	14	10	17	—
UAR	4	3	10	5	15	12	5	4	7	17	20	10	—
Yemen	4	3	11	5	14	13	7	4	7	18	22	11	—

¹ Other NATO, Pro-Western Commonwealth and European Countries.

UN VOTING RECORD OF ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

15th SESSION (1961)

Forum, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers		Other NATO, Euro-Western Commonwealth and African Countries	Korean Bloc @ Yug	Afro-Asian Countries	Latin-American Countries	ME and North African Countries														Result				
		US	France					Cyprus	Ethiopia	Iran	Tunisia	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Algeria	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia		Turkey	UAR	Yemen	
1. Plenary March 16 1961 A/PV 583	South-West Africa. Draft res. from 4th Com. spec. Mexico and Venezuela: SA's attempts to assimilate SWA challenge to UN; contrary to Mandate; members asked to influence SA.	+	0																							Adopted (74, 0, 9)
2. Plenary March 23 1961 A/PV 586	Angola. Facilitation in Agenda	+	0																							Adopted (79, 2, 8)
3. Plenary April 7 1961 A/PV 579	South-West Africa. Draft res. from 4th Com. 20 A/Cs. spec. (incl. Iraq, Libya, India, Iran, Iraq, UAR), rejecting positions of SA Gov. exploring its attempts to assimilate SWA; requesting Commission on SWA to assist with or without SA cooperation.	+	0																							Adopted (85, 0, 9)
4. 3 P. Com. March 24 A/SPC/SR 231	Treatment of Indians and Pakistanis in SA. Draft res. 12 A/Cs. spec. (incl. Egi, Iran, Iraq, Saud, Tun, UAR) and Venezuela and Yugoslavia: regretting SA's unwillingness to arrive at a settlement; requesting UAR and Pak to negotiate; urging SA to negotiate.	+	0																							Adopted (71, 0, 6)
5. 3 P. Com. April 10 A/SPC/SR 245	Racial Conflicts in SA. Draft res. 1. African States (incl. Egi, Egi, Libya, Mor, Sen, Sud, Tun, UAR) and Cuba; France declaring SA's discriminatory racial policies inconsistent with UN Charter; requesting UAR and Pak to negotiate; urging SA to negotiate.	+	0																							Adopted (80, 0, 12)
6.	Op. para. 1: denouncing SA's disregard of GA and discriminatory measures leading to bloodshed.	+	0																							Adopted (72, 7, 10)
7.	Op. para. 2: denouncing above policies as reprehensible and favouring separate and collective action by members.																									
8.	Op. para. 3: declaring above policies inconsistent with Charter and Declaration of Human Rights, and incompatible with UN membership.																									

9.	Op. para. 4: noting that above policies are dangerous to international peace.	-	0	0	Maj 0; Austl, Bel, Port, SP; Ire, Neth, NZ +;	Maj +; China, Jap 0	Maj 0; Braz, Ec, Gm, Ind, Uru +; Peru —	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (62, 7, 23)
10.	Op. para. 5: recommending cessation of diplomatic relations with SAI, economic sanctions and refusal of facilities to SAI ships and planes.	-	-	-	All —	Maj +; Bar, Camb, Cey, China, F. Mol, India, Laos, Pak, Phil, Thai, Togo —	Maj +; Bar, Camb, Cey, China, F. Mol, India, Laos, Pak, Phil, Thai, Togo —	0	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (41, 32, 21)
11.	Op. para. 6: drawing attention of SC to above recommendations	-	-	-	All —	As above, except Jap	As above	0	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (45, 31, 19)
12.	Draft res. I as a whole	-	-	-	All —	As above, except F. Mol +	As above, except Chile 0	0	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (47, 29, 18)
13.	Draft res. II: Afghanistan, Ceylon, Malaysia, India and Indonesia spons. Presm.: essentially the same as in draft res. I, omitting mention of measures	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14.	Op. para. 1: identical with op. para 1 of draft res. I	+	+	+	Maj +; Bel, Port —	All +	All +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (52, 1, 1)
15.	Op. para. 2: deprecating SAI's racial policies as reprehensible	+	+	+	All +	All +	All +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (56, 0, 0)
16.	Op. para. 3: requesting members to consider separate or collective action in conformity with UN Charter	+	0	0	Maj 0; Aus, Can, Ire, NZ +; Bel, Port —	Maj +; Togo 0	Maj +; Dom —	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (80, 3, 11)
17.	Op. para. 4: affirming above policies violation of UN Charter and of Decl. of Human Rights, and inconsistent with UN member's obligations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18.	Op. para. 5: noting danger to international peace and security	-	-	-	7 nations +; Aus, Can, Ire, NZ, Neth; 7 nations 0; Port —	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19.	Op. para. 6: reminding SAI of Charter provisions; Op. para. 7: calling for SAI to continue with its Charter obligations	+	0	0	+	All +	Maj +; Dom 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (85, 1, 10)
20.	Draft res. II as a whole	+	+	+	Maj +; Port —	All +	All +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (85, 1, 0)
21. <i>Plenary</i> <i>Adopted 13</i> <i>AT/PV 381</i>	Draft res. I as above Op. para. 5 (see No 9)	0	0	0	Maj 0; Austl, Bel, Port —; NZ +	Maj +; China, Jap 0	Maj 0; Braz, Ec, Gm, Ind, Uru +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (64, 3, 29)
22.	Op. para. 5 (see No 10): (When not adopted, spons. withdrew entire draft res. 1)	-	-	-	All —	Maj +; Jap —; Aus, Can, F. Mol, Ind, Laos, Pak, Phil, Thai, Togo 0	Maj +; Cuba, Ec, Gm, Ind, Uru 0	0	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	Not adopted (42, 36, 21)
23.	Draft res. II as above Op. para. 3 (see No 16)	-	-	-	8 nations +; Aus, Can, Ec, Gm, Ind, NZ, Neth; 8 nations 0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24.	Op. para. 3 (see No 18)	+	0	0	Maj +; Port —; Austl, Bel, Fin, Ire, Swe 0	All +	Maj +; Dom —	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (85, 1, 10)
		+	0	0	-	All +	Maj +; Dom 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (86, 1, 8)

For key to abbreviations and signs, see p. 42.

Forum, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers		Other NATO, Pro-Western Commonwealth and European Countries	Eastern Bloc & Yugoslavia	African Countries	Latin American Countries	AME and North African Countries													Result																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																											
		U.S.	France					Cyprus	Ethiopia	Iran	Iraq	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Mauritania	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Sudan		Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	U.A.R.	Yemen																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																						
25.	Draft res. II as a whole	+	+	Maj +; Port -	+	All +	All +																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																									

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For key to abbreviations and signs, see p. 42.

Forum, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers		Other NATO, Pan-Western Commonwealth and African Countries	Eastern Bloc & Yugoslavia	Afro-Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	ME and North African Countries														Result			
		US	France					Cyprus	Kabappia	Iran	Iraq	Jordan	Libanoun	Libya	Mauritania	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia		Turkey	U.A.R.	Yemen
63.	Presum. requesting failure of authorities to cooperate with UN Commission for R-U; Presum. requesting UN to demand that GA and OAS support territory for administration; urging constitutions of caretaker gov. pending elections; referendum on question of R-U; King 1963; UN Commission to return to R-U and authorized to request recovering GA resolution of independence or lack of co-operation; requesting that host future for R-U lay in independence as a single state	+	0	Maj +; Bel - Port, Sp, SAU 0		All +	All +		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (86, 1, 4)
64. Plenary, April 21, A/PV 994	Dissemination of Information on UN and International Trusteeship System; Draft res. from 4th Com. reiterating importance of peoples of Trust Territories receiving information on UN and ITS; requesting the SG to take appropriate action in Tanganyika, R and U, New Guinea, PNG, and PNG; UNCTAD; information on UN and ITS, requesting the SG to take appropriate action for Colonies and Peoples	+	0	Maj +; Austl Can, Neth, NZ, Sp, Port, SAU 0		All +	All +		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (78, 0, 9)
65. Plenary, April 21, A/PV 994	Failure of Cameroon (UK). Draft res. from 4th Com., 10 African (former French) states, Sep. vote on motion in Draft res. of agreed policies for a union of South Cameroons with the Republic of Cameroon into a Federal United Cameroon Republic	-	-	Maj 0; Bel, Can, Gre, It, Lux, Port					+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Rejected (0, 52, 43)
66.	Draft res. as amended by GA endorsing results of separate plebiscites: (a) North Cameroons to join Nigeria; (b) South Cameroons to join Cameroon	+	-	Maj +; Bel, Gre, Lux, Port, Sp 0					+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (85, 23, 11)
67. 1st Com., April 21, ACPV 1101	Cuba's Complaint of US Aggression. Draft res. 1, 7 Latin American spokes. Am's deleting references to OAS in original drafts (see Nov 64-66)	-	-	Maj -; Aus, Fin, Swe 0					+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (83, 23, 11)
68.	Presum.: expressing concern over situation, recalling SG res. and peaceful settlement established at 7th Meeting of American F.M. Sep. vote on: "receding..."	+	+	Maj +; Aus, Fin, Swe 0					+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (55, 44, 23)

Form, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers		Other NATO, Commonwealth and African Countries	Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	MF and North African Countries														Result
		US	France																		
79.	Draft res. II as above (see Nos 71-74)	-	-	Maj 0; Aus, Dec, Fin, Ind, Nor, SAI; Aust, Belgium, Can, Ger, It, NZ —	+	Maj +; Chad, Ivory C, Jap, Mad, Niger, Pak, Phil, Sen 0; S. Africa, Congo (L), Dah, F, Mal, Laos, Liber, Sen 0	Maj —; Dom 0; Bol, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecu, Mex +														Not adopted (41, 23, 20)
80. Finney A/IV 21	UN Operations in Congo 1961. Efforts to bring about a settlement in the 5th Com, Ghana, Liberia, Pakistan and Togo; opening of her account of \$100m for UN expenses in the Congo; request for UN to assist Members in accordance with scale for regular budget, with reductions for certain Members	+	0	Maj +; SAI 0; Bel, Port, Sp —	+	Maj +; Gai, Mali —; Afr, Camb, Indon, Ivory C, Mad, Togo, Up, Volta 0	Maj +; Hsi, Indon, Jap, Laos, Mal, Mex, Nic, Pan, Pers, Sal 0														Not adopted (45, 25, 27)
81.	Pakistan proposal to reconsider above decision, esp. with regard to reductions in assessment	+	0	Maj +; Bel Sp, SAI 0	All +; Y 0	Maj +; Gai, Mali —; Afr, Camb, Gab, Up, Volta 0	Maj +; Cuba —; Afr, Dom, Mex 0														Adopted (67, 12, 14)
82.	Am' by Argentina: 50% reduction in assessment for "developing states" instead of 75%	-	-	Maj —; Gre, It, SAI 0	All +; Y 0	Maj 0; CAR, Dah, Ivory C +; Chad, Congo (L), F, Mal, Mali, Niger, Sen, Togo, Up, Volta 0	Maj +; Cuba —; Dom, Pan 0														Rejected (21, 39, 33)
83.	Am' by Pakistan: as above, but 80% instead of 75%	+	0	Maj +; Bel —; SAI 0	All +; Y 0	Maj +; Afr, Camb, Chad, Indon, Mali, Niger, Sen, Up, Volta 0; Chad —	Maj +; Afr, Bol, Braz, Cuba, Chile, Con, —; Dom, Ecu, Haiti, Ven 0														Adopted (51, 17, 24)
84.	Draft res. I as amended	+	0	Maj +; Bel —; SAI 0	All +; Y 0	Maj +; Afr, Camb, Chad, Indon, Up, Volta 0; Gai, Mali —	Maj 0; Braz, Cuba, Mex —; Col, Nic, Pan, Pers, Sen, Uru +														Adopted (54, 15, 23)
85.	Proposed para. in Draft res. II (below No 84), emphasizing difference in nature of expenses for emergency operations compared with regular budget and different procedures	-	0	Maj —; SAI +	All +; Y 0	Maj 0; Gai, Jap, Liber, Niger, Sen, Togo, Up, Volta 0	Maj +; Afr, Bol, Braz, Cuba, Chile, Con, —; Dom, Ecu, Haiti, Ven 0														Not adopted (35, 27, 26)
86.	Draft res. II, from 5th Com., Canada speaks, requesting President of GA to appoint 15-member working group to consider administrative and budgetary matters relating to expenditures of UN	+	0	Maj +; Gre 0	All +; Y 0	Maj +; Afr, Camb, Chad, Congo (L), Gai, Indon, Jap, Niger, Sen, Togo, Up, Volta 0	Maj 0; Braz, Dom +; Uru, Ven —														Adopted (44, 13, 32)

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For key to abbreviations and signs, see p. 42.

Form, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers			Other NATO, Pro-Western Arab and European Countries	Eastern Bloc & Yag	Afro-Asian Communist	Latin-American Countries	ME and North African Countries														Result																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
		U/S	E/C	France					Cyprus	Tunisia	Syria	Sudan	Gambia	Nigeria	Sierra Leone	Yemen	Libya	Algeria	Morocco	Mali	Senegal	Guinea		Chad	Cameroon	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Benin	Togo	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Ivory 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3rd SPECIAL SESSION (AUGUST 1961)

Plenary	Situation in Tunisia										Situation in Cuba										Situation in Mexico										Situation in China										Situation in Japan										Situation in Korea										Situation in India										Situation in Pakistan										Situation in Bangladesh										Situation in Sri Lanka										Situation in Nepal										Situation in Bhutan										Situation in Tibet										Situation in Mongolia										Situation in North Vietnam										Situation in South Vietnam										Situation in Laos										Situation in Cambodia										Situation in Thailand										Situation in Burma										Situation in Indonesia										Situation in Malaysia										Situation in Singapore										Situation in Brunei										Situation in Philippines										Situation in Vietnam										Situation in Laos										Situation in Cambodia										Situation in Thailand										Situation in Burma										Situation in Indonesia										Situation in Malaysia										Situation in 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16th SESSION (1961-1962)

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For key to abbreviations and signs, see p. 42.

Forum, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers		Other NATO, Pro-Western, Commonwealth and European Countries	Eastern Bloc of Pact	Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	ME and North African Countries														Result		
		U.S.	France					Cyprus	Iran	Iraq	Jordan	Libanon	Libya	Mauritania	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Syria	Tadris	Turkey	U.A.R.		Yemen	
27.	(c) to respect Africa as a declassified zone;	0	0	As above	+	As above, except Haiti +	As above, except Haiti +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	Adopted (58, 0, 41)
28.	Above draft res. as a whole	0	0	As above	+	As above	As above	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	Adopted (57, 0, 42)
29 1st Committee Nov 14 A/C. I/PV 1199	Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons. Italian an't to the 12-power draft res. [No. 31]; In op. para. 2, purpose of proposed conference to be to consider means of prohibiting signing a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, instead of "for signing a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons."	+	+	As above, except Iran, Port, Swe 0	+	Maj +; China, F, Ind, Jap +; Pak, Phil, Thai 0	Maj 0; Arg, Bol, Chil, China, Cuba, Ec, Guat, Haiti, Ind, Nic, Pan, Par +; Cuba —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Rejected (25, 50, 25)
30.	Italian an't to 12-power draft res. substituting throughout for the phrase "the use of nuclear... weapons," the phrase "the use of nuclear weapons, including nuclear weapons," contrary to the Charter of the U.N.	+	+	As above	—	Maj —; China +; F, Maj, Jap, Pak, Phil, Thai 0	Maj +; Bol, Chil, China, Cuba, Ec, Guat, Haiti, Ind, Nic, Pan, Par +; Cuba —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Rejected (28, 50, 22)
31.	Draft res. upon, by 12 Af-As states (ME group: Eth, Libya, Sen, Sud, Tun). Declaration on prohibition of use of Nuclear Weapons... Weapons... dangerous stage of arms race, esp. with regard to nuclear weapons; Op. para 1: declaring any state using nuclear weapons, as defined and violating the Charter and committing a crime against mankind; Op. para 2: requesting SG to convene a conference for signing convention on prohibition of use of such weapons	—	—	9 nations —: Benin, Bot, Cam, Ind, Iran, NZ, Sen, Swe, Thai, U.S. 0	+	Maj +; China —	Maj 0; Guat, Nic —; Cuba +	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	Adopted (60, 16, 23)
32. Plenary Oct 27 A/PV 1043	Nuclear Tests Banter draft res. (from 1st Com.) on Soviet 50-meg. bomb (see No 14)	—	—	All +	+	Maj +; Mali 0	Maj +; Cuba —	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (67, 11, 1)
33. Nov 6 A/PV 1047	6-power draft res. (from 1st Com.) on suspension of tests (see No 19)	—	—	Maj +; Bol, North, NZ, Sp, U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S. 0	+	Maj +; China —; Arg 0	Maj +; Cuba, Haiti 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (71, 20, 8)
34. Nov 8 A/PV 1049	Draft res. as a whole, as amended	+	+	Maj +; Fin 0	+	Maj +; Afg, Ghana, Guat, Indon, Mali, Nepal 0	Maj +; Cuba —	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	Adopted (71, 31, 15)

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Forum, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers	Other NATO, Commonwealth and European Countries	Eastern Bloc & Yugoslavia	Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	Africa and North African Countries													Result
		U.S.	France	U.K.	France	U.S.	France	U.K.	France	U.S.	France	U.K.	France	U.S.	France	U.K.	France	U.S.	France	
76. Plenary Dec 19 A/PV 1084	Technical Assistance to Developing Countries. Draft res. from 2nd Com. on Technical Assistance to Developing Countries, adopted by 2nd Com. on 10 Dec. Op. para. 1-3, hoping that annual flows of international assistance and capital will be increased, 15% of committed national income of economically advanced countries	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (72, 0, 18)
77. Plenary Dec 19 A/PV 1084	Population Growth and Economic Development. Draft res. from 2nd Com. on Population Growth and Economic Development, recalling previous res. of GA and ECOSOC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Adopted (41, 13, 29)
	Op. part: recommending this item be put on the agenda of the 1965 session of the 2nd Com. Separate vote on the words "of 2nd Com."	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Not adopted (47, 25, 24)
	Draft res. as amended (i.e., without the words "of 2nd Com.")	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (31, 11, 29)
78. Plenary Dec 20 A/PV 1085	Question of Tibet. Draft res. Sal. P. Mal, Ire and Thai spons.; considering continued events in Tibet, involving violation of people's fundamental rights, including China's unilateral abrogation of Human Rights, incl. principle of self-determination; calling for cessation of events in Tibet	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (36, 11, 29)
79. 1st Com. Dec 19 A/C.1/ PV 1227	Question of Algeria. Draft res. 34 A-A spons. (incl. all ME states except Iran, Ir, Tur); recalling resolutions on ending colonialism and on the right of peoples to self-determination, noting the willingness of both parties to seek negotiated solution and calling upon them to resume negotiations to implement rights of Algerian people	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Adopted (61, 0, 34)
80. Plenary Dec 20 A/PV 1085	Above draft res.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Adopted (62, 0, 38)
81. 5P Com. Dec 19 A/SPC/SR 328	Report of Director of UNRW & Arab Relief and Appeal for Direct Arab Spont. (see No 83); Am't proposed for 1965, including Pak; (1) adding op. para. 5 below	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Adopted (47, 27, 24)

(2) adding no. para 4 below

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Form, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers		Other NATO, Pro-Western Countries and European Countries	Eastern Bloc of Yugoslavia	Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	ME and North African Countries												Result
		U/S	France																	
90. <i>Plenary</i> Dec 20 A/PV 1086	<i>UN Operations in Congo: Cost Estimates and Financing.</i> Draft res. from Dec 13, 1962, approved by the Security Council, 12-10-62. The extraordinary nature of expenses for UN operations in Congo and the consequent need for special procedures; request for the Secretary-General to report on the cost of UN operations in Congo for those expenses, authorizing the SG to expend during 1962 up to \$10m. and 1963 up to \$10m. for personnel and 1964 up to \$10m. for other expenses in accordance with scale of assessment for regular budget, with certain exceptions; appealing for voluntary contributions; requesting Belgium for substantial contribution to offset deficit resulting from above exceptions	+	-	Maj +; Bel - S.A. 0	All -; Yug +	Maj +; Mod -; Alg., Camb., CAR, Cam, China, Phil 0	Maj +; Cuba, Dom 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (67, 15, 15)
91.	Proposal for separate vote on 'op. of the Security Council' (voluntary contribution) of above draft res.	-	+	Maj 0; Bel + Gre, NZ - SAU 0	All 0; Yug -	Maj -; Cam +; CAR, Camb., India, Mad., Pak., Phil, Sierra L. 0	Maj -; Cuba, Dom 0	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	Rejected (5, 50, 40)
92. <i>Plenary</i> Dec 20 A/PV 1086	<i>Estimates for Maintenance of UNEF.</i> Draft res. from 14th Com. 6 (mostly participants in UNEF); authorizing SG to expend during 1962 up to \$100,000 per month, appropriate to 1962, and \$100,000 per month up to June 30, 1962, to be apportioned as in previous res. (Congo expenses), appealing for voluntary contributions, etc.	+	+	Maj 0 +; Bel, SAU 0	All -; Yug +	Maj +; Afg, Cam, CAR, Chad, China, Niger, S. Afr., Phil 0	Maj +; Cuba, Dom 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (61, 11, 28)
93. <i>Plenary</i> Dec 20 A/PV 1086	<i>UN Financial Position and Prospects.</i> Draft res. from 14th Com. 9 upon UNEF. Eib, Tan; authorizing SG to issue UN bonds and utilize proceeds for the Working Capital Fund	+	+	Maj +; Gre, SAU, Sep 0; Bel -	All -; Yug +	Maj +; Afg, Cam, CAR, Chad, China, India, Indon., Phil, Ugo 0	Maj +; Cuba, Dom 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (58, 13, 24)
94. <i>1st Com.</i> Dec 13 A/C.1/1 PV 1217 Dec 19 A/C.1/1 PV 1218 Dec 20 A/C.1/1 PV 1220	<i>Korean Question.</i> Mongin draft res. Dec 13, 1962, adopted by the Security Council without participation of North and South Korea; Op. pars. deciding to invite representatives of both, without right to vote	+	+	Maj +; Gre, SAU, Sep 0; Bel -	All -; Yug +	Maj +; Afg, Cam, CAR, Chad, China, India, Indon., Phil, Ugo 0	Maj +; Cuba, Dom 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (58, 13, 24)

[illegible]

Forum, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers		Other NATO, Pro-Western Groupings and Nonaligned Countries	Eastern Bloc & Yugoslavia	Asia-Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	A/E and North African Countries																Result
		E.S.	F.R.G.					Cyprus	Rhodesia	Iran	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Syria	Turkey	U.A.R.	Yemen			
103.	Proposal for separate vote on op. para. 7 at 45-power draft res. (see No 108)	+	+	All +	-	Maj -; Alg., CAR, Dah., Liber., Mad, Thai 0; Cam, China, F. Mal, Jap, Phil +	Maj +; Cuba -	0	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	0	+	-	-	Adopted (97, 43, 8)				
104.	Draft res. sponsors, 45 Af-Ae states (incl. all ME except Ir, Sud, Tur); Presun.: immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops; cessation of hostilities; immediate negotiations and failure to implement previous re- solutions, constituting this a threat to international peace; Op. para. 1-3: requesting Angolan people to fight to achieve their right to self-determination; condemning Portugal's repressive measures; urging Portugal to undertake extensive reforms with a view to transfer power to Angolan people.	+	+																					
105.	[Separate vote on phrase:] through the Special Com. of 17 established by the GA;	-	0	All -	+	Maj +; Cam, CAR, Congo, Liby, Mad, Mali, Pak, Phil, Togo 0; China, Dah, F. Mal, Gab, Ivory C, Nigeria, Thai -		+	0	+	0	+	-	+	0	+	0	-	0	Rejected (37, 44, 20)				
106.	Op. para. 7: requesting Special Com. to give urgent consideration to Ango- lan situation with a view to early independence;	-	0	All -	+	Maj -; China, Phil +; Cam, CR, Dah, Ivory C, Niger, Sen, Lao, Liber., C, Congo, Eze, Hsi, Mex, Niger, Thai, Togo 0	Maj -; Cuba +; Bol, Ind, Col, Ecu, Hsi, Mex, Uru, Ven 0	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	0	+	Not adopted (44, 32, 26)					
107.	Op. para. 8.11: requesting members to deny Portugal any support which may be used against Angolan people; Portugal to report to 15th session on implementation of this resolution	-	0	All -	+																			
	Above draft res. as amended	+	0	0	Maj +; SA, Sy -; Port A	All +	All +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (99, 2, 1)				
108. In Com. of Disarmament AGS I/PV 1283	Cuban Complaint of US Aggression against Revolutionary Government of Romeke; Presun.: condemning manner that situation in Caribbean may in- crease threat to universal peace and security	-	-		All +; Ven 0	Maj 0; China, F Phil, Thai -	Maj -; Cuba +													Rejected (11, 47, 42)				
109.	Recalling UN aim to develop friendly relations between peoples and nations in mutual affairs of any state	0	0	0	Maj -; Fin, Port 0	Maj +; China, F Mal, Camb, Pak, Liber., Mad, Pak, Phil, Tang, Thai, Togo 0	Maj 0; Cuba +	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Adopted (41, 0, 29)				

Forum, Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers		Other NATO, Pro-Western Countries and Commonwealth and European Countries	Eastern Bloc & Yugoslavia	Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	ME and North African Countries														Remarks			
		US	France					Cyprus	Rhodesia	Iran	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey		CAR	Yemen	
120. Plenary June 25 A/PV 1118	Future of Ruanda-Urundi: USSR isn't to be involved in the future of Ruanda-Urundi. Adding in op. para. 3 that Belgian forces in Ruanda-Urundi be evacuated by 1.7.1962	-	-	All -	+	Maj 0; China, Cuba, Indon., Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Laos, Mali, Nepal +	Maj -; Cuba +	0 +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0 +	0 +	0 +	0 +	+	-	+	0	0	Rejected (24, 46, 35)
121.	Draft res. from 4th Com. 23 AGAs (14Gons); Iraq, Maurit., Sen., Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAR, U.K. size of gov. of Ruanda and Burundi (R & B) to attain independence as separate states on 1.7.62; noting Belgian administration in Ruanda and Burundi to ensure her forces; Op. paras. 1-2; deciding to terminate relevant Trusteeship Agreement on 1.7.1962	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
122.	Op. para 3: calling on Belgium to withdraw forces still remaining in R & B Evacuation to be completed by 1.8.1962; Op. para 4: requesting SG to ensure evacuation of Belgian forces in R & B, to supervise Belgian evacuation and assist the gov.	0 0	0	Maj +; Austl, Ger, Port, SAI 0	+	Maj +; Togo 0	Maj +; Cam 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (34, 0, 9)
	Op. para 3: authorizing SG to enter into financial commitments up to \$2m. for emergency measures	+	-	Maj +; Gre, Port, SAI 0	All -; Yug +	Maj +; Alg, Camb, Laos 0	Maj +; Arg, Chile, Cuba, Dem. Rep. Congo, Hond., Mex., SAI 0; Cuba -	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	Adopted (75, 12, 16)	
123.	Op. paras. 6-9: requesting UN agencies' special consideration for needs of R & B, recommending admission of R & B to UN. Above draft res. as a whole	+	+	All +	All 0; Yug +	All +	All +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (95, 0, 10)	
124. Plenary June 26 A/PV 1128	Question of Southern Rhodesia. Bulgarian isn't to op. para. 2 of 30-power draft res. (see No 125), insisting: "on the basis of one man, one vote"	not participating	-	-	+	Maj +; China, F Rep. Indon., Pak, Tunis 0	Maj 0; SAI -; Egypt not participating	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Adopted (55, 1, 42)	

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS AND SIGNS

1) *UN Member States*

Afg(hanistan)
 Alb(ania)
 Arg(entina)
 Aus(tra)
 Aust — Australia
 Belg(ium)
 Bol(ivia)
 Braz(il)
 Bulg(aria)
 Bur(ma)
 Byel(orusian SSR)
 Camb(odia)
 Cam(eroon)
 Can(ada)
 CAR — Central African Republic
 Cey(lon)
 Chad
 Chile
 China
 Col(ombia)
 Congo (B) — Congo (Brazzaville)
 Congo (L) — Congo (Leopoldville)
 Cos(ta Rica)
 Cuba
 Cyp(rus)
 Cze(choslovakia)
 Dah(omey)
 Den(mark)
 Dom(inican Republic)
 Ecu(ador)
 Eth(impia)
 F(ederation of) Mnt(ays)
 Fin(land)
 Fra(nce)
 Gab(on)
 Gha(na)
 Gre(ce)
 Gus(temala)
 Gui(nea)
 Hai(t)
 Hond(uras)
 Hun(gary)
 Ice(land)
 India
 Indon(esia)
 Irau
 Iraq

Ire(land)
 Isr(ael)
 It(aly)
 Ivory C(ont)
 Jap(an)
 Jord(an)
 Laos
 Leb(anon)
 Liber(ia)
 Lib(n)
 Lux(embourg)
 Mad(agascar) — Malagasy Rep.
 Mali
 Maur(itania)
 Mex(ico)
 Mon(golia)
 Mor(occo)
 Nepal
 Neth(erland)
 Nic(nicaragua)
 Niger
 Nigeria
 Nor(way)
 NZ — New Zealand
 Pak(istan)
 Pan(ama)
 Par(aguay)
 Peru
 Phil(ippines)
 Pol(and)
 Port(ugal)
 Rum(ania)
 SAF — South Africa
 Sal — El Salvador
 Sand(ii Arabia)
 Sen(egal)
 Sierra L(Leone)
 Som(alia)
 Sp(ain)
 Sud(an)
 Swe(den)
 Sw(iz)
 Tang(anika)
 Thai(land)
 Togo
 Tun(isia)
 Tur(ke)
 UAR — United Arab Republic

UK — United Kingdom
 Ukr(anian SSR)
 Up(per) Volta
 Uru(guay)
 USA — United States of America
 USSR — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 Ven(ezuela)
 Yem(en)
 Yug(oslavia)

2) *Other Abbreviations*

A/C1/PV — UN General Assembly, First Committee proceedings, Provisional Edition
 A/PV — UN General Assembly, General Assembly proceedings, Provisional Edition
 A/SPC/SR — UN General Assembly, Special Political Committee proceedings, Summary Record
 Af-As — Afro-Asian
 am't — amendment
 Com. — Committee, Commission
 GA — General Assembly
 gov. — government
 inc. — including
 ITS — International Trusteeship System
 OAS — Organization of American States
 op. para. — operative paragraph
 FCC — Palestine Conciliation Commission
 para. — paragraph
 pream. para. — preambular paragraph
 res. — resolution
 RU — Ruanda-Urundi
 SC — Security Council
 SG — Secretary General
 SPC — Special Political Committee
 spons. — sponsored by
 SWA — South-West Africa
 UNRWA — UN Relief & Works Agency

3) *Voting Key:* + in favour
 — against
 O abstained
 A absent (ME countries only)

Result column gives numbers voting in favour, voting against, and abstaining — in that order.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND GROUPINGS

SYNOPSIS


Middle East countries participated in a number of international political conferences and groupings. In general, they belonged to the loose, informal Afro-Asian group, which emerged from the Bandung conference of 1955. The great differences inside this group grew wider during 1960-1, after a number of African countries achieved independence, and as a result of the Congo crisis which served as a catalyst in African politics.

The veteran international organization in the area was the Arab League (est. 1945), which by the end of the year comprised twelve independent Arab-speaking Muslim countries. In the North, the two non-Arab ME Muslim countries, Iran and Turkey, together with Muslim Pakistan and the United Kingdom, belonged to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) which began as the "Baghdad Pact" in 1955; this Western defence organization was strongly tied to the US. Other international organizations represented in the area were

NATO, of which Turkey was a member, and the British Commonwealth, which was joined by Cyprus in 1961.

During 1961 the African countries—including six member states of the Arab League—divided into two groups: (a) The Casablanca group, established at a conference in Casablanca in January, which comprised two Arab countries—the UAR and Morocco, as well as the Algerian Provisional Government—and three sub-Saharan countries—Ghana, Guinea and Mali; (b) the Monrovia group—formed at a conference in that city in May, which comprised the twelve countries of the *Union Africaine et Malgache* as well as Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia. The Casablanca group countries were pro-Lumumbist in the Congo and took a neutralist anti-Western line; those of the Monrovia group were more moderate, supported the established order, and the majority of them had strong ties with the West. The African Arab League countries

AFRICAN GROUPINGS




STATES OF MONROVIA GROUP

STATES OF CASABLANCA GROUP

TUNISIA AND LIBYA SENT OBSERVERS TO THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

MUSLIM COUNTRIES, THE ARAB LEAGUE AND CEN TO



THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES



were thus split between the two groups, with Libya and Sudan endeavouring to take a neutral line.

The Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (September) brought Yugoslavia, a European country, and Cuba, a Latin American one, into an otherwise Afro-Asian forum in which Muslim countries predominated. The division between "non-aligned" and "aligned" countries again cut across the Arab League—Kuwait, Libya and Jordan being absent from the meeting. On the other hand, Ethiopia, Somalia and Tunisia of the Monrovia group joined with the countries of the Casablanca group at this conference.

The UAR was the country most involved in these groupings. She was a principal member of the Arab League and the Casablanca group, a prime mover in convening the Belgrade Conference, and at the centre of the activities of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization and the All-African Peoples' Conference, both non-govern-

mental, strongly anti-Western, bodies. The UAR was also active in the Islamic sphere. The Islamic tie in foreign relations was emphasized even more by Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

At the other end of the scale was Israel, the only country in the ME which did not belong to any of these groupings, as a result of the influence that the 12 Arab League countries exercised in Afro-Asian councils and international politics in general.

Notes on Maps: (1) "Algeria" stands for "Algerian Provisional Government," established by the Algerian insurgents. (2) The predominantly Muslim Soviet republics and the Chinese autonomous region of Sinkiang have been included in the map as "Muslim Countries." (3) The population of Lebanon was assumed to consist of approximately 50% Muslims and 50% Christians. (4) Syria seceded from the UAR on September 28.

AFRO-ASIAN AND AFRICAN CONFERENCES

AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (AAPSO)

Cairo Meeting on Congo. The AAPSO, in an extraordinary session held in Cairo on Jan 21-22, adopted a resolution on the Congo which i.e. invited the governments which had announced the withdrawal of their troops to put them at the disposal of the "legitimate government of Stanleyville." (*NCNA, Jan 23 [25]*)

Fourth Session of AAPSO Council. [The fourth session of the Council took place in Bandung from April 10 to 13. The Council was the highest body of the AAPSO, functioning between general conferences of the organization.] (For second conference, see MER 1960, p 22)

Fifty-two nations were represented at the conference. The UAR delegation was headed by Muhammad Fu'ad Galil. The conference was opened by President Sukarno; the main theme of his speech was the struggle against imperialism (*Manila Bulletin, April 11*). In the declaration at the closing session, it was stated that neo-colonialism was the greatest threat to African countries. It was a subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, and military or technical means, perpetrated by the US, West Germany, Israel, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, and France. The Afro-Asian peoples were also warned of the "anti-national blocs," NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, which were all "headed by US imperialists." Other resolutions called on Sudan to lift the blockade it had imposed on the "legitimate government of Congo"; and supported the Algerian struggle for independence, declaring that the Sahara was an integral part of Algeria; individual resolutions were passed on all non-independent territories in Africa and Asia. (*Ahrum, April 8, 21; BBCM, Part III, Nos. 612, 613, 614, 615*)

On his return from the conference, AAPSO SG Yusuf as-Siba'i declared as the main results of the conference (a) a decision to hold a conference of the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to link the struggle against imperialism on the three continents; (b) the conference showed up Israel's aggressive and imperialist role in the ME and in Africa and Asia. (*Hayat, April 30*)

A report on the conference in the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* said that the role of the UAR as a neutral pacemaker for Soviet and Chinese Communism

was effectively demonstrated at the conference. The Russians and Chinese kept themselves in the background during the public sessions and it was left to the UAR to keep the discussions "on the Communist rails." Siba'i and Galil had engineered a resolution calling on Afro-Asian countries of the British Commonwealth to withdraw from the Commonwealth unless Britain gave up its "colonialist policies." It was Siba'i too who set the tone of the conference from the outset with an attack on "US neo-colonialism" and on the UN. Siba'i said that the neo-colonialists of the US were using the UN, and Hammarskjöld was "a corrupt politician and a traitor." (*Jew. Obs. April 28*)

Conference of the AAPSO Executive Committee in Gaza. [The committee met in Gaza from Dec 9 to 11. Representatives from 27 countries, including all Asian Communist countries and Morocco and Tunisia, participated. Observers from East European Communist countries also attended. The host delegation was the "Palestine Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity." The organizers intended to focus attention on the Palestine problem, and this subject was given special prominence both in the discussions and resolutions, and in activities outside the conference hall.] The UAR delegate, Fu'ad Galil, was elected chairman of the conference. (*R. Cairo, Dec 9-10, Dec 10*)

In his opening speech, SG Yusuf as-Siba'i said that the choice of Gaza as the venue of the meeting expressed the Palestinians' desire to couple their energies and activities with those of the Afro-Asian peoples who stood by them in their just struggle against the Israeli invaders and their imperialist masters. Siba'i also charged that there was cooperation between imperialism and reaction in countries like Jordan, Iran, and Turkey, and said that Guatemala and "Chiang's gang" supported the Syrian secession. Speaking of the struggle against imperialism, he denounced the intervention to restore in South Vietnam a regime hated by the people, and denounced the US Peace Corps members as agents of imperialism. He said that only a united anti-imperialist front of the African, Asian, and Latin American peoples would be able to thwart the imperialist conspiracies. (*MENA, Dec 9, 10 [12]*)

The "Palestinian" delegation forwarded a detailed

memorandum on the Palestine question, and on Dec 10 the delegates visited the demarcation line and a refugee camp. The conference adopted 24 resolutions. It confirmed earlier resolutions on Palestine, denounced Israel as an "aggressive entity established by imperialism," and supported the "legitimate right" of the Palestinian Arabs to "liberate their homeland and return to it." Other resolutions concerned the holding of the projected Afro-Asian-Latin American conference; condemnation of reactionary forces in the Arab world; a denunciation of the European Common Market, and individual resolutions in support of various countries and territories in their anti-imperialist struggle. (*MENA, Dec 11 [13]; Ahram, Dec 11, 12*)

Women's Conference. Jordan, Lebanon and the UAR, among others, were represented at the first Conference of Afro-Asian Women, which opened in Cairo on Jan 11. The conference was opened by Kamal ad-Din Hussein. President Abdel Nasser, in a message, emphasized the role of women in the struggle for freedom in Africa and Asia (*Falastin, Hayat, Jan 14; Akhbar, Jan 15, 16*); he also received the delegates.

THIRD CONFERENCE OF UN ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

(Addis Ababa, February)

Speaking at the conference, Mahmud Riyad, the head of the UAR delegation, warned African countries against economic colonialist domination. He called for a common transport system among African countries. He said that the African continent had contributed greatly to the development of the metropolitan powers, and this had now resulted in the African countries lacking capital to develop their resources and raise the standard of living of their peoples (*R. Addis Ababa, Feb 9 [11]*). The UAR and seven other African states demanded the withdrawal of non-African states from membership in ECA. (*Hayat, Feb 16*)

On a resolution moved by Riyad the commission stood in silence for one minute in tribute to Patrice Lumumba. (*R. Addis Ababa, Feb 14 [16]*)

On Feb 7 Mauritania was admitted as a member of the ECA. The UAR was one of the two countries which voted against Mauritania's admission. Following the vote, Morocco's delegation walked out of the session. (*R. Addis Ababa, Feb 7 [9]; R. Rabat, Feb 14 [16]*)

THIRD ALL-AFRICAN PEOPLES' CONFERENCE (AAPC)

(Cairo, March)

Synopsis. The third conference of the All-African Peoples' Organization was held in Cairo from March 25 to 31. Similar to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, which had its headquarters in Cairo, the AAPC was a "peoples' organization," in which not governments but parties, movements, unions, and exiles were represented. The organization was set up on the initiative of Ghana, in which country it held its first conference, in December 1958. The second conference was held in Tunis in January 1960 (see *MER* 1960, p. 23). The Cairo conference primarily attacked imperialism, identified with the West, and French colonialism in Algeria, supported Gizaiga in the Congo and criticized the UN role in that country, and attacked the UAM (or Brazzaville group) countries.

Participants. Seventy organizations and movements were invited to the conference. Figures regarding participants varied: 300 delegates representing 61 organizations, 200 delegates from 54 organizations in 31 African countries, 207 delegates representing 57 organizations. Arab delegations represented the UAR, Algeria, Morocco (Mahdi Ben Barka, the exiled opposition leader), and Tunisia. The UAR delegation was headed by Muhammad Fu'ad Galal, Vice-President of the National Assembly.

The following independent African countries were represented by political exiles or opposition leaders: Niger, Mauritania (Shaykh Sidch of the Independence Party [which supported the "return" of Mauritania to Morocco]), Cameroun, Sierra Leone, Congo Leopoldville. (*Ahram, March 9, 21, 26, 28; NCNA, March 26 [28]; NYT March 27; MENA, March 28 [29, 30]*)

Proceedings. The conference was opened by Fu'ad Galal, who was elected chairman of the conference. In the opening speech President Abdel Nasser spoke of imperialism in Africa, especially in the Congo, of French nuclear tests in the Sahara, and of Israel as a tool of imperialism in Africa and the ME. (*Ahram, March 26*)

Five committees were set up to deal with the following subjects: (1) Liberation of non-independent states; (2) neo-colonialism and the UN; (3) reorganization of the African social and political structure and liquidation of colonialism; (4) economic, social, and democratic development; (5) African unity and solidarity. (*MENA, March 28 [30]; Ahram, March 28*)

A clash occurred between the Somali and Ethiopian delegates. The UAR chairman intervened several times and requested the Somali delegate to cease speaking. The Somalis accused Ethiopia of aggression, and attacked the chairman for being biased and pro-Ethiopian (*R. Addis Ababa, March 28 [30]*). During discussions in the committee on liberation, the Somali delegates left the conference as a protest against the committee's refusal to call for the liberation of "Somali territories under British, French, and Ethiopian rule." (*Ahram, March 30*)

Delegates visited the Cairo broadcasting station and the Gaza strip, where they were shown refugee camps. (*Hayat, March 31; Ahram, April 1*)

Addressing the delegates at a reception he gave at the end of the conference, President Abdel Nasser said that moral forces were now more effective than atomic weapons and stressed that national unity was an essential factor in the struggle for independence. He assured his audience of the unflinching support of the people of the UAR for the African peoples' struggle. (*Africa on the March—All-African Peoples' Conference, UAR Information Dept., Cairo, 1961; R. Cairo, April 2 [5]*)

Resolutions. The conference adopted detailed resolutions on the topics dealt with by the committees. It called for stronger action in the struggle for independence and issued individual resolutions on all non-independent countries in Africa, as well as on Congo and Cameroun. According to some sources, the conference included Israel among the countries which they considered the principal neo-colonialists active in Africa, the others being the US, Germany, Belgium, Britain, France, Holland, and South Africa. (*R. Cairo, March 30 [April 4]; Ahram, March 31; Monde, April 1*)

AFRICAN RADIO CONFERENCE

(Cairo, April)

[An African Broadcasting and Television Union was set up in Rabat in May 1960; it decided to set up a technical committee in Cairo. See *MER* 1960, p. 23.]

On April 22-27, a conference on the technical aspects of African radio and television took place in Cairo. Thirteen states participated: Tunisia, Niger, Nigeria, Guinea, Somalia, Libya, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Upper Volta, Dahomey and the UAR.

The conference was opened by Abd al-Qādir Hātim, UAR Minister of State. He stressed the importance of the propaganda media in the struggle of African peoples. He dwelt mainly on the tasks of the "African broadcasters in the battle of African liberation." The UAR Deputy Director of Broadcasting was elected chairman of the conference.

The representative of Nigeria, an Englishman, left the conference when it was decided that Africans only would take part.

A Cairo weekly alleged that the Tunisian representative had tried—in vain—to obstruct the conference. He had made his address in French; the Libyan representative had demanded that he should not be heard unless he spoke in Arabic.

The following were the main points of the conference resolutions: (1) To set up a training institute of the African Broadcasting and Television Union; (2) to set up a technical centre in Cairo to deal with the technical aspects of the Union, to supervise the use of wavelengths, and to suggest ways of avoiding radio disturbances; (3) members were to intercede with the International Broadcasting Union to put pressure on European states to refrain from using wavelengths which were being used by African stations; (4) the conference denounced radio stations in Africa operated by "imperialist states" and which interfered with African stations.

The chairman said the conference denounced the use of the African continent as a base for foreign stations; member states would work to remove such stations. He also denounced the imperialist states for appropriating frequencies allocated to Africa. (*MENA*, April 26 [28]; *Ahram*, April 22, 28; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, May 1)

ALL-AFRICAN TRADE UNION FEDERATION (AATUF)

(Casablanca, May)

[The conference of the AATUF was held in Casablanca from May 25 to 30, on the initiative of the AAPC Council and in particular of the "Casablanca Charter" states—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the UAR, Morocco, and Algeria. The representatives of these countries together with those of the Tunisian *Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail* (UGTT) and the Guinea-based *Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire* (UGTAN), constituted the preparatory committee. The founding member-unions issued the invitations and guided the proceedings of the conference. They aimed at an all-African federation, in which the Casablanca states would have a dominating influence, and whose members would follow a policy of non-alignment and disaffiliate from any other international trade union body.] (See also MER 1960, p. 23.)

African trade union leaders meeting in Brazzaville sent a protest to the preparatory committee of the Casablanca

conference against discrimination in invitations to the conference and the invitation of non-representative unions and delegates. (*Le Courrier d'Afrique*, May 18)

The conference was attended by "delegates of 45 trade union organizations representing 38 African states" (*R. Rabat*, May 24 [26]). Representatives of trade unions from Communist and Western countries attended the conference as observers. (*BBCM*, May 27-June 2)

The conference was opened by King Hasan II and ended a day later than originally planned, following a crisis over the issue of disaffiliation from other international unions. The representatives from the Casablanca group countries, among others, demanded disaffiliation in order to enhance the unity and authority of the African federation. This demand was opposed by the representatives of unions affiliated to the ICFTU, among them Tom Mboya, the leader of the Kenya Federation of Labour, and Ahmad Tlili, SG of the Tunisian UGTT. (*BBCM*, May 27-June 2; *BBC* in Arabic, May 28-1MB, May 29; *Hayat*, May 30)

Charter and Resolutions. On May 30 the conference ended with the approval of a charter of the AATUF, and a set of resolutions. The charter laid down the political principles of non-alignment and struggle against imperialism and reaction, and demanded non-interference by foreign organizations with the trade unions of Africa. The Charter stipulated that the federation was composed of independent trade union organizations which must not be affiliated to international trade union organizations. A ten-month limit was allowed for the disaffiliation of member unions. The federation headquarters would be at Casablanca. (*NCNA*, June 2 [6]; *Jer. Post*, May 31)

Mahjub Ben Saddiq, SG of the *Union Marocaine du Travail* was elected President of the Federation. As'ad Rājih, SG of the Federation of Arab Workers, representing the UAR, was one of the six secretaries of the Federation; the others were from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Mali, and Kenya. (*BBCM*, June 2; *MENA*, June 2 [6])

The conference was attacked and termed a failure by trade union leaders of Kenya, Tunisia and Nigeria who had been outvoted at the conference, and by the SG of the ICFTU in Brussels. The organizers were criticized for being Communist sympathizers, and for employing undemocratic politics at the conference. (*Dépêche Tunisienne*, May 31, June 1, 18; *Daily Times*, Lagos, June 5; *R. Israel*, June 1 [6])

Plan for Rival Conference. [A rival conference of African trade unions was scheduled for July 30 in Dakar, but took place only in Jan 1962, when the All African Trade Union Federation was formed.] *Al-Ahram* attacked the ICFTU and the Federation of Christian Workers in Africa for planning an imperialist plot against free African trade unions by calling for a conference of trade unions in Dakar to which the Casablanca Charter states had not been invited (*Ahram*, July 16). (The Tunisian, Nigerian and Kenya unions, among others, subsequently joined the Dakar group.)

THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

SYNOPSIS

The Casablanca conference met in the Moroccan city after which it was named from Jan 3-7. It was called by King Muhammad V of Morocco, and attended by the heads of state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR and the PM of the "Algerian Provisional Government" (the FLN)—who constituted the Casablanca group—as well as by representatives of Libya and Ceylon.

The conference was called on short notice to deal with the Congo crisis. Those invited were all the African and Asian countries which had contingents in the UN force in the Congo, with the exception of Tunisia. But as India and Indonesia failed to attend, the conference which eventually issued an "African Charter" became "African" by default. Only three countries of the group belonged to "Black Africa"; the other three were Arab.

The participants had been brought closer together by the Congo crisis which served as a catalyst in African politics. The countries represented at Casablanca were pro-Lumumba in the Congo, and took a neutralist, anti-Western line in their foreign policies; some of them were of a "revolutionary" character, in particular the UAR, which was also the most powerful and influential member of the group. The heads of state of Ghana, Guinea and Mali had met on the eve of the conference in Conakry, and resolved to unite their countries.

The Casablanca conference was preceded by a conference of the 12 UAM countries (former French colonies) at Brazzaville (Dec 15-19 1960) which constituted a first attempt to create a bloc of African states. This step taken by African pro-Western states was one reason—in some opinion the foremost reason—for the Casablanca meeting which, in turn, underlined the political division in the continent. This division was further institutionalized by the Monrovia conference (May 8-13) in which the UAM countries were joined by seven others, with Tunisia as the only participant from north of the Sahara. All independent African countries had been invited, and only the Casablanca group countries as well as Libya and Sudan failed to attend. The minority character of the Casablanca group in African politics was thus emphasized. The Monrovia resolutions on African issues were more moderate than those of Casablanca, and supported the established order. Consequently, the Casablanca group denounced the Monrovia group as "imperialist inspired." The Monrovia conference was followed by a conference of the same group, at Lagos, in Jan 1962.

The differences between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups resembled those between the UAR and the other members of the Arab League, and it was thought that this fact was primarily responsible for the absence from the group of Tunisia, Sudan and Libya—the remaining three Arab countries in Africa. Tunisia and the UAR had been politically at loggerheads for years (see: Inter-Arab Relations), and lately Tunisia had also fallen out with Morocco as the only Arab country to oppose Morocco's claim for sovereignty over Mauritania.

A specific motive of the UAR in attending the conference was thought to have been her quest for African leadership. Observers commented in this connection that the UAR's efforts to rally the Arab countries behind her had been blocked; the UAR, on the other hand, emphasized that the African and Arab "circles" were interconnected. King Muhammad of Morocco was thought to have been motivated by a wish to prove to the strong

leftist opposition at home that he too was anti-imperialist, and by the wish to canvass support for his claim on Mauritania.

The Casablanca conference adopted resolutions on the Congo, Algeria and Ruanda Urundi, supported Morocco's claim on Mauritania, condemned racial discrimination and the French nuclear tests in the Sahara, and denounced Israel as an instrument of imperialism in Africa and elsewhere. The conference also proclaimed an "African Charter" which provided for the establishment of institutions which were to serve as the basis for the further cooperation of the group.

The stands taken by the conferees during the debate had, however, not been unanimous. On the Congo question, President Nkrumah and King Muhammad were rather more moderate than Presidents Abdel Nasser, Touré and Keita; the resolution was regarded as a compromise. The Palestine resolution was adopted only at the behest of Abdel Nasser; it did not accord with the ties which actually existed—and which continued after the conference—between Israel and Ghana and Mali. (The resolution was acclaimed in the UAR as a great Arab victory over Israel; this was, however, disputed by President Abdel Nasser's antagonists. In Israel there was a feeling that a certain set-back had been suffered.) Similarly, the resolution on Mauritania did not accord with the recognition of that state by Ghana and Mali. There was unanimous support for Algeria but King Muhammad, in his opening speech, laid claim to a section of the Sahara which was generally considered to be part of Algeria. The "African Charter," especially the Joint Command scheme, was thought to be expressive of President Nkrumah's pan-African aspirations, while President Abdel Nasser—if not at the conference then elsewhere (see p 675)—demonstrated a rather guarded approach to African unification schemes.

The conference was praised by the Communist countries and criticized by the Western press.

The "African Charter of Casablanca" provided for the setting up of an African Consultative Assembly, an African Political Committee comprising the heads of state, African Economic and Cultural committees at ministerial level and an African Joint High Command comprising the chiefs of staff. Except for the first, all these institutions were established during the year.

In Feb, following the murder of Lumumba, the Political Committee, at the level of foreign ministers, met in Accra to discuss the Congo situation. A "conference of experts" to draft a protocol to the "African Charter" met in Accra in April. The protocol was signed in a conference of foreign ministers which met in Cairo in May. The conference encountered difficulties and had to be prolonged, mainly, it was reported, because Ghana was again out of step with the majority.

In July, the Economic and Cultural committees and the "Command" met in Conakry, Tangier and Cairo respectively. The Economic Committee adopted far-reaching resolutions and recommendations on economic cooperation, and warned against the "danger" of African countries joining the European Common Market. The Political Committee met in Cairo at the end of August, on the eve of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. As Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Touré of Guinea failed to attend, the meeting was held at the level of foreign ministers. In addition to dealing with current international issues, the Committee discussed

the reports submitted by the "African Command" and the Committees. The communiqué made no reference to either the location of the headquarters of the "Command" or its chief, and it was reported that no agreement had been reached on these points.

Further meetings of the above-mentioned institutions were scheduled for 1962. By the end of the year coopera-

tion within the framework of the "African Charter" was still limited to the exchange of views in the political sphere—the Charter not having provided for binding resolutions—and to the charting of plans by the committees. No joint venture had actually been set up nor had the "African Command" yet taken any practical form.

THE CONFERENCE

PARTICIPANTS

On Dec 22, 1960, it was reported from Rabat that King Muhammad V of Morocco had invited the heads of states of the following countries to a conference on the Congo: the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, Ceylon, India and Indonesia. (All had contingents in the UN force in Congo.) The same report said acceptance had been received from the Presidents of the four first named. Somalia and Togo were invited to send observers. Later it became known that Libya and the Algerian Provisional Government (APG) had also been invited as participants, and the "legitimate [Congo] government of Lumumba" as an observer.

No invitations were extended, a UAR source emphasized, to President Bourguiba, despite Tunisian reports that he had declined an invitation, nor to Mauritania, the member states of the French Community or the "Mobutu [Congo] Government." However, Tunis Radio itself said at the time of the conference that Tunisia had not been invited, possibly due to her attitude over Mauritania.

Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sudan as well as India and Indonesia informed that they regretted not being able to attend the conference.

The names of the participants were officially announced in Rabat on Dec 30, 1960. The announcement said that in view of the aggravation of the situation in the Congo and after consultations with the heads of the African states directly interested in the Congo problem, King Muhammad V had proposed to hold a conference at the highest level.

The following heads of state took part in the conference: King Muhammad V of Morocco (Chairman), Presidents Gamāl Abdel Nasser of the UAR, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali. Other participants were Ferhat Abbas, PM of the APG, Abd al-Qādir Allām, FM and representative of the King of Libya, and Alwin B. Pereira, Ambassador, representing the PM of Ceylon. (*Eg Gaz.*, Dec 24, 1960; *R. Rabat*, Dec 30, 1960 [Jan 2, 1961]; *BBCM*, Jan 6; *Casablanca Conference, Information Department [UAR]*, no date)

A delegation of Lumumba representatives and another of the "Senegalese opposition" also attended. (*MENA*, Jan 3 [6]; *R. Rabat*, Jan 3 [7])

MOTIVES AND AIMS

Generally, the Casablanca conference was considered a step in the crystallization of African political groupings which had been set off by the Congo crisis.

"Brazzaville Led to Casablanca." "Brazzaville led to Casablanca," wrote Colin Legum, a close observer of the African scene. (The Brazzaville conference of the 12 UAM countries had taken place from Dec 15-19; it favoured mediation in the Congo, upheld Mauritania's

independence, professed friendship for France and called on her to end the war in Algeria in 1961 on the basis of Algerian self-determination, and while opposing political union, advocated the strengthening of African solidarity through economic cooperation. The conference constituted a first attempt to create a bloc of African states.)

"The group of African states which had adopted a clear-cut Lumumbist line in the Congo," Legum continued, "had for some time felt the need to coordinate their policies. They had become a minority in the African group at the UN and they were anxious to reassert the initiative taken by them in the earlier stages of Pan-African developments..." (Colin Legum, *Pan Africanism*, London, 1961, p 50)

Antecedents of the Casablanca Group. [The UAR, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea and Mali had come closer together through the Congo conflict. On Dec 6, 1960 the UAR (as well as Ceylon and Yugoslavia) announced the withdrawal of their contingents from the UN Force in Congo; Morocco and Guinea joined them a few days later. Only Ghana did not join in this move.

Ghana, Guinea and Mali (the latter had separated in Aug 1960 from its federation with Senegal) met at Conakry on Dec 24, 1960, and declared their intention to establish a union of the three states.] The three Presidents flew together from Conakry to Casablanca on Jan 3 "in two Russian made and piloted planes." (*NYHT*, Jan 4)

Morocco. An article in *Le Monde* outlined changes in Morocco's policy which led her to the Casablanca conference. King Muhammad's foreign policy had taken a recent change towards militancy and extremism. The absence of Bourguiba from the conference dealt a blow to Maghreb unity which had been an important factor in Moroccan policy. On the other hand, Abdel Nasser's presence had a special meaning, not only in the context of Maghreb unity—Abdel Nasser being an adversary of Bourguiba—but also in the wider context of Morocco's Arab and foreign policy, for in the past Morocco had been reserved in its attitude towards the UAR's regime and its policies. The writer asked: Did these changes in Morocco's policy come in order to efface her long period of reserve on the Algerian conflict? Or in order to "confiscate the foreign policy of the leftist opposition?" Or did they stem from a need to cover the failure on Mauritania? (*Monde*, Jan 3)

Another commentator took it for a fact that the King, who was generally regarded a "man of the West," was seeking to prove to the strong opposition in his country that he was working with the "anti-imperialists." On the other hand, the commentator thought it was "not completely correct" to attribute the King's change of course to the failure of the West to support his claim on Mauritania. (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, Jan 5)

[The negative attitude towards Morocco's claim on Mauritania on the part of the Brazzaville conference as well as of Tunisia (see above) should also be noted in regard to the general background for the Moroccan initiative.]

The UAR. Cairo broadcasts presented the conference as a countermove to an imperialist alliance in Africa and a display of cooperation between African nationalism and Arab nationalism. Abdel Nasser's presence at the conference would explode "imperialism's myth" that Arab and African nationalism were diametrically opposed. Not one traitor would be present. (*BBCM*, Jan 3, 4)

At Casablanca Abdel Nasser launched the African offensive which he had been preparing for a long time, later comments said. In the ME his horizons were blocked: Iraq was making her own bid for Arab leadership; Jordan was defending her independence ferociously; and Israel, by her very existence, constituted an insupportable defiance. Africa was more open to UAR activity. (*L'Action Catholique, Canada*, Jan 26; *La Croix, Paris*, Jan 19)

A foreign correspondent in Cairo thought that the UAR's primary interest at Casablanca was to build up President Abdel Nasser as an African leader. Though the UAR could register no success in the Congo itself, her involvement there had put her in "the front line of the Africans," and the UAR now sought to strengthen this position. (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, Jan 5)

PROCEEDINGS AND RESOLUTIONS

Debate on Agenda. In a preliminary meeting, the Cairo weekly *Rûs al-Yûsuf* reported, the heads of state agreed to make the conference as short as possible to enable them to attend to their business at home. Thus they agreed to skip opening speeches except for one by King Muhammad. After the King's speech the heads of state met again to determine the agenda. The placing on the agenda of the questions of Congo, Algeria and the French atomic tests in the Sahara was quickly agreed upon while the inclusion of the questions of Palestine, Mauritania and Ruanda Urundi was opposed by some of the participants, and the debate lasted hours (For an official announcement on these meetings see *R. Rabat*, Jan 4 [6]). Some countries had diplomatic relations with Israel and received assistance from her [Ghana, Guinea, Mali]. However, after Abdel Nasser spoke at length about Israel being a "tool of imperialism," the Palestine issue was put on the agenda. Thereafter King Muhammad set out his views on Mauritania, and following a drawn-out debate between him and President Keita of Mali, this issue too was put on the agenda. This was also the case with Ruanda Urundi, after a lengthy memorandum from the country's representatives was received during the meeting. The last point left was a number of proposals for the organization of Inter-African cooperation. *Rûs al-Yûsuf* reported, but time was running out. King Muhammad was sick with malaria, Sekou Touré was expected on a state visit in Yugoslavia, Nkrumah was in a hurry to get home... (*Rûs al-Yûsuf*, Jan 16; compare also *NYHT*, Jan 5)

The agenda was finally agreed upon as follows: (1) The Congo and Algeria, (2) The Sahara and Mauritania, (3) Palestine, (4) racial discrimination, (5) the unity of Africa and African organizations. (*R. Rabat*, Jan 4 [6])

The conference, which had opened late-on Jan 4 instead of Jan 3—because of the late arrival of Presidents Keita, Nkrumah and Touré (*Times*, Jan. 4), was also

prolonged by one day, to Jan 7, reportedly because of last minute difficulties involving translations and the phrasing of a joint statement. In the evening of Jan 6 an unscheduled work session took place instead of the scheduled public closing session. There was no official explanation for the delay. President Touré had left for Yugoslavia already on the morning of Jan 6. (*NYT*, Jan 7)

Congo. The most important point under this heading, *Rûs al-Yûsuf* reported, was the position of the UN in the conflict, but also on other points the debate was long-drawn. "The heads of states had to cancel the planned hanquets and to make do with sandwiches, and eventually also gave up the sandwiches to save time." (*Rûs al-Yûsuf*, Jan 16)

Nkrumah's position diverged from that of the majority. Morocco, the UAR, Liha, Mali and Guinea had already declared their intention of withdrawing their troops from the Congo. Ghana, on the other hand, maintained that there should be no withdrawal until a joint African command was ready to replace the UN command in which Ghana played an important part. (*Times*, July 9)

The UAR was the most ardent promoter of Lumumba and the Lumumbist government in Stanleyville (see pp 636 ff). Reports during the conference said "Abdel Nasser, vigorously supported by Sekou Touré," wanted the African states to give outright military aid to the Stanleyville government and put at its disposal the troops to be withdrawn from the UN Command. Modibo Keita had also taken this stand. Ghana and Morocco, on the other hand, though they strongly supported Lumumba, opposed such an extreme move, feeling that it would precipitate civil war which might spread to the rest of the continent and invite armed intervention by the world powers (*NYHT*, *NYT*, Jan 6). *Rûs al-Yûsuf*, however, reported that it was primarily Sekou Touré who debated Nkrumah, while Abdel Nasser mediated between the two. Keita supported Sekou Touré. Following reports which the Cairo *Al-Gumhuriyah* had spread by "imperialist trumpets," Nkrumah denied that he intended to return home before the conference closed.

The Liha Foreign Minister objected to the inclusion of certain wordings in the resolutions but immediately withdrew his objections when he was confronted by the unanimity of the other participants and had a talk with King Muhammad. (*Gumhuriyah*, Jan 6; *Rûs al-Yûsuf*, Jan 16)

A compromise was reached, it was reported, according to which Ghana agreed in principle to the withdrawal of the forces, but only after the UN was given another chance to help Lumumba return to power in the Congo (*Jer. Post*, Jan 6; *Ahram*, Jan 10). [This compromise will be seen in the resolutions on Congo.]

In the "Communiqué concerning the situation in the Congo" the conference: (1) Declared "the intention and determination" of the participants to withdraw their troops placed under the UN Command in the Congo; (2) Reaffirmed their recognition of the elected Parliament and legally constituted government of the Congo which came into being on June 30, 1960; (3) Being convinced that the only justification for the presence of the UN troops in the Congo was (a) to answer the appeals of the "legitimate government" of the Congo "at whose request the UN decided to create the Command." (b) to implement the decisions of the Security Council, (c) to safeguard the unity, independence and integrity of the Congo; (4) Urged the UN to act immediately to: (a) "disarm and disband the lawless bands

of Mobutu," (b) release from prison all members of the Parliament and the "legitimate government," (c) reconvene the Parliament, (d) eliminate all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel not belonging to the UN, (e) release to the "legitimate government" all airports, radio stations and other establishments, now "unlawfully withheld" from it, (f) prevent the Belgians from using Ruanda Urundi as "a base to commit aggression" against the Congo; (5) "Besides that, if the purposes and principles which justified the presence of the UN Operational Command in the... Congo are not realized and respected, then the states here represented reserve the right to take appropriate action." (For sources, see below: Resolutions.)

According to a Cairo source, secret resolutions on the Congo had also been adopted. A Soviet correspondent in Casablanca reported that these resolutions concerned the "appropriate measures" mentioned in para 5 above, and were considered to refer to a plan to aid the Stanleyville government outside the UN framework. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Jan 15; *Izvestia*, Jan 10 quoted in *Mizan*, Jan)

Two principal suggestions which King Muhammad had made in his opening speech were completely omitted from the resolutions. He suggested that once the authority of the "legal government" [Lumumba] had been established, the UN General Assembly create a permanent Congo committee and appeal to all Congolese leaders to meet in a national conference which should attempt to heal—with the help of the Congo committee—the dissensions in the country (*Moroccan Embassy, London: News Bulletin No 43, Jan*). [A round table conference had been proposed by the Brazzaville group, though as an initial step in seeking a solution, and on the eve of the Casablanca conference President Kasavubu of Congo called for a round table conference on Jan 25. See also p 640 for background information on the Congo crisis.]

It was commented that the resolution "conveniently left open the date of withdrawal" of the contingents from the UN Command (*Times*, Jan 9). Ghana did not recall her contingent with the UN force. Mali had withdrawn hers already in Nov 1960. Guinea withdrew her troops in Jan, the UAR in Feb, Morocco in March-May. Ceylon and Indonesia also recalled their troops. Sudan withdrew her contingent in April, after Sudanese troops were attacked by a Congolese force at Matadi on March 5-6. Indian and Tunisian troops, among others, reinforced the depleted UN force. (*UN Year Book 1960, 1961*)

The Palestine Question. In his opening speech, King Muhammad made two short references to the question. Condemning the "partitioning of national territories in order to weaken them," he mentioned Algeria, "Arab Palestine," Congo (Katanga) and Indonesia (West Irian). He also asserted "our determination to resist colonialism... to liberate Arab Palestine from Zionist occupation, the Congo, Algeria..." (*Moroccan Embassy, London: News Bulletin No 43, Jan*). These passages did not appear in the original official text of the speech but were added, it was reported, at the behest of Abdel Nasser; one was pencilled in and the other added later. (*NYHT, Jan 5*)

UAR sources gave details on the debate. Hassanain Haykal in *Al-Ahram* published what he said were excerpts from minutes of the conference. King Muhammad suggested to open the debate on the topic, whereupon Sekou Touré said there was no need for a prolonged debate, the conference should call for the implementation of the UN resolutions. King Muhammad

then read out a short note saying that the conference should propose a "just solution" to the question, "in accordance with the UN resolutions and restoring to the Arabs of Palestine their full rights." Ferhat Abbas supported the King's declaration.

At this point Abdel Nasser intervened, explaining his view point in detail. He said it was not a question of UN resolutions only. He alleged that Israel was both an imperialist force and an imperialist tool. Israel, he said, had been established by Western imperialism which utilized it as a base for aggression in the ME—as in the Suez Campaign of 1956—and as a base for infiltration into Africa and Asia. He said the British had enabled Israel to enter Ghana before the UAR—and Nkrumah knew this for a fact. Imperialism in Africa hid behind Israel because she was small and did not appear dangerous. He claimed that Israel's stands on the Congo, Algeria, Cyprus and other questions were all evidence of her imperialist role. Abdel Nasser said that the UAR stood guard against the imperialist danger at Africa's north-eastern gate but she also felt that the African countries should protect her from any threat from the rear. He concluded that the conference should adopt resolutions both on the rights of the Arabs of Palestine and on Israel's imperialist penetration. (*Ahram*, Jan 20)

Touré and Keita supported Abdel Nasser, *Ruz al-Yusuf* reported, and King Muhammad dwelt on the rights of the Palestine Arabs. Nkrumah on the other hand explained in detail the diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between Ghana and Israel. After a debate on Nkrumah's statement the Ghanaian President agreed with the other participants (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Jan 16). The "Resolution on Palestine" said: The conference (1) Warns against the menace which this situation presents to the peace and security of the ME and the international tension which results therefrom; (2) Insists on... a just solution in conformity with the UN resolutions and the resolutions of Bandung to restore to the Arabs of Palestine all their legitimate rights; (3) Notes with indignation that Israel has always taken the side of the imperialists... concerning vital [African] problems... notably Algeria, the Congo and the nuclear tests in Africa, and the conference therefore denounces Israel as an instrument in the service of imperialism and neo-colonialism not only in the ME but also in Africa and Asia; (4) Calls upon the states of Africa and Asia to oppose this new policy which imperialism is carrying out to create bases for itself. (For sources see below: Resolutions)

"Resolutions on Palestine"—Arab and Israeli Reaction. "The salient point of the Casablanca conference as described in your message to me," President Abdel Nasser told the UAR National Assembly after his return home, "is that it was a measure taken against imperialism and against Zionism as one of its agents and tools." At Bandung, Adel Nasser said, there was "Afro-Asian unanimity" to place Israel "behind the barrier of isolation" as a form of the "imperialist disease," and this had now recurred at Casablanca. Israel's only harvest in Africa would be her "bitter fury." In a later speech (Damascus, Feb 21) he said Africa was made aware at Casablanca of the "imperialist danger" that was Israel. (*Nasser's Speeches*, pp 3-23)

UAR press and radio commentaries echoed the President's words, e.g.: "The outcome on the Palestine question was the main gain from the Casablanca conference." "The Palestine problem has now become an African problem as much as it is an Arab problem" (*Akhbar*, Jan 10; *Ayyam*, Jan 9). Abdel Nasser in one stroke had

succeeded in frustrating the Israeli rulers' toil and struggle in Africa. (*R. Cairo, Jan 8-IMB, Jan 9*)

In Jordan the radio and part of the press criticized the UAR for exaggerating the importance of the resolution. An Amman radio commentary attacked Abdel Nasser for not having brought a single African leader to sever relations with Israel. (*R. Amman, Jan 9-IMB, Jan 10*; see also *Menas, Jan 8, 10*)

The Israeli press sought explanations for and voiced disappointment at the fact that the three non-Arab African countries had consented to the anti-Israeli resolution: "The strong anti-Israeli resolution... has caused some surprise in diplomatic circles in Jerusalem..." reported *Ha'aretz*, which surmised that possibly the resolution had been passed after Nkrumah and Sekou Touré had left Casablanca, a day before the end of the conference (*Ha'aretz, Jan 8*). [There was no evidence to this effect; in any case, both later affirmed that they stood by the resolutions.] "The fact that a very strong anti-Israeli resolution was adopted... shows that our political relations with the countries of Africa and Asia demand unceasing efforts on our part in disseminating information and in constructive acts..." The Casablanca decision, even though its practical implementations are not clear, gives cause for concern." (*Ha'aretz, Jan 9*)

The *Jerusalem Post*, describing the close relations existing between Israel and Ghana and Mali, thought that Abdel Nasser had made the adoption of anti-Israeli resolutions the condition for a common stand on other subjects; thus, for the sake of this unanimity, Presidents Nkrumah and Keita had agreed to join in resolutions against Israel as well as Mauritania, which had been recognized by Ghana a short time before. This stand, however, could hardly be consistent with African policies of neutrality (*Jer. Post, Jan 9*). The Israel Foreign Ministry instructed Israel diplomatic representatives in Ghana, Mali and Guinea to request formal explanations on the resolution. All three countries made known that they stood by the resolutions, while Ghana and Mali also expressed the wish to continue their ties with Israel. (*Jer. Post, Jan 11, 19, 27*; see also: Israel, International Relations: Ghana, Guinea, Mali)

On March 22, an Israel official spokesman said that as relations with Ghana, Guinea and Mali were continuing, the Casablanca resolution was only of a limited importance. (*Jer. Post, March 23*)

Algeria. [On the Algerian question, unanimity reigned, according to all sources.]

It was remarked, however, that in his opening speech King Muhammad surprised his listeners by making an implied claim to the Sahara region of Reggan, regarded by France and the Algerian insurgents as part of Algeria. The King referred to the third French atomic test carried out in that region as having taken place "on a part of the territory of our Kingdom." (*NYT, Jan 5*; text of speech in *Moroccan Embassy, London: News Bulletin, No. 43, Jan*)

In its "Resolution on Algeria" the conference declared its determination to support "by all means" the Algerian people and the Algerian Provisional Government (APG) in their struggle for independence. It termed "any assistance given to France in her war in Algeria" as an "act of hostility directed against Africa as a whole," called on all governments to recognize the APG and "approved" the enlistment of African and other volunteers in the Army of National Liberation. (For sources, see below: Resolutions.)

Mauritania. [Morocco's claim for sovereignty over Mau-

ritania, which had gained independence in Nov 1960, was supported by the Arab countries, Tunisia excepted.] As also mentioned above, one of King Muhammad's motives in calling the conference was thought to have been his wish to canvas support on the question (*Monde, Jan 3*). President Keita raised objections to Morocco's stand, but agreed in the end to the Moroccan resolution. (*Ruz al-Yaumi, Jan 16*)

The resolution adopted defined Mauritania as the southern part of Morocco and stigmatized her as a "puppet state" set up by France; the conference approved "any action taken by Morocco on Mauritania for the restitution of her legitimate rights." (For sources see below: Resolutions.)

Resolutions. In addition to the Communiqué on the Congo and the resolutions on Palestine, Algeria and Mauritania, the conference adopted the following resolutions:

Nuclear Tests: The conference condemned French nuclear tests in Africa, the "collusion between France and Israel with regard to nuclear tests," and invited all African countries "to reconsider their relations with France."

Ruanda Urundi: The conference denounced "Belgian attempts to divide this country," to use it "as a base for aggression," demanded the evacuation of all Belgian forces in the territory and supported the cause of the people of Ruanda Urundi in their struggle for "real independence."

Apartheid and Racial Discrimination: The conference denounced the government of South Africa for "its contempt of the decisions taken by the UN and African and Asian conferences"; denounced the "imperialist powers" who supported this government, and called for sanctions by the UN.

The conference also adopted an "African Charter" for which see below. (For text of resolution see, e.g.: *Casablanca Conference, Jan 1961*, issued by Information Department, UAR; *Colin Legum, Pan Africanism, London, 1961*; *MENA, Jan 8* [10].)

The African Charter of Casablanca provided the basis for the activities of the Casablanca group. Whereas all resolutions were issued in the name of the conference, the Charter was proclaimed by the assembled heads of African states only.

The heads of state proclaimed their "determination to promote the triumph of liberty all over Africa and to achieve its unity," to promote world peace, to adopt the policy of non-alignment, and to liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism; they also proclaimed the necessity for the African states to direct their policies to the exploitation of their national wealth for the benefit of their people and its equitable distribution among the citizens. To promote effective co-operation among the African states they decided on the creation of the following bodies:

The African Consultative Assembly, to be established "as soon as conditions permit," and to comprise representatives of all African states.

The African Political Committee, comprising the heads of state or their representatives.

The African Economic Committee, comprising the ministers of economic affairs.

The African Cultural Committee, comprising the ministers of education.

The Joint African High Command, comprising the chiefs of staff.

Liaison Office, to co-ordinate the activities of the different organizations.

The committees and High Command were to meet periodically to coordinate policies and promote cooperation. The High Command would seek to ensure the common defence of Africa. (For sources see above: Resolutions)

The African High Command was proposed by President Nkrumah, it was reported on the eve of the conference. It was remarked that he probably thought that he would be entrusted with the position of Commander-in-Chief. The Egyptians had agreed to the establishment of the Command with reservations. They had also pointed out that the Command would provide the opportunity to remove from the African armies "the white officers and Israelis." (British officers were especially prominent in the Ghanaian army.) (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, Jan 5)

WORLD REACTIONS AND COMMENTARY

Western Criticism. The Western press disapproved of the conference and its resolutions. The participants were termed "impatient" or "revolutionary Africa" (*Monde*, Jan 3), and the "African dissidents" (*NYT*, Jan 5), and it was thought that the conference was apt to widen the divisions within the continent (*Times*, Jan 3). If the participants had anything in common, it was remarked, it was their strong anti-colonialism (*Daily Express*, London, quoted by *McAerie*, Jan 9). *The New York Times* said the Casablanca group had proclaimed an African "Monroe Doctrine," namely to liquidate with UN help all Western positions in Africa. Comparing President Kasavubu's approach to a Congo solution—a round table conference and reuniting the country on a federal basis—with the alternative of a "centralized dictatorship imposed by force," which was endorsed by the Casablanca group, the paper favoured the former. The paper noted that the group "undertook to dictate to the UN" by threatening to withdraw their contingents from the UN forces unless their demands were met. (*NYT*, Jan 5, 10)

The conference was regarded as a victory for President Abdel Nasser. He had gained a strong condemnation of Israel. The King of Morocco gained similar support for his claim to Mauritania, and Dr Nkrumah was won over by the setting up of the African High Command and the Charter, steps nearer in the direction of his pan-African aspirations. But only Abdel Nasser had to make no concessions. (*Scotsman*, Jan 10). Abdel Nasser was thought to have been more than usually aggressive in his anti-western stand and in his attacks on the UN "to which he owed more than any other leader in the world." (*Washington Post*, Jan 10)

Communist Countries Approve of Conference. Telegrams of support were sent to the conference by PM Khrushchov, PM Chou En-lai, President Tito and Chairman Ulbricht (*Tanyug*, Jan 4 [EE 6]; *ADN*, Jan 2 [EE 4]; *R. Berlin (GDR)*, Jan 6 [EE 9]). Soviet, Eastern European and the Peking radio stations hailed the conference as an anti-imperialist gathering working for a just solution of the Congo problem and the liberation and unity of the African states. (*See BBCM, EE, FE, SU, Jan 1-12*)

In a statement on the Congo and Ruanda Urundi, issued on Jan 11, the Soviet government termed the Casablanca conference "an important event in the struggle for the liberation of Africa from... colonialism." It fully supported the conference's resolutions on the Congo. (*Mizan*, Feb)

Arab Attitudes Divided. [Arab official reactions and press comment reflected the differing attitudes towards the

UAR and her President as well as towards the world powers.]

Abd al-Halîq Hassûnah, the [Egyptian] SG of the Arab League, Ahmad Shukairy, the Saudi Arabian representative at the UN [a Palestinian], Baghdad Radio and papers (but no official Iraqi spokesmen) were among those which had praise for the conference. (*Gumhuriyah*, Jan 6; *Fajr al-Jadid*, Jan 11; *Ahali*, Jan 10; *R. Baghdad Jan 3-IMB*, Jan 4; *R. Baghdad*, Jan 9, 10 [10, 11])

President Bourguiba of Tunisia said in a press interview on the conference: "Such a meeting of a limited number of African States has the disadvantage of demonstrating, or perhaps crystallizing, the divisions between African states, strengthening them and widening them. It involves the risk of creating divisions among the very small group meeting in Casablanca..." He said he was "not in favor of these improvised meetings by Heads of State assembled to run down a country that does not toe the line, and to attack the UN." He thought that "our position is that of the vast majority of the African countries..." (*Afrique Action*, Jan 9)

Amman disparaged the "alleged success of the conference." Amman Radio said Abdel Nasser's "trumpets" were busy building up the conference "as if the solution of the Palestine problem depended on signatures by Ghana, Guinea or Mali." Abdel Nasser had failed to persuade any African leader to take any positive steps which could be termed a victory over Israel. (*R. Amman*, Jan 9 [11])

[While Lebanese pro-UAR papers extolled the conference, other papers were critical, e.g.: *Al-Jaridah* said that Abdel Nasser should appreciate the importance of the coexistence of various African currents and should try to unite them instead of identifying himself with one of them (*Jaridah*, Jan 6). Another paper thought that the reason for the absence of Sudan, Tunisia and Ethiopia from the conference was the UAR policy towards them which made them wish to keep their distance from her. (*Nahar*, Jan 4)]

A resolution of the Baghdad Conference of Arab League Foreign Ministers (Jan 30-Feb 4) requested the member states which had not participated in the Casablanca Conference to consult its resolutions. One country, [probably Tunisia], made a reservation. (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 4 [6]; *Jaridah*, Feb 5)

Brazzaville Group: The Senegal radio and paper condemned the conference as a divisive effort: Whereas the Brazzaville conference had been open to all African countries, Casablanca had been closed to certain countries "because of their realism and moderation." The Africa that met at Casablanca was "carried away by a tempest of sterile passions and various competitions." There was no prospect for isolating the Brazzaville powers. (*R. Dakar*, Jan 11 [13])

Both Dakar and President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast were critical of the linking of Africa to Arab affairs as was the case with the Palestine question: President Houphouët-Boigny said it was the right of Morocco and Egypt to consider that "the Arab League must come before Africa" and to take up at the League level questions that most concerned them. "Indeed not all the Arabs are African. We should like to have it understood, however, that we, too, have some problems to discuss together, first of all among ourselves, without calling for undeserved reproaches or accusations about which the least that can be said is that they are inopportune and unjustified." (*APS Press Agency, Abidjan, Ivory Coast*, Jan 5)

Dakar Radio asked whether the need to escape isolation made it necessary for certain African states to align themselves unconditionally with the stand taken by the Arab League. All Africans were obviously in agreement with the conference's condemnation of racialism. Their only wish was that there should be no exceptions, and

that neither Israel nor any other state should be discriminated against. "It is always possible to unite people or countries against something, but this is not very constructive. Let us beware lest Casablanca should mark another form of imperialism—even racialism." (*R. Dakar*, Jan 10 [12])

ACTIVITIES OF THE CASABLANCA GROUP

ACCRA CONFERENCE ON CONGO

(February 19-22)

Following the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in Katanga (announced on Feb 13) Ghana called for an urgent conference of the political committee of the "African Charter." The foreign ministers of the six signatories of the Charter—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the UAR and the Algerian Provisional Government—met in Accra from Feb 19-24. The ministers were also to discuss the establishment of the committees provided for in the Charter.

[While the conference was meeting, the Security Council too was dealing with the Congo question, and the Lumumba murder in particular. It adopted a resolution sponsored by the UAR, Ceylon and Liberia with which the resolutions adopted at Accra did not correspond. Compare p 639]

In a communiqué issued on Feb 23, the conference supported President Nkrumah's suggestion, made a week before, that the UN Command in the Congo should be reconstituted "with a view to the setting up of an African Command." All diplomatic missions in the Congo should be temporarily withdrawn to give the "African Command" a "fair chance" and eliminate the cold war from the country. The conference affirmed the recognition of the Gizenga government by the participating countries and called on all other countries to exchange missions with it. [The UAR had been the first government to follow the USSR in recognizing the Gizenga government, on Feb 13; meanwhile a number of Communist countries had followed suit.] There were a number of other recommendations. Earlier the conference had resolved to send a letter to the UN Secretary-General demanding that the advance of the "gangs of Mobutu" towards Orientale Province be stopped.

It was also decided to hold a "conference of experts" of the Casablanca group countries in Accra, on March 20. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 23; *R. Rabat*, Feb 21 [24]; *R. Brazzaville*, Feb 22 [24]; see also *Ahram*, Feb 18, 22, 23; *Monde*, Feb 22, 23; *Hayat*, Feb 24)

ACCRA CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS

(April 6-11)

The "conference of experts" originally scheduled for March 20 (see above) met in Accra on April 6. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 7)

[The six signatories to the "African Charter" were joined in this conference by Tunisia.] Libya failed to attend and cabled an apology. (*R. Cairo*, April 15 [18])

"Tunisia Accepts African Charter." According to one Cairo source, Tunisia's approval of the Casablanca resolutions preceded her participation in the Accra conference (*Gumhuriyah*, quot. in *BBCM*, April 11). According to another Cairo report the Tunisian delegate's presence was in accordance with an agreement between Presidents

Nkrumah and Bourguiba. Following a Ghanaian proposal that the UAR delegate should be chairman, the Tunisian representative (her Ambassador in Morocco, *Hayat*, April 5) said that he had been instructed to attend the conference but not to comment on its decisions. In reply the Guinean delegate had said: "Tunisia cannot place one foot inside the conference and the other outside it"; she could not participate unless she declared her approval of the "African Charter." Thereupon the Tunisian delegate declared that his government endorsed the Charter. On his return from Accra, Mahmūd Rīyād, the UAR chief delegate, said, however, that there had been no disagreement over the chairmanship; Tunisia had welcomed the UAR delegate to the chair. (*MENA*, April 9, 12 [11, 14])

Rīyād stated that the experts had drawn up a draft protocol for the coordination of the work of the committees to be established under the "African Charter," as well as draft by-laws for their work, in preparation for the foreign ministers' conference which would meet in Cairo on April 30. The experts would meet for further preparatory work on April 27. (*R. Cairo*, April 15 [18])

CAIRO CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PROTOCOL OF AFRICAN CHARTER

(April 30-May 5)

The conference—which was preceded by a meeting of the experts committee on April 27—took place with the participation of the six signatory countries to the "African Charter." Libya apologized for its absence (*MENA*, April 30 [May 2]). Tunisia did not participate.

Tunisia's Absence. Tunisia, it was reported from Tunis, had decided against participation on the grounds that "little constructive work" could be accomplished by participants holding such widely divergent views (*Mid. Mir.*, May 6). [Tunisia participated in the rival Monrovia conference, see below.] The organ of the Tunisian Neo-Destour party criticized the Cairo conference and contrasted it with the Monrovia conference which represented the majority of states. The paper said the Cairo conference dealt mainly with propaganda, while Africa was in need of action (*Amal*, April 30). On May 2, however, a conference spokesman at Cairo reiterated that Tunisia and Libya had acceded to the treaty [Charter]. (*MENA*, May 2 [4])

Issue of Monrovia Conference. One of the issues discussed at Cairo was the Monrovia conference of African states which met from May 8-13. [19 countries, the majority of independent African countries, were represented at this conference, mostly at the level of heads of state or government. Invitations to the conference—which was to discuss African unity and cooperation, stability and decolonization, the situation in the Congo, Angola,

THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

South Africa and other questions—were sent out at the beginning of April by a number of states, including Guinea and Mali of the Casablanca group. The other Casablanca group members declined the invitations. Later Guinea and Mali also declined to attend, possibly due to Ghanaian influence. Some days before the conference Ghana, Guinea and Mali requested that the conference be postponed, but President Tubman of Liberia—the host of the conference—did not agree.]

On May 3 the Cairo conference issued a statement saying that it had been informed of the invitations to the Monrovia conference and of the request for its postponement. It added that the heads of state of the "African Charter" would participate in all joint actions undertaken by African states for the unity of Africa that agreed with previous resolutions of the conferences of African independent states and the Casablanca conference. (*Ahram, May 4*)

[The Monrovia conference was attended by the 12 UAM states, including Mauritania (the Brazzaville conference group), and by Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia. The six signatories to the "Casablanca African Charter," as well as Libya and Sudan did not attend. The Monrovia resolutions were rather more moderate than those of Casablanca. In regard to inter-African relations they emphasized (not unlike the majority of Arab states in regard to inter-Arab relations) the equality of states, their right to independence of each other as well as to union, respect for territorial integrity and non-intervention in each others internal affairs. As to the Congo, they implicitly opposed the Lumumba regime. The Monrovia conference thus served to crystallize the division of the continent into two camps; on the one hand, the Monrovia group comprising the moderates, both pro-Westerners and neutralists; on the other, the Casablanca group, encompassing a minority of neutralist anti-Western inclined countries, some of them "revolutionary," with the Arab countries predominating.]

UAR broadcasts disparaged the Monrovia conference (*R. Cairo, R. Damascus, May 10 [12]*). Rabat denounced it as imperialist inspired (*R. Rabat, May 12 [15]*). [and President Nkrumah alleged that the majority of African countries represented at Monrovia was "false" and did not reflect the "force and strength of the African masses"; Africans must be ready to reject the established frontiers drawn for the convenience of the colonial powers.]

Conference Encounters Difficulties. The signing of the protocol to the "Casablanca Charter," was officially scheduled for May 4 (*R. Cairo, May 3 [5]*), but was postponed. On May 4 reporters waited for over an hour to record the signing of the protocol before being told that it would not, in fact, be held. Mahmud Riyad told the press that the signing would not take place on the next day either, and when asked regarding May 6, he answered merely, "Who knows?" Some of the delegates expressed pessimism on the score of achieving ultimate accord. It was thought that it was Ghana who was out of step with the majority, both on the African High Command and the Congo issues (*Mid. Mir., May 3*). Ghana reportedly came under criticism for not having put the Casablanca resolutions into effect [for not having withdrawn her troops from the UN Command in the Congo?] and for having continued her relations with Israel as before. (*Daver, Tel-Aviv, May 5*)

Legal difficulties were reported to have cropped up with regard to the ratification of the Charter. The Charter would bind the countries in a way similar to that of the Arab League. But as three of the participants—Ghana, Guinea and Mali—had previously decided on a

union of their states, and as Algeria was not yet independent, only Morocco and the UAR could approve the Charter without problems. (*Monde, May 3*)

The conference ended on May 6; a spokesman said the delegates had approved the text of the protocol to the Charter, but the protocol itself was not produced, and was made public only on May 9. (see below; *Mid. Mir., May 13*)

The Resolutions and Protocol were made public by Mahmud Riyad on May 9. The protocol, Riyad said, was signed by the foreign ministers on the authority of their heads of state and would be ratified by each state according to its constitutional requirements.

The first meetings of the institutions of the Charter were to be held as follows: On July 15, the Economic Committee at Conakry, and the High Command [venue unspecified]; on July 31, the Cultural Committee at Casablanca; the Political Committee before Sept 15 at a venue to be decided through consultations.

Bamako, the capital of Mali, would be the headquarters of the liaison office. The temporary secretary—pending appointment of a permanent secretary by the Political Committee—would be a Moroccan.

The protocol had 19 articles. It reiterated that cooperation within the framework of the "African Charter" would be conducted through the three committees, the High Command and the liaison office; the Political Committee (heads of state or their representatives) would meet once a year, the other bodies—"periodically." It laid down the duties of the liaison office and its head, the secretary—recommending measures for coordination, drafting the budget and secretarial work.

Art. 16 provided that any African state accepting the provisions of the Charter and protocol could become a member upon the approval of the Political Committee.

The member states declared that their international obligations and commitments should not contradict those under the Casablanca Charter and protocol and, in particular, the policy of non-alignment. They undertook to inform the secretary of any agreements and treaties to which they became party.

The protocol could be amended at the request of one member state and the approval of two-thirds of the members with a view to strengthening the relations among the members. The protocol was to become effective when approved by at least two member states. (Full text in *MENA, May 9 [11]*)

AFRICAN COMMAND AND COMMITTEES' MEETINGS

Higher Council of African Joint High Command (Cairo, July 15-28). The six signatories of the "African Charter" were represented in the meeting by high-ranking officers, [not by the chiefs of staff.] (*Ahram, July 16; BBCM, July 18*)

On July 28 the Council released a communiqué saying that at the meetings the Command had organized its bodies, defined their procedures and adopted practical decisions regarding cooperation among the armies of the member states. The situation in Africa had also been considered. There had been complete unanimity of views. The next two meetings would take place in the UAR and Morocco. At the closing meeting, the UAR delegate said that the meeting was laying the basis for the first African military organization for the defence of Africa. (*MENA, July 28 [31]; Ahram, July 29*)

On Aug 30 it was reported that the Political Committee of the Charter had chosen Maj.-Gen. Muhammad

Fawzi, director of the UAR war college, as C-in-C of the African Command (*Ahram*, Aug 30), but this was not confirmed in the communiqué of the Committee, (see below).

In Sept the intention was reported to set up the Command in Accra. (*Ahram*, Sept 24; *Ghanaian Times*, Sept 26; see also below: Political Committee Meeting)

Economic Committee Meeting (Conakry, July 17-21). The UAR was represented by Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysuni, Central Minister of Economy and Finance. Both Qaysuni and President Sekou Touré, who opened the conference, blamed imperialism for the economic backwardness of the African countries. Qaysuni warned against the "danger" of African countries joining the European Common Market, a step which he said would harm their foreign trade and hinder industrialization. He called for an African economic bloc instead, geared to the specific needs of the African countries. (*Ahram*, July 19)

The conference decided on the establishment of a free African trade zone within five years, starting with a 25% reduction in customs duties from Jan 1, 1962. The resolution also included the creation of an African development bank, the signing of an agreement on technical cooperation, the establishment of an African payments union, the bringing about of economic unity to which end a permanent council for economic unity would be established, and the adopting of a common external economic policy. It was also agreed in principle to create a commission for communications to deal with cooperation in posts, telecommunications, and maritime, air, rail, and road transport, to set up joint shipping and air lines, to set up African postal and telecommunications unions, and to establish air routes between the member capitals. Two commemorative postage stamps were to be issued on the first anniversary of the Casablanca conference, one bearing the photograph of the late King Muhammad V, the other in memory of Lumumba.

The next meeting was to be held in Jan 1962. (*R. Rabat*, July 29 [Aug 1]; *R. Cairo*, Aug 1 [3]; *Ahram*, Monde, Aug 2; *Horaya*, Conakry, Aug 22)

The Cultural Committee (Tangier, July 31-Aug 4). The six signatories to the "African Charter" were represented at the meeting.

The conference agreed *inter alia*: to set up a centre for African studies; to convene scientific conferences; to draft an agreement on exchange of teachers and scholarships; to encourage cultural exchange; to hold an African festival; to set up a joint fund for Algerian students;

to hold a census of technical institutions of learning; to establish prizes for scientific achievements; to examine ways of evolving a common policy on technical assistance from the UN and through multi-lateral agreements. (*L'Esor*, Bamako, Aug 1, 11; *R. Rabat*, Aug 5 [8]; *Ahram*, Aug 19, 26)

The Political Committee (Cairo, Aug 28-29). The heads of state of the "African Charter" countries were due to meet in Cairo on Aug 28, preliminary to the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Sept 1-6) which all of them were to attend. President Nkrumah of Ghana and President Sekou Touré of Guinea, however, failed to attend. Nkrumah was on a visit to the USSR, and Touré was reportedly kept at home by a political crisis. Present at the opening were President Abdel Nasser, King Hasan II of Morocco (King Muhammad had died on Feb 26), President Modibo Keita of Mali, PM Yousef Ben Khedda of the APG, and the foreign ministers of Ghana and Guinea. On the suggestion of Abdel Nasser, it was decided to continue the conference at ministerial level. (*Monde*, *Ahram*, Aug 29)

"Usually reliable sources" reported that the meeting had failed to agree on the location of the headquarters of the "African Command." The majority had favoured Cairo but Ghana had suggested Accra. It had been agreed to discuss the matter with President Nkrumah at Belgrade. It was also noted that the communiqué (see below) made no reference to the identity of the commander of the "African Command" though Cairo papers, the previous day, had stated that Maj.-Gen. Fawzi had been appointed to the post. (*Mid. Mir.*, Sept 2)

The communiqué, issued on Aug 30, said the Committee had approved the recommendations of the "African Command" to establish a "Higher Council" of the Command consisting of the chiefs of staff, and to set up a permanent military staff. The Committee approved the "allocation of some forces" from the Charter members for employment by the Command in time of need. The Committee had taken note of the reports submitted by the economic and cultural committees.

The committee also took stands on various African issues: Congo, Angola, the "French aggression against Tunisia" (the Bizerta crisis), Algeria, racial discrimination, the "danger" to Africa from European economic groupings, "the attitude of imperialist powers in Africa and their disguise behind agents." The Committee welcomed the adherence of other African states to the Charter. (*MENA*, Aug 30 [Sept 1])

THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

SYNOPSIS

The Belgrade Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held on Sept 1-6; it was attended by heads of state or representatives of 25 countries: Afghanistan, the Algerian Provisional Government (APG), Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (L), Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, the UAR, Yemen and Yugoslavia.

Three Latin-American countries, Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador, were represented by observers.

Thirteen of the 25 countries represented were predom-

inantly Muslim. Nine participants were Arab, but three members of the Arab League were not represented—Jordan, Kuwait and Libya. The Communist, SEATO and CENTO countries among the ME and Asian countries had, of course, not been invited, as was the case with Israel (though she fitted the requirements of non-alignment specified by the preparatory conference.) Sub-Saharan Africa was represented by a minority of countries—half of them being members of the Casablanca group. Cuba was the sole participant from the Americas, and Yugoslavia the sole country from Europe.

The conference was sponsored by President Abdel Nasser of the UAR and President Tito of Yugoslavia. Re-

ports that those two leaders were contemplating the idea of a neutralist conference first appeared in February and March. Tito was said to have conceived the idea in 1959, when he was at odds with both the USSR and People's China, while President Sukarno of Indonesia, and originally also Abdel Nasser, were said to have wished for a new Afro-Asian conference on the pattern of the Bandung conference (at which People's China was represented). PM Nehru of India, however, the dean of the neutralist leaders, had opposed both a neutralist and a Bandung type conference, and in particular any attempt at forming a third world bloc.

The UAR's view was, it was later explained in Cairo, that in the face of the world crisis (Congo, Cuba, Berlin), the non-aligned countries must save the peace. For the United Nations was ineffective and so were the regional groupings of Afro-Asian states; the latter were divided among themselves, and some of them were tied to the West. (On the political divisions in Africa which had recently emerged see under: The Casablanca Conference, above.) The UAR's growing interest in Latin America was also noted in connection with the conference. An Indian correspondent in Cairo said the UAR felt that by virtue of internal stability and political vigour she had qualified herself for leadership among the "wobbly regimes" of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The decisive step was taken in April when Abdel Nasser and Tito met in Cairo. The Bandung idea, which Sukarno continued to sponsor, was shelved, and India was confronted with a *fait accompli*, namely the consent to a neutralist summit of other countries besides the two sponsors. Abdel Nasser and Tito jointly issued invitations to a preparatory conference in Cairo; Sukarno later became a co-sponsor, but Nehru, it was reported, declined the honour. Several explanations were proffered for Nehru's attitude: fear that "hot-headed" neutralists might split the Afro-Asian group; the wish not to annoy the powers on whose assistance India's development plans depended and to whom she might also be looking for support against China; India's "increased isolation" among the neutrals as a result of her policy of moderation, especially in the Congo crisis; and the view that the neutralists would not be able to influence big-power attitudes on decisive questions.

The preparatory conference met in Cairo in June, with the participation of the countries which later attended the Belgrade conference, except Congo (L), Cyprus, Lebanon and Tunisia, who had not been invited. Three Latin American countries who had been invited did not attend: Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. It was reported that three attitudes, which had been emerging among the neutralists for some time, were expressed in groupings at the conference: A "leftist" attitude represented mainly by the three members of the Casablanca group from sub-Saharan Africa—Ghana, Guinea and Mali—as well as by Cuba; a "rightist" group headed by India, and a middle of the road group—nearer, however to the "leftist"—headed by the sponsors, the UAR and Yugoslavia. Controversy arose over such questions as the seating of the rebel governments of the APG and the Stanleyville regime to which India objected; argument also ranged over the invitations—India seeking wide participation, the "leftists" wishing to confine it, and, on similar lines, over the definition of non-alignment. The "middle of the roaders" helped in achieving compromise. The conference adopted a 7-point agenda for the Belgrade conference, concerning the struggle against imperialism, non-intervention in internal affairs of states, racial discrimination, disarmament, peaceful coexistence,

the role of the UN, and problems of economic development.

The Cairo conference referred the question of invitations to an ambassadorial committee, meeting at Cairo, where the Indian approach was defeated. Eight countries in addition to the original 22 were invited: Cyprus and Lebanon; Nigeria, Tanganyika, Togo and Upper Volta; Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico. Only the first two accepted; the last three sent observers.

The Belgrade conference lasted from Sept 1-6. On the eve of its opening, the conference was confronted by an unforeseen issue when the Soviet Union announced its decision to resume nuclear tests. Abdel Nasser was the first speaker to refer to the issue, expressing his "shock" at the Soviet step.

The three differing attitudes among the neutralists re-emerged at Belgrade, though there was apparently no rigid alignment on these lines. A major change from Cairo was that Tito now joined the "African group" or "leftists," and consequently Abdel Nasser was seen to have emerged as the foremost "middle of the roaders" and mediator; his relative moderation was duly noted in the West and especially in the US. Iraq, which was in conflict with the West over Kuwait and questions of oil, joined the "leftists" and took an extreme anti-Western stance.

The divergent attitudes emerged on all major questions. Regarding the role of the non-aligned countries in the world conflict, it was generally agreed that these countries should not constitute a third world bloc, but should actively participate in world affairs, especially in the preservation of peace. Differences arose, however, as to whether the world crisis or the traditional themes of colonialism, racism, etc. should have priority; Nehru adopted the first line and Sukarno the second. Also, Nehru, in contrast to some of the leftists, thought that the capacity of the neutralists to intervene in the world conflict was strictly limited.

On the German question Nehru joined the "leftists"—Cuba, Ghana, Indonesia and Iraq—in declaring that the existence of the two German states must be recognized; Nehru, though, was reported to have opposed a formal resolution to this effect. Abdel Nasser, on the other hand, emphasized that the division was artificial.

On the question of the UN almost all participants thought that some structural reforms were needed, as well as changes in the composition of the UN's organs, in view of its many new members. Tito and Nkrumah proposed that the power of the Secretary-General (SG) be limited; Nkrumah also reiterated the proposal he had made at the UN to appoint three deputy SGs, on the lines of the Soviet "troika" proposal. Tunisia and Somalia, on the other hand, favoured a strong SG. Abdel Nasser in his public speech did not commit himself on this point.

The Arab's proposal for the condemnation of Israel was defeated; foremost among its opponents was PM U Nu of Burma.

The conference issued a separate Statement on the Danger of War and Appeal for Peace, in accordance with the attitude of Nehru. On the other hand, the first 14 resolutions of the General Declaration of Heads of State or Government—out of a total of 27—dealt with imperialism and related issues, in accordance with the Indonesian stand. The declaration supported general and controlled disarmament; it was believed that Nehru had secured endorsement for the Western position that disarmament must be founded on control. The declaration called for accelerated economic development, and eco-

nomic cooperation between the developing countries to resist pressures from the industrial countries. As regards the UN, the declaration urged that the membership of the Security Council and ECOSOC be expanded, and a "more appropriate" structure of the secretariat; the question of the Secretary-General was not mentioned. Those participants who recognized People's China recommended her admission to the UN. On the German problem and Berlin, the conference urged the powers not to resort to force to solve the question.

The conference also addressed identical letters to President Kennedy and PM Khrushchov, urging them to hold direct negotiations to arrest the deterioration in the international situation. Nehru and Nkrumah were chosen to deliver the letter to PM Khrushchov, while Keita and Sukarno carried it to President Kennedy. Both the statesmen sent non-committal replies.

Western comment on the conference said the value of the neutralists' opinion had been "debased": the conference had fallen dismally short of its opportunities, especially in regard to the reaction to Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. At the same time it was noted that the neutrals had been "far less enthusiastic" about Com-

munist than had been the case at Bandung. It was also remarked that the "non-aligned had remained largely unaligned even among themselves."

Soviet comment presented the conference as endorsing Soviet policies. Communist China praised the attitude of the "leftists" and condemned those who advocated priority for questions of peace and war over questions of colonialism, especially Nehru, and, of course, Tito.

In November a short meeting took place in Cairo between Presidents Abdel Nasser and Tito and PM Nehru. Since the Belgrade conference Abdel Nasser had experienced the Syrian secession, and Tito thought himself under heavy pressure from both East and West; both were looking for support. Nehru, who was on his way home from a visit to the US, was reported to have been a reluctant partner to the meeting, and to have restricted the scope of talks and resolutions. The joint communiqué, which Western observers termed "tranquillizing," mentioned the need for strengthening means of economic cooperation. Tito was thought to have in mind a neutralist economic conference, to which Nehru was said to object, but which indeed met in 1962.

PRELIMINARIES

YUGOSLAV-UAR INITIATIVE

(February-May)

Abdel Nasser's Plans and Contacts. In Feb it was reported from Cairo and New Delhi that Abdel Nasser was contemplating a summit conference of non-aligned countries to discuss world problems, with special emphasis on the Congo crisis. He was reported to be in contact with various heads of states, including Nehru, Tito, Nkrumah and Sekou Touré. (*Hayat*, Feb 17)

The UAR approach was explained at a later date by Hassanain Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*. The struggle between East and West, he wrote, demanded the existence of a "third opinion (*ra'y*) or a free opinion capable of opening an impartial road for the peaceful development of events." Haykal mentioned, in particular, the struggle along "the line separating the two blocs" in Southeast Asia, Iran, Turkey, Algeria, Angola, Congo and Cuba. The Cuban revolution was having a violent impact throughout Latin America. These countries were now being swept by waves of struggle for social progress and liberation from imperialism. On these borders the world faced the threat of armed clashes which might, by miscalculation, develop into an atomic war. Who would avert this danger?

The UN, "simply a group of nations," was incapable of saving anyone; it needed saving itself. Experience had proved that a regional grouping of Afro-Asian states was also ineffective, as they were divided among themselves and there were African states tied to Britain and France. Moreover, the problems facing the world were not restricted to Asia and Africa, the question now was peace or war. There remained only the non-aligned countries to take up the cause of peace. (*Ahram*, May 26)

A Western correspondent in Cairo noted, in connection with the conference, Abdel Nasser's growing interest in Latin America. (*NYT*, May 5)

UAR Claims "Role of Leadership" Among Neutralists. According to K. L. Khanna, *The Times of India* cor-

respondent in Cairo, the UAR felt that "by combining stability with political vigour it has qualified itself for a role of leadership among the wobbly regimes of three continents": Africa, Asia and Latin America. Cairo divided the neutralists into three trends: the "left neutralists" like Guinea, Ghana and Mali; the "right neutralists" like India, Burma and Ceylon; and the hard-core "middle-roads," with the UAR and Yugoslavia in the van. The acceptance by the UAR of these distinctions had "engendered a new mood of tolerance in Cairo that has taken many Western observers here by surprise." The UAR approach to the neutralist summit was thus a flexible one. (*Times of India*, May 20)

Nehru Disagrees with Tito, Abdel Nasser and Sukarno. *The Observer* wrote later that Tito, Abdel Nasser and Sukarno had been trying for two years to persuade Nehru to join in sponsoring a summit conference of non-aligned nations. Tito was said to have conceived the idea in 1959, when the USSR and People's China had launched a campaign to discredit Yugoslavia in Africa, while Abdel Nasser and Sukarno had been hoping for a repetition of the Bandung Conference. Nehru was said to have opposed any conference resembling Bandung, or any attempt to constitute a new bloc between East and West. (*Observer*, May 7, June 11)

K. L. Khanna said, however, that Abdel Nasser, though basically in sympathy with the approach of Yugoslavia and Indonesia, had "faithfully echoed Mr. Nehru's view that such a conference would do more harm than good."

In Feb 1961, Khanna continued, Abdel Nasser had sounded Nehru once again, but the latter had said that the time was inopportune because of the Congo situation, the changing US policy towards the uncommitted countries and other international developments. If a neutralist summit conference should be attempted at all at a later time, he reportedly indicated, it should be a representative gathering of a world-wide movement and not of a few "hot-headed" Afro-Asians alone. (*Times of India*, May 20)

Indonesia Proposes Bandung-type Conference. The next step, Khanna wrote, was an Indonesian proposal, made in Cairo in March, envisaging two stages: a conference of Cuba, Ghana, India, Indonesia, the UAR and Yugoslavia, to be followed by a Bandung-type Afro-Asian meeting. (*Times of India*, May 20; on Sukarno's initiative see also *Eg. Gaz.*, March 21)

At the same time it was reported that President Tito had sent a letter to Abdel Nasser suggesting a conference of neutral states to discuss the international situation and Afro-Asian problems. This was followed by consultations between Yugoslavia, India, Indonesia and the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, March 24-*IMB*, March 24)

Tito and Abdel Nasser Sponsor Conference. The decisive step was taken when Tito visited the UAR from April 17 to 22, at the end of an African tour. At this meeting with Abdel Nasser, it was reported, the Bandung idea was shelved and the number of countries to be invited enlarged to 21. India was said to have indicated that she could not oppose the proposal even if she was not enthusiastic about it; Cairo had faced her with the consent in advance of Sudan, Ethiopia and Brazil. (*Times of India*, May 20)

In a joint communiqué issued on April 21, Abdel Nasser and Tito expressed "deep concern regarding the . . . developments in international relations and the serious stage these relations have reached as a result of recent events" (failure of disarmament talks, the situation in the Congo, Algeria and Laos, and "foreign interference in Cuba"). They believed that "contacts and consultations among the neutral powers" were "imperative for the strengthening of world peace, the safeguarding of the independence of all nations, and the elimination of the danger resulting from interference in the affairs of any state. These consultations must help strengthen economic, cultural and technical cooperation for the good of the people of those nations and the entire family of nations." (*R. Cairo*, April 22 [25])

Abdel Nasser and Tito jointly invited heads of state to participate in a preparatory conference in Cairo. (*R. Cairo*, April 30-*IMB*, April 30; *NYT*, May 5)

On May 12 it was reported in Cairo that Sukarno had become co-sponsor of the conference.

It was understood that Nehru had also been invited to act as co-sponsor, but had felt that it would not be proper for him to join in the invitations already extended. (*Times of India*, May 13, 18)

Abdel Nasser-Touré-Sukarno Talks. On May 15 Sekou Touré and Sukarno (who were paying state visits to the UAR) and Abdel Nasser held talks in Cairo which were referred to as a "little summit." An official source said later that the three were "in complete agreement" concerning the forthcoming conference. The communiqué issued at the end of Touré's visit (May 17) expressed the belief that an effort should be made to expand the front of non-aligned nations "so that it may embrace the largest possible number of countries in the world." (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 18; *Arab Obs.*, May 21)

Controversy Starts Over Participants. Since the Abdel Nasser-Tito meeting, it was reported in mid-May, "confusion galore" had developed on the question of the participants and the agenda. [Controversy was to continue in the preparatory conference and afterwards.] Tito wanted Abdel Nasser to patch up inter-Arab differences and invite President Bourguiba of Tunisia. Supported by In-

donesia, he also favoured better representation for Europe, with the participation of countries like Ireland, Finland and Sweden.

Indonesia thought Uruguay and Bolivia should be included. Many Afro-Asians looked askance at the "snub administered to Lebanon" by leaving her out. Some wanted Nigeria and Malaya to come in. Cairo was throwing out feelers with a view to inviting the Algerian Provisional Government and the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville, Congo.

There was little evidence anywhere that "a constructive mind" was being applied to the purpose of the forthcoming conference, this report concluded. (*Times of India*, May 20)

India Still Reluctant; Awaiting Outcome of Preparatory Meeting. On May 18 Nehru told the press that India would attend the Cairo preparatory meeting and might attend the main conference, but had no intention to accept an invitation just yet. (*Times of India*, May 19)

India's position was that adequate steps must be taken to ensure success; the conference should be as representative as possible; it should not function as a bloc or take up a rigid attitude. (*Indian Express*, June 1)

In Cairo, it was reported, the "uncharitable" implied that this caution sprang from a desire to avoid annoying the great powers, on whose aid India's third five-year plan depended.

Others explained it, however, as due to the fear that a "capricious grouping of neutralist states" might lead to a split in the Afro-Asian bloc, and to scepticism as to whether decisions of a neutralist summit conference could influence big-power attitudes on questions like Laos and disarmament. (*Times of India*, May 20)

Nehru's qualified consent was thought to be due to India's increased isolation, as a result of her policy of moderation and mediation in the UN, especially her attitude in the Congo crisis. Besides, she was looking for support against China. (*Observer*, May 7, June 11)

It was thus reportedly "known" in Cairo that the UAR, Yugoslavia and Indonesia felt that they could have the conference they wanted and that New Delhi could not help but "welcome" it. (*Times of India*, May 20)

THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE IN CAIRO

(June 5-13)

The countries represented at the preparatory conference by ambassadors or special envoys were: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, the UAR, Yugoslavia and the Algerian Provisional Government. Brazil was represented by observers. The UAR Foreign Minister, Fawzi, presided over the sessions, which were closed to the press; Subandrio and Popovic, FM's of Indonesia and Yugoslavia respectively, were vice-presidents. (*Doc. Belg.*; this source, however, did not mention Yemen, who was given as a participant by all other sources; see e.g. *Arab Obs.*, June 18.)

Countries Not Invited or Declining to Attend. Venezuela and Argentina, who were invited, did not participate.

Mexico, who was approached a week before the meeting, when the UAR and Yugoslavian ambassadors called on President Mateos Lopez, was not represented either. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 1)

[Cyprus was apparently not invited.]

According to *Ruz al-Yusuf*, Malaya, Pakistan, and Nigeria could not be invited as they were members of military or semi-military pacts. On the other hand, the paper said, the fact that India, Ceylon, and Ghana were members of the British Commonwealth did not interfere with their policies of non-alignment, as it was not a political organization. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, May 15, 22)

Uninvited Arab Countries: Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan. *Ruz al-Yusuf* explained that Abdel Nasser and Tito had rejected these countries for the following reasons:

Although Lebanon had declared herself a non-aligned state, she had in practice followed Western policies. For example, she had voted at the UN against the admission of Communist China. [See MER 1960, p 78.]

Libya's non-alignment had become questionable after she had left the Casablanca Conference. (See p 54a.)

Tunisia and Jordan had made it quite clear that they were following the policies of the West.

Although countries like Morocco and Saudi Arabia did maintain foreign bases on their territory, the paper argued that they could still be considered non-aligned, as the bases had been established before they had attained independence, and against the wishes of their governments and peoples. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, May 15, 22)

Question of Lebanese Participation and Lebanese Neutralism. On May 14 Philippe Tagla, the Lebanese FM, told the parliamentary foreign affairs committee that Lebanon had been sounded on participation but had not yet decided. (*Hayat*, May 17)

On June 6 when the preparatory meeting in Cairo was already in session, Tagla told the committee that he did not know on what basis some countries were regarded as qualified to attend the Cairo meeting; the term neutralism could be widely interpreted, as each country followed its own policy of neutralism. Pressed to define Lebanon's neutralism, Tagla explained it as follows: Lebanon did not prefer one country to another; she dealt with them equally in accordance with "mutual friendship and esteem" and "the changing international situation." However, Lebanon would not allow foreign bases to be established on her territory by any power, or enter into alliances with any foreign power or bloc, which would affect her freedom to determine her own policies. Lebanon regarded herself as bound only by the Arab League Charter, the Arab Joint Defence Pact and the UN Charter (*Hayat*, June 7). [Later, certain Arab countries proposed the invitation of Lebanon; see below.]

Issues Discussed in Cairo; Major Divisions Among Participants. (The major issues at the preparatory meeting were: the invitation to the present meeting of the Algerian Provisional Government (APG) and the Stanleyville (Congo) government of Antoine Gizenga; the countries to be invited to the main conference—a problem which involved the definition of non-alignment—; and the agenda. There were serious differences on all these issues. The question of venue also had to be determined.)

The major groups were those already defined by an Indian observer in May (see above): the "African" or "left neutralists" group, headed by Ghana, Guinea and Mali; the "Indian" or "right neutralists" group; and the "compromise" or "middle of the road" group, headed by the sponsors, the UAR and Yugoslavia (*Times of India*, June 12). (In fact, however, the basic approach of the "middle of the road group" was nearer to that of the

African group, while Cuba might also be classified with the "leftists.")

[This division was also reflected in the fact that draft resolutions were usually presented by the "left" and "right" groups, while the UAR and Yugoslavia appeared only in the final drafting committees.] Thus draft definitions of non-alignment were presented by Guinea, India, Indonesia and Cuba, while Yugoslavia was added to these countries to frame the final draft. Similarly, on the agenda, drafts were presented by Guinea, Ghana, Cuba, Indonesia, Ceylon and India, while the drafting committee consisted of India, Guinea and the UAR. (*MENA*, June 11 [14])

The debates, which lasted three days longer than scheduled, were variously described as "extremely lively" (by a Yugoslav source) and as "protracted and heated" (by an Indian source). Another Indian observer said that the conference had "deteriorated into a farce." (*Times of India*, June 12; *Tanyug*, June 10 [14]; *Hindu*, Madras, June 18)

India Opposes Seating of Stanleyville and APG. The seating of these two governments [which had already been sponsored by the UAR in May—see above] was one of the first questions debated. The invitation of the APG was proposed by the Arab countries and Ghana. In the vote taken by the Committee of 11 (see below) on June 7, all members were in favour except India, who abstained on the ground that she did not recognize the Algerian regime. The Algerian delegation was subsequently seated. (*Times of India*, June 8)

The invitation of the Stanleyville regime was proposed on June 7 by Ghana, Ceylon and Iraq. India again objected, with the support of Burma, Ethiopia, Nepal, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The UAR tried to mediate, and it was decided to debate the question at the conference itself. (*Times*, June 9; *Observer*, June 11)

Controversy Over Invitations to Belgrade Conference; Decision Deferred. Controversy arose over the countries to be invited to the Belgrade Conference. As the plenary meeting could not agree on the issue, it was referred to a sub-committee of 11 members (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, the UAR and Yugoslavia). On June 8 the committee was enlarged to include Ceylon and Ghana. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 8, 9; *Mid. Mir.*, June 10)

From fragmentary reports of the discussions the following details emerge.

The African group, led by Guinea and Ghana, wanted to confine participation to countries attending the preparatory meeting, with the addition of the APG and the Stanleyville regime. India, while opposing these two additions, insisted on broad participation. The UAR, Yugoslavia and Indonesia, although sympathizing with the African view, suggested, as a compromise, the inclusion of a few more countries on an *ad hoc* basis. The UAR reportedly suggested the APG, Congo (L), Lebanon and several Latin-American states. An earlier report said that Lebanon had previously been proposed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Cuba and Iraq also proposed the inclusion of Libya and Malaya.

India rejected the UAR proposals, while the UAR indicated that she would resist India's attempt to further enlarge participation. A MENA despatch on June 14 said that it was not so much the number of powers attending the conference that counted as the principle of non-alignment; a deviation from this principle would diminish the value of the conference.

THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

At India's insistence it was decided that after the closing of the preparatory meeting (on June 13) an ambassadorial committee would be set up in Cairo to decide on further invitations. (*Times of India*, June 8, 11, 12, 15; *Indian Express*, June 8; *Eg. Gaz.*, June 15)

Controversy Over Definition of Non-Alignment. The question of participation necessitated a definition of non-alignment. [Here again the above divisions reappeared.]

Guinea suggested three major criteria: the country concerned should have officially proclaimed non-alignment; it should apply this policy in its internal and international affairs; it should not be a member of any military alliance or allow foreign military bases on its territory.

Indonesia, supported by most delegates, specified non-participation in bilateral or multilateral military alliances and the banning of foreign military bases on national territory.

India favoured a more flexible definition, which would have permitted nations having foreign bases on their soil against their will to attend. She insisted, however, that only UN members should qualify. This broad definition of non-alignment was supported by Cambodia and Afghanistan, the strongest opponents being Ghana, Guinea and Mali. The UAR and Indonesia played the role of conciliators. (*Observer*, June 11; *Times of India*, June 12)

Non-Alignment Defined. The final criteria of non-alignment, adopted after lengthy discussions, specified that:

1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems and on non-alignment, or should be showing a trend towards such a policy.

2. The country concerned should be a consistent supporter of national independence movements.

3. It should not be a member of any military alliance in the context of great-power conflicts.

4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a great power or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement with the great power should not have been deliberately concluded in the context of great-power conflicts.

5. If the country has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of great-power conflicts. (*Times of India*, June 15)

The *Times of India* regarded the definition as a partial victory for India, because these criteria, if liberally applied, would make many other countries eligible. India had, however, made a concession by agreeing to the participation of non-members of the UN. (*Times of India*, June 12)

Debate on Agenda. The central problem in deciding on the agenda was whether to admit only subjects of broad international significance or also to include specific issues. India insisted that the conference should aim at broad understanding on larger world issues, like disarmament, banning of nuclear tests, racialism, colonialism and the structure of the UN, rather than purely regional problems, like Mauritania and Palestine.

Even on the world issues, however, India believed that the conference should not take up rigid positions. While promoting cooperation, it should not try to commit the participants to particular lines of action against their will. The Indian view was opposed by the "extremists," who wished to adopt definite policies on particular issues. (*Times of India*, June 9, 12)

The provisional agenda which was finally adopted was couched in general terms (see below).

Egyptian sources, however, said it was understood that under the heading of "terminating colonialism" the conference would discuss the Congo, Angola, Palestine and West Iran. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 14)

An Indian observer commented that this apparently meant that UAR intended to trade support on local issues in the ambassadorial committee. (*Times of India*, June 15)

Agenda for Belgrade Conference Adopted. The following provisional agenda was adopted:

Exchange of views on the international situation; consolidation and strengthening of international peace and security:

1. Respect for the right of the peoples and nations to self-determination; the struggle against imperialism; liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism;

2. Respect for the territorial sovereignty and integrity of states; non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states;

3. Racial discrimination and apartheid;

4. General and complete disarmament; prohibition of nuclear tests, problem of foreign military bases;

5. Peaceful coexistence between states with different political and social systems;

6. Role and composition of the United Nations and the implementation of its resolutions;

7. Problems of unequal economic development; improvement of international economic and technical cooperation. (*Doc. Belg.*)

Belgrade Chosen as Venue. On June 9 it was agreed to hold the conference in Yugoslavia. [The Yugoslav town of Bled, which had originally been fixed as the venue, was later replaced by Belgrade.] Other proposals had been: Havana, proposed by Cuba alone; and Cairo, proposed by Guinea and supported by Yemen, Mali and Morocco. (*Tanyug*, June 10 [14])

CAIRO COMMITTEE ON INVITATIONS

(June-August)

Cairo Ambassadorial Committee to Determine Invitations. The committee to determine the countries to be invited to the conference consisted of the diplomatic representatives of the participants in the preparatory meeting. It was set up in Cairo under UAR chairmanship. It held its first meeting on June 21. (*Observer*, June 13; *Eg. Gaz.*, June 22)

India's Insistence on Wide Participation Overruled. India suggested that 19 additional states be invited: Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, Brazil, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Malaya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta and Togo.

The Cuban delegate who, it was reported, had set himself up as an arbitrator on invitations to Latin-American countries, alleged that India deliberately wanted to vitiate the non-aligned and anti-imperialist character of the conference. He was supported by Guinea and Mali who, according to *The Times of India*, received the silent support of the UAR and Yugoslavia. The Indian proposals were supported by six or seven delegates. The committee's deliberations, described as 30 hours of "acrimonious discussions," were concluded only in mid-July,

with the addition of eight countries to the original 22. They were: Lebanon, Nigeria, Upper Volta, Togo, Ecuador, Tanganyika, Cyprus and Bolivia. Invitations were also renewed to Mexico and Brazil.

An Indian observer thought that, though the Indian approach had been defeated, at least approximate equality had been achieved between those favouring the "liberal Indian" approach and the other, more extreme nationalists. (*Times of India*, June 22, 26; *Observer*, July 9; *Statesman*, Calcutta, Aug 19)

Formal invitations were issued by Yugoslavia, following soundings by her and by the UAR. (*Times of India*, July 27). [Of the additional countries, only Lebanon and Cyprus accepted. Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador sent observers.]

Tunisia Invited After Bizerta Crisis. Tunisia [who initially had not been approached] was invited through the mediation of Sudan. On Aug 8 it was reported that, after ascertaining that Tunisia wished to attend, President Abud had formally suggested to President Tito that Tunisia be invited. (*R. Umdurman*, Aug 8; *R. Tunis*, Aug 9 [10])

On Aug 11 President Bourguiba delivered a policy declaration emphasizing that Tunisia's foreign policy was based on the principle of non-alignment with any bloc. He added that after the "battle of Bizerta" the causes of estrangement between the UAR and Tunisia had altogether disappeared and that complete understanding prevailed between them. [See also p 172a.] (*R. Tunis*, Aug 11 [14])

On Aug 17 Bourguiba stated that Tunisia had accepted an invitation to Belgrade. (*MENA*, Aug 17 [19])

Cyprus Accepts Invitation Over Opposition of Turkish Cabinet Members. On Aug 22 the Cypriot cabinet decided by a majority, consisting of the Greek members, to participate in the conference. The Turkish members opposed the decision, it was reported, insisting that the constitution linked Cyprus to the Western camp through her attachments to the UK, Greece and Turkey. (*Cyprus Mail*, Aug 23; *Reuters*, Jer. Post, Aug 23)

Vice-President Fazil Küçük later said that, though he had not used his veto against participation, the Turkish community continued to object to it. (*Cyprus Mail*, Aug 25)

On his way to Belgrade, Makarios said in Athens (Aug 30) that he could not guess why the Turkish-Cypriots were against participation. He denied rumours that the UK, Turkey and Greece had attempted to dissuade him from going to Belgrade. (*Times*, Aug 31)

European Neutrals Not Participating. Private soundings in Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Finland and Switzerland showed that all except the latter were interested, but preferred not to be invited until they saw how the first conference shaped. (*Observer*, Sept 3)

When asked why Switzerland or Sweden were not invited at least as observers, Abdel Nasser replied that these countries "have made us feel that they would not

participate even if they were invited. Thus it would be better not to embarrass them by inviting them as long as they don't wish to attend." (*MENA*, Aug 13 [15])

India Delays Decision. [The Indian decision to attend came only at the end of July.]

On July 27 it was reported that PM Nehru had sent a message to Abdel Nasser and Tito, re-emphasizing the Indian view on the need to avoid the impression that a restricted neutralist bloc was being created. The conference should discuss world problems in the context of the East-West conflict and not get lost in petty disputes of local significance, he said.

The message was understood to convey New Delhi's annoyance at the failure of the Cairo preparatory meeting to give due weight to the Indian view. It was assumed that India's final decision would depend on the replies received. (*Statesman*, Calcutta, July 29; *Times of India*, July 30)

Casablanca Group Meeting in Cairo; Indian Protest. A meeting of the Casablanca group (the APG, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR) took place in Cairo on the eve of the Belgrade Conference (Aug 27-28). [See p 56b; the meeting was described as routine but was widely understood to be designed to rally the group in preparation for Belgrade.] While a MENA despatch on Aug 24 on the draft agenda for the meeting made no mention of Belgrade (*MENA*, Aug 24 [26]), President Keita of Mali declared on Aug 25 that the Cairo discussions would "serve to formulate certain special ideas to be taken to Belgrade." (*R. Bamako*, Aug 25 [28])

India reportedly sent a note to the UAR, Yugoslavia and Indonesia stating that it was not desirable that the heads of the Casablanca group should meet immediately before the Belgrade Conference. Spokesmen of the Casablanca group explained, however, that the Cairo Conference had been envisaged long before the Belgrade Conference and that it would be confined to African matters. (*Times of India*, Aug 20)

The *Observer* wrote that India was afraid that the Casablanca group might try to swing the conference to their side. The paper thought that the position of this group on the Berlin question could be of decisive importance, because it operated as a caucus in international affairs. (*Observer*, Aug 6, 27)

India Plans Pre-Belgrade Talks in Delhi. India invited Asian heads of state to stop over in New Delhi for consultation on their way to Belgrade (*Times of India*, Aug 20). The *Times* wrote that India expected to do a little lobbying before the conference. However, only King Mahendra of Nepal and U Nu of Burma arrived in Delhi, on Aug 28. It was disclosed that Mrs Bandaranaike of Ceylon had declined the invitation and so did Sukarno who, according to *The Times*, resented Nehru's opposition to his idea of regarding Belgrade as another Bandung Conference. (*Times*, Aug 29)

THE CONFERENCE

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEEDINGS

(September 1-6)

Participation. 25 participants and three observers attended the conference, which opened on Sept 1.

Following are the heads of delegations: *Afghanistan*, Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan, PM; *Algerian Provisional Government*, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, PM; *Burma*, U NU, PM; *Cambodia*, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State; *Ceylon*, Mrs Sirimavo R. Bandaranaike, PM; *Congo (Léopoldville)*, Cyrille Adoula, PM (arrived, together with Antoine Gizenga, his deputy, only on Sept 4); *Cuba*, Oswaldo Dorticos Torrado, President; *Cyprus*, Archbishop Makarios, President; *Ethiopia*, Emperor Haile Selassie; *Ghana*, Kwame Nkrumah, President; *Guinea*, Beavogui Luis Lansana, FM; *India*, Jawaharlal Nehru, PM; *Indonesia*, Ahmed Sukarno, President; *Iraq*, Hashim Jawid, FM; *Lebanon*, Sâ'ih Slâm, PM; *Mali*, Modibo Keita, PM; *Morocco*, King Hassan II; *Nepal*, King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva; *Saudi Arabia*, Shaykh Ibrahim as-Suwayl, FM; *Somalia*, Adan Abdullah Osman, President; *Sudan*, Ibrahim Abbud, President; *Tunisia*, Habib Bourguiba, President; *UAR*, Gamal Abdel Nasser, President; *Yemen*, Prince Sayf al-Islam al-Hasan; *Yugoslavia*, Josip Broz Tito, President.

Observers: *Bolivia*, Jose Fellman Velarde, Minister of Education; *Brazil*, De Melo Franco Filho, Ambassador to Switzerland; *Ecuador*, Jose Joaquin Silva, Ambassador in Bonn. (*Dac. Belg.*)

Heads of State Absent From Conference. PM Qasim did not attend (although specially urged by Tito and Sukarno), reportedly because of preoccupation with the oil negotiations, which were resumed on Aug 24 (*Times*, Aug 17). King Saud was prevented from attending for health reasons (*R. Mecca*, Aug 25 [28]). President Sekou Touré of Guinea, one of the firm supporters of the conference, was held up at the last moment by an internal political crisis. (*R. Cairo*, Aug 29-IMB, Aug 30; *Economist*, Sept 9)

Proceedings. The conference was opened on the morning of Sept 1, in the Federal Peoples' Assembly Building in Belgrade. President Tito delivered the opening address. The report of the Committee for Organizational Matters was unanimously accepted. All heads of delegations took part in the general debate (Congo was allowed two speeches, by PM Adoula and his deputy, Gizenga), which covered 14 open plenary sessions. In two closed sessions the heads of the delegations, each accompanied by one adviser, adopted the documents of the conference, which had been prepared by a drafting committee. The documents were approved at the closing session on Sept 6.

Messages to the Conference. Hundreds of messages and telegrams were received from political parties, movements, organizations and individuals. The only Western head of state who sent a message was President Kennedy. From the Eastern bloc, messages arrived from PM Khrushchov of the USSR, PM Chou En-lai of the Chinese Peoples' Republic, and the governments of Bulgaria and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (*Dac. Belg.*). (For a full list see *Dac. Belg.*, pp 266 ff.)

All the messages supported the conference's aim of contributing to the preservation of peace. While Khrush-

chov exhorted the delegates to "curb the forces of aggression and revenge," Kennedy emphasized that, like the US, the delegates were committed to the UN Charter, as well as to a "world society in which men have the right and freedom to determine their own destiny" and where "one people is not enslaved by the other."

Chou En-lai hoped that the conference would help to defend world peace and oppose imperialist aggression and intervention and colonialism, old and new. (For Khrushchov message see *R. Moscow*, Sept 1 [SU, 4]; Kennedy—*USIS*, Aug 31; Chou En-lai—*NCNA*, Aug 31 [FE, Sept 2].)

Earlier the German Federal Government had sent a memorandum to all countries to be represented in Belgrade (except Yugoslavia, with whom she had no diplomatic relations). The note, to which a personal letter from Chancellor Adenauer was attached, urged the neutrals to issue an appeal, directed particularly at the USSR, to abstain from any unilateral act which would render negotiations over Berlin and Germany more difficult. (*Times*, Aug 31)

REACTION TO SOVIET RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

On Aug 31, the eve of the conference, the Soviet government announced its decision to resume nuclear tests. This followed a moratorium during which the US, the UK and the USSR, but not France, had discontinued their tests. The text of the Soviet announcement was communicated to the delegates on the same date. A US report on a first Soviet nuclear explosion after this announcement was published on Sept 1 (*NYT*, Aug 31, Sept 1, 4), [and there were two further explosions reported before the conference ended].

Yugoslav officials were reported to have described the resumption as "a brutal act," and most of the delegates were shocked. Some thought the timing indicated a deliberate Soviet attempt to undermine the conference and show disregard for neutralist opinion.

Tito and Nehru were expected to set the tone in reacting to the Soviet move. Nehru declared upon arrival: "I am against nuclear tests at any time in any place" (*NYHT*, *NYT*, *Times*, Sept 1), but Tito made no mention of the Soviet step in his opening statement on Sept 1. (*Dac. Belg.*, pp 17 ff)

Abdel Nasser "Shocked." President Abdel Nasser was the only speaker on the first day of the conference who directly referred to the Soviet move. (He was preceded by Tito and Sukarno, and followed by Abbud, U Nu, Bourguiba and Daud Khan. For Bourguiba's attitude, see below.) After noting that, because of the "lack of faith in peaceful coexistence," armaments were growing, Abdel Nasser expressed "deep regret" at "the fact that in this atmosphere filled with anxiety the government of the Soviet Union found itself in a position which, according to its own point of view, leads it to the resumption of nuclear tests. This decision shocked me just as it shocked world public opinion," he declared. "Yet whatever the motives of the Soviet government that prompted this decision, the main thing in it is its clear bearing on the deterioration of the dangerous international position." He added that it was "painful" to see France persisting in "provoking world public opinion by holding nuclear

tests" in the homeland of peoples who refused to allow them. He accused colonial powers and reactionary elements of being at the head of the forces who exploited the situation, "where peace depends on the frightening nuclear equilibrium." In this connection he mentioned the use of NATO weapons in Algeria and Angola. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 47)

Cairo: Abdel Nasser Acted on Hint from Khrushchov; USSR Showed Consideration for Conference. Haykal, the editor of *Al-Ahram*, wrote that the Soviet note to the delegates was accompanied by a personal letter from Khrushchov saying: "I know that this decision will be a shock to you." Haykal thought that the USSR's action was a hint to the delegates to act quickly for the sake of peace, or it would be too late. He thought Abdel Nasser had noticed this hint and mentioned it in his speech. (*Ahram*, Sept 8)

While Abdel Nasser did not go into the motives for the Soviet tests, Cairo Radio declared that the West was to blame. The commentator said that the USSR had warned the US and the UK against their underground tests and against their encouragement of France to continue her tests. He explained the timing of the Soviet move as follows: The USSR knew that a demand for the banning of nuclear tests would probably be adopted in Belgrade. Rather than resume tests after the conference, which would have been interpreted as a snub, the USSR announced its decision beforehand, risking adverse comments. (*R. Cairo*, Sept 3-IMB, Sept 4)

Nehru Regrets, Tito Not Critical. PM Nehru said in his address on Sept 2 that the danger of war "has become nearer to us, perhaps, by the recent decision of the Soviet government to start nuclear tests." No one was in a position "to know all the facts which underline this decision," he continued, but it "makes the situation much more dangerous" and therefore "I regret it deeply." (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 113-4)

President Tito stated in his speech on Sept 3 that negotiations on an atomic test ban had reached an impasse, while France continued tests without interference by the Western atomic powers. "The matters have now reached such a point," Tito continued, "where the Soviet government has published a statement on the resumption of nuclear weapons tests. All this has alarmed the whole world." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 156)

Abdel Nasser's "Firm Condemnation" Noted in West. A *Times* correspondent, reporting on the first day of the conference, wrote that Abdel Nasser was the only delegate to voice "a firm and unequivocal condemnation of the Soviet move" (*Times*, Sept 2). The *New York Times* wrote that only Abdel Nasser spoke with "anything remotely like the required honesty and openness" in condemning the Soviet act (*NYT*, Sept 2). On the other hand, *Newsweek* wrote that he "had put just as much blame on the US and France" as on the USSR (*Newsweek*, Sept 11). Moscow Radio mentioned only Abdel Nasser's statement that the Soviet decision had been a shock to him. (*R. Moscow*, Sept 1 [SU 7])

Reactions of Other ME Countries. President Bourguiba of Tunisia said that the "unexpected decision recently announced by a Great Power" was liable to heighten international tension and increase the anxiety of the peoples." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 77)

PM Sliam said he was "truly astonished, as was the whole world," by the Soviet announcement especially as

it came on the eve of a meeting planned to "urge all the powers to listen to dictates of reason." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 132)

King Hasan of Morocco said that the Soviet announcement "has caused us serious concern," coming at a time when the whole world was awaiting an agreement to ban the tests. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 202)

President Makarios expressed shock at the Soviet decision, as well as concern over the continuation of French tests in Africa. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 173)

Representatives of the following ME countries made no mention, either direct or indirect, of the Soviet announcement, but spoke about the banning of nuclear tests in general: Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia, the Algerian Provisional Government, and Yemen (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 60-1, 135, 150, 228, 235, 241). Emperor Haile Selassie did not refer to nuclear tests at all. (*Doc. Belg.*)

SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED BY ME COUNTRIES

(ME countries' positions on questions referred to in the agenda are dealt with separately below.)

[All the ME Arab countries raised the question of the Palestine refugees and condemned Israel as an imperialist bridgehead in the ME and Africa (see p 191 b). They also supported the Algerian Provisional Government and condemned French "aggression" in Bizerta. The question of southern Arabia was raised by Iraq, Sudan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.]

Lebanon's Neutrality. PM Sliam stated: "The neutrality of Lebanon in international politics and its non-alignment to world blocs are linked to its people's unity and to its independence." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 129)

Jawād: British Imperialism in Kuwait. Hashim Jawād, of Iraq, said that Kuwait was the most recent example of British imperialism, which had turned the country into "a military base threatening the security and disturbing the stability of the ME region." (On the Kuwait crisis, see pp 117 ff.) (*Doc. Belg.*, p 151) (The only other delegate to mention Kuwait and demand the withdrawal of British forces was President Dorticos of Cuba.)

Saudi Arabia: Oman Will Not Give Up the Fight. Ibrahim as-Suwayl declared that the "free people" of "fighting Oman" would accept no foreign domination. They were "fighting for their liberty," and would not give up the fight. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 135)

Yemen: British Imperialism in "Southern Yemen." Prince Hasan of Yemen said: "British imperialism, with its notorious deceit, infiltrated during the Ottoman domination into certain Yemeni southern areas" and created the [Aden] Protectorates (*Doc. Belg.*, p 240). (No other delegate mentioned "southern Yemen.")

Tunisian Policy of Non-Alignment, Moderation and Reason. President Bourguiba stated that non-alignment had been a "fundamental element of our policy for many years now." Tunisia had maintained her freedom of choice, he said, in accordance with her national interest and the "fundamental and universal values of our time." "We in Tunisia do not go back on our friends," he said, "but we place attachment and loyalty to principles above preferences and affinities. At all times and in all places, we try to keep our reactions at a moderate level and ensure that reason prevails over sentiment." (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 72-3)

Somalia: Self-Determination for French Somaliland. Demanding the consideration of the "legitimate national

aspirations of the Somali people," the Somali representative said that French Somaliland was one of the Somali territories still under foreign rule, suffering from French "colonialism" and "tyranny." The Somalis were ethnically a homogeneous race, he declared, and should be geographically united. (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 230-1)

THE ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS (The World Conflict and Colonialism)

[It was generally agreed in public speeches that the non-aligned states did not and should not constitute a third bloc; views diverged, however, on the degree of coordination that was desirable. Again, all were agreed that non-alignment meant active participation, mainly through "moral-power," in world affairs, especially in the preservation of peace; views differed, however, as to the capacity of the non-aligned countries to intervene in the world conflict by adopting judgements on rights and wrongs and submitting concrete proposals for solutions, as well as on the desirability of such intervention. There were also differences on whether the world crisis should be given priority at the conference over the traditional themes of colonialism, racialism, etc.]

Tito: No Third Military Bloc, but Clearcut Neutral Positions on Current Problems Needed. "The purpose of this meeting," President Tito said, "is to make the great powers realize that the fate of the world cannot rest in their hands alone." The role of the non-aligned nations was to contribute towards the solution of international problems and towards the "easing of dangerous international tension in general." To this end they should adopt "clear and unequivocal positions on current problems." They did not intend to create a third bloc, he said, for blocs were mainly characterized by their military aspects and economic discrimination against others. Where the "stands" of the neutrals differed from or coincided with those of "one or the other side" would become clear once they had defined their positions. They would take their decisions with the aim of furthering peace and not of supporting one bloc or another. The conference, he continued, would not attack certain countries "for propaganda motives," but would voice its "resolute disagreement with the methods applied by some great powers towards other countries." He also advised the neutrals against getting entangled in "issues of secondary importance" which could be referred to bilateral negotiations. (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 15-22)

Nehru: Non-Aligned States Should Concentrate on World Crisis, Not Colonialism, and Avoid Definite Attitudes. Nehru said that "classic colonialism is gone and is dead," though it still gave "a lot of trouble." The question of imperialism, he said, was overshadowed by the world crisis and the question of peace and war—or, rather, the choice "between negotiations for peace or war." The non-aligned states should, therefore, concentrate on the main problem, and "throw [their] weight, such as it is, in favour of peace." The conference should beware of getting lost in "long resolutions and . . . brave declarations" on "anti-imperialism, anti-racialism and all that." Nehru repeatedly stressed that the non-aligned countries must realize their "lack of strength." "We must not imagine," he warned, "that we can order about great countries or, as small countries, do as we like." Therefore the non-aligned should use their limited capacity, their moral strength—"call it what you like . . . without force but with courtesy . . . so that we may influence those who

have the power of war and peace in their hands." To try and adopt definite attitudes and propose concrete solutions, to "denounce and irritate" the powers, would only make it more difficult for them to follow the path of peace. (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 107 ff.)

Sukarno: Colonialism, Not Big-Power Conflict, the Basic Problem; Non-Aligned States Strive for New World Equilibrium. Sukarno thought that non-alignment should become a "coordinated accumulated moral force"—though not a third bloc—powerful enough "to make its impact felt upon the two conflicting blocs." This should be based, he said, on a new common approach to the basic issues, which would "startle mankind by its freshness." He maintained, however, that the real source of international tension was not the ideological conflict between the great powers, but the conflict between "the new emergent forces for freedom" and the "old forces of domination." In every single case," he said, "the cause of international tension is imperialism and colonialism and the forcible division of nations." The newly emergent and non-aligned nations, on the other hand, strove for a "new stable equilibrium," which would be established by making all nations truly independent and in which there would be no place for conflicting blocs. (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 25 ff.)

Nkrumah Proposes Concrete Solutions to World Problems. President Nkrumah said the delegates had come to interpose their influence between the two blocs, so that the fate of mankind "should cease to hang . . . on the desires and ambitions of the great powers." Though not a third bloc, they constituted a "distinct moral force, which should be a balancing force and influence between the East and the West in the cause of peace," and they should coordinate their efforts at the UN to this end. Nkrumah singled out colonialism and disarmament as the most acute world problems. On these and other issues he proposed a set of seven definite solutions. (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 98 ff.)

Abdel Nasser: To Coordinate Efforts for Peace and Fight Colonialism, with More than "Moral Efforts." Abdel Nasser said that the non-aligned states bore "a special responsibility towards peace," as "by dint of their just and unbiased outlook" on world problems they could "shorten the gap separating" the world powers and help "many other peoples still in shackles."

Abdel Nasser stressed that the non-aligned nations did not constitute a third bloc, but said that the conference "may agree on taking common action." In this public speech, he said, he had "tried [his] utmost" to avoid any particular proposal on world problems; but this would come at a later stage of the conference.

Abdel Nasser mentioned six priorities, starting with international tension and disarmament and continuing with imperialism, racialism, etc. He also said he was aware that the conference was unwelcome to "several powers hostile to peace," especially the colonial powers.

The non-aligned nations should back their objectives with constant cooperation and co-ordinated efforts, both within and outside the UN, he continued, remaining in constant touch with the two conflicting camps. He emphasized that in the battle against colonialism and racial discrimination "we can give more than just moral efforts" and "protests." (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 40 ff.)

Iraqi FM: Conference Should Determine Causes of Conflicts; Blames West. Hashim Jawad, the Iraqi FM, after condemning the Western powers for basing their inter-

national relations on power politics and exploitation, said that the conference should examine the underlying causes of the impasse in international relations and "recognize the forces which hinder the promotion of peace and progress." Jawād declared that imperialism was the main obstacle to peace and that the cold war was fraudulently justified "by the pretext of collective security against the so-called Communist conspiracy to dominate the world," whereas, in fact, the West was utilizing it to preserve its colonial grip on the underdeveloped areas.

He proposed that the conference should work out a programme of peace and "press by every positive means possible for its implementation" [without specifying the means.] (*Doc. Belg., pp 143 ff*)

Haile Selassie and Makarios Call for Objective Judgements. Emperor Haile Selassie said that to be non-aligned meant the capacity to act independently of the world powers and neutrality in the cold war. To be neutral meant to judge actions and policies objectively in their relation to the preservation of peace and the improvement of the lot of man. To urge the powers to negotiate without making such judgement, the Emperor said, was equivalent to adverting responsibility.

Though lacking in military power, the Emperor continued, the neutrals should not underestimate their strength, as the big powers, who competed for their support, were "highly sensitive" to their reactions and judgement. He warned the neutrals, however, not to act and vote as an organized group, because group action could only be achieved by pressure and deals within the group, which in turn would dissipate their moral influence. (*Doc. Belg., pp 85-8*)

President Makarios thought that all the peoples were looking to the conference for a "dynamic signal of moral progress" leading to lasting peace. They should not seek "a point of compromise between the two sides without relating such compromise to the merits of the case and to basic principles," he said. (*Doc. Belg., pp 170-1*)

North Africans Stress Mutual Assistance. President Bourguiba, who asserted that non-alignment had been "a fundamental element of our policy for many years now," thought that the "moral striking force" of the neutrals would in the end be decisive. While he, too, was opposed to a third bloc, he stressed the need for solidarity and mutual assistance among the neutrals and said he would propose that they hold periodical conferences. When speaking of particular issues, Bourguiba put "decolonization," with stress on "Tunisia's struggle" [i.e. the Bizerta affair, see p 170 h], before disarmament. (*Doc. Belg., pp 72 ff*)

King Hasan of Morocco said it was not enough for the neutrals to indicate the origins of international tension; they must "outline partial solutions." Additional countries should be induced to adopt non-alignment, but the neutrals must be prepared to help them in case they were "exposed to the risk of reprisals." (*Doc. Belg., pp 197-9*)

Ben Khedda, PM of the APG, called on the neutral peoples to "assess the true responsibilities in the race to catastrophe." He emphasized that effective non-alignment was not only based on genuine independence but also involved full support for the struggle of all peoples for independence. (*Doc. Belg., pp 234-5*)

Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Somalia Urge Moderate Approach to Powers. President Abdu expressed the hope that "an exposition of our understanding and objectives may serve to display our ideals and not to impose them." (*Doc. Belg., p 53*)

The Saudi Arabian delegate said "our souls must be innocent of any bias" so that "our feelings can examine problems freely, and can seek out flexible solutions," non-provocative but convincing. (*Doc. Belg., p 134*)

The Somali representative thought it imperative not to display "bitter hostility" against either of the great-power blocs, as "has been the consistent practice of the majority of us here"; on the other hand, the neutrals should express their views "without fear and favour." (*Doc. Belg., pp 226-7*)

Lebanon, Yemen: Sā'ib Slām thought non-aligned nations should "inculcate, instead of the paths followed by the two blocs..., a new path" which would "build one stable world instead of two." (*Doc. Belg., p 130*)

The Yemeni representative emphasized that the great powers, who seemed to have the right to decide the fate of others, must understand that the other nations were now aware of their rights and interests. (*Doc. Belg., p 239*)

GERMANY AND BERLIN

Background Note. The Berlin question was potentially the most explosive in world affairs in the summer of 1961. In June PM Khrushchov of the USSR had said that a peaceful settlement of the Berlin and German questions must be achieved that year. If the other powers who had been at war with Germany did not conclude peace treaties with both German states, the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and the West would have to negotiate with the East German authorities on access to Berlin, which should become a free city. The attitude of the Western powers in general was that a German settlement must be based on the freely expressed will of the German people. They refused to perpetuate the division of Germany, to recognize the German Democratic Republic, and to countenance any change in the status of Berlin, where, they claimed, their forces were stationed by right and to which they had the right of free access. Tension between the blocs mounted during the summer and East Germany erected a fortified wall between East and West Berlin.

Tito, Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno and Iraqi FM Declared that the Existence of the Two German States Must Be Recognized, and urged negotiations to settle the Berlin question. Nehru thought that a guarantee of free access to Berlin would remove one major cause of conflict. Tito criticized the West for arming Germany and Nkrumah thought the conference should call upon the big powers to sign peace treaties with both states. The only ME country which supported this attitude was Iraq: Jawād said that the Berlin question could not be solved unless the existence of the two Germanies was recognized and both made part of a neutral area. (*Doc. Belg., pp 36, 101, 111, 149, 157*)

Abdel Nasser: German Division Artificial. Abdel Nasser on the other hand, spoke about "that artificial line which divides the German people into two peoples hostile to each other." "Our duty," he said, was not "to stand in front of the wall built between East and West Berlin and imagine that we have reached a dead end." But he did not indicate any solution and related the problem to the wider one of the "crisis of peaceful coexistence." (*Doc. Belg., p 43, 46*)

Ethiopia and Cyprus Call for Self-determination and Free Access to Berlin. Emperor Haile Selassie supported

the concept of a "unified Germany" and "the principle of free access to West Berlin." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 96)

President Makarios of Cyprus emphasized that the German people had the right to self-determination, which should be exercised through a plebiscite under UN auspices. The people of Berlin, he said, could not "be kept in a kind of concentration camp" and movement between East and West Berlin should be free. (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 172-3)

Other ME Countries Non-Committal. The representatives of Morocco, Somalia and Yemen called for negotiations to settle the German problem (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 203, 228, 241), while those of Algeria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Tunisia did not raise the question.

STRUCTURAL REFORMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Background Note. At the 15th UN Assembly, in Sept and Oct 1960, PM Khrushchov, while attacking SG Dag Hammarskjöld for "serving the imperialists in the Congo crisis," demanded the replacement of the SG by a "troika" of three representatives, one each from the Western, Eastern and neutral groups. The West fully backed the SG and categorically opposed the innovation on the ground that it would paralyse the UN.

No non-Communist country backed the Soviet proposal and the majority, including all ME representatives except Abdel Nasser, explicitly expressed their support for Hammarskjöld (MER 1960, p 11). [The UAR criticized the UN attitude in Congo much in the same vein as the USSR, and Iraq adopted the same attitude at a later stage (MER 1960, pp 7, 25 ff).]

President Nkrumah of Ghana proposed a plan, endorsed by President Touré of Guinea, for three deputy SGs, on the same lines as the troika.

Almost all participants in the Belgrade Conference thought some structural reforms were needed in the UN. While few proposed functional alterations, the majority suggested changes in the composition of the UN's organs, in view of its new membership.

Tito, Nkrumah Propose Limiting Power of SG. Tito called for the enlargement of the Security Council and ECOSOC to represent Asia and Africa more fully. He did not support the troika plan but suggested that the role of the SG should become purely administrative, without "independent political functions"; a consultative body of five or more should be set up to assist him and ensure "a proper interpretation of the recommendations." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 166)

Nkrumah reiterated his UN proposal to appoint three deputy SGs and proposed an executive body elected by the Assembly to ensure the faithful and prompt implementation of UN decisions. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 104)

Nehru: UN Should Reflect New Balance of Power. Nehru pointed out that the framework of the UN reflected the balance of power existing 15 years ago and called for structural changes in view of its new membership. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 112)

Abdel Nasser Criticizes Big-Power Manipulation of UN. Abdel Nasser said it was regrettable to see the UN "sometimes transformed into a field of conflict between the blocs" or used as a "tool in the hand of colonialism," with the result that resolutions sometimes remained unimplemented unless they were in line with the policies of the

major powers. He demanded that the UN "adapt itself to the present dynamic nature of the world" and proposed, without going into detail, "constructive changes" in the UN "administrative machinery" and changes in the "distribution of power in its various centres." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 49)

Tunisia and Somalia Favour Strong SG. President Bourguiba said he was in favour of a strong SG "invested with powers of interpretation and enforcement," but proposed that the SG should have several assistants. He thought the non-aligned nations were not fairly represented in the Security Council and ECOSOC but called for "a correct balance between the power of the big nations and the number of the small." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 78)

The Somali representative, who warmly praised the UN's action in the Congo, also rejected any alteration in the structure of the Secretariat, but called for a revision of the veto power. He proposed that foreign aid be channelled through the UN. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 232)

Ethiopia, Lebanon, Morocco and APG Call for More Representation of New Members. (See *Doc. Belg.*, pp 90, 131, 200-1, 235.) King Hasan also suggested a general conference of UN members to review the Charter and consider the organization of an international force to ensure the enforcement of UN decisions, as well as ways to deal more effectively with problems of underdeveloped countries. (*Doc. Belg.*, pp 200-1)

President Abbad of Sudan, who praised the work of the UN, proposed (like the Somali representative) to strictly limit, or abolish, the veto. All power and authority, he thought, should be centred in the Assembly. The authority of the specialized agencies should be expanded and the regional commissions become the focal points of much of the UN's work. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 63)

The representatives of Saudi Arabia and Cyprus made only short statements in support of the UN. The Iraqi representative did not mention the subject at all, except in connection with the Israel question. (*Doc. Belg.*)

ADMISSION OF PEOPLE'S CHINA TO UN

The majority of the delegates demanded the admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. Of the ME countries, Ethiopia, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the UAR did so, while other ME countries did not raise the question. (*Doc. Belg.*)

DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

The Conference issued three documents:

1. Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace;
2. Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries;
3. A Letter in identical terms to the US President and the Soviet PM.

Divisions Between "Moderates" and "Leftists" Over Documents: Abdel Nasser Described as Mediator. The difference between the "leftist" African and "moderate" groups, which had dominated the Cairo preliminary meeting (see above), came out strongly, according to observers in Belgrade, in "long and acrimonious" debates in the drafting committee and at the closed plenary session, at which the texts of the documents were debated.

Nehru was the main spokesman for the moderate opinion, and Burma, Ceylon, Cyprus, Lebanon, Nepal and Tunisia were variously mentioned as sharing his approach.

On the other hand, Tito, who apparently, together with

Abdel Nasser, constituted a third, "middle-of-the-road," group at Cairo, joined the "African group" at Belgrade. Thus, according to an American observer, a "Tito-African-Arab group" was formed. Yugoslav reports that Tito was trying to help Khrushchov "against a potential military take-over bid" in Moscow were treated somewhat sceptically in the Western press. (*Times*, Sept 4, 5; *NYT*, Sept 5; *Economist*, Sept 9)

Of the African leaders in this group, Nkrumah alone was generally mentioned. Having come to the conference direct from his talks with Khrushchov in Russia, Nkrumah was reportedly regarded by many delegates as the Soviet PM's spokesman on world problems.

It was not clear who were the Arabs in this group, but in the open sessions Jawād of Iraq had been the most vehement anti-Western spokesman among the Arabs.

Abdel Nasser was thought to have emerged as the foremost mediator. (*NYT*, Sept 1, 5, 6, 7; *Monde*, Sept 2, 3; *Times*, Sept 4, 5; *Newsweek*, Sept 11, 18; *Time*, Sept 15)

However, there did not seem to have been any rigid alignment of these lines, as will be seen below.

Cairo sources said that the identical messages to Kennedy and Khrushchov were proposed by Abdel Nasser at a closed plenary session on Sept 4, following consultations between himself and Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno, Tito and U Nu. The draft text was proposed by Nehru. According to these reports, Abdel Nasser also proposed the "messengers" who were to present the letters in Moscow and Washington. (*MENA*, Sept 4 [6]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 4, 5)

Western observers said that Abdel Nasser was showing "a responsible attitude" at the conference. A reflection of this was seen by some quarters in such instances as the moderation of Antoine Gizenga, the Congolese vice-PM [whose regime in Stanleyville, which he had left only two days previously, was extremely anti-Western]. Abdel Nasser met the Congolese leaders before they spoke. (*NYT*, Sept 6)

Divisions on Various Issues. A major point of disagreement was reported to be the question of priorities in the declaration. The Indians, in conformity with Nehru's policy of absolute priority for the preservation of peace, pressed for a special document on this question. On the other hand, Indonesia insisted on priority for questions of colonialism. According to a *New York Herald Tribune* report, this was also Abdel Nasser's attitude, though he also advocated a declaration for world peace. [In the end, a separate appeal for peace was issued, while in the main declaration priority was given to questions of colonialism.] (*NYHT*, Sept 5, 6)

On the German question, it was reported that Yugoslavia, Cuba and Ghana wished to include a resolution calling for the recognition of East Germany, but this was successfully opposed by Abdel Nasser and Nehru [though the latter had declared in his speech that the existence of the two Germanies was a fact of life which must be recognized—see above]. (*Times*, Sept 5; *NYT*, Aug 7, 31, Sept 6)

It was believed to be Nehru who secured endorsement for the Western position that disarmament must be founded on inspection and control. (*NYT*, Sept 6)

Algeria was another issue on which there was no unanimity. During the conference Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ghana and Yugoslavia announced their recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government. [Cuba, Guinea, Indonesia, the UAR and Yemen had extended recognition earlier.] The majority of the participants, including In-

dia, continued, however, to withhold recognition. (*Times*, *NYT*, Sept 6)

An additional point of contention was the resolution on Israel and the Arab refugees; Arab proposals for condemnation were defeated. (For details see pp 191-3.)

In general, it was thought, the mainly moderate tone of the conference's documents was due to the fact that Nehru's approach prevailed. (*Times*, Sept 6; *Time*, Sept 15)

Statement on the Danger of War. Expressing deep concern that the grave and critical situation might lead to world annihilation, the conference urged the US and the USSR to suspend war preparations and continue negotiations until total disarmament and enduring peace was achieved; it called on their leaders to make "immediate direct approaches to each other."

"While decisions leading to war or peace at present rest with these great powers, the consequences affect the entire world," the statement continued. It expressed the hope that other nations, not represented at the conference, would join the appeal. (*Doc. Belg.*, p 252)

The Declaration of the Heads of State or Government.

The preamble to the 27 resolutions contained in the declaration reiterated the belief of the non-aligned nations in the principles of peaceful coexistence; international cooperation; the elimination of imperialism, colonialism and neo-imperialism; the rejection of the idea of the cold war, and the solution of outstanding conflicts and differences by negotiations.

Resolutions 1-14 concerned imperialism and related issues. The conference reaffirmed its support for the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; it demanded the "immediate, unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism" and respect for the territorial integrity of independent states. It declared support for the Algerian Provisional Government and the integrity of its territory, including the Sahara; denounced repressive measures against the Angolan people and demanded independence for the territory; demanded the immediate termination of all colonial occupation in Asia, Africa and Latin America; the evacuation of French forces from Tunisia and the prevention of further foreign intervention in the Congo; and condemned imperialist policies in the ME and expressed support for the rights of the Arab refugees (for the last point see p 192 b). The conference condemned racial and ethnic discrimination, mentioning especially the *apartheid* policy in South Africa, and proclaimed respect for the rights of minorities. The delegates called for the abolition of foreign bases, particularly where their existence was in violation of the sovereign will (only the US base at Guantanamo, Cuba, was specifically mentioned), and reiterated their conviction that all nations have the right to determine their political, social, economic and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance—again with particular reference to Cuba only.

Resolutions 15-20 dealt with disarmament. Support was expressed for "general, complete and strictly and [sic] internationally controlled disarmament," and for the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. The great powers were urged to sign a treaty for complete disarmament without delay. The non-aligned nations should be represented at all future conferences on world disarmament, which should be held under UN auspices, as well as on teams of inspection and control. The conference called for a ban on nuclear tests and demanded

that, meanwhile, the moratorium on tests should be resumed. Immediate negotiations on this question, either separately or as part of the talks on complete disarmament, were urged. The conference recommended that the UN Assembly convene a special session or a world conference devoted to the question.

Resolutions 21-23 dealt with economic questions. The conference called for accelerated development to bridge the gap between the economically advanced countries and the less developed ones; it demanded the adjustment of terms of trade adversely affecting the economies of the latter and urged the establishment of a UN Capital Development Fund.

The developing countries were invited to institute economic cooperation in order to resist economic pressures and the "harmful results which may be created by the economic blocs of the industrial countries," and to convene a conference to discuss common economic problems and "ways and means of repelling all damage which may hinder their development." The conference declared that countries receiving economic and technical assistance must be free to determine its use.

Resolutions 24-25 dealt with the UN. Revision of the Charter was urged to expand the membership of the Security Council and ECOSOC in "harmony with the needs of the Organization and with the expanded membership on the UN." A "more appropriate" structure for the Secretariat, "bearing in mind equitable regional distribution," was advocated.

Resolution 26 said that those countries who "recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China" recommended that the UN Assembly should accept it at its forthcoming session as the only legitimate representative of China.

The last resolution, No. 27, spoke of the "decisive influence" of the German problem on the international situation and urged the powers not to resort to force to solve the question. (*Doc. Belg., pp 253 ff*)

Letters to Kennedy and Khrushchov. In identical letters to President Kennedy and PM Khrushchov, the members of the conference expressed their distress at the "deterioration of the international situation and the prospects of war which now threaten humanity." In order to "avert the developments that may precipitate it," they urged the two statesmen to hold direct negotiations to find a way out of the "present impasse." (*Doc. Belg., pp 264-5*)

Nehru and Nkrumah were chosen by the conference to deliver the letter to PM Khrushchov, while Modibo Keita and Sukarno carried it to President Kennedy. (*NYHT, Sept 6*)

President Kennedy replied (on Sept 13) that, although he agreed in principle to negotiations "at the highest levels," they needed "careful preparation" and a "reasonable chance of success." He also stressed that the US did not intend to enter negotiations "under ultimatum or threats," and did not propose to discuss "either abdication of our responsibility or renunciation of the modalities for carrying out those responsibilities." He also pointed out that there was an opportunity for serious talks about Germany and other problems between the US Secretary of State and the USSR Foreign Minister, who were both scheduled to attend the UN General Assembly session the following week. (*USIS, official text, Sept 14, 18*)

Khrushchov answered (on Sept 16) that he would be ready to meet with Kennedy if such a meeting promised to be fruitful. The USSR, he said, welcomed talks that

would result in the conclusion of a general peace treaty. (*NYT; Newsweek, Sept 18*)

WESTERN COMMENT ON OUTCOME OF CONFERENCE

Value of Neutrals' Opinions "Debased." The US State Department's reported reaction to the conference was that it "deflates a rather exaggerated regard for the opinion of these so-called uncommitted nations, since their behaviour in Belgrade debases the value of their opinion—good or bad." (*NYHT, Sept 8*)

The New York Times wrote that the meeting "fell dismally short of its opportunities," especially with regard to the reaction to Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. (*NYT, Sept 6*)

The New York Herald Tribune, in an editorial entitled "Neutrals Miss the Boat," criticized the neutrals for failing to find ways "to impose their voice more productively on the course of the cold war," and accused them of lacking "courage of commitment at a crucial hour." (*NYHT, Sept 8*)

Newsweek believed that the attitude of the neutrals in Belgrade had prompted President Kennedy's decision to cut down aid to nations who did not share the US view of the world crisis. (*Newsweek, Sept 18*)

Time wrote that the neutrals were chiefly committed to "the profitable middle-way to preserving their neutrality at whatever cost of principle, to keep the money flowing in from both camps." (*Time, Sept 15*)

A *Le Monde* editorial, which expressed similar opinions, said that the only true winner at the conference was the Algerian Provisional Government, which had scored recognition by a number of countries. On the positive side, the paper added, was the realization by the delegates that non-aligned nations should assume the role of mediation between the two blocs on such issues as disarmament. (*Monde, Sept 7*)

Decreasing Affinity With Communism Noted. *The New York Times* commented that the neutrals were far less enthusiastic about Communism at Belgrade than at Bandung (*NYT, Sept 6*). Similarly, the *London Times* wrote that both the Americans and the Russians had been wrong "in the days when they both felt that neutralism was the first step to Communism." (*Times, Sept 7*)

Another observer believed that the concept of non-alignment, which should have been clarified in Belgrade as superseding "positive neutralism," remained vague. Probably, however, it constituted a certain change from the communist point of view, as positive neutralism tended to be more hostile to "Western imperialism." If the resolutions included some denunciations that such conference could not escape, it also contained a new tone of moderation. (*Orient, No 19, pp 19-25*)

"Non-Aligned, Unaligned Among Themselves": No Follow-through. The *London Times* wrote that the most obvious result of the conference was that the "countries which met in Belgrade have remained largely unaligned even among themselves... Non-alignment has become more self-conscious and confident. But it is still groping for definitions and identity." The paper declared that if the US had resumed nuclear testing in place of the Soviets, "the outcry would have been loud and bitter." (*Times, Sept 7*)

The Economist described the outcome of the conference as "flat." "Apart from the personal appeals of peace that are being made in Moscow and Washington, the impact of which cannot yet be assessed, no original initia-

tive emerged from the conference, nor is there any suggestion of a coherent follow-through on a working level," the paper wrote. (*Economist*, Sept 9)

COMMUNIST ATTITUDES

Soviet Russia. Having given only scant notice to the lengthy preparations that had preceded the Belgrade Conference, the Soviet press and radio accorded extensive coverage to the proceedings of the conference itself, stressing its representative nature as the largest gathering of non-aligned nations since the Bandung Conference and the 1960 UN General Assembly.

Both the main Soviet daily newspapers, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, as well as Moscow Radio presented the conference as endorsing Soviet policy on such major issues as the German peace treaty, Berlin, colonialism and disarmament, and gave prominence to the resentment with which the Western powers were said to have greeted this endorsement.

On the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests, it was said that the issue occupied "the centre of attention"; but while the leaders of the non-aligned nations were understandably perturbed at the prospect of further nuclear explosions, they "understand the reasons which have impelled the Soviet Union to this step." *Pravda* reported that Nkrumah had referred to the Soviet announcement concerning the resumption of tests as a "shock" which

served to underline the gravity of the situation and the need for fresh efforts to safeguard peace. Despite the attempts of "American and West German cold war troubadours" who sought to inflame the opinion of conference participants, the latter had refused to be drawn into a "hysterical campaign" and had instead maintained a realistic attitude towards the problems of world peace.

In broadcasts to Africa, Moscow Radio emphasized the anti-colonialist aspects of the conference, while in broadcasts to Iran and Turkey it gave prominence to the advantages of neutrality. (*R. Moscow*, Sept 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 [SU 13]; *Pravda*, Sept 1, 7, 9; *Izvestia*, Sept 2; *Mizan*, Sept)

Communist China. Official spokesmen as well as the press and radio of Communist China commented favourably on the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist attitudes expressed at the conference and consequently singled out for praise speakers like Dorticos, Nkrumah and especially Sukarno. On the other hand, they condemned as "spokesmen for imperialism" those speakers who wished to give prominence to "the so-called question of peace and war," especially Nehru. The "Tito clique" was singled out for sharp criticism. It was further stressed that the "banner of anti-imperialist colonialism" had been raised at the Bandung Conference, and the convening of another such conference was strongly advocated. (*NCNA*, Sept 7, 8, 9, 10 [FE, 12, 13])

ABDEL NASSER-NEHRU-TITO MEETING IN CAIRO

(November 19)

[Presidents Abdel Nasser and Tito, and PM Nehru held a one-day conference in Cairo on Nov 19.]

Tito arrived on the night of Nov 17, and Nehru the next night. (*Borba*, Nov 19)

Controversy: Who Proposed the Meeting? Was Nehru Taken Unawares? On Nov 2 it had been disclosed that Nehru would meet with Abdel Nasser in Cairo on Nov 18 on his way home from the US (*Ahram*, Nov 3); it was later reported that his original intention had been to report on his talks in Moscow and Washington (*Observer*, Nov 19). Later, on Nov 14, *Al-Ahram* reported that in a few days important political talks would be held in Cairo. The paper further reported on Nehru's impending visit [but made no mention of Tito]. (*Ahram*, Nov 14)

The first report on the tripartite meeting, scheduled for Nov 19, came only on Nov 16 from Belgrade and Cairo. [Foreign?] sources in Cairo said that the meeting was "entirely President Abdel Nasser's doing." When he had been advised that Nehru planned a twenty-minute stop-over at Cairo airport, he had pressed him to stay at least overnight. [In fact the first report on the planned stopover spoke only of an Abdel Nasser-Nehru meeting on Nov 18—see above.] Abdel Nasser then sent a "quick invitation" to President Tito who was reported to have agreed only on Nov 16 after a second, stronger appeal. (*NYT*, Nov 17)

In fact, the first Cairo report on Tito's impending visit came only on the radio on the evening of Nov 16, and in the press on Nov 17, the day of his arrival, in the framework of a report on the forthcoming tripartite meeting. [There was no official announcement.] *Al-Ahram* said that the three leaders had been in contact all through

the week to arrange the meeting. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 16 [18]; *Ahram*, Nov 17)

The Egyptians, however, said it was Tito, not Abdel Nasser, who had proposed the conference, which the Yugoslavs privately denied. The correspondent who reported this, after the conference, thought there were ample grounds for accepting the UAR version, as it was Tito's projects that mainly occupied the three statesmen. (*NYHT*, Nov 21)

Tito arrived in Cairo on the afternoon of Nov 17. On the following day Nehru, on his way to Cairo, was reported to have told the press in New York and at London airport that he had heard only the previous day that Tito would be in Cairo. He said he would see Tito as well as Abdel Nasser "if it was possible." (*Times*, Nov 20)

Some days after the meeting, however, Abdel Nasser personally asserted that Nehru had agreed to the conference in advance and that the idea had originated with Tito. On Nov 25 *Al-Ahram* published a cable from Abdel Nasser to Tito in reply to a cable of thanks from the latter, thanking Tito for raising the idea of holding the meeting after he had learned that Nehru would pass through Cairo. Abdel Nasser said that Nehru had warmly welcomed the idea.

Al-Ahram summed up the stages leading to the meeting as follows: On Nov 1 Nehru proposed to stop over in Cairo. When Tito heard of this, he proposed the tripartite meeting. Cairo welcomed the idea but advised that Nehru should be consulted. On Nov 13 the Indian Ambassador in Cairo conveyed Nehru's agreement. *Al-Ahram* said that all other versions were fabrications of Western papers. (*Ahram*, Nov 25)

Topics at UAR-Yugoslav Talks, Motives and Intentions. According to UAR sources Abdel Nasser and Tito discussed the following main topics during their preliminary meeting, before Nehru's arrival:

1. The development of the international situation since the Belgrade conference; 2. ways of countering the "pre-meditated conspiracies" to divide the non-aligned countries; 3. the need for further cooperation, both political and economic, between them. (*R. Cairo, Nov 18-IMB, Nov 19-BBCM, Nov 20; NYT, Nov 20*)

Other reports provided an elaboration of these points. Both Yugoslavia and the UAR believed, it was reported, that, since the Belgrade Conference, the non-aligned nations had been subjected to dangerous pressures from both East and West. In particular, Yugoslavia charged that the US was exerting economic pressure on her in an attempt to alter her policy. In a speech on Nov 13 Tito had complained of such pressures, and especially that the US was withholding wheat supplies that Yugoslavia had requested after a drought. (Some US senators had demanded the withholding of aid from Communist Yugoslavia—*NYHT, Nov 20*.) Yugoslavia also pointed to attacks on her at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress. Cairo sources said that both Yugoslavia and Ghana were being subjected to such pressures, because of their attitude at the Belgrade Conference. *Al-Ahram* accused President Kennedy of wanting to prevent certain countries from adopting a neutralist policy. In particular, however, the UAR pointed to the Syrian revolt, which, it said, was organized by Western agents in collaboration with Arab reactionaries, in execution of the imperialist policy of "divide and rule."

Yugoslavia also wanted to discuss the possibilities of joint action in view of the progressing economic integration of Western Europe. In the above-mentioned speech Tito had hinted at such a need. He wished, it was believed, for a non-aligned economic community.

Observers in Cairo believed that one of Abdel Nasser's important motives in holding the meeting was to help restore his prestige after Syria's secession, to silence rumours as to the stability of his regime, and to support his claims to speak for the Arab world. (*NYT, Nov 17, 19, 20; Ahram, Nov 18; NYHT, Nov 19, 20, 21; Times, Nov 20; Economist, Mid Mir., Nov 25*)

Joint Communiqué Composed of Generalities, but Mentions Economic Cooperation. [Following a short preliminary meeting after Nehru's arrival on Nov 18, the three statesmen met for some three hours on Nov 19.] The publication of the joint communiqué was delayed; it was issued only after Nehru's departure early the next morning (*NYT, Nov 20*). It said that the three leaders had exchanged views on international problems, and especially the situation since the Belgrade Conference, in

a "friendly atmosphere." They noted with concern that international tension still persisted, agreed that the problem of war and peace was the question of the survival of mankind, confirmed their resolve to concentrate their efforts for the sake of peace, and appealed for a general and comprehensive agreement on disarmament.

They noted, however, that "the efforts, especially those of non-aligned countries," had contributed to a certain improvement in the international situation, and mentioned the appointment of an acting SG of the UN, the resolutions on the moratorium on nuclear tests and the establishment of Africa as a non-atomic zone, and the termination of the hunger strike of Algerian prisoners. They noted efforts to solve the Berlin problem through negotiations, and "devoted attention" to the need for strengthening means of economic cooperation between all countries, "including those affected by economic groupings in the world." (*R. Cairo, Nov 20 (21)*)

Comment: Nehru Restricted Scope of Talks and Resolutions. It was the consensus of Western observers that what was termed as the "negligible formal results" of the talks was due mainly to Nehru's reluctance to commit himself. At the conference he had "listened sympathetically to the facts about pressures," but had objected to any specific political or economic proposals. It was understood that the Indians had deleted almost all the points for common agreement submitted by Abdel Nasser and Tito. The "tranquillizing communiqué"—as it was defined by *The Economist*—was believed to be "a reflection of Mr. Nehru's discreet optimism rather than the strident anxieties of the other two." The absence of any harsh indictment of the big powers or the "imperialist conspiracy" was especially noted. (*NYHT, NYT, Nov 21; Economist, Nov 25*)

One proposal that was understood to have been dropped due to Nehru's objections was a high-level economic conference of non-aligned nations (*Times of India, Nov 21*). [However, such a conference took place in Cairo in 1962.]

Even the manner of Nehru's departure on Nov 19, almost immediately after the talks ended, was regarded as indication of his feelings that the meeting had been given a publicity buildup disproportionate to its brevity and informality. A press conference scheduled to take place before Nehru's departure was cancelled without explanation. It was reported that a security cloak was thrown about his departure and all but some local correspondents were barred from the airport. Egyptian sources stated that the Indian embassy had requested it, but this was denied by embassy officials. (*Times, Nov 20; Mid. Mir., Nov 25*)

Belgrade, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of the meeting as a fresh effort towards peace. (*Borba, Belgrade, Nov 19*)

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

NOTES

Definition. The tables below include only new agreements concluded in 1961. Thus, e.g., USSR operational contracts under general credit agreements concluded in former years are not given.

The tables contain grants-in-aid, loans and credits from governments, governmental agencies and banks, and large-scale credits from private companies with government backing (the last category was not given in MER 1960). Military assistance, current commercial credits, private donations and, in the case of Israel, private and government income from the reparations agreements with the German Federal Republic, are not included.

US Public Law 480. In order to avoid double accounting, only the original surplus food agreements signed during 1961, but not the use of counterpart funds accruing from the domestic sale of the surpluses, have been included.

The IBRD and the IMF appear under Western agencies because the Soviet Bloc did not participate in these agencies.

Explanatory Notes. Where no amount is given in the second column, the reasons are explained under: Details.

Sums in the second column are given in round figures, converted—if necessary—into dollars at the official rate of exchange. Exact figures, in the currencies stated in the reports, are given under: Details.

SOURCES

AID	Agency for International Development, Operations Report as of Dec 31, 1961.
DLF	Development Loan Fund, Press Releases.
Dep. of State	Department of State, Bulletin, Press Releases.
Bul.	Department of State, Bulletin, Press Releases.
Ex-Im. Bank	Export-Import Bank of Washington; Report to Congress, Financial Year 1961; Press Releases.
Ec. Rev.	Three Monthly Economic Reviews, The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.
EFSPA	Etude Mensuelle sur l'Economie et les Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes, Centre d'études et de documentations économiques, financières et sociales, Damas (Syrie).
FOA	Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963. Hearings before a subcommittee of the US House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations.
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Seventeenth Annual Report, 1961-1962.
IDA	International Development Association, Annual Report 1961.
IFNS	International Financial News Survey, published by the International Monetary Fund.
IMF	International Monetary Fund.
Kitvei	
Amanah	Israel Treaty Series.
MEED	Middle East Economic Digest, London.
UNSF	UN Special Fund Report, May 1962.
USAM	US Aid Mission to Israel, Financial Report, Data as of Dec 31, 1961.
USRFR	Office of US Representative (Israel), Financial Report as of June 30, 1962.
VEFRPA	Etude Mensuelle sur la Vie Economique et Financière de la RAU [RAS—since Nov 1961] et des Pays Arabes, Bureau des documentations arabes, Damas.
Press Reports.	

ETHIOPIA

Donor	Amount (million \$)	Date	Details	Sources
US DLF	2.0	June 28	DLF announced signature of \$2.0 million loan agreement with Development Bank of Ethiopia, for re-lending to private borrowers for agricultural and industrial projects.	IFNS, No. 27, July 14; DLF press release, June 28
US DLF	0.2	July 5	DLF announced signature of \$180,000 loan agreement with Ethiopia. Loan to be given to Atlas Engineering and Contracting Co. S.A. to help establish sawmill and logsquaring mill at Hardins, Ethiopia.	DLF, press release, July 5; IFNS, No. 27, July 14
US DLF	23.3	July 17	\$23.35 million loan agreement signed to help build or improve four major airports and 22 minor airfields, \$3.1 million for equipment and spare parts to keep two jet aircraft in operation. Loan to be repaid in 20 years at 3% interest.	DLF, press release, July; MEED, July 21; IFNS, No. 42, Oct 27

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million \$)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Sources</i>
US DLF	3.6	Aug 15	\$3.6 million loan agreement signed to finance procurement in US of equipment, parts and shop tools for road upkeep and improvement.	DLF, press release, Aug; IFNS, No. 42, Oct 27
World Bank IBRD	2.0	Nov 22	Agreement signed with Development Bank of Ethiopia for \$2.0 million loan repayable over 10-14 years, to enable DBE to finance foreign exchange outlays of industrial and agricultural projects in private sector.	IBRD 17th Annual Report, 1961-1962
IRAN				
US DLF	12.0	Jan 11	DLF approved \$12.0 million loan for construction of deep-water port—only one in southern Iran, repayable over 25 years at 3¼% interest.	DLF, press release, Jan 11; MEED, Jan 20
US	21.8	Jan	Grant of \$10.0 million from ICA for sugar purchases; \$11.8 million grant for buying US goods, motor vehicles, tyres and tubes, pharmaceuticals and lubricating oil.	MEED, Jan 20; Ec. Rev. Iran, No. 21, April
US DLF	26.2	First quarter of 1961	\$26.2 million loan from DLF for highway construction.	Dept. of State Bul. Jan 9; Ec. Rev. Iran, April
US Export- Import Bank	15.0	First quarter of 1961	\$15 million loan (approved on Dec 8, 1960) given for purchase of American goods for development plan projects, repayable over five years from Jan 15, 1964, at 5¼% interest.	Dep. of State Bul., Jan 9; Ec. Rev. Iran, April; Ex-Im. Bank Report to Congress, F.Y. 1961
US Export- Import Bank	0.2	April 26	\$182,000 loan authorized to Iranian private firm for cotton-spinning equipment.	Ex-Im. Bank Report to Congress, F.Y. 1961
US Export- Import Bank	0.25	May 10	\$245,600 loan authorized to Iranian private firm for acquisition of cotton-spinning machinery from US.	Ex-Im. Bank Report to Congress, F.Y. 1961
US Bank of America	10.0	May	Short-term loan of \$10 million to Iranian government.	Ec. Rev. Iran, No. 22, July
US Export- Import Bank	7.0	July 24	Two loan-agreements, for \$3.5 million each, at 5¼% interest, signed. One, repayable over five years from Jan 1, 1964, to be used for acquisition of machinery, equipment and services for highway maintenance; the other repayable over seven years from June 15, 1963, for purchase of locomotives, spare parts and services for Iranian state railway.	Ex-Im. Bank press release, July; IFNS, No. 36, Sept 15; Ex-Im. Bank Report to Congress, F.Y. 1961
German Federal Republic	55.0	Sept	Credits of DM220 million repayable in 13 years at 5¼% interest, obtained in Sept. DM200 million from GFR government, the rest from industry. Credits to be used for constructing oil and gas pipelines, an oil refinery and a dam.	Kayhan, Aug 22, Sept 3; IFNS, No. 37, Sept 22

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million \$)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Sources</i>
US ICA	15.0	Sept	Grant of \$15 million for 1961/62 given.	Ec. Rev., Iran, No. 24, Feb 1962
IMF		Oct	IMF Iran stand-by arrangement for \$35 million signed in Oct 1960, which was to expire in Oct 1961, was extended until March 1962.	IFNS, No. 47, Dec 1
IRAQ				
UN Special Fund	0.6	Sept 28	Grant of \$604,100 approved to Iraq for establishment of management, development and supervisor training centre. Plan of operation signed Sept 28.	UNSF Report, May 1962
ISRAEL				
US DLF	6.0	Feb 20	DLF announced signature of agreement for \$6 million loan, to be repaid in ten years at 3½% interest to finance part of foreign exchange cost of a telephone expansion programme.	DLF press release, Feb 20; US Aid Mission to Israel, Financial Report, Dec 31
US Export- Import Bank	1.5	March 17	Agreement signed for \$1.5 million loan, repayable over ten years at 5¾% interest, to help finance purchase of communication, electrical and motor equipment for Lod (Lydda) International Airport.	Office of US Representative (Israel), Financial Report, June 30, 1962
US PL 480	25.9	May 10	Agreement signed for \$25.9 million worth of US surplus farm products: 10% of local currency proceeds for US Government uses in Israel; 20% to be lent to private Israel and US companies in Israel to finance purchases in US; 35% as a grant for development projects; 35% as a loan to Israel to be repaid in 30 years at 4% interest.	AID, F.Y. 1962 Operation Report, Dec 31, 1961; Kitvei Amanah 430, 431, 432
US Export- Import Bank	2.0	June 21	Agreement signed for \$2 million loan, to be repaid over 15 years at 5¾% interest for port expansion.	Ex-Im. Bank Report to Congress, F.Y. 1961; Office of US Representative (Israel), Financial Report, June 30, 1962
World Bank IBRD	25.0	July 11	Bank and Dead Sea Works signed agreement for \$25 million loan, repayable over 15 years at 5¾% interest, for expanding the works.	IBRD, 17th Annual Report, 1961-1962
US Export- Import Bank	13.0 3.7 0.8	July 25	Three agreements signed, for \$13 million, \$3.7 million and \$0.8 million loans, repayable over 15 years at 5¾% interest. \$13 million loan for machinery, equipment and services for agricultural settlements; second loan for Electric Corporation's expansion programme; third loan for acquisition of diesel-electric locomotives, spare parts and services for Israel Railways.	Ex-Im. Bank Report to Congress, F.Y. 1961; Office of US Representative (Israel), Financial Report June 30, 1962
UN Special Fund		Sept 4	Grant of \$816,000 approved to expand facilities for training of vocational instructors, technicians, and foremen. Plan of operation signed on Sept 4. (The sum appears in MER 1960.)	UNSF Report, May 1962
US DLF	10.0	Sept 9	Agreement signed for \$10 million loan to be repaid in ten years at 5% interest to Industrial Development Bank of Israel, for loans to finance foreign exchange costs of specific projects.	USAM (Israel), Financial Report Dec 31

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

Donor	Amount (million \$)	Date	Details	Sources
US Export- Import Bank	4.3	Dec 22	Agreement signed for loan of \$4.288 million to El Al Israel Airlines, guaranteed by Israel government. The loan, to be repaid in seven years at 5¼% interest, was to be used for purchasing aircraft and spare parts.	Office of US Representative (Israel), Financial Report, June 30, 1962
JORDAN				
US DLF	1.0	Jan 12	Approval announced of \$1 million loan to Arab Land Bank, to be re-lent to private agricultural and industrial enterprises in Jordan—details to be negotiated.	DLF, press release, Jan 12
US	40.5	F.Y. 1961/2	US budget support to Jordan during Jordanian fiscal year 1961/62 was \$40.5 million.	IFNS, March 3
US	6.6	F.Y. 1961/2	US economic and technical grants to Jordan during fiscal year 1961/62 were \$6.6 million.	Jer. Times, Feb 21; FOA for 1963 (p 265)
UK	8.0	F.Y. 1961/2	Grant-in-aid of £2,356,000 to the Jordanian budget for fiscal year 1961-2 and £0.5m. interest free development loan.	MEED, July 14; Falastin, July 4
German Federal Republic	3.8	Aug	\$3.8 million loan repayable over 15 years at 3¼% interest agreed on for expansion of Aqaba Port.	IFNS, No. 34, Sept 1; EFSPA, No. 44, Aug
UN Special Fund	0.8	Nov 2	Grant to Jordan of \$811,300 approved to assess ground-water potential of aquifers in Azraq and adjacent areas and to train Jordanian personnel. Plan of operation signed on Nov 2.	UNSF Report, May 1962
World Bank IDA	2.0	Dec 22	Credit of \$2 million to be repaid in 50 years at 0.75% interest, extended for Amman water supply project.	IBRD 17th Annual Report, 1961-62; IDA Annual Report
LEBANON				
US PL 480		Dec 23, 1960	15,000 tons of US wheat to be distributed free to needy persons by Lebanese government to relieve drought shortage. [Should be added to US aid in 1960—MER 1960, p 50.]	Dep. of State Bul., Jan 7
Kuwait	14.0	March	Government of Kuwait granted Beirut Municipality £5 million loan, to be repaid in ten years beginning 1964 at 4% interest.	EFSPA No. 39, March; IFNS, March 17
US Export- Import Bank	0.06	May 26	Loan of \$56,000, guaranteed by Banque de Syrie et du Liban, authorized to private firm for citrus packing.	Ex-Im. Bank Report to Congress, F.Y. 1961
LIBYA				
US PL 480	1.8	Feb 2	US government grant of 17,000 tons barley and 5,000 tons wheat, valued at \$1.8 millions distributed in drought-stricken areas.	Dep. of State Bul., Feb 27
US	10.0	F.Y. 1961/62	The US budget support to Libya during the fiscal year 1961/62 was about \$10 million (£13.57 million).	Ec. Rev. Libya, No. 34, July

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million \$)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Sources</i>
UK	9.1	F.Y. 1961/62	UK budget support to Libya during fiscal year 1961/62 was £L3.25 million (\$9.1 million).	Ec. Rev. No. 34, July
German Federal Republic	7.5	Aug 7	Long-term loan of DM30 million (\$7.5 million) announced to finance agricultural and industrial projects.	MEED, Aug 18
SUDAN				
US		Dec 1960	Offer announced of "an additional" \$8,025,000 in aid during fiscal year ending June 30, 1961. [Probably part of US aid in 1960—as listed in MER 1960, p 51]	Morning News, Dec 29, 1960
UN Special Fund	0.5	May 3	Grant of \$521,000 approved for development of tanning, footwear and leathercraft industries. Plan of operation signed on May 3.	UNSF Report, May 1962
World Bank; IDA; German Federal Republic	50.9	June 14	\$50.9 million for Roseires dam, part of larger agricultural development project: on June 14 World Bank signed agreement for \$19.5 million loan to be repaid in 25 years at 5¼% interest; IDA made available \$13 million development credit to be repaid in 30 years without interest; GFR provided \$18.4 million.	IBRD, 17th Annual Report, 1961-1962
USSR	22.0	Aug	USSR agreed to provide credit of \$22 million repayable in 12 years at 2¼% interest, for establishing grain silos, canning factories, asbestos cement plant, agricultural research laboratories and station.	EFSPA No. 44, Aug; Tass, Nov 22 [24]
UN Special Fund	0.9	Oct 10	Grant of \$889,000 approved for research project on land and water resources of Kordofan Savannah belt. Plan of operation signed Oct 10.	UNSF Report May 1962
US PL 480	4.6	Nov	Agreement signed for \$4.6 million worth cereals; part of local currency proceeds to be given to Sudan as gift, part as loan.	VEFRPA, No. 95/35, Dec; EFSPA, No. 48, Dec
US	4.0	Dec	"Non Project Aid" grant of \$4.0m. approved to provide foreign currency for imports [counter part funds to be used for development projects].	Sudan News Agency, Dec 29
UN Special Fund	0.8	Dec 19	Grant of \$832,000 approved to help establish forest research institute and improve training facilities at Forest Rangers College. Plan of operation signed Dec 19.	UNSF Report, May 1962
SYRIA				
UN Special Fund	0.6	April 30	Grant to Syria of \$568,000 approved for research and pilot projects in food industry. Plan of operation signed April 30.	UNSF Report, May 1962
German Federal Republic		July 5	Agreement signed for loan of DM500 million (\$125 million) to cover foreign exchange costs of Euphrates Dam in Syrian Region. [By Aug 1962 the loan had not yet been authorized.]	EFSPA No. 43, July; IFNS, No. 30, Aug
US PL 480	8.8	Nov	Agreement signed for 100,000 tons of wheat and flour and 12,000 tons of rice, valued at \$8.8 million. Most of local currency proceeds to be reserved for credits to private companies in Syria; the rest to be lent to Syrian government for development projects.	VEFRPA No. 94/29, Nov; EFSPA No. 47, Nov

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

Donor	Amount (million \$)	Date	Details	Sources
TURKEY				
IMF		Jan 1	Under a one-year stand-by arrangement from Jan 1, 1961, Turkey could draw equivalent of \$37.5 million in currencies held by the Fund. In May 1961 she drew \$16 million. (Included in MER 1960, p 52.)	IFNS, Jan 13, March 10, June 30
US PL 480	12.4	Jan 11	Agreement signed for 200,000 tons of wheat, valued at \$12.4 million, to be paid for in local currency—20% of proceeds to be given as a grant to Turkish government and the rest to be used for cultural purposes and for US government purchases in Turkey.	Ulus, Jan 12
US DLF	129.6	Jan	Credit granted by DLF to Ereğli works to help establishing a second steel mill; repayable over 20 years—3/4 in Turkish currency—at 5¼% interest.	IFNS, Aug 4; AID, F.Y. 1962, Operations Report, pp 26, 30
US	43.6	Jan 16	Grant to Turkish government to help finance 1961 imports.	Cumhuriyet, Jan 17; MEED, Jan 20
US Technical Assistance Program	4.3	Jan	Received at end of Jan.	Cumhuriyet, Feb 1
US PL 480	11.4	March 28	Agreement signed: Turkey to receive 150,000 tons of wheat and 10,000 tons of rice to value of \$11.4m.	Cumhuriyet, March 29
German Federal Republic Government	50.0	June	Credit of DM200 million for 46 investment projects in 14 enterprises including Karabuk Iron and Steel Works, cellulose and paper factories, Sümerbank and Etibank, repayable in 15 years at 3% interest.	IFNS, Aug 4
Italy Government	10.0	June	Loan to Ereğli Iron Works for purchase of equipment in Italy; terms not published.	Cumhuriyet, July 1; IFNS, Aug 4
US ICA	33.0	July	Grant mostly for purchase of transportation equipment, chemicals, synthetic fibres and industrial machinery from US.	IFNS, Aug 4
US Export- Import Bank	1.6	Oct 3	Loan approved to Turk Willys-Overland Fabrikasi of Istanbul, repayable over five years.	IFNS, Oct 27
US PL 480	71.0	Dec 8	Agreement concluded: Turkey to receive 35,000 tons of soya beans; 15,000 tons of cotton oil; 20,000 tons of beef fat and 770,000 tons of wheat—total value \$71 million.	Ulus, Kudret, Dec 9
UAR (EGYPT)				
Yugoslavia	20.0	Jan 10	Economic and industrial cooperation agreement signed: \$20. million loan to buy Yugoslav equipment, machines and machine tools; 20% to be paid in cash on receipt; rest to be repaid in eight years for equipment, and three years for machinery at 3% interest.	EFSPA, No. 37, Jan, No. 38, Feb

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million \$)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Sources</i>
US PL 480	4.5	Jan 16	Agreement signed for 15,000 tons soya oil and 600 tons frozen poultry, value \$4.5 million, to be paid for in local currency. Eighty per cent of proceeds to finance economic development.	EFSPA, No. 37, Jan
US DLF	1.3	Jan 19	Agreement announced for \$1.3 million loan to help establish telecommunications organization in Egyptian Region; equipment and services to be purchased in U.S.	DLF, press release, Jan 19
German Federal Republic	2.0	Feb 12	Agreement signed: grant of DM8 million (\$2 million) for establishing of (1) metrology and materials testings institute in Cairo; (2) institute for oil research; (3) training centre for precision machine industry.	EFSPA, No. 38, Feb
UN Special Fund	1.1	April 17	Grant of \$1.1 million for civil aviation training centre in Cairo for Egypt and neighbouring countries. Plan of operations signed April 17.	UNSF Report May 1962
UK private firm	56.0	May 4	Agreement signed: C. Tenant, Sons & Co., London opens £20 million (\$56 million) credit to buy British capital goods for five-year industrialization programme; to be repaid in five years at 5% interest.	MEED, May 12
US PL 480	13.0	May 27	Agreement signed: Egypt to receive 200,000 tons wheat and flour, value \$13 million to be repaid in local currency. Sixty-five percent of total to be lent, repayable over 30 years at 4% interest, and 15% as outright gift, for economic development.	EFSPA, No. 41, May; VEFRPA, No. 88/24, May
Netherlands private firms	14.0	May 4	Agreement signed: group of Dutch companies to extend a \$14m. credit for the purchase of industrial machinery in the Netherlands; repayable over five years at 5% interest.	Gumburiyah, April 24; Ahram, May 5; MEED, May 12
US PL 480	4.0	June 24	Agreement signed for 50,000 tons of maize and 3,000 tons of edible oils worth \$4 million. (Terms same as under item of May 27, above).	VEFRPA, No. 89/25 June; EFSPA, No. 42, June
German Federal Republic	137.5	July 5	Agreement signed in Bonn: DM550 million (\$137.5 million) credits for Egyptian Region: DM150 million to finance basic economic projects (dams, bridges, roads, etc.), to be repaid over 12-16 years at 3% interest; GFR government guarantees for private credits up to DM400m. (incl. un-utilized balance of long term credits under 1958 agreement) for 7-10 years, at international market interest rates, to finance foreign exchange cost of other projects. (For second part of this agreement, see Syria.)	VEFRPA, No. 89/25, June; EFSPA, No. 43, July; IFNS, No. 30, Aug 4
IMF	10.0	July 27	Egypt drew equivalent of \$10 million from IMF, half in DM and half in Italian lire, to help meet loss of convertible currency reserves.	IFNS, Aug 4, quoting IMF press release, Aug 2
UN Special Fund		Aug 20	Fund approved grant of \$0.9 million to help establish Vocational Instructor Training Institute in Cairo; plan of operation signed Aug 20. (Sum not taken into account as included in assistance for 1960, see MER 1960, p 54.)	UNSF Report, May 1962

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million \$)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Sources</i>
US PL 480	64.1	Sept 2	Agreement signed for 900,000 tons wheat and flour and 100,000 tons maize to value of \$64.1 million. (Terms same as under item of May 27, above.)	EFSPA, No. 45, Sept
Italy private and public companies	200.0	Sept	Credits obtained in Sept: (1) \$50 million from Ital-Africa Co. for industrial projects—repayable over five years, at 4% interest; (2) \$50 million from the Fine Mecanica Co. repayable over nine years at 4% interest; (3) \$50 million from Fiat Co. for purchase of equipment from the company; (4) \$50 million from Italian oil concern ENI for a second drilling machine to accelerate oil exploitation in Gulf of Suez.	EFSPA, No. 45 Sept
US PL 480	6.7	Oct 7	Agreement signed for 4,000 tons tobacco—value \$6.7 million to be repaid in local currency; 70% to be used for development projects in Egypt.	Gumhuriyah, Oct 8
US PL 480	20.7	Nov	Agreement signed for 200,000 tons maize, 20,000 tons fats, 18,000 tons oils and 250 tons powdered milk—\$20.7 million worth. (Terms same as under item of May 27, above.)	EFSPA, No. 47, Nov; VEFRPA, No. 94/29, Nov
YEMEN				
US PL 480	0.5	Sept	Agreement signed in Sept: 7,000 tons food grain, valued at about \$500,000 as donation of US government.	Aden Chr., Sept 14
US	4.0	F.Y. 1961	US supporting assistance, mainly for road building and water supply. (No reports on agreements signed under this item were available.)	US Senate, Com. on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance for 1962, Washington, 1961

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES IN 1961 — NEW AGREEMENTS

(in millions of dollars)

Contributing Country or Agency

Recipient Countries	USSR	Yugo- slavia	Western Countries and Agencies					UN Special Fund	IMF	IDA	IBRD	Italy	Holland	Kuwait	Total Foreign Aid	Total Soviet Aid	Total Western Aid
			US	UK	West Germany	Italy	Holland										
Ethiopia	—	—	29.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.0	—	—	—	31.1	—	31.1
Iran	—	—	107.4	—	55.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	162.4	—	162.4
Iraq	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	—	—
Israel	—	—	67.2	—	—	—	—	25.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	92.2	—	92.2
Jordan	—	—	48.1	8.0	3.8	—	—	—	—	2.0	—	—	—	—	62.7	—	61.9
Lebanon	—	—	0.06	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14.0	14.06	—	0.06
Libya	—	—	11.8	9.1	7.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28.4	—	28.4
Sudan	22.0	—	8.6	—	18.4	—	—	19.5	13.0	—	—	—	—	—	83.7	22.0	59.5
Syria	—	—	8.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9.4	—	8.8
Turkey	—	—	306.9	—	50.0	10.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	366.9	—	366.9
UAR (Egypt)	—	20.0	114.3	56.0	139.5	200.0	14.0	—	10.0	—	—	—	—	—	554.9	—	533.8
Yemen	—	—	4.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.5	—	4.5
Total	22.0	20.0	706.7	73.1	274.2	210.0	14.0	46.5	15.0	10.0	5.3	14.0	1,410.8	22.0	1,549.5		

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

US ASSISTANCE TO ME COUNTRIES

Following are figures for US aid to ME countries for *US fiscal years 1960/2* (July 1, 1959-June 30, 1962)

Programmes for Fiscal Years 1960-1

[In thousands of dollars]

Country	1960			1961		
	Mutual Security Appropriations		Total	Mutual Security Appropriations		Total
	Military Aid	Economic Aid		Military Aid	Economic Aid	
Cyprus					75	75
Ethiopia	5,812	4,578	10,390	14,781	37,680	53,161
Iran	44,574	37,367	81,941	72,592	63,155	132,647
Iraq	—	815	815	30	1,100	1,130
Israel	—	23,863	30,100	—	24,500	44,500
Jordan	5,066	47,718	52,784	3,753	47,401	51,154
Lebanon	1,026	1,313	2,339	200	800	1,000
Libya	714	17,557	18,271	768	16,521	17,289
Sudan	—	13,039	13,039	—	8,525	11,925
Turkey	90,476	92,370	211,046	163,724	211,600	395,624
UAR	—	28,321	61,700	—	2,247	76,200
Yemen	—	2,986	2,986	—	4,000	4,000

(US Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance, for 1962, Washington 1961, pp 297-300)

Public Law 480 Assistance Fiscal Years 1960-1962

[In Millions of Dollars]

Country	FY 1960	FY 1961	FY 1962
Iran	—	21.9	9.0
Israel	37.6	25.9	27.5
Sudan	—	4.6	—
Syria	9.6	18.6	9.0
Turkey	35.0	25.4	127.5
UAR (Egypt)	72.7	79.8	165.8

(AID, FY 1963, Operations Report, Dec 31, 1962)

THE FOREIGN TRADE

Exports (in millions)

Export from	Cyprus ^a			Egypt ²		Ethiopia	Iran ¹	Iraq ¹		Israel ²	
	Jan-June			1960	1961	1960	1959	1960	1961	1960	1961
	1960	1960	1961								
Exports to	1960	1960	1961	1960	1961	1960	1959	1960	1961	1960	1961
Cyprus	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2	—	...	1.8	2.7
Egypt	0.05	—	0.1	—	—	1.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	—	—
Ethiopia	—	—	—	0.1	1.1	—	0.6	...	...	1.0	1.0
Iran	—	—	—	0.2	...	0.1	—	0.2	0.1	—	—
Iraq	—	—	0.1	0.2	0.7	—	1.9	—	—	—	—
Israel	0.3	0.3	0.2	—	—	1.6	0.3	—	—	—	—
Jordan	0.03	0.1	—	2.3	2.2	—	—	...	0.3	—	—
Kuwait	—	0.1	0.1	1.8	1.4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lebanon	0.4	0.4	0.3	5.4	6.6	1.5	1.1	3.9	3.2	—	—
Saudi Arabia	—	—	0.2	8.3	8.6	4.1	—	...	1.5	—	—
Sudan	0.1	0.1	—	13.8	14.3	0.3	8.6	0.2	0.1	—	—
Syria	—	—	—	16.9	0.8	—	1.0	1.3	0.8	—	—
Turkey	0.02	—	—	0.6	1.0	—	3.0	—	—	8.9	7.3
Austria	0.2	0.1	0.4	8.2	9.2	—	2.0	...	—	1.5	1.7
Greece	0.07	0.1	0.3	0.3	3.7	0.9	24.5	—	—	3.0	5.1
Japan	1.2	1.2	0.1	15.2	14.3	2.0	29.9	49.2	0.3	1.9	3.9
Switzerland	0.05	0.1	—	6.4	6.0	0.5	4.7	—	...	12.0	13.7
United Kingdom	10.1	10.0	10.4	13.1	11.5	4.9	160.2	111.5	0.7	36.1	35.8
United States	0.8	0.5	0.8	28.5	29.8	29.6	50.9	17.4	1.6	29.4	39.2
Belgium ¹	0.6	0.4	0.3	4.2	2.9	0.2	54.3	0.1	0.3	13.4	15.0
France	1.4	0.6	0.7	10.8	12.6	1.8	52.3	104.8	—	4.5	4.7
German Fed. Rep.	12.7	7.7	4.1	26.3	14.9	1.4	97.7	66.0	0.2	21.1	24.8
Italy	2.7	1.5	1.6	20.7	21.5	6.9	31.7	112.6	0.1	10.6	12.1
Netherlands	3.5	2.2	1.4	5.2	4.6	2.0	16.6	1.1	0.2	12.4	12.8
Bulgaria	—	—	—	5.5	3.7	—	—	0.1	—	0.5	1.3
China (Communist)	—	—	—	44.5	14.6	—	—	1.5	1.5	—	—
Czechoslovakia	0.3	0.1	0.1	37.2	68.3	0.5	—	0.7	0.7	0.1	—
German Dem. Rep.	—	—	—	28.8	17.5	—	—	0.4	0.2	—	—
Hungary	—	—	—	6.1	8.6	—	1.8	0.1	0.2	0.8	1.7
Poland	—	0.1	—	22.1	9.8	—	1.0	...	...	0.6	0.8
Rumania	0.3	0.2	0.1	10.8	13.2	—	—	...	...	1.6	2.2
U.S.S.R.	0.6	0.6	1.4	88.6	72.9	—	18.7	1.1	2.1	0.3	0.4
Yugoslavia	0.1	0.1	0.2	38.8	3.2	1.9	—	...	0.4	3.0	5.7
Africa	—	—	—	0.7	3.7	—	—	—	0.4	9.5	12.4
Latin America	—	—	—	9.5	13.2	—	—	—	—	3.4	2.7
Total all countries	46.6	29.7	27.1	347.0	462.6	77.5	927.0	645.6	646.7	216.6	245.3
Exports to ME countries	0.9	1.0	1.0	49.6	36.9	8.9	17.0	5.8	—	11.7	11.0
Percentage of total	1.9	3.4	3.7	9.1	8.0	11.5	1.8	0.9	—	5.4	4.5
Exports to Eastern Bloc	1.2	1.0	1.6	243.6	208.6	0.5	21.5	3.9	4.7	3.9	6.4
Percentage of total	2.6	3.4	5.9	44.5	45.1	0.6	2.3	0.6	0.7	1.8	2.6
Exports to Western and other countries (including EEC)	44.5	27.7	24.5	253.8	217.1	68.1	888.5	635.9	635.8	201.0	227.9
Percentage of total	95.5	93.2	90.4	46.4	46.9	87.9	95.9	98.3	98.3	92.8	92.9
Exports to Common Market Countries	20.9	12.4	8.1	67.2	56.5	12.3	252.6	376.2	—	62.0	69.4
Percentage of total	44.8	41.8	29.9	12.3	12.2	15.9	27.2	58.2	—	28.6	28.3

OF ME COUNTRIES

of dollars)

(For notes and sources, see at end of tables.)

Jordan		Kuwait ⁷	Lebanon ⁸		Libya			Saudi Arabia ⁷	Sudan	Syria		Turkey	
1960	1961	1960	1960	1961	1960	Jan-June 1960	1961	1960	1960	1960	1961	1960	1961
...	...	—	1.0	0.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
...	...	—	0.8	1.0	1.2	0.6	0.1	23.0	8.7	17.1	1.2	1.5	2.3
...	...	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.0	1.0	—	—	—	—
...	...	12.1	3.8	9.3	—	—	—	—	0.7	0.9	0.7	3.6	5.1
0.4	—	—	7.4	5.0	—	—	—	—	2.9	0.7	2.5	...	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.9	6.0
—	—	—	7.9	14.4	—	—	—	6.3	—	6.7	5.4	1.1	—
1.3	14	—	—	—	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1.5	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	26.0	0.6	13.6	11.5	16.0	24.4
0.9	0.1	—	19.8	36.2	—	—	—	—	4.1	7.5	4.2	0.2	0.2
...	...	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.8	—	—	—	—	—
1.8	2.3	0.5	8.5	9.5	—	—	—	0.8	—	—	—	5.1	2.5
—	—	—	0.4	0.2	—	—	—	5.9	—	0.6	0.1	—	—
—	—	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	—	0.5	—	—	4.8	4.9
...	...	—	1.6	—	0.6	—	0.1	0.3	2.2	...	—	1.6	—
...	0.2	205.3	—	0.1	—	—	—	105.5	5.1	2.3	1.6	1.3	2.1
...	...	—	6.7	16.6	—	—	—	—	1.0	—	—	9.4	15.9
...	...	448.8	2.8	5.9	1.7	0.5	0.5	40.0	47.3	3.3	2.5	30.7	29.7
...	...	124.0	3.8	3.2	0.1	—	0.2	43.0	5.7	3.3	3.5	57.9	65.2
—	...	16.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	—	—	24.3	2.9	2.0	0.4	9.9	13.6
—	...	142.4	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.2	0.1	64.8	8.8	9.3	7.3	16.2	23.9
...	...	26.5	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.2	0.3	125.8	11.4	3.8	3.4	47.1	51.1
...	...	135.0	2.5	1.8	3.6	1.7	1.2	98.5	12.4	3.9	5.2	27.4	34.2
—	...	132.5	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.4	0.1	28.5	4.5	...	3.7	5.9	5.8
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.8	2.4	1.6	1.0
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9.4	...	12.1	—	—
0.6	—	—	1.0	0.8	0.3	—	0.1	—	4.7	6.0	5.1	14.7	10.1
—	—	—	0.9	0.6	—	—	—	—	0.2	0.1	—	6.2	4.7
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.8	1.4	1.1	6.9	3.9
0.5	0.1	—	—	0.6	—	—	—	—	0.8	1.9	0.4	3.6	3.9
—	—	—	0.2	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.8	2.3	2.7	1.1	1.9
—	—	—	2.4	2.4	0.4	0.2	0.5	—	5.8	6.6	3.3	4.8	4.5
1.7	2.2	—	0.1	0.1	—	—	—	—	1.6	0.2	—	4.1	2.3
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9.7	11.9	—	99.5	181.3	11.2	4.3	3.8	—	181.9	96.4	98.6	317.5	347.2
5.9	5.3	—	49.6	76.5	1.2	0.6	0.2	—	18.0	50.4	27.4	34.4	40.5
60.8	44.5	—	49.8	42.2	10.7	13.9	5.3	—	9.9	52.3	27.8	10.8	11.7
1.1	0.1	—	4.5	4.7	0.7	0.2	0.6	—	23.5	20.1	27.1	38.9	30.0
11.4	1.0	—	4.6	2.6	6.3	4.7	15.8	—	12.9	20.9	27.5	12.3	8.6
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.7	6.5	—	45.4	100.1	9.3	3.5	3.0	—	140.4	25.9	44.1	244.2	276.7
27.8	54.5	—	45.6	55.2	83.0	81.4	78.9	—	77.2	26.8	44.7	76.9	79.7
...	...	—	4.7	4.0	6.0	2.5	1.7	—	40.0	19.0	20.0	106.5	128.6
—	—	—	4.7	2.2	53.6	58.1	44.7	—	22.0	19.7	20.2	33.5	37.0

THE FOREIGN TRADE

Imports (in millions)

Imports by Imports from	Cyprus			Egypt ^a		Ethiopia	Iran		Iraq		Israel ^a	
	1960	Jan-June 1960 1961		1960	1961	1960	1959	1960	1960	1961	1960	1961
Cyprus	—	—	—	...	...	—	—	—	...	0.1	0.4	0.3
Egypt	0.3	0.2	0.2	—	—	0.2	—	—	0.1	0.3	—	—
Ethiopia	—	0.1	0.1	1.7	0.5	—	—	—	0.3	0.2	1.8	1.7
Iran	—	0.3	0.3	1.3	0.7	0.6	—	—	2.5	2.6	—	—
Iraq	—	—	—	0.2	0.4	—	0.9	1.3	—	—	—	—
Israel	1.9	0.9	1.3	—	—	1.0	0.6	1.5	—	—	—	—
Jordan	—	—	—	...	...	—	—	—	0.3	2.0	—	—
Kuwait	—	—	—	0.2	0.2	—	3.9	12.1	—	—	—	—
Lebanon	1.0	0.4	0.5	1.0	1.7	0.1	1.5	6.0	11.2	6.5	—	—
Saudi Arabia	—	0.1	0.2	23.0	14.6	7.0	—	—	...	...	—	—
Sudan	0.1	0.1	0.1	7.2	9.8	1.0	0.1	0.8	3.1	3.2	—	—
Syria	—	0.1	0.1	21.2	1.2	—	0.4	0.7	0.3	1.5	—	—
Turkey	0.6	—	—	1.7	1.3	—	—	—	0.8	...	7.7	6.0
Austria	1.6	0.9	0.8	6.5	7.2	—	3.3	5.3	3.1	2.9	3.8	3.4
Greece	3.3	1.2	1.1	1.6	2.0	0.1	—	0.2	0.5	0.6	1.1	2.0
Japan	0.7	0.4	0.3	11.4	23.5	11.5	56.9	35.5	18.2	19.4	8.9	2.5
Switzerland	0.9	0.4	0.3	12.0	11.5	0.5	7.9	10.3	7.0	4.9	21.1	19.7
United Kingdom	40.2	21.0	19.4	39.0	50.5	7.6	76.0	79.7	95.5	90.5	59.3	80.1
United States	5.4	2.6	5.0	114.7	130.6	13.2	88.7	105.7	44.0	43.8	146.4	172.9
Belgium ¹	2.8	1.4	1.6	9.1	3.4	1.2	11.9	14.1	25.2	21.9	11.4	11.2
France	7.0	3.4	3.2	25.3	16.3	1.9	18.2	20.5	0.3	0.2	25.4	46.8
German Fed. Rep.	9.7	5.3	4.9	92.2	74.0	8.2	129.6	117.0	35.0	38.5	71.9	84.8
Italy	9.8	5.0	4.7	32.1	23.0	13.8	18.0	22.2	7.6	10.5	13.7	13.9
Netherlands	4.2	2.2	1.6	16.6	10.6	2.2	11.1	19.4	10.6	10.8	23.5	23.8
Bulgaria	—	—	—	4.0	3.2	—	0.2	0.3	2.1	1.5	1.4	1.4
China (Communist)	—	—	—	19.5	18.9	—	13.9	19.0	7.0	6.3	—	—
Czechoslovakia	0.9	0.5	0.4	23.1	16.9	2.3	9.3	6.0	9.8	9.3	0.1	0.2
German Dem. Rep.	—	—	—	25.3	22.7	—	1.6	0.7	2.5	2.5	—	—
Hungary	—	0.2	0.1	6.9	7.7	0.4	4.5	3.2	4.8	3.0	0.8	2.2
Poland	—	—	0.1	8.2	8.0	—	—	0.1	1.7	2.3	0.6	1.0
Rumania	0.7	0.4	0.1	8.3	8.9	—	0.7	1.7	2.8	4.2	1.0	1.0
U.S.S.R.	0.6	0.3	0.4	65.7	74.0	1.5	20.8	17.3	7.3	21.2	0.1	0.3
Yugoslavia	0.8	0.4	0.6	18.7	18.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.5	5.1	8.0
Africa	—	—	—	1.6	5.4	—	—	—	—	2.4	16.0	18.6
Latin America	—	—	—	3.1	13.1	—	—	—	—	—	2.5	3.1
Total all countries	109.7	55.6	54.5	646.0	662.4	87.7	526.8	557.6	390.7	407.9	502.7	586.3
Imports from ME countries	3.9	2.2	2.8	57.5	30.4	9.9	7.4	22.4	18.6	16.4	9.9	8.0
Percentage of total	3.6	4.0	5.1	8.9	4.6	11.3	1.4	4.0	4.8	4.0	2.0	1.4
Imports from Eastern Bloc	2.2	1.4	1.1	161.0	160.3	4.2	51.0	48.3	38.0	50.3	4.0	6.1
Percentage of total	2.0	2.5	2.0	24.9	24.2	4.8	9.7	8.7	9.7	12.3	0.8	1.0
Imports from Western and other countries (including EEC)	103.6	52.0	50.6	427.5	471.7	73.6	468.4	486.9	334.1	341.2	488.8	572.2
Percentage of total	94.4	93.5	92.9	66.2	71.2	83.9	88.9	87.3	85.5	83.7	97.2	97.6
Imports from Common Market Countries	33.5	17.3	16.5	175.3	127.3	27.3	188.8	193.2	78.7	81.9	145.9	180.5
Percentage of total	30.5	31.1	30.3	27.1	19.2	31.1	35.8	34.6	20.1	20.1	29.0	30.8

OF ME COUNTRIES

of dollars)

(For notes and sources, see at the end of tables.)

Jordan		Kuwait ²		Lebanon ²		Libya			Saudi Arabia ²		Sudan		Syria		Turkey	
1960	1961	1960	1960	1961	1960	1960	Jan-June 1960	1961	1960	1960	1960	1961	1960	1961	1960	1961
...	—	—	0.6	0.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.2	2.6	—	14.8	23.6	2.4	1.5	1.0	8.3	15.0	14.7	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.8	—	—
...	0.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.1	0.5	—	0.3	—	—	—	—	—
0.8	1.1	—	1.7	1.4	—	—	—	—	8.9	0.8	0.3	0.4	2.7	—	—	—
0.1	1.2	—	4.3	3.9	—	—	—	0.3	0.2	2.0	1.9	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.8	7.3	—	—	—
—	—	1.3	2.7	2.5	—	—	—	0.9	—	—	2.1	2.5	—	—	—	—
...	0.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	0.2	—	—	—	—	—
6.7	5.1	—	—	—	0.6	0.2	0.2	13.9	0.5	8.0	6.4	0.3	0.2	—	—	—
6.3	3.5	—	26.0	21.3	—	—	—	—	0.8	0.8	0.4	5.9	7.9	—	—	—
0.7	0.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.1	—	—	0.2	—	—	—	—	—
7.9	5.8	3.3	24.2	19.8	—	—	0.1	7.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1.7	3.4	—	13.1	23.7	1.2	—	—	0.2	—	—	5.6	2.5	—	—	—	—
1.4	1.5	—	3.7	4.6	1.2	0.6	0.5	—	1.5	4.3	2.9	9.7	7.9	—	—	—
0.1	—	—	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	—	—	—	—
4.3	4.8	22.4	5.1	5.5	2.1	1.0	1.3	15.6	4.5	6.8	3.7	4.6	3.2	—	—	—
0.7	1.0	—	6.3	11.3	0.5	0.2	0.3	—	1.1	5.4	3.7	6.5	7.5	—	—	—
16.9	18.5	42.3	84.7	111.2	32.8	16.4	14.5	19.0	49.6	17.3	14.4	52.4	67.0	—	—	—
14.2	19.6	41.0	40.6	72.8	34.0	15.2	14.2	66.0	5.2	32.2	30.4	119.4	140.1	—	—	—
2.9	3.1	7.7	10.0	12.0	2.0	0.8	0.4	7.3	3.6	8.6	5.1	10.1	8.0	—	—	—
2.5	2.1	5.6	29.5	32.2	12.5	6.3	3.0	4.3	4.6	19.2	10.4	16.2	17.7	—	—	—
12.1	10.6	18.6	33.1	35.7	14.9	9.1	10.1	16.3	14.9	26.4	22.6	97.2	85.1	—	—	—
8.7	3.5	8.3	22.5	25.7	31.4	15.9	15.9	7.7	9.6	13.6	9.7	29.8	42.9	—	—	—
4.1	3.5	5.9	8.4	9.2	8.8	3.8	2.6	9.9	3.6	10.3	5.9	12.0	12.1	—	—	—
1.4	1.6	—	—	—	—	—	0.1	—	—	0.8	0.9	1.5	1.8	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	0.4	0.2	0.2	—	2.2	1.3	1.1	—	—	—	—	—
1.0	1.3	—	4.0	5.1	0.5	0.2	0.5	—	3.1	3.6	2.9	11.6	11.7	—	—	—
1.2	1.2	—	1.5	1.6	4.9	—	—	—	0.2	1.9	1.9	7.8	6.2	—	—	—
0.5	0.6	—	—	—	0.5	0.1	0.3	—	1.8	1.0	0.7	5.2	4.3	—	—	—
0.8	0.7	—	—	2.3	—	—	—	—	1.0	0.5	0.8	8.5	5.6	—	—	—
1.0	1.0	—	2.4	3.8	0.1	0.1	—	—	1.7	2.9	2.8	1.7	1.5	—	—	—
—	—	—	4.6	3.6	0.9	0.3	1.2	—	6.5	7.3	8.1	5.9	8.4	—	—	—
0.7	0.8	—	1.5	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.8	—	0.6	2.6	2.3	4.8	3.6	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
120.2	117.3	—	396.1	484.3	165.0	78.0	73.8	—	180.8	215.1	169.0	463.5	509.5	—	—	—
26.4	24.5	—	87.4	96.7	4.2	1.7	1.3	—	25.9	34.5	15.5	15.7	18.9	—	—	—
22.0	20.9	—	22.2	20.0	2.5	2.2	1.8	—	14.3	16.0	9.2	3.4	3.7	—	—	—
5.9	6.4	—	12.5	16.4	7.3	0.9	2.3	—	16.5	19.3	19.2	42.2	39.5	—	—	—
4.9	5.5	—	3.2	3.4	4.4	1.1	3.1	—	9.1	9.0	11.4	9.1	7.8	—	—	—
86.8	85.5	—	293.2	371.2	153.5	75.4	70.2	—	138.4	161.3	134.3	405.6	451.1	—	—	—
73.1	73.6	—	74.6	76.6	93.1	96.7	95.1	—	76.6	75.0	79.4	87.5	88.5	—	—	—
30.3	22.8	—	103.5	114.8	69.6	35.9	32.0	—	36.3	78.1	53.7	165.3	165.8	—	—	—
25.2	19.4	—	26.3	23.7	42.2	46.0	43.4	—	20.1	36.3	31.8	35.7	32.5	—	—	—

NOTES AND SOURCES FOR TABLES ON ME FOREIGN TRADE

NOTES

General Notes

- (a) Figures have been converted at the official rates of exchange as follows:

Cyprus	\$2.80	per Cyp.£
Egypt	\$2.87	per £E
Ethiopia	40.25 cent	per \$Eth.
Iran	1.32 cent	per Riyal
Iraq	\$2.80	per ID
Israel	55.56 cent	per IL
Jordan	\$2.80	per JD
Lebanon	45.63 cent	per £L
Libya	\$2.80	per Libyan £
Sudan	\$2.87	per £S
Syria	27.98 cent	per \$S
Turkey	11.11 cent	per £T

- (b) When no figures are given this indicates either that there was no trade or that no detailed figures were available.
(c) The sign (...) designates that figures were less than \$50,000.
(d) It should be remembered that only part of the income from oil exports went to the exporting countries, the other part going to the oil companies.

Special Source Abbreviations

YITS 1960: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1960, United Nations.

DIT: Direction of International Trade, Joint Publication, United Nations, IMF, IBRD, monthly issue.

Specific Notes

- 1) Including trade with Luxembourg.
2) Cyprus: There are some discrepancies between the figures for the full year 1960 and those for Jan-June 1960; the source for the first is YITS 1960, for the second—DIT, Jan 1962.
3) UAR (Egypt) trade with African countries (excluding Ethiopia):

(In millions of \$)

	1960	1961
Total Egyptian Imports		5.4
Main countries		
Union of South Africa	1.6	0.8
Somalia		0.6
Congo (Leopoldville)		1.2
Southern Rhodesia		1.1
Kenya		0.4
Total Egyptian Exports		3.7
Main countries		
Union of South Africa	0.7	0.5
Somalia		1.6
Guinea		1.0
Nigeria		0.6

- 4) Including exports of crude oil, which amounted in 1959 to 28.7 million tons; direct payments of petroleum companies to the Iranian Government in 1959 totalled \$261.8 million.

- 5) *Iraq 1960*: Including oil exports. The figures have been added up from two sources: 1) Oil exports from *Quarterly Bulletin of the Central Bank of Iraq, No. 39, July-Sept 1961*; 2) Other exports from YITS 1960. The second source is more detailed as to countries but does not include oil exports. There are slight discrepancies between the two sources as to non-oil exports.

In 1960, payments by petroleum companies to the Iraqi Government totalled \$266.6 million.

Iraq 1961: The break-down of oil exports to individual countries was not available. Oil exports amounting to \$624,680,000 have, however, been included in the totals under "Western and other countries." Sources: General exports: *MEED, Oct 1962*; Oil: *International Financial Statistics, Vol 15, No. 6, June 1962, IMF*.

- 6) *Israeli Trade With African Countries* (excluding Ethiopia)

(In millions of \$)

	1960	1961
Total Israel Imports	16.0	18.6
Main countries		
Union of South Africa	6.3	7.0
Gabon	—	3.0
Kenya	1.8	2.0
Guinea	0.5	1.6
Ghana	1.4	1.2
Ivory Coast	—	1.1
Algeria	0.2	0.7
Total Israel Exports	9.5	12.4
Main countries		
Nigeria	1.9	2.9
Union of South Africa	1.9	2.6
Ghana	2.0	2.1
Algeria	0.2	1.5
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	0.5	0.6
Liberia	0.7	0.5

- 7) The grand totals are lacking, as figures for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were taken from the statistics of other countries. In 1960 Kuwait exported 77.8 million tons of crude oil and Saudi Arabia 50.5 million tons. Direct payments by petroleum companies to Kuwait in 1960 totalled \$410.6 million, and to Saudi Arabia \$347.3 million.

- 8) (a) There were two rates of exchange in Lebanon: for exports—\$1=£L3.07; and for imports—\$1=£L2.19. All calculations here have been made at the latter rate.

- (b) As from 1960 Lebanese foreign trade statistics also included trade in securities and currency, traveller checks, etc. Figures given for such trade in 1961 were as follows:

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF ME COUNTRIES

(In thousands of \$)

Country	Imports	Exports
German Fed. Rep.	2.3	—
Iran	6.8	401.8
Italy	35.1	—
United Kingdom	11,635.8	2,373.3
Turkey	1,023.5	—
Syria	474.2	1,607.8
Switzerland	3,936.3	15,938.4
Iraq	268.4	112.5
France	301.8	—
Canada	—	13.7
Egypt	17,805.4	—
Jordan	267.6	4,243.3
Saudi Arabia	3,521.2	29,337.3
Austria	8.3	—
India	1,934.1	—
Netherlands	31.3	—
United States	231.9	286.1
Greece	264.7	28.8
Other Countries	7,219.7	54,293.5
Total	48,988.3	108,836.7

SOURCES

(For special source abbreviations, see above)

Cyprus: See above: Notes

Ethiopia 1960: YITS 1960

Iran (Exports 1959; Imports 1959, 1960): DIT, Jan 1962

Iraq: See above: Notes

Israel 1960, 1961: *Israel Foreign Trade (1961)*, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem 1962

Jordan

1960: YITS 1960: *Statistical Yearbook 1960*, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics

1961: Ibid, 1961

Kuwait 1960: From statistics of countries trading with Kuwait, YITS 1960

Lebanon

1960: YITS 1960

1961: *Le Commerce Du Levant* No. 25, Sept 15, 1962.

Libya

1960: DIT, Jan 1962

1961: DIT, Jan 1962

Saudi Arabia 1960: From statistics of countries trading with Saudi Arabia, YITS 1960

Sudan 1960: YITS 1960

Syria

1960: YITS 1960

1961: MEED, Mar 1962; *Monthly Summary of Foreign Trade 1961*, Damascus

Turkey

1960: YITS 1960

1961: MEED, May 1962

UAR (Egypt)

1960: YITS 1960

1961: *Economic Bulletin*, Vol XIV No. 4, 1961, National Bank of Egypt; *Journal du Commerce et de la Marine*, May 28, 1962.

THE WESTERN POWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

THE MILITARY POSITION OF THE WEST IN THE ME

[Note: On the Russian military position in the area, only Western reports and reviews were available; these are included below.]

Western strategy in the ME continued to be concerned with the oil interest and the overall strategic value of the area in the struggle with the Communist countries; the first received more emphasis in the UK, the latter in the US.

The outstanding military event during the year was Britain's operation in Kuwait, in defence of her oil interests. In face of an open Iraqi threat to Kuwait's newly won independence, and in response to a Kuwaiti request for assistance under her agreement with Britain, a UK force was landed in Kuwait, starting on July 1. This was the first Western military intervention in Arab affairs since 1958, when US and British forces came to the assistance of the Lebanese and Jordanian governments respectively, after the coup d'état in Iraq. In 1961, as in 1958, the intervention was legal in that it was requested by the government concerned, and also as in 1958, it met no armed opposition either locally or from abroad. Both Kuwait's independence and Britain's oil interest were preserved, though that credit for this was due to the presence of the British force remained a matter for speculation. (On the political circumstances of the Kuwait crisis, see pp 117 ff.)

From the military point of view, qualified observers argued that the operation, while executed speedily and efficiently, also demonstrated the great limitations of the small British strategic reserve, which was committed to action for the first time. By using most of the resources of the RAF Transport Command, and with several days warning, it took almost a week to concentrate in Kuwait one reinforced brigade group in an unopposed operation. In case of Iraqi armed opposition, it was thought, air cover, armour, and even sea defence would have been inadequate. Nor would sufficient troops have been available, as the whole strategic reserve consisted of three brigade groups, a parachute brigade and two Marine commandos. Thus the intervention would have had to be abandoned entirely, or else postponed for so long a time that an entirely new situation would meanwhile have arisen. In Oct the British troops were relieved by an Arab League force in safeguarding Kuwait's independence.

Except for the Kuwait operation, where the British forces in the area were reinforced from the central strategic reserve in Britain, no major change took place in the order of battle of Western forces in the ME and the Mediterranean. The main Western deterrent in the area remained the US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, which was constantly at a state of full combat readiness. For land forces, however, apart from the small British garrisons in the ME and East Africa (Kenya) and the 1,800 marines of the 6th Fleet, the West had to rely on

its strategic reserve and on its airlift capacity for speedy intervention in an emergency. British resources were very limited, as already stated, even considering the seven brigades of the Army of the Rhine. The US capacity to commit forces grew as the Administration put more emphasis on strengthening forces for non-nuclear, limited wars and guerrilla warfare, as well as on increasing the air-lift capacity. The Berlin crisis also contributed to increasing the readiness and the strength of the US forces.

CENTO, upon the insistence of Iran and Pakistan, decided to appoint a military commander, a step interpreted as the cornerstone for a military command structure and forces committed to the organization. The appointment, however, was not actually made, and thus, it was commented, the power of CENTO continued to be expressed primarily in the bilateral defence agreements between the US and Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.

The Soviet Union's submarine flotilla withdrew from Albania following the deterioration in the relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union's capacity to intervene in the ME by airborne troops and land forces, however, presumably remained as considerable as before; (see MER 1960, pp 95, 102).

WESTERN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Western strategic objectives in the ME continued unchanged. (See MER 1960, p 95.)

British Oil Interests. [The determination to defend the oil interests was demonstrated by Britain's military assistance to Kuwait in face of the Iraqi threat to the latter's independence.] A leader in *The Times* confirmed again that "a threat to the oil of the Middle East is one of the main preoccupations of British strategy." (*Times*, July 11)

US Strategy. The objectives of the US in the ME were defined by one of her commanders in the area, Maj-Gen. Frank S. Bowen, Deputy C-in-C, US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. He declared that the reasons for US concern in the area were strategic location and oil.

Geographically, he said, the ME was the hub of the eastern hemisphere. History seemed to demonstrate that anyone who would desire to dominate the continents of the eastern hemisphere must, as an essential step, dominate the ME. Conversely, for anyone trying to resist continental expansion, the ME must be protected at all costs. Soviet Russia sought to expand southward, as the Turks had done, while the emergence of independent African states gave her an additional reason for desiring to play a dominant role in the ME.

In addition to its strategic location, the ME contained three-quarters of the world's known oil resources, upon

which the allies of the US were dependent for their supply. While the Russians perhaps had no vital need of ME oil for their own use, it would certainly be of tremendous advantage to them to be able to control its production and exportation.

US aims in the ME were: (a) to assist the people of the ME to resist domination by a totalitarian power, whose aims were inimical to the free world, and to ensure the availability of the oil; (b) to prevent the spread of Communism in the area, regardless of the form it might take; (c) to ensure the ME's continued neutrality or alignment with the West.

As to the means employed, Bowen said, the US sought to promote peace, understanding, and economic stability in the ME primarily through diplomatic channels and economic and military aid. "Direct military support may be provided at the request of nations who may find themselves in difficulty" (the "commitment to Lebanon" [in 1956] was such a case); Bowen emphasized, however, that "initial effort and incentive must be of indigenous origin."

There were no US [land] forces in the area, and the forces which might be required had to come from Europe, the US, and the Far East. Emphasizing that successful intervention required a short reaction time, the General spoke of the logistic problems involved—mainly aircraft requirements—and raised the questions of aircraft capacity as well as the availability of the Suez Canal. (*Army, Oct*)

East Africa to Enable Defence in Depth. An article in a US military journal discussed the strategic value of East Africa as a "bastion for the Western world." While the land bridge from Asia to Africa retained its extraordinary strategic importance, the loss of the British positions in and around the pivotal Suez positions, as well as political changes in the ME area, had enhanced the importance of East Africa.

British defence planning had now prepared a new role for East Africa. In addition to the major stake the Western allies had in Africa itself, they needed a place of security in which to mass reserve forces for defence in depth against assault through the Middle East. They also needed bases outside the vulnerable European theatre for deploying airpower to strike in the Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean, as well as facilities for naval power in the Indian Ocean. Finally, they needed an "enclave of political stability and pro-Western faith in an unpredictable continent..."

Concluding his survey of the area—Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Pemba—the author said that East Africa had the "characteristics for a defensive position of some strength" and that the US could contribute to the creation of such a position. (*US Naval Institute Proceedings, March*)

US FORCES AND BASES

The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. After taking over command in July, Vice-Admiral David L. McDonald declared in London that the fleet normally consisted of some 50 ships, almost 30,000 men, and more than 200 naval aircraft. The fleet was at full strength and at a state of full combat readiness. (*NYT, July 6, Aug 8*)

The composition of the fleet continued in the main as in 1960 (see MER 1960 p 95). However, the report quoted in MER 1960 on Polaris (nuclear) submarines in the fleet was apparently erroneous. In Feb a *New York Times* correspondent reported from Ankara that the 6th Fleet had Polaris submarines. In Aug, however,

a report on the composition of the Fleet made no mention of them (*NYT, Feb 22, Aug 8*), and in the same month the US Secretary of the Navy denied that there were any immediate plans for Polaris submarines to operate in the Mediterranean. (*Times, Aug 24*)

Fifteen mobile Jupiter medium-range missiles and nuclear warheads to arm them were emplaced in Turkey (30 such missiles were in Italy). Turkey agreed to the emplacement of the missiles in spite of Soviet warnings. Both forces were fully committed to NATO and could not be used unilaterally by their own governments. (*Flight, March 3; NYT, Feb 22*)

Exercises in Turkey. [In Sept. at the height of the Berlin crisis] NATO exercise Checkmate II was held in western Turkey. A force of about 2,000 parachute troops from the US 101st Airborne Division were dropped, and other troops carried out a beach assault at Saros Bay. Turkish, British, Greek, and US forces took part in the exercise. About 230 US fighter and transport aircraft participated.

The USSR protested to Turkey against the holding of this exercise in an area "directly bordering on the Soviet Union and Bulgaria." It said that US naval ships—among them an aircraft carrier—were calling on Turkish ports on the Black Sea coast. The Soviet government, precisely during the Berlin crisis, could only assess this exercise as a hostile demonstration; the use of the Black Sea itself as an area for manoeuvres was incompatible with the existing international agreements (*Times, Sept 8, 18; Pravda, Sept 26*). (Admiral Arleigh Burke, US Chief of Naval Operations, had declared at the beginning of the year that the US Navy would go into the Black Sea whenever it pleased, and the Soviet Union would not stop it. (*Times, Feb 17*))

Wheelus Air Base in Libya. In July the Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli came under the command of the 17th Air Force of the USAFE (US Air Force, Europe). The base covered an area of more than 3,000 acres, and its runways carried a greater volume of tactical aircraft traffic than any other runway in the USAFE. Air forces based in Europe did weapon training from the base, which could accommodate over a hundred aircraft and a thousand personnel for training purposes. Each tactical fighter pilot in the USAFE came to Wheelus as the average of twice a year for one month. Wheelus was also important as a MATS (Military Air Transport Service) base. During 1961 it played an important part in facilitating the movements of UN staff and supplies to the Congo and refugees from the Congo. (*Flight, April 20; Times, Dec 16*)

US Air Base in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia). In March Saudi Arabia asked the US to cease its military operations from the Dhahran airfield. (For details see pp 428-9)

BRITISH NEAR EAST COMMAND

The unified ME Command, with headquarters at Akrotiri (Cyprus), was redesignated Near East Command, as of March 1. It was responsible for all British forces within the Mediterranean area i.e. Cyprus, Libya, and Malta. (*Report on Defence 1961, Memorandum on Army Estimates 1961-62, HMSO*.)

In mid-1961 a total of seven infantry battalions were stationed in the Mediterranean area, including Gibraltar. But in Dec it was reported that British garrisons in the ME would be reduced considerably, and that the area

would be largely the responsibility of a UK-based strategic reserve. (*Times*, June 27, Dec 7)

British Bases in Cyprus. The British forces in Cyprus operated in the sovereign base areas without any serious disturbance throughout the first full year of Cyprus' independence.

Air Marshal Sir William MacDonald, Air Officer C-in-C, Near East Air Force, and Administrator of the Sovereign Base areas, Cyprus, described the treaty relations with Cyprus as working extremely well. Boundaries of the sovereign territory had been marked with stones instead of barbed wire. The bases were the biggest employers on the island (12,000-15,000 Cypriots). (*Times*, March 20)

Between July 26 and Aug 7 the water pipeline leading to Dekhelia base was sabotaged 12 times. (See p 252 h.)

Strategic Value of Cyprus Questioned. The strategic value of Cyprus was questioned. A US observer thought Britain might find her position in Cyprus seriously impaired, either by political developments or by the exposed location of the island, in an age of jet bombers and missiles (*US Naval Institute Proceedings*, March, p 22). The Defence correspondent of *The Times* described the Cyprus commitments, together with others such as Malta, irrelevant to immediate strategic needs. They seemed to be outside of the framework of any foreseeable strategic concept. The withdrawal from them might be unattractive and even painful, but it would be an important step towards solving the manpower problem. (*Times*, Sept 15)

Forces in Cyprus. The strength of the British forces on the island was about 20,000 servicemen, supported by 12,000-15,000 civilians.

The major units were: No. 3 Infantry Brigade Group; 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment; Canberra bombers and fighter aircraft. (*Soldier*, June; *Times*, Oct 3; *Memorandum on Air Estimates 1961-62*, HMSO)

The Mediterranean Fleet and British Forces in Malta. Malta was the base of the British Mediterranean Fleet, which also operated two airfields on the island.

The Royal Navy was broadly divided into the ships based west of Suez, which were virtually all interchangeable between the Home and Mediterranean Fleets, and the Eastern Fleet, based at Singapore. West of Suez were always two aircraft carriers.

The permanent establishment of the Mediterranean Fleet consisted of 1 cruiser, 5 destroyers, 4 frigates, 1 submarine squadron, 1 repair ship, 1 guided missile ship, 8 coastal minesweepers. (*Explanatory Statement on Navy Estimates 1961-62*, HMSO)

Among other British forces in Malta was a Royal Marine Commando. (*Soldier*, June; *Times*, Feb 8)

Exercises in Cyprus, Libya. The strength of the permanent British garrison in Libya remained unchanged during 1961, namely, one armoured and two infantry battalions (*Soldier*, Nov). The El Adem airfield continued to serve as an important staging point for the RAF. (*Times*, Oct 14)

Exercise Triangle, in March, was described as one of the highest exercises in North Africa since the Second World War. The 3rd Independent Infantry Brigade Group moved from Cyprus to Libya in what was described as the biggest airlift out of Cyprus since the Suez operation. The move was supported by sea transport. The opponents of the Cyprus force were troops permanently stationed in Libya.

In April Exercise Fabulist was held in Cyprus. The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade of the Strategic Reserve in the UK joined her battalion stationed in Cyprus for five days during the exercise, which was intended to test combined air mobility and ground tactical training. It opened with a mass drop in the north-west of the island, and afterwards the troops were engaged in the Adolphus forest area. The transportation of the brigade involved the biggest military airlift to Cyprus since the time of the Suez intervention. (*Times*, March 16, April 26; *Soldier*, June)

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

General. On March 1 British Forces Arabian Peninsula was redesignated Middle East Command. The titles of commanders were as follows: C-in-C Middle East; Flag Officer Middle East; GOC Middle East Land Forces; GOC East Africa Command; Air Officer Commanding Air Forces Middle East. (*Army Quarterly*, July)

Air Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy was the C-in-C. The Command included Aden and the Arabian coast up to Kuwait, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and the western half of the Indian Ocean. The protection of the oil interest was regarded as the main task of the Command. "The way to protect that interest is to protect the weak coastal powers and the minorities against outward pressure of the powers and peoples of the interior." The command, it was reported, "backs the minority of white settlers in Kenya. In Aden it wages a spasmodic war against Yemen in defence of the nascent federation of shaykhdoms on the Aden coast. It supports the Sultan of Muscat and Oman against the ever rebellious Omanis... who get their guns from Saudi Arabia. It finances the Trucial Oman Scouts, who keep the Saudis out of the strategic Buraimi Oasis." (*NYT*, July 7)

There were 8,000 UK land troops in Aden, Bahrain, and Kenya. (*NYT*, July 1)

The forces under command consisted of: **Naval:** three frigates; the Amphibious Warfare Squadron, with headquarters ships and three tank-landing ships; the commando carrier *Bulwark* with one marine commando; one marine commando based at Aden.

Land: In Aden, one infantry battalion, one armoured car regiment, one field-gun battery, and one light aircraft squadron, as well as five infantry battalions and an armoured car squadron of the Aden Protectorate Levies (on which see p 441 b).

In Bahrain, two infantry companies, reinforced in Oct by a parachute battalion.

In Sharjah, one armoured squadron.

In Kenya (as local strategic reserve), the 24th Infantry Brigade, with four infantry battalions and one field-gun regiment.

Air: Two Hunter squadrons, a transport force engaged in maintaining the widely dispersed ground and air forces. (*Times*, July 3, 20, Oct 3, Dec 28; *Journal RUSI*, Nov; *Army Quarterly*, Jan 1962)

Bases in Aden. The Army rebuilt its administrative and workshop centre, and spent £3.5m. on new barracks at Khormaksar, Aden. At Bir Fukum, 22 miles from Aden, the biggest single military building scheme ever undertaken in the area was launched—the \$5m. Little Aden cantonment for 2,500 soldiers and 1,000 dependants. (*Times*, Oct 9; *Soldier*, June)

Bases in Kenya. African leaders, especially of KANU, were conducting a sustained campaign against the British Army cantonment being built at Kahawa, 14 miles from

Nairobi, and the RAF station at Eastleigh, Nairobi. (*Times*, July 1, Oct 18)

On Nov 30 it was announced that discussions on the future of the military bases were to take place between the governments of Kenya and the UK. The decision was reached after an outright demand to stop further military activity and to take steps to remove the bases without delay. (*Times*, Dec 1)

OPERATION IN KUWAIT

General. In the Kuwait crisis (on which see pp 117 ff) Britain's Strategic Reserve—the "fire brigade" force—was tested for the first time in action, though in a bloodless operation. (*Soldier*, Sept)

Build-up of Forces. As the reports of the Iraqi build-up were received, a British review of the operation said, it was obvious that the Ruler of Kuwait might request assistance and that certain preparatory moves would have to be made. During June 27 and 28 more information about the build-up came in, and the decision was made to put the commando carrier *Bulwark* [which was at Karachi] within reach of Kuwait, and to move a Hunter squadron to Bahrain. On June 30 the Ruler of Kuwait asked for British assistance (*Army Quarterly*, Jan 62). On the same day the 24th Infantry Brigade in Kenya was alerted, and a small number of administrative troops moved from Cyprus to the ME Command. (*Times*, July 1)

D-Day (July 1): 600 Royal Marine commandos of 42 Commando from the commando carrier *Bulwark* (escorted by one frigate only) were landed by helicopters near the town of Kuwait, and 14 Centurion tanks of 3rd Dragoon Guards from Bahrain were landed by tank landing ship. The Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade Group established a joint Kuwait-British Headquarters. By nightfall British troops were established on the Mutla ridge, which covered the only approach to the town of Kuwait from the north. (*Soldier*, Sept; *Army Quarterly*, Oct 1961, Jan 1962)

D + 1 (July 2): Troop-carrying aircraft flew in more men and equipment. A British army spokesman confirmed that the British troops in Kuwait were, in addition to 42 Commando and 3rd Dragoon Guards: 45 Commando (from Aden), two companies of the Coldstream Guards from Bahrain, a squadron of the 11th Hussars with armoured cars from Aden, an airborne gun battery from Aldershot, and advance elements of the 24th Infantry Brigade from Nairobi; there were 12 Hawker Hunter jet aircraft; an Inter-service amphibious headquarters joined the *Bulwark*. (*Times*, July 3)

D + 2 (July 3): Further troops arrived of the Coldstream Guards and also of the 2nd Parachute Battalion from Cyprus, who were flown over Turkey and Iran. Air forces on the spot included eight Canberra bombers, two Hawker Hunter fighter squadrons, short-range transport aircraft, and a reconnaissance flight of the Army Air Corps. A squadron of Javelin fighter aircraft of the RAF Fighter Command was standing by in Britain. The Force in Kuwait was by now "a very strong brigade group, with air support." (*Times*, July 3, 4)

D + 3 (July 4): Military transport aircraft continued to arrive at an average of five an hour. The new arrivals were mainly infantry from Kenya and two 25-pounder gun batteries from the U.K. (*Times*, July 5; *Army Quarterly*, Jan 1962)

D + 4 (July 5): 34th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers arrived (*Times*, July 6). More than 7,000 men were by now in position, holding an 80-mile defence line. (*Soldier*, Sept)

D + 6 (July 7): The naval forces off Kuwait were reinforced by the aircraft carrier *Victorious* and her escorting vessels (this force had been ordered to sail from Hongkong on June 29—*Times*, July 30; *Journal RUSI*, Nov) and minesweepers from Aden (*Army Quarterly*, Jan 1962). With the arrival of the 1st Battalion, the King's Regiment, from Kenya, the men of the Coldstream Guards returned to Bahrain. The C-in-C ME announced that the build-up had been virtually completed. (*Times*, July 8)

[The forces, drawn from Aden, Kenya, Cyprus, Germany, the UK, and Singapore, consisted finally of the following:

Naval: One fleet carrier, one commando carrier, one amphibious warfare squadron, and minesweepers. In reserve off Aden: one light aircraft carrier and a destroyer squadron (which had sailed through the Suez Canal.)

Land: Under command of HQ 24th Infantry Brigade Group: two infantry battalions, one parachute battalion, two marine commandos, most of an armoured car regiment, a tank squadron, a field-gun regiment, an airborne gun battery and supporting units.

Air: Two Canberra (bomber) squadrons, two Hunter (ground attack and fighter) squadrons, one Javelin (air defence) squadron on alert in the UK, one photo-reconnaissance Canberra squadron, and one Shackleton (maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine duties) squadron, Beverley transports and communication and liaison aircraft.]

ME Command commanded this force from advanced joint headquarters at Bahrain. (*Army Quarterly*, Jan 1962)

Theatre Reserve (Kenya): HQ 19th Infantry Brigade and two infantry battalions of the UK Strategic Reserve were airlifted to Kenya starting July 7. These units replaced those of the 24th Infantry Brigade sent to Kuwait, and provided a base from which reliefs and reinforcements to Kuwait could be carried out. (*Times*, July 4, 5, 7)

Role of RAF Transport Command. Never before had British troops moved so rapidly, a British source said (*Soldier*, Sept). Some 70 aircraft were used, most of them within the first 48 hours. This figure was given by the Air Minister, who said that three Royal Rhodesian Air Force aircraft and 17 chartered civil machines were also used in the first six days. About 7,000 men and 700 tons of stores were moved to airfields in the Persian Gulf and Aden. The final seal was set on the airlift on July 14. The transport force included one Comet squadron, two Britannia squadrons, 4 Beverley squadrons, 3 Hastings squadrons, and one Valetta squadron. (*Flight*, July 13, 27)

Activities. The force in Kuwait held an 80-mile defence line near the Iraqi border. There was a reserve for defending the oilfields and the water and distillation plants. (*Times*, July 4, 7)

Not one shot was fired in anger. The biggest enemy turned out to be the weather. Scores of men (though, significantly, not those who had been acclimatized in Bahrain and Aden) were prostrated by the overpowering

heat, and violent sandstorms tore at the troops. (*Soldier, Sept, Nov*)

The Withdrawal. The withdrawal started on July 19 with the return of 45 Marine Commando to Aden, followed on July 21 by the *Bulwark* with 42 Marine Commando.

With the arrival of Arab League troops the parachute troops started to leave for Bahrain on Sept 19. By Oct 10 the withdrawal had been completed. In mid-Oct the troops which had been sent to Kenya started to return to the UK. (*Times, July 20, 22, Sept 16, 20, Oct 11, 16*)

Evaluation of Operation. The joint planning staff of the Ministry of Defence, a *Times* leader said, had provided a workable plan which had been executed by the service ministries and their commanders and staff with precision.

The situation which faced the British government bristled with political difficulties, but militarily General Qasim surrendered the initiative when he announced his claims on Kuwait without making a military move of any consequence. This enabled the government to move a force into a friendly country and to take up defensive positions there—an operation needing far smaller resources than would have been needed if Iraq had acted without warning. Using most of the resources of the RAF Transport Command and the commands overseas, and with several days warning, it took a week to concentrate and deploy a reinforced brigade group.

There were obvious gaps in the composition and equipment of the force. The most serious of these was the strength of its defence against armour. Aircraft armed with rockets could be considered to strengthen the anti-tank resources, but they could not replace the tank as the principal close anti-tank support for ground forces. (*Times, July 11*)

Nor was the air situation considered satisfactory. To provide reconnaissance, close support of ground forces, and air defence, at least five different types of RAF and Royal Navy aircraft were used. The deployment of Canberra and Hunters with the possibility of reinforcement by Javelins, the Defence correspondent of *The Times* noted, pointed to a gap in the equipment of the RAF: There was no all-purpose aircraft, capable of being ferried long distances without refuelling and of operations from short unmade runways in a combined air-defence and ground-attack role. The Canberra was basically a bomber, with limited capability in air defence. The Javelin was an air fighter with an effective air-to-air missile designed primarily to operate from the UK, but it needed long metal runways and could be ferried long distances only by using frequent stages and flight refuelling. The Hunter was virtually obsolete as an air-defence fighter, having no air-to-air missile armament, and would have been at a disadvantage against the MIG 17 aircraft with which the Iraq Air Force was equipped. There seemed to be a clear need for a versatile aircraft, like the French Mirage, for operations in limited war. (*Times, July 4, 5, 7*)

On the naval side serious risks had to be taken, an authoritative British source said. As luck would have it, the commando carrier *Bulwark* was at Karachi, only two days steaming from Kuwait. But for protection of the *Bulwark* out of three frigates in the area only one was available. Iraq had no submarines, but she had 10 motor torpedo boats, which could have delivered a night attack on the carrier. Alternatively, they could have been used to lay mines, and there was no minesweeper within 4,000 miles of the scene of operation. Two minesweepers which

passed through the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean, could not reach the area before July 16. But most serious of all was the lack of air protection during the early stages, since a commando carrier did not carry any aircraft for this purpose and had limited armament. Much had been made of the useful role of the commando carrier, but she was very vulnerable. The only carrier east of Suez, the *Victorious*, was 5,000 miles away when the crisis arose. She was only able to reach the scene some nine days later. The light fleet carrier *Centaur* and two escorts, which sailed from Gibraltar, could reach Kuwait only three days after that, so she was held at Aden. This force could have been easily held up in the Suez Canal by the Egyptian government. (Vice Admiral B.B. Schofield in *Army Quarterly*, Oct)

The Force in Kuwait had been successfully deployed largely because it was unopposed. If an opposed landing had been necessary the outcome might have been very different. In fact, the *Bulwark* would have been obliged to await the necessary concentration of forces before entering the operational area, and by that time the aggressor would have been in possession of the field (see also below: Strategic Reserves). (*Times, July 11; Army Quarterly, Oct*)

Second ME Alert. In Dec there was another, though limited, alert, in regard to Kuwait (see p 137 b ff).

Two hundred officers and men of the army and the RAF left Britain on Dec 27 for the ME, by air. The move was part of precautions which began to be taken before Christmas, when last minute changes were made in the leave arrangements of the central Strategic Reserve to meet increasing tension in the ME. The aircraft carrier *Centaur* sailed from Mombasa to the Aden area, accompanied by a tank landing ship and two frigates.

The *Times* Defence correspondent remarked that although no official statement was made about the nature of the threat, there could be little doubt that the sensitive area was once more Kuwait. The British troop movements were almost no more than intelligent precautions, as it would have been difficult to bring effective aid to Kuwait after an attack by the Iraqis. (*Times, Dec 28*)

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION

Organization. The organizational setup of CENTO remained unchanged during 1961 (see MER 1960, p 100).

Ninth Session of CENTO Council; Question of Military Commander. [Pakistan and Iran had been urging for some time the appointment for CENTO of a military commander with powers similar to those of the Supreme Commander of the NATO Forces. It appeared that the two countries wished to have a US general as Commander.]

Before the annual meeting of the CENTO Ministerial Council (ninth session, Ankara, April 27-28) it was reported that the proposal for a "CENTO joint military command" was likely to be dropped, because the US, "while unwilling to detract from the importance of existing military pacts... is not eager to take on any new commitments."

Mr. A.O. Baig, CENTO SG, [a Pakistani] stated that without the US CENTO would not have much reality; her presence "gives us an umbrella against any possible aggression." (*Times, April 19*)

Following the meeting of the Military Committee in Ankara (April 24-25), which, as usual, preceded the

session of the Ministerial Council, the CENTO SG said "that the command structure in itself is not so important, even if desirable as a goal, so long as CENTO is confident that the US and Britain will come to our aid in case of aggression." He added that the allocation of troops by member countries to CENTO "had been agreed but never actually spelt out"; this point would again be raised at the Council meeting.

The unified command question was the leading issue at the Ministerial Council meeting. The Council decided to appoint a Military Staff Commander with the rank of full general.

The CENTO SG said that the decision was "the corner stone of a command structure." The SG said that the general was likely to be an American, because of the need to appoint some officer who was versed in the technicalities of modern nuclear warfare. But he added that the Americans were in no way committed to providing the new commander. It was believed, the *Times* correspondent added, that the decision was taken largely at the insistence of Iran and Pakistan, both of whom, especially Iran, which was a member of no other alliance, felt militarily "out of the world." Turkey, being a member of NATO, found the question of a unified command more academic.

Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, declared after the meeting that full US membership of CENTO had not even been discussed at the meeting. The Americans would remain as "observers," it was remarked, though the US "provided the military power and the lion's share of the economic resources of the pact." The power of CENTO would continue to be expressed in the bilateral defence agreements that the US signed in 1959 with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, the wording of which was considerably stronger than that of the CENTO treaty. [By the end of the year no military commander had yet been appointed.]

On the economic side the communiqué of the Council merely "reaffirmed keen interest" in development projects in the area, some of which were known to be short of sufficient funds. The CENTO SG said all economic projects were behind schedule. (*Times*, April 27, 29)

Telecommunications Project. In June a high-frequency radio link between London and Turkey and Iran was inaugurated. The link was devised to improve communications between the CENTO countries. The link with Pakistan was expected to be completed in 1962. The equipment was provided by the UK as part of its bilateral technical assistance to CENTO regional countries. (*Times*, June 22)

Soviet Charges CENTO with Nuclear Plot. On Aug 18 the USSR made public what she claimed were secret documents of the Baghdad Pact, the forerunner of CENTO, dated Feb 3, 1958, and entitled "Nuclear Target Study." According to the purported documents and a Tass statement, the plan outlined nuclear targets in the Soviet Union and the Sinkiang province in China, as well as 40 populated targets in Iran and Pakistan in order to establish a "zone of death" to prevent a Soviet attack to the south. Tass also charged that suspicious military activity had been going on recently on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. The allegations were strongly denied by the CENTO countries, the US, and by officials of CENTO headquarters. (*Times*, Aug 19, 21; *BBCM*, Aug 21, 22; *NYT*, Aug 21)

WESTERN CAPACITY TO INTERVENE IN ME

The Sixth Fleet. [The US 6th Fleet remained on first call for an eventual US emergency intervention in the ME. Its land force consisted, however, of only, 1,800 Marines.]

US Strengthens Mobile Force to Fight Limited Wars. [The strength and mobility of the US force was increased during the year, mostly on account of the Berlin crisis.]

In his message to Congress on the 1962 defence budget, President Kennedy stated that the free world's security could be endangered not only by nuclear attack, but also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery by forces of subversion, infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggression, internal revolution, diplomatic blackmail, guerrilla warfare, or a series of limited wars.

The President's material recommendations, in addition to speeding up the missile programme, included the strengthening in manpower, weapons and mobility of the conventional forces, to improve the ability to fight guerrilla and limited wars. He said the US should have "strong, highly mobile forces trained in this type of warfare, some of which must be deployed in forward areas, with a substantial airlift and sealift capacity and pre-stacked overseas bases." "Our capacity to move forces in sizable numbers on short notice and to be able to support them in one or more crisis areas could avoid the need for a much larger commitment later."

It was remarked that this statement was fully applicable to the ME. (*NYT*, *NYHT*, March 29)

During the year the unified Strike Command was formed, combining the Army's Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and the Air Forces' Tactical Air Command (TAC) (*NYT*, Sept 20). STRAC included the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, the 4th Infantry Division, the 150th Armoured Cavalry and supporting units, including a missile brigade, all under command of the Eighteenth Airborne Corps. This force had a strength of 115,000 officers and men (*Army*, May; *NYT*, July 27; *Times*, Aug 9). TAC had 46,000 officers and men. It included the Ninth, Twelfth and Nineteenth Air Forces. Its 1,800 planes included fighter-bombers, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, long-range heavy cargo and assault troop-carriers with complementary in-flight refuelling tanker aircraft, and Mace and Matador missiles. TAC had been responsible for the composite airstrike force sent to Lebanon in 1958. (*NYT*, March 27, Sept 9)

On the Military Air Transport Services (MATs), whose task was to provide strategic airlift, see MER 1960, p 101 (US Airlift Capacity); in 1961 MATs operated 996 propeller-driven aircraft. Thirty Boeing C 135 jets and 23 C 130 E turboprops had been ordered, and the first Boeing aircraft was delivered in June. (*Times*, Feb 3; *Flight*, June 29)

The British Strategic Reserve. The Strategic Reserve consisted of three brigade groups, a parachute brigade (16th) and two Royal Marine commandos. The central reserve was based on the UK; one infantry brigade group was in Kenya, a parachute battalion in Cyprus, and some units in Bahrain and Aden. The Royal Marine commandos were based West of Suez in Malta and East of Suez in Singapore, Aden, and on the commando carrier *Bulwark*.

In the Kuwait crisis the Strategic Reserve was tested in action for the first time, though in a bloodless operation. This operation committed the Strategic Reserve heavily. Two brigade groups and two Royal Marine commandos were tied down. [See above: The Kuwait Opera-

tion). This left only the parachute brigade and one infantry brigade in reserve, with a limited amount of administrative backing. Any additional reinforcements would have had to come from the Army of the Rhine, which comprised seven brigades. (*Times*, July 5)

The lesson of the Kuwait operation was that Britain would find it difficult, if not impossible, to deal with more than one emergency of this sort without either taking away forces from Germany or calling her allies for help. (*Times*, July 11)

The Berlin crisis at the very time of the Kuwait action strained British resources heavily. The defence correspondent of *The Times* commented that whereas in the past the Central Strategic Reserve and the British Army of the Rhine had been the source of manpower for emergencies in other parts of the world, the roles were now reversed. If the situation in Europe got worse, it would be necessary to withdraw administrative and signal units from the Mediterranean or the Far East to fill the gap. (*Times*, Aug 14)

On Aug 17 the War Office announced the establishment of a strategic reserve division, to be based on the UK. The division (3rd) would consist of two infantry brigades of the Strategic Reserve, the 19th and the 51st. The 16th Parachute Brigade would have three infantry battalions temporarily under its command [two battalions of the brigade were at the time in Cyprus and Bahrain], and would be responsible for meeting sudden calls of the fire-brigade type, leaving the 3rd division to concentrate on the requirements for reinforcing the British Army on the Rhine. *The Times'* comment on this reorganization was that whereas requirements in Europe were for mechanized forces, with armour and heavy artillery, elsewhere the need was for lightly equipped, air-transportable forces trained in internal security and guerrilla warfare. The requirements were mutually exclusive. "The Central Strategic Reserve is now to be asked to organize and train for both tasks with the obvious danger that it will be properly prepared for neither..." (*Times*, Aug 18, 21, 25, Dec 28)

The mobility of the small British reserve depended

mainly on the RAF Transport Command. Its strength was as follows: 10 Comets, 23 Britannias, 60 Hastings, and 50 Beverleys. (In the Kuwait operation these resources were fully committed; see above.) Transport Command had on order 5 Comets 4C and 56 Argosy tactical transports; 5 Vickers VC-10 jets were also to be ordered. (*Times*, Sept 6)

The commando carrier *Bulwark*, commissioned in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 101), played a major role in the Kuwait operations (see above). A second commando carrier, *Albion*, was due to be commissioned in 1962, and consequently a fifth Royal Marine commando was to be formed. The First Lord of the Admiralty stated that this decision had to be regarded as a recognition of the need to keep a highly trained mobile force in readiness, particularly in the area East of Suez. (*Times*, May 19, 24)

SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN THE ME

Russian Air Power in the Balkans. US military leaders considered that Soviet air facilities in the Balkan countries were a threat to vital western defence positions, declared the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force. In these countries there existed a well developed and modern base system, suitable for employment by Soviet offensive aircraft and missile forces. The location of this area made these facilities extremely important as forward strike bases threatening western key centres. (*Times*, Feb 20)

Soviet Naval Movements in the Mediterranean. On May 26, owing to the deterioration of Russian-Albanian relations, eight Soviet submarines left their base at the Albanian port of Valona and returned to the Soviet Union. The submarine pens that the Russians maintained at Valona—"the only symbol of Soviet power in the Mediterranean area"—were apparently abandoned. (*NYT*, July 6)

Naval Facilities for USSR in Egypt Denied. (See p 659 a.)

PART TWO

**RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE COUNTRIES OF
THE MIDDLE EAST**

INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

SYNOPSIS: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

The year 1961 witnessed three clearly defined periods in inter-Arab relations. The *détente* which had begun in the course of 1960 became more pronounced in the first half of 1961. This period was brought to an abrupt end in the second half of June when Gen. Qasim put forward Iraq's claims to sovereignty over Kuwait; the next three months were dominated by this issue. The break-up of the UAR on September 28 opened a third period and a new chapter in the relations between the Arab countries.

During the first six months, a number of Arab League conferences took place, beginning with the Baghdad conference of foreign ministers which was followed by a number of bodies which it had been impossible to convene previously or which had been inactive for a long time.

None of these conferences led to actual inter-Arab cooperation. The basic conflict between the UAR and the majority of the other Arab countries remained unresolved. The UAR leadership made it quite clear all through this period that it continued to strive towards the establishment of an Arab union, with a regime after its own pattern and under its leadership, and that it saw in the Arab peoples—in contrast to their leaders—willing partners in this endeavour. There were, however, no reports or specific charges during this period, as there had been previously, that the UAR was engaged in revolutionary and subversive efforts to overthrow unsympathetic regimes in other Arab countries; whereas in his letters to King Hussein, Abdel Nasser reiterated the UAR's aims and policies, he also said he believed in the right of every Arab country to a policy suited to its own circumstances. All other Arab governments continued to advocate a policy of "Arab solidarity"—namely cooperation of independent states within the framework of the League and otherwise and non-interference in one another's affairs.

The dispute also encompassed the nature of the internal regime ("Arab socialism versus reaction"), the international orientation, and the Arab-Israeli conflict—the major question before the League since its inception. As to international orientation, the question was one of anti-imperialism and "positive neutralism" versus various shades of cooperation of certain countries with the West and, on Jordan's part, anti-Communism as the main plank in foreign policy. Jordan, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia were rejected by the UAR as candidates for the Belgrade conference of non-aligned nations on the grounds that they followed the policies of the West; Tunisia, however, was invited in the wake of the Bizerta crisis. As to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab countries were agreed that it should be solved through the elimination of Israel, but they differed deeply on the means to this

end. Whereas Abdel Nasser said an "independent and comprehensive Arab force" was needed, King Hussein would be content with inter-Arab coordination (see: The UAR-Jordan; the Abdel Nasser-Hussein correspondence) and Qasim continued to argue that the burden must be borne primarily by the former Palestinian Arabs themselves.

The Baghdad conference (January 30–February 4) was the first League Council meeting since 1958 to be attended by all League members. It was, to some extent, an endeavour by the protagonists of "Arab solidarity" to further their aim and to bring the UAR into cooperation with them on their terms. The way had been paved for such an attempt by Iraq's return to the League at the Shtura meeting (MER 1960, p 120) and the rapprochement of Iraq and Jordan in 1960 and it was to this end that these two countries now expended much effort towards bringing Tunisia back into the fold. They were aided by developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict—the issue of Israeli nuclear capacity and the progress of the Israeli project to utilize part of the Jordan river waters—which aroused Arab concern and, it was argued, made solidarity imperative. No controversial issue was discussed at the conference, it was noted, and the resolutions passed had been accepted in principle by all members in advance. While in Iraq and Jordan the conference was praised as an achievement of Arab solidarity, Cairo sources called on the Arab masses not to be misled by advocates of the doctrine of "non-interference in internal affairs," as every Arab had the right to criticize and even try to change certain situations according to his nationalist conscience; the real Arab solidarity was that of the people; cooperation through the League did not mean that the UAR should limit her commitments to the Arab struggle—and the Baghdad conference had changed nothing.

There was, however, a transient change, in the wake of the conference, in UAR-Jordan relations. King Hussein, while still being accused of promoting terrorist activities in Syria, wrote to President Abdel Nasser calling for Arab solidarity on the basis of equality. Correspondence followed in which the two leaders set out their differences as to inter-Arab, international and internal policies but agreed, for the time being, to disagree. The propaganda warfare between the two countries ceased and an uneasy truce followed. UAR relations with Tunisia, on the other hand, remained openly strained, though representatives of the two countries at Baghdad had reached a measure of agreement on co-existence. President Bourguiba was the only Arab leader during the ensuing period to attack Abdel Nasser openly and was denounced in turn.

With the above exception, however, the atmosphere

which prevailed in inter-Arab relations in the period February-June was the quietest since the beginning of 1957. It was preserved by convening inter-Arab bodies but refraining from either discussing at all or deferring matters of contention. Thus the committee of the directors of "Palestinian machineries" (February 11-16) and the Palestinian Experts' Committee (May 29-June 7), which both met for the first time, dealt with the "Palestinian Entity" scheme (which had been sponsored by the UAR but opposed by Jordan as calculated to bring about her dismemberment). The Arab Defence Council (June 10-18), which met for the first time since 1954, dealt similarly with the questions of the Jordan waters (again a matter of controversy between the UAR and Jordan), a unified military command and other matters. A special committee on amending the League Charter (June 15) eliminated from its report all points of controversy. The Economic Council which found Iraq and the UAR at loggerheads—the UAR advocating economic union and Iraq cooperation only—also referred the matter to the League Council. The Council meeting at ministerial level, to which most of these issues were referred, and which was due to be held in Casablanca in September, never took place, since inter-Arab relations had meanwhile been disrupted by the Kuwait crisis.

The oil-rich Shaykhdom of Kuwait became formally independent on June 19, with an exchange of notes terminating the 1899 agreement between Britain and the Shaykh of Kuwait. Six days later, on June 25, Gen. Qassim, the Iraqi PM, proclaimed Kuwait an integral part of Iraq on historic-legal as well as anti-imperialist grounds, and stated that he intended to "liberate" it. With the exception of Ibn Saud's wars in the Arabian peninsula, this was the first time since Arab political entities emerged in the wake of World War I that one Arab state laid claim to sovereignty over another sovereign state, be it even tiny and newly independent. It was thought that, apart from considerations of internal policy, Qassim's motives might have been a wish to forestall possible UAR and Saudi Arabian encroachments as well as to gain, by means of an "anti-imperialist" feat, a leading position in the Arab world which had hitherto escaped his reach.

With various degrees of emphasis, differing arguments and, it was thought, differing motives, all Arab countries supported Kuwait's independence. Saudi Arabia immediately offered Kuwait her support, and claimed that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were one country; her stand was attributed to rivalry with Iraq over oil resources and in the Persian Gulf in general. The UAR differentiated between a "genuine Arab union" which she advocated, and "annexation" which she could not accept; observers thought that her attitude might have derived from rivalry with Baghdad for Arab leadership and oil. Jordan was careful not to give offence to Iraq, expressing fear for the precariously-balanced Arab solidarity. Tunisia proclaimed the right to self-determination.

On July 1, after reports appeared on Iraqi troop concentrations—which were denied by Iraq—British and Saudi Arabian troops entered Kuwait, at the request of the Kuwaiti government. Thus it happened—it was generally remarked—that troops of a foreign power led by Arab nationalists to be the imperialist power *par excellence* were called on to Arab soil by an Arab government because of an inter-Arab conflict. Cairo accused Qassim of having brought this about and even of collusion with Britain. The question now became one of the Arabs being able to replace the British force in

safeguarding Kuwait. Britain herself officially welcomed action by the League. (For a synopsis including the non-Arab aspects of the crisis, see below: The Kuwait Crisis.) There followed two-and-a-half months of inter-Arab manoeuvring, in which the League SG was especially active, around two main questions: (1) the admittance of Kuwait to the League, categorically demanded by Saudi Arabia and vehemently opposed by Iraq; (2) Kuwait's demand that an Arab force be set up to relieve the British troops and protect her independence. Alternatively, it was suggested that Qassim renounce his claim; he, however, reiterated it.

Kuwait was admitted to the League at the Council meeting of July 20 whereupon Iraq declared that she would boycott all League meetings in which Kuwait was represented. Discussions on the establishment of an Arab force started immediately after the Council meeting; however, the first Arab contingent arrived in Kuwait only seven weeks later, on September 10. The force consisted of contingents from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR and, by mid-September, comprised some 3,000 men; it was under the dual control of the League and the participating countries, and had a Saudi Arabian commander-in-chief. All British forces had withdrawn by October 10.

The Kuwait crisis, though it isolated Iraq, did not in fact terminate the period of "Arab solidarity." While showing up anew the depth of inter-Arab dissensions, it also produced, in the Arab force, an example of actual cooperation between the UAR and her antagonists in the framework of the League, even though it took a long time to accomplish. At the same time, all the countries which advocated "Arab solidarity," except Saudi Arabia, were careful to avoid giving offence to Iraq as much as the situation allowed, and direct relations between them and Iraq did not in fact deteriorate.

Another outcome of the crisis was that Kuwait, in return for the Arab support, made arrangements for the utilization of some of her plentiful oil revenues to aid the development of the "have-not" Arab countries; support for such a move was also voiced in the West, and it was thought that by sharing their oil wealth the Gulf shaykhdoms might preserve peace in their area.

The Bizerta crisis in mid-July—when French and Tunisian forces engaged in battle following President Bourguiba's demand for evacuation of the Bizerta naval base, brought forth a show of solidarity by all Arab countries in the midst of the Kuwait crisis. It also occasioned at long last a truce between Tunisia and the UAR. UAR support for Bourguiba, Abdel Nasser said, was based on the famous old Arab saying "my brother and I against the foreigner" in spite of the quarrels of yesterday (the first part of this saying goes: "I against my brother"). All Arab countries offered assistance including volunteers; there were no reports that volunteers actually reached Tunisia but some financial and medical assistance did.

The Arab force in Kuwait had not yet settled down when the break-up of the UAR opened a new chapter in inter-Arab relations, relegating the Kuwait crisis to the sidelines. The Syrian military coup d'état of September 28 ended the first experiment of a voluntary union of two independent Arab states; it had lasted three years and seven months. (The other such experiment, the Arab Federation between the Hashimite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan, set up on February 14, 1958 as a countermove to the establishment of the UAR, was terminated after five months by the Iraqi revolution.)

The insurgent army officers made it clear from the

beginning that they were revolting against what they termed "tyrannic Egyptian rule" over Syria as well as against the "socialist laws" imposed during the year. During the day, in negotiations with Field Marshal Amer, it was reported, they demanded the rescinding of these laws and the conversion of the union into a federation in which Syria would have equal status with Egypt. Abdel Nasser, however, resolved that, in his words, "the situation allow[ed] for no bargaining or a middle-of-the-road solution." He refused to condone a situation whereby a form of union would be preserved but actual control of Syria would have passed from his hands into that of the insurgents. He ordered the dispatch of forces from Egypt by air and sea, to land in the Aleppo-Latakia area which, during the day, was still controlled by pro-UAR commanders. When in the late evening these areas came under the control of the insurgents, Abdel Nasser recalled the forces to avoid a situation, as Cairo explained, where Arabs would be fighting each other while their enemies, Zionism and imperialism, lay in wait; in addition, a shooting war would only have deepened the rift. Some 120 paratroopers landed before receiving orders to return; they surrendered the next morning. On the morning of September 29 the Syrian Arab Republic was established. Egypt retained the name of the United Arab Republic.

Arab government reactions on the day of the coup were generally non-committal, due partly to uncertainty as to the aims of the leaders of the coup and its outcome. This, however, changed the next day, when Jordan recognized Syria's independence; King Hussein extolled the coup d'état as a "blessed upsurge" and vilified Abdel Nasser whom only a short time before he had addressed as his brother in Arabism. The Iraq government, during the following days, made clear its sympathies with Syria. Bourguiba praised Abdel Nasser for his orders to avoid bloodshed but also told him that Arab unity should be founded on the consent of the people. All other governments remained either publicly non-committal or expressed sympathy with the UAR; Morocco and Sudan were conspicuous among the latter.

On October 1 Abdel Nasser instituted a diplomatic blockade of Syria by cutting off relations with Jordan and Turkey, which had recognized the new republic on September 29. On October 5, however, he called off the blockade because, he said, it was the Syrian people which would suffer from it; he called for internal unity in Syria but said the UAR itself would withhold recognition until after the Syrian people had freely decided on the road it would take.

Iraq and Tunisia accorded recognition to Syria on October 9; Saudi Arabia—on October 10; Lihya—on October 19; Yemen—on October 25; Lebanon—on November 8; Morocco—on December 16. Sudan had not yet accorded recognition by the end of the year. Syria was admitted to the Arab League on October 28.

There was relatively little reflection in the speeches of the Arab leaders and in publicists' comments of the significance of the union's failure in the historical context of the Arab quest for unity versus Arab divisions. Gen. Qassim remarked that Arab as other empires had always been doomed to failure; he therefore advocated fraternal links between the Arabs (p. 165 a). Arab comment in the main wished to see in the failure a lesson from which to learn for a new attempt. (For detailed analyses of the causes of the failure, see pp. 605-7, 617 ff.)

The political impact of the event was manifold. The powerful and aggressive nucleus of a potential all-Arab union had ceased to exist. Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon

now had as their neighbour a weak Syria in place of a strong UAR. Syria, which before the union had been torn between rival factions and was the prime objective in the contest for hegemony between Egypt on the one hand and Iraq and Jordan on the other, might now possibly be returned to this traditional role. Abdel Nasser had lost his foothold in the fertile crescent and, it was generally assumed at the time, had been most gravely weakened. Soon, however, it was once more Abdel Nasser who was giving direction to the inter-Arab struggle.

Two weeks after the secession, Syria presented a project for a loose Arab confederation. The plan was thought to have been prompted by internal political considerations. Cairo's reaction was hostile, that of Iraq and Jordan non-committal, and soon the issue faded out. At the beginning of November, Syria and Iraq concluded an economic agreement which they proclaimed as the initiation of "real Arab solidarity." Otherwise, there was no move by the countries opposed to Abdel Nasser to strengthen their position. In Syria, the government strove to stabilize the regime. Iraq was preoccupied with the Kurdish revolt and the Kuwait crisis, which still estranged her from Saudi Arabia. King Hussein felt himself much strengthened and his policies justified—"my confidence in myself is growing," he declared (p. 146)—and he waged an all-out propaganda campaign against Cairo, but he made no attempt to rally anti-UAR forces.

In the UAR, on the other hand, a sense of direction was soon felt. It appeared from remarks by President Abdel Nasser and by publicists that the Egyptians felt "bitterness and pain" and disappointment at Egypt's Arab venture and there was a desire that Egypt should now keep to herself. Egypt's Arab consciousness which, it was pointed out, had not yet grown very strong, had now suffered a severe shock. Abdel Nasser, however, immediately told his people that Egypt would continue to adhere to Arabism and to lead the Arab struggle. Abdel Nasser resolved on a new policy, in keeping with the main conclusion he had drawn from the Syrian coup, namely, that it had been engineered by "reaction" which had allied itself with imperialism with a view to undoing the revolutionary socialist achievements. He resolved, therefore, "to fight imperialism in the palaces of reaction"; the mistake of compromising with reaction on grounds of national policy would not be repeated. Socialism, this doctrine was further developed, must precede the union, as reaction could otherwise exploit "local chauvinism" in order to strike at the union. Therefore, said Abdel Nasser in a speech on December 23, the UAR was raising the banner of socialism in the Arab world. In this struggle, Abdel Nasser's chief spokesman explained, Egypt would act in a two-fold role: as a state on the formal level and as a revolution on the popular level, cooperating with the struggling people everywhere in the Arab nation; preference would be given to the revolutionary role. (At the beginning of 1962, this doctrine was finally termed "unity of aim before unity of ranks.")

Initiative, however, in the inter-Arab struggle which followed the Syrian secession, was by no means one-sided.

The new Syrian leaders showed no more willingness to come to terms with Abdel Nasser than he with them. While Cairo attacked them as "capitalist reactionaries and imperialist lackeys" and asserted that the people in Syria were pro-UAR and opposed the "separatist regime," the Syrians denounced Abdel Nasser and expressed the hope that the Egyptian people would also be able to

"free" itself of his rule. Syria charged Cairo with launching a subversive campaign against it from Lebanese territory. Contacts between the two states were kept to the bare minimum, such as were necessitated by the repatriations which were effected indirectly through Lebanon and through the good offices of the Arab League. Cairo did not recognize Syria even after the elections and clearly did not accept the "separatist regime" as there to stay.

King Hussein, as has been related above, was the first to break the truce with Abdel Nasser. Cairo soon accused him of having plotted to destroy the UAR even while he was corresponding with Abdel Nasser.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, however, it was Cairo which, towards the end of October, opened the attack by accusing King Saud of participation in plots in Syria, and Saudi Arabia's endeavour to preserve her former peaceful relations with Cairo proved futile.

Again, it was Imam Ahmad who made the first step to change his relationship with Cairo who he published a poem in December attacking the nationalization policy; two weeks later, the UAR announced the dissolution of the United Arab States federation between the UAR and Yemen, which had been formally established in March 1958 but never actually implemented.

UAR relations with Iraq remained strained. Cairo viewed with hostility the development of friendly relations between Iraq and Syria, claiming that Qasim intended to draw Syria into a union with Iraq. Qasim was severely criticized also on other counts; however, no all-out propaganda campaign was conducted against him as was the case with the countries mentioned above.

The Lebanese government endeavoured to pursue a policy of neutrality but both internal and external factors repeatedly involved her in inter-Arab conflicts; in

particular, her territory was utilized as a base for subversive activities against Syria, by Jordan before the secession and afterwards by Cairo, according to Syrian charges (see pp 141, 163-4).

The remaining Arab countries were less involved in the conflict.

Sudan kept out of inter-Arab affairs and identified herself primarily with African nationalism; at the same time, she was careful to promote friendly relations with her powerful Arab neighbour, the UAR.

The Gulf sheikhdoms strove to develop friendly relations with all Arab countries.

The Algerian Provisional Government, though in the political field it was closest to the UAR, received financial and other aid from most of the Arab countries. As in 1960, it was not very satisfied with the practical (as opposed to the verbal) political support it received.

Morocco, though it came close to Cairo through co-operation in the Casablanca group (see pp 48 ff), also further developed friendly relations with the UAR's opponents.

By the end of the year, the UAR was isolated among the Arab countries of the Middle East but took the offensive, even more so than before the Syrian break-away, on the oft-repeated assumption that in her revolutionary policies of anti-imperialism, quest for union, and "Arab socialism" she truly represented the universal aspirations of the Arab people. Each of the other Arab ME countries was primarily occupied with its own affairs, and though they were opposed to Abdel Nasser's aspirations, they took no steps towards concerted action. The Arab League was boycotted by Iraq while the UAR was "prepared to freeze its effectiveness" if it were to impede her movement (p 161 b). The UAR also withdrew its contingent from the Arab force in Kuwait.

THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

(*jāmi'at ad-duwal al-arabiyyah*)

MEMBERSHIP

Kuwait Admitted. On July 20 the State of Kuwait, which had become formally independent on June 19, was admitted to League membership by a majority vote at the Council's meeting in Cairo. It was the eleventh member (compare MER 1960, p 123). (*Arab Obs.*, July 23; see also below: The Kuwait Crisis.)

Syria Admitted. Following the break-up of the UAR, and the re-establishment of Syrian independence, the Republic of Syria was readmitted to the League on Oct 28, becoming its twelfth member. (Egypt retained the name of UAR.) (*Hayat*, Oct 29)

THE LEAGUE SECRETARIAT

Special Activities of League SG: (See: The Kuwait Crisis; Relations Between Syria and the UAR.) Abd al-Halîq Hassûnah, an Egyptian, continued to hold the post of Secretary-General.

Arab League Office in New Delhi. Dr Clovis G. Maksûd was appointed head of the League's office in New Delhi.

In April he was said to have reported to the League SG on the activities of the office, the sympathy of the Indian authorities, and the encouragement of PM Nehru. (*Hayat*, April 5)

Assistant SG. In March at its 35th ordinary session, the Arab League Council swore in Dr Sayyid Nawfal as assistant SG of the League. (*Hayat*, Eg. Gaz., March 21)

GENERAL ACTIVITIES 1961

The Council of the Arab League met six times during the year.

(1) An extraordinary Council meeting to the form of a conference of Arab foreign ministers took place in Baghdad from Jan 30 to Feb 4. This meeting had been resolved upon by the Arab foreign ministers' conference at Shura in Aug 1960. Tunisia rejoined the Council at this meeting.

(2) The 35th ordinary session took place in Cairo from March 21 to April 1 at the level of ambassadors.

(3) An extraordinary meeting at the level of ambassadors took place in Cairo, from July 4-20, to deal with the Kuwait crisis. Kuwait was admitted at this meeting and consequently Iraq boycotted the council meeting from this session on.

(4) An extraordinary meeting at the level of ambassadors took place in Cairo on July 24, to deal with the Bizerta crisis.

(5) The 36th ordinary session took place in Cairo on Sept 14-19, at the level of ambassadors. The session

was originally to be held at Casablanca on Sept 9, at ministerial level; the change was thought to have been due to the Kuwait crisis.

(6) An extraordinary meeting in Cairo on Oct 28 admitted Syria to the League.

The Joint Defence Council held its third session on June 10-18 in Cairo. (The second session took place in Jan 1954.)

The Economic Council met twice during the year, in April in Baghdad and in June in Damascus.

For other conferences, see text.

THE LEAGUE BUDGET 1961/62

The draft budget of the Arab League for the fiscal year beginning July 1961 totalled £1,125,000, of which £623,000 was to be spent on Arab propaganda abroad. (*R. Baghdad, March 8 [W 16]*)

In Jan it was reported that Iraq had promised to pay its debt of £750,000 to the League. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, Jan 14*)

Yemen requested the reduction of its share in the League's budget which, it was reported, it had not paid since 1947 (*Ruz al-Yusuf, Feb 20*). In Sept its contribution was reduced from 2.2% to 1.1% of the budget. (*Mid. Mir., Sept 23*)

Kuwait's contribution was fixed at 13% of the budget. (*Eg. Gaz., Sept 19*)

LEAGUE CHARTER REVISION ISSUE

NOTE: For English text of Charter see: J.C. Hurewitz: *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1956, Vol II, pp 245 ff.

Baghdad Conference Calls for Meeting of Special Committee. One of the resolutions adopted by the Arab foreign ministers' conference in Baghdad on Feb 4 invited the special committee for amending the League Charter to meet at a date to be fixed by the SG. [The Council had requested a meeting of this committee as far back as Sept 1959; see MER 1960, pp 123-4.] (*R. Baghdad, Feb 4 [6]*)

The Tunisian FM said on the eve of the Baghdad conference that his country advocated amending the Charter, as did others, but there would have been no need for this, if Art. 8 of the Charter, stipulating non-interference in member-states' internal affairs, had been properly observed. (*R. Amman, Jan 26-IMB, Jan 27*)

A Jordanian paper commented that amending the Charter would solve nothing; the Baghdad conference should rather discuss the behaviour of Arab leaders. (*Manar, Feb 2*)

Meeting of the Special Committee: Proposed Amendment. The special committee met on June 1 in Cairo. All member-states were represented. Previously, the secretariat had submitted a memorandum to member-states, pointing out that Art. 19 of the Charter provided that the Charter could be amended by a two-thirds majority and containing the following suggestions (compare MER 1960, p 123):

(1) Amending Art. 8: to make resolutions binding by majority vote instead of unanimity on all member-states, whose constitutions should be amended so as to make League resolutions binding and to ensure their being put into effect.

(2) Establishment of an Arab People's League (*jāmi'ah arabīyah sha'biyah*), alongside the existing League, to represent parliaments, organizations, trade unions and

other "people's institutions" in the Arab states. This League, Cairo papers said, would be free to act without the restrictions which obstructed the present League's activities and would rally the Arab popular forces to work for the unification of the Arab nation. This League "would be more responsive to events" than the present League. The memorandum left open the question of the election of League members as well as the implementation of its decisions. This proposal, the *Arab Observer* said, had been under consideration since 1955.

(3) Establishment of an Arab Court of Justice for the trial of member-states which fail to comply with the League's resolutions or deviate from the general Arab policy approved by the League; the Court would be empowered to impose economic sanctions or other punishments. The Court was specifically mentioned in Art. 19 of the Charter as an amendment which might be introduced.

(4) A Syrian proposal made in 1948 for preventing member-states from conducting negotiations with any foreign country for military or economic pacts without prior approval of the League Council.

(5) A later Syrian proposal to set up a "United Arab States" as a nucleus for a "complete Arab union."

(6) Proposals made by three members in connection with the functions of the League SG and his assistants.

(7) Regulations for cooperation between the League and the UN as well as other international bodies. (*Hayat, May 4; Haqā'iq, May 5; Arab Observer, May 7; Eg. Mail, May 27*)

The committee received proposals for amendments also from Morocco, Iraq and Tunisia. (*Hayat, June 2, 4*)

The chairman explained that the committee's function was to prepare a report on the various proposals and observations relating to the revision issue, to be submitted to the foreign ministers' conference scheduled to meet in Casablanca in Sept. (*Hayat, June 8*)

The Iraqi Plan, which, according to the Iraqi representative, served as the basis for the discussions, included the following main points:

(1) League membership should be open to every independent Arab state without the need for a Council resolution; (2) the Council should be granted an "obligatory legal right" to settle differences between member-states—at the request of any member of the League—by peaceful means, including resort to the Arab Court of Justice which should be established; (3) the Council should be summoned if aggression against any member occurred or seemed imminent and would decide by a two-thirds majority on measures to counter the aggression; (4) abolition of the unanimity principle in favour of the majority principle in adopting Council resolutions; (5) a ban on the conclusion by Arab states of agreements or treaties inconsistent with the Charter; (6) the Council should meet in rotation in the various member-countries; (7) the Council should meet for one session a year; (8) League secretariat personnel should be selected according to personal qualifications; (9) no member should be allowed to quit the League.

The Iraqi representative added that the commission had "agreed" to proposal no. 2 [including 3] but proposals 4, 5 and 9 had met with opposition. The commission tended to favour proposals 6, 7 and 8 [all of?] which had also been proposed by Tunisia. (*R. Baghdad, June 20 [22], IMB, June 21*)

[UAR for Arab Union. The UAR submitted no proposals. [UAR papers advocated the establishment of the "Peo-

ple's League,—see above.] The head of the UAR delegation, Dr Muhammad Hasan az-Zayāt, said his country viewed the issue in the light of Art. 19 of the Charter, which said that any amendment should aim at the promotion of closer relations among Arab countries. He cited UAR achievements and efforts in this respect, such as the merger between Egypt and Syria, the union with Yemen, its adherence to the Arab Mutual Defence Pact and its advocacy of Arab economic union. (*Arab Observer*, June 11)

Binding Majority Vote Opposed. Before the meeting, a Cairo source said Lebanon was the only state to oppose a binding majority vote instead of the present system (*Eg. Mail*, June 27). But according to other sources, this proposal was opposed also by others as being inappropriate at the present time. (*Akhbar al-Ubū'*, Jordan, July 14); Jordan and Yemen were specifically mentioned in this context. (*MENA*, June 7 [9])

Proposals Dropped to Move League HQ From Cairo. Question of Venue of Council Meetings. One of the reported Tunisian proposals, supported by Iraq and Jordan, was to move the League HQ from Cairo. The UAR representative later said that the sponsors of this proposal had withdrawn it, and it would not be submitted to the League Council. (*MENA*, June 10 [13]; *Hayat*, June 15; *Akhbar al-Ubū'*, July 14)

A related question concerned the venue of the League Council. A Cairo paper remarked that Art. 10 provided that Cairo was the permanent seat of the League while the Council could assemble wherever it chose; it was therefore incomprehensible why some countries should wish to amend this Article. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, June 5)

Tunisian Proposal for Non-Interference Reported Rejected. A Tunisian proposal regarding interference by Arab League members in each other's affairs (according to *Al-Hayat*, regarding the definition of aggression) was rejected. (*MENA*, June 10 [13]; *Hayat*, June 15)

Two Amendments Agreed Upon. According to *Al-Hayat*, the committee agreed to two amendments, authorizing the SG to convene the Council in cases of emergency and setting up an Arab Court of Justice. (*Hayat*, June 15)

On June 15 the committee completed its work after having prepared a report to be submitted to the conference of Arab foreign ministers scheduled to be held in Casablanca in Sept [which did not take place]. (*R. Cairo*, June 15 [17])

Iraqi Call for Reform of League. In Oct the Baghdad *Al-Bayān* called for a reform of the League which had fallen under the influence of one country. The article attacked the SG for serving unilateral interests. In order to fulfil the hopes of the Arab people, the basis of the League Charter should be modified. (*Iraq Times*, Oct 8, quoting *Bayan*, Oct 3)

THE ARAB LEAGUE AND AFRICA

[The subject of Africa featured in most Arab League conferences and other inter-Arab meetings. Discussions mainly centred around ways and means of combating Israeli "infiltration" into the continent. Most decisions did not advance beyond the recommendation stage. (For details, see index.) One exception was a tour of West Africa by a delegation representing the Arab chambers of commerce and industry.]

Offices To Be Opened in Africa. The Permanent Arab Information Committee, at its meeting in Cairo (Feb 18-23), recommended to the League Council to open an information office in Accra, provided that this did not impede the setting-up of such an office in Dakar, as proposed by Iraq. (*MENA*, Feb 23 [25]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 24)

In Dec it was reported that a League request for permission to open an office in Accra had been approved by Ghana. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, Dec 20)

Projected Technical Assistance. The League was reported to be planning the dispatch of Arab aviation experts as well as doctors and youth instructors to work in Ghana for the purpose of combating Israeli penetration. (*Manar*, May 21)

In Sept a Lebanese report said the Arab states had decided to grant 500 scholarships to youths from Africa and Asia (*Nahar*, Sept 16). [By the end of 1961, there were no reports of League assistance to Africa or any concerted Arab effort in this sphere.]

Economic Mission. Between July 18 and Aug 15 an economic delegation representing the chambers of commerce and industry of Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the UAR, the Arab League Secretariat and the Federation of Arab Chambers of Commerce, toured eight West African countries: Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal and Mali. The aims of the tour were given as: (a) to strengthen commercial relations and to open new markets for Arab products; (b) to put an end to Israeli activities in Africa and to explain the Palestine problem. (*Mawt*, May 25; *Jihad*, July 16, 19; *MENA*, July 15 [W 20]; *The Listener*, Monrovia, Aug 2; *Mid. Afr.*, Aug 19)

The decision on the tour had been taken during the board meeting of the Federation of Arab Chambers of Commerce, held in Beirut in Nov 1960 (see MER 1960, p 125). The delegation was headed by Burhān Dajāni, an officer of the federation.

[The delegation had meetings with ministers, officials and chambers of commerce.] In Guinea they were received by President Sekou Touré, who was quoted to have said that lack of unity among Arabs and among Africans was the reason for lack of solutions to the problems of Palestine and Algeria. He added that it was necessary that goods from Arab states should reach Guinea directly. (*Hayat*, Aug 9; *Palestine*, Aug 16)

African press reports emphasised the anti-Israeli character and purpose of the delegation's tour (*Nigerian Tribune*; *Daily Times*, Lagos, July 20) and there was some criticism on this score (e.g. *Nigerian Tribune*, July 21; *Liberian Age*, Aug 11; *Abidjan-Matin* quoted in *West Africa*, London, Aug 19)

The Arab press quoted members of the delegation on the great success of the tour and its impact on Afro-Arab relations to the detriment of Israeli activity in the continent.

The delegation found that the Arab communities in West Africa played an important part in the economy of those countries and would be of great help in advancing Afro-Arab economic relations.

The UAR (Southern Region) member of the delegation said that the delegation had recommended the following Arab activities in Africa: (a) invitations to African heads of state and ministers to visit the Arab states; (b) the offer of loans; (c) the holding of permanent commercial exhibitions; (d) the setting up of firms, banks and shipping lines; (e) the offer of a larger

number of scholarships; (f) the strengthening of relations at governmental level and (g) the dispatch to Africa of experts, doctors and teachers. (*Akhbar Sa'ah, Aug 23; Ahram, Aug 26*)

Burhan Dajani, head of the delegation, added further recommendations which were all to be forwarded to the Conference of Arab Chambers of Commerce due to be convened in Casablanca. He said the League should initiate a joint Arab-African building and contracting company,

and Arab petroleum-producing countries should set up refineries in African countries and export their oil to those countries. (*Hayat, Sept 3; Zaman, Iraq, Sept 13; Jaridah, Sept 15*)

A Beirut daily reported that African diplomatic representatives had expressed dissatisfaction at Dajani's report, complaining that it contained inaccuracies and "certain briefings in favour of UAR policy in Africa." (*Nehar, Nov 22*)

THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL

NOTE: No official reports on the Council proceedings were published except for the agreed resolutions, and its deliberations were mostly secret.

EXTRAORDINARY SESSION: CONFERENCE OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BAGHDAD

(January 30-February 4)

Date, Place, Participants. A League conference of Arab foreign ministers was held in Baghdad from Jan 30 to Feb 4. This was the first League Council meeting in Baghdad, and the first meeting since 1958 at which all members were represented. (*Zaman, Jan 30-Feb 5*)

The conference had been scheduled by the Arab foreign ministers in Shura to take place immediately after the fifteenth session of the UN General Assembly (see MER 1960, p 130).

On Iraqi insistence, the League Secretariat agreed to hold the conference in Baghdad instead of in Cairo, thus fulfilling an Iraqi demand, pending since summer 1959, to have such a conference take place in its capital. (*Zaman, Jan 6, 7; Hayat, Jan 7; R. Cairo, Jan 4-IMB, Jan 5*)

The foreign ministers of Iraq, the UAR, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia (as of Jan 31), Libya, Sudan and Yemen, and the Deputy PM of Morocco participated as full members. The Foreign Minister of the Algerian Provisional Government, the brother of the exiled Imam Ghālib Ibn Ali of Oman, and representatives of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee attended some of the meetings as observers. (*Zaman, Jan 31-Feb 5*)

The Political Setting. [As set out in MER 1960 (see: Synopsis, pp 115-6), an improvement had been apparent in the inter-Arab atmosphere towards the end of 1960, based on the realignment of the majority of the Arab countries in favour of "Arab solidarity" as opposed to Arab union favoured by the UAR. Nonetheless, throughout the conference, propaganda warfare continued between the UAR on the one hand and Jordan and Tunisia on the other.]

UAR Bid for "Union of Arab Peoples" Versus Demand for "Arab Solidarity." The basic divergence between the governments of the UAR and the other Arab countries was analyzed in two articles on the eve of the conference and after its conclusion by *Al-Hayat's* well known political commentator, writing under the pseudonym of "Arab Elder Statesman" (*shaykh arabi qadim*).

President Abdel Nasser, he wrote, advocated an appeal to the Arab countries to unite with the UAR or at least to coordinate their international and social policies with her. The UAR supported revolutionary movements in the Arab countries and regarded the Arab

League as an instrument for executing her policies. According to this doctrine, the UAR was truly representative of the feelings and aspirations of the Arabs everywhere and denied the right of the Arab governments to represent the citizens of the respective countries, considering them the obstacle to complete Arab unity. Consequently UAR propaganda denounced Arab governments and at the same time glorified the Arab peoples.

In contrast, a doctrine propounded by Iraq and Jordan and enjoying the sympathy of Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Libya argued that the true way to Arab union lay through the gradual evolution of Arab society, through Arab solidarity freely arrived at, and through cooperation within the Arab League. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs must be observed. According to this theory, the real obstacles in the way of a full union were not to be found in the Arab governments but in internal factors, deeply-rooted in the various Arab countries and their peoples, which could not be changed simply by changing governments or regimes.

[This analysis was borne out by the behaviour of the two opposing camps during the conference and their comments upon it after its conclusion, as will be seen below.]

The writer concluded that Arab leaders could meet, but results would be nil so long as they adhered to their diametrically opposed attitudes. The writer thought that the period in which President Abdel Nasser's doctrine of Arab nationalism was predominant had ended and the balance had tilted in favour of the other doctrine, namely cooperation and coordination of policy within the League. The writer thought that the efforts to conciliate Tunisia fitted into the policy of Iraq and Jordan, designed to form a strong group which would take the initiative within the League, and if necessary oppose the efforts of the UAR. (*Hayat, Jan 29, Feb 12*)

No Prospects Seen For Effective Anti-UAR Grouping. Before, during and after the conference, intimations appeared of an anti-UAR grouping. A Lebanese commentator thought that Iraq, in order to embarrass the UAR, might urge the adoption of decisive resolutions on the Palestine question and Arab solidarity, but a common front on Arab solidarity, presented by Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, could not bear fruit so long as President Abdel Nasser dominated Syria and conducted a policy of conciliating Arab rulers and stirring up Arab public opinion at one and the same time. Further, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were not agreed on the Palestine question: e.g. Iraq advocated the establishment of a "Palestine Republic," which Jordan opposed. The author concluded that Iraq would not succeed in setting up a "permanent, effective and worthwhile anti-UAR front."

(*Jaridah*, Jan 20; for similar views, see *Manar*, Jan 26; *Falastin*, Jan 29.)

Amman Radio attributed Cairo's indifference to the conference [the UAR mass media gave it only scant coverage] to its knowledge "that the conference will not bring it any positive results." (*R. Amman*, Jan 31 [Feb 2])

On Feb 4 Dr Mahmūd Fawzi, the UAR FM, said in a press conference in Baghdad that there had been "trends" at the conference but it was inaccurate to call them groupings. (*Zaman*, *Hayat*, Feb 5)

After the conference, a Cairo daily said that extensive efforts had been made to isolate the UAR and place her in an embarrassing position, but the UAR delegation had successfully counteracted these efforts. (*Akhbar*, Feb 10)

The choice of Baghdad as the meeting place was also seen in the context of the anti-UAR struggle. Amman Radio claimed that it was indicative of "a victory for the Arab group (*majmū'ah*) in its long struggle against Cairo's misconduct," compelling Cairo to abandon its illusions of leadership, and was a step towards the implementation of the principle of equality among the Arab states (*R. Amman*, Jan 30-31 [Feb 1]). UAR stations did not comment on this topic (*BBCM*, *IMB*, *IMH*). After the conference, a Cairo daily wrote that "certain Arab states believed that proposing and choosing Baghdad would embarrass the UAR, but it did not." (*Akhbar*, Feb 10)

Tunisia's Participation Through Iraqi Mediation. On Jan 6 the League secretariat officially requested Iraq to exercise its influence in reversing a Tunisian decision to boycott the conference. [Tunisia had been boycotting the League since 1958, immediately after becoming a member, because of its strained relations with the UAR—see MER 1960, pp 126-31, 164-3.] (*Zaman*; *Hayat*, Jan 6-8)

On Jan 18 the Iraqi Minister of the Interior left for Tunisia, carrying a message from Gen. Qassim to President Bourguiba asking for Tunisian participation in the conference in the name of Arab and Islamic solidarity (*Zaman*, Jan 18, 21). King Hussein sent a message to Bourguiba to the same effect (*Jihad*, Jan 25). President Bourguiba's reply was brought to Baghdad by the Foreign Minister, Sadok al-Moqaddem. (*Zaman*, Jan 25; *Hayat*, Jan 27-29). It reportedly included the following points: (a) no dispute existed between Tunisia and the League; (b) Tunisia's boycott of the League stemmed from its strained relations with the UAR; (c) if Tunisia participated in the meeting, her representative would raise her complaints against the UAR; (d) Tunisia wished to obtain an assurance from the UAR that the latter was ready to settle the dispute. (*Hayat*, Jan 25)

It was reported that efforts, mainly Lebanese, were under way to persuade the UAR to consider the Tunisian request. (*Hayat*, Jan 26)

On Jan 30 Baghdad announced that Tunisia would participate in the conference (*R. Baghdad*, Jan 30-IMB, Jan 31). On Jan 31 the Tunisian delegation headed by the Foreign Minister arrived in Baghdad. (*Zaman*, Jan 31-Feb 1)

Iraq's mediation efforts were hailed by the Iraqi press and radio. Jordanian and some Lebanese papers praised the "Arabic orientation of the Tunisian leaders," while the UAR press disregarded the whole matter. (*Zaman*; *Raq Times*; *Hayat*; *Jaridah*; *Amal*; *L'Orient*; *Jihad*; *Falastin*, Jan 18-29; *BBCM*, *IMB*, Jan 18-30)

When the conference was in session, a Cairo commen-

tator said that the real reason for President Bourguiba's decision was his wish "to tone down severe resolutions that the conference might take against France" (*V of A*, Feb 4-IMB, Feb 5), while after the conference a Lebanese [pro-UAR] daily wrote that Bourguiba's intention was to play "the role of an imperialist agent" in the solution of the Algerian question. (*Hawadith*, Feb 10)

The Economist thought that Tunisia's return to the League was due to President Bourguiba's frustration in trying to formulate policies calculated to appeal to all Africans and Arabs. "Without some footing in the League, he found himself at a dead end." (*Economist*, Feb 4)

The Agenda. On Jan 30 SG Abd al-Khālīq Hassūnah announced that the agenda, as approved in secret session, included the Algerian question, the "Palestine Question" (for sub-headings of which see below: Resolutions), the Omani question at the UN, the amendment of the League Charter, the Casablanca conference, Mauritania, "Southern Yemen," nomination of representatives of Arab countries to UN posts and the need to acquaint the world with Arab progress, Arab nationalism and Arab questions in general. (*Zaman*; *Hayat*, Jan 31; *R. Baghdad*, Jan 30-Feb 1 [Jan 31-Feb 2]; *Jāmi'at ad-dūwal al-arabiyyah: Taqrir al-amin al-amm ila majlis jāmi'at ad-dūwal al-arabiyyah fi dawr in-'iqdiki al-iddi al-khāmis wa-ath-thalāth*, March 31, 1961—The Arab League: Report of the SG of the Arab League to the Arab League Council Ordinary 35th Session, March 31, 1961, pp 62-70; further referred to as *Report of the SG*)

Following the opening ceremony, the conference went into secret session, on which *Al-Haydi's* correspondent, Salim Habāqi, reported as follows:

Tunisia-UAR Dispute. The first secret session on Jan 30 dealt with the Tunisian-UAR dispute without the participation of the Tunisian delegation, which had not yet arrived. According to Habāqi, "the atmosphere was rather tense." The UAR delegate voiced reservations regarding the Tunisian demands, but Hashim Jawād, the Iraqi FM, intervened, urging the member-states to forget their grudges and to present a united front in face of Israeli atomic threats. Other delegates presented similar arguments and consequently it was resolved to invite the Tunisian delegation to take its place at the conference, to call on the UAR and Tunisia to settle their disputes and to ask some of the ministers to mediate (*Hayat*, Jan 31, Feb 1). Following a dinner which Jawād gave at his home for the foreign ministers of the UAR and Tunisia and a prolonged discussion with the participation of SG Hassūnah, the two parties agreed to "annul the minutes of the Arab League Session of Oct 18, 1958" [wherein Tunisia accused the UAR of subversion, and subsequently withdrew] and to hold additional private meetings between the two ministers. (*Zaman*, Feb 1-2; *Hayat*, Feb 2)

The Tunisian FM told the press that a settlement had been agreed upon on the basis of the Shura conference resolution on Arab solidarity, namely that relations among Arab states should be based on mutual respect and equality, that an end be put to propaganda campaigns and that political refugees be prevented from carrying out activities liable to disturb inter-Arab relations (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 5 [7]). An agreement was also reported whereby Sālah ben Yūsuf (President Bourguiba's major political antagonist) who was then touring West Germany, would not return to Cairo [where he lived in exile]. (*Hayat*, Feb 7)

The Algerian Question was discussed in three prolonged secret sessions on the basis of a memorandum submitted by Krim Belkacem, FM of the APG (*Zaman*, Feb 2). Sharp differences arose over certain proposals by Morocco and the UAR. (For details, see pp 174 b, 175.)

The "Palestine Question." Emile Ghuri, representative of the Arab Higher Committee, asked the member-states to establish the "Palestinian Entity," set up a "Palestinian Army" and stop by force any Israeli attempt to divert the River Jordan.

In the secret discussion, it was reported, the various items concerning the "Palestine question" were discussed as a whole, following an Iraqi proposal seconded by the UAR. (*Zaman*, Feb 1-4; *Hayat*, Feb 2-3)

Resolutions. On Feb 4 the conference unanimously approved a 16-point resolution. The official communiqué enumerated the various items and on most of them merely stated that appropriate plans or decisions had been approved. (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 4 [6]; *Zaman*; *Hayat*; *Jaridah*, Feb 5; *MEA*, April 1961; *Report of the SG*)

A summary of the official communiqué, together with some unofficial remarks, are given herewith:

1. *The Algerian Question:* (See special heading.)
2. *The Palestine Question in the UN.* It was reported that the ministers had unanimously decided to charge the UN with responsibility for the refugee problem, to work for the appointment of a custodian for "Arab properties" in Israel and for the enlargement of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, March 18). (This line had already been adopted at the 15th UN General Assembly and was further pursued at the sixteenth session.)

3. *Diversion of the River Jordan:* The conference approved plans for opposing Israel's work in diverting the waters of the River Jordan (for details, see p 218).

4. *"Israel's Attempt to Produce the Atomic Bomb":* Plans were approved for counter-action (see also p 223 a).

5. *Iran-Israel Relations:* It was decided to continue efforts with the Iranian authorities "so that the latter may truly respect relations with the Arab countries when dealing with Israel."

6. *Cyprus-Israel Relations:* Member-states having diplomatic representatives in Cyprus would watch Israel's activities there and report to the SG.

7. *Israeli Activity in Africa:* The issue was referred for detailed study by the Palestinian Machinery Committee.

8. Plans for advancing the Omani cause at the UN were approved.

9. *Mauritania:* The conference approved, over Tunisia's objection, a Moroccan proposal that member-states should make further efforts to prevent the admission of Mauritania to the UN.

10. *Amending the League Charter:* The Committee for Amending the Charter was invited to meet at a date to be fixed by the SG.

11-14. *Nomination of Arab Members to International Organizations:* The conference decided to support various Arab nominees to international organizations, among them Mongi Slim of Tunisia, for the presidency of the UN General Assembly's 16th session.

15. *Casablanca Resolutions:* The member-states which had not participated in the Casablanca conference were requested to consider its resolutions. (One country, not named, voted on this resolution with a reservation.)

16. The "Southern Yemen" Question was referred to "the next meeting" of the Council. (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 4 [6]; *Zaman*; *Hayat*; *Jaridah*, Feb 5; *MEA*, April 1961)

Arah Solidarity, Stopping Inter-Arab Propaganda Campaigns. Though these issues were not on the agenda, the conference dealt with them following a telegram from the Imam of Yemen, who called on the member-states to stop mutual "radio and press campaigns" in order to strengthen Arab solidarity and pave the way for an Arab summit conference. The SG reminded the participants of the Shtura conference resolution on this subject (see MER 1960, p 130) and urged the member-states to behave accordingly. (*Zaman*, Feb 1-3; *Hayat*, Feb 2, 3, 5)

Jordanian political circles were quoted to the effect that for Jordan it was of the utmost importance that member-states should pledge themselves fully to respect Art. 8 of the League Charter providing for non-interference in the internal affairs of other member-states. (*Falastin*, Feb 2)

During the conference, Gen. Qassim received the various delegations (*R. Baghdad*, Jan 31-Feb 3-IMB, Feb 1-4). *Al-Hayat* reported that he discussed the possibility of a summit conference to prepare "a general Arab plan that will push Arab nationalism forward," but indicated that before such a meeting could take place, a sincere effort should be made to settle disputes and to stop press and radio campaigns between the Arab countries. (*Hayat*, Feb 2)

On Feb 5, the day after the conclusion of the conference, King Hussein ordered the Jordanian radio and press to refrain from answering attacks by "certain Arab countries" in response to the wish expressed at the Baghdad conference and with the "desire to clear the Arab atmosphere" (*R. Amman*, Feb 5 [7]). This move was highly praised by Jordanian and Lebanese papers. (*Hayat*, Feb 5; *BBCM*; *IMB*, Feb 5-8; *Jaridah*, Feb 5-6; *Jihad*; *Difa*, Feb 6-7)

On Feb 6 the Damascus and Cairo stations stopped their special programmes on Jordan and attacks on Tunisia, but the Voice of the Arabs continued to attack Hussein in its general programme. (*BBCM*; *IMB*, Feb 7-10)

A Damascus daily commented that Arab solidarity could not be achieved by stopping radio warfare or by verbal rapprochement. Real Arab solidarity would find its expression in genuine cooperation in implementing the Baghdad resolutions, in free intercourse between the Arab people everywhere, in increased trade and in enabling the poor Arab countries to benefit from Arab natural resources. The paper concluded that the UAR sought the cooperation of all in achieving such genuine, and not merely superficial, solidarity. (*Nasr*, Feb 7)

Comment: The Arab Conflict Unresolved. *Al-Hayat's* "Arab Elder Statesman," whose analysis of the rift between the Arab countries has been quoted above, wrote after the conference that no controversial issue had been discussed and that the resolutions passed had been accepted in principle by all members in advance. The Arab League could not unite the Arab governments and the dispute between the Arab countries remained unresolved. (*Hayat*, Jan 29, Feb 12). [For similar comment see *Hayat*, Feb 5, 7; *Nahar*, Feb 2, 5; *Amal*, Feb 4, 6; *Times*, Feb 6.]

Iraq and Jordan: The Conference A Success. Arab Solidarity Stressed. Both the Jordanian and Iraqi radio and press covered the conference extensively.

Iraqi sources stressed the part played by PM Qassim and FM Hashim Jawad in bringing about the "success of the conference and the achievement of Arab solidarity." (*R. Baghdad*, Jan 31-Feb 5 [Feb 1-7]; *Akhbar*;

Mustaqbal; Fajr al-Jadid, Feb 1-5; Zaman, Feb 3; Ahali, Feb 3, 8, 10)

The Jordanian *Al-Manar* commented that the conference had helped to proclaim a fact long known, namely, that the majority of Arab countries denounced the policy of mutual recriminations and believed in Arab solidarity based on confidence, equality and non-interference. (*Manar, Feb 5*)

UAR Makes Clear Struggle Continues. [The UAR comment during and after the conference made it clear that no basic change had occurred in the inter-Arab situation.]

The UAR radio and press paid little attention to the proceedings of the conference. (*BBCM; IMB; Ahram; Gumhuriyah; Akhbar, Jan 25-Feb 10; IMH, Feb 22*)

During the conference, the Cairo radio stations intensified their campaign against Jordan, and to a lesser extent against President Bourguiba. (*BBCM; IMB, Jan 31-Feb 6; IMH, Feb 22*)

On Feb 5, after the conference, Cairo radio recalled that the Shura conference had adopted unanimous resolutions on the very questions dealt with by the Baghdad conference, but they were immediately floated for a common Arab struggle was not in the interest of agents who depended on foreign support. This could be also the fate of the Baghdad resolutions. (*R. Cairo, Feb 5 [7]*)

The Cairo *Ruz al-Yusuf* came out against those advocating "non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Arab countries," and called on the Arab masses not to be misled by this phrase. While there was much justification for non-interference in the regime, government, constitution, elections, etc. of other countries there were many issues which could not be regarded as an "internal affair" of this or that country, such as the attitude to the questions of the Arab refugees, Palestine, Algeria or imperialist bases on Arab territory. These matters were highly important to every Arab anywhere and he had the full right to comment, criticize, and even try to change certain situations according to his nationalist conscience. The argument of "non-interference" was employed by certain Arab leaders to cover up dangerous intentions, which might eventually lead to the isolation of their countries from the Arab world, but this trick used by the agents and the hirelings could not hinder the holy march of Arab nationalism. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, Feb 6*)

Mubammad Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram* [and an unofficial spokesman for President Abdel Nasser], wrote that nothing new had occurred in Baghdad because the basic factors defining relations among the Arab governments had not changed. For instance, the only point of disagreement between the UAR and King Hussein was imperialism. The UAR was at war with imperialism, but to King Hussein imperialism meant his throne, and to imperialism Jordan was a base. "The result is that the UAR and His Hashimite Majesty cannot but be themselves and defend their existence and future."

Arab solidarity, Haykal said, had existed before the Baghdad conference. "The real Arab solidarity is that of the people: it is the rulers who differ about progress." About the Arab League, Haykal said that it should be supported but not asked to do the impossible. "Cooperation through the Arab League does not mean that the UAR should freeze its commitments to the Arab struggle for the sake of reaching unanimous agreement." (*Ahram, Feb 10*)

THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY COUNCIL SESSION

(March 21-April 1)

On March 21 the 35th ordinary session of the Arab League Council opened at the League headquarters in Cairo, at ambassadorial level. All member-states took part. Representatives of the Algerian Provisional Government (APG) and the "All-Palestine Government" participated in some of the meetings. (*Hayat; Eg. Gaz., March 22-28*)

The meetings were secret as usual. The Council heard the SG's report on developments in the Arab world since the last Council session. (*Eg. Gaz.; Hayat, March 21-22; Report of the SG*)

Resolutions. The Council unanimously passed resolutions endorsing the recommendations of the committee of the heads of the "Palestine Machineries" (with some alterations—see below: The "Palestine Question"); supporting the APG's stand in the negotiations with France; approving recommendations for the nomination of Arab and other candidates to membership or posts in international organizations; approving the report of the Office for the Boycott of Israel, and endorsing the Economic Council's recommendations on the boycott [at its seventh session—see MER 1960, pp 139, 187]; approving the recommendations of the Permanent Information Commission; urging member-states to settle their outstanding contributions to the League information offices overseas (the Sudanese and Yemeni delegates voiced their reservations); requesting the Defence Council to reconsider at its next session a "powerful, practical policy towards Israel" and towards the states aiding it; deciding to implement the Arab Collective Security Pact and inviting all Arab states to join it; deciding to request Arab delegations at the UN to frustrate, together with friendly nations, colonialist attempts to enforce a unilateral settlement of the Palestine issue. According to *Al-Hayat*, the Council had passed certain "confidential resolutions on the relations of Iran and Malaya with Israel."

On some subjects on the agenda, no resolutions were reported, e.g.: "Israel's recruiting of Jewish youth in western countries to serve Zionist ambitions"; formation of an Arab union for ex-servicemen and war-victims; social and cultural affairs; administrative, financial and legal matters; the budget of the "All-Palestine Government" for 1961-62; and the establishment of a permanent technical office for Arab unity affairs. (*Eg. Gaz.; Ahram; Hayat, March 22, April 2*)

EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ADMITS KUWAIT TO LEAGUE

(July 4-20)

Between July 4-20, the League Council in extraordinary session dealt with the Kuwait crisis. On July 20 the Council decided unanimously, with Iraq absent, to admit Kuwait to the League. Iraq protested and announced that it would boycott all League meetings at which Kuwait was represented. (*Zaman, July 20-21; see also: the Kuwait Crisis*)

EXTRAORDINARY MEETING ON BIZERTA CRISIS

(July 24)

On July 24 an extraordinary session of the League Council took place in Cairo to discuss "French aggression against Tunisia." Iraq did not participate since

THE JOINT DEFENCE COUNCIL

Kuwait was represented at the meeting (*Ahram*, July 25). The Council passed resolutions supporting the Tunisian stand. (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Hayat*, July 25; see also: Tunisia and the Arab countries of the ME)

36TH ORDINARY COUNCIL SESSION

(September 14-19)

The session took place in Cairo at ambassadorial level. Members of ten Arab states took part. Iraq boycotted the meeting since Kuwait participated. (*Hayat*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 15)

Change of Venue, Level and Date. The session had originally been scheduled to take place in Casablanca on Sept 9, with the participation of foreign and economic ministers (*Hayat*, Aug 5; *Ahram*, Aug 16), and it had been expected to pass resolutions on important economic issues referred to it from the June session of the Economic Council, especially the issue of Arab economic union. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, June 28; *Ahram*, June 30; *Hayat*, July 14; *Jihad*, July 2)

Early in Sept Jordan requested the postponement of the meeting, because of its preoccupation with the forthcoming elections. The SG announced that the foreign ministers would meet in New York while attending the UN General Assembly. (*ANA*, Sept 3 [5]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 11)

Al-Hayat commented that this change was a consequence of the Kuwait crisis which had paralyzed the League. The general idea prevailing in Cairo was "not

to charge the League with anything important, so that it may rest and let others rest." (*Hayat*, Sept 12)

Resolutions Adopted. On Sept 19 the Council passed resolutions calling on the Arab countries to coordinate their stands at the 16th session of the UN General Assembly; referring Oman's application for membership in the League to the next meeting of the foreign ministers; calling for contributions in support of the Omani national struggle; recommending to the Arab states the recognition of the Republic of Chad and other newly independent states in Africa; recommending the postponement of Arab recognition of the Republic of South Africa [following the withdrawal of the Union of South Africa from the Commonwealth and its reconstitution as the Republic of South Africa on May 31]; urging member-states to support the resolutions passed by the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations concerning Arab issues and world peace (Libya expressed its reservations as it had not participated in the conference); approving nominations of Arab countries to membership of executive bodies of international organizations; and recommending measures for collecting contributions for an Arab information fund. The Council also passed resolutions on Algeria and the "Palestine question" (see relevant headings). (*Hayat*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 20)

According to MENA, the Council and its subcommittees also passed resolutions concerning the preparation of documentary films on the Arab countries, the holding of Arab trade fairs, the establishment of ex-servicemen's associations and of a special section for Palestine in the Higher Institute for Arab Studies. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 18; *MENA*, Sept 19 [21])

THE JOINT DEFENCE COUNCIL

(April-June)

Background Note. [The Joint Defence Council was established under the Treaty for Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation which was approved by the League Council on April 13, 1950, and came into force on Aug 23, 1952. The treaty, also known as the Collective Security Pact (*mu'ahadat ad-difa' al-muhtarak*), provided for an automatic collective security system. Member-states undertook to aid the attacked state by all means, including armed force, "immediately, individually and collectively." The treaty also provided for consultations and joint defence measures in case of threat of war, for the coordination of the armed forces and the preparation of collective means of defence. To implement these measures, the treaty established a Joint Defence Council, consisting of the foreign and defence ministers of the member-states, assisted by a permanent military commission consisting of representatives of the general staffs. Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority of the Council were to be binding on all members. By supplementary protocol signed in Feb 1951, a consultative military organization (*hay'ah istishariyah askariyah*) was formed, consisting of the chiefs of staff, to supervise the permanent military commission and to report to the Council.

The treaty was originally sponsored by Egypt as a counter-move against an Iraqi-Syrian union. During 1953-54 the Council and commission were fairly active in efforts to secure military coordination and cooperation. However, with the intensification of the inter-Arab con-

flikt from the end of 1954, these institutions ceased to function.

The Joint Defence Council met only twice before 1961, in Sept 1953 and Jan 1954.

In 1961 the following were signatories to the treaty: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco (joined in June), Saudi Arabia, the UAR (Egypt and Syria) and Yemen.]

Sixth Conference of the Military Organization. This committee met in Cairo from April 22-26, following a resolution of the League foreign ministers' conference at Baghdad. The conference was attended by the chiefs of staff of the states signatory to the Collective Security Pact. Representatives of Morocco, Libya and Sudan attended as observers; Tunisia was not represented. Gen. Ali Amer, the UAR CGS, presided.

The conference, it was reported, was to formulate concerted Arab plans to counteract Israel aggression, with special reference to Israeli atomic capacity. (*Hayat*, April 5; *Ahram*, April 22-26)

No official statement was issued regarding the subjects discussed. It was reported that discussion took place on a plan to set up a unified Arab army, to deal with Israel. (*Kul-Shay*, April 8, 22)

Al-Hayat disclosed that the conference had recommended the establishment of an atomic research department at the Arab League secretariat and urged diplomatic measures to prevent an Israeli military parade in

Jerusalem (for which, see pp 214-5; *Hayat*, April 22-26). The possibilities of acquiring non-conventional weapons (*R. Cairo*, April 22-IMB, April 23) and standardizing military ranks in the Arab armies were also discussed. (*Masa*, April 26)

An official spokesman stated that the conference had been most successful and complete agreement had been reached. The resolutions would be submitted to the Joint Defence Council (*Ahram*, April 27). [No resolutions were published.]

The Joint Defence Council (June 10-18). On June 10, the third conference of the Joint Defence Council opened in Cairo with the participation of the foreign and defence ministers, and the chiefs of staff of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the UAR and Yemen. Libya, Morocco and Sudan were represented by observers (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, June 10-11). Tunisia did not participate.

The agenda reportedly included the following items: the drawing-up of a unified military plan to prevent Israel's diversion of the Jordan River as well as a plan to frustrate the conspiracies of countries supporting Israel at the UN; the proper implementation of the Collective Security Pact and the desirability of the adherence of additional Arab countries to the pact; Israeli atomic research; the Palestinian Entity and army; the recommendations of the Arab consultative military organization (see above) and of the Palestine Experts' Committee (see below: The "Palestine Question" (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 10; *Hayat*, June 10-11))

The Council's proceedings were officially kept secret. Salim Habāqī, *Al-Hayāt's* special correspondent, reported that an atmosphere of sincere cooperation prevailed. First, the whole development of the Palestine question since 1947 was reviewed. The Council then analyzed Israel's intentions and concluded that the best way to frustrate Israel aggression was by reactivating the "Collective Security Pact." (*Hayat*, June 14, 20; *Ahram*, June 15)

At the fifth session, the Council divided into two groups. The defence ministers, with the military experts, discussed ways and means of implementing the pact, including the setting-up of a unified command, the nationality of the C-in-C (according to para. 5 of the Military Annex to the Treaty, he should belong to the country with more forces in the field than any of the other states—unless he were elected in another manner) and various military questions arising out of a unification of command. (*Jaridah*; *Ahram*, June 13-16; *Hayat*, June 13-20)

The foreign ministers, on the other hand, discussed the political aspects of the Palestine question, the activities of the Palestine Conciliation Commission; Israel's work on the diversion of the Jordan river; Israeli atomic research, Jewish immigration and the settlement of the Negev; President Kennedy's messages to Arab heads of states, and questions connected with the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly (*Gumhuriyah*, June 11-16; *Hayat*, June 13-17, 20; *R. Cairo*, June 11-16;

R. Amman, June 11-17-IMB, June 12-18). The Palestinian Entity was not discussed. (*Falastin*, June 20)

Decisions Deferred. On June 15, the Council discussed the military recommendations, but according to *Al-Hayāt*, "at this stage, signs of disagreement became apparent. Some Arab countries expressed reservations and asked to be given enough time to study the various proposals, in the light of their territorial position and their means" (*Hayat*, June 16, 20). Consequently, the conference resolved to refer the political questions to the next meeting of the League Council and the military ones to "a special meeting to be convened within a few months." It also resolved to consider the Tripartite Declaration invalid. (*Hayat*, June 18-24; *Falastin*, June 21, 24)

The Cairo press reported that the Council had unanimously agreed to appoint an Egyptian officer as C-in-C of the Arab armies (*Ahram*; *Gumhuriyah*; *Akhbar*, June 17-18). Hashim Jawād, Iraqi FM, stated that Iraq did not object to a UAR commander, provided the UAR furnished most of the men and equipment. (*ANA*, June 19 [21])

An official statement said that the Council had unanimously passed resolutions "ensuring the common Arab interest and upholding Arab solidarity in all fields of activity" and referred to the adherence of Morocco (see below) to the pact as a "success." (*Hayat*; *Eg. Gaz.*, June 19)

Morocco Adheres to Treaty. During the conference on June 13, Morocco joined the Joint Defence Treaty (*Hayat*, June 14, 19). The representatives of Libya and Sudan expressed their countries' full support of the Arab cause and readiness to provide assistance in case of aggression [but they did not join the treaty]. (*Hayat*, June 13-14)

Comment—"Council a Failure." *Al-Hayāt* commented that "the Arabs everywhere are accustomed to reading without the slightest enthusiasm about the League resolutions, for they are sure that they will remain paper decisions," and added that the delegates who passed the resolutions could not oblige their governments to implement them. (*Hayat*, June 20)

A western correspondent, writing from Beirut, said: "Public opinion in the Arab world, which had been led to expect some clear-cut decisions on the questions of policy towards Israel, appears to be confused by this familiar tactic, (of issuing a vague communiqué on the Council) and confusion is already being compounded by contradictory statements made about the conference by those who took part. These conflicting statements appear to confirm what is generally supposed—that the Defence Council meeting found Jordan and the UAR at cross purposes on measures to be taken to contain Israel, and in particular, to counter Israeli intentions to divert the river Jordan." (*Glasgow Herald*, June 20)

THE "PALESTINE QUESTION"

THE "PALESTINIAN ENTITY" AND THE "PALESTINIAN ARMY"

SYNOPSIS

As set out in MER 1960 (p 132), the projected establishment of a "Palestinian Entity" (PE) and a "Palestinian Army" lost much of its intensity as an issue in inter-Arab relations in the course of 1960, in the wake of the relative improvement in the inter-Arab atmosphere. The issue continued, however, to be a matter of inter-Arab controversy and no joint action was taken by the Arab countries to put into effect any proposal to organize the Arab refugees politically or militarily. This state of affairs continued throughout 1961.

During the first half of the year, while inter-Arab relations continued to improve, and a truce was established between the UAR, the major proponent of the PE scheme, and Jordan, its major opponent, there was some institutional progress on the inter-Arab plane. For the first time, meetings were held of the heads of the "Palestine machineries" of the Arab foreign ministries as well as of the Palestine Experts' Committee, but it was probably because they did not deal decisively with the PE question that meetings of these bodies could be held at all. With the deterioration of inter-Arab relations following the Kuwait crisis and the break-up of the UAR, no more was heard of these bodies during the rest of the year.

At the Arab League Council meetings, including the Arab foreign ministers' meeting in Baghdad (Jan 30-Feb 4), the issue of the PE was avoided.

Meanwhile, the UAR—in the Gaza strip and in Syria—and Iraq continued some efforts on their own to organize former Palestinians politically or militarily. Syria, however, after the break-up of the UAR, disbanded the "Palestinian National Union" which had been established there in 1960, and showed herself wary of the Arab refugees on her soil because of their pro-Nasser sentiments.

The "Arab Higher Committee," which had formerly enjoyed the protection of the UAR and lately had begun to cooperate with Iraq, now also started to cooperate with Jordan. Thus the committee's realignment had gone full circle, since Amin al-Husseini, its head, and the Hashimites had been arch-enemies for some 40 years (compare MER 1960, p 133: Jordan Denies Existence of Arab Higher Committee); Saudi Arabian contributions to the committee were also reported to have been resumed. In the UAR, on the other hand, the disbanding of all independent Palestinian organizations was advocated on the ground that they had done disservice to the cause.

While thus there was no progress at all in giving substance to a "Palestinian Entity," representing the "Palestinian people," the Arab states at the UN and elsewhere endeavoured to further this cause by portraying it as a struggle of the "Palestinian people" on the Algerian pattern (see: The Arab Refugees).

VIEWS AND POLICIES

The "Entity" Plan. A UAR source said that the plan adopted by the Arab foreign ministers in 1959 (see MER 1960, p 132), and which met with Jordanian obstruction, comprised the following points: (1) A national assembly, representing all Palestinian Arabs, whether refugees or not, would be elected under the super-

vision of the League secretariat. (2-3) The assembly would meet every year. At its first meeting, it would formulate a constitution which would incorporate an Arab nationalist charter for the liberation of Palestine in cooperation with the Arab countries. It would formulate its internal regulations. (4) The assembly, at its first session, would elect a ten-man executive council with specific portfolios and a president. (5) The executive council would represent the Palestinian Arabs internationally and in the Arab world; it would be responsible for policy on, and take part in the struggle for Palestine. Its headquarters would be in Cairo "in order to be near the League" and it would have a permanent delegation at the UN. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, Dec 31, 1960)

Jordan: "Comprehensive Plan." On Jan 10 Musa Násir, the Jordanian FM, restated in the Jordanian Parliament what he said was "Jordanian public opinion" on the Palestine issue: The issue concerned all Arabs, and no Arab state must take unilateral action. The whole issue required deep and comprehensive study, on which action would be based. Meanwhile, no half-measure such as the PE project must be taken. (*Jihad*; *Difa*, Jan 11)

On Jan 17 the PE was debated in the Jordanian Senate and severely criticized; the Senate decided to shelve the issue. (*Jihad*, Jan 18)

Abdel Nasser: A Matter for All Arabs with UAR as Vanguard. In his only speech during the year addressed specifically to the Arab refugees (Damascus, March 3), Abdel Nasser made no mention of the PE or the "Palestinian army." (Compare also MER 1960, p 171, Synopsis.) He said the Palestine issue was not one which belonged to the "Palestinian people" alone but to all Arabs. "The restoration of our rights" in Palestine involved a struggle with imperialism and its stooges and with Zionism, the unification of the Arabs and the building-up of civil and military strength. The UAR was the vanguard in this struggle and in these efforts. (*Nasser's Speeches*, pp 74-7)

Iraq: Palestinians Urged to Selfreliance "Like Algerians." On Nov 2 Gen. Qasim, addressing a meeting organized by the Arab Higher Committee in Baghdad, urged the Palestinians to rely on themselves, not to listen to any promises, to unite their ranks; to refrain from quarrels and to shoulder their own burden like "the Algerian heroes." "Following the line of sisterly Algeria, you have to proclaim to the entire world the existence of your structure [entity]..." he said. He called on them to prepare for the battle "to clear your holy land of the Zionists and the treacherous elements and for the proclamation of the immortal Palestine republic." He promised Iraq's help in "the liberation battle." (*Iraq Times*, Nov 3)

Independent Syria Warns Palestinians Against UAR. On Nov 28 Dr Izzat an-Nus, the Syrian FM, said in a public speech that Syria had always placed the Palestine question above Arab differences and would continue to sponsor the Palestinians' struggle. He urged the Palestinians to direct their energies "in collaboration with the whole Arab nation to liberate Palestine." He

accused "the self-styled advocates of Arabism" [the UAR leaders] of prejudicing the Palestine cause and of discriminating against the Palestinians as compared with their own people. He accused "a small group of Palestinians" of "blindly following those who wish evil on our country as they did on the Palestinians in the past." This group, he said, endeavored to split the refugees and distract their attention from their vital problem. (*R. Damascus, Nov 28 [30]; Ayyam, Nov 29*)

CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF "PALESTINE MACHINERIES"

(*mu'tamar ru'asā' ahjikat falastin*)
(February–September)

[In Sept 1959 the Arab foreign ministers at their conference in Casablanca decided that the Arab governments should set up special "machineries" (*jihāt*) in their foreign ministries to handle and coordinate Palestinian affairs; see MER 1960, p 133.]

On Feb 11, the first meeting of the heads of these machineries opened in Cairo. All League member-states, except Tunisia, were represented. (*Ahram, Feb 11–12*)

Abd al-Khāliq Hassūnah, the League SG, announced that the conference would not discuss the Palestinian Entity; this would be done by a special committee [see below: The Palestine Experts Committee]. The purpose of the machineries conference was to work out "a perfect and positive policy" on the various aspects of the Palestine issue and Israeli plans and conspiracies, to follow Zionist activity abroad and to draw up plans to counteract it. (*Akhbar, Cairo; Hayat, Arab Observer, Feb 12*)

Resolutions: The Organizational Set-Up. On Feb 16 the conference passed the following resolutions:

"*Palestine Machinery*": Every Arab country should set up a "Palestine Machinery" attached to its foreign ministry and headed by an official of ambassadorial rank. This staff should comprise the following departments: (a) The Political Department, to study the political aspects of the Palestine problem; (b) "the Department for Occupied Palestine," to follow internal developments in "occupied Palestine" with special reference to the Arab minority and Arab properties there; (c) the Arab Refugees Department, to follow UNRWA activities and deal with problems arising between the Agency and the Arab governments; (d) the Department for Anti-Israel and Anti-Zionist Activities, with special reference to immigration, the combating of Israel's penetration into Africa and Asia and cooperation with the boycott offices; (e) the Military Affairs Department, to deal with armistice questions and follow "Israel's aggressive activities."

Duties of Heads of the Palestine Machineries. The heads of the Palestine Machineries should meet periodically for planning and coordination; the reorganization of the Palestine Department of the Arab League Secretariat should also be their concern. The League SG would convene the conference twice annually with the consent of the majority of the members; the SG or three members could call special meetings. The chairmanship would be held in rotation. The Palestine Department of the League Secretariat was to cooperate with the machineries, supply them with information, prepare the agenda for the directors' conference, supervise the implementation of its resolutions and report on the activities of the machineries to the League Council.

Activities: Other resolutions called on the directors

to interest themselves in the implementation of resolutions on combating Israel activities in Asia and Africa; called on the League to strengthen its information agencies, in order better to serve the refugees' cause, and to cooperate with Arab communities in Latin America in combating Zionism; asked the League Secretariat to prepare a report on Arab properties in the "occupied land" and called on the Arab countries to work for the establishment of an international commission to investigate the conditions of the Arabs in "occupied Palestine." (*Akhbar, Feb 17; Nida', al-Awdah, Gaza, Feb*)

In March the League Council approved these recommendations, but its political committee decided that "the machineries should be headed by high officials" instead of by "ambassadors" as suggested by the conference. (*Akhbar, March 26; Hayat, March 26, 28–30*)

Second Meeting of Conference. On July 29 the second meeting of the conference opened in the Old City of Jerusalem with the participation of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAR, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Morocco. Iraq, Tunisia and Libya were not represented. The Kuwaiti representative joined the conference on July 31. (*Hayat, July 30; Jihad, Aug 1*)

The agenda included reports on the activities of the machineries, "Zionist anti-Arab" activities, Israel penetration in Asia and Africa, Arab properties in Palestine, and Jewish immigration to Israel. (*Jihad, July 30*)

On Aug 1, the conference closed after adopting eight secret resolutions and deciding that the next session was to be held in Rabat. (*R. Amman, Aug 1 [3]; Hayat, Aug 3*)

It was reported that the conference had recommended that Arab women be used in propaganda for the Palestine cause; that Arab women's organizations strengthen relations with such organizations in Asia and Africa; and African and Asian women leaders be invited to visit the Arab countries; that broadcasts be made in African languages; that action be taken against Israel's efforts to obtain Jewish assets [the owners of which had perished at the hands of the Nazis] in Swiss banks (see p 316 b); that pressure be exercised on East European governments not to permit the immigration of their Jewish citizens to Israel; and that Arab propaganda be intensified. (*Akhbar al-Yawm, Sept 16*)

THE "PALESTINE EXPERTS COMMITTEE"

(*lajnat khubarā' qādiyat falastin*)
(May–June)

Background Note. [The convening of a five-man committee of "Palestine experts" to prepare a comprehensive Arab policy on the "Palestine question" had been decided upon by the League Council in Feb 1960, as the Council itself was deadlocked on the "Palestinian Entity" (PE) project and related issues. The establishment of the committee met with difficulties (see MER 1960, pp 127, 130, 134–5). With the relative improvement in inter-Arab relations, as exemplified by the Baghdad conference (Jan 30–Feb 4), it was found possible to convene the committee.]

Meeting in Cairo (May 29–June 7). On May 29 the Palestine Experts' Committee met in Cairo. The participants were League SG Abd al-Khāliq Hassūnah (chairman); Ahmad Shukairy, Saudi Arabian Minister of State for UN Affairs; Rafiq al-Husseini, Jordanian Minister of Economy; Fu'ad Amoun, Director-General of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry; Qāsim Hasan, Ambassador

at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry; Mahmud Riyad, Political Adviser to President Abdel Nasser; Amin Hilmi, Director of the Palestine Department at the UAR Foreign Ministry; and Dr Nawfal, Assistant SG of the League. (*Hayat*; *Eg. Gaz.*, May 30)

The Arab Higher Committee protested against the League's "deliberate policy" of excluding Palestinians from the discussions. It called on the participants to prepare an agreed Arab plan to save Palestine and to give substance to the PE. (*Hayat*, May 30)

No Agreement on Palestinian Entity. On the committee's deliberations which were not made public, Arab sources reported as follows:

(a) On Israel's diversion of the Jordan river, recommendations were forwarded to the Arab Defence Council scheduled to meet in June. (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 30)

(b) Regarding President Kennedy's messages to Arab heads of states, (see p 197 h) the committee prepared "agreed points" to be embodied in the replies. (*Ahram*, May 31; *Hayat*, June 23)

(c) The preparation of a common Arab plan "for the frustration of potential Israel aggressions" and recommendations regarding "attacks on the armistice lines," were referred to the Arab Defence Council. (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, June 1)

(d) Regarding the PE, the committee completed drafts to be submitted to the Arab Foreign Ministers at their next meeting. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 2) According to MENA, these drafts were designed to enable the Palestinian Arabs to play a part in "liberating and restoring Palestine." To do this, they would have to be strengthened financially, politically and morally. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 2)

It was reported that the Jordanian representative had opposed the establishment of the PE and related proposals. He maintained that Jordan represented the PE both by reason of geography and the number of Palestinian refugees on its soil. (*Gumhuriyah*, June 2; *R. Beirut*, June 4-IMB, June 5)

Assistant SG Dr Nawfal declared that the committee had prepared a plan to ensure the entity of the Palestinian people and to establish an organization (*hay'ah*) to represent them (*Hayat*, June 8). The Jordanian delegate declared that the committee resolutions were not binding on the governments represented. (*R. Amman*, June 7 [9])

Meeting in Bhamdun: No Plan on PE. (June 26-29) On June 26, the committee resumed its meetings in Bhamdun, Lebanon "to meet members of the Palestine people." The committee received delegations of the Arab Higher Committee, the Palestinian Women's Union and the Palestinian Arab Youth Organization. (*Arab Observer*, June 11; *Hayat*, June 27-29)

It was reported that the Arab Higher Committee had asked the committee to establish political machinery, to be approved and supported by all the Arab states, to represent the Arabs of Palestine. This body should have no bearing on the status quo on the Western Bank of the Kingdom of Jordan or the Gaza Strip. SG Hassunah objected to the word "only" when told by a member of the delegation that the Arab Higher Committee was the only body representing the Arab refugees. (*ANA*, June 29 [July 1])

According to *Al-Hayati*, the committee discussed the setting up of three alternative bodies to establish the PE: a provisional government, an organization which would become the official government at a later date, and a committee for the liberation of Palestine. Finally,

on June 29, it was decided to refer the PE question to the League Council and the question of a Palestinian army to the Arab Defence Council. (*Hayat*, June 28, 30)

On June 29 there were conflicting statements by SG Hassunah and members of the committee as to whether or not the gathering should be considered as ended and as to the venue of the next session (*ANA*, June 29 [July 1]). [No additional session took place during the year.]

THE "PALESTINIAN ARMIES"

Iraq: "The Palestine Liberation Army" (see also MER 1960, pp 137-8). Twenty Palestinians were among the 575 graduates of the second reservists' [officers] course which graduated in Baghdad on April 30. Gen Qasim, addressing the graduates, pledged that Iraq would back the "force of Palestinian brothers" with money, arms and men "until the usurped parts of the homeland are liberated." (*R. Baghdad*, April 30 [May 2])

According to Baghdad radio, a daily programme entitled "Those Who Will Return" (*al-e'idin*) was prepared and presented by the "Palestinian Liberation Army" (PLA) under the supervision of the Iraqi 5th Division HQ. (*R. Baghdad*, May 15-IMB, May 16)

Haji Amin al-Husseini, head of the Arab Higher Committee, visited the PLA in July and was received by the GOC, 5th Div. (*Zaman*, July 9)

On Nov 15 the commander of the Iraqi Reserve [Officers] College disclosed that a new unit of the PLA would shortly join the college. (*Zaman*, Nov 16)

On Nov 17 Gen. Qasim issued instructions "to accept a large number of Palestinian students residing in sister Arab countries into the Iraqi military academies in order to train them as officers and leaders of the future Palestinian army." (*Zaman*, Nov 19)

Egypt and the Gaza Strip (see also MER 1960, p 138). On July 23, a symbolic "Palestine army" unit took part in the Egyptian revolution anniversary parade in Cairo. (*R. Cairo*, July 23 [W 27])

Lt-Gen. Yusuf al-Agrudi, governor of the Gaza Strip, disclosed in an interview published in Oct that "Palestine has now a real army which is undergoing intensive training in the most modern methods of warfare" and as a result "the general morale in the strip is very high." (*Qunwat al-Musallahah*, Oct 1)

THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE

(*al-hay'ah al-arabiyyah al-ulya*)

[For background on the Committee see MER 1960, p 132: Rift Between the UAR and Amin al-Husseini.]

The Committee's Policies. In Feb the Arab Higher Committee convened a congress in Beirut to discuss "the development of the Palestine problem during the last 13 years."

In addition to reaffirming "the Arab identity of Palestine" and calling on the Arab governments to coordinate their policies in combating Israel, the congress passed resolutions: (a) calling for the establishment of "responsible official machinery to deal with all matters connected with the Palestine issue" including the "mobilization of the Palestinian Arabs," while emphasizing that this should not involve the separation of the West Bank from the Jordanian Kingdom or the changing of the present status of the Gaza Strip; and (b) calling on Palestinians everywhere to refrain from involvement in party politics or other internal problems of the Arab countries. (*Hayat*, Feb 28)

The first of these resolutions was brought by the Arab Higher Committee before the League's Expert Committee on Palestine at its session in Beirut in June (see above). The second resolution found an echo on Nov 27 [on the eve of the Syrian general elections]. Zaki al-Tamimi, Director of the Committee in Damascus, urged the Palestinian refugees in Syria to avoid interference in Syrian domestic affairs. (*Ayyam, Nov 28*)

[Both resolutions were aimed at keeping the committee and its adherents out of inter-Arab rivalries. The reference to the West Bank of Jordan should be noted in the context of the rapprochement between King Hussein and the Committee, for which see below.]

Al-Hayat saw in these resolutions "a new start" on the part of the Palestinians to take their destiny in their own hands, and called on the Arab governments to give them the opportunity to work for their cause. (*Hayat, March 2*)

Various Activities. During March the Higher Committee sent missions to the UAR, Iraq and Jordan, "to explain the need for placing the Palestine question above internal or inter-Arab differences, and to urge them to place full financial and military support at the disposal of the Palestinian Arabs to continue their struggle to liberate Palestine." (*Hayat, March 29*)

In May Hajj Amin al-Husseini visited India. (*Times of India, Bombay, May 16*)

Cooperation with Iraq. In July Hajj Amin al-Husseini visited Baghdad as guest of the Iraqi government. He was received by Gen. Qasim among others and also visited the "Palestinian Liberation Army." On his return to Beirut, Hajj Amin declared that his mission to Iraq had been very successful. (*Zaman, July 9; ANA, July 9 [11]*)

In Aug an office of the Arab Higher Committee was opened in Baghdad, headed by Ziyad al-Khatib. (*Zaman, Aug 14, 28, Oct 15*)

Cooperation with Jordan; Saudi Arabia. On Sept 16 Emile Ghuri, member of the Arab Higher Committee, was received for a two-hour talk by King Hussein. Ghuri told the press that he had received "constructive advice" from King Hussein on the solution of the Palestine problem and the coordination of Arab Higher Committee policy with that of the Jordanian government, especially at the UN General Assembly. (*Falastin, Sept 17; Manar, Sept 17-18*)

Subsequently [the pro-UAR] Beirut daily *Al-Hawadith* claimed that the rift between King Hussein and the

Committee had ended with a private donation of £5,000 to the Committee from King Hussein, that the King was considering Amin al-Husseini for the premiership of Jordan, and that the Committee's relations with Saudi Arabia were back to normal and Saudi Arabian donations and support had been resumed. The Arab Higher Committee issued a "complete denial," adding that its relations with all Arab countries had always been excellent and there was nothing to prevent the Committee from accepting financial support. (*Hayat, Sept 19*)

A UAR Opinion Against Palestinian Organizations. In May Mamduh Rida of *Ruz al-Yusuf* called for the abolition of all Palestinian organizations working in the UAR, such as the Arab Higher Committee; the Palestine Club; the General Union of Palestinian Students, etc. Rida wrote that "since the Palestine catastrophe none of the above-mentioned organizations has made any positive or constructive contribution to the liberation of Palestine." On the contrary, they had so behaved as to undermine the holy cause. One of them had constantly collected contributions from all over the world "to distribute them amongst a small group of swindlers" [probably a reference to the Arab Higher Committee]. Rida suggested, "as many Palestinian students had asked," the setting up of the Palestinian National Union in Egypt, similar to that existing in the Gaza Strip and in Syria. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, May 8*)

THE "PALESTINIAN NATIONAL UNION" IN THE UAR

The PNU in The Gaza Strip and Syria. [Before the break-up of the UAR, the authorities continued efforts to organize the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the refugees in Syria in the Palestinian National Union (PNU) (see also MER 1960, p 136) claiming that thus they were implementing the PE. In independent Syria, the National Union was disbanded.]

In Jan the first [and last] elections to the PNU took place in the Gaza strip. Suffrage was open to men only. Three hundred and fifty-four candidates out of 935 were elected by 53,224 votes.

The Egyptian Military Governor of the Gaza strip expressed his admiration of the "electoral awareness amongst the Palestinians," and promised suffrage for women at the next elections. He said the final objective of the elections was to create a "free Palestinian public opinion," and to prepare the refugees for the "holy march" to liberate Palestine. (*R. Cairo, Jan 16, V of A, Jan 20-IMB, Jan 17, 22*)

INTER-ARAB ECONOMIC RELATIONS

THE ECONOMIC COUNCIL

THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Synopsis: The Council met twice during the year, in April and June, to complete discussion of the items on the agenda of the seventh session which held its first meeting in December 1960 (MER 1960, pp 138-9). On the central issue of Arab economic union, the session ended in deadlock over opposing projects presented by the UAR and Iraq. The UAR advocated a scheme of economic union (which it had first proposed in 1957), in keeping with its aim of establishing a comprehensive Arab union; Iraq proposed a gradual approach, starting

with a multilateral commercial agreement, again in keeping with its general policy of inter-Arab cooperation instead of union. With the deterioration of inter-Arab relations following the Kuwait crisis—which broke out immediately after the Council meeting in June—and the disintegration of the UAR, the whole issue lost any shred of actuality.

Economic Council Meeting in Baghdad (April 10-17). The second meeting of the seventh session of the Council opened in Baghdad on April 10 at ministerial level. Delegations from the UAR, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan,

Libya and Tunisia participated (the last four were not members) (*Zaman*, April 11; *Arab Observer*, April 16). The Agenda contained several items which had been deferred from the Dec 1960 meeting in Cairo: completing the discussion on an economic unity scheme, including the creation of an Arab common market, the removal of restrictions on inter-Arab trade, ratification of agreements on the establishment of the Arab Financial Foundation and the formation of Arab oil pipeline, tankers and airline companies; the exemption of Arab companies and organizations from local nationality restrictions. (*Hayat*, March 2; *Eg. Gaz.*, March 15; *R. Baghdad*, April 7-IMB April 8)

The Council resolved to set up the World Arab Airlines organization, with a capital of 17m. dinars, and the Arab oil tankers company, based on Kuwait, with a capital of 35m. dinars; to amend the Arab Financial Foundation agreement so as to exclude foreign capital and influence and to increase its capital to £25m. The Council decided to defer the other items on the agenda to its next meeting, to be held in two months' time. (*R. Baghdad*, April 17 [19]; *R. Beirut*, April 18-IMB, April 19; *Mid. Mir.*, April 22; *Arab Observer*, April 23)

Economic Council Meeting in Damascus Ends in Deadlock Over Economic Union Scheme. (June 17-24) On June 17, the third meeting of the seventh session of the Council opened in Damascus with the participation of all member-states and non-member observers. The agenda contained the items left over from the previous meeting (*Hayat*, June 18) and, later on, "the possibility of Israel joining the European Common Market" was added to the agenda. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 21)

The UAR and Iraq presented opposing proposals on the question of Arab economic integration.

The UAR proposal, in the form of a draft 20-point agreement, called for complete economic union between the Arab countries by means of a customs union, unification of foreign trade policies, including joint trade agreements with other countries, and a large degree of co-ordination of their labour, fiscal and commercial legislation; a permanent body, the Union Council, with its head office in Cairo, would supervise the implementation of the agreement. An Arab common market, to be achieved within ten years, would be the main basis of this Arab economic union.

Iraq submitted a memorandum, in the form of a draft 15-point agreement, on ways and means of achieving an inter-Arab "complementary economy" and technical co-operation. The Iraqi proposal, allowing for differences in the economic structure and stages of development of the various Arab countries, sought to achieve economic co-ordination through the Economic Council itself. The EC was to be converted into an independent structure which would include a permanent committee of economists as well as a technical bureau. It would submit its suggestions and projects to the Arab states for consideration and implementation within the limits of their capabilities and their constitutional systems. A general secretariat for economic affairs would convene the EC when necessary, continuously supervise the work of the co-ordinating committee and the technical bureau and assist in implementing the Council's resolutions. The post of secretary should be filled in rotation by each Arab country for a three-year term. Under this proposal, the Arab common market would initially take the form of a multilateral commercial agreement providing for customs exemption from 25% to 100% on agreed lists of goods,

which would be extended from time to time in accordance with the development of the Arab economies. These proposals were based on the principles incorporated in the 1958 trade, economic and technical cooperation agreements concluded between Iraq and the UAR.

The UAR opposed the Iraqi proposal. A UAR spokesman pointed out that already in 1957 the EC, with the participation of Iraq, had approved the UAR-proposed agreement for economic union; only Lebanon had expressed reservations. A detailed UAR note to the Council said that the advocates of the Iraqi proposal had "shown a studious wish to avoid unity." The difference in economic standards between the Arab countries, cited by Iraq as an underlying reason for its proposals, in fact strengthened the argument for economic integration which would raise income levels in all countries. The Iraqi delegation argued, the note went on, that the economically-developed countries would benefit at the expense of the backward countries; the UAR, however, was of the opinion that "it will be among the duties of economic unity to crystallize industrial potential in [the] various Arab countries." (Before the conference opened, Dr Fakhr al-Kayali, leader of the UAR delegation, said that the UAR paid no heed to rumours alleging that her attitude was dictated by reference to her future interests as an industrial state; her market would provide a guarantee for the success of industries in other Arab states, and in addition every country would be able to protect its products, if necessary.) Iraq also argued that the union council to be established under the economic union agreement was to have jurisdiction which would infringe on the sovereignty of member states; to this the UAR delegation commented that council decisions would require the approval of two-thirds of its members.

Shaykh Abdallah al-Tariqi, the Saudi Arabian Minister for Oil and Mineral Resources, announced his country's support of the UAR proposal. He remarked that the Iraqi proposal would entrust everything to an Economic Council, the decisions of which would not be binding on Arab countries.

The meeting concluded on June 24 without reaching an agreement on the issue. The delegates merely decided to refer the questions of the economic union, the Arab common market and the Iraqi proposals to the meeting of the League Council to be held in Casablanca (which did not take place).

Other items referred to the Council were the removal of restrictions on inter-Arab trade and "the exempting of Arab companies from local nationality conditions." (The last point, raised by Lebanon, had been included in the Iraqi proposals.)

The Council advocated measures to frustrate Israel's entry into the Common Market and recommended the setting-up of a technical committee to follow Israel's progress in this respect. It recommended that the Arab states should participate with a joint pavilion in the 1964 World Fair in New York.

Amman Radio called the conference "another big stone in the colossal pyramid of failure." (*R. Damascus*, June 17 [20], June 24 [27]; *R. Baghdad*, June 18, 19 [20]; *R. Amman*, June 25 [27]; *Eg. Gaz.*, May 30, June 15, 17, 20, 22-25; *Mid. Mir.*, June 24; *MEED*, June 23, 30)

Eighth Session of EC Postponed. On Dec 7 it was announced that the eighth session of the Arab Economic Council, due to be held on Dec 7 in Cairo, had been postponed until March 1962. (*MENA*, Nov 6 [8]; *R. Amman*, Dec 7-IMB, Dec 8)

JOINT ECONOMIC UNDERTAKINGS

Arab Aviation Company. (See MER 1960, pp 139-40.) Aviation experts from League member-states met in Baghdad from March 26 to April 4 to continue discussions on the creation of an Arab aviation company. (*Zaman*, March 26, 28-31, April 1-5; *Eg. Gaz.*, March 27)

The April meeting of the Economic Council in Baghdad approved the experts' recommendations. According to MEED, the capital would be £17m. to which Iraq and the UAR would subscribe 20% each, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 15%, while Lebanon and Yemen agreed to subscribe towards the remaining 30% capital and other Arab countries were also invited to subscribe. The company was to operate eight jet aircraft on international routes between the Middle East and North and South America and South Africa not served by existing national Arab airlines, which would continue to operate on their present routes. Meanwhile, representatives of the participating countries had gone to Montreal for discussions with IATA on matters relating to the company [which had not yet been established by the end of the year]. (*R. Baghdad*, April 17 [19]; *MEED*, April 14)

Arab Financial Foundation For Economic Development (*al-mu'assasah al-maliyah al-arabiyyah li-l-inma' al-iqtisadi*). (See MER 1960, p 139.)

In April the Economic Council adopted amendments proposed by Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq requested that foreign capital should be excluded from the foundation's funds [it had made the same proposal in regard to the aviation company], that the foundation itself should be "strengthened" and its funds invested in projects which came strictly within the scope of its charter. A Kuwait proposal to raise the foundation's capital from £20m. to £25m. through her participation with £5m. was also accepted. Thereafter, Iraq officially signed the agreement and undertook to subscribe 3.2m. dinars. (*R. Baghdad* April 17; *R. Beirut*, April 18-IMB, April 18, 19; *Mid. Mir.*, April 22)

A Cairo paper wrote that six Arab countries had signed the agreement—Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the UAR. Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen had been expected to sign at the EC meeting but had not done so. Meanwhile, the foundation existed in name only because, of the six signatories, only the UAR had submitted the ratification documents. Some of these countries had told the League SG that the ratifications were on their way but money would not be forthcoming for some months. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, April 29)

On May 1 it was reported that the UAR had made available to the League £1 million as its first instalment on account of its share in the foundation's capital. (*Ahram*, May 1; *R. Cairo*, May 1-IMB, May 1)

Two weeks later, it was reported that the League Secretariat had rejected a Lebanese proposal that the members of the foundation's board of directors should be appointed in proportion to the shares acquired by each country; consequently, Lebanon would postpone its adherence to the foundation. (*Jaridah*, May 14)

The final allocation of shares of £10,000 each was as follows: Iraq—320 shares; Jordan—56; Kuwait—500; Lebanon—113; Libya—38; Saudi Arabia—291; Sudan—120; UAR—1,006; Yemen—56. All the countries except Sudan, it was reported in June, had by now agreed to take up their shares. (*Wahdah*, Damascus, June 20)

Arab Oil Pipeline Company. In April the Economic Council meeting in Baghdad decided over Saudi Arabian opposition to defer discussion of the proposal to establish an Arab oil pipeline company until it had been fully studied by a committee of economic experts. (*R. Baghdad*, April 13-IMB, April 14; *R. Baghdad*, April 17 [19]; *Arab Observer*, April 23)

On Nov 11 the experts' committee met in Cairo with the participation of the UAR, Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq, Syria and Jordan were not represented. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 11 [14])

The Arab Oil Tankers' Company. In April the Economic Council at its meeting in Baghdad approved the establishment of an Arab Oil Tankers' Company with a capital of 35 million dinars and with Kuwait as its headquarters.

It was stipulated that instruments of ratification would be deposited with the Arab League Secretariat within nine months. (*R. Baghdad*, April 17 [19]; *Arab Observer*, April 23)

[No practical steps to implement the decision had been reported by the end of the year.]

Arab Transit Agreement. (See MER 1960, p 140.) In April the Iraqi Ministry of Trade proposed the establishment of a committee to study the question of Iraq's adherence to the transit agreement. (*R. Baghdad*, April 26 [W, May 4])

In June it was reported that the Arab Transit Committee, comprising Lebanon, the UAR, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, might be convened in the near future to discuss proposals submitted by Iraq. (*Hayat*, June 30)

INTER-ARAB CONFERENCES

The Islamic Congress in Jerusalem (*al-mu'tamar al-islami fi al-quds*). Jerusalem, Jan 15-17. [An Islamic congress was first convened in Jerusalem in December 1931, sponsored by Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the then Mufti of Jerusalem. In Dec 1953 a similar congress was organized by Jordan, mainly as a counter move to the Islamic Congress sponsored at that time jointly by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with Anwar Saadat as its SG. The Muslim Brethren, the adversaries of the military regime in Egypt, became active at the Jerusalem congress. The SG of the congress was Sa'id Ramadan, son-in-law of the late Supreme Guide of the Brethren, Hasan al-Bana. The

congress had a permanent office in Jerusalem. See also p 363 on the activities of the congress in regard to Africa.]

The conference was attended by Muslims from Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, Iran, Pakistan, Algeria, Chad and Europe.

On Jan 14 the permanent office of the conference organized a mass rally to celebrate the anniversary of the Prophet's ascension (*mir'aj*). King Hussein, addressing the rally, said that the Arabs' two great enemies were Zionism and Communism. He made a plea for Arab unity and collaboration based on fact rather than

imagination. He said that Zionism was planning to swallow up the Arab world, while Communism "had gained somebody from amongst us and used him to disrupt our ranks for its purposes... by shaking faith in the hearts of the people," and when he failed to do this he did not hesitate to tread the path of crime, and reverted freely to every kind of underhand plot.

The congress passed resolutions: calling on the Muslim world and leaders to consider Islamic principles and laws in their legislation, educational systems, etc as well as in international relations, criticizing "the hesitation displayed by Arab states in drawing up political, military and economic blueprints for the recovery of Palestine which would become binding upon all of them," and urging joint Arab efforts to prevent the passage of Israel shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba, to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan river waters, and to counteract Israel's penetration into Africa. The congress also called for unity among Muslim and Arab leaders, and for an Arab boycott of France until she recognized Algeria's independence. It accused the Communist authorities in the USSR of persecuting "millions of Muslims" and of attempting to stamp out their religion, and appealed to Arab and Muslim nations to work, within the framework of the UN, for the liberation of Muslims in the Soviet Union from Communist imperialism. (*Al-Nadwa*, Jan 15, 19; *Mid. Mir.*, Jan 22—the dates given in the latter source are not correct.)

Congress of Arab Oil Workers' Federation (*mu'tamar ummal al-batrāl al-arab*) (Cairo, Jan 19-22). This was a constituent congress convened by the Egyptian oil workers union and attended by delegations from the UAR, Libya and Aden. Anwar Salim, an Egyptian, who served as chairman, said he had received cables of support and apology for non-attendance from oil workers in Tunisia and the Lebanon.

The participants declared their support for all Arab liberation movements, and decided to collaborate with the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions. They recommended the setting up of trade unions for oil workers in all Arab countries, that efforts be made to persuade oil unions in Iraq, Lebanon and Tunisia to join the Federation, and that the Federation participate in the forthcoming Arab oil conference. Mukhtar al-Tallali of Libya was elected council chairman of the Federation and Anwar Salim SG; Abdallah Ubayd of Aden became one of the vice-chairmen. (*Ahram*, Jan 20; *eg. Gaz.*, Jan 20, 23; *R. Cairo*, Jan 19 [21]; *MENA*, Jan 21, 22 [W 26])

Sixth Arab Lawyers' Conference (*mu'tamar al-muhamin al-arab*) (Cairo, Feb 1-6). The conference took place as scheduled (see MER 1960, p 143). It declared that the "merger between Egypt and Syria is a prelude to an all-embracing unity between the different parts of the Arab world," called for the removal of artificial barriers between the Arab countries and expressed the view that the "ends of Arab nationalism cannot be served except within the framework of freedom of thought and expression." The conference expressed its support for all Arab causes, from Mauritania (in support of Morocco's claim) and Algeria to the Arab South and the issue of the Jordan waters. The conference also recommended that each Arab state should set up a constitutional court and that the Arab League should establish a high court of justice, and resolved to hold the seventh conference in Jerusalem during the second half of 1962. (*Mid. Mir.*, Feb 11; *eg. Gaz.*, Feb 12)

Fourth Arab Scientific Congress (*al-mu'tamar al-ilmi al-arabi ar-rabi*) (Cairo, Feb 2-9). The congress was attended by 272 representatives of scientific organizations from the UAR, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Mustafa Nazif, the chairman of the Arab Science Union (*al-ittihād al-ilmi al-arabi*), stressed the importance of scientific development in the Arab countries and of coordination between them. The congress recommended the establishment of a central Arab co-ordinating body for scientific research, translation and standardization of scientific terms, the issue of a scientific magazine, and the "revival of the Arab scientific legacy." (*Hayat*, Feb 3, 10)

Permanent Arab Information Committee (*al-lajnah ad-dā'imah lil-ilm al-arabi*) (see MER 1960, p 143, under: Arab League Information Standing Committee.)

The third session of the Committee took place at the League headquarters in Cairo from Feb 18-23. All League member-states, as well as Qatar, were represented; it was presided over by Sa'ad Afrah, Minister Plenipotentiary at the UAR Foreign Ministry.

The Committee adopted the following recommendations, to be submitted to the Arab League Council:

(1) to counter Israeli infiltration in Africa, the Arab states should study the requirements of the African states, send experts there, and open an office for Arab propaganda in Accra, provided this did not impede the setting up of such an office in Dakar as proposed by Iraq; (2) the Arab states should double their information efforts in Eastern Europe against Jewish immigration into Israel; (3) a Spanish-language magazine should be distributed in Spain and Latin America to expound the Arab cause; (4) the League Secretariat should publish an Arab news bulletin for distribution abroad; states should provide the Secretariat with information and the Secretariat should appoint correspondents in the member-states; (5) the Secretariat should call a conference of foreign and Arab specialists in Arab studies; (6) member-states should exchange information material and radio and television programmes; (7) an Arab information week should be held annually in all the Arab countries on March 22, the day of the establishment of the Arab League; (8) £3,000 should be offered as a prize for the best Arab film dealing with an Arab national topic; (9) a commemorative Arab stamp should be issued during the propaganda week; the proceeds to go to the League's information fund.

Two secret resolutions were adopted regarding Israel's "exploitation of the Eichmann trial" and on "countering Israeli propaganda in America." (*MENA*, Feb 23 [25]; *eg. Gaz.*, *Hayat*, Feb 24; *Mid. Mir.*, March 4)

The fourth session of the Committee took place in Sept. (*Akhbar al-Ubū*, Jordan, Sept 29)

Meetings were also reported on June 5 and on Oct 9. (*MENA*, June 5 [7]; *Akhbar Sa'ah*, Oct 11)

Conference on Standardization of Arabic (Rabat, April 3-7). The conference met at the invitation of the Moroccan government. The Algerian Provincial Government, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco were represented. The Moroccan Minister of Education spoke of the need to make Arabic the language of science, culture and civilization in all its aspects. (*R. Rabat*, April 3 [6])

Seventh Arab Social Affairs Experts' Conference (Cairo, April 15-20). Experts representing ten member-states of the League, observers from the ILO and a number

of other local and international organizations attended the conference. The conference recommended (1) the Arab countries to request the ILO to recognize Arabic as an official language; (2) the establishment of labour departments in the League offices in foreign countries to counteract Zionist activities; (3) the establishment of a labour advisory council in each Arab country; (4) the establishment of special machinery in each Arab country where it had not yet been set up, to handle workers' social insurance; (5) the introduction of vocational training programmes; (6) the establishment of labour inspectorates and, (7) the encouragement of Arab women to assume responsibilities in social affairs. (*Eg. Mail*, April 15; *MENA*, April 15 [18]; *Hayat*, April 22)

Seminar on University Education in the Arab Countries. (Benghazi, May 3-17) University teachers from various Arab countries participated. The recommendations of the seminar, which were to be submitted to the Arab League, included: the formation of an Arab Universities' Federation, facilitating the admission of Algerian and Palestinian students to the Arab universities; the teaching of sciences in Arabic; and coordination and cooperation between the universities. (*Hayat*, April 27, May 19; *Iraq Times*, May 8; *Akhbar al-Yaum*, May 20; *Nahar*, May 26)

29th Arab Medical (Physicians') Conference (*al-mu'tamar al-tibbi al-arabi—sometimes al-atibba' al-arab*), (Cairo, May 24-8) (see also MER 1960, p 134). About 1,000 physicians participated, representing physicians' associations and medical societies in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the UAR and Yemen.

The conference decided to set up an Arab Medical Federation to be composed of all the medical practitioners in the Arab world, with a permanent HQ in Cairo. The leaders of the delegation signed the organic law of the federation and agreed on its immediate implementation. The federation's aim would be to promote the interests of the Arab world, cooperation among members of the profession, study of endemic and epidemic diseases and the teaching of medicine in Arabic. An Arab medical conference would be held annually. The conference also decided to form an Arab Health Organization, within the framework of the federation, with permanent HQ in Cairo, to carry out scientific research, combat diseases and epidemics in the Arab states and coordinate health planning. The conference made recommendations on health planning and education to the Arab governments. The thirtieth meeting was to be held in Baghdad. (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 28, 29; *MENA*, May 28 [W, June 1]; *Arab Observer*, June 4)

The First Arab Education Conference (*al-mu'tamar al-tarbiyyi*) (Cairo, June 24-July 3) was attended by delegations from ten states and four amirates. The conference adopted resolutions and recommendations regarding the development of education curricula, including a uniform oath for teachers in all Arab countries. (*Ahram*, June 24, July 4; *MENA*, June 24 [W 29]; *R. Baghdad*, July 8 [W 13])

The Arab Emigrants' Conference (*mu'tamar lil-mugh-taribin al-arab*) opened in Cairo on July 22 and was attended by 220 delegates; 100 of them represented the "Union of Muslim Arab Emigrants in Canada and the US" led by James Muhammad Khalil; the other 120 were Christians representing Syrian and Lebanese associations in the US.

The conference, which met at the Arab League HQ, was opened by SG Hassūnah. He urged those present to enlighten American public opinion on matters relating to the Arab world and reminded them that they were "ambassadors of true friendship." The delegates were also addressed by UAR ministers and high officials who spoke of Arab democracy, Arab socialism and positive neutralism and told the delegates that it was important to be loyal to the old homeland as well as to the new. They also accused the US and Canadian press of an anti-Arab and pro-Zionist attitude. James Muhammad Khalil said that the delegates, on their return to America, would be able to describe the UAR people's love for Abdel Nasser and the progress achieved under his leadership.

The delegates were taken on tours of the UAR and entertained by the UAR authorities. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 18, 23; *MENA*, July 23 [25]; *Ahram*, July 23)

First Conference of Graduates of the Arab Community Development Centre (*al-mu'tamar al-awwal li-khariji markaz tanmiyyat al-mujtama' al-arabi*), (Beirut, July 25-Aug 2). This conference of graduates of the Sir al-Liyan centre, located in Egypt, was attended by delegates from Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the UAR, Yemen and the Arab League Secretariat. There were representatives from the WHO, FAO, ILO and UNRWA. The conference passed 62 recommendations stressing the need for government programmes to develop the Arab community in the social, health, educational and other fields, including the sending of technicians to over-populated villages and Bedouin areas, agricultural education, increased health budgets and better health services, combating of illiteracy, mobilization for "the great fight against ignorance"; encouragement of the cooperative movement and greater opportunities for Arab women to show their abilities. (*Hayat*, July 25, Aug 2, 3; *Mid Mir.*, July 29, Aug 5)

The Conference of Aviation Companies (Bhamdun, Lebanon, Aug 16-21) was attended by representatives from the UAR, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and Kuwait, who met to coordinate air transport between the Arab countries. The participants agreed on a joint publicity campaign for tourism to the Arab countries, air transportation by Arab airlines within Arab countries and between Arab and other countries, and standardization of technical terms. The next meeting was to be held in Jerusalem in 1962. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 17; *Hayat*, Aug 23)

Arab Teachers' Conference (Beirut, Aug 21-25). This conference, sponsored by the Lebanese Teachers' Union, was attended by representatives of teachers' unions from Lebanon, Morocco, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAR, Tunisia, Aden and Oman. The unions in the UAR (an Egyptian and a Syrian union), Iraq, Tunisia and Lebanon agreed to create an Arab Teachers' Federation (*ittihād al-mu'allimin al-arab*). The federation's secretary would temporarily be located in Cairo. Muhammad Sa'id al-Aryan was elected SG of the federation. (*ANA*, Aug 21 [W 24]; *Mid Mir.*, Aug 26; *Ahram*, Aug 22, 26, 27; *Hayat*, Aug 22, 25, 26)

Third Pan-Arab Games in Casablanca (Aug 24-Sept 8). Teams from Kuwait, Libya, Sudan, Jordan, "Palestine," Morocco, Lebanon and the UAR, comprising some 1,000 sportsmen, participated. King Hasan opened the games in the Casablanca stadium. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 23; *R. Beirut*, Aug 24 [26]; *Ahram*, Sept 9)

Conference on Planning of Social Development (*mu'tamar at-takhtit al-khas bi at-tanmiyah al-ijtimadiyah*), (Beirut, Nov 6-12). The Conference, sponsored by the UN Regional Social Affairs Office in Beirut, was attended by delegates from Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAR and Yemen. There were also representatives of the Arab League Secretariat and UN bodies. The conference discussed ways and means of achieving balanced economic and social planning and recommended, *inter alia*: (1) the establishment of a body for economic and social development planning in each Arab country; (2) the carrying out of social research for development planning; (3) a proper balance in the social and economic development budgets. (*Hayat*, Nov 7-11, 14; *Mid. Mir.*, Nov 11)

Arab Atomic Experts' Meeting (Cairo, Nov 8). The meeting was to discuss the construction and utilization of an atomic reactor for the production of electricity as well as ways of increasing the production of uranium 235. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 8 [W 16])

Arab Aviation Conference (*mu'tamar al-tayarân al-ara-bi*) (Amman, Nov 15-16). Representatives of Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria and a delegate from the Arab League Secretariat attended the conference, which recommended the establishment of centres in Damascus, Beirut and Amman for regional meteorological information for aircraft flying over member-states. The League Secretariat representative described the recom-

mendation as a realistic solution to a three-year-old problem; each of the four participating countries had, since 1958, sought to have a single regional centre established on its territory. (*Hayat*, Nov 16, 17; *Mid. Mir.*, Nov 18)

The Arab Tourist and Travel Offices' Conference (Beirut, Dec 2-5), was attended by representatives of travel offices from Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the UAR. The Conference urged Arab countries to facilitate inter-Arab travel and to abolish entry visas for tourists from friendly countries on the basis of reciprocal treatment. Alternatively, the issue of an "Arab visa," valid for all Arab countries, was suggested. The Conference urged reduction in fares between Arab countries; a joint tourist policy towards foreign countries and towards foreign tourists travelling to the "occupied parts of Palestine." The resolutions were submitted to all Arab governments. (*Hayat*, Dec 3, 6; *Mid. Mir.*, Dec 9)

The Ninth Conference of the Arab League Permanent Committee for Communications (*lajnat al-muwassalat ad-d'imah at-tib'ah li-jam'at ad-duwal al-arabiyyah*) (Rabat, Dec 9-22). The Conference was attended by representatives of Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the UAR, Yemen, the Algerian Provisional Government and a delegation of the League Secretariat. The Conference approved recommendations concerning sea, air and land transport and referred them to the member-states. (*R. Rabat*, Dec 9 [W 14]; *Hayat*, Dec 10; *Mid. Mir.*, Dec 30)

THE KUWAIT CRISIS

SYNOPSIS

Kuwait achieved full independence on June 19 by an agreement with the UK in the form of an exchange of notes between the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Ruler of Kuwait. The agreement of 1899 was terminated, taking into account the fact that the Ruler's government had "the sole responsibility for the conduct of Kuwaiti internal and external affairs." At the same time the United Kingdom undertook to assist the government of Kuwait at the latter's request. Both the Kuwaiti and the British governments repeatedly emphasized that the agreement had been concluded between two equal parties, that Kuwait had been independent previously, and that the agreement had merely formalized an existing situation. The UK initially intended the British Political Agent to remain in Kuwait with the same functions, but after the advent of the Kuwait crisis the title of the Agent was changed to Consul General, and in September he was appointed Ambassador—with no personal change taking place.

Six days after the declaration of independence, PM Qasim of Iraq proclaimed Kuwait an integral part of Iraq on historic-legal as well as anti-imperialist grounds. Legally, the Iraqi case was based on the argument that prior to World War I Kuwait had been a district of Basra province—then under Ottoman rule—and that the Kuwaiti Shaykh had had no authority to sign the 1899 agreement with Britain, being merely an Ottoman district commissioner. After the war the British had separated Kuwait district from Basra province, which by then constituted part of the Iraqi State. The new agreement, the Iraqi argument went on, was nothing more

than a device to perpetuate British imperialist domination over Kuwait as well as over the Gulf area in general. Qasim said that Iraq would "liberate" "this section of [her] territory," but he was ambiguous as to the means to be employed; he said that Iraq always resorted to peaceful methods but added that these were useless in dealing with imperialism.

It was thought that apart from considerations of internal policy Qasim might have been motivated by the wish to forestall possible UAR and Saudi Arabian encroachments, and by means of an "anti-imperialist" feat, to gain a leading position in the Arab world which hitherto had eluded him. A fortnight after first making his claim and after the landing of British forces in Kuwait, Qasim himself stated that he had never meant to annex Kuwait by force but that his intention had been to state Iraq's claim before the world.

Kuwait declared her determination to safeguard her independence, putting forward historical and legal arguments of her own. The government entered into consultations with the UK and requested the support of the Arab League and governments.

All Arab countries supported Kuwait's independence, but with different degrees of emphasis, different arguments and, it was thought, different motives. Saudi Arabia immediately offered Kuwait her support, and claimed that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were one country; her stand was attributed to rivalry with Iraq over oil resources and in the Persian Gulf in general. The UAR differentiated between a "genuine Arab union" which she advocated, and "annexation" which she could not accept; observers thought that her attitude may have

stemmed from rivalry with Baghdad for Arab leadership and oil. Jordan was careful not to give offence to Iraq, expressing fear for the precariously balanced Arab solidarity. Tunisia proclaimed the right to self-determination. The Lebanese government, as usual, tried to remain neutral.

Meanwhile the UK had assured Kuwait of her support, and naval moves towards Kuwait started apparently on June 28 or 29. The UK was in close consultation with the US on the matter, and it was pointed out that the US as well as Britain had interests in Kuwaiti oil. At the same time the British government let it be known that it welcomed efforts by the Arab states to safeguard Kuwait's independence.

On June 29 unconfirmed reports of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Kuwaiti border were heard in Cairo, and on June 30, in Washington also. On the latter day the UK announced that she had taken precautionary measures in regard to the situation. The US contacted the Iraqi government and obtained assurances of Iraqi peaceful intentions; the UAR called on the "Iraqi people" to remain within the "principles of the Arab struggle," and King Saud cautioned Qasim not to take irresponsible steps.

On July 1 British and Saudi Arabian troops entered Kuwait at the request of the Kuwaiti government. On the same day, but only after the Kuwaiti announcement that it had asked for military assistance, did Iraq officially deny the reports of her alleged troop concentrations and affirm that she would "recover Kuwait district by all peaceful means." Five days later there were about 7,000 British troops in defensive positions in Kuwait, supported by air and naval forces. PM Macmillan stated that this measure had been taken purely for purposes of defence, following evidence of Iraqi troop concentrations and in accordance with Britain's treaty obligations and the Ruler's request. The Opposition supported the move. The much smaller Saudi Arabian force took up positions in a separate area; reports on liaison between the two forces were denied, the UK and Saudi Arabia having no diplomatic relations, and being in dispute over Buraimi.

The Arab countries were now involved in a situation in which troops of a foreign "imperialist" power were called onto Arab soil by an Arab government because of an inter-Arab conflict. Cairo accused Qasim of having brought this about and even of collusion with Britain. The question now became one of the Arabs being able to replace the British force in safeguarding Kuwait. Britain herself officially welcomed action by the League.

Meanwhile the issue came up in the Security Council (July 2-7) following a complaint by Kuwait of an Iraqi threat (July 1) and an Iraqi complaint of a threat to her territory by British forces (July 2). The USSR, whose first reaction to the Iraqi claim had been non-committal, now supported the Iraqi stand in denying Kuwait's sovereignty and calling for the withdrawal of the British forces. The UAR, then a member of the Council, avoided espousal of either side and presented a resolution urging that the question be solved by peaceful means and calling on the UK to withdraw her forces immediately; the resolution was supported by the USSR. The UK proposed a resolution in support of Kuwait's independence and welcoming steps by the Arab League to restore tranquillity to the area; this resolution was vetoed by the USSR on the grounds that it made no reference to the withdrawal of the British forces. The US expressed her support for the action taken by the

UK and Saudi Arabia in extending military assistance to Kuwait. No resolution was adopted.

There followed two and a half months of inter-Arab manoeuvring, in which the League SG was especially active, around two main questions: (1) the admittance of Kuwait to the League, categorically demanded by Saudi Arabia and vehemently opposed by Iraq; (2) Kuwait's demand that an Arab force be set up to relieve the British troops and protect her independence. Alternatively, it was suggested that Qasim renounce his claim; in fact, he reiterated it. Kuwait made it clear that in return for the support of the Arab countries she was prepared to use part of her oil revenues to aid in their development.

Kuwait was admitted to the League at the Council meeting of July 20, whereupon Iraq declared that she would boycott all League meetings in which Kuwait was represented and demanded SG Hassinah's resignation.

Discussions on the establishment of an Arab force started immediately after the Council meeting; however, the first Arab contingent arrived in Kuwait only seven weeks later, on September 10. The force consisted of contingents from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR, and by mid-September comprised some 3,000 men; it was under the dual control of the League and the countries participating, and had a Saudi Arabian commander-in-chief. The withdrawal of British forces had started previously—on July 19, when the situation had somewhat cleared—and was completed on Oct 10.

At the end of September the Kuwait crisis, which had dominated inter-Arab relations for three months, was relegated to the sidelines by the break-up of the UAR. Two weeks later the UAR announced the withdrawal of her contingent from the Arab Force on the grounds that anti-UAR intrigues were being planned by "imperialists and their stooges"; at the same time there were reports of political friction in the force between Egyptian officers on the one hand and Syrian, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian officers on the other. The UAR-Egyptian contingent was actually withdrawn at the beginning of December; the Syrian troops which had originally formed part of the UAR contingent also left.

Kuwait's application for UN membership was considered by the Security Council on November 30. The State of Kuwait had meanwhile been recognized by over 60 countries. The application was sponsored by the UAR and supported by the UK, but vetoed by the USSR which supported the Iraqi stand and asserted that Kuwait "continues to remain a British colony." In consequence of the Soviet support, Iraq now grew ever closer to the USSR.

In December there was renewed tension, occasioned by a spate of ambiguous statements by PM Qasim, all of the same pattern as mentioned above. The seizure of Goa by an Indian force (December 18-19) was frequently referred to in Iraqi commentaries. Kuwait protested to the Security Council and, at the end of the month, the UK took what was officially described as "small-scale precautionary (military) measures," namely slightly reinforcing the British ME Command (with HQ at Aden). But this time reaction to the British move differed from that of June. While Iraq protested to the Security Council that the British measures threatened her security, Kuwait announced that she had not asked for British help. The Arab League, which now maintained a force in Kuwait, announced that the defence of the Arab lands was an Arab responsibility. Cairo, which since the break-up of the UAR regarded itself subject to a concerted

offensive by "imperialism and Arab reactionaries," charged that the British move was directed against her as well as against Qassim, in a conspiracy against liberation movements in the ME.

On the significance of the Kuwait crisis in the general context of inter-Arab relations see, pp 97 ff: Synopsis. For Kuwait's internal affairs and her foreign relations, see pp 446 ff. On the British armed intervention, see pp 91-2.

KUWAIT GRANTED INDEPENDENCE

(June 19)

Background: History, Oil, Population. The Shaykhdom— with a population of 321,621 according to a census in 1961—consisted of the town of Kuwait and the surrounding desert area (see map). The town was believed to have originated in the 18th century, when several families of the Anayzah tribe migrated from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula to the shore of the Persian Gulf. The As-Sabah ruling dynasty dated from about 1756, when the inhabitants first appointed a shaykh to administer their affairs and represent them vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities. Relations between Britain and Kuwait started in 1775, when for a brief period the main part of Kuwait was used as a station for British overland mail from India to the Mediterranean. The British East India Company protected the Shaykhdom against raids by Wahhābi tribesmen. However, to retain her autonomy Kuwait had to maintain good relations with the Turks who dominated the mainland. In 1871 Shaykh Abdallah as-Sabah accepted the title of *Qaymaqam* (district commissioner)

under the Turkish *Vali* (governor) of Basra *Vilayet* (province), which after World War I became part of Iraq. Kuwait paid tribute to the Turks but did not come under direct Turkish administration.

Fearing Turkish occupation, Shaykh Mubārak, who became Ruler in 1896, appealed for British protection as a means of severing his ties with the Ottoman empire. At first Britain was not interested, but in 1899 she reconsidered her attitude, being apprehensive of Russian plans to build a port or coaling station there and German plans for a Berlin-Baghdad railway. To forestall these plans, Britain concluded an agreement with Shaykh Mubārak under which, in return for British protection, he undertook not to cede or dispose of any part of his territory without British consent. (For text, see below.) In 1904 a British Political Agency was established in Kuwait in spite of Turkish protests. In 1909 Britain and Turkey opened negotiations, which led to a draft agreement in 1913. Under this agreement, which was never ratified, Kuwait was to gain a measure of self-government, while Turkish and British rights were defined. In 1914 Shaykh Mubārak was assured by the British government that Kuwait would be recognized as an independent principality under British protection, on condition he cooperated in the capture of Basra.

After the First World War, Kuwait's boundaries with Iraq and Saudi Arabia remained undefined, with the result that rival tribes clashed over pasture rights. A conference was held in 1922 at Uqair to bring about a *modus vivendi*, and a treaty was signed between King Ibn Saud, representing Saudi Arabia, and Sir Percy Cox, representing Iraq and Kuwait. The agreement created two neutral zones, one between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and the other between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

In the 'thirties large oil reserves were discovered in Kuwait. On Dec 23, 1934, Shaykh Ahmad granted a concession for oil exploitation (revised Dec 1, 1951) to the Kuwait Oil Company—owned equally by the American Gulf Oil Corporation and the British Petroleum Company. In 1961 Kuwait held third place among the world's oil-producing countries, and first place in the ME. In that year she produced 620 million barrels of oil, and her oil reserves were estimated at about a quarter of the known world total. According to American oil experts, Kuwait's oil potential was over 60,000 million barrels.

In 1961 income from oil was estimated at £200 million per year—90% of total government revenue, and income per capita of the population was about £1,500 a year, among the highest in the world.

Most of Kuwait's income was invested abroad, particularly in Britain, which added more weight to British interests in the country. An investment board, with the Shaykh's agent in London as chairman, was set up in 1953.

(*RILA: The ME, a Political & Economic Survey*, Oxford University Press, 1958; *The ME 1962: Europa Publications*, London, 1962; J.C. Hurewitz: *Diplomacy in the ME, a Documentary Record*, Van Nostrand, 1956; Sir Arnold T. Wilson: *The Persian Gulf*, George Allen & Unwin, 1959; G. Lenczowski: *Oil and State in the ME*, Cornell, 1960; Davis H.M.: *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1953; J. Marlow: *The Persian Gulf in the 20th Century*, Crested, London 1962; B. Shwadron: *The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers*, Praeger, NY, 1959; *The Truth About Kuwait* (1), *The Republic of Iraq*, July 1961; *ME Affairs*, Vol XIII, Jan 62, June-July 1961; *Mid. Mir.*, Aug 19, 1961.)



British-Kuwaiti Exchange of Notes. On June 19 notes were exchanged between the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, W. H. Luce, and Shaykh Abdallah as-Sālih as-Sabāh, the Ruler of Kuwait.

Luce referred to recent discussions between the Ruler and his predecessor about "the desirability of adapting the relationship of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Kuwait to take account of the fact that Your Highness' Government has the sole responsibility for the conduct of Kuwait's internal and external affairs."

"The following conclusions were reached in the course of these discussions," the note continued:

"a) The Agreement of the 23rd of Jan 1899, shall be terminated as being inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait."

"b) The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a spirit of close friendship."

"c) When appropriate the two Governments shall consult together on matters which concern them both."

"d) Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's Government to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter request such assistance."

The British Resident proposed that "the present Note together with Your Highness' reply to that effect shall be regarded as constituting an Agreement between the United Kingdom and Kuwait in this matter which shall continue in force until either party gives the other at least three years' notice of their intention to terminate it, and that the Agreement of the 23rd of Jan, 1899, shall be regarded as terminated on this day's date."

In his reply, the Ruler agreed that "Your Excellency's Note and my reply shall be regarded as constituting an Agreement between Kuwait and the United Kingdom in this matter." (Cmnd. 1409)

The 1899 Agreement was signed by Shaykh Mubārak as-Sabāh and Lt.-Col. Malcolm J. Meade, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on Jan 23, 1899. It stated that "Shaykh as-Sabāh of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs, and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Shaykh Mubārak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government." (Cmnd. 1409.)

"Kuwait Previously Independent." The exchange of notes was made public on June 19 in the House of Commons. The Lord Privy Seal (Edward Heath) pointed out that "for some time past, Kuwait had possessed entire responsibility for the conduct of its own international relations, and with the full support of HM Government has already joined a number of international organizations as an independent sovereign state." This development, he said, had rendered "obsolete and inappropriate" the terms of the Anglo-Kuwait agreement of 1899. (For transfer to Kuwait of jurisdiction and conduct of foreign relations, see MER 1960, pp 404-5; this volume, pp 449 b-450.) Heath said that the UK did not intend to maintain forces in Kuwait. The British Political Agent would remain, with the same functions, although these "had grad-

ually been changing during recent years with the transference of jurisdiction." There had been no request by the Ruler of Kuwait to change the title of the Political Agent. If the Ruler decided to apply for UN membership, the UK would "warmly support it." (Hansard C, Vol. 642, Col. 954-8, June 19)

Later, on June 28, Mr Heath stated that as a result of consultations with the Ruler the title of the Political Agent would shortly be changed to Consular Representative (Hansard C, Vol. 643, Col. 448, June 28). This was done three days later; finally, in Sept, the former Political Agent was appointed Ambassador. (Faitin, July 2; Times, Sept 23)

The government of Kuwait issued a statement on June 19 giving the text of the agreement, which, it said, had been reached between "two equal parties after the UK has made a *de jure* recognition of Kuwait's independence and full sovereignty." The statement explained that para d) of the agreement (see above) did not mean that Kuwait "is obliged to seek assistance from a certain State or a certain source," or that such assistance was "imposed" on her. Kuwait was confident that she would "receive all the assistance she needs from sister Arab States." (R. Beirut, June 21—IMB, June 22; AWA, June 29)

Kuwait's Proclamation of Independence. On the same day Kuwait's independence was proclaimed by the Ruler in a special message to the nation, in which he called for the "welfare of the country and its continued progress and prosperity," for the strengthening of the "bonds of friendship and brotherhood with sister Arab States," and the "realization of the aspirations of the Arab Nation." He stated that Kuwait would apply for membership of the Arab League, the UN and other international organizations. (Manar, June 20; R. Baghdad, June 20—IMB, June 21; AWA, June 29)

Congratulations from Arab Rulers, Including Qassim. The proclamation of independence was immediately followed by telegrams of congratulations to the Ruler from all heads of Arab states. Among the first (June 20) were PM Qassim of Iraq and King Saud of Saudi Arabia. (R. Baghdad, June 20 [22]; Manar, June 21)

President Abdel Nasser on June 23 referred to Kuwait's independence as "a glorious historic event tremendously welcomed by all Arabs" (Eg. Gaz., June 24). Jordan sent a ministerial delegation to convey King Hussein's congratulations. (R. Amman, June 24—IMB, June 25)

QASSIM CLAIMS KUWAIT

(June 25)

[On June 25 Abd al-Karim Qassim, PM of Iraq, proclaimed Kuwait an integral part of Iraq and stated that he intended to "liberate" it.]

First Intimations. [On June 13 Iraq still voted for the admission of Kuwait to the ILO as an independent country at the ILO conference in Geneva. (Heath's statement—Hansard C, Vol. 642, Col. 449, June 28).]

In his cable of congratulations (June 20) Qassim made no direct reference to Kuwait's independence. He expressed his satisfaction at the "abrogation of the illegal, forged and internationally unrecognized" agreement of 1899, which, he declared, had been "falsely concluded with Shaykh Mubārak as-Sabāh, Qaymaqam of Kuwait, who belonged to Basra province (*vilayah*), without the

knowledge of his brothers in Kuwait and the then legal authorities in Iraq."

Qasim warned the Ruler of "plots and intrigues of the British imperialists," who divided the ranks inside the homeland to ensure that "they will remain behind the scene," and said that Iraq would never be deceived by these tricks. (*R. Baghdad, June 20 [22]; Zaman, Iraq Times, June 21*)

The next day, a Baghdad Radio commentary said that Britain was only pretending to grant independence to Kuwait, in order to deceive the Kuwaiti people and "other conscious people, who would not hesitate to make every sacrifice the Kuwaiti people ask for to fulfil national aspirations." (*R. Baghdad, June 21 [23]; see also Ahd al-Jadid, Fajr al-Jadid, June 22*)

Qasim Claims Kuwait as Part of Iraq. On June 25 in a press conference in Baghdad, Premier Qasim for the first time stated publicly Iraq's claim to Kuwait as an "indivisible part" of her territory.

Qasim presented his case in the framework of a denunciation of imperialism in general and British imperialism in particular. The main issue, he said, was to put an end to imperialism, which, he charged, was "intriguing against the security of Iraq." It (the UK) was trying to create a federation under its domination of shaykhdoms of the "Eastern Arab South" with Kuwait as its cornerstone, which would block Iraq's approaches to the Indian Ocean. This was a complementary step to the establishment of the Federation of the Amirates of the South (Aden protectorates), which was also designed to control the approaches of the Arab countries to the Indian Ocean. The UK had also endeavoured to bring Kuwait into the Commonwealth, but as Iraq had foiled this attempt, the deceitful agreement of June 19 had been signed to achieve the same purpose by other means.

Kuwait, however, was an integral part of Iraq, Qasim declared, reiterating that the Shaykh of Kuwait had had no authority to sign the 1899 agreement as he was a mere district commissioner of the Ottoman Basra province. This forged agreement, he said, was never internationally recognized.

The new agreement, Qasim said, was "a blow to the independence of Iraq and the aspirations of the Kuwaitis." It had been signed by a ruling clique of "irresponsible persons" serving the interests of the imperialists. Iraq did not recognize its legality, as Kuwait was part of Iraq; no one except Iraq could sign agreements on her behalf. Iraq had therefore decided, he said, "to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait and to demand all the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs to the province of Basra." "When we say this, it means that we can execute it," he declared, and added that a decree would be issued appointing the Shaykh of Kuwait as "qaymaqam of the district of Kuwait" under the authority of the Basra province.

The Shaykh of Kuwait, Qasim said, would be warned that if there was any violation of the people's rights, he would be "severely punished and regarded as an insurgent." At the same time, he expressed his hope that the "esteemed Shaykh" (*al-jalil*) would not stand as an obstacle in the way of the prosperity of the "entire Iraqi people from the north of Zakho [Iraq's northernmost town] to the south of Kuwait."

Qasim did not specify how the incorporation of Kuwait was actually to be brought about. At one point he said: "We will liberate this section of the Iraqi territory." Again he stated: "We are capable of obtaining all our rights. But we always resort to peaceful means... But I

assure you that peaceful methods are useless with imperialism..." [There was no reference to military preparedness.] (*Zaman, June 25; R. Baghdad, June 25 [27]*)

Iraq's Case: Kuwait Formerly Part of Ottoman Basra Province. A memorandum stating Iraq's claim to Kuwait was delivered by the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to diplomatic representatives on June 26. It explained that until the outbreak of World War I Kuwait had belonged to the *liwa* (province) of Basra, both being under Ottoman rule. The district commissioner (*qaymaqam*) of Kuwait was appointed by the Sultan, and derived his administrative authority from the Ottoman authorities in Basra. "British colonialism," which had made several attempts to gain access to the Arab Gulf area in 1899, had concluded a "secret" agreement with Shaykh Mubarak under which the latter ceded to the British rights that he did not possess, but the Shaykh had maintained his allegiance to the Sultan and his representative in Basra. An attempt by the British in 1913 to "separate Kuwait from Iraq" by means of an agreement with the Ottoman Empire had not materialized (the source below gives the details of the draft agreement), and only after the First World War had Britain been able by occupying Iraq to separate Kuwait from her. The document stated that the "imperialist agreement" of June 1961 actually "secured the continuance of British protection over Kuwait" through the British undertaking to extend assistance to the Shaykh on request and the provision for consultation on matters of common interest. The government of Iraq declared that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq; it was determined to resist imperialism and "safeguard the unity of the people in Iraq and Kuwait." The Iraqi claim to Kuwait was presented in detail in a Foreign Ministry paper. (*The Truth About Kuwait, Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1961*)

Previous Iraqi Claims. Claims over Kuwait had been raised by previous Iraqi governments. In 1938 King Ghazi made such a claim, and in 1958 Premier Nuri as-Sa'id negotiated with Britain and the US for Kuwait's admission to the Arab Union (of Iraq and Jordan) (*Hayat, June 25*). While Qasim made no reference to these facts, they were briefly referred to in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry paper as claims made by "governments of Iraq before the revolution" who could do no more than present their claims to the British government, "since they were not free to plan their policy." (*The Truth About Kuwait*)

On June 25 Baghdad Radio broadcast messages of support to Qasim from the Iraqi Chief of Staff, state organizations and prominent individuals.

Regular radio programmes were cancelled on June 25 and 26, and military bands played patriotic songs. (*R. Baghdad, June 25, 26 [27, 28]*)

[The Iraqi press supported Qasim's move without reservations.]

ON QASSIM'S MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS

Qasim: To Alert World Opinion. A fortnight after his declaration of June 25 (and after the landing of British forces in Kuwait), Qasim said that he had never meant to annex Kuwait by force and that his intention was to state Iraq's claim. In a press interview on July 6, he maintained that the claim had already been included in his inaugural speech of July 14, 1958, when he mentioned the creation of "a popular republic based on complete Iraqi unity." His motive in re-stating it on June 25, he said, was to arouse public opinion. "The world has paid

an adequate attention to our declaration," he declared, "and this subject occupies the world press and international politics." (*Hayot*, July 7)

Forestalling UAR and Saudi Arabian Encroachments. Arab diplomats in Lebanon, who did not expect a military move by Iraq, regarded Qasim's statement as a manoeuvre to prevent the UAR gaining control of the Shaykhdom. Although there appeared to be no opposition in Kuwait, especially after the introduction of the extensive welfare schemes, it was reported that such as remained had more affinity with the UAR than with Iraq. (*NYT*, June 27, 30; *Economist*, July 1)

The *Financial Times* thought that Qasim might have been expecting Saudi Arabian and Egyptian encroachment in the Persian Gulf and wanted to establish Iraq's claim as "a basis from which to compromise later." (*Financial Times*, July 3)

"Attempt to Divert Attention from Internal Failures." This motive was attributed to Qasim by the UAR and other Arab press, as well as by British and American opinion. All were convinced that he did not mean to use force. (For UAR opinion, see *Akhbar*, July 5; *Akhbar al-Yawm*, July 8)

Western diplomats were reported as believing that Qasim's action was motivated by his failure to carry through the reforms he had promised. (*Newsweek*, July 24)

"Manoeuvring for Leading Position in the Arab World." *The Times* wrote that Qasim was seeking to portray himself as "the most anti-imperialist" of the Arab leaders. As his domestic position was weak and he had "clearly failed to capture the tide of Arab nationalism," he was attempting to rally home and foreign support by "forcing Britain into colonialist costume," casting Kuwait as "victim or stooge" and the UAR as accomplice. The paper doubted whether Qasim contemplated a military move, which would have involved the risk of British military intervention, as well as a "solid front of Arab opinion." (*Times*, June 27)

Another opinion was that as Qasim was negotiating a new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Kuwait claim served as "an admirable cover for a deal with the imperialists" and could serve, without costing a penny, as "a popular rallying cry for months and years to come." (*Time*, July 7)

No Definite Plan. [Some opinion was doubtful whether Qasim had any plan at all, or was even disparaging.]

The *Economist* said the move as "one of General Qasim's periodic brainstorms" and said that this was generally believed in Lebanon. It doubted whether he intended to seize Kuwait by force, because "he would have acted first and talked afterwards." The paper suggested that he wanted "to test Kuwaiti courage and the reaction everywhere else." (*Economist*, July 1, 8)

Another observer doubted whether Qasim had any "consistent plan" and thought his announcement looked more like "a sudden impulsive gesture." (*Financial Times*, July 3)

Muhammad Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, was puzzled by the "new addition to the great mysteries of the strange man who nowadays rules in Baghdad." (*Ahram*, July 2)

KUWAITI AND BRITISH REACTIONS TO QASSIM'S DECLARATION

(June 26-30)

Kuwait: "Determined to Protect Her Territory." The Kuwaiti government secretariat issued a statement on

June 26 declaring that Kuwait was "an independent Arab state with full sovereignty, recognized internationally." The statement continued: "The Kuwaiti Government backed by the entire Kuwaiti people is determined to protect and defend Kuwaiti territory [and] is fully confident that all friendly and peace-loving countries, especially sister Arab States, will support it in preserving its independence." (*R. Kuwait*, June 26 [28]; also the sources immediately below.)

The Case for Kuwaiti Independence. Kuwait rejected Qasim's historical claims and maintained that throughout her history she had been an independent entity and had not been under Ottoman rule. She had concluded the 1899 agreement with Britain as an independent legal entity and had been recognized as such by Iraq in all communications between the two countries. (Documents in proof of this assertion were cited in the Kuwaiti publications given below.) It was also emphasized that Iraq had supported Kuwaiti requests to join international organizations, the latest case being Kuwait's admission to the ILO on June 13. ("*The Kuwaiti-Iraqi Crisis*" and "*The Truth About the Crisis Between Kuwait and Iraq*," Government of Kuwait, Printing & Publishing Department, no date)

Kuwaiti Political and Military Measures. Mass demonstrations in support of the Ruler were reported in Kuwait. Army forces were sent to the borders. The Kuwaiti Army then consisted of 3,000 troops armed with British weapons: tanks, armoured cars and 12 planes. Its commander was Mubarak Abdallah as-Sabäh, a Sandhurst graduate. (*NYT*, June 27; *Times*, July 8)

At the same time Kuwait entered into consultations with Britain with regard to the situation (*Times*, June 30), and sent dispatches to leaders of Arab countries asking for their moral support. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 27)

The Deputy Ruler of Kuwait, Abdallah Mubarak as-Sabäh, met the SG of the Arab League on June 26 to discuss the situation. The Ruler sent a letter to the League, protesting against Qasim's statement and expressing confidence that the League would support Kuwait. (*MENA*, June 27 [29]; *BBC in Arabic*, June 27-IMB, June 27)

Britain: First Reactions Cautious; Obligation to Assist Kuwait Stressed. On June 26 a British Foreign Office spokesman said that the dispute was primarily a matter between Iraq and Kuwait. He said, however, that Britain was pledged to come to Kuwait's aid under the June 19 agreement. On the same day a Ministry of Defence spokesman said that no action had yet been taken to put troops in readiness. *The Times* noted that the Foreign Office was determined to play down anxiety over Qasim's claim.

Close consultations took place between the Ruler of Kuwait and the British Political Agent, Sir John Richmond. In Iraq, the British Ambassador, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, met Foreign Minister Hashim Jawad. He was reported to have stated that Iraq's threat to Kuwait's sovereignty would be a matter of grave concern to Britain. (*NYT*, June 28; *Times*, June 27, 30)

On June 28 D.W. Healy, MP (Lab.), asked in the House of Commons whether the government had received a request for assistance from the Ruler of Kuwait in view of the Iraqi claims. The Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, replied that the government "have assured the Ruler of their support." Healy said that, as the dispute seemed to be essentially an Arab problem and the Iraqi govern-

ment had evidently "isolated themselves from the rest of the Arab world," it would be a mistake for Her Majesty's government "to come more forward" in support of Kuwait. Heath agreed that the Arab countries as a whole had reacted in support of Kuwait, but stressed that under the June 19 agreement the UK was pledged to come to Kuwait's assistance if requested. (For source see below.)

British-US Consultations. Heath was asked by G.D.N. Nabarro, MP (Cons.), whether there had been full consultations between the UK and the US government, as both countries were interested in the large oil output from Kuwait. He wanted to be assured that there would be "no action by the Government without full support from the US." Heath replied that the UK was in close consultations with the US. (*Hansard*, Vol. 643, Col. 448-9, June 28)

UK Starts Military Preparations. On June 29 the Ministry of Defence stated that, in view of Heath's statement, "it is natural that we should take any measures which may be necessary to increase the readiness of our forces for this purpose," but no comment could be made on any detail of the movement of forces. *The Times* commented that the UK was facing a dilemma: as the government was clearly determined to respond to a request from the Ruler, it had to make advance preparations in order that this assistance would be effective, while, on the other hand, it did not wish, by doing so, to provoke Iraq into action (*Times*, June 30). Naval moves towards Kuwait started apparently on June 28 or June 29 at the latest. (*Reuters*, June 29; *NYT*, June 30) [For details see pp 91-2]

UK Justifies Military Moves; Asks Arabs to Safeguard Kuwait's Independence. On June 30 a Cabinet meeting, held to study the latest reports from Kuwait, approved a Foreign Office statement which said that "the Government has certain obligations to the Government of Kuwait" and that it had to take some "normal precautionary measures" in the face of a "declared threat to this small independent State" of annexation by "a more powerful neighbour." The government had "informed a number of friendly Governments in the ME and elsewhere of their deep concern at this situation" and had expressed the hope that they "will use their moderating influence with the Iraqi Government so that Kuwait may continue her development as an independent Arab State..."

The governments informed were reported to be the US, all the Arab States with which the UK maintained diplomatic relations, and Turkey, India and Pakistan.

The Times wrote that this was expected to help counter Arab distaste for British military moves. The paper thought that the quarrel would gradually "dissipate itself in negotiations," but said that the UK had to take precautionary measures because Qasim's actions were not "predictable by normal criteria." If no action had been taken, the paper continued, all trust in British protection among the other shaykhdoms in the Persian Gulf would have been destroyed.

The Times believed that stability in the ME could best be achieved by "encouraging the self-interest of the Arab countries" to work out this problem "in their own terms, as long as these do not include fighting." Therefore the UK welcomed attempts by the Arab League and by other Arab states to urge moderation. (*Times*, June 27, July 1)

The Economist wrote that the risk of waiting to see whether Qasim was bluffing had to be weighed against

the difficulties of "trying to dialogue the Iraqis from Kuwait bad it turned out that he was not bluffing." (*Economist*, July 8)

FIRST ARAB REACTIONS

(June 26-July 3)

Saudi Arabia: Immediate Support; "Kuwait and Saudi Arabia One Country." On June 26 in answer to the Ruler's message, King Saud assured him of his full support: "We are fully prepared to meet any danger which brotherly Kuwait may face." On the same day the Saudi Arabian Chief of Staff, Gen. Ibrahim Hasan, visited Kuwait for talks with the Ruler. (*R. Kuwait*, June 26 [28]; *Bilad*, June 27)

At the same time Saud cabled the following statement to Arab heads of state: "It must be well known to all that Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are one country. Whatever affects Kuwait consequently affects the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and vice versa." (*R. Mecca*, June 26 [28]; *Bilad*, June 27)

After an emergency meeting under the chairmanship of the King on June 27, the government proclaimed that it "has decided to take the necessary positive steps to preserve its (Kuwait's) independence and sovereignty." (*R. Mecca*, June 27 [29])

On June 27 Saud informed the Iraqi Ambassador of his "grief" at Qasim's statement on Kuwait. He urged Qasim to allow wisdom, prudence and Arab interests to prevail. (*R. Mecca*, June 27 [29])

On June 27 Saud wrote to Hasaniyah, SG of the Arab League, asking for an early meeting of the League to consider Kuwait's admission. (*R. Damascus*, June 28-IMB, June 29; *Hayat*, June 28)

Following the Chief of Staff's report on his visit to Kuwait, the King announced that he would use force for the defence of Kuwait if necessary. (*R. Beirut*, June 29-IMB, June 30; *Hayat*, June 29)

It was reported that he had moved several battalions to the Kuwaiti border. (*NYT*, June 29)

Al-Bilad, Jeddah, explained that Saudi Arabia must be the first to react against the Iraqi move because of her close ties with Kuwait, based on blood relations, common cultural heritage and joint struggles in the past. (*Bilad*, June 28)

Saudi Arabian Stand Attributed to Rivalry with Iraq. *Al-Hayat* wrote that Saudi Arabia feared Iraqi expansion in the Arabian peninsula and acquisition of control over new oil resources. Relations with Kuwait had sometimes been hostile, but Saudi Arabia had now decided to strengthen the ties between the two countries in order to forestall Iraqi designs in the Persian Gulf. (*Hayat*, July 2)

UAR Supports Kuwait. Differentiates between "Genuine Arab Union" and "Annexation." The first reaction from Cairo was non-committal. Cairo Radio reported Qasim's claim on June 25 without comment. The next day it quoted foreign sources to the effect that Qasim's declaration was only a manoeuvre to distract public opinion from Iraq's internal problems, and that it had caused the postponement of the departure of British troops from Kuwait. (*R. Cairo*, June 25-27-IMB, June 26-28)

The UAR attitude was officially declared only on the night of June 27, when Abd al-Qadir Hatim, Minister of State, broadcast a statement in the name of President Abdel Nasser. The President believed, Hatim declared, that all relations between Arab nations should be determined only according to "principles initiated by the long

struggle of the Arab nation." The "historic destiny" of the Arabs was the creation of "genuine Arab unity." However, the UAR considered that this should not be based on the traditional European example and on "regional demands based on the text of old treaties," and she could not accept the principle of "annexation." While the UAR had emerged from a union between Egypt and Syria, and therefore could not but support any trend towards unity, she believed that this unity should be "a unanimous expression of Arab popular will based on free choice."

Believing that it was the duty of the stronger Arab nations to give disinterested support to the smaller ones, the UAR regretted the "surprising situation" that had been created between Kuwait and Iraq. She believed that "the great Iraqi people" had other claims to unity with Kuwait, "better, deeper and more lasting" than documents of the old Ottoman Empire. As the Iraqi and Kuwaiti people were of the same Arab nationality, "this in itself is a link and extension between them capable of creating political unity" if based on "unanimous popular will in both countries."

The declaration ended with the hope that the crisis would be solved in agreement with "Arab principles." The UAR could not imagine a situation where Arab soldiers would have to face each other in battle. (*R. Cairo, June 27* [29]; *Eg. Gaz., June 28*)

The Deputy Ruler of Kuwait said that the statement had proved that President Abdel Nasser was "a wise and inspired leader" who dealt with Arab affairs with "absolute frankness." (*R. Cairo, June 29* [July 1])

The *New York Times* wrote that Abdel Nasser's pledge of support was expected to swing over most of the Arab nations and the Arab League to support of Kuwaiti independence. (*NYT, June 28*)

Abdel Nasser answered the Kuwaiti Ruler's cable (see above) by saying that the UAR was following the situation "with much attention and anxiety" and regarded the independence of Kuwait as an expression of the "free will of its people." He stressed the UAR's belief that relations between the Arabs should be governed by principles "emanating from their continuous struggle" and declared that the UAR would endeavour to "defend these principles against any danger." Abdel Nasser answered King Saud's letter in similar terms (*Eg. Gaz., June 30*). While Cairo Radio continued to criticize Iraqi policy in cautious terms along the lines of Hâtîm's statement, *Al-Gumhuriyah* openly attacked Qassim, suggesting that perhaps Britain was behind his attitude, and also that "internal causes" had prompted Qassim "to play this comedy." (*BBCM, June 30, July 1; Gumhuriyah, June 30*)

Comment: Cairo Rivalry with Baghdad for Arab Leadership. Oil. The *New York Times* commented that the UAR's attitude stemmed from the long rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad for the leadership of the Arab world. Some observers thought that she wanted to prevent Iraq from swallowing Kuwait not only because it would enrich Iraq, but also because Cairo itself would have liked a share of Kuwait's wealth. (*NYT, July 10*)

This same view was expressed by *Al-Hayât* (Lebanon), which added that Qassim's claim had brought Iraq again, for the first time since 1958, into the forum of Arab activity, and that the UAR weighed this situation from the angle of inter-Arab propaganda as well as of Qassim's prestige. By supporting Kuwait, Abdel Nasser had secured her as an ally, as well as improving relations with Saudi Arabia after a long period of estrangement. (*Hayat, July 2*)

Jordan Non-Committal; New Arab Dissensions Feared. On June 26 King Hussein answered the Ruler of Kuwait with a promise that Jordan "will always remain the supporter of right and justice and will continue in its endeavour for the welfare... of the entire Arab nation" (*R. Kuwait, June 26* [30]). He answered King Saud's cable in similar terms. (*R. Amman, June 27* [30])

Amman Radio, while expressing a sympathetic attitude towards Kuwait, refrained from attacking Iraq's policy. It quoted, however, foreign sources to the effect that Qassim's declaration had aroused surprise in Amman, where it was feared that the situation might divide the Arab world. (*R. Amman, June 27-IMB, June 28*)

In Amman the King reportedly told the Iraqi Ambassador that Iraq's claim to Kuwait would receive no support from Jordan. (*R. Cairo, June 27-IMB, June 28; Economist, July 1*)

At the same time, Qassim received the Jordanian Ambassador in Baghdad, Wafsi al-Tal. An official bulletin issued on July 1 described the meeting as "a cordial interview which covered good relations between the two brotherly countries." The Ambassador also met Foreign Minister Jawad and was reported to have denied "fabricated reports" that Jordan intended to send troops to Kuwait (*Iraq Times, July 2*). Earlier (*June 30*) the Jordanian Minister of Defence, Wafsi Mirza, also denied such reports. (*R. Amman, June 30* [July 3])

Lebanon: Officially Neutral; Mediation Discussed. Extensive government consultations took place in Lebanon during the days following Qassim's declaration. At a Cabinet meeting on June 28 it was decided that Lebanon would study the situation further before adopting a definite stand.

In Parliament several delegates criticized the government's irresolute attitude and demanded the adoption of a decisive official stand. Government supporters maintained, however, that Lebanon's position enabled her to take the role of a mediator and she should therefore remain neutral. A proposal to send a delegation to congratulate Kuwait on her independence was defeated by a large majority. (*Hayat, June 28, 29, 30*)

On June 29 the PM publicly expressed the hope that the crisis would not develop to such a degree "that it would harm all the Arabs," who needed a united front against "Zionist aggression" more than ever. On July 1 he said that Lebanon's optimism during the past few days had been borne out. (*Hayat, June 30, July 2*)

Support for Qassim's Move in Lebanese Press. [While pro-UAR papers adopted an anti-Qassim attitude and *Al-Hayât* (*June 27, July 2*) was also critical of his move, several Lebanese papers openly supported it.] Michel Abu Jawdah wrote in *An-Nahâr*: "We are with Iraq, even though Iraq might lose." He maintained that Kuwait had not yet acquired the features of a state, and compared the case of Iraq and Kuwait to that of France and Monaco, or the Chinese People's Republic versus Nationalist China. The paper argued that the Arab League could not admit to membership a country which was regarded by a League member as an integral part of its territory (*Nahar, June 28, 29*). *As-Zamân* also approved of Qassim's decision (*Zaman, June 28*). Another writer in *An-Nahâr* said that the Arab peoples' sentiments were on Qassim's side. The annexation of Kuwait by Iraq would have the same meaning for the UK as the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and its success would serve as an example to Saudi Arabia, who would then annex the other Gulf protectorates. He called Qassim's

move "a master-stroke," recalling the July revolution and causing embarrassment to the entire world (*Nahar*, June 28). *Al-Jaridah* also expressed sympathy for Qasim's move, claiming that Iraq's policy in the Persian Gulf could develop national and progressive movements in the area while checking UAR and Saudi Arabian influences. (*Jaridah*, June 28)

Tunisia: Support for Self-determination; Comparison with Mauritania. On July 1 President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, in reply to the Ruler of Kuwait's cable of July 1 expressed full support for the independence of Kuwait. "Every people has the right to determine its own fate," he declared. (*Hayat*, July 2)

Earlier, on June 30, an official statement rejected Arab unity based on forceful annexation, and expressed the same points of view as the UAR statement of June 27 (see above). (*R. Tunisia*, June 30 [July 3])

The Tunisian paper *Al-Amal* asked why those Arab states that had recognized the independence of Kuwait objected to that of Mauritania and supported Morocco's demands. (*R. Tunisia*, June 29 [30])

Libya Supports Kuwait. King Idris sent a message of congratulations to Kuwait on June 29 expressing Libya's wish to strengthen friendly relations between the two countries. (*R. Kuwait*, June 29 [July 1])

The Libyan PM, Muhammad Ibn Uthman as-Sa'id, delivered a note to the Iraqi Ambassador calling upon the Iraqi government to refrain from steps that would endanger peace in the ME. (*R. Cairo*, July 3-IMB, July 4)

Sudan Congratulates Kuwait on Her Independence. President Abdu of Sudan sent the Ruler a message congratulating him on Kuwait's independence. (*R. Umdurman*, June 26 [29])

Algeria Non-committal. On July 3 the representative of the Algerian Provisional Government in Cairo, Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, expressed regret over the crisis between Kuwait and Iraq. He told the press that his government hoped the Arab front would maintain its unity and solidarity so that national aspirations would be realized. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 4)

Persian Gulf Principalities Support Kuwait. The Ruler of Qatar, Ahmad Al Thani, and the Ruler of Bahrain, Shaykh Salmān Ibn Hamad Al Khalifah, wrote to the Ruler of Kuwait announcing their support for Kuwait and denouncing Qasim's claims. (*R. Kuwait*, July 2 [4]; *Hayat*, July 6)

It was reported that the (exiled) Imam of Oman, Ghālib Ibn Ali, who resided in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, also supported Kuwaiti independence. (*R. Cairo*, June 26 [29])

The Arab League: Unanimous Vote for Acceptance of Kuwait Not Required. On June 26 an Arab League spokesman described Iraqi claims over Kuwait as surprising. He recalled that at the League Defence Council meeting in April Iraq had consented to Kuwait's membership in the Council and the other Arab organizations. It was reported from League circles in Cairo that Kuwait could be accepted as a member of the League on a majority vote, as there was no provision requiring a unanimous vote for the acceptance of a new member. Meanwhile, Hassānah, the League SG, revealed that the Secretariat had received no note from the Iraqi govern-

ment explaining its attitude towards Kuwait. (*R. Beirut*, *R. Cairo*, June 27-IMB, June 28; *Hayat*, June 27)

The Arab countries were informed of the Kuwaiti complaint to the League (see p 122 b). The Secretariat was to confer on June 28 with Arab ambassadors in Cairo on the calling of an emergency meeting of the League to discuss the crisis. It was reported that Iraq strongly objected to a League discussion of the subject. (*MENA*, June 27 [29]; *Hayat*, June 29)

While Saudi Arabia was urging the earliest consideration of Kuwait's application, it seemed that the League Secretariat was uncertain how to proceed in this matter if Iraq opposed her admission. (*Times*, June 29)

League SG to Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. On July 1 Hassānah arrived in Baghdad where he said that he would also visit Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (see below). (*ANA*, July 1 [4])

WORLD REACTIONS

(June-July)

US Support for Kuwait's Independence. The State Department said on June 28 that the US regarded Kuwait as a "sovereign state" and would support her application for UN membership. The spokesman said that if Kuwait expressed a wish to establish diplomatic relations with the US "this country would probably agree." So far as he knew, however, the CENTO treaty had no provision for military assistance to Kuwait in the event of her being forcibly annexed to Iraq. (*USIS*, June 28)

British-US Common Oil Interests in Kuwait. (See also above: British-US Consultations.) A London paper wrote: "For the UK to be strong in this part of the world is in the interest of the whole Western Alliance, and particularly [emphasis in paper] of the US, which has a share in the oil of Kuwait." (*Daily Express*, July 1)

The New York Times wrote that in view of British-US interests in Kuwait's oil, "no matter how much we are in favour of independence for small countries, we can hardly be enthusiastic about any arrangement which would give somebody else control over the oil of Kuwait." (*NYT*, July 7)

Chinese People's Republic Congratulates Kuwait. Premier Chou En-lai cabled his congratulations to the Ruler of Kuwait on the attainment of independence. (*R. Kuwait*, June 30 [July 3])

On July 4 a Chinese paper said that Kuwait was entitled to independence and that Qasim's claim, which was disputed by Arab states, had created a complex situation which should be left for the Arabs to settle among themselves. (*NCNA*, July 4 [5])

Czechoslovakia and East Germany: Dispute an Arab Matter. Both countries commented that the dispute was clearly a matter to be solved by the Arab countries concerned and the Arab League. They denounced British assistance as imperialist exploitation of the situation. (*R. Berlin*, July 2, *R. Prague*, July 3 [4, 5])

USSR Non-committal; Concentrates on Demand for Withdrawal of British Forces. The USSR offered no congratulations on Kuwait's independence. Qasim's claim was reported briefly by Tass on June 27, and on June 29 *Pravda* wrote that the "imperialist powers" were hastening to exploit the crisis, and to protect their oil interests. The Soviet press did not touch upon the issue between

Iraq and Kuwait and did not express support for Qasim's claim. When British forces arrived in Kuwait, Soviet comment concentrated entirely on their presence, supporting both the Iraqi and the UAR points of view (see farther below); the main issue was declared to be the withdrawal of British forces, as threatening the security of Arab states in general. (*Mizan*, July/Aug 1961)

The *Economist* wrote that British support for Kuwait had simplified the Soviet attitude, which was at first non-committal, because now it could concentrate its attacks on "colonialism" and become the champion of both Iraq and the UAR. (*Economist*, July 8)

Iran Strongly Supports Kuwait. On June 21 the Shah sent a message of congratulations to the Ruler of Kuwait (*Kayhan*, June 27), and the Cabinet sent a goodwill mission, which discussed with the Ruler the conditions of the "70,000 Iranians" in the Shaykhdom. (*Kayhan*, July 2, 12)

Ettela'at [pro-government] wrote that Qasim's claim was unfounded; Qasim would have been wiser to support Kuwait against possible penetration by the UAR. Iran would support Kuwait, even if Qasim were to recognize Iran's claim to Bahrain, the paper said. (*Ettela'at*, June 25, 26)

Turkey Non-committal. On June 28 Foreign Minister Selim Sarper said that Turkey would not intervene. On July 1 President Cemal Gürsel declared that the problem was a matter that concerned the UK. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 29, July 2)

India Supports Kuwait's Independence. PM Nehru declared in New Delhi on June 30 that India would continue to regard Kuwait as an independent country. The government of India sent a communication to Iraq urging a peaceful approach to the dispute. (*Times*, July 1, 3)

Nationalist China Congratulates Kuwait. The Ruler received a cable of congratulations from Chiang Kai-shek. (*R. Kuweit*, June 30 [July 3])

REPORTED IRAQI TROOP CONCENTRATIONS; WEST AND ARABS CAUTION QASSIM

(June 29-30)

Unconfirmed Reports on Iraqi Troop Concentrations. On June 29 reports of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Kuwaiti border appeared in the Cairo press and broadcasts. (*R. Cairo*, June 29, 30 [July 1])

According to *The Times*, it was reported in Washington on June 30 that an Iraqi attack on Kuwait was to be launched the next day, but the origin of the information was obscure, and it was denied that such reports had reached the State Department. By the night of June 30, the paper added, there were still no confirmed reports of Iraqi troop movements towards the border, "though there may have been some movement into the Basra area." (*Times*, July 1)

(However, on July 3, after the British forces had landed, PM Macmillan stated that on June 29 and 30 "evidence accumulated" that reinforcements were moving into the Basra area, while the forces originally garrisoned there were in themselves sufficient to occupy Kuwait. An Iraqi denial came on July 1. See below.)

A report on June 29 that Iraqi torpedo boats in the Shatt-al-Arab had opened fire on Iranian boats carrying cargoes to Kuwait, was denied by Iraq and by the Iranian authorities. (*R. Cairo*, June 29-IMB, June 30; *R. Baghdad*, July 1 [3]; *Kayhan*, July 2)

On June 30 a Kuwaiti government spokesman denied knowledge of Iraqi troop movements towards Kuwait and said that all information to this effect had come from American broadcasts. (*R. Amman*, July 1-IMB, July 2)

British Precautionary Measures. At midday on June 30, the British Foreign Office stated that in view of the UK's obligations to Kuwait and the open threat to this small independent state of annexation by a more powerful neighbour, "the Government had to take some normal precautionary measures." It had informed friendly governments in the ME and elsewhere of its "deep concern," and had expressed the hope that they would use their moderating influence with the Iraqi government. (*Times*, July 1)

US Diplomatic Pressure on Iraq. On the same day State Department sources said that the US had brought diplomatic pressure to bear on Iraq not to attempt to seize Kuwait by force. *The Times* wrote from Washington that though the origin of the reports on Iraqi intentions was obscure, the State Department "obviously believed that some cautionary advice was necessary." Representations were made by the US embassy in Baghdad on June 28, and the Iraqi Ambassador in Washington was summoned on June 30. As a result, assurances were received that the Iraqi government contemplated only peaceful measures in establishing her claim to Kuwait. A State Department spokesman said on June 30 that he trusted this was the official policy of the government of Iraq. (*Times*, July 1)

UAR Appeal to "Iraqi People." Also on June 30, the UAR issued an appeal to the Iraqi people. Minister of State Abd al-Qādir Hātīm, stated that the UAR had received information that Iraqi armed forces had been ordered to move to the Kuwait border and that "some Baghdad circles" were seriously discussing the possibility of an armed intervention. The UAR government called upon the "great Iraqi people" to remain within the principles of the Arab struggle, which should come "before any personal glory or regional ambition." Some elements knew what they were doing, the UAR believed, while others did not realize the consequences of their actions. The crisis might benefit the enemies of the Arab nation. The UAR was confident that the Iraqi people would not act against their better judgement, and that no Arab would risk leaving the fate of the Arab nation at the mercy of international manoeuvring and imperialist intervention. (*Eg. Mail*, July 1)

King Saud Cautions Qasim. In a cable on June 30 King Saud called upon Qasim to refrain from taking irresponsible steps in Kuwait. He warned him of the possibility of foreign intervention in Arab affairs, and drew attention to the "concentration of Israeli forces" on the Syrian border, a danger which necessitated a united Arab front. (*R. Mecca*, July 1 [3])

BRITISH AND SAUDI ARABIAN FORCES ENTER KUWAIT

(July 1)

[At the request of the Kuwaiti government, as published on the morning of July 1, British and Saudi Arabian armed forces entered Kuwait on the same day.]

Kuwait's Request for Military Assistance. On July 1 at 10.30 GMT, Kuwait Radio broadcast a statement by

the Supreme Council of the Kuwaiti government announcing that the Ruler had asked for Saudi Arabian and British military assistance—the latter in accordance with the exchange of notes of June 19. The announcement said that Kuwait had refrained from taking any active step since Qasim's declaration, hoping that he would change his mind. When, however, it became clear that "Qasim had begun to mass his forces along the borders" in preparation for invasion, the Ruler had applied for military assistance. King Saud had ordered the despatch of his forces, and the UK had immediately responded. "As soon as the crisis ends these forces will be withdrawn immediately," the statement declared. (*R. Kuwait, July 1 [3], text of application for assistance in MEA, Jan 62*) [Neither this statement nor that of PM Macmillan, cited below, made it clear at what time the requests for assistance were made.]

According to a British source the request for assistance was made on June 30 (*Army Quarterly, Jan 1962*), but this was not mentioned in *The Times* of July 1, reporting on the developments of the previous day.

The next day it was officially stated in Kuwait that the duration of the British forces' stay in Kuwait depended entirely on Qasim, that Kuwait did not contemplate a military treaty with the UK, and that she would welcome the good offices of Arab states or any other help from them to overcome the crisis. (*R. Kuwait, July 2 [4]*)

Kuwaiti Complaint to Security Council. On July 1 the Kuwaiti government sent a complaint to the SC (see below). It cabled Foreign Ministers of Arab states informing them of this step and asking them to support Kuwait at the UN. (*R. Kuwait, July 2 [4]*)

Iraqi Denials of Troop Concentrations. At 11.45 GMT on July 1, 1½ hours after the Kuwaiti announcement, the Iraqi News Agency issued an authorized statement "categorically" denying that there was any concentration of Iraqi troops "at a specific area of the homeland." The statement charged "imperialist circles" with the fabrication of unfounded news to distort Iraqi aims and "fishing in troubled waters." It was stressed that Iraq was "determined to recover the Kuwaiti district by all peaceful means." (*R. Baghdad, July 1 [3]; Iraq Times, July 2*)

British Forces Land in Kuwait. [British naval and troop movements toward Kuwait had begun already on June 28 or 29—see above.]

On July 1 over 600 marine commandos were flown ashore by helicopters from the commando carrier *Bulwark*. (The sources available do not state the exact time of these landings; according to *Soldier* they took place "only hours" after the Kuwaiti request for assistance.) Five days after the first landings, some 6,000–7,000 British troops (according to different sources) were deployed in defence positions in Kuwait, supported by air and naval units. (*Hansard C, Vol. 644, Col. 214–17, July 11; Soldier, Sept*) [The withdrawal of the British forces was started on July 19.] (For details of the British military operation see pp 91–2.)

On the morning of July 1, PM Macmillan had a talk with Hugh Gaitkell, Leader of the Opposition. Later, opposition leaders made it clear that they supported the government decision. Macmillan also met cabinet ministers and the chiefs of staff to discuss details of the operation. In a speech on the same day he said that he still trusted that threats against Kuwait were "no more than words." (*Times, July 3*)

Macmillan Explains British Action and Warns Qasim. On July 3 PM Macmillan explained the situation in the House of Commons as follows: "The Iraqi forces at Basra, only about 30 miles from the Kuwait border, were clearly quite sufficient to occupy Kuwait by a rapid movement against the modest Kuwait (sic). On June 29 and 30 evidence accumulated... that reinforcements, especially reinforcements of armour, were moving towards Basra. In these circumstances the Ruler felt it his duty to make a formal urgent request for British assistance under the exchange of Notes of June 19. Her Majesty's Government responded at once. British forces were landed in Kuwait, on the morning of July 1."

The PM declared: "Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope that counsels of moderation will prevail in Baghdad. Our forces are in Kuwait purely for defence purposes and in accordance with our treaty obligations. They will be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the independence of Kuwait is no longer threatened. They present no threat to Iraq, with whom we wish to maintain the friendliest possible relations. I am convinced that it was the duty of HM Government to act as they did."

In reply to questions, the PM again referred to the sending of troops as "what I hope will lead to the Government of Iraq having second thoughts." (For source see below.)

British Opposition Supports Move, Proposes UN Force. Hugh Gaitkell declared that, while the Labour Party approved the government's handling of the situation, they thought the UK should propose a UN force to protect Kuwait, which would help to "get rid of misrepresentation" of the UK action. Macmillan said he did not rule out any solution by a UN force, but "first things first." "The force that has been landed is at present the only effective method of maintaining the independence of Kuwait," he declared. It might be possible, at a later stage, to support the independence of Kuwait by arrangements "made upon a wider basis." (*Hansard C, Vol. 643, Col. 1006–1012, July 3*)

Saudi Arabian Forces in Kuwait. Saudi Arabian troops arrived in Kuwait on July 1 and 2 (*Times, July 3*). Accompanied by Kuwaiti officers, they took up positions in the triangular area where the borders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq meet (*R. Cairo, July 2–IMB, July 3*). There were conflicting reports on the strength of these forces. Cairo sources said that they numbered over a thousand men (*R. Cairo, July 4–IMB, July 5; Eg. Gaz., Aug 3*). Another report said they numbered 150 (*Hayat, Aug 8*). [The smaller figure was probably nearer the truth.]

Liaison Between British and Saudi Arabian Forces Denied. On July 5 Baghdad Radio, as well as UAR sources, said that the Saudi Arabian troops were under British command (*R. Baghdad, July 5 [7]; Hayat, July 11*). *The Times*, however, reported that they were not in liaison with the British command, because there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries. (*Times, July 5*)

The Saudi Arabian embassy in Cairo denied these reports (*MENA, July 6 [7]*). On July 8 a Saudi Arabian paper wrote that the presence of Saudi Arabian and British forces in Kuwait did not signify any rapprochement between the two governments. (*R. Mecca, July 8 [11]*)

The presence of Saudi Arabian forces in Kuwait was denounced in Iraq as "an unforgivable crime" and

"treasonable behaviour," for which they "will have to pay dearly." (*Thaurrah*, July 6, 7)

UAR-Saudi Arabian Consultations. On July 1 the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Ibrahim al-Suwai, came to Egypt carrying a message to Abdel Nasser from King Saud. After a meeting also attended by Abd al-Hakim Amer, Vice-President and head of the armed forces, he left for home carrying a reply from Abdel Nasser, who, he stated, was in complete accord with the King's views and had expressed his anxiety to preserve Kuwait's independence. (*R. Cairo*, July 1, *MENA*, July 1, 2 [3])

Further British Statements on Iraqi Aggressive Intentions Denied. On July 3 the British C-in-C in the ME, Air Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy, alleged that Iraqi infantry were not far from the Kuwait border and that Iraqi armour was massing in Basra. Part of this movement had taken place before the British landing and part since, he said. He thought an Iraqi attack seemed unlikely, but the next day Brig. Derek Horsford, Commander of British ground forces in Kuwait said that he could see no reason to believe that Qasim was not going to attack. (*Times*, July 4, 6)

On July 6 Qasim denied troop movements. The proof that Iraq had no aggressive intentions was that he could have subdued Kuwait long before he made his claim on June 25, he said. (*R. Baghdad*, July 8-10)

No Armed Incidents Between British and Iraqi Troops. There were no incidents with the Iraqi army during the time that British troops were in Kuwait, except on July 25, when three British soldiers were captured by the Iraqis near the border. The soldiers said they had lost their way, while the Iraqis claimed that they had been engaged in sabotage. The soldiers were held without trial until Dec 13, when they were released by Qasim's orders. (*R. Baghdad*, July 27 [29]; *Times*, July 29; *Daily Express*, Dec 14)

ARAB REACTIONS TO BRITISH INTERVENTION (July 1-10)

UAR: Qasim Accused of Collusion with UK. Cairo Radio accused Qasim of hinging about the "imperialist" intervention in Kuwait by falling into a British trap. The UK, seeking a pretext to return to Kuwait, had instructed "certain circles in Iraq" to suggest to the officials there that the time was opportune to claim Kuwait. (*R. Cairo*, July 1, 2 [4, 5])

Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, wrote that, by declaring that he did not intend to use force only after the British forces had landed in Kuwait, Qasim had paved the way for British imperialism to remain in Kuwait for ever. (*Ahram*, July 2)

Al-Gumhuriyah said that the fact that Iraq continued with economic talks in London while condemning British intervention in Kuwait showed that Qasim had an understanding with the UK in the economic as well as other fields. (*Gumhuriyah*, July 3, 4)

UAR Demands British Withdrawal But Opposes United Arab Force. On July 5 the UAR issued an official statement denouncing the "large-scale military operations carried out by the British troops in the Arab [Persian] Gulf area and in Kuwait." The way the British had acted indicated "that the whole operation, if not predetermined, was at least dependent on the first opportunity for its justification." The UAR regarded the British troop concentrations as "an actual menace to the Iraqi

people and the entire Arab nation." The UAR saw no reason to maintain British troops in Kuwait, as Iraq had already renounced her claims and she insisted on the immediate withdrawal of the troops as a condition for Kuwait's admission to the UN. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 6)

[In the Security Council the UAR submitted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the British troops. See below.]

An *Al-Ahram* article commenting on Hugh Gaitskill's proposal for a UN force (see above), said: "We do not want Kuwait to become either a British or an international colony" or to share the fate of the Congo; Arab states should agree to preserve Kuwait's independence. (*Ahram*, July 4)

UAR Reasons For Not Supplying Military Assistance. On July 5 Hassanein Haykal explained why the UAR did not send forces to Kuwait, which would have made British forces unnecessary: (1) The UAR had received no such request from Kuwait and did not want to "arouse suspicion"; (2) The Ruler of Kuwait asked for British aid and the UAR could "never agree to participate in the same mission with the imperialist forces"; (3) The UAR did not believe in Arab forces facing each other in combat readiness. (*Ahram*, July 5)

Western sources believed, however, that as Abdel Nasser had always made a point of opposing imperialism and had often referred to the shaykhdoms as "imperialist lackeys," he could not afford to seem less anti-imperialist than Qasim. (*Time*, July 7; *NYT*, July 10)

Question of Passage of British Ships to Kuwait Through Suez. *The Times* wrote that "Port Said has taken very calmly" the arrival of British destroyers in the Suez Canal (*Times*, July 6). Baghdad Radio reported that the UAR authorities had provided all facilities for a speedy passage of the ships through the Canal. (*R. Baghdad*, July 4, 5 [7]). *MENA* published a denial of these reports. (*MENA*, July 5 [7])

Al-Ahram wrote on July 10 that the UAR would prevent military ships of any country from passing through the Canal if engaged in an invasion of an Arab country. "But so far not a single shot has been fired in the Kuwait dispute." Therefore, the paper wrote, the UAR could not allow itself to be pushed into a war with the UK for no clear reason. (*Ahram*, July 10)

Iraq Sees UAR Embarrassed Position. The UAR's denunciations of British troop concentrations were interpreted in Iraq as meaning that she had undertaken "a reappraisal of her position," but her attitude was still regarded as contradictory. The UAR was said to be "standing with imperialism against Iraq and with Iraq against imperialism" (*Thaurrah*, July 7). Another comment said that the UAR pronouncements were not "an expression of sincerity to the Arab nation" so much as "an oral arrangement to get out of an embarrassing situation in which the UAR government found itself landed after it had sided with the imperialists." (*Sawt al-Ahram*, July 9)

Yemen. On July 6 the Deputy of the Imam of Yemen in Cairo issued a statement on the British forces in Kuwait similar to that issued by the UAR the day before, see above. (*R. Cairo*, July 6 [8])

THE ISSUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

(July 1-7)

Kuwait Complaint of Iraqi Threat. On July 1 Kuwait cabled the Security Council complaining "in respect of

the situation arising from the threat by Iraq to the territorial independence of Kuwait, which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" (S/4844). Kuwait requested an urgent meeting of the Council, with the support of the UK in a letter from its representative to the President of the SC. (S/4845)

Iraqi Complaint of British Threat. On July 2 the Iraqi representative at the UN, Dr Adnan Pachachi, asked the SC to meet to consider "Complaint by the Government of the Republic of Iraq in respect of the situation arising out of the armed threat by the United Kingdom to the independence and security of Iraq, which is likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security." (S/4846)

Iraq also sent a letter declaring that the complaint signed by "an individual who calls himself the Secretary of State of Kuwait" was not receivable, as Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq and "is not and never has been an independent state." (S/4848)

UK: Role of Forces Defensive Only. At the SC meeting of July 2 both complaints were placed on the agenda. The UK representative, Sir Patrick Dean, described the developments that had led the Ruler of Kuwait to ask for British assistance. Dean reiterated his government's official statement of July 1 (see above), and declared that British forces "will be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers the threat to the independence of his country is over." The British forces presented no threat to Iraq. "Our forces could only be employed in a combat role if Kuwait were to be attacked from across the border," he declared. [For source see below.]

UAR: Seeks Arab Solution. [The UAR was a member of the SC.] The UAR representative, Umar Luthi, said that the UAR hoped that this problem would be settled in accordance with "Arab traditions and principles." "We consider that no Arab is entitled to jeopardize the security of the Arab nation by exposing himself to possible imperialist intervention unless such action is necessitated by legitimate requirements of the struggle of the Arab nation." [For source see below.]

Iraq and USSR Condemn "British Aggression" and Deny Kuwaiti Independence. [Iraq was not a member of the SC.] The Iraqi representative questioned the "motives of the UK in bringing the complaint to the SC" as "the Government of Iraq has repeatedly stated that it would employ peaceful means to settle this difficulty and has denied the reports of troop concentrations." It was clear, he declared, that the UK intended to justify the "blatant act of aggression" it had committed by landing its forces in Kuwait. (S/PV 957, July 2)

The SC met again on July 5, and Kuwait asked to be allowed to participate in the discussions (S/4851). Zorin, the USSR representative, said that the USSR did not support the request. An Iraqi request to be allowed to address the Council on the question of Kuwait's participation was supported in the vote by the USSR alone. Zorin stated that "the delegate of Kuwait could scarcely be deemed to be acting as the representative of a sovereign state, inasmuch as effective power in the country is being exercised by the British occupation troops." The Iraqi representative made the same point. He reiterated that "the alleged defence of Kuwait is not, and has never been, the real reason for the British landing," and that "preparations to send armed forces

to the Gulf area were made before the present crisis erupted." He urged the SC to "ensure the immediate withdrawal of this aggressive force," claiming that the UK aimed to create "dissension among the Arab states," and was using "gunboat diplomacy" to protect her oil interests and "consolidate British influence and power in the Gulf." He was supported by the USSR representative, who asked the SC to condemn Britain's intervention and call upon her to immediately withdraw her forces from Kuwait.

The Kuwaiti delegate agreed that "foreign" troops should be withdrawn, but only after "sufficient guarantees have been given that our land will not be violated in any way." He submitted documents to prove Iraq's previous recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty. (S/PV 958, July 5)

British Resolution Welcomes Arab League Action. On July 6 the UK presented a resolution calling "upon all states to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait" and urging "that all concerned should work for peace and tranquillity in the area." The SC was asked to welcome "any constructive steps which may be taken by the Arab League on the line of the present resolution." (S/4855)

UAR Resolution Supported by USSR, Calls for British Withdrawal. At the final meeting on July 7, the UAR also presented a resolution urging "that the question be solved by peaceful means" and calling on the UK "to withdraw immediately its forces from Kuwait." (S/4856)

The UAR representative explained that his draft resolution took into consideration the Iraqi undertakings to use only peaceful means in solving the question. He insisted that the presence of British forces further aggravated the problem.

The UK representative replied that the UAR, while supporting Kuwait's independence, was denying her one of the main attributes of independence, "the right to call on a friend and ally in time of trouble."

The UK resolution was supported by seven members, (Chile, Nationalist China, France, Liberia, Turkey, the UK and the USA). Ceylon, Ecuador and the UAR abstained. The USSR representative cast his veto against the resolution, on the ground that it made no reference to the immediate withdrawal of British forces, which, he said, was the main requirement of the situation.

The UAR resolution was supported by Ceylon, the UAR and the USSR, the rest of the members abstaining. (S/PV 960, July 7)

US Supports British and Saudi Arabian Military Assistance. The US representative fully supported the "desire of the Kuwaiti Government and the Kuwaiti people to remain fully independent and fully free." The US considered that the UK and Saudi Arabia "have acted appropriately and that these actions will tend to ensure the preservation of peace in the area." Noting that the US had been informed by Iraq that it did not intend to resort to force in Kuwait, he said he hoped the Ruler of Kuwait "may soon receive assurances to the same effect from the Government of Iraq." (S/PV 960, July 7)

Meeting Inconclusive. Summing up, the President of the Council, Dr Leopoldo Benites (Ecuador), expressed "deep concern" that no resolution had been adopted while a "tense situation that might endanger international peace

and security prevailed." He said that the SC would remain "vigilant" and that it would be reconvened if it became necessary. (S/PV 960, July 7)

UAR Comment: Understanding of Qassim, Criticism of Kuwait. Commenting on the SC debate, *The Egyptian Gazette* wrote that Kuwait's insistence on international safeguards for her independence and on Qassim's renunciation of his claim as conditions for her asking the British to withdraw had led to a stalemate. Qassim could "scarcely drop all his claims before the question has even come to the point of either private or public Arab discussion" and "even if his position at the head of the Baghdad government was more secure than it is, it would be political suicide." Qassim could not "negotiate under duress, which is what the presence of British troops in Kuwait amounts to." The paper added that the Iraqi government had declared its policy "sufficiently firmly" by "any standards" to allow for the withdrawal of the British forces and the "opening of discussions among the Arab countries themselves." (Eg. Gaz., July 9)

Western Comment. *The New York Times* said that the UAR had avoided in the SC "an espousal of either side's position" (NYT, July 6). The paper wrote later that USSR support for the UAR resolution was contrary to reports of "a cooling in relations between Moscow and Cairo." The paper believed that the USSR had meant to submit an amendment to the British proposal, but had later decided to back the UAR draft instead (NYT, July 8). *The Times* wrote that British initiative in presenting a resolution "had the effect of forestalling a possible motion by Russia" seeking to condemn the UK for her intervention" (Times, July 7). *The Economist* wrote that the USSR, which had earlier been non-committal on the Kuwait dispute, had, after the British military intervention, swung decisively to the Iraqi side by refusing to allow "the Kuwait area" to present its case to the SC. (Economist, July 8)

Commenting on the USSR attitude, Qassim said on July 14 that Iraq regarded the Soviet Union as her friend and was proud of this friendship. (R. Baghdad, July 14 [17])

INTER-ARAB MOVES

(July 1-11)

League Secretary-General's Efforts to Solve Dispute Fail. While the Security Council was debating the Kuwait question, the SG of the Arab League, Abd al-Khaliq Hassūnah, was conducting talks in Baghdad, Kuwait and Ta'if. On July 1 he arrived in Baghdad, where he had talks with Qassim and Foreign Minister Jawād. (Iraq Times, July 4, 5)

Hassūnah failed to bring about a change in the Iraqi attitude; he was reportedly told that Iraq would withdraw from the League if Kuwait's membership was approved. (Times, July 4)

On July 4 Hassūnah went on to Kuwait, where he held talks with the Ruler. The next day he visited Saudi Arabia and conferred with the King, who reaffirmed his support for Kuwait's independence and her admission to the League. (R. Kuwait, July 5 [7]; Bilad, July 5, 6)

On his return to Cairo on July 6, Hassūnah said he would continue his talks with representatives in Cairo of other Arab countries. (MENA, July 6 [8])

Arab League Council Meeting Adjourned. Following Saudi Arabia's request of July 1, the League Secretariat

called an extraordinary meeting at ambassadorial level for July 4 in Cairo to discuss Kuwait's admission. On July 2 and 3, the acting SG, Isma'il ad-Dardiri, continued his efforts to reach an understanding between the delegations before the meeting.

Meanwhile Hassūnah (who returned to Cairo only on July 6) urged the postponement of the meeting until the completion of his talks. (Hayat, Eg. Gaz., July 4)

On July 4 the League Council met, all member-states being represented, under the chairmanship of the Moroccan delegate, Abd al-Khaliq Torrès.

As reported, heated discussions revealed the following situation: Iraq threatened to resign from the League if Kuwait was admitted. (This was denied, however, by Baghdad Radio.) Saudi Arabia threatened to resign if Kuwait's request was rejected. Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia and Sudan undertook to straighten out the differences and bring about a postponement of the decision until Hassūnah's return. This was agreed in spite of Saudi Arabian objections, and it was decided to hold a further meeting on July 12. (R. Baghdad, July 4-1MB, July 5; Eg. Gaz., Hayat, July 5)

The Iraqi delegate was reported to have said that Iraq's opposition would prevent Kuwait's admission, as according to the League Charter, new members had to be accepted unanimously. (Hayat, July 5)

Attempts at Mediation. [The first Arab country where mediation was contemplated was Lebanon (see above).]

It was reported that Lebanon was responsible for Iraq's willingness to hold talks with the Arab League SG. On July 3 Slim said that Lebanon's efforts had been rewarded, as the Iraqi government had announced that it would not resort to force. (Hayat, July 2, 4)

It was reported that Hajj Amin al-Husseini [the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem], who visited Iraq during the first week of July, delivered a message from King Saud to Qassim proposing a meeting. (Hayat, July 4; Mid. Mir., July 8; ANA, July 9 [11])

On July 11 informed circles in Tunisia stated that Tunisia would send a delegation, headed by her Foreign Minister, to Iraq and Kuwait to mediate. The next day, however, it was reported that Tunisia had informed Iraq that the departure of the delegation had been postponed in view of the Bizerta crisis. (Hayat, July 12; MENA, July 12 [14])

Kuwait Demands Renunciation of Iraqi Claim and Guarantees for Her Independence. On July 6 the Kuwaiti government expressed satisfaction at the Iraqi undertakings not to resort to force, but demanded that the statements be followed by "practical steps" and that Qassim "must announce clearly through his delegates to the UN and the Arab League that he had abandoned his ambitions and his claim to annex Kuwait."

The Kuwaiti statement also said that, while submitting her case to the Security Council and the Arab League, Kuwait welcomed "any peaceful measures that may restore conditions to normal and unite the ranks and opinions of the Arabs." This could be achieved through effective international guarantees for the protection of Kuwaiti security. The Kuwaiti government and people "wanted nothing more than the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territory following the removal of this cloud." (R. Kuwait, July 6 [8])

This statement was broadcast on Kuwait Radio for three days running, with supporting comment justifying the Ruler's request for British aid. (BBCM, July 8, 10)

UAR Attacks Shaykhs of Kuwait. On July 5 the Egyptian *Al-Akhbar* attacked the "Kuwaiti Shaykhs," declaring that they had asked for British assistance solely in order to protect their position and wealth. The paper differentiated between the Kuwaiti government, which had acted from "ignorance, disorientation and pride," and the Kuwaiti people, who, the paper claimed, had "strong emotional ties" with the UAR and trust for the "Arab national leader" (Abdel Nasser). (*Akhbar*, July 5)

Rumours of Contemplated Federation of Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia Denied. On July 7-8 Cairo sources quoted what they said were Reuters' reports that Kuwait was considering the possibility of union with Saudi Arabia (*R. Cairo*, July 7, 8-IMB, July 9, 10). The rumours were not officially denied by the Kuwaiti government. (*Falastin*, July 8)

On July 11 *The Egyptian Gazette* featured an AP report that Jordan contemplated a plan to settle the Kuwait issue, based on a federation of Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and possibly Saudi Arabia, in which the participants would retain complete internal sovereignty. This plan would leave Kuwait with authority over its internal affairs, satisfy Qasim's claim, and enable Jordan to dispense with foreign aid (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 11). This rumour was denied by the Jordanian PM, Bahjat al-Talhuni. (*R. Amman*, July 11 [13])

Kuwait Indicates Willingness to Share Oil Revenues with Arab States. On July 10 a Kuwaiti government mission, headed by the Minister of Finance and Oil Affairs, Shaykh Jabir Ahmad al-Sabāh, went to Cairo and other Arab capitals to explain Kuwait's position and secure support. The mission indicated Kuwait's willingness to share her oil income in return for such support. (*BBC in Arabic*, July 9-IMB, July 10; *R. Cairo*, July 10 [12])

[A first step to enable Arab countries to benefit from her oil income was taken by the Kuwaiti government in 1960. In July 1960 Kuwait lent Jordan £1 million (MER 1960, p. 405). She also agreed to subscribe £E5 million towards the establishment of an Arab Development Fund.]

The New York Times commented that this diplomatic campaign was likely "to spread Kuwait's wealth more evenly throughout the ME" and that Arab countries, especially the UAR, would press Kuwait to inject oil royalties into development projects. (*NYT*, July 10)

On July 3 Gaitskill had suggested in the House of Commons that the UK propose to the Arab countries the creation of a fund to which oil-producing countries would contribute for ME development. He warned against the dangers involved in "the great disparity of wealth" between ME countries, and said that the Ruler of Kuwait had indicated his willingness to subscribe to such a fund. (*Hansard C Vol. 643 Col. 1007-8*, July 3)

The Economist also pointed out that the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms and Kuwait should realize that if there was to be peace in their part of the world they should cooperate in distributing their wealth to combat ME poverty, and that this should be the UK's aim too. (*Economist*, July 8)

The Kuwaiti delegation arrived in Cairo on July 11 and was received by Abdel Nasser (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 12). *The New York Times* wrote that Western experts warned that a "subtle game of blackmail" was being played against Kuwait, and that the Ruler might be given to understand "that the price of Cairo's political-protection is the redirection of Kuwait's oil revenues from London

to investments in the Arab world." Lebanese observers thought the delegation would meet with difficulties in Cairo for "committing the unpardonable sin in Arab politics" of welcoming British intervention. (*NYT*, July 11)

From Cairo the delegation proceeded to Sudan, Libya, Jordan and Lebanon. Shaykh Jabir made it clear that Kuwait was willing to use part of her oil revenues to finance development projects in these countries (*Mid. East*, July 29). The mission returned to Kuwait on July 26 (*R. Kuwait*, July 26 [28]). (See also farther below, on the question of Kuwaiti financial assistance to the Arab countries after the arrival of the Arab force in Kuwait.)

Attempts to Postpone League Council Meeting Fail. When the date for the scheduled League Council meeting (July 12) approached, Iraq and Jordan asked for its postponement.

The Iraqi delegate, Abd al-Hussein al-Qutaybi, said that Iraq felt that Arab countries should turn their attention from "family quarrels" to warding off dangers from outside, such as the buildup of British forces, the Israeli rockets, and the French attitude in Algeria (*Iraq Times*, July 10). The Jordanian delegation applied for a postponement for consultation with their government. (*Hayat*, July 11)

Saudi Arabia, the UAR, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Sudan opposed any postponement.

Saudi Arabia insisted on the discussion of Kuwait's admission without delay; in its opinion this subject should not be mixed up with the question of the dispute between Kuwait and Iraq. (*MENA*, July 11 [14]; *Hayat*, July 12)

The UAR attitude, however, was that the question of Kuwait's admission should be coupled with the immediate withdrawal of British forces. Earlier *Al-Ahram* had severely criticized the Arab League, saying that it had proved "absolutely incapable of dealing with the Kuwait crisis in a manner fully compatible with the dictates of Arab interests" (*Ahram*, July 6). *The Egyptian Gazette* wrote that the presence of British forces would affect the League's discussions, because Kuwait would be tempted to speak from a position of strength and Iraq would not be as amenable to mediation as she might otherwise have been. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 11)

The Iraqi delegate said that Lebanon and Yemen supported his demand to postpone the meeting, but it was disclosed that Lebanon had decided against postponement (*Hayat*, July 12), as did the Yemeni delegate after his talks with Hassūnah (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 10). *Al-Haydi* reported that a compromise was reached between the two viewpoints by deciding to hold the meeting as scheduled, but to postpone the decision on Kuwait's admission to another session. (*Hayat*, July 11)

On July 11 MENA reported from Arab League sources that a four-point agenda would be discussed at the meeting: consolidation of Kuwait's independence; the immediate withdrawal of British forces from Kuwait; admission of Kuwait to the Arab League; and adequate Arab guarantees against any threat to Kuwait. It was reported that these points would be dealt with as an indivisible unit. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 12)

ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING OF JULY 12

The Arab League Council met on July 12 and 13 at ambassadorial level, under the chairmanship of Abd al-Khalīq Torrès of Morocco. All member-states were represented.

Kuwait Proposes Arab Force. Kuwait submitted a memorandum proposing two alternative conditions for the withdrawal of British forces: (a) That Qasim should renounce, both in the League and in the UN, any intention of annexing Kuwait, or (b) that an Arab force be created to replace British troops in protecting Kuwait's independence. (*Hayat, Eg. Gaz., July 13*)

It was reported that the proposal for an Arab force had been brought up by the Kuwaiti delegation in a meeting with President Abdel Nasser the day before. (*Times, July 12; BBCM, July 13*)

Arab Force Suggested in British Press. Earlier, the establishment of an Arab force in Kuwait had been suggested in the British press. *The Guardian* commented on July 3 that the British forces, having successfully deterred Qasim from the physical annexation of Kuwait, should be withdrawn as soon as possible. The paper suggested that its place might be taken by Arab forces, though few Arab rulers were disinterested. The Ruler, *The Guardian* said, already had Saudi Arabian troops on his territory and he should feel safer if a variety of Arab governments, with inevitably conflicting interests, sent forces to join them. (*Guardian, July 3*)

UAR for Arab Force Without Her Participation; Iraq Against. The UAR representative at the League Council declared that, though the UAR welcomed Kuwait's position, the first alternative depended on the wishes of Qasim alone. Therefore it declared its "complete and sincere readiness and full agreement" to send Arab forces to Kuwait. He added that, in view of "unusual Israeli movements" near the Syrian border, "some Arab countries which are bordering Israel might prefer to leave their troops where they are..." The other Arab states may undertake to form the force, with the sincere cooperation of the UAR. (*R. Cairo, July 12 [14]; Eg. Gaz., July 13*)

Al-Hayât reported that in the morning the UAR had indicated her willingness to participate in the force, and had changed her attitude in the course of the day, because friction had suddenly arisen between the UAR and the Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti delegations.

The Iraqi delegate reportedly declared that if an Arab force were landed in Kuwait, Iraq would resign from the League and regard any country participating as committing a hostile act against her, to which she would react accordingly. When discussions on the force continued, the Iraqi representative left the conference hall. (*Hayat, July 13, 14*)

Lebanon's position was that the Arab force should be discussed by a meeting on at least Foreign Ministers' level. (*MENA, July 13 [15]*)

At a later meeting the UAR representative said that it would be suicidal for the League to evade the Kuwait problem. To end its meeting without a decision would be equivalent to a decision to keep the British troops in Kuwait. There was a sharp exchange between the UAR and Iraqi representatives, the former accusing Iraq of not cooperating with the League in getting the British forces out of Kuwait. (For sources see below.)

Moroccan Proposal. At this point the Moroccan delegation presented a resolution, calling on Kuwait to ask the British to withdraw and on Iraq to renounce any intention of annexing Kuwait by force. Arab states would undertake to admit Kuwait to League membership, to help her to gain admission to the UN, to give effective assistance for her protection in accordance with the Kuwaiti memorandum, and to support any wish by Ku-

wait for unity or federation with other Arab countries in accordance with the League Charter. A Tunisian amendment called for a week's postponement to enable delegates to consult their governments. (*R. Cairo, July 13 [15]; Hayat, July 14, 15*)

Council Adjourned in Spite of Saudi and UAR Opposition. The Saudi Arabian delegate objected to a postponement. At this point the Iraqi representative proposed, on instructions received from his government, that the discussion be indefinitely postponed. The UAR and Saudi Arabia vigorously objected, other members also expressing dissatisfaction. The proposal was not put to the vote in view of the Moroccan-Tunisian proposal already before the Council. (*MENA, July 13 [15]; Eg. Gaz., July 14*)

The Tunisian proposal was then passed, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon and Iraq voting in favour, while the UAR and Saudi Arabia voted against; Yemen abstained (*Ahram, July 14*). The UAR representative explained later that the UAR objected to postponement because it would prolong the stay of British troops on Arab soil.

The meeting was adjourned until July 20. (*R. Cairo, July 13 [15]; Eg. Mail, July 15*)

Summary of League Members' Positions. During the interval between the League sessions of July 13 and 20, the position of the members was believed to be as follows:

Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya and Yemen insisted on Kuwait's admission, disregarding the Iraqi reaction.

Iraq reportedly threatened to resign from the League if Kuwait was admitted and to regard the dispatch of Arab forces as an act of aggression against her. (On July 19, however, Qasim said Iraq had no such intentions—see below.)

Kuwait insisted on Qasim's renunciation of his claim over her territory and stipulated, as a condition, the withdrawal of British troops, their replacement by effective Arab forces, capable of facing Iraqi threats.

The UAR was ready to support Kuwait's admission, but insisted that she should guarantee in advance that the British forces would be withdrawn. At first the UAR declined to send forces to Kuwait. It was reported that Saudi Arabia pressed her to send at least a token force, and later she agreed to participate on two conditions: that her troops comprise the majority of the Arab force and that they should not be engaged in combat roles.

Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and Sudan were ready to support Kuwait's admission provided unanimous agreement could be reached, including Iraq's consent. *Al-Hayât* thought that this attitude was merely a pretext and that their major consideration was to avoid antagonizing Iraq. (*Hayat, July 14, 15, 16, 18*)

Meanwhile, contacts between heads of delegations continued. It was reported that proposals to ask for UN troops were rejected. Arab League sources revealed that efforts were being made to make the meeting of July 20 a decisive one as further delay would give the impression that the League was incapable of solving Arab problems. (*Eg. Gaz., July 18, 19*)

Qasim Calls on British to Withdraw and Renews Claim to Kuwait. On July 14, the anniversary of the Iraqi revolution, Qasim demanded that the UK quit Kuwait and called on the Arab countries to close their ranks against imperialism. He declared that Iraq had no dispute with Kuwait, but with the British, who "intended to create a permanent base on Arab soil in order to strike against us." He again gave a detailed account of Iraq's

historical claims to "Kuwait district" and declared that Iraq would not "budge an inch as far as her rights were concerned." (*R. Baghdad*, July 15 [17]; *Iraq Times*, July 18)

On July 18 Qasim declared that, besides wishing to exploit Kuwaiti oil, the UK was afraid that her economy would collapse were Kuwait to withdraw her extensive funds from British banks. Qasim demanded the abrogation of the British-Kuwaiti agreement of June 19 and "the return of Kuwait to the motherland." (*Iraq Times*, July 19)

Qasim ordered his Minister of Industry to work out industrial programmes for the "Kuwait district" (*Iraq Times*, July 19) and the Iraqi military governor, Maj.-Gen. Ahmad Salih al-Abdi, instructed the Basra authorities to stop all legal proceedings against Kuwaitis who had violated passport and residence regulations. Thus, they would, in effect, enjoy the same rights and privileges as Iraqis. (*Times*, July 8)

Qasim Attacks Arab States, League and Arab Forces for Kuwait. Speaking to Lebanese journalists on July 19, Qasim attacked the attitude of the Arab states on the Kuwait issue. Saudi Arabia, he said, had seized a large part of Kuwait under the Uqair Treaty of 1922 (see Background, above), and was afraid of losing this area were Kuwait to be returned to Iraq.

The Arab League, he said, "served the interests of the imperialists," and should "either render free and true service or abandon its work." Nevertheless, he said, Iraq did not intend to withdraw from the League; on the contrary, he aimed to strengthen and reform it. Commenting on the proposed Arab force, Qasim said that disgrace would befall forces that defended imperialist interests. Some Arab states, he said, were exploiting the crisis for their own advantage, hoping to profit from loans or grants [from Kuwait]. He said that he had been offered "by some one" ID 40 million a year in exchange for renouncing his claim to Kuwait, but, he declared, "We do not sell our homeland."

Qasim praised Lebanon's attitude and paid tribute to her cooperation with Iraq. (*R. Baghdad*, July 19 [21]; *Hayat*, *Iraq Times*, July 20)

Qasim Attacked by Kuwait and UAR. An official Kuwaiti statement denied that Kuwait had made the 40 million dinars' offer (*R. Kuwait*, July 20 [22]). Kuwait Radio broadcast attacks on Qasim, accusing him of abnormality and excessive personal ambition and advising him to "annex Palestine" instead of displaying "bravado" against Kuwait. (*R. Kuwait*, July 19 [21])

Preparing Legal Grounds for Kuwait's Admission. On July 18 it was disclosed that a legal memorandum had been drawn up at Arab League headquarters declaring that membership of the League was the right of every Arab state following the declaration of its independence; the Arab League was not empowered to discuss this membership and its only duty was to welcome a new member. The memorandum noted that this view had been adopted by Iraq herself during discussions on the League Charter. (*MENA*, July 18 [20])

On the other hand, Iraq maintained that Kuwait's admission would violate the Charter, which, she claimed, had been unanimously interpreted as precluding the admission of new states otherwise than by unanimous vote. (*Mustaqbal*, July 19)

ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING OF JULY 20

Kuwait Admitted. Kuwait was admitted to League membership by a majority vote at the Council's meeting in Cairo on July 20. The Iraqi delegate protested against the proposal and left before the voting. In his absence the vote was considered to be unanimous. (*Arab Obs.*, July 23)

The Council adopted a Saudi Arabian draft amending the Moroccan resolution of July 13 (see above p 132 a). It read:

"The Arab League Council has examined the application of the Kuwaiti government for joining the Arab League and approved the following:

- "1. (a) The Kuwaiti government undertakes to ask for the withdrawal of the British forces from her territory as soon as possible.
- "(b) The Iraqi government pledges not to use force in annexing Kuwait to Iraq.
- "(c) Every desire expressed by Kuwait for unity or federation with Arab League member states in accordance with the League Charter should be supported.
- "2. (a) Kuwait should be welcomed as member of the Arab League.
- "(b) Kuwait should be supported in its application for UN membership.
- "3. (a) The Arab countries undertake to render practical assistance for the safeguarding of the independence of Kuwait at her request. The Council entrusts the SG of the Arab League to take the necessary measures for the carrying out of this decision immediately." (*Eg. Gaz.*, *Hayat*, July 21)

Iraq Proposes Annulment of June 19 Agreement and Withdraws From Session. In the discussion Iraq expressed reservations as to points 1(b) and (c). During the discussion on point 2(a), the Iraqi delegation withdrew. (*Arab Obs.*, July 23)

Earlier the Iraqi delegation submitted a draft resolution calling upon Arab countries to take "joint action for the annulment of the agreement of June 19 between the UK and Kuwait and the withdrawal of British forces from Kuwait." It also called for the postponement of the discussion on Kuwait's membership until the Sept session, provided that by then the British forces had been evacuated (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 21; *R. Baghdad*, July 23 [25]). The Iraqi proposal was not put to the vote as the Iraqi delegation had withdrawn. After the voting on the Saudi Arabian proposal, the Kuwaiti delegate, Abd al-Aziz Hussein, was invited to take his place in the Council chamber. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 21)

Iraq announced that she would boycott all League meetings in which Kuwait was represented. (*Zaman*, July 20, 21)

Hassūnah to Start Contacts for Formation of Arab Force. Following the session, SG Hassūnah announced that he would begin to make contacts immediately with a view to the formation of an Arab force to replace British troops in Kuwait. (*Eg. Gaz.*, *Hayat*, July 21)

Al Hayat wrote that, although the decision adopted did not specifically mention the despatch of an Arab force, it was "clearly understood" that the member states had intended it [in para 3a]. (*Hayat*, July 22)

Iraq Protests, Demands Hassūnah's Replacement. The Iraqi delegate issued a statement in Cairo denouncing

the League's decision, which, he said, showed disrespect for the League's Charter. He also referred to "bribes which the shaykhdoms are offering." An Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesman said the government of Iraq regarded the resolution as "null and void." (*Iraq Times*, July 23; *Mid. Mir.*, July 29)

It was only on Aug 10, however, that Iraq formally reacted against the League's decision. In a Foreign Office memorandum sent to members of the League, Iraq demanded that the resolution be revoked, that member-states should attempt to have the June 19 agreement abrogated, and that the post of League SG be entrusted to someone "solicitous for Arab interests."

The memorandum stated that under the prevailing circumstances it would be difficult for Iraq to fulfil her obligations to the League. Iraq regarded the decision calling on Arab states to render practical assistance to preserve Kuwait's independence, which was "later interpreted by the Secretariat-General as the despatch of Arab troops to Kuwait," as "a clear violation of the Arab League's Charter and its principles." Kuwait's admission to the League constituted a grave violation of the Charter, which specified the admission of sovereign states only, whereas Kuwait, "being a part of Iraq, was neither a state nor an independent entity."

The decision, it was stated, was also invalid on the grounds that it was taken against Iraq's opposition, in violation of the Charter provision that no decision would be forced upon a state. The "strange enthusiasm" shown by the SG in persuading members to accept this decision was "unsuitable to his role and attitude of neutrality." (*R. Baghdad*, Aug 13 [15]; *Iraq Times*, Aug 14)

Earlier, an Iraqi paper [for the first time] voiced criticism of the government's attitude, saying that "we no longer want to bear vague promises of our rights in Kuwait," and that the Iraqi people were entitled to know what was the government's exact policy. (*Thawrah*, Aug 1)

THE ARAB FORCE IN KUWAIT

(July-Dec)

[Discussions on the establishment of an Arab force to safeguard Kuwait's independence started immediately after the League Council meeting of July 20. However, though it was clear that the British force would not be withdrawn unless the task of safeguarding Kuwait's independence was taken over by the Arab countries, the first Arab contingent arrived in Kuwait only seven weeks later, on Sept 10.]

Changing Attitudes. The Arab League Secretariat sent urgent letters to member-states asking them to specify the size of the forces they were ready to send, the duration of their stay and the expenses involved. (*R. Beirut*, July 23-*IMB*, July 24)

Earlier, Hussein, the Kuwaiti delegate, disclosed that Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco were willing to send forces, while other countries, including the UAR, would participate by sending equipment and other assistance. (*MENA*, July 22 [25])

However, a few days later he said that all Arab countries except Tunisia (because of the situation in Bizerta) would send troops and that the force would be merely symbolic. (*R. Kuwait*, July 30 [Aug 1])

[In the end, however, contingents came from the UAR, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Tunisia.]

Proposal for "Symbolic Force" Rejected by the UK.

It was reported that the Ruler of Kuwait had indicated that 250 or 500 Arab troops would be sufficient to replace the British. This was interpreted as meaning that in case a crisis developed the British could again be recalled, while the principle of a joint Arab effort for the preservation of Kuwait's independence would be also observed. (*Hayat*, July 26)

The Times wrote that the theory of a symbolic Arab force "had grown from the notion that General Qassim has become more amenable" (*Times*, July 24). *The Economist* wrote that the question was whether a political or a military deterrent was needed. The UK was disinclined to withdraw her troops if no more than a token substitute was found. Some 2,500 British troops still remained in Kuwait [partial withdrawal had started on July 19], and the British government was hoping for a substitute Arab force of around brigade strength. The paper added that negotiation about where the soldiers should come from, who should command them, and how they should be paid, were "still very much in the air." (*Economist*, July 29)

League Military Delegation and SG Go to Kuwait. A League military delegation left for Kuwait at the Ruler's request on Aug 6. It was headed by the chairman of the League's Permanent Military Committee, Gen. Ahmad Halim al-Imam [of the UAR], and included the Deputy SG, Nawfal. The delegation paid a short visit to Saudi Arabia, where it reportedly asked the King to increase the strength of his force in Kuwait. In Kuwait it conferred with the Ruler and senior officers, and inspected positions on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. (*R. Cairo*, Aug 1, *R. Mecca*, Aug 6, *R. Kuwait*, Aug 7, 8, 9, *R. Beirut*, Aug 8 [3, 9, 10]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 7; *Hayat*, Aug 8)

Gen. Imam said that the size of the Arab force was not yet decided, but it would be strong enough to repel any attack. It would be so composed that the forces of any one country would not by far exceed those of any other (*Hayat*, Aug 9). SG Hammūnah joined the delegation in Kuwait on Aug 12, and it returned to Cairo on Aug 13. (*R. Kuwait*, Aug 12, 13, *MENA*, Aug 13 [15])

Kuwait Signs Arab Collective Security Pact and Agreement on Arab Force. On Aug 12 Hammūnah and the Ruler signed an agreement on the Arab force. The Ruler also signed the Arab Collective Security Pact [adhered to by seven states: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAR, Lebanon, Yemen, Morocco and Iraq]. (*Hayat*, Aug 13, 15; *Mid. Mir.*, Aug 19)

On Aug 15 the League Council held a short meeting in which it approved the agreement with the Ruler and heard the SG's report on the establishment of the Arab force. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 16)

The agreement was reported to include the following points: soldiers of the Arab force were to enjoy diplomatic immunity, like League officials. Their command was to be directly connected by radio link to League headquarters as well as to the participating member-states. The soldiers were to respect Kuwaiti laws and refrain from interference in political matters. They would not be subject to Kuwaiti courts but to the codes of their own countries. (*Mid. Mir.*, Aug 19)

Nawfal, the League Deputy SG, said that part of the expenses would be covered by the Arab League and part by Kuwait. (*BBC in Arabic*, Aug 26-*IMB*, Aug 27)

League Military Delegation Goes to Other Arab Countries. On Aug 17 the military delegation that had previously visited Kuwait and Saudi Arabia left Cairo for

Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen. (*R. Amman, Aug 18-IMB, Aug 20; Hayat, Aug 18*)

The *Economist* wrote that the delegation's mission had not been easy, as the only precedent for a united Arab force was "the unhappy one" of the Arab army that lost the Palestine war, and this time the Arabs were asked to face the possibility of clashing with other Arabs. The fact that the mission had succeeded to some extent was due to Arab "self-respect and an enlightened view of self-interest." (*Economist, Sept 16*)

On Aug 29 the delegation completed its mission, after signing agreements with Tunisia, Sudan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAR on participation in the Arab force. (*R. Cairo, Aug 28, 29-IMB, Aug 29, 30*)

Jordan: To Check and Balance UAR Forces. The announcement that a Jordanian force was ready to move came on Sept 6 (*R. Amman, Sept 6 [8]*). It consisted of an infantry battalion with supporting units, having an estimated strength of 920 officers and men (*ANA, Sept 15 [16]*). Before leaving for Kuwait on Sept 13, the force was addressed by King Hussein, who said that it was important that Jordan should not be an exception to the united Arab front. (*Hayat, Sept 14*)

Al-Hayat commented that Jordan, which considered herself a friend of both sides, had preferred not to take part, but she decided that her troops would serve as a balancing factor and check attempts by any side to gain predominance in the force. (*Hayat, Sept 12*)

At a later date, on Oct 20, PM Talhuni was reported to have told an Iraqi paper that Jordan had sent troops because she feared that "Abdel Nasser's soldiers might dominate Iraq." (*Mid. Mir., Oct 28*)

UAR "to Watch Developments on the Spot and Act as Deterrent." The UAR, [who had all along been reluctant to send troops to Kuwait], contributed administrative and maintenance units. Their strength was reported as 1,000 (*R. Beirut, Sept 22 [25]*) [but possibly did not exceed 300 or 400].

Al-Hayat commented that the UAR had decided to maintain troops in Kuwait so as to be able to follow developments on the spot and to act as a deterrent against a possible Iraqi move. (*Hayat, Sept 12*)

Sudan, Pressed by Saudi Arabia, Follows UAR Lead. Sudan was reported to have told Iraq that she had no grudge against her. Al-Hayat wrote that Sudan was subject to pressure from Saudi Arabia, which could not be ignored in view of Sudanese interests in that country, and felt obliged to follow the example of the UAR. She had decided to send troops on condition that they were not to be involved in combat. (*Hayat, Sept 12*)

On their departure, on Sept 12, they were told by Maj.-Gen. Muhammad Lutfi Uthman, Deputy Chief of Staff, that Sudan must act in conformity with the League decision, but that "Iraq, Kuwait and other Arab nations are all brothers to us." (*R. Umdurman, Sept 12 [14]*) [The contingent was possibly of company strength.]

Lebanon Follows Policy of Neutrality. Lebanon informed the League that she could not contribute any contingent but was ready to provide medical and engineering facilities. The League was reported to have asked Lebanon to send 100 men. (*Hayat, Aug 16; Eg. Cos., Aug 18*)

During the talks with the military delegation, President Shehab and PM Sliem reportedly said that Lebanon's

interests obliged her not to commit herself, as the issue involved her relations with the UAR, Iraq and Kuwait, which she did not want to affect in any way, but she would consider the matter further. Government circles were hoping that new developments would enable Lebanon to extricate herself from a delicate position. (*Hayat, Aug 29*)

Tunisia Sends Token of Solidarity. Tunisia decided to send a token force, in keeping with the principle of Arab solidarity, informing Iraq that this did not mean any hostility to her (*Hayat, Sept 12*). The Tunisian contingent was reported to consist of 100-200 men.

Libya and Morocco, which it was reported, had promised to subscribe a token force (*Hayat, Sept 12*) did not do so.

Yemen: Complete Refusal. Yemen refused to receive the League's military delegation. The Imam's representative announced in Cairo on Aug 22 that Yemen was "too concerned with British aggression in South Yemen." (*Mid. Mir., Aug 26*)

Delays in Sending Force. On Sept 5 Nawfal said that final arrangements were not yet completed; the organization and coordination of the troops had proved more difficult than expected. (*BBC in Arabic, Sept 5-IMB, Sept 6*)

The *Economist* wrote that the Arab states attached more importance to not fumbling their operation than to making a punctual appearance. Preparations were slow for lack of experience and ready-made machinery. Some governments were reluctant to contribute troops for fear their soldiers might actually clash with the Iraqis, and the UAR, which could send troops immediately, thought that the first contingent should not consist only of her troops, but should symbolize Arab unity from the start. (*Economist, Sept 2*)

A Saudi Arabian spokesman said on Sept 4 that a contingent of 1,200 soldiers was ready to leave for Kuwait. This announcement was interpreted in Cairo as an attempt to speed up the League's arrangements with other countries. (*BBC in Arabic, Sept 5-IMB, Sept 6*)

The Command of the Force. On Sept 7 a League spokesman announced the following nominations to the command of the Arab force: Gen. Abdallah Isa of Saudi Arabia, C-in-C; Brig. Khalid as-Sahn of Jordan, Deputy C-in-C, and Col. Kamil ad-Dabbagh of Saudi Arabia, Chief of Staff. These officers had been expected to leave for Kuwait on Sept 9, but had postponed their departure. (*Hayat, Sept 7, 8; R. Mecca, ANA, Sept 7 [9]*)

Earlier it had been reported that a Moroccan would be in command (*R. Morocco, Aug 21 [23]*), but Morocco did not participate in the force. The appointment of a Saudi Arabian to command the force was in conformity with Nawfal's earlier statement that command would be given to the country that provided the largest number of troops. (*Mid. Mir., Sept 2*)

The Force's Arrival in Kuwait. On Sept 10 the first contingents arrived in Kuwait; they were Saudi Arabian. General Isa arrived the following day, with his staff and the officers of the Sudanese command (*Hayat, Sept 12*). The Sudanese contingent left for Kuwait on Sept 12, and the Jordanian battalion, as well as the UAR technicians, on Sept 15 (*Mid. Mir., Sept 16*). Within the week, the force numbered just over 3,000 men. (*Economist, Sept 16*)

On Sept 21 the Ruler of Kuwait visited King Saud in Riyadh. They discussed the withdrawal of the British forces and the reinforcement of Arab troops in Kuwait. Earlier it was reported that Kuwait had asked the League to increase the size of the force to 5,000. The League called upon the UAR and Saudi Arabia to send more troops. Saudi Arabia agreed to send 500 armoured reinforcements. The UAR reaction was not known, but the next day it was announced that Sudan and Saudi Arabia would send more soldiers. A Saudi Arabian armoured regiment arrived in Kuwait on Sept 27. (*R. Amman, Sept 20-IMB, Sept 21; Mid. Mir., Sept 23, 30*)

Withdrawal of British Forces. On Sept 14 the Ruler of Kuwait asked the British government to withdraw its troops from Kuwait. (*Eg. Gaz., Hayat, Sept 15*)

The British command in Bahrain announced that the withdrawal would start on Sept 19, and would follow stages agreed between the Political Resident and the Ruler. (*Eg. Gaz., Sept 14*)

British official sources were reported to have said that the delay in withdrawal had been due to the pace of the Arab force's deployment (*Hayat, Sept 16*). The Arab troops did not take over British positions but chose new ones (*MENA, Sept 25 [27]*). On Oct 10 it was announced in Kuwait that the last British troops had left. (*R. Kuwait, Oct 10 [11]*)

"Uneasiness During Change-over." On Sept 11 Kuwait Radio stated that Qasim had intended to seize Kuwait before the arrival of the Arab force, but Iraqi soldiers in Basra had refused to obey his orders to move against Kuwait on the night of Sept 7 (*R. Kuwait, Sept 11 [13]*). The Iraqi embassy in London described these reports as "complete and utter nonsense" (*Mid. Mir., Sept 16*). On the other hand, Baghdad Radio reported a mutiny among Saudi Arabian soldiers who allegedly refused to protect "imperialist interests." This was denied by Mecca. (*R. Mecca, Sept 11, R. Baghdad, Sept 12 [14]*)

The *Economist* wrote that these "absurd" rumours were symptomatic of uneasiness during the change-over between the British and the Arabs. (*Economist, Sept 16*)

Kuwait To "Pay" for Arab Support By Investment in Arab Countries. ANA reported from Kuwait that after the League forces had settled down in Kuwait, "attention was focused" on the possibility of using Kuwait's wealth to help Arab countries. A five-man Kuwaiti economic delegation representing the Finance and Economy Department and the Chamber of Commerce left on Sept 27 on a fact-finding tour of Arab countries. The delegation first visited Jordan. (On the same issue see also above, p 131.)

On Sept 14 following the dispatch of Jordanian troops to Kuwait, Jordanian newspapers had called upon Kuwait to invest her money in Arab countries. *Ad-Difa'* said that the fulfilment of the promises made by Jordan and other Arab countries should encourage Kuwait to carry out her commitments. *Al-Jihad* expressed the hope that Jordan would get the lion's share of the Kuwaiti capital to be invested in Arab countries.

The head of the Kuwaiti delegation, Ahmad Umar Asim, said that its purpose was to make preliminary studies of Arab projects to which Kuwait would subscribe funds. After Jordan, the delegation was to visit the UAR, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon. (*Jihad, Difa', Sept 14; Mid. Mir., Sept 16, 30*)

After the conclusion of the delegation's talks in the UAR, a joint communiqué issued on Oct 5 said that it

had expressed Kuwait's desire to promote economic relations with the UAR by investing her capital in economic development projects and fostering trade between the two countries. (*MEA, Feb 1962*)

In Dec it was reported that Kuwait had decided to establish a fund, provisionally of 5-10 per cent of the state budget, for low interest loans to Arab governments carrying out development projects. (*MENA, Dec 19 [21]*)

Iraqi spokesmen, including Qasim, referred to the whole issue as Kuwaiti "bribes" and an exploitation of the situation by the Arab countries for their selfish financial interests. (See, e.g., Qasim's speech - *Iraq Times, July 20* and the statement by Iraq's delegate to Arab League - *Iraq Times, July 23*.)

Egyptian Troops Recalled After Break-up of UAR: Abdel Nasser: Anti-UAR Intrigues. On Oct 12 [following the break-up of the UAR], *Al-Ahram* reported that the UAR [Egypt] had asked the League's permission to recall her troops from Kuwait. (*Ahram, Oct 12*)

The Egyptian troops left, however, only at the beginning of Dec. (*Hayat, Dec 6*)

On Oct 18 Abdel Nasser explained this step in a letter to the Ruler of Kuwait. He said that he had received information to the effect that an attempt would be made to harm the relations between Kuwait and the UAR, and that an attempt was to be made to accuse UAR soldiers of interference in Kuwait's domestic affairs and conspiring against her. While Abdel Nasser was confident of the good intentions of the Ruler and the Kuwaiti people, he said that he did not trust the "imperialists and their stooges," who wanted to isolate the UAR from the other Arab countries as they had attempted to do in 1957. Abdel Nasser assured the Ruler of "the paramount importance" the UAR attached to the independence of Kuwait and her desire to safeguard it. (*R. Cairo, Oct 18 [20]; Eg. Gaz., Oct 19*)

The Ruler wrote asking Abdel Nasser to reconsider his decision. (*Mid. Mir., Oct 28*)

Inter-Arab Friction in Force Reported. On Oct 17 *Al-Hayat* quoted a report in the Syrian *An-Nasr* that Egypt's decision was a result of friction between Egyptian and Syrian soldiers in the UAR forces, which developed into dissension between the Egyptian officers and the Arab High Command in Kuwait. The Egyptian officers were alleged to have been intimidating Syrian soldiers who refused to declare their allegiance to the UAR. Saudi Arabian and Jordanian officers in the joint command intervened to stop the Egyptian pressure. A Jordanian officer was reported to have declared that the Syrian soldiers were free to form a separate unit or join any other unit of the Arab force. The Ruler of Kuwait was reported to have intervened personally, declaring that no political activity would be tolerated in the Arab force. (*ANA, Oct 16 [18]; Hayat, Oct 17*)

On Oct 17 a spokesman of the Jordanian command in Kuwait denied rumours of discord in the Arab force. (*BBCM, Oct 19*)

Amman Radio accused Abdel Nasser of seeking to stir up the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis again and exploit the situation to further his own ambitions in the region. It said that he had taken the decision to withdraw his troops without referring to the Arab League or the states participating in the Arab force. (*R. Amman, Oct 12 [14]*)

In Oct Syrian military sources reported the recall of Syrian troops from Kuwait (*Hayat, Oct 20*). They were replaced by a new contingent of Jordanian troops. (*Hayat, Dec 12*)

KUWAITI MEMBERSHIP OF UN VETOED

(Nov 30)

Application Sponsored by UAR and Backed by UK. On Nov 30 the Security Council met to consider Kuwait's application for UN membership, which was sent to the SG on June 30 by Kuwait and was sponsored by the UAR (*S/4852, S/5001*). The UAR representative submitted a draft resolution calling on the Council to recommend to the General Assembly the admission of Kuwait (*S/5006*). He said that Kuwait was a peace-loving state, which fulfilled the requirements for UN membership. British troops had been withdrawn from Kuwait, and Kuwait now enjoyed complete independence and sovereignty and was recognized by 62 states. The UK representative backed the draft resolution.

Iraq Opposes and USSR Vetoes Application. The Iraqi delegate urged the Council to reject the resolution on the grounds that Kuwait was not a state "in the internationally accepted sense" and possessed "none of the prerequisites of statehood."

All members of the Council voted for the acceptance of Kuwait, with the exception of the Soviet Union, which cast its veto against it.

The USSR representative, Valerian Zorin, proposed that the acceptance of Kuwait be postponed, as "formal withdrawal of British troops from Kuwait, under the circumstances of such withdrawal, does not in any way mean that Kuwait can be regarded as a genuinely independent state." He claimed that the exchange of notes between the UK and Kuwait made Kuwait "play the role of a pawn, a jumping-off stage for possible further aggression." Zorin pointed out that oil was involved in the Kuwait question and that "the actions of the UK government in regard to Kuwait cannot, under these circumstances, be regarded otherwise than as manoeuvres designed to cover up the fact that Kuwait continues to remain a British colony and to help the UK to retain in Kuwait a military base in the Near and ME." Zorin also argued that by admitting Kuwait, the Council would be "prejudging the subject of this controversy between Arab states." (*S/PV 984, Nov 30*)

Iraq Praises USSR, Attacks Arab States for "Support of Imperialist Oil Interests." FM Hāshim Jawād of Iraq said that the Soviet Union had once again proved that "it is the only big state which uses it [the veto power] in accordance with clear objective principles which aim at strengthening the principles of the UN Charter for the sake of establishing peace and justice in the world and combating imperialism in a clear, logical way." The Soviet veto, he said, was "a triumph for right and justice in international relations and a blow for the British imperialists." The Soviet Union was "the friend of the weak, which proved in a practical way that it is a sincere friend of Iraq." He declared that it was "really shameful that certain Arab states should support the British imperialists and help them to protect their oil interests and to keep the Arab people in the Gulf and South of the peninsula in an underdeveloped state under a foreign yoke." The Kuwaiti problem had "unmasked many rulers and exposed the true facts about them." (*R. Baghdad, Dec 1, 4; Bilad, Dec 2*)

Jawād's praises of the USSR were echoed in many articles in the Iraqi press, which also attacked the UAR for its attitude. (*Thaurah, Dec 1; Akhbar, Dec 2*)

No Cairo Comment On Soviet Stand. Before the Council

meeting, Cairo sources doubted whether the Soviet Union would risk offending the Arab states by casting a veto against Kuwait's admission (*Eg. Gaz., Nov 27*). [There was no official UAR comment on the Russian veto.] No editorial comment appeared on this topic in major Cairo papers. (*Ahram, Gummuriyah, Dec 1-7; Akhbar al-Yawm, Dec 2, 9; Raz al-Yusuf, Dec 4, 11*)

More Russian Support for Iraq and Syria Against Abdel Nasser Expected in West. *The New York Times* wrote after the voting that some observers, including Arab sources, expressed the view that the Soviet move "presaged increased future support for the leaders of Iraq and Syria in their regional rivalries with Abdel Nasser." Western observers saw the Russian move as designed to keep up political pressure in the ME, weaken British interests in the Persian Gulf, and keep the Kuwaiti issue open for future bargaining purposes. Whatever the Soviet strategy considerations, they thought the outcome was damaging to the prestige of President Abdel Nasser, who had sponsored Kuwait's application. (*NYT, Dec 1*)

Further Kuwaiti Efforts. At the close of the year Kuwait was still attempting to acquire UN membership. Shaykh Sabāh as-Sālim as-Sabāh, the Kuwaiti FM, said on Dec 21 in Cairo that Kuwait was in constant touch with the UAR over her application, and that she would go on contacting other states in this connection and try to persuade the USSR to change her attitude. (*MENA, Dec 21 [23]*)

RENEWED TENSION

(December)

Qassim Warns of War in the ME. On Dec 3 Qassim warned the UK to relinquish Kuwait, "or else we shall kindle a ferocious war in the ME area and force it to abandon this place." Qassim was speaking at a "Safety Day" celebration, the anniversary of his escape from an assassination attempt in 1959.

Qassim declared that the "stolen province of Kuwait" would unflinchingly be restored to Iraq; the UK had been warned, he said, and she "would be responsible for the consequences." He called on the Arab troops in Kuwait to withdraw. "These traitors, calling themselves Arab forces, do nothing more than serve the imperialists, but they will be thrown out too," he declared.

Commenting on foreign broadcasts "meant to inflame hostility between Iraq and the UAR," Qassim said that what had happened between Egypt and Syria was their own concern, and that "no imperialist could estrange us from the Syrians, or the Egyptians, who are our brothers." (*R. Baghdad, Dec 3 [5]; Iraq Times, Dec 5*)

In another "Safety Day" speech, delivered at a party at the Ministry of Defence (held by the Second Battalion, 19th Brigade) Qassim said that now that imperialism had been destroyed in Iraq, it must be attacked in all parts of the Arab peninsula. "The army will shortly be on its way to liberate these parts," he said; "equipment, forces and arms have been prepared for the purpose" and "military ships are from time to time carrying arms and equipment for the defeat of imperialism." (*R. Baghdad, Dec 3 [5]*)

A similar warning was issued by Qassim on Dec 17, when he told units of the Fifth Division, referring to Kuwait, that Iraq would continue to use peaceful means, but in the end "no way would be effective with the treacherous and the oppressors, except a means which will force defeat on them." (*R. Baghdad, Dec 17 [19]*)

[The Iraqi press and broadcasts gave pride of place to these themes throughout Dec.]

Kuwait's Protest to Security Council. Following Qassim's "Safety Day" speeches, Kuwait cable the Security Council drawing its attention to the "recurrent statements and speeches made lately" by the Iraqi PM threatening to annex Kuwait by force, and to "provocative broadcasts and commentaries daily disseminated over Baghdad Radio proclaiming Iraq's inflexibility in continuing to claim the annexation of Kuwait." The cable said that these actions were incompatible with the repeated assurances of the Iraqi delegate to the Council that Iraq would not use force to further her claim to Kuwait. Kuwait asked the chairman to circulate this cable among Council members and "to take into consideration the danger that may beset world peace in this area." (*R. Kuwait, Dec 4 [6]*)

Lesson of Goa Expounded by Iraq. The seizure of Goa by India (Dec 18-19) was frequently referred to in Iraqi official utterances and press commentaries. On Dec 20 Qassim said that imperialism in the "usurped district of Kuwait" would be defeated "just as they [the Indians] did in Goa." (*Iraq Times, Dec 22*; see also *Thaurah, Dec 28, 27*)

Anti-Kuwait Measures. On Dec 19 it was reported that the Iraqi authorities had seized ten Kuwaiti vessels in the port of Basra and that the accounts of Kuwaiti citizens had been frozen in Iraqi banks (*MENA, Dec 19, R. Kuwait, Dec 20 [22]*). The Kuwaiti FM said in Cairo that Kuwait had no intention to raise the subject of "Iraqi provocations" at the UN. (*Arab Obs., Dec 25*)

Iraqi Warning Against Establishing Diplomatic Relations with Kuwait. On Dec 26 the Iraqi FM, Hashim Jawad, declared that several states with whom Iraq had diplomatic relations were contemplating the exchange of diplomatic representatives with "the so-called state of Kuwait," and that Iraq regarded any such step as "an unfriendly act and violation of Iraq rights." Iraq would have to "reconsider its attitude with regard to the diplomatic relations with countries establishing such relations with Kuwait." (*R. Baghdad, Dec 26-IMB, Dec 27-BBCM, Dec 28*)

By the end of the year, Kuwait had diplomatic representatives in the UK, the US, Iran, the UAR, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. (*ME, Europa, 1962*)

The Kuwaiti Ambassador in Egypt commented the next day that if Iraq meant what she said she would have to break off relations with 65 countries who had recognized Kuwait. (*BBC in Arabic, Dec 27-IMB, Dec 28*)

Kuwait Radio reported on Dec 27 that India had officially expressed a desire to establish diplomatic relations with Kuwait. (*R. Kuwait, Dec 27 [29]*)

Small-Scale British Military Precautions. [Though PM Qassim's belligerent warnings started on Dec 3, some very limited British military precautions were reported only at the end of the month. The withdrawal of the British troops from Kuwait had been completed on Oct 10.]

A Ministry of Defence statement of Dec 26 said, "During the past 24 hours our forecast that the Christmas period might be used to increase tension has been partially confirmed as far as the Middle East is concerned."

"Although operations are not thought to be imminent, certain small-scale precautionary measures have again had to be taken..."

The Times commented that although ministry officials declined to explain the reference to the ME, "a possible explanation might be found in the similarity between the position of Kuwait in relation to Iraq and Goa in relation to India." (*Times, Dec 27*)

On Dec 27 200 officers and men of the Army and Air Force left the UK for the ME. The carrier *Centurion* also left for the ME, accompanied by two frigates and a landing craft. A Ministry of Defence spokesman said that no further action was being taken at the moment, as enough had been done to raise the level of the preparedness of the ME Command to meet any emergency.

The Times commented that, apparently, renewed Iraqi troop movements had again induced Kuwait to ask for British aid, as it was unlikely that the "Arab force on the spot could or would offer more than token resistance."

It was reported, however, that no diplomatic action had been taken by the British government in Baghdad or Kuwait and there had been no request for assistance from Kuwait. (*Times, Dec 28*)

Iraq and Kuwait Protest to the Security Council. On Dec 28, Iraq sent a protest to the Security Council against "the British demonstration of force and acts of provocation which have created a state of high tension, endangering peace and security in the region and threatening the freedom and security of Iraq," and the "hostile propaganda campaign directed against Iraq." Iraq did not, however, ask for the convocation of the Council. (*Times, Dec 29; Monde, Dec 30*)

On Dec 29 Kuwait sent a message asking the Council to "take such measures as would restore the peace and the feeling of security in the area." In view of continued Iraqi threats, pressure, and the concentration of military forces, it had become necessary to make "a strong protest"; the note said Kuwait had no alternative but to take "every possible precautionary measure." The question of British aid was not mentioned. (*NYT, Dec 30*)

Kuwait Disclaims Responsibility for British Steps; League Warning. Shaykh Sabah Salim as-Sabah, the Kuwaiti FM, declared that Kuwait relied on the Arab League and had not asked the UK for help (*MENA, Dec 29 [Jan 1, 1962]*). (A similar statement had been made earlier, on Dec 28, by the Kuwaiti Ambassador in Cairo.)

Nawfal, the Deputy SG of the League, said that the defence of the Arab area from the Gulf to the Ocean was an Arab responsibility and that the UK had no territories to defend in the ME. (*MENA, Dec 28 [30]*)

Nawfal had informed the FM, it was reported, that if British troops re-entered Kuwait the Arab force would be ordered to leave; under no circumstances could the League force cooperate with British soldiers. (*Heyat, Dec 30; R. Beirut, Dec 30-IMB, Dec 31*)

UAR (Egypt) Believes British Offensive Directed Against Herself. On Dec 27 Cairo Radio charged the UK with moving forces into the ME in order to exploit "the new secessionist mutiny directed against the UAR" [the secession of Syria]. The commentary did not mention King Hussein's visit to London and Ben-Gurion's sudden stop in Tehran (see pp 362 b, 328 b). (*R. Cairo, Dec 27 [29]*)

On Dec 28 MENA claimed that the UK was using Kuwait as a pretext in her general "plot" in the ME area. Her aims were to bolster reactionary regimes in the ME, unite them under British protection, and use pressure against states adhering to "social justice" by isolating

them and threatening them with military force. (*MENA*, Dec 28 [30]; see also *Akhbar*, Dec 28)

Al-Gumhuriyah wrote: "Many signs point to the fact that imperialism is preparing for a new round against the Arab peoples." (*Gumhuriyah*, Dec 28)

UAR-Iraqi Common Anti-British Interests Seen. On Dec 29 a *MENA* despatch said: "The present British military movements aim at paving the way for a coup d'état in Iraq to get rid of Qasim and relieve the danger of oil nationalization as well as the annexation of Kuwait." This was described as a "conspiracy" against liberation movements in the ME, later to be directed against the UAR as well. (*Eg. Mail*, Dec 30)

Al-Hayat wrote that in spite of the rivalry between Qasim and Abdel Nasser, their policies in the Persian Gulf seemed to coincide. While Qasim was running a political campaign in the eastern Gulf, Abdel Nasser had launched a new policy in the west of the area by revising his relations with Saudi Arabia and breaking up the union with Yemen (Dec 26) (see pp 154-5). The relations of both with the UK had thus deteriorated, and *Al-Hayat* thought that renewed British troop concentrations could be interpreted in this light. (*Hayat*, Dec 30)

UAR Attitude Criticized. The pro-Hashimite *Ar-Ruwad* (Lebanon) criticized the UAR for militarily abandoning Kuwait by withdrawing its forces (see above). The paper doubted whether any other Arab country would

have guaranteed to defend Kuwait if Iraq had really attacked. (*ANA*, Dec 28 [30])

The *Times* wrote that the withdrawal of UAR troops might encourage Qasim to abandon his restraint. The worsening of relations between Abdel Nasser and Kuwait's main protectors, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, was also mentioned. (*Times*, Dec 28)

British Press Divided. The British press was divided over the justification for the military precautions. The *Daily Telegraph* thought the UK could not afford prolonged meditation on whether Qasim intended to attack, especially in view of India's example in Goa and FM Jawad's warnings (*Daily Telegraph*, Dec 28). The *Sunday Times* also thought that the Iraqis must have been up to something. (*Sunday Times*, Dec 31)

The *Economist*, however, claimed that "the whole baffling affair was generally interpreted as a defensive move taken because somebody somewhere suspected General Qasim of immediate aggressive designs on Kuwait." The paper said that the evidence seemed "circumstantial if not far-fetched." (*Economist*, Dec 30)

The *Observer* thought that Iraq's threat to Kuwait was only one of the reasons for the military precautions; these were also intended to guard against the possibility of trouble on the Yemen-Aden border and in the Gulf protectorates. The paper concluded that the UK once again regarded her interests in the ME as more important than anywhere else and wished to protect her commercial and oil interests in the area. (*Observer*, Dec 31)

RELATIONS BETWEEN KUWAIT AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES—CURRENT AFFAIRS

The Kuwait Crisis. [In her dispute with Iraq, which claimed sovereignty over the newly-independent state, Kuwait enjoyed the support of the other Arab countries and especially the UAR and Saudi Arabia. In July she was admitted to the Arab League. In Sept an Arab force took over from the British army the guarding of Kuwait's independence. Kuwait was expected, and made arrangements, to repay the Arab countries by using part of her oil wealth to extend financial aid to them. (For details see: The Kuwait Crisis.)]

Jordan. In July a Kuwaiti delegation came to Jordan to select teachers and judges for work in Kuwait. (*Akhbar* Sa'ah, July 26)

In Jordan the hope was expressed that that country would get the lion's share of Kuwait's projected financial assistance to the Arab countries. During Sept 27-30, a Kuwaiti economic delegation, on a fact-finding tour of the Arab countries, discussed in Jordan the question of Kuwaiti participation in Jordanian development projects: the second stage of the Eastern Ghor Canal, construction of a potato plant and the establishment of an institution to provide agricultural loans. These, as well as tourist industry projects, would cost about JD 25 million which Jordan sought to obtain from Kuwait as a grant or loan on easy terms. (*Manar*, Sept 30, Oct 1, 10, 12; *ANA*, Sept 30 [W Oct 5])

In Nov Lt-Gen. Habis al-Majali, the Jordanian Chief of Staff, visited Kuwait to inspect the Jordanian contingent there. The Ruler of Kuwait gave a luncheon in his honour. (*Jihad*, Nov 13; *Falastin*, Nov 14)

In Nov it was reported that Jordan would coalesce

Kuwaiti officers to attend Jordanian military courses. (*ANA*, Nov 21 [W 30])

Lebanon. It was reported in Feb that there were 37,000 Lebanese working in Kuwait, most of them technicians. (*Hayat*, Feb 25)

In March it was reported that Kuwait had granted Beirut municipality a £5 million loan to be repaid in ten years beginning 1964, at 4% interest. (*EFSPA* No. 39, March; *IFNS*, March 17)

At the end of Sept *Al-Hayat* reported that the two countries had decided to establish diplomatic relations between them; and also gave the names of the ambassadors-designate. [However, by the end of the year, diplomatic representation had not yet been established.] On Dec 30, the Iraqi Ambassador in Beirut issued a warning that Iraq would not hesitate to break off diplomatic relations with any country establishing such relations with Kuwait. (*Hayat*, Sept 28, Dec 31)

In Sept it was reported that Kuwait had asked Lebanon to send her experts to assist in organizing its Foreign Ministry. (*Jihad*, *Jaridoh*, Sept 27)

At the end of Oct, a Kuwaiti economic delegation, touring the Arab countries (see p 136), arrived in Beirut (*Hayat*, Oct 26). They discussed the possibilities of economic cooperation between the two countries, and the investment of Kuwaiti capital in Lebanese development projects. (*Hayat*, Oct 26-29)

Saudi Arabia. On April 1 King Saud, accompanied by a 56-man entourage, arrived in Kuwait on a seven-day

official visit. A joint communiqué stated that King Saud had had friendly talks with the Ruler of Kuwait on strengthening relations in all fields between the two countries. It praised King Saud's efforts on behalf of the Arab nation and the advancement of his people's living standards (*Hayat*, April 8). It was remarked that rumors that King Saud had sought a loan from the Ruler could be discounted. It was thought that the question of the oil-rich Neutral Zone was inconclusively discussed; each country was supposed to be responsible for half of the Zone but the halves had not been separated or demarcated. (*Times*, May 18)

In Aug it was reported that Kuwait had appointed its ambassador to Saudi Arabia. (*MENA*, Aug 16 [18])

UAR. In 1960 the UAR, in its negotiations with Britain over the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, asked permission for the opening of UAR consulates in British territories and protected areas, including Kuwait (MER 1960, p 535). A Kuwaiti announcement of Jan 25 to the effect that any negotiation to establish consular relations should be conducted with the Kuwaiti government, which was responsible for Kuwait's foreign relations, was understood to refer to this development (*Hayat*, Jan 27). In May the UAR Deputy Foreign Minister said that Britain had refused the UAR permission to open the consulate because of its oil interests. A British source said that an agreement in principle by the Ruler for the opening of the consulate had already been transmitted to Cairo. (*Times*, May 19)

On Feb 25 President Abdel Nasser congratulated the Ruler of Kuwait on the occasion of the anniversary of his accession. (*Eng. Gaz.*, Feb 26)

There were repeated reports that the UAR was to

open a tourist office in Kuwait. (*Eng. Gaz.*, Feb 26; *Ahram*, Aug 26)

A number of UAR (Egyptian) experts went to Kuwait to work in administrative and other fields. In Sept two officials went to Kuwait to help in the organization of the Foreign Ministry (*MENA*, Sept 23 [26]). In Dec Gen. Abd al-Fattah al-Bandari, former Director-General of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, was appointed by the Kuwait government as an adviser on general security and police affairs. The UAR also agreed to send 12 prosecutors to Kuwait for one year and three surgeons for two years' service. (*Ahram*, Dec 12; *Akhbar* Sa'ah, Dec 13)

The UAR appointed its first ambassador to Kuwait in Oct and Kuwait its ambassador to the UAR in Nov. (*Ahram*, Oct 27; *Akhbar*, Nov 13)

On Dec 28, FM Shaykh Sabah as-Salim as-Sabah arrived in Cairo on his way from Libya and was received by President Abdel Nasser. (*MENA*, Dec 28 [30]; *Ahram*, Dec 30)

Persian Gulf Principalities

Abu Dhabi. In Oct Shaykh Shakhbüt Ibn Sultan, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, arrived in Kuwait for a three-day visit. (*R. Kuwait*, Oct 7 [10])

Bahrain. The Ruler visited Bahrain in Nov. (*R. Kuwait*, Nov 4 [7])

Dubai. The Shaykh of Dubai, Rashid Ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, arrived in Kuwait on Nov 5 on a three-day visit to the Ruler. (*R. Kuwait*, Nov 5, 8 [7, 9])

Qatar. The Ruler of Qatar visited Kuwait in May and conducted talks with the Ruler to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two countries. (*Akhbar*, Egypt, May 21)

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND JORDAN

SYNOPSIS

January witnessed the continuation of propaganda warfare between the UAR and Jordan as well as of Syrian charges of a Jordanian-organized terror campaign in Syria (see MER 1960, p 148). At the beginning of February, however, in the wake of the Baghdad conference, King Hussein called off his propaganda campaign and met with an immediate though partial response from the UAR. Syrian charges of Jordanian-organized sabotage, and even of an attempt to assassinate President Abdel Nasser, continued until the middle of March, and were denied by Amman.

At the same time, Hussein made a new departure by addressing a message to Abdel Nasser on February 23, calling for Arab solidarity on the basis of equality between the Arab states and non-interference in each other's affairs. A reply by Abdel Nasser dated March 13, in the main a detailed statement of policy, was followed by another letter from Hussein, on the same pattern, dated April 2. After prompting by Jordan, a second message by Abdel Nasser, dated May 7, concluded the correspondence. While couched in friendly terms, the correspondence revealed anew the basic differences in aims and policies: the "cooperative socialist democratic society," a comprehensive Arab union, and anti-imperialism as the main plank in UAR foreign policy; a non-socialist development policy, Arab solidarity instead of union, and anti-Communism as the main plank in Jordan's foreign policy. Hussein presented himself in his

letter as an Arab leader equal to Abdel Nasser in stature and status.

Hussein's initiative was thought to have been prompted mainly by the wish to strengthen his position internally, and at the same time to break down his relative isolation in the Arab world. The correspondence opened a period of uneasy truce. While setting out their differences, the two leaders had for the time being agreed to disagree, but a meeting between them, proposed by Hussein, did not materialize and diplomatic relations remained at the level of *chargé d'affaires*. In the Kuwait crisis, however, between June and September, Jordan and the UAR found themselves on the same side of the fence in supporting Kuwait's independence against Qasim's claims.

The truce was broken by Hussein on the secession of Syria from the UAR. Jordan was the first state to recognize independent Syria on September 29, the day after the coup. King Hussein was the only Arab leader who almost immediately extolled the coup d'état as a "blessed upsurge" while vilifying Abdel Nasser (though without mentioning his name). Hussein said that this policy was not fortuitous and that his confidence in himself was growing.

Cairo retaliated by severing its relations with Jordan (as well as with Turkey, which had also recognized Syria on September 29). Abdel Nasser said that he had been deceived by Hussein and promised that this would not happen again.

The propaganda warfare was resumed. Cairo charged

Hussein with complicity in the Syrian revolt, said that he had been plotting while professing friendship, and called on the people to kill the King and his associates. Jordanian propaganda challenged the UAR's socialist policy, and Hussein described Abdel Nasser as a "tyrant who drank from the blood of the people."

Towards the end of December, Hussein ordered the cessation of propaganda warfare by Amman radio. Cairo rejected this gesture, having meanwhile launched its policy of "battling imperialism in the palaces of reaction."

TENSION CONTINUES, ABATES

(January-March)

Propaganda Warfare Continues. During Jan the intensive propaganda campaign between the UAR and Jordan continued unabated, the themes remaining in general the same as in 1960 (MER 1960, pp 149-50). Jordanian broadcasts concentrated especially on Abdel Nasser's "neglect" of the Palestine question and his alleged dissipation of Arab energies through involvement in international conflicts. They also warned the peoples of Africa to beware of Abdel Nasser's acts of "treason, subversion and exploitation." The Cairo—*Saut al Arab* and Damascus radio stations, on the other hand, continued with special programmes vilifying King Hussein. (BBCM, IMB, Jan)

On Jan 2 a "mammoth" rally organized by the Palestinian National Union took place in Damascus in protest against the execution in Amman, on Dec 31, 1960, of four persons found guilty of participation in the assassination of the late Jordanian Premier al-Majali (*Ayyam*, Jan 3). Damascus Radio charged that the execution of those "honest, innocent and good-natured" persons was an attempt to divert Jordanian attention from King Hussein's own crimes." (R. Damascus, Jan 3 [5])

Propaganda Warfare Abates. [The propaganda warfare began to abate somewhat at the end of Jan, especially that conducted by the Cairo radio stations. The major change, however, came only at the end of the Baghdad conference of Arab foreign ministers (Jan 30-Feb 4).]

On Feb 5 the Jordanian cabinet announced that King Hussein, in response to desires expressed at the Baghdad conference and prompted by his wish to clear the Arab atmosphere, had ordered the Jordanian radio and press "to refrain from answering attacks and diatribes" launched by certain Arab countries. (R. Amman, Feb 5 [7])

On Feb 6 Damascus Radio and Cairo Radio stopped their special programmes on Jordan but the Cairo Voice of the Arabs continued to attack Hussein in its general programme. (R. Cairo, R. Damascus, Feb 6-14 in BBCM, IMB, Feb 7-16)

Jordanian papers welcomed the lessening of tension in UAR-Jordan relations (*Palastin*, Feb 8; *Manar*, Feb 8, 14; *Difa*, Feb 7, 10). A Damascus daily commented that Arab solidarity could not be achieved by stopping radio campaigns. (*Nasr*, Feb 7)

While touring Syria in Feb, President Abdel Nasser in his many speeches refrained from attacking Arab rulers. This was highly praised by Amman papers which [for the first time for many months] commented favourably on the UAR and its president. (*Manar*, Feb 22; *Difa*, Feb 23)

Jordan Charged With Subversive Activities in Syria. [See also the charges made against Jordan at the end of 1960 (MER 1960, p 154); the charges of Jordanian involvement in the NSP coup in Lebanon (p 388) as well as the charges of subversion levelled against King Hussein by Cairo after the break-up of the UAR (below).]

On the night of Jan 13-14 two time-bombs exploded in Damascus and another in Hama, in cars which had recently crossed the frontier from Lebanon, causing injuries and damage. An official Syrian source said the bombs had been placed by "hirelings of the Jordanian embassy in Beirut." (*Hayat*, Jan 15; R. Damascus, Jan 17-IMB, Jan 18)

On Jan 14 the Lebanese Premier Sa'ib Slim declared that all possible steps were being taken, in cooperation with the Syrian authorities, to trace the perpetrators (*Hayat*, Jan 15). Two days later Beirut radio reported that eight Jordanians had been arrested in connection with the explosions and that seven Jordanians had been deported. A later Beirut report said twenty people had been detained for questioning. (R. Beirut, Jan 17-19-IMB, Jan 18-20)

It was reported that Lebanon would set up border patrols to prevent the infiltration of possibly dangerous elements and to avoid any recurrence of the Damascus explosions. (*Jaridah*, Jan 20)

Amman radio on Jan 19 denied any Jordanian involvement and claimed that the Syrian authorities intended to poison relations between Jordan and Lebanon. (IMB, Jan 20)

On Jan 23 an official Syrian statement said that the day before a Jordanian had been killed by a UAR patrol which was engaged in a skirmish by Jordanian infiltrators on Syrian territory (R. Damascus, Jan 23 [25]). Jordan officially denied this report (*Manar*, Jan 25). A Cairo publication alleged that the infiltrator was a graduate of a Jordanian sabotage training centre, specially organized for operations against the Syrian Region. (*Arab Observer*, Jan 29)

In a press conference in Damascus on Feb 22, two Syrians stated that they had been sent by the Jordanian authorities to place time-bombs in Damascus during the UAR anniversary celebrations in order "to create confusion," but after crossing into Syria they had immediately reported to the authorities. One of them said that three years previously he had gone to Amman where he was offered a job by the "Political Section" [of military intelligence of the Jordanian army]. He said he had learned of plots hatched by Sharif Nāsir Ibn Jamil [the King's uncle], Brigadier Khālid al-Yāwir, head of the Political Section, Syrian refugees including Salāh ash-Shishakli and Hishām al-Barāzi, and George Abd al-Masih and Fādl al-Kunji of the Nationalist Social Party (the Syrian Nationalist Party or PPS). Together with the British military attaché, they wished to instigate a revolt in Syria with the aim of breaking up the UAR. A group of Syrian exiles was formed, but as most of the funds provided for them were seized by Shishakli, the group broke up. The bearer of the tale himself was put in charge of a section entrusted with assassinating official personalities in Syria and had received his instructions for the bomb-throwing in Syria from the Political Section and the explosives— from Barāzi. (*Ayyam*, Feb 23; *Mid. Mir.*, Feb 25)

[It may be noted that the day after this press conference Hussein handed the UAR chargé d'affaires in Amman his letter to Abdel Nasser, calling for Arab solidarity.]

From Feb 22-26, UAR broadcasts mentioned this allegation on a few occasions [but without the voluminous comment and the sharp personal attacks usual in the propaganda broadcasts]. (See BBCM, IMB, Feb 22-27)

On Feb 25 an official Jordanian spokesman denied that the Jordanian government had any connection with the two men. He added that his government strongly "denounced acts of sabotage and believed that the two

men were working for certain quarters which sought to disturb relations among the Arab countries." (*Hayat*, Feb 26; *Mid. Mir.*, March 4)

The very same evening, Syria made a new charge in an official statement, which said that two Jordanian infiltrators had exploded three mines under a railway track eleven km inside Syrian territory, causing damage. The tracks of the infiltrators had led into Jordan. (*Ayyam*, Feb 26)

On March 2 a Cairo paper claimed that a plot had been "engineered in cooperation with the Jordanian authorities" for a tribesman to plant explosives near the state guest house in Damascus [where President Abdel Nasser was staying]. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 2)

On March 12 an official statement charged two Bedouin from the Arab ash-Shar'ah with an attempt to assassinate Abdel Nasser. They confessed to having been instructed by a Jordanian officer to hurl bombs at the President during his visit to Suweida. [No such visit took place.] (*Ayyam*, March 12; *Mid. Mir.*, March 18)

Amman denied any connection with the alleged plots and declared that after the Baghdad conference Jordan had done its utmost to help clear the Arab atmosphere. (*R. Amman*, March 12-*IMB*, March 13; *Difa*, March 183; *Mid. Mir.*, March 18)

THE HUSSEIN-ABDEL NASSER CORRESPONDENCE

(February-May)

Hussein's Initiative; Atmosphere of Rapprochement; The Correspondence. Between the end of Feb and the beginning of May, King Hussein and President Abdel Nasser exchanged four letters. King Hussein took the initiative in a message, dated Feb 23, calling for Arab solidarity. He handed it to the UAR chargé d'affaires in Amman, Zuhayr ad-Dalati, who at Hussein's request went immediately to Damascus to deliver it to Abdel Nasser who had just started on a tour of Syria. Before writing the letter, the King told his Cabinet of his intention; the Cabinet gave its warm approval.

During the following days Amman Radio began to stress the need for Arab solidarity and praised King Hussein for striving to achieve it. At the same time, rumours began to circulate that the differences between the UAR and Jordan would soon be resolved. Such a prospect was warmly welcomed by the Jordanian press, which said that it had filled the Jordanian people with joy. The atmosphere of a thaw in Jordan was further encouraged by the announcement on March 5 that King Hussein had ordered the return to the UAR of a Mig fighterplane, held in Jordan since Sept 1960 (*MFR* 1960, p 153). On March 6 a Jordanian paper published news of the letter. The next day, Damascus confirmed it and said Abdel Nasser would reply after his return to Cairo. On March 8 Jordanian papers published a picture of Abdel Nasser, in addition to that of King Hussein, for the first time for many months. [The UAR mass media, however, paid no further attention to the matter, and up to the middle of March Jordan was officially and repeatedly accused of subversive activities in Syria, see above.] (*Jihad*, March 6, 8; *Difa*, *Menar*, *Falastin*, March 8; *Mid. Mir.*, March 11; *R. Amman*, Feb 25-March 30-*IMB*, Feb 26-March 31)

The President's reply—in the main a detailed statement of policy—was, as published in *Al-Ahrām*, dated Damascus, March 13. [Abdel Nasser, however, had already returned to Cairo on March 9.] It was delivered to Hussein by Dalati, in the presence of PM Talhūni, on March 23.

It was reported that after reading the reply, Hussein

telephoned Dalati a message for the President, saying that he was very happy with it. The Jordanian Cabinet considered the President's message. (*Difa*, March 24; *Jihad*, March 25, 26; *Ahrām*, March 31)

The first official statement on the messages came from PM Talhūni on March 25; he described Abdel Nasser's reply as "completely satisfactory" and said the letters paved the way to unity. (*Mid. Mir.*, April 1)

The two letters were first made public in full by Hassanain Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahrām*, on March 31, for, he wrote, they could prove "a turning point in Arab history" (*Ahrām*, March 31). The Jordanian PM remarked at a press conference that it made no difference who published this correspondence first. (*Jihad*, April 1) [There was no report as to whether publication had been agreed upon.]

In response to Abdel Nasser's message, Hussein in turn set out his attitudes and policies in a letter dated April 2. He also proposed a meeting with the President. The latter delayed his reply for one month; in his letter, dated May 7, he explained that he had considered the correspondence closed but had been informed that the King was awaiting a reply and agreed that a meeting was desirable. The text of these two messages was first made public by Jordan on May 10. (*R. Amman*, May 10 [12])

King Hussein's First Letter: King Hussein opened his letter by saying that his writing was inspired by the month of Ramadan, the time of the revelation of the holy Qur'an, which had led the Arab nation and humanity from darkness to light. He aimed only at "satisfying God and our conscience and at making the utmost efforts for a better future for our valiant Arab nation."

Hussein wrote that he felt that Abdel Nasser would realize the causes which had prompted him to write, and continued: "God knows that we... are still able to meet good with good, as we are able to deter an evil... God has endowed us... with courage to defend right and our nation..."

Hussein then emphasized his "belief that the Arab people and nation never were and never will be... the property of Hussein Ibn Talāl and Gamāl Abdel Nasser"; both were only servants of the nation and history would pass judgement on their deeds. Hussein continued that the responsibility for any division in the ranks of the nation would be borne by the person who created it.

Hussein went on to point out the dangers to which division exposed the Arab nation, and the blessings which unity of purpose would bring, and deplored the fact that "differences among a few people of our one nation should appear as if they were deep-rooted." He expressed his belief that the supreme interests, the national, religious, historical and geographical ties, and the common aims of "the various parts of our homeland" must grow stronger than the causes of differences. The simplest principle for cooperation was equality of rights and obligations and non-interference in each other's affairs.

He therefore extended to Abdel Nasser, as "an Arab in a responsible position," a "call for fraternization, harmony and solidarity" in the hope that this call would mark the beginning of an era of constructive cooperation for the sake of "our nation and nationalism" ("*ummatuna wa-quwamiyatuna*"). (*Ahrām*, March 31; *R. Cairo*, March 31 [April 5])

Abdel Nasser's Reply: President Abdel Nasser opened his letter (which was more than twice as long as Hussein's letter) by expressing his "happy surprise" at King Hussein's message. In reply to Hussein's "noble effort," he

wished now to give a true picture of his opinion; to "open my heart to you" not as President to King but as an Arab citizen and soldier.

Abdel Nasser then made two preliminary remarks: (1) the disputes between the Arab states were by no means superficial but reflected contemporary Arab reality. (2) Arab solidarity was essential but it must not be a solidarity of appearance only nor should it hinder the Arab resurgence and restrict the "movement of the Arab vanguard."

Abdel Nasser then proceeded to "cast a glance at the past," not, he said, in order to fetter the Arab future to it, but "for the sake of frankness." He made two points:

(1) Regarding Hussein, he recalled his expulsion of "the pillar of British imperialism in the Jordanian army" [a reference to the expulsion of Gen. Glubb on March 1, 1956]. Those were the days when Abdel Nasser tried to be a brother to Hussein and helped to try and promote "the legend of a young and heroic king" in order that he should become a lofty example of struggle for the nation, and certainly not in order to destroy it later on. Abdel Nasser said that he did not want to go any further except to point out that after the 1956 aggression upon Egypt, certain quarters sought to isolate Egypt as well as the Arab countries from each other. And though it was Egypt's loss if Jordan drew away from her, Jordan lost more if Egypt drew away from her. In both cases the Arab cause was weakened.

(2) On Arab solidarity, Abdel Nasser stated that the UAR had done its utmost to support the "independence of every Arab country." In support of this statement, Abdel Nasser spoke first of the "Palestine problem," the "foremost Arab problem," saying that it had determined many UAR political attitudes. The UAR opposed the Baghdad pact as it was aimed at diverting Arab efforts away from their main problem. The Palestine problem was "one of the reasons" for breaking the [Western] arms monopoly. "Certain Arab brethren" said the arms acquired were Communist arms; in fact, "the arms in our hands are Arab arms." The Palestine problem was also one of the reasons for the triple aggression which the Egyptian people repelled. The power of the UAR army had now reached a stage which would "satisfy the hopes of every Arab."

Abdel Nasser went on to recount in detail the support extended by the UAR to most of the Arab countries from Morocco and Algeria to Iraq and Oman.

Mentioning Iraq, Abdel Nasser said that although he realized the nature of the family ties which disturbed Hussein on this topic, "I am confident that with your intelligence and wisdom you are capable of separating personal sentiments from the inevitability of history"; this became clear when Hussein restored relations with Baghdad.

In concluding the theme of Arab solidarity, Abdel Nasser wrote that "in view of our people's material and moral possibilities, fate has made our people the vanguard and the base of the Arab struggle," a base not for domination but for service.

The President then proceeded to set out the UAR's attitudes to current affairs:

(1) Imperialism was an evil and an affliction; to surrender to it meant destruction and to bargain with it destroyed the people's strength.

(2) In international relations, the UAR believed in positive neutrality as the way to a peace based on justice; it also believed that the Afro-Asian group had a great part to play in building a bridge between the two world

blocks, and that the UAR bore "special responsibilities" toward the liberation movements, especially in Africa.

(3) Israel was an evil which "should be uprooted." This required a "comprehensive sovereign Arab force" (*qawwat arabiyyah shāmilah*) for the Arabs were confronting not only Israel but also considerable imperialist forces.

(4) Regarding the "internal front," Abdel Nasser outlined the cooperative socialist and democratic society which the UAR was endeavouring to establish.

(5) Arab nationalism, the UAR believed, led to "comprehensive Arab unity" (or "union"—*wahdah arabiyyah shāmilah*); it was not the constitutional form of this unity but the will of the Arab people which most concerned the UAR. At the same time, a united and developed Arab nation was necessary to "face Israel successfully."

Abdel Nasser concluded his letter by assuring Hussein that the UAR did not mean to impose this policy on other Arab states. "I realize that every Arab state is more capable than others of facing its own special considerations and that it has more right than others to have the final word." He wished to leave to Hussein the final decision as to the points on which they might agree and expressed the hope that disagreements between them could be faced "in a spirit of fraternal forgiveness and deep understanding of each other's motives." He assured Hussein that he truly desired to cooperate with every Arab state and remarked that he had no dreams of personal glory: "My nation has been more generous to me in its feelings than I could ever have expected." He signed the letter "your sincere brother." (*Ahram, March 31; R. Cairo, March 31 [April 5]*)

King Hussein's Second Message. [King Hussein's reply to the UAR President, dated April 2, closely followed the pattern of Abdel Nasser's letter in setting out the King's opinions. In fact, Hussein often employed phrases used by Abdel Nasser or paraphrased his expressions, in his point-by-point reply to the President's arguments.]

Constantly addressing Abdel Nasser as "brother," Hussein first expressed his "joy and hope" at the President's "sincere response" to his approach. He then affirmed that "our Arab nation is one nation." [Turning Abdel Nasser's introductory remark around, he then said that he was "unfolding [his] heart's feelings" to him not only as an Arab citizen and soldier "but also as a man of authority who has been honoured by God's will and the confidence of his people and his nation (*sha'bihi wummatihi*) to shoulder responsibility..."]

[Echoing Abdel Nasser's two preliminary remarks], Hussein then made the following points: (1) The inter-Arab disputes may indeed not be superficial; they could be the outcome of "paradoxes in contemporary Arab reality," but if all agreed that opinions might differ, then understanding could be reached through a calm exchange of ideas in mutual respect. (2) Arab solidarity was vital and the wish to achieve it had prompted Hussein's initiative. He repeated [the President's statements] that this solidarity should not restrict the "potentialities of the Arab emergence." Mutual criticism was welcome, provided that the method employed was "contact among the Arabs responsible" (*ma'ufin*—i.e. the men in power).

[Again repeating expressions employed by Abdel Nasser], Hussein said that in clarifying his attitudes he left "the final opinion" to the President and would now proceed to "cast a quick glance at the past."

Regarding Abdel Nasser, Hussein said that ever since his first meeting with him [in Cairo, in Feb 1955], he

had had nothing but love for and confidence in him. During the triple aggression he ("we") rushed to his side and that of his people. Nor was he untrue later to the "legend of the heroic people and the heroic Arab." But, Hussein continued, "days fell on us with unexpected vigour and cruelty" and "we defended ourselves after exhausting our patience." He would say no more than this but reaffirmed his feelings towards "his brother in Arabism." He agreed with the President that the estrangement of the Arabs caused them great injury.

Regarding the Arab cause, Hussein wrote, "we have always considered every Arab question as our own." As regards the "Palestine question," his attitude was "an extension of our grandfather's stand against injustice and tyranny" and he desired that "justice may be fully restored to its owners." To face Zionism, there was need for "comprehensive Arab coordination in the political, military and other fields." Hussein recalled that at the meetings of Arab heads of states [King Hussein, King Saud, President Abdel Nasser and PM Asali of Syria in Jan 1957; the first three and President Qawatly of Syria in Feb 1957 in Cairo] "one of our brothers" had "maintained that time alone would solve the Palestine problem"; he, Hussein, however had said then and still maintained that time must be exploited for the mobilization and coordination of forces. Hussein also opposed the idea of leaving the task to the Palestinians alone; it was because of this that he advocated the unity of both banks of the Kingdom. The King then spoke of Jordanian support for other Arab causes, mentioning Algeria, and of the "need for strengthening our Arab League" [the League had not been mentioned by Abdel Nasser].

Referring to the President's remarks on the King's relations with Iraq "with which you dealt with your well-known subtlety" (*labāqah*—this word conveys also an impression of cleverness, slyness), Hussein said that he "looked upon the matter only as a servant of my nation"; at no time had he considered family ties when considering the nation's supreme interests. "A page was turned, and history may judge for or against it"; his brothers in Iraq could now rely on his support just as all his Arab brothers.

Regarding his position on international relations, Hussein said that it was based on Arab interests, UN principles and the right of peoples to dignity and freedom, mutual respect between states, and cooperation in the cause of peace. He was the enemy of imperialism. He accepted with thanks all unconditional military or economic assistance as it helped to strengthen the Arabs; this course was agreed upon "at our last meeting in Cairo" [Feb 1957]. Hussein took exception to [Abdel Nasser's] statement that there were two camps competing for the domination of the world. The "Communist threat," "red imperialism," was the more dangerous, especially to the nationalist movements. Therefore "we here make no peace with Communism... and try to differentiate between real... imperialist danger... and propaganda..."

Hussein then went on to set out Jordan's internal policies: freedom of the individual, national unity, a society providing the opportunities of "exploitation of all resources by all [of the people]" on the basis of justice, the building of an effective "machinery" [administration] which would not be dependent on any particular men, the spreading of education and health facilities, the strengthening of the armed forces, development as "the continuing existence of the homeland depends on its attaining self-sufficiency."

Hussein renewed his appeal to face differences in a

spirit of brotherly understanding and forgiveness, and said: "Neither shall I derogate from your rights in this world nor shall you impose yourself on me in any form whatever. Both of us will reap the fruit of our own work and meet the will of God and His judgement."

Hussein said that he was "fully prepared" to meet Abdel Nasser.

Referring to Abdel Nasser's concluding statement about his indifference to personal glory and the feeling shown to him by "our nation," Hussein wrote "I too face life with the same outlook." (*R. Amman, May 10 [12]; Jihad, May 11*)

Abdel Nasser's Reply. Abdel Nasser's reply, dated May 7, was comparatively short. He wrote that the delay in his reply was due to his belief that with the detailed exchange of views "the circle was completed"; he also feared lest the exchange of messages might seem like "a competition in views and attitudes..." However, it had been conveyed to him that Hussein was expecting an urgent reply. As both had explained their views, he would only add some notes:

(1) He believed in the right of every Arab country to a policy suited to its own circumstances.

(2) Due to their "difference in capacity" (*tāqah*) as well as differences in stages of development, the policies of all the Arab governments could not be alike. This did not prevent Arab solidarity nor did it "prevent all their peoples from aiming at comprehensive Arab unity."

(3) Abdel Nasser was not passive towards "all that Your Majesty said you were doing for the good of your great people." In fact, the UAR had "unlimited appreciation of these brave people who proved their ability and firmness in the struggle for Arab aspirations and... deserve to enjoy the fruits of this struggle..."

Expressing his hope that Hussein would achieve his aspirations, the President wrote that the true way for the Arabs to face their problems and dangers was to develop their potential strength; this strength, in turn, lay in the "full freedom of the Arab land and the Arab owner of this land."

In conclusion, Abdel Nasser welcomed the King's "wish to meet me"; he believed that such a meeting would serve the nation. (*R. Amman, May 10 [12]; Jihad, May 11*)

Jubilation in Jordan, Pro-Nasser Sentiments. In Jordan the exchange of letters was received with great enthusiasm.

Amman Radio praised King Hussein for his efforts to achieve Arab unity [and rarely mentioned the name of Abdel Nasser]. (*R. Amman, April 1-8-BBCM, IMB, April 2-10*)

On April 1 thousands of people, especially students in Amman, Nablus, Jenin and other towns joined in spontaneous demonstrations hailing the rapprochement. The demonstrators carried pictures of Hussein and Abdel Nasser and shouted "Long live Nasser," "Long live Hussein."

A foreign observer wrote that "security officers were astonished to see pictures of Abdel Nasser—long illegal—appear in every shop window in Jerusalem. In fact the movement gathered such momentum that the authorities took fright." The crowds had begun to shout the names of the "free officers" who had plotted against the King.

King Hussein in an official statement thanked the Jordanian people for their loyalty and called on them to stop demonstrations and to express their feelings in constructive work for the country. (*Difa, Jihad, Manar, Hayat, April 2; NYT, April 4; Financial Times, April 25*)

The Cairo *Al-Ahram* quoted a Reuter dispatch to the effect that the demonstrations resembled those at the time of the dismissal of Gen. Glubb in 1956. (*Ahram*, April 2)

Comment on Hussein's Motives, Dangers To Throne Seen. [Foreign comment pointed to motives which possibly prompted Hussein's initiative as well as to dangers to his regime thought to be inherent in the rapprochement.]

The Economist, in a note on Jordan entitled "Trial Run with the UAR," said that Jordan was seeking friendship with the UAR on grounds of internal security. Whilst guarding its frontier with Israel, it could not indefinitely maintain the security forces to treat pro-Nasserism as a sin. Having failed to get Western backing for the immense irrigation schemes for refugee resettlement, King Hussein had to give the refugees the hope of a solution in a larger setting than Jordan.

As to the prospects of rapprochement, *The Economist* said that in King Hussein's 1955-6 alignment with Cairo, the final sacrifice demanded was his throne, if not his life. But those were the days when "revolutionary Nasserism was a volcanic eruption in Egypt, spilling over the borders, regardless." Now Nasserism was "more controlled and experienced, and with energies dispersed across the whole face of Africa, its impact on Arab neighbours need not necessarily be so harsh."

The paper also thought that Abdel Nasser's letter showed that the President was "veering away from a purely revolutionary process as a means of achieving Arab union." (*Economist*, April 15)

The Times editorially welcomed the signs of rapprochement "on the one condition that [King Hussein] can carry the country with him." Seeing the reconciliation against the background of a general suppression of inter-Arab differences, following the Baghdad conference, and alarm at Israel's apparently growing military strength, the paper said that "on the other hand, many Jordanians are suspicious of a policy of rapprochement and King Hussein may run into difficulties." (*Times*, March 27)

The ME correspondent of *The Financial Times* asked for the reasons behind the King's initiative at a time when his regime seemed relatively stable and in view of the danger that he might lose the support of the Bedouin who had helped him to survive. He dismissed the explanation that US pressure had been brought to bear on him, with a view to making possible a reduction of the size of Jordan's American-financed armed forces. The most probable explanation was Hussein's desire to end his isolation in the Arab World; King Saud was no longer supporting him and PM Qassim was too deeply involved in his own affairs. "If King Hussein can slowly and unobtrusively broaden the basis of his rule by restoring moderate Arab nationalists to positions in the army and government he has probably found the best way of ensuring his own survival." (*Financial Times*, April 25)

Israeli papers [concerned with the security implications to Israel of any possible change in the Jordanian regime] commented that Abdel Nasser had agreed to cooperation only if Hussein would accept Cairo's ideological directives. If Hussein's intention was to obtain from Abdel Nasser a certificate of national rectitude—the price could be his throne. (*Jer. Post*, April 2; *Ha'aretz*, *Haboker*, April 3)

To this Cairo Radio, in Hebrew, replied that Israeli and imperialist concern for the fate of the "Arab throne" or of any Arab personality, could only harm the position of that personality. The throne was threatened by the

Jordanian people so long as Jordan's official policy did not follow Arab nationalism, but now the throne could best be protected by the Jordanian people itself, which had shown its joy at the rapprochement. (*R. Cairo*, April 4 [6])

UAR: "A New Ray of Hope." *Mideast Mirror* remarked that in contrast to the "enormous prominence" given in the Jordanian press to PM Talhuni's announcement on the correspondence (March 25), the Egyptian press did not comment and barely reported on it [up to March 30]. (*Mideast Mirror*, April 1)

On March 31, however, Hassanein Haykal, in his article introducing the text of the letters, praised King Hussein's initiative and said that it deserved the support of the Arab peoples, as did the President's reply. This development could prove a turning point in Arab history, and was a new ray of hope in the Arab situation. (*Ahram*, March 31). Another Cairo paper described the rapprochement as "a turn for the better after an extended period of unnecessary bitterness." (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 3)

March-September: Uneasy Truce. [The Hussein-Abdel Nasser correspondence was not followed by a real rapprochement. The proposed meeting between the two leaders did not materialize. Diplomatic relations remained at the level of chargé d'affaires. The divergent policies on international affairs, made clear in the correspondence, found a new factual expression in Jordan's non-participation in the Belgrade neutralist conference of which Abdel Nasser was a sponsor (see p. 60 a). On the other hand, the propaganda warfare had ceased, and, between June and Sept., Jordan and the UAR found themselves on the same side of the fence in supporting Kuwait's independence against Iraqi claims.]

THE BREAK-UP OF THE UAR AND AFTER

(September-December)

Jordan First to Recognize Syria, Hussein Attacks Abdel Nasser. Amman Radio was the only Arab station to repeat the insurgents' communiqués on the day of the Syrian revolt (Sept 28). In the evening the Jordanian forces were alerted. The alert was called off by the King on Oct 2; PM Talhuni stated that this was a "natural" sequel to the "decisive victory" of the Arab revolution in Syria. (*BBCM*, Sept 29, 30; *Manar*, Sept 29; *R. Amman*, Oct 2-IMB, Oct 2)

Jordan was the first country to recognize independent Syria. The announcement came on the morning of Sept 29, the morning of the rising, less than four hours after the Syrian revolutionary command announced that Ma'mun al-Kuzbari had been charged with the formation of a cabinet, and ten minutes after the latter announced its formation. [Turkey accorded recognition the same day. Other Arab countries did so only from Oct 9, after Abdel Nasser had stated that he would not impose a diplomatic blockade upon Syria or oppose her admission to the Arab League.]

After a cabinet meeting in the morning, at which the King gave orders for the recognition of Syria, PM Talhuni sent a cable conveying the recognition to the "Revolutionary Command" and another to PM Kuzbari. He expressed "Jordan's pride" at the "blessed revolution" and said Jordan and her King were "happy" that Syria had again become "a song of true Arab glory and pride, and a springboard of true Arab nationalism."

Later in the day, Amman Radio reported that the King had appeared at the radio station in person and given instructions that it place itself "at the service of

the cause of freedom and right, which valiant Syria was living through..."

Soon afterwards, Amman Radio made a direct attack on Abdel Nasser with a sarcastic review of a speech he had made earlier in the day. (*R. Amman, Sept 29 [Sept 30, Oct 2]*)

In a speech broadcast on Oct 1, King Hussein extolled "the blessed upsurge" in Syria as "an expression of freedom," "a march towards unity," "a bridge towards a better life," and said that "our support for the Arab glory whose sons rose in valiant Syria, is boundless..." Hussein denounced the "one among the Arabs" who had drugged the people and abused them, and distorted their aspirations. He did not mention Abdel Nasser by name. He said the recognition of Syria was not merely a formal act; "our national actions are not governed by motives that change according to circumstances and time." (*R. Amman, Oct 1 [3]; Jihad, Oct 2*)

Cairo Severs Relations With Amman. Cairo retaliated first by denouncing the "feudalist government of Hussein," the "pupil of imperialism," whose speedy recognition of "the secessionists" was without precedent, except for President Truman's recognition of Israel (in May 1948). (*BBCM, Oct 3*)

On Oct 1 President Abdel Nasser issued a decree severing diplomatic relations with Jordan and Turkey "because of their hostile attitude to the UAR and Arab nationalism" (*R. Cairo, Oct 1 [3]*). This step was brought to the attention of all Arab countries by the League Secretariat, upon UAR request. (*MENA, Oct 3 [5]*)

Amman Radio (Oct 2) reacted by saying that Jordan had broken off "nationalist (qawmiyah) relations" with Abdel Nasser long ago and proclaimed battle; she would continue the battle against everything Abdel Nasser stood for. (*BBCM, Oct 4*)

The UAR Embassy staff left Jordan on Oct 7; the Jordanians left Cairo two days later. (*Palastin, Oct 8-10*)

Saudi Arabia agreed to protect Jordanian interests in the UAR; the latter's interests in Jordan were to be protected by Morocco. (*Mid. Mir., Oct 21*)

Air services were suspended, but were resumed on Oct 8, at UAR request, according to a Jordanian source. (*ANA, Oct 8 [10]*)

Abdel Nasser: "I was Deceived by Hussein." In his speech of Oct 2, President Abdel Nasser said he admitted that he had been deceived by King Hussein's message of Feb. Now he knew that this had been only a stratagem while all the time Hussein had intended "to swoop down on our republic and our nationalism" and to deliver them into the hands of imperialism. Abdel Nasser said he was sorry to have believed in the repentance of Hussein but "every believer was deceived. The Companions of the Prophet... were also deceived." But victory has always been with the believers who were able to benefit from experience. "And the believer will not be bitten from the same hole (den) twice." (*Ahram, Oct 3; BBCM, Oct 4*)

Renewed Propaganda Warfare. [With Jordan's recognition of Syria and its accompanying attack on Abdel Nasser, the Jordanian-UAR propaganda warfare which had been stopped in Feb, was resumed with a vengeance and continued unabated to the end of the year. Following are some instances of the campaign.]

Jordanian Propaganda; Hussein: "Confidence in Myself Growing." On Oct 4 Amman Radio introduced a pro-

gramme "The Voice of Damascus from Amman," consisting of recordings of material, originally broadcast by Damascus Radio, which included also attacks on President Abdel Nasser. (*BBCM, Oct 6*)

Later, and until the last week of Dec, special programmes were directed at the UAR, e.g.: "To the brothers in the Southern Region," "We, Abdel Nasser and Falastin," "Lo, Gaza, the Hashimite," (?) "An Egyptian Speaks." (*IMH, Dec 31*)

On Oct 15 King Hussein in a broadcast to the people attacked "certain persons," evildoers and criminals (as in his speech of Oct 1, without mentioning names; a tactic new for Hussein, but consistently employed by Gen. Qassim). He said that these persons thought that the Arab nation had become "a group of slaves or a flock of sheep" but they had been taught a lesson and the nation was ready to teach them more lessons. "My confidence in myself and in you is growing," Hussein said. (*R. Amman, Oct 15 [17]; Jihad, Oct 16*)

Amman Radio repeatedly asserted, on the basis of newspaper reports, that Abdel Nasser's regime in Egypt was on the brink of downfall; the people and the army might rise any minute. (See e.g.: *R. Amman, Oct 23, 25 [25, 27]*.)

[In obvious reference to Abdel Nasser's "anti-capitalist" measures following his programmatic speech of Oct 16], Amman accused him of turning one class against the other and arming the peasants and the factory workers (*R. Amman, Oct 25 [27]*). [Many broadcasts dealt with this topic.]

In a speech on Dec 15 Hussein attacked Abdel Nasser, again without mentioning his name, as a "tyrant oppressor" whose lust for power was boundless; "he drank freely from the blood of the people but his thirst was not quenched. He bit and ate the flesh of his people but was not satisfied." But the people were capable of destroying the evil, and as true vigilance spread among them "the sun of right will shine on every Arab horizon." (*R. Amman, Dec 15 [17]; Jihad, Dec 16*)

Cairo Charges Hussein With Complicity in Syrian Revolt; Calls for His Assassination. Some days after the Syrian revolt, Cairo began to charge Hussein with complicity in it. (See e.g. *Voice of the Arabs, Oct 4 [6]; Mustafa Amin in Musawwar, Oct 10*)

Abdel Nasser himself claimed (during the Preparatory Committee debates) that Hussein had plotted with Ma'mun al-Kuzbari (Syria's first Premier after the revolt). (*Ahram, Nov 30*)

Detailed charges were made by Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*. He alleged that already at the beginning of the year Hussein had informed King Saud that he had decided to act in Syria; he received a sum of money from the latter and was in contact with [Lt.-Col.] Haydar al-Kuzbari [one of the officers who led the coup] whom Haykal described as the chief plotter. The latter planned a coup for Aug, at a time when Abdel Nasser was scheduled to be in Syria and he informed Hussein accordingly. "The child ruling in Amman" flew immediately to Riyadh (on this visit, see also p 158 a), where he succeeded in enlisting Saud's financial support. The plot was called off as Abdel Nasser changed his schedule (*Ahram, Dec 1*, see also pp 614 b, ff). [Haykal did not allege that Hussein had played any direct part in or had any advance knowledge of the Sept coup.]

King Hussein in a speech broadcast in Dec said he had been falsely accused of having "participated in what has happened." (*R. Amman Dec 15 [17]*)

On Oct 31 a station calling itself "The Voice of the

Arab Nation" [apparently belonging to Egypt], was monitored for the first time. The station addressed itself to Arabs everywhere with the declared objectives of "rallying the Arab ranks and combating imperialism and its agents." The broadcasts were chiefly dedicated to denouncing Kings Hussein and Saud. (BBCM, Nov 2-4; see also ANA, Oct 30 [W, Nov 2])

In a talk on the newly-elected Jordanian Chamber of Deputies, the above-mentioned station, speaking of the King, the Deputies and Hasan al-Katib, Minister of the Interior, called on the people to "revolt and kill the criminals, squash them with your boots." (BBCM, Nov 3)

Ahmad Sa'id repeatedly predicted for Hussein an early and violent end. When, in Dec, Hussein went to England (for a medical checkup and rest—Mid. Mir., Dec 23), Sa'id said the people were indeed preparing a rest for him and "you will not escape it." (See e.g. V of A, Nov 7 [9]; Dec 9-10 [12].)

UAR stations addressed themselves often to the "Palestinians" in Jordan, urging them to destroy their rulers, "the traitors." "The Voice of the Arab Nation" called on them to destroy the Eastern Ghor (irrigation and land reclamation) project. (See e.g. IMB, Nov 16-18; BBCM, Nov 17-19, 22.)

When Hussein went to England in Dec (see above), Cairo charged that he was hatching new plots against the Arabs with his "imperialist masters" and that he had presented a plan to them for preventing the spreading of UAR socialism to other Arab countries. (See e.g. V of A, Dec 17 [19]; Akhbar, Dec 20.)

Hussein Orders Cessation of Jordanian Attacks. On Dec 24, after his return to Jordan (Dec 20), King Hussein,

in a reference to the New Year, ordered Amman Radio to cease replying "to any attacks by others," broadcast or written (R. Amman, Dec 24 [28]). Thereafter the station discontinued its direct attacks on Abdel Nasser as well as the special programmes directed to the UAR and the Gaza strip. Indirect criticism, however, continued. (IMH, Dec 31)

Hussein's gesture was rejected by the UAR. Ahmad Sa'id, of the Voice of the Arabs, said it was Jordan which had renewed the campaign against Cairo after King Hussein had "begged for truce" in his letters to Abdel Nasser. The UAR was not so stupid as to believe that Hussein was himself the author of this "New Year forgiveness." Perhaps, he suggested, it was Macmillan, "when you were at his feet receiving details of the new plot" or "your wife, Toni, the British queen..." (V of A, Dec 28 [30])

A Foreign Comment. The Economist remarked that King Hussein's "bitter tirade" against Abdel Nasser had been met by a "lack of emotion" in the Arab world, a symptom of Abdel Nasser's isolation. The paper added that the King's performance as a challenger to Cairo's social revolution and an advocate of free economy, contributed to the cause of the "counter-revolutionaries" outside Jordan, though few amongst them would see a leader in him. The paper concluded that the current economic prosperity in Jordan achieved "by government participation in companies rather than outright nationalism" was not synonymous with stability and that Jordan could not offer itself as an example of real strength as long as it had to spend most of its foreign aid on its army. (Economist, Dec 30)

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES

(See also: The UAR-Jordan; Syria-The UAR; The Arab countries of the ME and the Algerian Question; Morocco and the Arab Countries of the ME; Tunisia and the Arab Countries of the ME; Kuwait and the Arab Countries.)

THE UAR-IRAQ

Synopsis. The relative *détente* between the UAR and Iraq which had begun in 1960 continued during the first half of the year, though there were a number of attacks on Qasim in the Cairo press. The basic differences between the two countries came again into the open at the League Economic Council in June, when the UAR presented a plan for Arab economic union and Iraq a plan for cooperation only. In the Kuwait crisis, the UAR supported Kuwait's independence against the Iraqi claim to sovereignty over it. The strong UAR criticism of PM Qasim's policy, however, was often overshadowed by violent denunciation of the British intervention. On the break-up of the UAR, Qasim showed support for the independence of Syria and soon the two countries established friendly relations. Relations with Cairo continued as before. At the end of December, Qasim was denounced by Cairo as rendering service to imperialism and for trying to draw Syria into a union with Iraq.

Détente Continues; The Baghdad Conference. At the beginning of the year before the Arab League conference at Baghdad (Jan 30-Feb 4) and during the following weeks, the *détente* between the UAR and Iraq

continued. (Compare MER 1960, p 147-48.)

During Jan several nationalist papers urged Gen. Qasim to take active steps to "close the ranks" and "strengthen relations with the UAR." (Fajr al-Jadid, Jan 3, 24; Ahali, Jan 4, 15; Bayan, Jan 10, 12)

As of Jan 21, the Egyptian papers Al-Akhabir, Akhbar Sifah and Al-Musawwar were permitted to be imported and freely sold in Iraq. (Zamon, Falastin, Jan 24; Akhbar, Cairo, Jan 31)

On the eve of the Baghdad conference, Gen. Qasim denied in a press interview the existence of a dispute between Iraq and the UAR and said that relations were "taking their proper course towards cooperation and understanding." (Joridiah, Feb 1)

On Jan 30 thousands of Iraqi nationalists gave a tumultuous welcome to Dr. Mahmud Fawzi, the UAR FM, on his arrival in Baghdad to attend the League conference (Zamon, Jan 31). The demonstrators shouted: "Abdel Nasser! Abdel Nasser! Arab Unity! Arab Unity!" and their banners proclaimed: "The Iraqi people sides with the UAR"; "Long live Arab Unity"; "We welcome the delegation of Abdel Nasser" and "We will wipe out imperialism" (Eg. Gaz., Jan 31; Mid. Mir., Feb 4). A Cairo source remarked that Iraq gave no publicity to this public outburst. (Akhbar, Feb 10)

Dr. Fawzi was received by Gen. Qasim for a two-hour talk on Feb 4. Dr. Fawzi told the press that the discussions had been "friendly and constructive"; his visit had cleared the atmosphere between the two countries." (Zamon, Feb 5)

(On the Baghdad conference, see pp 103 ff. The conference did not alter the basic differences between the UAR on the one hand and the other Arab countries, including Iraq, on the other. Iraq acted at the conference as a mediator between the UAR and Tunisia.)

On Feb 7 it was announced that Iraq had released 4,000 Syrian gas cylinders, held by the Iraqi authorities since 1959. (*Mid. Mir.*, Feb 11)

Renewed Cairo Attacks on Qassim. In March and April, especially following the "taxi drivers' riots" in Baghdad (see p 264 b), the Cairo radio and press expressed their disapproval of the Qassim regime. (*IMH*, May 7)

One writer said that the attitude of the Iraqi leaders towards Arab nationalism had not changed; their real goal was to keep the Iraqi people quiet. They were endeavouring to convince the people of an Iraqi-UAR rapprochement while continuing with their policy of opposing Arab nationalism. The writer concluded: "We know quite well the attitude of each leader in our region as well as his true political inclinations." (*Mamduh Rida in Ras al-Yusuf*, March 13)

Another paper said that revolution was the need of the hour in Iraq (*Akhbar*, March 30) and still another that Iraq had a do-nothing regime; it had neither maintained stability nor introduced reforms. It was a gain for imperialism that the Iraqi people should have to expend their energy in trying to correct distortions instead of working for progress. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, April 1). A Lebanese (pro-UAR) daily predicted a month later that the end of Qassim "was near at hand." (*Ha-wadith*, May 5)

[There was no Iraqi reply to these attacks and there were additional Iraqi steps to improve relations.]

Re-opening of Road Between Iraq and Syria; Iraq Lifts Trade Restrictions. On April 13 Gen. Qassim declared that he had ordered the reopening of the Iraqi-UAR frontier (*Zaman*, April 14). Two days later Baghdad said that it was lifting restrictions on trade between the two countries and issuing export-import licences from and to both regions of the UAR in accordance with the trade agreement of Nov 1958 (*R. Baghdad*, April 15 [18]). The following day it was reported that travellers on the Baghdad-Damascus road were excused from changing vehicles at the border. (*ANA*, April 16 [W, 20])

Iraqi papers expressed the hope that these "brotherly measures" would find a positive response in the UAR, and especially that diplomatic relations would be fully restored. (*Bayan*, Thaurah, April 16)

[The 1958 trade agreement had never been implemented because of the deterioration of political relations between the two countries.] Following Qassim's announcement, implementation of the agreement was discussed at a meeting in Baghdad between a UAR delegation attending the Arab Economic Council and Iraqi representatives. It was agreed that further contacts should be made through the foreign ministers (*Bilad*, April 18). Dr Fakhir al-Kayali, UAR Minister of Justice and head of the UAR delegation, declared that relations between Baghdad and Cairo had returned to normal. (*Zaman*, April 19)

Iraq Asks for UAR Teachers. In May it was reported that contacts were in progress between Iraq and the UAR to provide Iraq with teachers, including a number of professors for the Basra medical college. (*Gumhuriyah*, May 27; *MENA*, May 28 [W, June 1])

Jawid Meets Abdel Nasser. On June 13 Dr. Hâshim Jawid, attending the Arab League Defence Council in Cairo, was received by President Abdel Nasser. Jawid told INA that he was highly satisfied with the meeting (*Zaman*, June 14). Cairo Radio said that Jawid had discussed the possibility of raising the level of diplomatic representation between the two countries. (*R. Cairo*, June 16-*IMB*, June 18). [In March 1959 diplomatic representation had been lowered to the level of chargé d'affaires.]

Dispute Over Arab Economic Unity Scheme. [At the Arab League Economic Council meeting (June 7-14), the UAR and Iraq were in dispute over their respective plans for Arab economic cooperation. While the UAR advocated an economic union, Iraq presented a scheme for cooperation only. (See: The Economic Council, above.)

The Kuwait Crisis. [In the Kuwait crisis, starting at the end of June, the UAR supported Kuwait's independence against the Iraqi claim to sovereignty over it. The UAR strongly criticized FM Qassim's policy; however this criticism was often overshadowed by violent denunciation of British intervention. In Oct after the break-up of the UAR, President Abdel Nasser withdrew the Egyptian contingent from the Arab force which had been stationed in Kuwait. (See: The Kuwait crisis, above.)

UAR Criticizes Qassim on Kurdish Rising. In Sept, when the Kurdish revolt in Iraq assumed large-scale proportions, UAR papers gave it extensive coverage. (*Akhbar*, Sept 3, 10, 18, 20; *Gumhuriyah*, Sept 15-19; *Ahram*, Sept 3, 10, 14, 16, 19, 24)

Al-Ahram said the UAR was studying the situation in Iraq with concern and that the following was self-evident: the UAR opposed every separatist movement; it believed Gen. Qassim was personally fomenting separatist strife in order to strengthen his rule by balancing opposing forces; even so, the UAR would support all sincere efforts to protect national unity in Iraq; the disturbances bore the mark of Communist participation, "the same elements which cooperated with Qassim in the policy of isolating Iraq from the rest of the Arab nation." (*Ahram*, Sept 18)

Iraqi Political Exiles in Cairo. On Sept 20, the "Free Men of Iraq" (*ahdr al-iraq*) held a ceremony in Cairo to commemorate the second anniversary of the execution of the "Iraqi victims" in Baghdad [following the Mosul Revolt of March 1959]. The ceremony was attended by a large number of "Arab dignitaries and representatives of popular organizations" [no names mentioned]. (*Gumhuriyah*, Sept 21)

Iraq and the Break-up of the UAR; Cautious Support for Syrian Independence. On Sept 28 Baghdad Radio referred to the revolt in Damascus, which had broken out in the morning, in its evening news bulletin only. [It gave much greater prominence to the communiqués of the insurgents than to Abdel Nasser's speeches.] (*R. Baghdad*, Sept 28 [30]; *IMB*, Sept 29)

On the morning of the coup, Gen. Qassim referred to it as "the serious events in the country of our brothers, the noble and courageous Syrians." In his speech (on the anniversary of the agrarian reform law), Qassim said he had ordered the army "to oppose the foreigner if he tried to interfere in the country of our brothers." He appealed to "our brothers in Syria and our brothers in

Egypt to extend their hands to each other to realize amity" as the imperialists were lying in wait for them. [Qassim made no reference to a possible preservation of the union.] (*R. Baghdad, Sept 29 (Oct 2)*)

Iraqi press opinion was divided. The [Communist] *Sa'at al-Ahrar* (Sept 30, Oct 1) and [Muhammad Hadid's] *Al-Bayān* (Sept 29) blamed Abdel Nasser for the break-up of the union. "Nationalist" [i.e. pan-Arab-inclined] papers on the other hand, expressed dismay at the success of the revolt and accused imperialism of plotting against the Arabs. (*Fajr al-Jadid, Thawrah, Sept 29*)

On Oct 2 Qassim declared in a press interview that Iraq was considering Syria's request for recognition and added that "our attitude as I stated it in Jan 1960 [support for an independent Syrian republic—see MER 1960, p 145] is unchanged" (*Nahar, Beirut, Oct 3; Iraq Times, Oct 6*). The 1960 statements concerned were republished in Baghdad papers on Oct 4. (*INA, Zaman, Iraq Times, Akhbar, Bilad, Oct 4*)

Support for President Abdel Nasser and denunciation of "the imperialist and reactionary rebellion" continued to find expression in the [nationalist] press (*Fajr al-Jadid, Oct 5*). Abdel Nasser's speech of Oct 5, in which he declared that he would not impose a diplomatic blockade, was generally praised [except by the Communists]. (*Zaman, Thawrah, Oct 6; Bayan, Oct 8*)

On Oct 9 [following Abdel Nasser's speech] Iraq recognized the Syrian Arab Republic [as did also other Arab countries]. The Cabinet statement reiterated Iraq's belief in Arab and Muslim "fraternal bonds" as well as in "national unity" (*wahdah wataniyah*—meaning unity inside the separate Arab countries). (*Bilad, Oct 10*) [Relations with the UAR (Egypt) continued as before.]

Cairo Attack on Qassim. In Dec, Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, *Al-Ahram's* editor, attacked the regime of Gen. Qassim. [Since the break-up of the UAR, Cairo had concentrated its propaganda warfare against "the seats of reaction in Amman, Damascus and Riyadh," while relations with Iraq had continued as before.]

Haykal expressed the fear that the "forces of darkness," which had temporarily engulfed Damascus, might seek out Baghdad as their next target. For Baghdad had a "strange regime," "neither imperialist, nor reactionary, nor progressive," a vacuum exposed to dangers. Qassim was "rendering, consciously or unconsciously, service to imperialism" by "securing imperialism's interests in Iraq's oil"; "imposing an unparalleled reign of terror on Iraq"; "submerging the people in baths of blood"; "preoccupying the entire Arab nation with his unjustified desire to annex Kuwait, at a time when he is unable to annex even Iraq." "At the advice of FM Hashim Jawad," Qassim was thinking of drawing up a constitution in order to exercise more influence on Syria and draw her into unity with Iraq, but what Qassim really wanted was to be the de Gaulle of Iraq "as sole leader with a parliamentary facade and extraordinary powers." (*Ahram, Dec 8*)

A Baghdad paper, in reply, spoke of the "obsession of Haykal, the sick man." (*Ahd al-Jadid, Dec 11, 12*)

THE UAR-LEBANON

Synopsis. As in previous years, but even more so because of the break-up of the Egyptian-Syrian union, relations between Lebanon and the UAR were determined to a considerable extent by two factors.

(1) Seen from Lebanon, relations with the UAR were very much an extension of internal politics, namely the

conflict between the Muslim, pan-Arab, pro-UAR section of the population and their opponents, the Christian, Western-oriented proponents of an individual Lebanese identity. The more extreme amongst the latter, the Phalanges and the NSP, made quite clear their distaste for what the UAR stood for, and were in turn sharply attacked by Abdel Nasser who accused them of trying to disrupt the UAR. At the same time he gave repeated public assurances of the UAR's concern for Lebanon's independence and internal tranquillity. The Lebanese government, while endeavouring to pursue a neutral course and to avoid giving offence to either the UAR or to her opponents, was perhaps slightly more wary in regard to the UAR.

(2) Lebanon's internal structure and liberal regime made her an easy base for subversive activities against neighbouring Syria. At the beginning of the year, there were Syrian charges that Lebanon served as a base for Jordanian-organized terror in Syria with the aim of undermining the UAR; after the break-up of the UAR, the new Syrian regime alleged that Egypt was conducting a subversive campaign from Lebanon to sow dissension in the republic.

Reports on Terrorist Activities in Syria Organized by Jordanian Agents From Lebanese Territory—Jan-March: See: Relations Between the UAR and Jordan.

Abdel Nasser Attacks Lebanese Parties, Phalanges and NSP in Damascus in Feb; Lebanese PM's statement on relations with UAR. (See pp 387 b-389 a.)

Lebanese Delegations Call on Abdel Nasser. In Feb and the beginning of March, while President Abdel Nasser stayed in the Syrian R, a number of official and private Lebanese delegations went to Damascus to congratulate the President on the anniversary of the establishment of the UAR. There were delegations from the armed forces, the Chamber of Deputies, a delegation headed by former PM Rashid Karāmi, the Junbalāt faction of the Druze community and Kamāl Junbalāt the Minister of Education himself, journalists, students and other private persons (*Hayat, Feb 21-28, March 1*). [These visits, taking place at the time Abdel Nasser was attacking the Lebanese parties, had political repercussions and even led to violence inside Lebanon when anti-UAR sections of the public demonstrated their feelings.] (See p 389 a.)

On March 4 PM Sā'ib Slām himself met with Abdel Nasser in Damascus "to clear up difficulties." On his return, he said the President had convinced him of his friendliness towards Lebanon and that there was no danger of UAR intervention in Lebanese internal affairs. (*Hayat, Jaridah, March 5, 6*)

Abdel Nasser Declares UAR Supports Lebanon's Independence. In his three addresses to the delegations (Feb 26, 28, March 5) Abdel Nasser assured them of the UAR's support for Lebanon's independence and her concern for Lebanon's internal unity and tranquillity. Any unification of Arab countries, he said, must have the unanimous approval of the countries concerned. In reference to his speeches against the Phalanges, the NSP and certain newspapers, he said that this was in defence of national unity inside the UAR which they had attacked; up to now, he said, "in spite of all this abuse and treachery, we have been very patient." The independence of the different Arab countries did not prevent them from uniting against their enemies and there remained the fact that "we are one people, one nation,

one indivisible brotherhood." (*Nasser's Speeches*, pp 59-64, 72-3, 96-8)

Various Contacts, Visits. In March Muhammad Safi ad-Din, the Lebanese Minister of Agriculture, who came to Cairo to inaugurate the Lebanese exhibit at the Cairo International Agriculture Fair, was received by President Abdel Nasser. (*Hayat*, March 25; *Ahram*, April 7)

On April 12 the UAR oil workers cabled to IPC workers in Lebanon, denouncing the company's attempts to discharge them and declaring their full solidarity with them. (*MENA*, April 12 [14])

In April a UAR First [Syrian] Army sports group visited Lebanon for various matches with Lebanese army teams. (*ANA*, April 27 [W, May 4])

On June 15 Abdallah al-Mashnūq, Lebanese Minister of the Interior, arrived in Cairo, where he was received by President Abdel Nasser. He later praised the President's "leadership of the Arab renaissance." (*Hayat*, June 16, 19; *MENA*, June 18 [20])

A Lebanese military mission attended the ninth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution in Cairo in July. (*R. Cairo*, July 20 [22]; *Hayat*, July 21)

Reported Murder in Damascus of Lebanese Communist Leader, Farajallah al-Hilu, and political repercussions during May-June, see pp 391-392.

Arrest of Lebanese Police Officer in Damascus on Charges of Espionage. On July 18 a number of deputies in the Lebanese Chamber raised the case of Emile Khayrallah, a Lebanese officer who had been arrested in Syria. The Premier announced that, while on leave, Khayrallah had crossed into Syria and was arrested there. The Syrian authorities had promised to hand him over to Lebanon at the end of the interrogation. On July 19 strikes were declared in Bhamdun and the neighbouring village of Kahale in protest against Khayrallah's arrest. (*Hayat*, Jaridah, July 19-21; *ANA*, July 18, 19 [20, 21])

On July 30 Khayrallah was handed over to Lebanon following talks the day before between the Lebanese Minister of the Interior and Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj in Damascus (*Hayat*, Aug 1). On Aug 2 it was officially revealed in Beirut that Khayrallah had been charged with espionage and that the Lebanese authorities had detained all the accused persons named in the Syrian investigations. (*Jaridah*, *Hayat*, Aug 3)

On Sept 9 a Lebanese in Syria was sentenced to life imprisonment on a charge of spying for Israel. (*Hayat*, Sept 10; *ANA* Sept 9 [12])

Attitude to the Break-up of the UAR. [The break-up of the UAR occasioned internal tension in Lebanon, and there were widespread demonstrations in support of the UAR and Abdel Nasser. The anti-UAR factions, on the other hand, showed moderation. The country quieted down after Abdel Nasser's speech of Oct 5, in which he recognized the break-up of the UAR as a *fait accompli* for the time being, and abandoned the political boycott of Syria. The Sīām government, however, continued to withhold recognition from Syria even after other Arab governments had granted it; recognition was finally accorded on Nov 8 by the Karāmi government. (See p 393 a and Relations Between Syria and Lebanon.)]

The repatriation of Egyptians, civilians and military, from Syria and Syrians from Egypt was effected through Lebanon. (See: Relations between Syria and the UAR.) President Abdel Nasser sent a message to President Shehab, thanking him for the courtesy extended by Le-

banon to the Egyptian citizens in transit. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 25)

Sequestration of Lebanese Property in the UAR. The nationalization measures in the UAR (Egypt) in Oct reportedly affected property owned by Lebanese and Egyptians of Lebanese origin to the value of £E100m. On Nov 5 the Lebanese Ambassador to the UAR was recalled to Beirut for consultation on this issue.

An official statement issued the following day in Beirut expressed the government's concern and added that it would deal with this question in the hope of reaching a solution which would protect the legitimate interests of the Lebanese within the framework of the friendly relations between the two countries. (*Hayat*, Nov 1, 7)

The Lebanese Ambassador was given the following directions: (1) Egyptians of previous Lebanese nationality were to be permitted to reacquire it; (2) the repatriation of Lebanese residents in Egypt was to be facilitated; (3) negotiations were to be conducted with the UAR to secure compensation for the property of all Lebanese nationals affected; as well as for (4) new economic and financial agreements to increase trade (*Hayat*, Nov 11). It was later reported that the UAR had agreed in principle that original Lebanese capital investments, estimated at about £L40m.-£L50m., might be repatriated following the conclusion of an agreement, while holdings which had accrued from local profits should not be dealt with until they could be properly assessed (*Hayat*, Nov 23). [By the end of the year, there was no report of any compensations having been paid.]

Abdel Nasser Again Attacks Lebanese Papers. In a speech on Dec 18, President Abdel Nasser said certain Lebanese papers expressed the views of the British Embassy, the US Embassy or King Hussein (*Ahram*, Dec 19). Ahmad Sa'id, the "Voice of the Arabs" commentator, said that ten out of the thirty daily papers in Lebanon had either been established or bought by imperialists, agents and royal palaces; he cited *Al-Jaridah*, *Al-Hayat*, *As-Zaman*, *An-Nahar*, *Al-Amal*, *Ash-Shams* and *An-Nida'*. (*V of A*, Dec 21 [23])

THE UAR-LIBYA

Various Ties and Contacts, UAR Aid. On Dec 22, 1960 Libya and the UAR concluded a trade and payments agreement, providing for the establishment of special centres to market their respective products (*Akhbar*, Dec 21, 1960; *Ayyam*, Syria, Dec 26, 1960). A year later, in Dec 1961, an Egyptian marketing centre started to operate in Benghazi. (*Ahram*, Dec 2)

On Jan 1 it was announced that Libyan workers in Egypt were exempted from the obligation to acquire special work licences. (*Ahram*, Jan 2)

On Jan 3 telex and telephone services were inaugurated between Cairo and Benghazi. (*Gumhuriyah*, Jan 4)

The UAR labour code was reportedly to be introduced in Libya, with minor alterations. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Jan 9)

A branch of the Egyptian Islamic Supreme Council was to open in Benghazi. (*Hayat*, Jan 14)

The UAR approved the engagement at the Libyan University of four Egyptian professors. (*Gumhuriyah*, Jan 12)

On Feb 1 an air service connecting Cairo with Benghazi and Tripoli was to be inaugurated by the Libyan National Airline Co. (*Akhbar*, Jan 20)

On June 21 the United Arab Airlines was to introduce

a weekly air service between Damascus and Tripoli. (*R. Damascus, June 17 [W 22]*)

In Oct a Libyan mission arrived in Cairo to study the operation of the Egyptian Institute of Desert Agriculture. (*Ahram, Oct 19*)

Political Relations. On Feb 8 a special envoy arrived in Tripoli carrying a personal message from President Abdel Nasser to King Idris as-Sanūsī. (*Hayat, Feb 12*)

The "Voice of the Free" [a clandestine, anti-UAR station broadcasting in Arabic] alleged that acting on a Russian request President Abdel Nasser was exerting pressure on the Libyan authorities for the abrogation of the agreement between Libya and the USA and the liquidation of the Wheelus base. President Abdel Nasser had raised this question with the Libyan FM at the Casablanca meeting and since then his agents had been trying to arouse Libyan public opinion against the maintenance of this US base, through incessant propaganda, the distribution of secret leaflets and meetings at the Egyptian cultural clubs in Tripoli and elsewhere in Libya. The station advised President Abdel Nasser to demand instead the withdrawal of UNEF from Egypt's eastern borders "and the raising of our flag over these occupied areas." (*V of the Free, March 8 [10]*)

In March President Abdel Nasser officially invited King Idris to visit the UAR. The invitation was accepted but no date was fixed. (*Ahram, March 10*)

On June 2 the Libyan PM, Muhammad Uthmān as-Sa'id, declared in an interview with a Cairo paper that his country's policy was national and Arab, aiming at strengthening inter-Arab and especially Libyan-UAR relations, and fighting Zionism. He expressed his satisfaction at the activities of the various Egyptian educational missions in Libya. To express its appreciation, Libya had postponed its demand for the repayment of ££3m. frozen in Egypt. (*Musawwar, June 2*)

Egyptians Involved in Plot Against Libyan Government. According to Libyan press reports, as quoted by Israel Radio, a number of Egyptian citizens were among the 300 persons arrested during Aug by Libyan authorities, following the discovery of a plot against the regime. (*R. Israel in Arabic, Aug 24 [26]*)

At the end of Aug it was reported in Cairo that Libya had decided to transfer from Cairo all its diplomatic staff, except the ambassador. No reasons or comments were given. (*Gumhuriyah, Aug 29; Hayat, Aug 30*)

Attitude on Break-up of UAR. [No Libyan reports were available on Libya's official attitude.] Cairo reported on support for the UAR (e.g. *R. Cairo, Oct 3, 4 [5, 6]*). Libya recognized the new regime in Syria [only] on Oct 19 [after five of the ten Arab countries concerned had accepted recognition]. (*Jaridah, Oct 20; R. Amman, Oct 21-IMB, Oct 22*)

THE UAR-SAUDI ARABIA

Economic and Financial Agreements. Following the visit to Riyadh of a Syrian economic delegation in Jan, the 1955 trade agreement between the two countries was renewed and became effective on April 16. (*Hayat, Feb 3, 5; ANA, April 16 [W 20]*)

In Feb Ahmad Shata, Saudi Arabian Minister of Trade, held further trade talks in Cairo. (*R. Cairo, Feb 27 [W March 9]*)

Following the visit of an Egyptian financial mission to Saudi Arabia in Feb (*Ahram, Feb 26, 28*) and talks conducted by Amir Talāl, Saudi Arabian Minister of

Finance, in Cairo in March, the two countries reached an economic and financial agreement. The agreement regulated trade and financial relations, the exchange of technical information and pilgrimage dues. An agreement regulating monetary relations was also reached between the Central Bank of the UAR and the Saudi Arabian Government. (*Ahram, March 28-31; R. Cairo, March 30 [W, April 6]; see also R. Mecca, April 13 [15].*)

Saudi Arabian Professions of Friendship, Denial of Tension. On Jan 21 Ahmad as-Shukairy, Saudi Arabian Minister of State for UN Affairs, stated in Cairo that he had handed President Abdel Nasser a message from King Saud congratulating him on his achievements at the Casablanca conference. Shukairy stressed that the King's foreign policy was based on positive neutrality and on maximum cooperation with Abdel Nasser (*R. Cairo, Jan 22 [24]*). Shukairy carried back to Riyadh a message from Abdel Nasser. (*Hayat, Jan 29*)

In Jan, on the eve of the Baghdad conference of the Arab foreign ministers, Ibrahim al-Suwayl, Saudi Arabian FM, visited Cairo where he discussed with Dr. Fawzi, UAR FM, various Arab issues, including the Buraimi question. He was received by President Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram, Jan 24, 27; Eg. Gaz., Jan 26*)

On March 30 Amir Talāl, who concluded the economic and financial agreement in Cairo (see above), declared at a press conference that the object of his visit had been to silence imperialist rumours of tension between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. He added that Abdel Nasser had agreed to visit Saudi Arabia, and that the date of the visit had been fixed. (*Ahram, March 31*)

On May 20 King Saud received the UAR pilgrimage delegation led by Hasan Abbās Zaki, Minister of Economy. (*R. Mecca, May 20 [23]*)

The Kuwait Crisis (June) [The Saudi Arabian and UAR stands on the crisis coincided in the main, in opposition to the Iraqi claim to Kuwait; see pp 117-8.]

Saudi Arabia Silent on Syrian Revolt. Mecca Radio's only comment on the day of the revolt came at noon [when it seemed for a moment that the break-up might be avoided]. It thanked God that, according to reports received, the break-up had been averted. (*R. Mecca, Sept 28 [30]*)

[The Saudi Arabian press and radio remained non-committal until after the UAR attacks on King Saud at the end of Oct, for which see below.]

Saudi Arabian recognition of Syria came on Oct 10, together with recognition by other Arab countries. (*Hayat, Oct 11*)

UAR Charges King Saud Sponsored Syrian Revolt. On Oct 27 Muhammad Hassanain Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, charged that "King Saud's funds were the power behind the coup [in Syria] that toppled the union... three and a half years after his earlier attempt against it." The reference to the earlier attempt concerned the allegation that in 1958 the King had endeavoured to bribe the Syrian leaders Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj and Shukri al-Quwatly to stage a coup to prevent the union (*Ahram, Oct 28*). This article was repeatedly broadcast by Cairo Radio and by the Voice of the Arabs (see *IMB, BBCM, Oct 29-31*; for another attack on King Saud, see *Gumhuriyah, Oct 30.*)

Haykal's article was one of a series on the Egyptian-

Syrian union. In a previous article a week earlier, Haykal had already recounted the charge of the 1958 attempt (*Ahram*, Oct 20). [However, no other charges against King Saud were made by UAR sources before Oct 27.]

UAR Socialism Background of Attack. [The background to Haykal's charges and the attacks which followed might be seen in Abdel Nasser's resolve—made public in his speech of Oct 16—to make a clean break with "reaction" and to concentrate on revolutionary socialism. Though Abdel Nasser in this speech did not speak explicitly of other Arab countries, subsequent events and statements made it clear that this doctrine was to apply also to them.] *Al-Hayāt's* "Arab Elder Statesman" (*siyāsī arabī qadīm*), writing on UAR socialism as the background to the attack, said that there were ££300m. of Saudi Arabian capital in Egypt which were now liable to be nationalized and he thought that the conflict between the two countries would become even sharper. (*Hayat*, Nov 5)

Saudi Arabian Professions of Friendship. On Oct 28 Mecca Radio broadcast a statement by the Saudi Arabian government denying the Cairo charges. It gave the text of a verbal message conveyed to the UAR Ambassador in Riyadh on Oct 26 which completely denied the charges and declared that the campaign against Saudi Arabia was harming the Arabs' cause at a time when they were most in need of unity. This message had, however, proved of no avail. Cairo radio and press attacks were continuing. The statement challenged anyone to produce documents supporting these lies. The government would rest content with this clarification and had no intention to enter into an altercation. (*R. Mecca*, Oct 28 [3])

On Oct 30 Mecca Radio broadcast a programme presented "for the sake of Islam in Egypt, for the sake of Arabism in Egypt, for the sake of brotherhood and neighbourliness" and for the sake of age-long friendship, which recalled in detail how from the very first days of the Suez attack King Saud had supported Abdel Nasser (*R. Mecca*, Oct 30 [Nov 1]; *Bilad*, Oct 31). There was very little comment on the UAR attacks in the Saudi Arabian press (for a survey of which see *Hayat*, Nov 9).

UAR Attacks Continue, Ambassadors Recalled. A station calling itself "The Voice of the Arab Nation" (*Sawt al-ummah al-arabiyyah*), monitored for the first time on Oct 31, launched severe personal attacks on King Saud (as well as on King Hussein). It repeated the charges made by Haykal and alleged extravagance and other conduct offending Wahhabī principles in King Saud's private life. (*Voice of the Arab Nation*, Nov 1 [3])

In Nov it was reported that an extensive espionage network, directed by an Egyptian employed in the Saudi Arabian Premier's Office, had been recently uncovered. (*Hayat*, Nov 14)

On Nov 20 the UAR Ambassador to Saudi Arabia was recalled to Cairo for consultations. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 20 [22])

On Nov 23 Saudi Arabia recalled its Ambassador from Cairo in protest against the propaganda campaign directed against it. (*Jaridah*, Nov 24)

Haykal Details Charges Against King Saud. On Dec 1, Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, continuing in *Al-Ahrām* his series "What Happened in Syria," detailed his charges against King Saud. He wrote that though he had no documentary proof, such as convicted King Saud of an

attempt to bribe Sarraj in 1958, when he made his payment in cheques, there existed circumstantial evidence that Saud had helped to finance an attempted coup in Aug last. Already at the beginning of 1961 Saud had given King Hussein, who approached him in this matter, a sum of money for action in Syria on condition that he did not become directly involved. When in July it became known that Abdel Nasser was to visit Syria in mid-August, the Syrian plotters contacted Hussein with the aim of organizing a coup on this occasion. Hussein in turn flew to Riyadh (on Aug 1, see p 158 a) to enlist Saud's help. The revolutionary laws of July in the UAR had aroused King Saud's special concern. His logic in this matter was that "if he did not hasten to lunch on socialism, then socialism would dine on His Majesty." King Saud paid—but this time not in cheques. When Abdel Nasser's schedule was changed, Saud feared that the conspiracy might have been unmasked, and to cover himself he sent an "astonishing" message to Abdel Nasser reporting what he claimed to have discussed with Hussein. When Saud heard of the coup of Sept 28, he danced with joy, and when he was informed of its success he "entered his harem, full of the scent of incense, perfume and poison." [Haykal did not allege that Saud had played any direct part in, or had any advance knowledge of, the Sept coup.] (*Ahram*, Dec 1)

On Dec 23 President Abdel Nasser in a public speech strongly attacked King Saud as a "reactionary" and described social conditions in Saudi Arabia as contrary to "the law of justice and the law of God." (*Ahram*, Dec 24)

THE UAR-SUDAN

Synopsis. Relations between the UAR and Sudan remained cordial without Sudan following the UAR in its involvements in Arab and world politics. Cooperation continued in technical affairs arising out of the building of the Aswan High Dam and there were growing economic ties and some UAR technical assistance.

Reports available on alleged UAR arms transfers to the Gizenga forces in Stanleyville via Sudan did not provide a clear picture. There was an unofficial UAR complaint of Sudanese obstructionism. Both the UAR and Sudan denied, however, that the UAR was exerting pressure on Sudan to allow such transit.

Sudan was the only Arab state, besides the UAR itself, which did not accord recognition to the Syrian Republic after the break-up of the UAR.

Alleged UAR Pressure on Sudan to Allow Transit of Arms to Congo. In Jan 1961 *The New York Times* reported alleged pressure on Sudan by the UAR and the Soviet Union to permit the passage of supply planes carrying arms supplies to the Gizenga forces in Stanleyville. (See MER 1960, p 32; see also this volume, pp 635 ff, on the Congo Crisis.)

In Feb Hassanein Haykal wrote that the UN force in the Congo was doing the work of imperialism; Sudan and Ethiopia, by participating in the force, were in fact serving imperialism. He also complained that Sudan had held up for 15 days a permit to overfly Sudanese territory for a UAR aircraft carrying spare parts for another UAR aircraft in the Congo. (*Ahram*, Feb 17)

A week later, Ahmad Sa'īd, the Voice of the Arabs commentator, alleged that the US had offered Sudan helicopters with American crews, for the detection of the convoys of cargo aircraft which tried to "smuggle" military aid from the UAR over Sudan to the Gizenga government. Sudan had naturally rejected the offer, al-

though the US insisted that the recent Security Council resolution made it incumbent on Sudan to prevent the UAR from using Khartoum airport for the refuelling of its aircraft. (*V of A, Feb 24 [27]*)

In March a report, attributed to the Associated Press and widely quoted in the UAR and other Arab countries, said that Maj-Gen. Hasan Bashir Nasr, Sudanese Minister of State and Deputy C-in-C of the Armed Forces, had told Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, during his present visit to Britain, that Sudan was under continuous UAR pressure to allow the passage of military supplies to the Stanleyville regime in the Congo (*R. Damascus, March 21-IMB, March 22*). MENA commented that Nasr could not have said such a thing and that the UAR would never exert pressure in any case. (*Ahram, March 22*)

An official Sudanese statement of March 25 denied British press reports to this effect (*R. Umdurman, March 25 [27]*). On March 27 Nasr told the press at Cairo airport, on his way from London to Sudan, that Sudan was not encountering any such UAR pressure. (*R. Cairo, March 27 [29]*)

Al-Akhbar accused the British government of seeking to drive a wedge between Sudan and the UAR in order to "secure a free hand in Sudan." (*Akhbar, March 23*)

Various Contacts, Cooperation, Technical Assistance. In Jan officers of the UAR Police College visited Sudan; they were received by the Sudanese Minister of the Interior. (*R. Umdurman, Jan 26 [W, Feb 2]*)

In Feb Santino Deng Teng, the Sudanese Minister for Animal Resources [and the only minister from Southern Sudan], paid a 15-day visit to Egypt. As a result of the visit it was decided to send UAR agricultural experts to Sudan. (*Ahram, Feb 16; Eg. Gaz., Feb 17, 20; Rus al-Yuruf, Feb 27*)

The Egyptian Health Ministry agreed to loan 36 doctors to Sudan; they were to leave in April. (*Akhbar, March 17*)

A number of Sudanese airmen were to be sent to Cairo to train as pilots for the Mig jet aircraft given by President Abdel Nasser to Sudan as a present during his visit in 1960. (*MER 1960, pp 135-6*) (*R. Coiro, April 1 [W 6]*)

In May members of the Sudanese police completed three months' training in Egypt. (*MENA, May 22 [W 25]*)

On July 26 the UAR and Sudan were to sign an agreement for mutual tax exemption for aviation establishments in the two countries. (*Akhbar, July 26*)

A UAR delegation visited Sudan in Aug to discuss telephone and telecommunication relations between the two countries. (*R. Umdurman, Aug 7 [9]*)

The UAR offered Sudan twenty scholarships for studies at Al-Azhar. (*Masa, Aug 23*)

In Oct Sudan decided to abolish entry charges between the UAR and Sudan, with a view to promoting friendship. (*R. Umdurman, Oct 10 [12]*)

Joint Technical Commission on Nile Waters. The Commission, established under the Nile waters agreement of 1959, met periodically as scheduled. (*R. Cairo, Jan 17 [W 21]; Masa, July 30; Hayot, Dec 5*)

The Commission also held informal talks with representatives of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika on demands made by these countries for a share in the Nile waters. (*Ahram, Oct 31*)

Sudan Supports Cairo on Break-up of UAR. On Sept 28 the Sudanese government announced that it was fol-

lowing with great concern "the deplorable events in the Syrian region of the UAR" and that President Abdud "has been in constant contact with the UAR authorities to ascertain the true facts of the situation." (*R. Umdurman, Sept 28 [30]*)

On Sept 30 Abdud cabled Abdel Nasser that he was disturbed and hurt by the "regrettable events in the UAR." He praised Abdel Nasser's "wise decisions" which had prevented bloodshed. (*R. Cairo, Sept 30 [Oct 3]*)

Cairo reported cables of support to Abdel Nasser from Sudanese leaders and organizations, including Ali al-Mirghani, leader of the Khatmiyah sect. (*R. Cairo, Oct 4 [6]*)

An official Sudanese statement following Abdel Nasser's speech of Oct 5, in which he called off the diplomatic boycott of Syria, said that Abdel Nasser's decision had strengthened "the unity of the Arabs," adding that the Sudanese government viewed the "calamity" as an internal UAR matter. (*R. Umdurman, Oct 6 [7]*)

[By the end of the year, Sudan had not recognized the Syrian Republic.]

Economic Relations, Trade. On Feb 3 the Sudanese Minister of Trade and Industry laid the foundation stone of the Khartoum branch of the Miar Bank. (*MENA, Feb 4 [W 9]*)

On May 10 talks opened in Cairo to amend the trade and payments agreements between Egypt and Sudan so as to cover also the UAR Northern R. The Sudanese delegation was led by Brig. Irwath, Minister of Commerce and Industry. The original agreement had provided for £E5m. volume of trade each way. Egyptian exports had fallen from £E9.4m. in 1956 to £E4.8m. in 1960 while Sudanese exports had fallen from £E4.7m. to £E2.5m.

A joint communiqué on May 15 said that the meeting was pervaded by a spirit of cooperation and that the parties "had agreed to hold another meeting in the first week of Nov in Khartoum." (*Ahram, May 11, 18*)

During Aug a UAR trade mission, led by the chairman of Miar Co., toured Sudan and sold Egyptian goods to the value of £E1.5m. A Sudanese source said that the delegation had offered prices below those prevailing on the world market. (*MENA, Aug 19 [W 24]; Ahram, Aug 22*)

Al-Ahram reported that Sudan had suggested the renewal of talks on an Egyptian proposal for joint international marketing of cotton and had recommended that Sudanese manufacturers and businessmen should be invited to visit industrial projects in the UAR.

The delegation had also concluded an initial agreement with a Sudanese businessman for the establishment of a Sudanese-UAR oil company to distribute oil products in Sudan and to prospect there for oil. The company would have a capital of £E1m., 51% Sudanese-owned. (*Ahram, Aug 22; see also Nav 4*)

In Nov the UAR Economic Organization concluded two agreements with Sudanese enterprises. An agreement of Nov 3 provided for the export of UAR cotton textiles and other commodities to Sudan to the value of £E1m. (*R. Cairo, Nov 3 [W 9]*). On Nov 10, an agreement with a Sudanese company provided that the latter would act as agent for the Organization in regard to exports to and purchases from Central African countries on a 2%-5% commission basis. (*R. Cairo, Nov 10 [W 16]; Ahram, Nov 11*)

In Dec it was reported that Sudan had agreed to the opening of UAR Economic Organization offices in Khartoum to promote the marketing of Egyptian products. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, Dec 1*)

On Dec 15 a mission of the Economic Organization

went to Sudan "to participate" in the formation of the UAR-Sudanese oil and mining company and the establishment of a tourist hotel in Khartoum. The UAR Minister of Economy, Qaysuni, was to go to Sudan at the head of an economic delegation in the near future. (*Ahram*, Dec 16)

THE UAR-YEMEN

(The United Arab States)

(*ittihād ad-duwal al-arabiyyah*)

(NOTE: The exact translation of the name of the federation is The Union of Arab States.)

Synopsis. Until December relations continued as previously, with the UAR-Yemeni federation existing on the formal level only. After the break-up of the UAR, the Imam published a poem in mid-Dec denouncing inter-Arab propaganda warfare and the policy of nationalization. Ten days later Abdel Nasser attacked the Imam in a public speech, and on Dec 26 the UAR dissolved the federation, as a consequence, it was explained, of her new policy of combating "imperialism in the palaces of reaction." The Cairo group of "Free Yemenis," headed by Muhammad az-Zubayri, became active in the propaganda warfare against the Imam.

Political Relations; The United Arab States (UAS). In Feb Imam Ahmad ordered the celebration in Yemen of the national holidays of the UAR. (*Musawwar*, Feb 10)

President Abdel Nasser congratulated the Imam on his escape from the attempt on his life in March. (*Ahram*, April 1)

It was reported that Egyptian journalists who wished to interview the Imam after the attempt on his life were refused entry into Yemen. (*Ayyam*, Aden, April 13)

The Inter-Arab Relations Committee of the UAR National Assembly rejected a draft resolution to accord diplomatic immunity to the office of the Yemeni representative to the UAS Federal Council in Cairo, on the ground that such immunity was against the spirit of the Union. (*Ahram*, April 30)

On Aug 12, Amir al-Hasan Ibn Sayf al-Islam Ali, the new "Special Representative" of the Imam to the Federal Council and to Cairo, arrived in Cairo to take up his posts. He carried a message from the Imam to President Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram*, Aug 13)

On Sept 21, the Imam issued a decree renewing for three years the term of the executive council of the United Arab States—as provided by the Union charter. (*Ahram*, Sept 23)

Following the break-up of the UAR, it was reported that the Imam had cabled Abdel Nasser praising his statesmanship in handling the crisis and condemning the separatist movement in Syria (*BBC in Arabic*, Oct 8-10, Oct 9). In Yemen there were reportedly public demonstrations condemning the dissolution. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Oct 5)

In Nov the Yemeni Crown Prince Sayf al-Islam al-Badr on his way home from Europe came to Cairo for a three-day private visit (*Ahram*, Nov 15); he lunched with President Abdel Nasser. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 15 [17])

The Imam's Poem, Attack on Nationalization. On Dec 13, the Aden weekly *Al-Qalam al-Adani* published a 64-line poem by Imam Ahmad in which he deplored Arab dissensions, denounced nationalization policies and called for Arab unity based on the teachings of Islam. Following is a précis of the poem:

We advise all Arabs capable of heroic deeds and worthy of the glory of their heroic ancestors to remember the precepts of the Qur'an which calls upon the Arabs to preserve their unity. But I see you filling the air with hate and envy-charged speeches, hear you howling into the microphones and fouling the language. You smear the noble ones of Arabia, insult each other and snare each other. You are not worthy of your ancestors! You have forgotten our enemy who has realized his hopes. Let us form a unity based on true Arab principles, on the Shari'ah. We must rid ourselves of harmful innovations, which allow what Islam had forbidden us. We need unity which is not based on ideologies which allow men to be robbed of their honestly-gained property, a robbery called nationalization, which pretends to attain equality between rich and poor. Neither religion nor logic allows anything not mentioned in the precepts of Islam. Robbing a man of his property by force is a sin in the eyes of Islam. The needy shall be given from the *zakāt* and what remains in the hands of the one who has given the *zakāt* is his by right. The situation can still be corrected, the people can still return to their beloved tranquillity—then there will be security in a fruitful land. (*Text in Hayat*, Dec 29; *Mid. Mir.*, Dec 16)

ANA, reporting the summary of the poem, described it as "an indirect challenge to the Cairo *Ulema* who assert that nationalization is a fundamental Islamic principle." (*ANA*, Dec 14 [16])

Abdel Nasser Attacks Imam. On Dec 23 President Abdel Nasser, speaking at a rally in Port Said in commemoration of "Victory Day," ridiculed the Imam and described social conditions in Yemen and Saudi Arabia as contrary to "the law of justice and the law of God." (*Ahram*, Dec 24)

UAR Dissolves The Federation. On Dec 26 Dr. Abd al-Qādir Hātīm, UAR Minister of State, announced the dissolution of the United Arab States. The statement explained the motives for this step as follows: (1) because of the difference in their nature, the two governments had been unable to shape this union into an effective political instrument for the promotion of the Arab Cause; (2) the UAR believed in socialism as the correct solution for the Arab situation and that consistency in social theory was vital to the success of Arab unity; (3) the UAR had hoped the Union would serve the just causes of the Yemeni people, but in fact they had not benefited from the experiment.

The UAR wished the Yemeni government to understand the situation which did not affect the possibility of continued peaceful coexistence. The UAR would not hesitate to offer this government any aid, economic, military or political, which might be useful to the brotherly Yemeni people (*R. Cairo*, Dec 26 [28]; *Ahram*, Dec 27). [The UAS had been established in March 1958, five weeks after Egypt and Syria formed the UAR.]

The *Economist* commented that "now, with Syria gone and the Egyptian revolution turned resolutely towards socialism, the connection with Yemen has become a dispensable embarrassment." (*Economist*, Dec 30)

Haykal: Dissolution Because of UAR Struggle Against Reaction; His Version of Establishment of Union. Hassanin Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, wrote that the dissolution of the union was a consequence of the UAR's new Arab policy which was based on the realization that the "palaces of reaction are the present battlefield

against imperialism and reaction"; it was an error to think that the Imam's poem was the cause.

The union was established at a stage in the Arab struggle when it was, perhaps wrongly, believed necessary to appease reaction in order to promote unity. The actual story of the establishment of the UAS was as follows. In Feb 1958, when Shukri al-Quwatly was in Cairo to sign the charter of the Egyptian-Syrian union, a message from Imam Ahmad was delivered to Abdel Nasser saying: "By God do not adjourn before including us with you." By cable, Abdel Nasser and Quwatly inquired of the Imam what he meant and received the following reply: "I have consulted the stars... it was learned that your star eclipses the others... Therefore I want to join you. The boy (*al-walad*), Al-Badr, is coming to you to discuss the question..." It was discovered, Haykal went on, that the Imam had actually consulted "the palace's fortune-teller and astrologer."

It was Quwatly who had tipped the balance in favour of the union with Yemen. His reasons were as follows: (1) there should be no hesitation about any step towards union; (2) Yemen might thus be opened to civilization; (3) the pressure on the Yemeni nationalists might be lessened; (4) if the UAR would not accept the Imam it would virtually hand him over as a gift to its enemy, King Saud. It was not Quwatly's fault that his expectations had not materialized, but it had been a mistake

to make a truce with reaction, Haykal concluded. (*Ahram*, Dec 29; *R. Cairo*, Dec 29 [Jan 2, 1962])

Attacks on the Imam. As of Dec 25, the Cairo radio and press launched a concentrated attack on the Imam's regime, describing it as tyrannical, feudal and terrorist. The Imam had desired the federation only as a means of forestalling a civil uprising and perpetuating his regime. The federation had remained on paper only as the Imam had never intended to implement it.

There were also broadcasts in the name of the Yemeni Union and Muhammad Mahmūd az-Zubayri (on whom, see p 700) who was described as the leader of the "Yemeni Liberation Movement in Cairo"; they called on the Yemeni people to rise against the Imam. (*IMB*, Dec 25-31; *BBCM*, Dec 28, 1961-Jan 12, 1962, *Cairo Press*, Dec 26, 27)

Imam's Reply to UAR Attacks. On Dec 27, San'a broadcast a statement by the Imam regretting that "a sister government" was attacking him in radio broadcasts and the press using as a pretext the advice he had tendered the Arabs in his poem, which had been misconstrued. The radio then broadcast the poem [apparently for the first time] "which does not violate the teachings of Islam or the spirit of the Qur'an." (*R. San'a*, Dec 27 [29])

The Imam recalled from Cairo the Yemeni representatives on the federal council. (*Mid. Mir.*, Dec 30)

RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

(See also: The UAR-Iraq; Syria-Iraq; The Arab Countries of the ME and the Algerian Question; Morocco and the Arab Countries of the ME; Tunisia and the Arab Countries of the ME; Kuwait and the Arab Countries.)

IRAQ-JORDAN

Synopsis. Relations were friendly throughout the year, and were not noticeably impaired by Jordan's support for the independence of Kuwait against the Iraqi claims.

Development of Friendly Relations. In Jan Mūsā Nāsir, the Jordanian FM, utilized the opportunity of his participation in the Arab foreign ministers' conference in Baghdad to express Jordan's friendliness towards Iraq. On Jan 30 Nāsir and Ambassador Wafā al-Tal were received by Premier Qassim and, it was reported, discussed cooperation between the two countries and the need to strengthen Arab solidarity (*Manar*, Jan 31). Nāsir stated that the Palestine question had been discussed and added that relations between Iraq and Jordan were now very strong and solid. (*Iraq Times*, Feb 5)

There was also a report that Iraq would extend financial aid for the upkeep of the Jordanian national guard (*Jihad*, Feb 6; *Hayat*, Feb 7) [but nothing came of it].

Appointment of Iraqi Ambassador. The Iraqi Republic's first ambassador to Jordan, Abd al-Karīm Shākir, arrived in Amman on Feb 20 and presented his credentials to King Hussein. (*R. Amman*, Feb 20, 25-*IMB*, Feb 21, 26). This was an occasion for both sides to renew their expressions of friendship and determination to make common efforts in the Arab cause. (*Iraq Times*, Feb 17, 19; *Jer. Times*, *Manar*, Feb 21; *Mid. Mir.*, Feb 25)

Development of Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Relations. From January to April, the development of friend-

ly relations between the two countries was widely reported. There were meetings between the respective premiers, foreign and other ministers with the ambassadors in both Amman and Baghdad, meetings of joint committees, the opening of an Iraqi Chambers of Commerce office in Amman (Jan 12), the provision of transit facilities to Iraq through Aqaba port, trade reports from both Amman and Baghdad of Jordanian purchases of livestock and dates and Iraqi purchases of fruit and vegetables, embassy statements in Amman and Baghdad on the issue of visas. All this was accompanied by repeated assurances by both sides of good will and friendship, and that there were no problems outstanding between the two countries. (*Falastin*, Jan 20; *Jer. Times*, Feb 20; *Difa'*, Feb 23; *Jihad*, Feb 23; *R. Amman*, Feb 19 [W 23]; *R. Amman*, March 9-*IMB*, March 10; *R. London*, March 31-*IMB*, March 31; *Manar*, Jan 12, 14, 23, March 3, April 4; *Mid. Mir.*, Feb 18, April 1; *Iraq Times*, March 9, 13, April 13; *Hayat*, March 20, 31 April 11, 12)

In March Jordan appointed a cultural attaché in her embassy in Baghdad to look after the affairs of Jordanian students in Iraq and to secure Iraqi teachers for Jordan (*Iraq Times*, March 3). An exchange of teachers was discussed between the Jordanian Education Minister and the Iraqi Ambassador, who had two further meetings on cultural relations during April (*Difa'*, March 3, April 19, 26). A Jordanian delegation of teachers and students visited Iraq in March; they were welcomed by the Minister of Education who later received a letter from Premier Talhūnī thanking him for the friendly reception of the delegation. (*R. Baghdad*, March 15, 16-*IMB*, March 16, 17; *R. Baghdad*, March 16 [18]; *Iraq Times*, *Difa'*, March 17; *Manar*, March 28)

In July it was reported that a hundred Jordanian students had been admitted to Iraqi universities; sixty of

them were granted Iraqi scholarships. (*Difa*, July 2, Aug 14; *Iraq Times*, Aug 13)

King Hussein's Wedding. [There were apparently no Iraqi press or radio comments on Hussein's engagement to Miss Toni Gardiner.] Lt-Gen. Muhammad Najib al-Rubay'i cabled his congratulations; King Hussein cabled his reply. (*Iraq Times*, May 8)

The Kuwait Crisis and Continued Good Relations. [Throughout the Kuwait crisis, which broke out in June, Jordan endeavoured to avoid giving offence to either Kuwait or Iraq. Reports said King Hussein made it clear to Iraq that she could expect no Jordanian support for her claim to Kuwait but at the same time Jordan strove to maintain friendly relations with Iraq. Jordanian participation in the Arab force in Kuwait was reportedly intended to check attempts by any side, and especially the UAR, to dominate the force. See: *The Kuwait Crisis*.]

A Jordanian military delegation participated in the third anniversary celebration of the Iraqi revolution in July. (*Jihad*, July 13)

On July 18 the Jordanian Premier sent cables of congratulations to five Iraqi leaders of the former regime on the occasion of their release from prison. (*Jihad*, July 20)

In Aug Muhammad Mahmūd as-Sawwāf, leader of the Muslim Brethren in Iraq, visited Jordan and was received by King Hussein. (*Manar*, Aug 16, 17, 18, 20)

In Aug the Jordanian Ambassador told the *Iraq Times* that relations between the two countries were now better than ever before. He said that during the past three months, over 5,300 entry visas to Jordan had been issued to Iraqis. (*Iraq Times*, Aug 13)

An Iraqi press delegation, which arrived in Amman in Aug, was received by King Hussein who emphasized the cordial relations between the two countries. (*Mid. Mir.*, Aug 26; *R. Amman*, Aug 22, 26 [23, 29]; *Jihad*, Aug 29)

The "brotherly relations" and "complete understanding" between the two countries were also emphasized by the Iraqi Ambassador who returned to Baghdad on Oct 16 for consultations. (*Mid. Mir.*, Oct 21)

Settlement of "Old Accounts." Financial talks, to settle "old accounts" arising from the former federation between the two countries, started in Baghdad in Oct (*Falastin*, Oct 24), and were completed in Nov, according to the Jordanian Ambassador, who added that the agreement reached would be implemented after consultations with the authorities in Baghdad and Amman. (*Mid. Mir.*, Oct 21, Nov 4; *Iraq Times*, Oct 27, Nov 1, 5, 7; *Hayat*, Nov 8, 12)

IRAQ-LEBANON

Political Relations. In Jan Najib as-Sā'igh, the Iraqi Ambassador in Beirut, told INA that harmony existed between Iraq and Lebanon. He added that there was no newspaper in Lebanon which attacked Iraq... all of them had realized that Iraq's policy was sound especially on Arab solidarity. (*Bilad*, *Iraq Times*, Jan 13)

On Jan 31 Philippe Taqla, the Lebanese FM, who was attending the Baghdad conference, was received by Gen. Qasim for a two-hour talk. Taqla told the press that they had discussed economic as well as Arab questions and that relations between Lebanon and Iraq were very cordial. (*Hayat*, Feb 1)

On March 7 the Lebanese Premier denied press reports

that political asylum had been granted to Col. Sālīb Mahdī as-Sannarrā'i, the former Iraqi military attaché in Beirut (and a close associate of Nūrī as-Sā'id, the late Iraqi PM). Sannarrā'i, though living in Beirut, had not applied for asylum. (*Anwar*, March 8; *MENA*, March 8 [9])

In March it was reported that Iraq would open an information office in Beirut, headed by a Foreign Ministry official. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, March 16)

Lebanon Neutral in Kuwait Crisis. [Lebanon's official attitude in the Kuwaiti crisis was determined by the wish to avoid taking sides. The Lebanese press was divided: pro-UAR papers denounced Gen. Qasim; *Al-Hayāt* was also critical of his move; several other papers supported him. (See pp 124 b, 130 b, 132 b, 135 a.)]

On July 17 Gen. Qasim received a delegation of Lebanese journalists who were attending the anniversary of the Iraqi revolution celebration. He praised Lebanon's cooperation with Iraq and thanked them for their appreciation of Iraqi efforts to exterminate imperialism. In reply the Lebanese journalist In'ām Ra'ad said: "As regards Kuwait, be sure that you have brothers in Lebanon who support you. They regard the question as that of right and there is no solution for it other than the one you have suggested." (*R. Baghdad*, July 19 [21])

In Nov an Iraqi military delegation attended the Lebanese independence day celebrations. (*Zaman*, Nov 22)

On Dec 28 the Iraqi Ambassador in Beirut warned that Iraq would break off its diplomatic relations with Lebanon if the latter exchanged diplomatic representation with Kuwait. (*Hayat*, Dec 30)

Iraq asked for Lebanese teachers to fill 150 vacancies in Iraqi schools. In Dec it was reported that the Lebanese authorities had agreed to send a number of teachers to serve one year in Iraqi secondary schools. (*Anwar*, March 12; *Hayat*, Dec 30)

Economic Relations, Air Communications. After much delay (see e.g. *Zaman*, Jan 29; *Hayat*, Feb 22) an agreement was reached whereby Iraq would export 3,000 sheep to Lebanon by the end of 1961. Iraq would also extend facilities to construct a refrigerating depot in Baghdad for Lebanese fruit (mainly apples) and vegetables. (*ANA*, April 14 [W 20]; *Hayat*, April 15)

From the beginning of the year, contacts were made with a view to concluding an air agreement between the two countries. (*Iraq Times*, Jan 17; *Hayat*, April 15; *Zaman*, May 21)

On July 28 an agreement came into force providing for twelve flights a week between the two countries. The agreement, between Iraqi Airways, Middle East Airlines and Lebanese International Airlines, provided six trips a week for Iraqi Airways, four for MEA and two for LIA. The profits were to be divided equally between Iraqi Airways and the two Lebanese airlines jointly. (*R. Baghdad*, July 31 [W, Aug 3]; *Hayat*, Aug 2)

In Sept a Lebanese delegation came to Baghdad to negotiate a civil aviation agreement. The negotiations failed, it was reported, as the Iraqi delegates had insisted on the following conditions: Air Liban to be denied landing rights in Baghdad; Lebanese aircraft not to overfly Iraq on the Kuwaiti route without prior permission; the Beirut-Baghdad flights to be reduced from six weekly to each side to three only. They also refused to discuss other questions relating to fees and taxes. (*Amal*, Sept 13; *Hayat*, Sept 21; *ANA*, Sept 20 [W 26])

Notwithstanding expectation of their imminent re-

RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

sumption (*Hayat*, Oct 24, Nov 8, Dec 15), the negotiations had not been resumed by the end of the year.

OTHER COUNTRIES

Iraq-Libya. On Jan 31 Gen. Qassim received the Libyan delegation to the Baghdad Conference. (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 1-IMB, Feb 2)

In Dec an Iraqi delegation, headed by a minister, attended Libya's independence anniversary celebrations. (*R. Baghdad*, Dec 24 [29])

Iraq-Saudi Arabia. On Jan 9, Mecca Radio broadcast an official statement denying press reports [e.g. *Hayat*, Jan 7; *Manar*, Jan 8] about a forthcoming meeting between King Saud and Gen. Qassim. (*R. Mecca*, Jan 9 [11])

In Nov the Saudi Arabian embassy in Baghdad offered four scholarships to Iraqi students for study at the recently-opened Islamic University in Medina. (*Hayat*, Nov 18)

Relations between the two countries deteriorated following Saudi Arabia's all-out support of Kuwaiti independence against Iraqi claims to sovereignty over it (see pp 117 ff). Iraqi papers described King Saud as an "imperialist agent," "autocrat," "crazy," "old sick man," etc. (*Akhbar*, June 27, July 14, Aug 5; *Mustaqbal*, July 8, 13, 24, Aug 5, 17, 30; *Thawrah*, July 25, 28, Aug 3, 9, 16)

Iraq-Sudan. On the occasion of Sudan's independence day, Qassim attended a Sudanese Embassy reception and

cabled President Abduh his congratulations. Baghdad Radio broadcast a special programme. (*R. Baghdad*, Jan 1 [3]; *Zaman*, Jan 1; *Iraq Times*, Jan 9)

Ten Iraqi teachers were to leave for Sudan in Feb. (*R. Baghdad*, Jan 24-IMB, Jan 25)

In Feb, on the occasion of the Baghdad conference, Qassim discussed with the Sudanese FM, Ahmad Khayr, the relations between the two countries. (*Iraq Times*, Feb 2, 3)

On Sudan's attitude to the Kuwait conflict, see: The Kuwait Crisis.

Iraq-Yemen. At the beginning of the year, Iraq and Yemen exchanged diplomatic representation at the level of chargé d'affaires. The Iraqi representative arrived in March; the Yemeni in April. (*R. San'a*, March 7 [9]; *R. Baghdad*, April 21-IMB, April 23)

In May the allocation of fifteen scholarships to Yemeni students for the year 1961/62 was announced in Baghdad. (*R. Baghdad*, May 9 [W 18])

A Yemeni delegation attended the anniversary celebrations of the Iraqi revolution in July (*Saba*, July 13; *Zaman*, July 14)

In Oct it was reported that Iraq was studying a Yemeni request to supply her with teachers and agricultural experts. (*ANA*, Oct 9 [W 12])

In Oct, Gen. Qassim, attending a reception at the Yemeni Legation in Baghdad, stressed Iraq's determination to cooperate with Yemen in every field. (*Zaman*, Oct 13)

RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

(See also: The UAR-Jordan; Iraq-Jordan; Syria-Jordan; The Arab Countries of the ME and the Algerian Question; Morocco and the Arab Countries of the ME; Tunisia and the Arab Countries of the ME; Kuwait and the Arab Countries.)

JORDAN-LEBANON

Jordan Accused of Using Lebanon as Base for Sabotage in Syria; Aiding NSP. During the first three months of 1961, Damascus repeatedly accused Jordan of organizing sabotage in Syria, partly by using Lebanon as a base (see: Relations Between UAR and Jordan), as had been the case also during the last quarter of 1960. (*MER* 1960, p 154)

The indictment, relating to the attempted coup d'état by the Nationalist Social Party in Lebanon on Dec 30, stated that Jordan had provided the NSP with financial aid amounting to JD20,000. [The indictment did not allege direct Jordanian involvement in the coup.] (*Hayat*, May 10, 1962; see also: Lebanon, The Attempted NSP Coup.)

Other Political Issues. During Sept King Hussein decorated a number of Lebanese personalities for their "service to the Arab cause"; they included Sa'id Farhih, owner of *Al-Sayyid*, and Riyad Taha, owner of *Al-Kifah* newspapers. (*Manar*, *Falastin*, Sept 1, 20, 28)

Following the break-up of the UAR, Amman Radio attacked two Lebanese Ministers, Abdallah al-Mashnuq and Kamal Junbalat, for their hostile attitude to Syria. It took Mashnuq to task for his "disgraceful record, first as an advocate of foreign oil companies and then of the Baghdad Pact and finally as an agent of Abdel Nasser's

embassy in Beirut." (*R. Amman*, Oct 5-IMB, Oct 6; *R. Amman*, Oct 6, [9])

It was reported that Lebanon had officially protested against these attacks to the Jordanian Government. This was officially denied by Amman, which added that the Lebanese Government had actually apologized for the attitude of the two ministers towards Jordan and Syria. A "ministerial source" in Beirut however insisted that it was Jordan which had apologized to Lebanon and not vice versa. (*Jaridah*, Oct 6, 7; *R. Amman*, *ANA*, Oct 6 [9])

On Oct 15, it was reported that Ali Abu Nuwar, the former Jordanian Chief of Staff (an opponent of King Hussein, in exile) had been expelled from Lebanon. He had arrived there two months earlier on a private visit. (*Al-Yaum*, Oct 15)

A Jordanian military delegation attended the Lebanese independence celebrations. (*Manar*, Nov 22)

Following King Hussein's attack on President Abdel Nasser in a recorded speech on Dec 15, Lebanese [pro-UAR] dailies sharply denounced the King, describing him as a "coward," "imperialist agent," etc. (*Siyasah*, Dec 17, 22; *She'ab*, Dec 20; *Beirut al Masa'*, Dec 18, 20; *Sawt al-Urubah*, Dec 18). The Jordanian ambassador in Beirut reportedly explored the possibilities of suing the papers concerned. (*Jaridah*, Dec 19)

JORDAN-SAUDI ARABIA

In Jan it was reported that Saudi Arabia had proposed to Jordan the establishment of a joint fishing company in the Gulf of Aqaba. (*R. Amman*, Jan 29-IMB, Jan 30)

In June it was reported that Jordan had decided to raise her diplomatic representation in Saudi Arabia from

chargé d'affaires to minister (*Jihad*, June 18). [By the end of the year this had not yet been done.]

King Hussein Visits King Saud. On July 29 King Hussein, accompanied by his Premier and several high officials and officers, arrived in Ta'if on a two-day visit to King Saud. (Reports on the forthcoming visit had already appeared during the first half of July, see e.g. *Jihad*, July 13.) A joint communiqué said that the two kings had discussed Arab issues and were in full accord as regards the needs for more efforts to unite the Arab ranks, to defend Arab rights, to deal with any Arab matters inside the Arab family, and to strengthen relations with the Islamic states and enhance the prestige of Islam. (*R. Mecca, Amman*, July 31 [*Aug 3*]; *Jihad*, Aug 1)

It was reported that King Saud had accepted an invitation to visit Jordan; the date had not been fixed. (*Manar*, Aug 1)

Al-Hayat reported from "reliable sources" that two issues had been discussed: the Kuwait crisis and the establishment of an Arab union. King Hussein was of the opinion that an Arab union based on full equality among the members should be established first between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to be joined later by Jordan, Yemen, Iraq and the shaykhdoms. King Saud emphasized his desire to safeguard Kuwait's independence before any new arrangement. (*Hayat*, Aug 18)

After the break-up of the U.A.R., Hassanin Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, alleged that King Hussein's object had been to enlist Saud's financial support for a coup in Syria in Aug, when Abdel Nasser was scheduled to be in Syria. The plot was called off by Abdel Nasser changed his schedule. (*Ahram*, Dec 1)

Miscellaneous. In Sept a Saudi Arabian delegation came to Amman to select 350 teachers for Saudi Arabian schools. (*Difa*, Sept 6)

LEBANON, LIBYA, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, YEMEN: RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES

(For relations of the above-mentioned countries with other Arab countries, see under other Arab countries.)

Lebanon-Libya. On June 12 the first Libyan Ambassador to Lebanon and Jordan arrived in Beirut, his place of residence. (*Hayat*, June 13)

In Sept talks in Beirut on the organized export of Lebanese fruit to Libya against the import of Libyan sheep reportedly led to an agreement in principle. (*Hayat*, Sept 15)

In Oct a Libyan delegation arrived in Beirut to discuss the possibility of engaging physicians and civil engineers for work in Libya. The head of the delegation told the press that the Lebanese authorities had undertaken to recruit the required experts. (*Hayat*, Oct 29)

Lebanon-Sudan. In Jan it was reported that Sudan had reduced customs on Lebanese fruit from 50% to 20%; contacts were being made for the conclusion of a Lebanese-Sudanese trade agreement. (*ANA*, Jan 16 [*W 20*])

In Aug Sudan informed Lebanon that it had approved in principle the conclusion of a commercial agreement and a delegation would come to Beirut for this purpose. A Lebanese draft stipulated the import into

In Sept it was reported that Jordan would loan Saudi Arabia some civil engineers. (*Jihad*, Sept 18)

In Oct King Saud and King Hussein exchanged messages on "Arab affairs." (*Manar*, Oct 12; *R. Amman*, Oct 15-16; *Oct 16*; *Jihad*, Oct 16)

OTHER COUNTRIES

Jordan-Libya. On Aug 30 the first Libyan Ambassador to Lebanon and Jordan—with residence in Beirut—presented his credentials to King Hussein. (*Hayat*, Aug 31) [Apparently no Jordanian representation had been established in Libya by the end of the year.]

Jordan-Sudan. On March 23 a Jordanian delegation, touring African countries, arrived in Khartoum on a two-day official visit. They were received by Gen. Abbud. (*Hayat*, March 24)

Jordan-Yemen. In Jan, on the eve of the Baghdad conference, Hassan Ibn Ibrahim, the Yemeni Foreign Minister, discussed in Amman with PM Talhuni "the forthcoming conference and Arab affairs in general." (*Jihad*, Jan 22-24)

On April 17, the first Yemeni diplomatic representative to Jordan, with the rank chargé d'affaires, presented his credentials to the Foreign Minister. He was received by King Hussein, to whom he handed a personal message from Imam Ahmad. (*Jihad*, April 18)

A Jordanian chargé d'affaires was to be appointed in the near future. (*Jihad*, April 18, 20)

In April a Yemeni mission led by Foreign Minister Hassan Ibn Ibrahim arrived in Amman on a three-day visit. The mission was on a tour of Arab countries. (*R. Amman*, April 21 [*24*]; *Manar*, April 23)

On June 23, the Yemeni Foreign Minister, who was attending a conference in Damascus, went to Amman where he had talks "of benefit to the Arab family" with PM Talhuni. (*Manar*, June 25)

Sudan of Lebanese fruit, mainly apples, and the export to Lebanon of Sudanese meat and sheep. (*Hayat*, Aug 9)

Saudi Arabia-Sudan. At the end of Aug it was reported that full diplomatic relations would shortly be resumed between Saudi Arabia and Sudan. (*Mid. Mir.*, Sept 2), [but by the end of 1961 this had apparently not come about]. (The two countries had withdrawn their ambassadors at the end of 1960; see MER 1960, p 168.)

Sudan agreed that the Arab League Council should meet in March 1962 in Saudi Arabia. (*Mid. Mir.*, Nov 18)

In Dec Riyadh offered Sudan six scholarships for study at the Islamic University in Medina. (*Anwar*, Dec 13)

Saudi Arabia-Yemen. In Jan five royal princes paid a five-day visit to Saudi Arabia. They were warmly welcomed and lavishly entertained. (*R. Mecca*, Jan 17 [*19*])

In Feb King Saud contributed 100,000 Riyal (\$22,000 appr.) to relieve the victims of a big fire in Hodeida. (*Hayat*, Feb 3)

On Sept 27 Crown Prince Badr of Yemen arrived in Riyadh on a state visit. (*Hayat*, Sept 28)

In Dec a Saudi Arabian medical mission went to San'a to help combat a malaria epidemic. (*Hayat*, Dec 27)

INTER-ARAB RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE UAR

ARAB REACTIONS TO THE SYRIAN COUP

(September-December)

[The Syrian coup began in the early morning of Sept 28 and, by the night of Sept 28/29, the separation from Egypt was accomplished. Abdel Nasser at first resolved to preserve the union by the employment of Egyptian forces, but on the night of Sept 28 he abandoned the idea of military intervention. On Oct 1 Abdel Nasser instituted a diplomatic blockade of Syria by cutting off relations with Jordan and Turkey which had recognized Syria.]

On the day of the coup, Sept 28, Arab reactions were generally non-committal due partly to uncertainty as to the aims of the leaders of the coup and its outcome. This, however, changed the next day. Jordan was the first to recognize Syria's independence, immediately after the establishment of the government, on the morning of Sept 29. No other Arab country followed suit. The Iraqi government during the following days made clear its sympathies with Syria. All other governments either remained publicly non-committal or expressed sympathy with the UAR. Morocco and Sudan were conspicuous among the latter.

Except for Jordan, already mentioned, the Arab countries granted Syria recognition only after President Abdel Nasser, on Oct 5, called off the diplomatic blockade he had imposed on the new republic.

Recognitions came as follows: Jordan—Sept 29; Iraq and Tunisia—Oct 9; Saudi Arabia—Oct 10; Kuwait—Oct 14; Libya—Oct 19; Yemen—Oct 25; Lebanon—Nov 8; Morocco—Dec 16. Sudan had not yet accorded recognition by the end of the year.]

(For details, see relations of individual Arab countries with the UAR and Syria.)

THE ISSUE AT THE ARAB LEAGUE

(October)

Tunisia Requests League Meeting. On Oct 2 Tunisia requested an immediate meeting of the League Political Committee to "examine the situation resulting from the Northern Region's secession from the UAR, and the formation of an independent Syrian state." (*R. Tunis, Oct 2 [4]*)

In its cable to the League SG, the Tunisian government claimed that the secession was "a serious event which affects all Arab countries." It was a duty of the League "to face such situations and help member states." The Arabs were now facing a "flagrant contention between brothers and a war of words over the radio between Cairo and Damascus which is getting fiercer... and may perhaps extend to other Arab capitals, if the League remains with arms folded..." SG Hassenah should call an urgent meeting "lest this problem become a source of weakness and cause of differences within the Arab entity." (*R. Tunis, Oct 5 [6]*)

UAR Protests "Interference in Internal Affairs." On Oct 4 Hassenah informed Tunisia that the UAR regarded the Tunisian request as an unacceptable interference in its internal affairs. Tunis Radio said this was "a misunderstanding of Tunisia's request... which was not intended to decide the attitude to the substance of the matter." (*R. Tunis, Oct 5 [6]*)

Abdel Nasser Calls off Diplomatic Blockade of Syria;

Demands League Investigation Committee. In his speech of Oct 5, Abdel Nasser called off the diplomatic blockade of Syria, and said he would not oppose her admission to the Arab League. He also said the UAR would ask the Arab League to form an investigation committee immediately to examine Syrian accusations against the UAR government and personnel. (For details see: Relations Between Syria and the UAR). (*R. Cairo, Oct 5 [7]*)

It was later learned that the establishment of such a committee was not a UAR condition for Syria's admittance to the Arab League. (*R. Beirut, Oct 9 [11]*)

Syria's Admission to the League. On Oct 28, at an extraordinary session of the League Council in Cairo, Syria was admitted to the League, and the UAR request to set up an investigation committee to examine Syrian complaints against Egypt was referred to SG Hassenah. [No such committee was established in 1961.]

Syria became the twelfth member of the League. Before the meeting, Cairo Radio in Hebrew asserted the UAR's willingness for Syria's return to the League, explaining that every action by the League was beneficial to Arab solidarity and that therefore all Arab states were welcome in it, "even those under the influence of imperialism." (*R. Cairo, Oct 28 [31]*; *R. Damascus, Oct 29 [31]*; *Hayat, Oct 29, Nov 1*)

SYRIA PROPOSES "UNITED ARAB STATES"

(October)

The Syrian Proposal. On Oct 11 an appeal was published in Damascus by the Supreme Revolutionary Command and the government, addressed to the Syrian people, to Arab governments "seeking strength, dignity, freedom and prosperity for their peoples," and to "every free Arab," "calling upon all Arab governments to convene their parliaments or consultative assemblies to study and approve the following principles and enter into urgent negotiations for their implementation." The principles, fourteen in number, were:

(1) Formation of a "comprehensive voluntary Arab unity" (or union—*wahdah arabiyah ta'w'iyah shāmīyah*) on the basis of constitutional decentralization, preserving "their local peculiarities and requirements" (*mumayyizat wa daruriyat mahalliyah*);

(2) Every member country to preserve its own legislature and executive, and to maintain its regional and international sovereignty;

(3-4) The "United Arab States" (*ad-dawlat al-arabiyah al-muttahidah*) to have a "supreme legislative council" in which the member-states would be represented equally; decisions of the council to be binding on all members if accepted by a two-thirds majority. At first, the council would formulate a unified policy for "economic, military, foreign and cultural affairs," and for other subjects later on;

(5-6) A "higher executive council" to be established, with member-states providing the president in annual rotation; the duties of the council "to be confined to the supervision of the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the higher legislative council";

(7-8) National armies to be retained, but a unified army to be set up under a joint command; the duties of the unified army to be "the protection of the borders of the great Arab homeland, the repulsion of foreign aggression... and the liberation of its usurped... components";

- (9) Member-states not to interfere in each other's internal affairs;
- (10) Safeguards against precipitate withdrawal from the union;
- (11) Foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence, positive neutrality and non-alignment;
- (12) Differences between member states to be settled by a "supreme Arab constitutional court";
- (13) The higher legislative council may amend the constitution;
- (14) "Unified Arab entities" (*kiyanat arabiyah muwashshadah*) may be set up within the framework of the "comprehensive Arab unity." (*R. Damascus, Oct 11 [12]; Nasr, Oct 12*)

Cairo Reaction Hostile. Egyptian comments were uniformly hostile: the Syrian proposal was akin to such "unions designed by imperialism" as the Hashimite Union, the Fertile Crescent and the Greater Syria plan; it enjoyed the approval of King Hussein and Israel, it aimed at a "union of words"; it was not worth listening to. (*R. Cairo, Oct 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 [13, 14, 16, 17]; Akram, Gumburiyah, Akhbar, Oct 12*)

Lebanese Opinions: Plan Prompted By Political Considerations. [Lebanese pro-UAR papers widely quoted by Cairo Radio took the same attitude as Cairo.] As to other Beirut papers:

Al-Jaridah said that a call for any kind of Arab union before the Arab states had won the battle of internal consolidation was unrealistic. It asked if the Syrian plan was not merely a method for launching a counter-offensive against Cairo. In any case it was no more than a bid to reorganize the Arab League. (*Jaridah, Oct 12*)

Al-Hayaz indicated that political necessities might have induced Syria to submit the plan, yet it considered it "a very special document" since it was the first time that an Arab government presented a well-defined plan that could be taken as a basis for discussion after settling the present dispute. (*Hayat, Oct 13*)

Jordanian and Iraqi Comments Non-Committal. [In Jordan official comments were friendly, though non-committal.] On Oct 11 PM Talhuni said that the Syrian appeal had had "a good effect" but the reply should come from the parliaments, as specified by the Syrian appeal itself, and this needed time, study and discussion. (*R. Amman, Oct 11-12, Oct 12*)

King Hussein said the plan merited serious study, since it recognized equality among the Arab states willing to join the union and rejected the idea that unity must be centred on one person. (*R. Amman, Oct 14 [17]*)

Baghdad papers at first published the Syrian proposal without any comment (*Zaman, Bayan, Thawrah, Ahali, Fajr al-Jadid, Oct 12-15*). *Al-Bayan* later wrote that an Arab liberated front including Iraq, Syria and Egypt should be established to deal with current Arab questions. (*Bayan, Oct 16*)

[By mid-Oct the issue had faded out.]

THE UAR'S NEW ARAB POLICY: ELIMINATION OF "REACTION AND IMPERIALIST SUPPORTERS" BEFORE UNION

(October-December)

Abdel Nasser: The Fight Against Imperialism—In the Palaces of Reaction. On Oct 16 President Abdel Nasser, in a programmatic speech following the break-up of the UAR, called for "revolutionary action" to implement the UAR's "revolutionary socialism." The speech was prima-

ry directed at the Egyptians but the UAR's relations with the Arab countries were referred to, at least indirectly, in the passages dealing with reaction.

Abdel Nasser described the Syrian coup as a reactionary blow designed to undo the revolutionary social laws introduced two months earlier, in July. Abdel Nasser concluded that it had been a mistake to make peace with reaction on the basis that the reactionaries were at least sons of the same Arab people. Experience had shown that reaction would always ally itself with imperialism to recover its privileges. It had been a mistake [during the last few years] to direct the blows against imperialism at military alliances and bases "where it no longer existed," while imperialism had changed its position and "concealed itself in the palaces and safes of millionaires." "We must fight imperialism in the palaces of reaction. We must fight reaction in the arms of imperialism." No compromise could be reached with reaction on national grounds. [Except for Syria, Abdel Nasser mentioned no names, and the attack on reaction could be interpreted as directed at "internal reaction."] (*R. Cairo, Oct 16 [18]; Akram, Oct 17*)

From Oct 21 onwards and into Nov, there followed the sequestration in the UAR of the property of over 800 "capitalist reactionaries" and the detention of many of them; the sequestrations also affected the property of many citizens or former citizens of other Arab countries. (See p 626 b.)

Arab Reactions: "Attempt to Save Egyptian Regime."

Commentators in Jordan, Syria and in part of the Lebanese press saw in Abdel Nasser's speech and in the sequestrations defensive measures to save the regime. These comments appeared together with reports of alleged military plotting against the regime, against a general background of instability, popular unrest and stringent security measures. (*BBGM, Oct 19, 24; Nasr, Wahdah, Damascus, Oct 18; Sabah, Beirut, Oct 23; Jaridah, Oct 24*)

Syrian papers claimed that the sequestration of property in Egypt owned by Syrians who had settled there and established industries before Abdel Nasser was born, was a retaliation for the Syrian revolution. (*Nasr, Oct 23; Ayyam, Oct 24*)

Although King Saud was described by the UAR as a reactionary and charged with having plotted the destruction of the UAR, Saudi Arabia unsuccessfully endeavoured to maintain friendly relations with the UAR. (See: Relations Between the UAR and Saudi Arabia.)

In Dec Imam Ahmad wrote a poem denouncing the policy of nationalization as a sin in the eyes of Islam. In reply, Abdel Nasser described social conditions in Yemen as "contrary to the law of justice and the law of God." At the end of the month, the UAR announced the dissolution of the Union of Arab States. (For details, see: Relations Between the UAR and Yemen.)

Syria Proclaims Arab Socialism. On Oct 17, the day after Abdel Nasser's speech, the Syrian government proclaimed its social and economic policy in an official statement entitled "The revolution of the new era and Arab socialism." The statement advocated the establishment of a regime in the Arab countries which would combine socialism and democracy. It defined socialism as a means to the attainment of the aims of Arab nationalism: a free Arab society and a great Arab civilization. Arab socialism would free the individual from all forms of enslavement, "whether by existing economic conditions or by tyrannical rule." The statement then outlined

detailed policies for Syria. (See also: Syria, Internal Affairs.) (*R. Damascus, Oct 17 [19]*)

[This statement should be seen primarily in the context of internal Syrian politics; it certainly could not have been prepared in its entirety as a reaction to Abdel Nasser's speech the evening before. It is, however, indicative of the fact that "Arab socialism" was at that time the proper attire for any Arab regime which wished to be regarded as progressive.]

The UAR: "Socialism Must Precede Union." In Dec, after the UAR had reopened its offensive against King Saud and his regime (end of Oct) and when the anti-nationalization poem by Imam Ahmad of Yemen was published (Dec 13), Hassanein Haykal wrote that "socialism must precede the union, to prepare for it"; this had been proved in Syria where reaction was able to exploit "local chauvinism" (*na'arāt mahalliyah*) in order to strike against the union. (*Ahram, Dec 15; BBCM, Dec 18*)

In a speech at Port Said on Dec 23, devoted mainly to Arab affairs, Abdel Nasser said the UAR was raising the banner of socialism and would expose imperialism and its supporters: King Saud and King Hussein and the reactionaries in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. If anybody asked him: "Why do you not liberate Palestine?" Abdel Nasser said, his answer was: "I am first waiting to get rid of reactionaries and the fifth column in the Arab countries." (For source, see below.)

Abdel Nasser; Principles, Not Plots, Are Our Weapons. Abdel Nasser strongly denied foreign press allegations that he was resorting to intrigues, although others had been plotting, unsuccessfully, against the UAR. "Had I plotted, I would have finished them all in two months," he said. At the same time, he warned that the day might yet come "when he will be compelled to prove" this. However, plots were useless; principles were the strongest weapons. "The things I am saying are reiterated by every Arab... moaning under the yoke of reaction and imperialism." (*R. Cairo, Dec 23 [28]*)

Arab and Pharaonic Egypt. In an article published on Dec 29 Hassanein Haykal set forth in more detail the tenets of Egypt's post-union Arab policy.

He first made the point that Egypt's Arabism was "eternal." To accept this fact did not entail dissociation from Pharaonic Egypt, "the creator of human civiliza-

tion"; the first grew out of the latter. Pharaonism was not a charge to be levelled at Egypt but an honour. On the other hand, "angry pride" did not befit the Egyptians even if such a charge was levelled by people who had no history whatever, and who had been apes in the pre-history of man. Nor did it befit Egyptians to compare their powerful progressive state of twenty seven million people with "a collection of tribes" ruled by imperialist agents. The Arabism of Egypt should not be subject to discussion. (For source, see below.)

Twofold Egyptian Policy: "As a State and As a Revolution" With Revolution Having Priority. Haykal explained that during the present socialist phase of the struggle, "we should differentiate between Egypt as a state" dealing with all Arab governments and "Egypt as a revolution" which should deal only with the peoples. Egypt as a revolution should carry its call across the borders and at the same time "initiate its peaceful revolutionary upsurge towards the Arab future. If we really believe in unity... in the existence of one Arab nation, we have no right to separate ourselves from the struggle of other citizens of our nation." Egypt as a revolution "will not be the Cairo government but it will become the progressive party within the framework of the Arab nation. It should extend its hand to all progressive elements of the nation, stand beside them openly, and help and support them." In so far as contradictions arose between Egypt's two roles, preference should be given to the revolutionary role. "We should even be prepared to freeze the effectiveness of the Arab League if it were to be used as a means to paralyze our movement."

After defining imperialism and reaction as the enemy, Haykal wrote: "We must clearly realize that the palaces of reaction" in Amman, Riyadh and elsewhere "are now the battlefield against imperialism and reaction."

The main weapons in this battle, according to Haykal, were "a continuous call against all that we revolt against and for all that we revolt for; clear support for whoever believes in what we believe in and whoever struggles, behind the artificial borders, for freedom, socialism and unity; honest implementation, within the boundaries of our homeland, which is the base, of all the principles we advocate, so that our small homeland may be a living part of our nation's major aspirations." Bribery, plots, bullets and bombs were not weapons to be used in this battle. (*Ahram, Dec 29*)

RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

SYRIA-THE UAR

NOTE: Relations between the UAR (Egypt) and Syria as independent entities, for the purpose of this survey, are assumed to start on Sept 29 with the establishment of the Syrian government in the morning, and President Abdel Nasser's decision to forgo attempts at restoring the union by force of arms, which he broadcast on the afternoon of Sept 29. (For previous developments, see: The Dissolution of the UAR.)

Abdel Nasser Calls Off Military Operation, Encourages Opposition to Syrian Regime. At 15.20 GMT on Sept 29, Abdel Nasser declared in a broadcast from Cairo that the previous day he had ordered the navy and air force to carry two parachute brigades to Aleppo and Latakia,

where "the people were calling for the preservation of... unity." When, however, "the separatists" gained the upper hand in the region, he cancelled these orders, after 120 paratroopers had already landed in Latakia area, "to avoid Arab bloodshed."

[Addressing himself to the Egyptians] Abdel Nasser urged them to overcome their bitterness at the treason committed by a handful of ambitious intriguers in the service of reaction. Arabism needed their devotion more than ever. He felt confident that the people of Syria would succeed in protecting the gains made under the union and that they would "stand against capitalist dictatorship, treachery and rejection of principles." (*R. Cairo, Sept 29 [Oct 2]*)

On Oct 2, in his next public address, Abdel Nasser

claimed that the Syrians were struggling to save the union. "The people in Aleppo and the people in Deir ez-Zor are struggling and fighting at this decisive moment to save the UAR... This, brothers, is... the Syrian Arab people. This is the Syrian Arab army. Since Thursday [Sept 28]... they have been fighting in Aleppo... in Damascus, ... in Deir ez-Zor." He promised no direct support. (*R. Cairo, Oct 2 [4]*)

Diplomatic Blockade. On Oct 1 the UAR severed its diplomatic relations with Jordan and Turkey, which had been the first to recognize the Syrian Republic on Sept 29, on the ground that their recognition of the "separatist reactionary movement in the Northern Region" constituted a hostile act and interference in UAR internal affairs. The UAR Foreign Ministry informed all foreign diplomatic representatives in Cairo of this measure, as well as UAR representatives abroad, including those at the UN. (*Ahram, Oct 2*)

Mutual Propaganda Campaign. From the evening of Sept 28, a sharp propaganda campaign developed between the Cairo and the Syrian press and radio. The Cairo stations broadcast appeals to the people of Syria not to allow a "handful of opportunists and reactionaries" to attack Arab unity and deprive them of the social benefits they had won, and reported news of alleged demonstrations, riots and clashes in Syrian towns and villages. Abdel Nasser's speeches were repeatedly broadcast. There were constant calls to "rise in rebellion." (For the image of the Syrian revolution and its leaders, as presented during these days, see: The Dissolution of the UAR.) (*R. Cairo, V of A, Sept 30, Oct 1 [Oct 3], Oct 2, 3 [4], Oct 3, 4 [5], Oct 4 [6]*)

Spokesmen for the new Syrian regime concentrated in the main on blaming Cairo and Abdel Nasser personally for having made dissolution inevitable as well as final because of their alleged imperialistic corruption, tyranny, and treachery on Sept 28. (For details, see: The Dissolution of the UAR.) A statement by Syrian politicians in support of the dissolution called on the people of Egypt to free themselves from the "dictatorship" which had led to the separation of Syria from Egypt.

At the same time there were repeated expressions of hope that Arahim might bring the two peoples together again. (*R. Damascus, Sept 28 [29], 29 [Oct 2], Oct 1 [3], Oct 2 [4]*)

Syrian Appeal To Abdel Nasser To Cease Propaganda Campaign. In the afternoon of Oct 5, the Syrian Revolutionary Command published an "historic appeal" to Abdel Nasser, terming the events in Syria an "uprising of justice" and calling upon Abdel Nasser, from a position of strength and equality, to cease "the war of radios and abuse," which, it said, was not started by the Syrians, "and we will do likewise." The appeal also assured Abdel Nasser that Syria would never again submit to his rule and requested him to ask himself whether he was not the prime obstacle to Arab unity and ought not to give up leadership and the presidency. If Abdel Nasser chose to ignore the appeal and refused to treat the new regime in Syria as brethren "under a comprehensive Arab unity," the Arab peoples "would act as umpires." (*R. Damascus, Oct 5 [7]; Narr, Oct 6*)

The broadcast of this appeal was begun at 4 p.m. GMT, simultaneously with Abdel Nasser's broadcast (for which see immediately below).

Abdel Nasser Calls Off Diplomatic Blockade, Advocates Internal Unity But Withholds Recognition. [A new

phase started with Abdel Nasser's speech on the evening of Oct 5.] Abdel Nasser said he could not consent to a situation in which "Cairo and Damascus were not comrades in struggle," where the Syrian army might find itself called upon to fight the Syrian people and where the strength of the Syrian people itself might be dissipated. Thus, just as he had previously rejected "military war" as a means of maintaining unity, he now rejected civil war [in Syria] as a substitute for it. Abdel Nasser also did not wish to impose a political blockade on Syria as it was the Syrian people that would suffer from it. National unity inside Syria took priority and should be regarded as a preparation for Arab unity.

Damascus had hitherto been unable to secure international recognition, the President said, whereas "the civilized world has expressed to me... support for the UAR. I regard this as sufficient..." The UAR would not oppose Syria's membership in the UN and in the Arab League.

The UAR, however, would "not recognize any government in Damascus except after a free and popular decision by the Syrians determining their road." Abdel Nasser repudiated the accusations levelled against the UAR from Damascus, concerning its stewardship of the union and in particular asked that a committee be appointed by the Arab League to verify the following points: (1) that the gold reserves and cover for the Syrian currency were intact in the Central Bank, Damascus, as before the union and that the Syrian treasury had benefited from the union in several aspects which he detailed; (2) that no more than 95 persons were under detention [for political reasons] in Syria [at the time of the revolution], despite "many cases of plotting"; (3) that the parachutists dropped over Latakia on Sept 28 had orders not to fire, and did not carry counterfeit Syrian money; (4) the meritorious and unselfish services of Egyptian personnel in Syria under the union. (*R. Cairo, Oct 5 [7]; Ahram, Oct 6*)

It was later learned from "informed circles" that the request for a committee of investigation was not an Egyptian condition for Syria's admittance into the Arab League. (*R. Beirut, Oct 9 [11]*)

(On further developments regarding the committee, see below: Question of Investigation Committee and Efforts to Settle Outstanding Matters.)

Syrian PM Acknowledged Abdel Nasser's "Retreat." PM Kuzbari's first "snap" reaction to Abdel Nasser's speech [which was widely acclaimed in the Arab countries and abroad for its moderation and as a remarkable feat of statesmanship] was reported as enthusiastic. A Syrian senior official quoted him as saying: "It is everything we could have asked... we will re-establish a new relationship on the basis of fraternity." Overnight, however, a radical change of tone occurred, reportedly under Army pressure. (*Daily Telegraph, Daily Herald, Oct 7; Akhbar, Cairo, Oct 8*; for more details, see p 496 a.)

On the morning of Oct 6, Damascus Radio broadcast a statement by PM Kuzbari, [consistent in tone with the Revolutionary Command's appeal of the previous day]. Kuzbari acknowledged Abdel Nasser's "retreat and admission of truth" which stemmed, however, merely from his "realization that... recognition of the new regime was imminent and inevitable and that a political siege would be directed against himself alone if he continued to sever relations with every state which recognized [Syria]." Dr Kuzbari restated the Syrian charges against Egyptian rule under the union, without referring to Abdel Nasser's demand for an Arab League committee of en-

quiry; he expressed his resentment at Abdel Nasser's continued smears of the new regime.

"The Arab people in Syria," Kuzbari continued, stretched out its hand to "the brotherly people of Egypt" as well as to all Arabs, to establish real Arab unity, but it refused to allow "an individual... to subject them to his designs." After further denunciations of President Abdel Nasser, Kuzbari concluded: "We only hope that the Arab people in Egypt will be able to do the same (i.e., "express their will with complete liberty") so that they may enjoy the freedom which God has bestowed upon us. Long live the Syrian Arab Republic! Long live true Arab unity!" (*R. Damascus*, Oct 6 [7]; *Nasr*, Oct 6, 7)

Kuzbari reportedly accepted Abdel Nasser's proposal on the committee of enquiry, but insisted that it should investigate the situation in both Syria and Egypt. (*Daily Telegraph*, Oct 7)

Comparative Let-Up in Propaganda Warfare. After Abdel Nasser's speech of Oct 5, Cairo Radio discontinued its direct attacks on the Syrian regime (*BBCM*, Oct 9). Cairo radio stations, however, soon resumed with quotations from Cairo and Lebanese papers alleging failures of the new regime, its unpopularity, corruption and anti-nationalist character. There was no return to direct incitement to rebellion or sabotage. The response to Syria's call for a loose all-Arab federation was negative and abusive. (For details, see p 160 a.)

Syrian broadcasts continued to charge the Egyptians with a rule of terror, etc. under the union. (See *BBCM*, *IMB*, Oct 10-Nov)

Repatriation of Egyptians and Syrians. [The repatriation of Egyptians from Syria and Syrians from Egypt started within a day of the coup but was completed only on Nov 20, as it encountered many difficulties, apparently because the two sides suspected each other of intending to hold back certain of the other's military personnel.]

[No total figures on the number of repatriates was available] but it was reported that, on the eve of the coup, there were 1,800 Egyptian officers in Syria. (*R. Amman*, Oct 24-*IMB*, Oct 25)

On Sept 30, Communiqué No. 20 of the Revolutionary Command called on all Egyptian employees in Syria, women excepted, to surrender on Oct 1 to the military commands of the areas in which they worked. The deadline was subsequently extended to Oct 5. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 30, Oct 4 [3, 6])

Lebanon agreed to a request from Cairo to look after Egyptians during their repatriation from Syria. (*Amal*, Beirut, Oct 1)

On Sept 30 Kamal Rifat, the Minister of Labour, and Tharwat Ukashah, the Minister of Education, were reported on their way back to Egypt, accompanied by eighty five Egyptians. The exodus via Lebanon started on Oct 1 and by Oct 4 7,000 Egyptian civilians were reported to have been repatriated. (*Ahram*, Sept 30; *Amal*, Beirut, Oct 1; *Hayat*, Oct 3, 4)

However, difficulties soon arose. On Oct 3 it was reported that the Syrian government had decided to detain Egyptian military personnel in retaliation for the Egyptian refusal to permit Syrian officials and officers to leave Egypt. (*Jaridah*, Oct 3)

On Oct 7 the first group of Syrian officers and their families, 700 in number, arrived by sea at Beirut and were conveyed to Syria. (*SNA*, Oct 8; *MENA*, *ANA*, Oct 7 [10])

On Oct 12 Gen. Zahr ad-Din accused Cairo of pre-

venting the repatriation of Syrian officers; in retaliation, Syria had stopped the repatriation of Egyptian officers. (*Jaridah*, Oct 13)

The next day *Al-Ahram* wrote that it was the Syrian authorities who had stopped repatriation of Egyptian officers, for which the paper found two reasons: (1) The officers who had led the revolt hoped that Egypt would retaliate by stopping the repatriation of the Syrian officers, in order that they might themselves occupy all the key positions before the return of these officers; (2) the authorities were attempting to force the Egyptian officers to work in order to alleviate technical deficiencies in the Syrian army. (*Ahram*, Oct 13)

Nonetheless, repatriation from both sides continued but Cairo complained on Oct 21 that Syria was repatriating far less Egyptians than Egypt Syrians. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 18, 21; *R. Amman*, Oct 24-*IMB*, Oct 18, 22, 25; *Jaridah*, Oct 21, 22)

At the same time, Nur ad-Din Kahhalah, the former Syrian Vice President of the UAR, and five former Syrian ministers in the UAR cabinet—Abd al-Wahhab Humad, Shawkat al-Qanawati, Nahid al-Qasim, Thabit al-Aris, Ahmad al-Hajji Yunis—returned to Damascus from Cairo. (*Manar*, Jordan, Oct 23)

At the end of Oct the UAR complained to the Arab League of maltreatment of the Egyptian officers in Syria and asked for an investigation. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 30-*IMB*, Oct 30)

On Nov 2 Cairo reported that the UAR and Syria had reached an agreement under the auspices of the Arab League for the completion of the repatriation. There were still 780 Egyptian officers in Syria and 930 Syrian officers in the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 1-*IMB*, Nov 1; *Ahram*, Nov 3). New difficulties arose, however, as Cairo claimed that the Syrians were not repatriating as many Egyptians as they had agreed to. (*Ahram*, Nov 5, 7)

An incident occurred on Nov 8/9, when an Egyptian captain who had carried Syrian repatriates in his ship to Beirut refused to enter the port as he was carrying some twenty Syrians less than had been agreed upon, and he feared, as he later explained, that the Syrian authorities would therefore refuse to let the Egyptian repatriates embark. The Syrian officers on board became alarmed and threatened to seize the ship. Later, assurances from the Arab League persuaded the captain to enter port. (*Mid. Mir.*, Nov 11)

Repatriation was finally completed on Nov 20. (*Mid. Mir.*, Nov 25)

Syria Charges Egyptian-Directed Infiltration From Lebanon. On Oct 27 a statement by a Syrian military spokesman said that the previous night an armed group had tried to enter Syria from Lebanon. After a clash with Syrian frontier guards, the infiltrators fled, leaving behind machine-guns and explosives; three of their number were killed. The Minister of the Interior added that the attempt had been organized by Abd al-Majid Farid, "an Egyptian saboteur expert." [Col. Abd al-Majid Farid had been UAR military attaché in Baghdad until he was expelled from Iraq in March 1959 in connection with the Shawwaf mutiny.] Later Damascus Radio asserted that the infiltrators had been sent by Abdel Nasser "to mar the Syrian Arab revolution and the rejoicing of the people at their deliverance." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 27, 30 [Oct 28, Nov 1])

Lebanon and Egypt Deny Syrian Charges. A spokesman for the Lebanese security authorities denied the Syrian

allegations; he said that "the Egyptian officer mentioned" had stayed in Lebanon three days only and left it ten days before; the incident was one of the clashes between shepherds and Syrian forces along the frontier. (*Jaridah*, Oct 29)

The same day *Al-Ahrām* reported that the UAR had requested Lebanon to investigate the "Damascus allegations" and to submit its findings to the Arab League or to make them public. (*Ahrām*, Oct 29)

Cairo Radio added that "the allegation was part of a new reactionary, imperialist attempt to stigmatize the UAR as a plotter." (*R. Cairo*, Oct 29-IMB, Oct 30)

A Second Infiltration Into Syria Reported. On Nov 1 a Syrian military spokesman announced that another group of infiltrators had tried to enter Syria from the vicinity of Zahle. The group had retired after an exchange of fire with a Syrian frontier patrol (*R. Damascus*, Nov 1 [3]). A Lebanese spokesman stated that no information had been received from Damascus regarding this incident. (*Jaridah*, Nov 3)

Spat of Syrian Complaints of UAR Aggression. The specific Syrian charges recorded above were followed by more generalized accusations against the UAR for organizing, and against Lebanon for abetting, hostile actions from Lebanese bases. Abd al-Hamid Ghālib, the UAR ambassador in Beirut, and [Col.] Abd al-Majid Farid were accused of organizing infiltration and the landing of arms and explosives on the Syrian coast for the purpose of sabotage and propaganda.

A group of Egyptian officers, experts in subversion of the Arab countries, and headed by Muhi al-Din Khufajah, had arrived in Lebanon and had been handed \$1.5m. by Ghālib to finance their activities. Captain Ahmad Shīnāwī, a UAR officer formerly stationed in Syria, was said to head a group of Egyptian engineering officers who were training Lebanese—especially members of the Popular Resistance (see MER 1960, p 347)—Palestinians and Jordanians in the handling of explosive devices for use in Syria. The Lebanese were urged to expel the "slanders and saboteurs," while articles in the press warned the Lebanese government not to let its country become "a corridor of aggression" against Syria. (*R. Damascus*, Nov 4-7 [7, 8]; *Nasr*, Nov 5, 6; *Ayyam*, Nov 7; *NYT*, Nov 7)

Syrian Commandos Destroy pro-UAR Radio Station Inside Lebanon. On Nov 6 "authoritative sources" in Damascus disclosed that, on the night of Oct 27, a Syrian force had blown up a secret radio transmitter which was being assembled under the supervision of [Col.] Abd al-Majid Farid [the Egyptian intelligence officer] at Hulwa, about a mile inside the Lebanese frontier near the Beirut-Damascus road; three men of the transmitter team were killed and seven captured, one of them an Egyptian and the others Lebanese and Palestinians. The station was to support Egyptian attacks on Syria. The action was taken since Lebanon had not acted on Syrian complaints in the matter.

Another secret transmitter, calling itself "The Voice of Arab Unity," was said to be operating from Sidon in Lebanon [40 kms. south of Beirut]. No such station was monitored either by BBCM or IMB; however, a pro-UAR radio station calling itself "Voice of the Arab Nation" (*saunt al-ummah al-arabiyyah*) was monitored by BBCM on Oct 31 on, to the end of the year. [No record of broadcasts by a "Voice of Arab Unity" could be identified.] (*Dimashq al-Masā*, No. 2672, Nov 7,

erroneously dated Nov 6; *Hayat*, *NYT*, Nov 7; *ANA*, Oct 30 [W Nov 2]; *BBCM*, Nov 2, Nov-Dec)

Lebanese Denials; Syrian Warning. The Lebanese Minister of the Interior described as "untrue" all reports about the clandestine radio station and subversive activities and said he would send a senior security official to Damascus to discuss relations between the two countries and the Syrian charges. (*Hayat*, Nov 10)

During Nov 13-15, Damascus Radio repeatedly accused the UAR ambassador in Beirut of spending large sums of money to buy support for the UAR and to finance armed incursions into Syria. (*R. Damascus*, Nov 13-15 [15-17])

(Syrian warnings to Lebanon culminated on Nov 16 with a statement by Dr Kuzbari. See: Relations Between Syria and Lebanon.)

Lebanon Offers To Mediate. On Nov 27 Rafiq Naja, the Lebanese Minister of Economy, after his mission to Damascus (see: Relations Between Syria and Lebanon) declared that Syria welcomed an offer of mediation by President Shehab between Syria and the UAR, to end the propaganda warfare between them. (*Jaridah*, Nov 28)

Negative Egyptian Attitude to Syrian Elections. The Egyptian attitude to the referendum and elections held in Syria on Dec 1-2 was negative. The atmosphere was described as one of terror and corruption, and the Syrian public was called upon to abstain from voting. (See, e.g. *R. Cairo*, Nov 30 [Dec 2]; *Dec 1, 2* [4].)

Egyptian comments saw in the election results proof that the Syrian people rejected the "separatist regime". (e.g. *R. Cairo*, Dec 2, 3 [5], 4 [6].)

[Cairo did not recognize Syria after the elections despite Abdel Nasser's statement of Oct 5 (see above).]

Question of Investigation Committee and Efforts to Settle Outstanding Matters. On Oct 28 an extraordinary session of the Arab League Council discussed the application of Syria for membership of the League and the UAR request to set up an investigation committee, which had been made by President Abdel Nasser on Oct 5 (see above).

The council approved Syria's application and decided to refer the UAR request to SG Hāsūnāh (*Hayat*, Oct 29, Nov 1). [No such committee was established.]

On Nov 2, through Hāsūnāh's mediation, the UAR and Syria agreed on the final repatriation of Egyptian and Syrian military personnel, as well as on the formation of expert committees to discuss and settle other outstanding matters between the two countries following the completion of the repatriation. (*Hayat*, Nov 7)

On Nov 22, following the completion of the repatriation, a Syrian delegation consisting of Col. Zuhayr Aql and Lt-Col. Muhammad al-Jandali came to the Arab League HQ in Cairo to negotiate on the formation of the committees, through the mediation of Sayyid Nawfal, the League Assistant SG. There were no direct meetings between the Egyptians and the Syrians. (*Hayat*, Nov 24)

At the end of Nov it was reported from Cairo that an agreement had been signed for the setting up of three committees to discuss foreign, financial and military affairs, to commence work on Dec 15 at the League HQ in Cairo. (*R. Beirut*, Nov 29 [Dec 1])

Syria appointed its delegates to the committees, but by the end of Dec negotiations had not been opened (*ANA*, Dec 9 [12]; *Ayyam*, Dec 10, 15, 29). [Egyptian sources made no mention at all of the whole issue of negotiations.]

On Dec 13 Syria lifted restrictions on the import of certain commodities from Egypt, including sesame, glycerine, cement and typewriter ribbons. (*ANA, Dec 13 [W 21]*)

Syria Announces Abstention From Propaganda War. On Dec 20 Dr Mustafa al-Barudi, Syrian Minister of Propaganda and Information, "reaffirmed" that Syria would abstain from radio and press campaigns against any other Arab country, "despite provocations by Cairo." (*R. Damascus, Dec 20 [22]*)

By the end of the year, no more mutual radio attacks had been monitored. (*BBCM, IMB, Dec*)

However, Abdel Nasser, in a speech on Dec 23, again attacked the Syrian "stooges of imperialism" and "reactionaries" who had destroyed the union and afterwards abused Abdel Nasser and the Egyptians. (*Ahram, Dec 24; BBCM, Dec 28*)

SYRIA-IRAQ

Iraq's Attitude on the Break-up of the UAR. Iraq's official attitude towards the revolt in Syria and the break-up of the UAR was cautious, but on Oct 2 Qasim let it be known that Iraq supported an independent Syria. Recognition of the new republic came on Oct 9, four days after Abdel Nasser had stated that he would not impose a diplomatic blockade upon Syria. (See: The UAR-Iraq)

Iraq Silent on Syrian Arab Union Plan. The Iraqi press published, without any comment, the Syrian proposal for a "comprehensive voluntary Arab union." (p 160 a.)

Economic Agreement and Expressions of Unity. On Oct 29 a Syrian economic delegation, led by Awad Barakat, Minister of Economy and Trade, and including, among others, Fu'ad al-Adil, Minister of Labour, and Brig. Faisal Sirri al-Husseini, Assistant Chief of Staff, arrived in Baghdad. (*R. Baghdad, Oct 29-IMB, Oct 30*)

On Nov 1 Qasim, at a dinner party for the delegation, said that the Iraqi Army had been alerted from the day Syria broke with Egypt, in order to "deal a blow" to "the treacherous imperialists before they reach Syria." He added that Syria was linked with Iraq "historically, nationally, geographically" and their peoples were one people. He continued that the lessons of history showed that all empires, whether secular or religious, were doomed to failure, and this was also true for the Arab empire. He therefore advocated "fraternal links" between the Arabs.

In reply, Fu'ad al-Adil declared that unity between Iraq and Syria was "natural, not artificial." (*Zaman, Iraq Times, Nov 2*)

On Nov 3 an economic agreement was signed in Baghdad.

The two countries would permit direct exports from and imports to each other of local products. Such products were exempted from customs duties except for certain manufactured articles. On some of these, duties were to be paid in full while on other items duties were reduced by 25% or 50%. The agreement also provided for most favoured nation treatment, facilities for freedom of personal movement by abolition of visas, and freedom of residence, work and economic activity "in accordance with the arrangements to be agreed upon." Goods in transit except oil through pipelines would be exempted from dues. Iraqi use of Syrian ports would be facilitated; vehicles would freely enter and cross Sy-

rian and Iraqi territory; consignments to Iraq would be carried in equal measure by Iraqi and Syrian trucks.

A joint experts' committee would be established to overcome obstacles, suggest revisions, and study coordination of industry with a view to making the two countries economically complementary. The two governments would encourage joint investments.

The agreement would be valid for two years with automatic renewal unless one side asked for its termination or revision at least three months in advance. (*Iraq Times, Nov 5; R. Baghdad, Nov 3 [W 9]*)

The head of the Syrian delegation said that the agreement would increase trade nearly ten-fold and from the long-term point of view, it would lay the foundations for complementary economies (*Ayyam, Nov 5*). The Iraqi and Syrian radio and press gave much publicity to the agreement, describing it as "the initiation of real Arab solidarity" and as "a bold step, opening wide vistas for economic expansion." (*R. Baghdad, V. of A., Damascus-IMB, Nov 3-6; BBCM, Nov 6-7*)

Instruments of ratification were exchanged on Dec 20. (*R. Baghdad, Dec 20 [W, 28]*)

The First Syrian Ambassador Arrived in Baghdad on Nov 26. The Ambassador, Fahmi Sultan, told reporters that Gen. Qasim was "the leader of the entire Arab world." (*Iraq Times, Nov 27*)

[By the end of 1961, no Iraqi ambassador had apparently as yet been accredited to Damascus.]

Civil Aviation Agreement. On Nov 25 Iraqi Airways and Syrian Arab Airlines initiated a draft agreement providing for two weekly flights on the Baghdad-Damascus route by each airline; it was hoped that flights would commence in Jan 1962. (*Iraq Times, Nov 27*)

The Issue of the Euphrates Dam. [The building of a dam on the Euphrates, to irrigate the Jazirah and provide electricity, had for long been envisaged by the Syrian authorities as a major development project. Since 1957, Soviet aid had been expected. When it failed to materialize, West Germany agreed, in July 1961, to provide credits to the tune of DM 500m. Thereafter, German experts proceeded with survey works.]

The Euphrates has its source in Turkey and continues through Syria and Iraq into the Shatt al-Arab and the Persian Gulf.]

When implementation of the project began to seem practical, the question of Iraqi rights came up.

In May the Syrian Minister of Public Works said, in answer to a journalist's question, that the dam would also benefit Iraq by regulating the water flow; Syria would use less water than was its due (*Ayyam, May 12*). In July he said that the building of the dam was the "right of the UAR" and Iraq could not object to it. (*R. Damascus, July 11 [W 20]*)

In Aug Iraqi papers began to protest that unilateral action by the UAR would cause Iraq untold harm, and urged joint utilization of the river (*Bayan, Aug 7; Zaman, Aug 26*). An (unnamed) Iraqi irrigation expert said that preliminary negotiations on the Euphrates' question had been going on for some time between Iraq and the UAR. He said that as both Iraqi and UAR plans for the development of the Euphrates valley had reached an advanced stage, it was both possible and imperative for them to coordinate these plans as a matter of urgency; thus each party would be made fully aware of the limits of its rights and its obligations. Iraq's acquired water rights were "fairly well covered by the terms of international law." Of the annual average discharge of

the Euphrates at Hit near the Iraqi-Syrian border (29 million cubic metres), Iraq consumed at present 17 million, irrigating about 1.38 million hectares; these were "acquired rights." Syria utilized some 2 million cubic metres, irrigating some 200,000 hectares in an area which also enjoyed considerable rainfall. Thus there remained a balance of some 10 million cubic metres the division of which should be negotiated. (*Iraq Times*, Aug 17)

Also in Aug an Iraqi ministerial committee was established to draft an agreement with the UAR for joint use of the Euphrates waters. The UAR would be asked to open negotiations. (*Bayan*, Aug 29; see also *Iraq Times*, Sept 12, 22)

On Sept 23 Qassim, answering a question at a press conference, said that the Euphrates belonged to Iraq, Syria and Turkey, and that no country could utilize more water than the average quantity it was using at present. "Those who want to build a dam, have to come to an understanding with us." (*Zaman*, Sept 25)

After the break-up of the UAR and the establishment of the Syrian Republic, the issue was repeatedly discussed between the two countries (see e.g. *Zaman*, Nov 4). On Dec 16 the Syrian Ambassador to Baghdad stated that he had discussed the issue with Gen. Qassim who had said that the problem was simple as long as good intentions prevailed on both sides. The Ambassador added that further talks would be held in the near future. (*R. Baghdad*, Dec 16 [19])

SYRIA-JORDAN

Jordanian Support. Jordan was the first country to recognize the new regime in Syria, on Sept 29, the morning of the coup. King Husain extolled the "blessed upsurge" in Syria and expressed his "boundless support" for "the sons of valiant Syria." (For details, see: Relations Between the UAR and Jordan.)

Various Contacts. At the beginning of Oct Jordan permitted the import of Syrian newspapers. (*Bilad, Jordan*, Oct 8)

On Oct 11 the border between the two countries was opened and on the following day the railway service between Damascus and Amman was resumed. (*R. Amman*, Oct 11 [13]; *R. Damascus*, Oct 13 [14])

Diplomatic Relations. In mid-Oct the two countries decided to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level (*Jihad*, Oct 16). The ambassadors took up their posts during Nov. (*Jihad*, Nov 1, 9; *R. Amman*, Nov 11, 15-16; *Nov 12, 16*)

Various Contacts. At the end of Oct and in Nov Syria and Jordan exchanged sport teams. (*R. Amman*, Oct 28 [31], Nov 9 [11]; *R. Amman*, Nov 10-16; *Nov 12*)

On Nov 9 150 members of the "Damascus trading club" arrived in Jordan for a two-day visit. (*R. Amman*, Nov 9 [11])

The Syrian Arab Airways opened on Dec 13 a service between Damascus and Amman (*Falastin*, Dec 14), and between Damascus and the Old City of Jerusalem on Dec 23. (*R. Damascus*, Dec 3 [W 7], Dec 10 [W 14]; *Falastin*, Dec 24)

SYRIA-LEBANON

Synopsis. Torn as Lebanon was by an internal struggle between pro-UAR and anti-UAR factions, the Sûlîm government withheld recognition from Syria long after the majority of other Arab countries had accorded it; only when a new government was formed by Rashid Karâmi

did recognition finally come, on November 8. The uncertainty as to what the future held for Syria made even usually anti-UAR circles hesitant at first to commit themselves or the country. Meanwhile Syrian charges had appeared that the UAR was utilizing Lebanon as a base for the subversion of Syria and that Lebanon was not preventing these activities. The Syrians said they had blown up a clandestine UAR radio transmitter on Lebanese territory as the Lebanese government had taken no action. Lebanon denied all the charges. The Syrians showed their coolness towards Lebanon even after PM Karâmi had singled out Syria for a profession of friendship in his government's statement of policy; before any act which was in Lebanon's interest, as in the economic field or the facilitating of travel, "positive" steps on the part of Lebanon were expected. Later the two countries exchanged goodwill missions. (See also: Lebanon, Internal Affairs; Relations Between Syria and the UAR; Relations Between the UAR and Lebanon.)

Lebanese Attitudes Towards the Syrian Coup. On the morning of Sept 28, Beirut Radio broadcast a statement by the Ministry of Information that "Lebanon is following with a fraternal interest the developments in the UAR and prays that bloodshed may be averted." (*R. Beirut*, Sept 28 [29])

The following day, demonstrations against the Syrian coup occurred in various places, but no anti-UAR demonstrations were reported. The Progressive Socialist Party, the *Najjâdah*, the Popular Resistance and others supported the UAR while the Nationalist Social Party supported the Syrian revolution. The Ba'ath Party and the Phalanges refrained from openly adopting a definite attitude. (For details see pp 393 b-394.)

The government tried to calm the country. The Lebanese Press Association instituted on Sept 29 censorship of press material on the Syrian crisis (*R. Beirut*, Sept 29 [Oct 2]). Damascus Radio repeatedly complained of the "unfriendly" attitude of "certain circles in Lebanon." (*BBCM, IMB*, Oct 3-12)

Recognition of Syrian Republic Delayed. On Oct 2 the Lebanese cabinet agreed to delay recognition of Syria and reaffirmed this on Oct 5. The cabinet also decided to ban demonstrations of solidarity with any other state (*Jaridah*, Oct 3-6). (Although President Abdel Nasser called off the diplomatic boycott of Syria on Oct 5 and thereafter the majority of other Arab countries recognized Syria, Lebanon's formal recognition was delayed until Nov 8.)

A guarded attitude towards Syria was, at least at the beginning, also taken by such a usually anti-UAR paper as *Al-Nahâr*. "Though Lebanon is Syria's nearest neighbour, yet it finds itself in a very delicate position which obliges it to behave during the few coming days or weeks as if it was the most remote country... we hope the new leaders in Damascus will appreciate our position and extend us some credit." The paper concluded: "Damascus might complain of a possible hesitation on our part. But we must say frankly that Damascus was always in such a hurry to adopt pro-Egyptian attitudes or to cancel them, that we were always obliged to linger behind." (*Nahar*, Sept 30)

Lebanese PM Sends Message to Ma'mûn al-Kuzbari; Various Contacts Established. A message from PM Sa'ib Slâm to Dr Kuzbari, the Syrian PM, delivered on Oct 13, reportedly stated that the Lebanese government shared the Syrian government's desire to uphold the League

Charter, and to establish brotherly relations between the two countries. (*Jaridah, Mid. Mir., Oct 14*)

On Oct 16 Syria announced that exit visas to Lebanon were again being granted. (*R. Damascus, Oct 16 [18]*)

Starting from the second half of Oct some Lebanese delegations and public personalities visited Damascus to express their congratulations to leaders of the new regime. They included a representative of the Maronite Patriarch, Bulus Ma'ashi, and a youth delegation from Zahle. (See e.g. *R. Damascus, Oct 16 [18], Nov 6 [8]*)

Syria Charges Lebanon Services as UAR Base. From the end of Oct to mid-Nov Damascus repeatedly alleged that Lebanon served as a base for subversive activities directed by the UAR against Syria. According to Damascus, a Syrian raiding party blew up a secret UAR radio transmitter inside Lebanese territory on Oct 27. The Lebanese denied all the charges. (See: Relations Between Syria and the UAR, also next item below.)

Lebanese Recognition. The first major act of the new Lebanese cabinet, headed by Rashid Karāmi, was the recognition of Syria on Nov 8. In regard to the charges that Lebanon was being utilized as a base for the subversion of Syria, Kamāl Junblāt, Minister of State, stated on cabinet instructions that Lebanon would not be a centre for inter-Arab strife; he also said that a government delegation would go to Syria to tender congratulations. (*Jaridah, Nov 9, 10*)

On Nov 16 Rashid Karāmi, in his government's statement of policy in the Chamber of Deputies, singled out Syria for special mention while speaking of Lebanon's Arab relations. He declared Lebanon would "remain the faithful neighbour of her sister, the Syrian Arab Republic, and her other Arab sisters..."; Lebanon would avoid any sort of interference in their internal affairs. (*R. Beirut, Nov 16 [18]; Hayat, Nov 17*)

The same day, at a press conference in Damascus, the Syrian Premier expressed his desire that the above-mentioned declaration would herald the "re-establishment of relations as they should have been for a long time"; every good or evil affecting Syria would perforce also affect Lebanon and this was a truth "our brothers in Lebanon should learn." Kuzbari warned that if conditions did not return to their "natural course," Syria might take steps to safeguard her security which she "considered above any brotherhood." In reply to a question on the abolition of travel permits to Lebanon and as to whether an economic delegation would go to Lebanon, Kuzbari said that Syria was still awaiting positive steps on the part of Lebanon. (*Hayat, Nov 17*)

Exchange of Goodwill Missions. On Nov 26 a Lebanese government delegation led by Rafiq Naja, the Minister of Economy, arrived in Damascus on a one-day visit "to congratulate Syria on the new regime." The delegation also discussed "in general terms questions outstanding from the disruption of the customs union between Le-

banon and Syria in 1950." (*Jaridah, Nov 26, 28; R. Damascus, Nov 26 [28]; ANA, Nov 27 [29]*)

The Damascus *As-Nasr*, welcoming the delegation, said that Syria wanted Lebanon to preserve its national integrity and not to allow its territory to become a base for aggression against its neighbour. This was the most important foundation for good relations between the two countries (*Nasr, Nov 27*). On his return to Beirut, Naja announced that Syria welcomed an offer of mediation by President Sbehab between Syria and the UAR, to end the propaganda warfare between them. On the day of the visit, an explosion occurred in the garden of Rafiq Naja's house. (*Jaridah, Nov 28*)

On Dec 7, a Syrian goodwill mission headed by Abd as-Salām al-Tarmanini, the Minister of the Interior, arrived in Beirut on a one-day visit to return the Lebanese goodwill visit. The Lebanese PM declared afterwards that he had "exchanged views with the delegation on relations between the two countries, and discussed solutions of outstanding economic problems." (*ANA, Dec 6 [8]; Jaridah, Dec 8*)

SYRIA-SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia recognized Syria on Oct 10. King Saud was later charged by Cairo with having financed the conspirators in Syria. (See: The UAR-Saudi Arabia.)

On Nov 10 a Syrian economic mission, headed by the Minister of Economy, arrived in Riyadh. Damascus Radio described the mission as a "further move to strengthen the Arab economy and achieve eventual unity." (*R. Damascus, Nov 11 [14]; Hayat, Nov 11*)

The signing of an economic agreement was announced on Nov 16. It was to replace the 1955 trade agreement due to expire at the end of the year. The agreement provided for the promotion of capital investment and trade exchange. Capital would be allowed to move freely from one territory to the other, joint enterprises would be encouraged and the movement of persons between the two countries would be facilitated. Syrian goods would enjoy preferential treatment on the Saudi Arabian market over and above facilities provided under the multilateral convention between Arab League countries. Industrial products manufactured from local raw materials, as well as vegetables and animal products, were exempted from customs duties and import permits; customs duties on a number of other products would be equivalent to one-third of the usual tariff. Payments would be made in convertible currencies. A joint experts' committee was set up to deal with the implementation of the agreement.

The Syrian negotiators also obtained a two-year postponement of an instalment of the Saudi Arabian loan of 1955, falling due in Dec 1961.

Assurances were also given during the negotiations for the safeguarding of the rights of the Damascus branch of the Saudi Arabian National Commercial Bank, which had been nationalized by a UAR decree on July 20. (*Hayat, Nov 17, 18; R. Damascus, Nov 16 [18]*)

MOROCCO AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE ME

SYNOPSIS

In 1960 Morocco had pursued a policy in favour of Arab solidarity on the basis of equality, which had brought her closer to such countries as Iraq and Jordan than to the UAR. From the beginning of 1961, however, while she kept on friendly terms with the other Arab

countries, closer cooperation developed with the UAR. This turn of events had been brought about by a meeting of interests—the UAR's general international interests and Morocco's claim over Mauritania—which brought the two countries together in the Casablanca bloc (on which, see pp 48 ff). Morocco supported Cairo over the

break-up of the UAR and was the last Arab country, besides Sudan, to accord recognition to the Syrian Republic.

General. [The death of the 51-year-old King Muhammad of Morocco on Feb 26 was widely mourned in all the Arab countries. Radio stations and the press praised the late King's struggle against imperialism, his work for the glory of Arabism and Islam, and support for Arab unity, nationalism and solidarity.]

In Jordan, a battalion of the regular army was named after the late King. (*Bilad, March 5*)

In Dec a Moroccan commercial mission visited Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo, Jeddah and Amman. (*Hayat, Dec 21-29*)

RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

Iraq. In March Isma'il al-Arif, Iraqi Minister of Education, declared on his return from a visit to Morocco that an Iraqi-Moroccan Cultural Agreement would be signed "shortly." Iraq would probably open a training institute for secondary school teachers in Morocco; she would also improve the standard of the training institute for elementary school teachers in Fes, founded by the Iraqi government and administered by Iraqis. This institute was helping to solve Morocco's main problem, the replacement of French-educated instructors by those with an Arabic education. (*R. Baghdad, March 12 [W 16]*)

In April, in a letter to the Iraqi cultural attaché in Rabat, the Minister noted that the staff of the college in Fes was not carrying out the college's basic aims of helping to eliminate illiteracy and to publicize Iraq in Morocco. He described the college as "a cultural embassy void of national feelings": no Iraqi flag was visible, no Iraqi emblem was displayed and there were no maps or pictures symbolizing the Iraqi revolution. (*R. Baghdad, March 29 [W April 6]*)

On June 17 Iraq banned the entry of the Moroccan paper *Al-Mukāfih* because of "its continued attacks on the policy of the Iraqi Republic." (*ANA, June 17 [20]*)

In Aug PM Qasim invited King Hasan II to visit Iraq. (*Zaman, Aug 15*)

In Nov an Iraqi military mission attended the annual Moroccan military manoeuvres. (*Zaman, Nov 14-17*)

Jordan. In Feb Jordan transferred JD60,000, donated by King Muhammad V and the Ruler of Kuwait, to UNRWA for the expansion of its vocational training centre at Wadi as-Sir. (*Jer. Times, Feb 13*)

In March it was reported that King Hussein had accepted an invitation by King Hasan II to visit Morocco; no date was fixed. (*R. Amman, March 2-IMB, March 2*)

On April 29 a Jordanian royal mission left Amman for Rabat aboard a royal aircraft which King Hussein was presenting to King Hasan II. The mission carried congratulations to King Hasan on his accession to the throne and an invitation to visit Jordan. (*ANA, April 30 [May 2]*)

On June 1 the Moroccan Minister of Public Works arrived in Amman, on his way from the pilgrimage to Mecca. (*Jihad, June 2*)

Lebanon. In Feb it was announced that Morocco had asked Lebanon to strengthen cultural ties between them. (*Hayat, Feb 12*)

On March 6 it was announced that King Hasan II had invited President Sbeih to visit Morocco; the latter accepted, but no date was fixed. (*Hayat, March 7, 16*)

In May a Moroccan mission arrived in Beirut to study questions connected with the free port of Beirut and transit trade in preparation for the establishment of a free-customs zone in Tangier. (*Hayat, April 30*)

On May 6 Driss M'Hammedi, Moroccan FM, arrived in Lebanon on a two-day private visit, on his way from Cairo to Rabat. (*Hayat, May 6-7*)

On May 16 an air agreement was initiated in Beirut, approving the existing arrangement under which "Air Liban" operated a weekly service to Morocco on its West Africa flight, and Morocco had the right to operate a weekly service to Beirut. (*ANA, May 16 [W 25]*)

Saudi Arabia. In March King Hasan II invited King Saud to visit Morocco (*Hayat, March 11*). [The visit took place in 1962.]

Sudan. In April a message from King Hasan II was delivered to General Abbud. (*R. Rabat, April 28 [30]*)

On May 2 a Sudanese economic mission headed by the Minister of Commerce arrived in Rabat on a 10-day visit. (*BBC in Arabic, May 2-IMB, May 3*)

Syria. [Morocco was the last Arab country—save Sudan—to accord recognition to the Syrian Republic. See also below: The UAR]

On Dec 16 King Hasan II cabled Nāzīm al-Qudsi congratulating him on his election to the presidency of Syria. Official recognition came the same day. (*Jaridah, Dec 17*)

The UAR; The Casablanca Conference. [Relations between Morocco and the UAR which, though correct, had been none too cordial (see MER 1960, pp 115, 161- Synopsis), became noticeably closer following the establishment of the Casablanca bloc to which both countries adhered. See pp 48 ff]

In Jan it was reported that Morocco had established a permanent educational mission in Cairo, to supervise Morocco's educational ties with the Arab countries. (*Ahram, Jan 16*)

It was reported in Feb that the UAR Economic Organization intended to buy out French owners of super markets in Morocco in order to convert the markets into permanent exhibition centres for UAR products. (*R. Cairo, Feb 8-IMB, Feb 9*)

On his way home from the Baghdad Conference, Abd al-Khāliq Torrès, Moroccan Deputy PM and Minister of Justice, stayed in Cairo for a week for discussions and was received by President Abdel Nasser. (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 15, 16*)

In Feb it was reported that Morocco had asked for Egyptian judges to replace French judges whose contracts were due to expire. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, Feb 18*)

On Feb 28 President Abdel Nasser called his congratulations to King Hasan II on his accession to the throne of Morocco, expressing confidence that he would "continue his father's struggle... to strengthen Arab solidarity and champion right and justice everywhere" (*Eg. Gaz., March 1*). UAR papers expressed some apprehension lest the young King deviate from the policy of positive neutralism followed by his late father. (*Gumhuriyah, March 13, 27; Akhbar, March 14; Ahram, March 24*)

Abd al-Khāliq Torrès, Moroccan Deputy PM, visited Cairo from April 5-17 to continue contacts within the framework of the Casablanca bloc. He carried a verbal message from King Hasan II to President Abdel Nasser. (*R. Rabat, April 5 [7]*). The convening of an African summit conference to establish an African League

similar to the Arab League was reportedly also discussed (*Hayat*, April 9). Torrès carried home with him a personal message from Abdel Nasser to King Hasan. He said that the President's official visit to Morocco was scheduled for Sept. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 18).

In April it was reported in Cairo that six UAR professors of law recruited by the Moroccan government had collectively resigned, as the dean of the faculty was "making their working conditions impossible." (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 10).

On May 31 Ahmad Balafrej, of the Istiqlal Party, delivered to President Abdel Nasser a message from King Hasan II regarding the proposed African summit conference (*Ahram*, June 1). On June 4 he returned with the President's reply. (*MENA*, June 4 [6]).

In June the two countries signed an agreement mutually abolishing the need for entry visas. (*R. Cairo*, June 20 [22]).

On July 19 Abd al-Khalil Torrès submitted his credentials to President Abdel Nasser as Morocco's new Ambassador to the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 20).

On July 10, an amendment of the Morocco-UAR trade and payments agreement of 1959 was initiated in Cairo (*details on R. Cairo*, July 10 [W 20]). By the end of the year the volume of trade between the two countries was expected to reach \$22,140,000. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 9).

In Aug a Moroccan youth delegation arrived in Damascus on a 15-day tour. (*Ayyam*, Aug 15).

On Aug 27 King Hasan II arrived in Cairo to participate in a meeting of the Casablanca bloc prior to the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (see p 56 b).

In Oct it was reported in Cairo that Morocco wished to conclude with the UAR an agreement for technical cooperation; the UAR Government was studying the request (*Ahram*, Oct 7; *Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 8). [No further mention of this topic was encountered.]

Following the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Jordan in Oct, Morocco agreed to look after UAR interests in Jordan. (*Ahram*, Oct 10).

On Nov 20 King Hasan II received a UAR military mission which had come to Rabat to participate in Morocco's independence anniversary celebrations and delivered a gift of arms manufactured in the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 20-IMB, Nov 21).

Morocco's Attitude on the Break-up of the UAR. On Sept 28 Rabat Radio broadcast a cable from King Hasan to Abdel Nasser expressing his hope that the crisis would result in strengthening the unity (*wahdah*) of the UAR.

[Morocco followed the UAR stand for several weeks. Rabat Radio news on the Syrian situation reflected support for the UAR. It was not heard to report Damascus announcements or to pass comment of its own on the new Syrian regime.] The Istiqlal Party organ *Al-Alam*, however, called for speedy recognition. (*R. Tunis*, Oct 15 [17]).

[Morocco was the last Arab country (save Sudan), to accord recognition to the Syrian Republic, on Dec 16, after the Syrian general elections and the election of Nazim al-Qudsi to the presidency.]

THE MAURITANIA PROBLEM

(*The Islamic Republic of Mauritania*)

Synopsis. Morocco continued to claim sovereignty over Mauritania. All Arab countries, save Tunisia, continued to support her claim. Morocco sought support in Africa

also and her co-sponsoring of the Casablanca conference was in part motivated by this aim. However, she gained the support only of Guinea and Mali. Mauritania, when addressing herself to Arab states, identified herself as Arab. Mauritania was admitted to the UN on Oct 27, with Tunisia voting in favour and the other Arab countries against. (See also MER 1960, pp 163-4.)

Issue At Baghdad Conference. At the Baghdad Conference of Arab League Foreign Ministers, Morocco renewed the Mauritania question (*Zaman*, Jan 31) (This body—in Tunisia's absence—had supported Morocco's claim over Mauritania already at its Shtura meeting in Aug 1960; see MER 1960, p 163.)

Mokhtar Ould Daddah, the Mauritanian PM, cabled the conference expressing surprise at Morocco's request to put the question on the agenda. He reminded the conference that his country had been recognized by 39 states, and invoked "the solidarity of the governments and brother Arab peoples," saying that he was convinced they would recognize the established fact of Mauritania's independence. (*Monde*, Feb 9).

In its resolutions the Baghdad conference approved, over Tunisia's objections, a Moroccan proposal that League member states should continue to oppose Mauritania's admission to the UN (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 4 [6]). Later the League requested its members to oppose Mauritania's admission to membership of the WHO. (*Ahram*, Feb 13).

No United Arab Front Against Mauritania. [The Arab states did not follow Morocco's lead in international conferences, not withdrawing when Mauritania was accepted. In the voting on the question at such conferences, the Arab vote was not unanimous.]

In Feb it was reported that two Arab states had abstained from voting in Morocco's favour on the Mauritania question at the Economic Commission for Africa Conference in Addis Ababa, when Mauritania was admitted as an associate member. (*Monde*, Feb 9; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, Feb 27).

Al-Ahram expressed surprise at Libya's agreeing to take part in the Monrovia Conference (see pp 54-5) and to sit at the same table with Mauritania. (*Ahram*, May 15) [In the end, Libya did not attend the conference.]

On June 20 Mauritania was admitted as a full member of the International Labour Organization by 236 votes to 25, with 72 abstentions. Tunisia and all African states south of the Sahara voted in favour, while the majority of Arab states voted against. (*Hayat*, NYT, June 21).

Morocco Attacks Mauritania on Relations with Israel. In May the Moroccan embassy in Amman published a "clarification" on Mauritania's relations with Israel. Its main points were: (1) Since by agreement France represented Mauritania in her foreign relations, France's ambassador in Israel was also a representative of Mauritania. (2) Part of the shares of Mifera Co., an iron-ore company operating in Mauritania, were owned by the Jewish Rothschild Bank which had financed the Zionist government. (3) Israeli fishing vessels called at Mauritania ports. (4) The Israeli ambassador in Senegal took part in the Mauritanian independence celebrations. (*Manar*, May 1).

The PM of Mauritania, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, was reported to have stated later that Mauritania's stand on Israel was "the stand of the Arab who believes in his rights in Arab Palestine, which means that we stand

together with the Arab camp, not against Israel; only, but against all the enemies of the Arab nation and Islam." (*Hayat*, July 16; on Mauritania-Israel relations see also *MER* 1960, p 313.)

Withdrawal of Mauritania Envoy to Arab East. Muhammad al-Banani, "Envoy of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to the Arab East," was due to leave Beirut on Aug. 16 after being recalled by his government. Banani had made several trips to the Arab states in the east in order to acquaint them with his government's views on the Mauritanian problem. (*Hayat*, Aug 13)

Mauritania Admitted to UN. On Oct 26 the Security

Council recommended the admission of Mauritania to the UN by nine votes to one (UAR), with one abstention (USSR). Morocco opposed the recommendation on the grounds that Mauritania was an integral part of her territory which had been cut off by French colonialist machinations. The UAR supported the Moroccan arguments. On the following day, Oct 27, the Assembly admitted Mauritania by 68 votes to 13 with 20 abstentions. The resolution was sponsored by African states and France. All Arab countries, save Tunisia, voted against, as did Cuba, Guinea and Mali. The Communist countries abstained. (*UN Yearbook* 1961, pp 166-8, 170-1)

TUNISIA AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE ME

SYNOPSIS

In January, at the Baghdad Conference of Arab foreign ministers, Tunisia rejoined the Arab League Council which she had boycotted since she joined the League in 1958, because of her strained relations with the UAR. Iraq and Jordan, desirous of strengthening the anti-UAR forces in the League, were instrumental in persuading Tunisia to take this step.

An effort was made at the Conference to conciliate the UAR and Tunisia, but their relations remained strained and occasional mutual denunciations continued. While in the US, President Bourguiba said Abdel Nasser was trying to achieve Arab unity by war; Bourguiba in turn was accused by Cairo of cooperating with imperialism, with the French against Algeria, and with Zionism.

The Bizerta crisis, and especially the battle of Bizerta between French forces and Tunisian troops and civilians in July, changed Tunisia's position in the Arab world for the time being. Bourguiba had become a "fighter against imperialism." The Arab countries expressed their support, offered assistance and registered volunteers. No volunteers reached Tunisia but some financial and medical assistance apparently did.

There followed a rapprochement with the UAR; diplomatic relations were re-established, and Tunisia attended the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, from which she had been previously excluded by Abdel Nasser on the ground that she was following the policies of the West. The two Presidents met in Belgrade. It appeared, however, that the underlying strain in the relations between the two countries had not been removed. Cairo spokesmen remained somewhat critical of Bourguiba's attitude on "the struggle for independence." Bourguiba expressed to Abdel Nasser his grief at "the events" in Syria, yet expressed no support for the continued existence of the Egyptian-Syrian union.

Tunisia supported Kuwait's independence in face of Iraq's claim to sovereignty over it, but tried to avoid giving any further offence to Iraq.

Tunisia's relations with the other Arab countries of the ME were friendly. Comparatively close cooperation developed with neighbouring Libya.

GENERAL

Tunisia Rejoins League Council. Following Iraqi mediation, Tunisia participated in the Baghdad Conference of the Arab League countries' foreign ministers (Jan 30-Feb 4). Thus she rejoined the Arab League which she

had boycotted since 1958—immediately after her adherence—because of her dispute with the UAR. (For details, see below: Relations with the UAR.)

The Bizerta Crisis. [Background: On July 6 President Bourguiba requested the French Government to start negotiations on the evacuation of the French naval base at Bizerta (at the same time, he also claimed part of the Sahara, see p 176 b). On July 17 he threatened to blockade the base. Following the arrival in Bizerta of French reinforcements on July 19, French and Tunisian forces engaged in battle. On July 22 French troops occupied the greater part of Bizerta. Tunisian casualties were officially given as over 800 dead and 1,155 wounded, most of whom were civilians. France refused to comply with a Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of all armed forces to their original positions, and boycotted a special session of the General Assembly which met on Aug 21-26. On Sept 8 Bourguiba agreed to allow the French to retain the base while the Berlin crisis continued, subject to its subsequent evacuation. On Sept 29 the two parties signed an agreement providing for the progressive withdrawal of the French troops from the town of Bizerta and their concentration within the base areas, pending "the examination of the Bizerta problem."]

Arab Support; Tunisia-UAR Rapprochement. All Arab countries expressed their support for Tunisia and made offers of assistance. The affair was given pride of place in Arab broadcasts and the press denounced France, NATO and imperialism (*IMB*, *BBCM*, *IMH* and the *Arab press*, July-Aug.). [However, the more important development in inter-Arab relations which arose out of the Bizerta crisis was a rapprochement between Tunisia and the UAR (for which see below).]

Volunteers Registered. [On July 21 President Bourguiba announced that Tunisian embassies would register foreign volunteers prepared to fight at Bizerta.]

On July 20 Gen. Qasim cabled Bourguiba expressing Iraq's full support. On July 24, it was announced that 400 Iraqi volunteers had registered with the Tunisian Legation in Baghdad. (*Zaman*, July 21, 25)

On July 21, it was reported from Libya that "hundreds, even thousands," had volunteered (*Hayat*, July 22). In Baghdad, Hashim Jawad, the Iraqi FM, "added his own name to the list of volunteers." (*Zaman*, July 22)

On July 23, it was reported, King Hussein ordered

an infantry company to be flown to Tunisia but its departure was postponed at Tunisian request, since all Tunisian airports had been rendered unusable by French bombings. (*Jihad*, July 24-26)

On July 24 the League Council decided on the despatch of volunteers. (See below.)

During Aug "hundreds of volunteers" for Tunisia, including "one hundred girls," registered with the UAR Students Federation in Cairo. (*Ahram*, Aug 3, 17) [There was no report that any volunteers reached Tunisia.]

Extraordinary Meeting of League Council. On July 24 an extraordinary session of the League Council in Cairo unanimously condemned "the barbarous French aggression" and resolved to offer immediate material and military assistance, to send volunteers and medical aid to Tunisia, to exert pressure at the UN to evacuate the French forces from Tunisia and to form a committee of the delegates of Tunisia, the UAR, Libya and Morocco to implement these decisions. (*Hayat*, July 25)

On July 28 League SG Hassinah arrived in Tunis to coordinate the implementation of these resolutions and "to place himself at the disposal of the President of Tunisia." (*Ahram*, July 29)

Financial and Other Aid. On July 31 the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies voted a £1500,000 grant to Tunisia. (*Hayat*, Aug 1)

On Aug 1 the UAR contributed £200,000 and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society 1,000 dinars to aid the relatives of the "Biserta martyrs." (*Ahram*; *Zaman*, Aug 2)

On Aug 2 King Saud "donated" 2,000,000 riyals (\$444,000 appx) for the relief of Tunisian victims. (*R. Mecca*, Aug 2 [4])

On Aug 2 a UAR Red Crescent medical convoy, consisting of four heavy lorries, arrived in Tunis. (*R. Tunis*, Aug 3 [4])

On Aug 22 a Saudi Arabian medical mission—three doctors and four nurses—arrived in Tunis. (*R. Tunis*, Aug 23 [25])

The Ruler of Kuwait informed Bourguiba that his government had decided to contribute \$1m. for the relief of Tunisian victims. (*R. Kuwait*, July 27 [29])

On Aug 5 a Kuwaiti medical mission left for Tunis. It consisted of five doctors, sixteen nurses, chemists and administrative staff, with tents, a surgical theatre and a mobile pharmacy. (*R. Kuwait*, Aug 5, 5 [5, 8])

Sudan also sent medical supplies. (*Sudan*, Oct)

Tunisia and the Kuwait Crisis: See: The Kuwait Crisis.

TUNISIA—THE UAR

Propaganda Warfare. During Jan Cairo radio stations continued the propaganda campaign against President Bourguiba (*BBCM*, *IMB*, Jan; see *MER* 1960, pp 164-5). He was accused of collaboration with the imperialists by preventing volunteers for the Algerian front from entering Tunisia (*Voice of the Arabs*, Jan 29 [31]). Tunis Radio claimed that Tunisia was not the first to suffer from "Nasserist plots"; many countries and leaders had suffered abuse. It accused Abdel Nasser of using the slogan of "Arab nationalism" to cover "sinister" activities such as the swallowing-up of Syria and plotting against the governments and leaders all over the Arab world. (*R. Tunis*, Jan 30, Feb 2 [Feb 1, 4])

The Baghdad Conference; Bourguiba Demands Radical Change in UAR Policy. Following Iraqi mediation, Tunisia participated in the Baghdad Conference of the

Arab League countries' foreign ministers (Jan 30-Feb 4). The issue between the two countries was discussed at the conference and further mediation by the Iraqi FM brought about meetings between the UAR and Tunisian foreign ministers. They agreed, according to the Tunisian FM, on the basis for a settlement of the dispute, namely the Shura resolutions on Arab solidarity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

It was reportedly also agreed that Salah Ben Youssef (on whom see also below) would not return to Cairo.

When the Conference was still in session, President Bourguiba declared in a press interview that Tunisia's return to the League was conditional upon the cessation of "conspiracies, abuses and the protection of Salah Ben Youssef" on the part of Egypt; Cairo must also cease considering itself the "government of all Arab countries." Bourguiba concluded on a note of optimism that the efforts of PM Qasim and others at Baghdad had yielded positive results. "Today we obtained assurances, tomorrow we shall resume our diplomatic relations with Cairo." (*R. Tunis*, Feb 5 [7])

In Feb a Cairo paper, quoting UAR official circles, denied that the resumption of diplomatic relations with Tunisia was imminent. (*Akhbar*, Feb 5)

Cairo Reports Bourguiba Tribute to UAR. On Feb 20 Cairo papers reported a statement by President Bourguiba saying that he would never forget that President Abdel Nasser had given substantial aid to Tunisia at the time of the French attack on the village of Sakhiyet Sidi Youssef [on the Tunisian-Algerian frontier, in 1959] and that the UAR had been the first country to recognize Tunisia and Tunisia the first to recognize the UAR. Bourguiba also said that the UAR and Tunisia, more than any other Arab states, were "philosophically and sociologically identical." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 20)

Tension Continues. During March-April the atmosphere between the two countries again became clouded, when the UAR press and radio cast doubt on President Bourguiba's intentions in intervening in the Algerian question. (For details, see pp 175-6.)

In May Cairo reported a diplomatic incident in Ottawa during Bourguiba's visit. The Tunisian FM and Ambassador to Canada had asked the Canadian authorities not to invite the UAR Ambassador to a reception in Bourguiba's honour. Later they apologized to the UAR Chargé d'Affaires who then accepted the Tunisian Ambassador's invitation to a reception. (*Ahram*, May 5)

On May 5 President Bourguiba, in reply to questions at the National Press Club in Washington, said that Abdel Nasser's policies were dangerous and harmful to Tunisia. Abdel Nasser, he alleged, considered Cairo the capital of the Arabs and everybody who resisted this kind of Arab unity was called a "stogee of colonialism." Abdel Nasser's "acquiescence of Syria" was nothing new; he was following in the footsteps of Muhammad Ali who considered that Arab unity should be achieved by war and who also subjugated Syria. Abdel Nasser had tried to demolish Bourguiba by propaganda and when this miscarried had tried to "get rid of him" with the help of Bourguiba's political foes and even the Algerian nationalist forces. (*NYHT*, May 6-7)

Abd al-Qadir Hatim, UAR Minister of State, said that such a statement might be expected from Bourguiba, for he had always conducted a pro-colonialist policy against Arab nationalism and against the UAR. (*Ahram*, May 7). Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, editor

of *Al-Ahrām*, wrote that Bourguiba represented reactionary and backward trends in the Arab world and this was the reason why the UAR's policy was dangerous for him. He described Bourguiba as an imperialist stooge and a dictator who was trying to strip the Tunisian people of their Arab character, but would not be able to evade the hour of reckoning. (*Ahrām*, May 7; see also *BBCM*, *IMB*, May 7-16; *Cairo press* for the period.)

One Cairo paper attributed "Bourguiba's abuses of Arab nationalism" to "his strong ties and cooperation with World Zionism." (*Akhir Sa'ah*, May 17)

In July, on the eve of the Bizerta crisis, Bourguiba demanded part of the Sahara for Tunisia and was consequently accused by Cairo of aiding France against the APG. (See below: The Arab Countries of the ME and the Algerian Question.)

Bizerta Crisis Brings Tunisia-UAR Rapprochement; Diplomatic Relations Resumed. When the fighting in Bizerta broke out (July 19), Mahmūd Riyād, political adviser to President Abdel Nasser, met with the head of the Tunisian delegation to the Arab League. Following the meeting, a UAR official communiqué expressed the unlimited support of the UAR for "the gallant Tunisian people in their heroic struggle." (*Ahrām*, July 22)

On July 22 President Abdel Nasser, in his speech on the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, stated: "We are ready to give Tunisia everything it needs in the political and military fields... because the Arab battle is one and the same in every Arab country... I declare that we support Habib Bourguiba in his battle... There are many people who will wonder and say: How did this come about? They were quarrelling yesterday; is it different today? 'My brother and I against the foreigner'—this is a famous old Arab saying... We may differ, but we can never allow imperialism or a foreigner to shed the blood of any Arab..." (*R. Cairo*, July 22 [25])

The next day, Muhammad al-Masmoudi, Tunisian Secretary of State for Information and Tourism, arrived in Cairo to inform Abdel Nasser about the Bizerta crisis. He stated that the "resumption of diplomatic relations would be announced within the next few hours." (*Gumhuriyah*, July 24)

On July 28, Sadok al-Mokaddem, Tunisian FM, arrived in Cairo and was received by President Abdel Nasser, to whom he conveyed a verbal message from President Bourguiba. An official UAR statement promised support for Tunisia and announced the immediate despatch of military supplies. (*Ahrām*, July 31)

Finally, on Aug 3, a joint communiqué announced the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries "as a result of the recent brotherly contacts" between the two governments and "with a view to strengthening the solidarity between the two fraternal countries, particularly in the current delicate circumstances..." (*Ahrām*, Aug 4). The ambassadors took up their posts during Oct. (*Ahrām*, Oct 12, 14, 15, 29)

During the second half of Aug a mission of UAR journalists visited Tunisia. They were received by President Bourguiba, who used the opportunity to reaffirm Tunisia's determination to stand by the other Arab countries on a basis of "common aims, high principles and freedom of choice for their peoples in accordance with its geographical position and aims." (*R. Tunis*, Aug 15 [17])

In a special interview with *Al-Gumhuriyah's* correspondent, Bourguiba said he intended to visit Abdel Nasser and expressed his willingness to maintain sincere and

close cooperation with "my brother President Abdel Nasser within the framework of ensuring the integrity and security of the Arab homeland." He added that President Abdel Nasser's good intentions had become clear to him and he was convinced that he was striving for the welfare of the Arab people. (*Gumhuriyah*, Aug 20)

Assassination of Salah Ben Yūsuf. [On Aug 12, Salah Ben Yūsuf, Bourguiba's chief political opponent, who had been living in exile in Cairo, was assassinated in Frankfurt-am-Main, West Germany. Ben Yūsuf, a former secretary-general of the Neo-Destour Party, had been sentenced to death in *absentia* by a Tunisian court in Dec 1958 for plotting against President Bourguiba and his government.]

The Cairo *Al-Gumhuriyah* claimed that the assassins carried Tunisian passports (*Gumhuriyah*, Aug 4). [However, there was no comment either in the UAR press or on the radio.] A Beirut [pro-UAR] paper said that no Arab could have committed such an act, and placed the blame on imperialism. (*Beirut al-Masa*, Aug 15)

The body of Ben Yūsuf was flown to Cairo for burial. (*Ahrām*, Aug 19, 25)

Bourguiba-Abdel Nasser Meeting. On Sept 1 Presidents Bourguiba and Abdel Nasser met in Belgrade, where they attended the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. [Originally, Tunisia had been excluded from this conference by Abdel Nasser on the grounds that she was following the policies of the West. Following the Bizerta crisis, Tunisia accepted an invitation to attend. (See also p 60 a, 62 a.)] The two Presidents breakfasted at the residence of President Abdel Nasser, and "had a very cordial discussion." (*R. Tunis*, *R. Cairo*, Sept 1 [6]; *Ahrām*, Sept 2)

Muhammad Hassanein Haykal on Bourguiba. Following a three-hour interview with Bourguiba at Belgrade, Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahrām*, concluded that Tunisia was at the stage in the struggle for independence which Egypt had reached in 1922. Bourguiba was following "the traditional way we followed in Cairo," of "taking what you can get now and asking for more after that," and was hoping for US help to achieve French evacuation. The "Arab East," on the other hand, had gone beyond these stages to a "comprehensive war." Haykal considered that Bourguiba was suffering from a "Cairo complex" induced by his having entered Egypt unclaimed when he first came there as a refugee. (*Ahrām*, Sept 15; *R. Cairo*, Sept 15 [18])

Bourguiba on Break-up of UAR: Arab Unity Must be Founded on Consent of Peoples. On Sept 29 President Bourguiba sent a telegram to Abdel Nasser expressing his grief at the events in the UAR's Northern R. "which were leading brothers to confront each other," and deepest regret that the Arabs "are forced to settle their differences through the use of force while tied by kinship..." He expressed his hope that "hearts will return to serenity" and "the Lord protect us all from all that may harm our unity." (*R. Tunis*, Sept 29 [30])

The following day, in a second message, Bourguiba praised Abdel Nasser for his orders to avoid bloodshed. He added: "We greatly admire [your] wise attitude... since Arab unity should be founded on the consent of peoples and their conviction that this unity complies with their interests and well-being. This attitude shows great courage and deep wisdom... it leaves the door open to reconciliation... It places no importance on

transitory human feelings, and leaves room for the true permanent interests of the Arab motherland." (*R. Tunis, Sept 30 [Oct 3]*)

Tunisia Radio repeated both Damascus and Cairo reports on the Syrian situation. (*BBCM, Oct 6*)

On Oct 2 Tunisia requested the Arab League SG to call an urgent meeting of the political committee, lest the events in Syria "become a source of weakness and a cause of differences within the Arab entity." The SG replied on Oct 4 that the UAR regarded the request as "an unacceptable interference in the UAR's internal affairs." (*R. Tunis, Oct 2, 5 [4, 6]*)

[Tunisia recognized Syria on Oct 9, after Abdel Nasser had called off the diplomatic boycott on the new republic.]

Various Contacts. In Sept Tunisia and the UAR concluded an agreement providing for a weekly flight on the Damascus-Cairo-Tripoli-Tunis route by the UAR National Airlines. (*Ahram, Sept 6*)

In Nov a UAR television team touring Tunisia to prepare programmes for Cairo Television was received by President Bourguiba. (*Gumhuriyah, Nov 10; R. Tunis, Nov 8 [10]*)

In Dec a Tunisian agricultural mission came to Egypt on a 10-day study tour. (*Ahram, Dec 7*)

RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES

Iraq. In Jan it was reported in Tunis that the Tunisian Government was working for the conclusion of a cultural agreement with Iraq. (*Dép. Tun., Jan 5*)

During Jan Iraq made efforts, which were crowned with success, to bring Tunisia back into the Arab League. Consequently Tunisia participated in the Baghdad Conference (Jan 30-Feb 4) where Iraq continued efforts to bring the UAR and Tunisia together (see p 104). Bourguiba, in a press interview, welcomed in this connection PM Qasim's "efforts and clear and sensible attitude." (*R. Tunis, Feb 5 [7]*)

On Feb 4 the Tunisian FM announced that PM Qasim had accepted an invitation by President Bourguiba to visit Tunisia. (*R. Beirut Feb 5, R. Baghdad, Feb 6-IMB, Feb 6, 7*)

Iraq commemorated the fifth anniversary of the Tunisian Republic, March 20, with special radio programmes and newspaper editions, in which President Bourguiba was much praised. (*R. Baghdad, March 20-IMB, March 21; Zaman, March 20; Dép. Tun., March 21*)

On April 17 it was announced that President Bourguiba had accepted PM Qasim's invitation to visit Iraq; no date was officially fixed but Sept was mentioned (*Dép. Tun., April 18*). (Both Qasim's and Bourguiba's visits failed to materialize.)

In the Kuwait crisis, which started in June, Tunisia supported Kuwait's right to self-determination (against Iraq's claim to sovereignty over the Shaykhdom) and participated with a token force in the Arab Force which was dispatched there. (See: The Kuwait Crisis.)

For Iraqi support during the Bizerta crisis, see special heading above.

On Dec 28 PM Qasim received a delegation from the ruling Neo-Destour Party. (*Zaman, Dec 29*)

Jordan. (For Jordanian efforts to induce Tunisia to participate in the Arab League Foreign Ministers' Conference in Baghdad, see p 104 a.)

In Feb Sadok al-Mokaddem, Tunisian FM, on his way from Baghdad, discussed in Amman the strengthening of relations between Jordan and Tunisia. It was

reported that he had delivered to King Hussein a message from President Bourguiba which included an invitation to visit Tunisia. This was in a reply to a message sent by Hussein to Bourguiba about the Baghdad Conference, the strengthening of Tunisian-Jordanian relations and the normalization of inter-Arab relations. (*R. Amman, Feb 8-11-IMB, Feb 9-12; R. Beirut, Feb 10-IMB, Feb 10; Hayat, Feb 10*)

The Jordanian radio and press hailed President Bourguiba for his "activities on behalf of a just solution to the Algerian question" (compare p 175 a), which were a great service to world peace and would block Communist inroads into North Africa. (*R. Amman, March 14-IMB, March 15; see also Palestina, March 14; Manar, March 6, 15.*)

(For Jordanian support of Tunisia in the Bizerta crisis, see special heading above.)

Kuwait. Tunisia supported Kuwait's right to self-determination in the Shaykhdom's dispute with Iraq and participated with a token force in the Arab force which was stationed there. (See: The Kuwait Crisis.)

(For Kuwaiti support during the Bizerta crisis, see special heading above.)

In Oct a Kuwaiti economic delegation visited Tunisia amongst other Arab countries. (For the background of this visit, see p 136 a.) The head of the delegation said he would recommend to his government ways in which Kuwaiti capital could be employed to help carry out Tunisian projects to raise the standard of living. (*R. Tunis, Oct 22 [24]*)

Lebanon. In March ten Lebanese journalists toured Tunisia by official invitation. (*Hayat, March 12*)

(For Lebanese support during the Bizerta crisis, see special heading above.)

Libya. Following discussions by a Libyan official in Tunis, in Jan (*Dép. Tun., March 25*), a Tunisian medical mission left for Libya on April 1. (*R. Tunis, March 27, April 1 [W, March 30, April 6]*)

In March a Libyan official examined the prospects of recruiting technicians and telecommunications experts for work in Libya. (*Dép. Tun., March 26*)

On Feb 9 President Bourguiba met with the Libyan PM, Muhammad Uthman as-Sa'id, who was on a private visit to Tunisia. (*Dép. Tun., Feb 10*)

On March 25 eight agreements between Tunisia and Libya were initialled in Tunis. They concerned nationality and residence (both countries would facilitate the movement of their citizens across their borders; citizens of one country residing in the other would be entitled to obtain the nationality of the state of their residence); communications (both sides would facilitate operation and maintenance of the Post, Telephone and Telegraph services, including the training of personnel); an extradition agreement; coordinating and facilitating land, sea and air communication; exchange of information on agricultural pests; a health convention calling for cooperation and coordination for prevention of epidemics; and a commercial agreement. (*Hayat, March 30*)

On June 21 the Tunisian Foreign Minister visited Libya and signed the agreements. (*R. Tunis, June 21 [23]*)

On June 7 the Libyan Minister of Agriculture arrived in Tunis, at the government's invitation, to study agricultural development. (*Sabah, Tunis, June 8*)

Saudi Arabia. In April a delegation of Saudi Arabian journalists toured Tunisia. They were received by Pre-

sident Bourguiba who discussed with them, *inter alia*, the question of the Ramadan fast. (*R. Tunis, April 10, 14* [12, 17].)

(For Saudi Arabian support during the Bizerta crisis, see special heading above.)

On Oct 18 a Saudi Arabian economic delegation visited Tunis. (*R. Tunis, Oct 18, 24* [20, 26].)

Sudan. In Sept a Tunisian goodwill mission to Sudan was received by Gen. Abbud. (*Dép. Tun., Sept 28*)

(For Sudanese support in the Bizerta crisis, see special heading above.)

Syria. On Oct 5 it was reported that President Bourguiba had received a cable from the Syrian PM requesting the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, Tunisia would not take any decision "unless the situation becomes clear and unless it can have talks with

the brother Arabs within a meeting of the Arab League" (*R. Tunis, Oct 5* [6]). [A Tunisian request to call a League meeting had been rejected by the UAR. (See also above: Relations with the UAR.)] Following Abdel Nasser's decision to call off the diplomatic boycott of Syria, Tunisia recognized the Syrian Republic. In a message sent by Bourguiba to PM Kuzbary on Oct 9, he stressed Tunisia's determination "to establish close and fraternal relations between the two sister republics." (*R. Tunis, Oct 9* [11].)

On Dec 19 a Tunisian delegation arrived in Damascus to congratulate Nāzim al-Qudsi on his election as the President of the Republic. (*R. Damascus, Dec 19-IMB, Dec 20*)

The appointment of the Tunisian Ambassador in Damascus was announced on Dec 31. (*R. Amman, Jan 1, 1962-IMB, Jan 2, 1962*)

THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE ME AND THE ALGERIAN QUESTION

NOTE: APG = Algerian Provisional Government

SYNOPSIS

The APG continued to enjoy the political support of all Arab countries, but remained closest to the UAR. The Algerian leaders frequently informed and consulted Cairo on their affairs. It was reported that Abdel Nasser had advised them to hold peace talks but to shun any alliance with France; the UAR information media, however, claimed that only through military operations could final victory be achieved. President Bourguiba, who mediated between the APG and the French and who warmly advocated a peaceful settlement, was sharply denounced by the UAR.

The APG remained somewhat critical of the scope of Arab political support. There was virtually no League or international meeting, joint communiqué, or political speech in which the Arabs omitted to express support for the Algerian cause; however, the APG's main political demands, e.g. for an Arab boycott of France and the evacuation of foreign bases on Arab soil, were not met.

Arab financial and other aid, such as scholarships and military training, continued as before.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Reactions to Referendum. [On Jan 6-8 the French Government held a referendum in France and Algeria on the bill "concerning the self-determination of the Algerian population and the organization of public powers in Algeria prior to self-determination." The referendum was boycotted by the APG, which condemned it as a denial of the principle of self-determination. There were many abstentions. The bill became law on Jan 15.]

[Arab reactions were extremely hostile. The press and radio of all Arab countries sharply attacked France and President de Gaulle before, during and after the referendum.]

On Jan 7-10 anti-French rallies and demonstrations took place in Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, Amman, Cairo, Tunis and Rabat. (*Hayat, Jan 7-14; Ahram, Jan 10; BBCM, Jan 9-13*)

From Jan 9-11, 500 UAR ulamā' (1,000 according to *Eg. Gaz., Jan 12*) met in Damascus "in support of

Algeria" and against the "theatrical referendum." Their long list of resolutions included a declaration to the Arab and Islamic worlds that in the eyes of Islam France was in a state of war with them and that any Muslim in the French army was a deserter from Islam. It declared the Algerian struggle a holy war (*jihād*). (*Hayat, Jan 10; Ahram, Jan 12*)

On Jan 9 the UAR National Assembly appealed to the Arab countries to boycott France in all domains, to confiscate French properties and to extend aid to the Algerian fighters. Arab countries which had NATO bases on their territories were called upon to abolish them; friendly countries were asked to recognize the APG. (*Ahram, Jan 10*)

On Jan 11 the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions resolved to call on the Arab governments to impose a boycott on French aircraft, shipping and goods (*Hayat, Jan 12; Ahram, Jan 12*). [No such boycott was imposed.]

At the Baghdad League Council Conference. The conference (Jan 30-Feb 4) discussed the Algerian question at three prolonged secret sessions, on the basis of a memorandum submitted by Krim Belkacem, Foreign Minister of the APG. The memorandum urged that the resolutions adopted by the Arab foreign ministers in Sbtura (MER 1960, p 166) regarding Algeria should be immediately implemented. (*Hayat, Jan 31*)

Al-Ahram reported that the debate was heated and Mahmūd Fawzi, the UAR FM, threatened to withdraw from the conference in protest against some remarks by the foreign ministers of Libya, Jordan and Sudan. The dispute was over two points. Fawzi, supported by the delegations of Morocco, Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria, demanded that "all resolutions by any conference on the Algerian question should be supported." [This probably referred in particular to the Casablanca Conference in which, of the Arab countries, only the UAR, Morocco and the APG participated, see pp 48 ff.] Morocco proposed that the resolution include a demand for the liquidation of all foreign bases in the Arab states. Sudan, Jordan, Libya and Tunisia "hesitated to approve the resolution" (*Ahram, Feb 2*). [There were foreign bases in Libya and Tunisia but not in the Sudan and Jordan.]

The resolution on Algeria included the following points:

the granting of additional and immediate military and financial assistance to the Algerian insurgents; permission for recruitment and transit of volunteers; support for the unity of the Algerian territory; increase in diplomatic efforts on behalf of Algeria; support of the APG offer to enter into bilateral negotiations to secure the right for self-determination [In a statement issued on Jan 16, following the referendum, the APG had said it was ready to "engage in negotiations with the French government on the conditions for a free consultation of the Algerian people"]; to reconsider the Arab states' political and economic relations with France if the Algerian war continued; to make certain that foreign bases on Arab soil would not be used against Algeria; to step up the campaign against countries and organizations aiding France against Algeria; to appeal to other countries harking the Algerian struggle to support this resolution (text in *Hayat*, Feb 2). "Very important secret resolutions" were also reported to have been adopted. (*Gumhuriyah*, Feb 3)

Krim Belkacem told the press that though some of the resolutions were not strong enough [probably a reference to the questions of an Arab boycott of France and foreign bases on Arab soil], yet considered as a whole, he was pleased with them. (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 2-IMB, Feb 3; *Zaman*, Feb 3)

Al-Hayat commented that the only constructive resolution was the support for bilateral negotiations with France. (*Hayat*, Feb 3)

President Bourguiba's Mediation. The Greater Maghrib Issue. During Feb Tunisia began to mediate between France and the APG. Talks between President de Gaulle and President Bourguiba took place in Rambouillet on Feb 27. Subsequently Bourguiba held talks with PM Ferhat Abbas and King Hassan of Morocco in Rabat (where they had attended the funeral of King Muhammad). A joint communiqué, issued on March 2, stated that they considered that "no obstacle must obstruct the opening of the direct negotiations between the APG and the French Government within the framework of total decolonization." They noted their complete agreement on the correct methods for the realization of Algerian independence. They reaffirmed their determination to build the greater Maghrib (i.e.: Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) and expressed their pleasure at the progress made in this direction. On March 30, the French Government and the APG announced that talks would open at Evian on April 7.]

The Jordanian press and radio hailed President Bourguiba's mediation efforts, expressed optimism as to the solution of the Algerian question and full support for the union of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. (*Falastin*, March 2; *Manar*, March 5, 6, 15; IMB, March 7-9, 13-15)

[Baghdad commented in a similar vein.] FM Hashim Jawad said that Iraq hoped that the Algerian question would be solved through negotiations. (*R. Baghdad*, March 5 [7])

Cairo's "Two Minds." On the other hand, UAR comment was critical. Wide circulation was given to an attack upon Bourguiba by Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi [a Moroccan political exile residing in Cairo]. He accused Bourguiba of wishing "to create a French state in North Africa similar to Israel in the Arab East," and warned the "Algerian fighters" against accepting Bourguiba's proposals "which were built on treachery and lies." (See e.g. *BBCM*, March 3; IMB, March 2-3). The "sup-

porters of imperialist solutions" were denounced and the Algerians warned to beware of a tendency to dissipate their moral and material forces. (*V of A*, March 2 [4])

On March 5-9 Krim Belkacem, the Algerian Deputy Premier and FM discussed with Abdel Nasser the latest developments in the Algerian question before attending a meeting of the APG in Tunis (*R. Cairo*, March 5 [7]; *Ahram*, March 6-10). A foreign observer noted that the Algerians had depended heavily on Abdel Nasser's support during their six-year fight and the APG now wanted his approval before falling into step with President Bourguiba. Abdel Nasser had advised the Algerian leaders to hold peace talks but had urged them to shun any military or political alliance with France. Financial ties should be accepted if the Algerians considered them advantageous. (*NYT*, March 13)

However, even while the Algerian leader was conducting his talks in the UAR, the UAR mass media continued to express reservations and warnings regarding the negotiations and claimed that only military operations could achieve final victory. Cairo Radio said that by insisting on a preliminary cease-fire and demanding that pro-imperialist factions [a reference to the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA) of Messali Hadj] should also take part in the negotiations, France had shown that her attitude had not changed. (*R. Cairo*, March 6 [8]; see also *BBCM*, IMB, March 8-18)

Regarding the effect of peace in Algeria on the position of the UAR in the Arab world, C.L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times* wrote from Cairo: There was in Cairo an initial feeling of satisfaction that the cause of Algeria was about to triumph. However, there did not seem to be full awareness of what the implications for Cairo might ultimately be. If a confederation evolved between Morocco, Tunisia and independent Algeria, possibly French-orientated, an important shift in Arab political relations might take place. There was likelihood that Abdel Nasser's position in these westward regions would diminish, and that of pro-French leaders, symbolized by Bourguiba, would grow. (*NYT*, March 22)

On March 24 two APG Ministers, Abdelhafid Bousouf (Armament) and Muhammad Yazid (Information) arrived in Cairo to "inform the UAR authorities on the latest development in the Algerian question." They stated that the APG would hold a special meeting upon their return to Tunis (*Hayat*, March 25). They were received by President Abdel Nasser for a 5-hour talk. (*R. Cairo*, March 27-IMB, March 27)

APG Withdraws Its Agreement to Send Delegates to Evian. [On March 31 the APG made known the withdrawal of its agreement to send delegates to Evian on April 7 because of French "negotiations with the valets of colonialism" (i.e. the MNA). However, the APG reaffirmed its wish to open peace negotiations as soon as possible.]

The radio and press of all the Arab countries supported the stand of the APG and attacked France; those of the UAR recalled their previous warnings and scepticism. (See *BBCM*, IMB, *Arabic Press*, April 1-8.)

In a speech on April 6 President Bourguiba exhorted both the French and the Algerians to distinguish between "the important and the more important" in order to achieve a solution. While Lebanese [western-orientated] papers supported this attitude (*R. Tunis*, April 6 [8]; *Hayat*, April 9; *L'Orient*, April 12), a Cairo paper spoke of the "strange statements by the well-known defeatist, Bourguiba." (*Akhbar*, April 9)

Muhammad Hassanin Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*,

disclosed UAR suspicions in an article entitled "Algeria In Its Most Critical Time." He wrote that Bourguiba wanted to use his friendship with President Kennedy and the USA to exert pressure on de Gaulle. Facts indicated that Washington had advised de Gaulle to receive Bourguiba in Paris in order to strengthen his prestige in the Arab world and also because of Bourguiba's plan to settle the Algerian question in the framework of a Mediterranean alliance to be joined by the Maghrib, including Algeria. The Maghrib would thus form an Arab bloc to counterbalance the anti-Western force in the Arab East. Bourguiba returned from France with dreams of a share in the Algerian oil. "This is the reason behind President Bourguiba's attempts to press the Algerian Government to appease de Gaulle even on the question of the Sahara." (*Ahram*, April 7)

Reactions To Abortive Military Coup in Algeria. [A military uprising, directed against President de Gaulle's Algerian policy, broke out in Algeria during the night of April 21-22; it collapsed within four days.] Jordanian, Tunisian, Moroccan and [pro-Western] Lebanese papers praised the stand of General de Gaulle, urged the APG to support him and later commented positively on his victory over the rebels. (*BBG*, April 28; *IMB*, April 27, 28; *L'Orient*, April 24, 27; *Amal*, April 25; *Bilad*, Tunis, April 25; *Sabah*, April 25, 27; *Bilad*, Rabat, April 26; *Hayat*, April 27; *Jihad*, Falastin, Jordan, April 27, 28)

On the other hand, UAR broadcasts and papers as well as Lebanese [pro-UAR] papers associated de Gaulle with the rebel leaders. De Gaulle and the rebels were said to be pursuing the same objective, that of opposition to Algerian freedom, and to differ only in the ways in which they sought to secure France's interests. (*R. Cairo*, April 22, 23, 25, *V. of A.*, April 22-26 [23-28]; *IMB*, April 23-27). *Al-Akhbar* wrote that Gen. de Gaulle was not unconnected with the rebels, just as he was not unconnected with the rebels of May 1958 who brought him to power. (*Akhbar*, April 23; also *Ahram*, April 24)

Mecca Radio followed the Egyptian line of argument. (*R. Mecca*, April 24 [26])

UAR comment argued that the presence of French troops in Algeria would not guarantee the fulfilment of any agreement reached with de Gaulle. The only solution was to continue the struggle until full victory. (*R. Cairo*, April 26 [28]; *Akhbar*, April 27; *Gumhuriyah*, April 27, 29; *Ahram*, April 28)

The Evian Negotiations. [Background: On May 20 negotiations between the French government and the APG opened at Evian. On the same day the French government announced that it had ordered its troops in Algeria to cease all offensive operations, that a large number of political prisoners and detainees would be released and that the FLN leaders detained in France would be placed in less rigorous confinement. The negotiations were suspended on June 13, on French initiative; were resumed at Lugrin on July 20 and broken off by the Algerians on July 28 as France refused to recognize the Sahara as Algerian territory. On Sept 5, however, President de Gaulle suggested that France might accept Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara if French interests there were safeguarded. In Oct first the French and then the Algerians offered to resume negotiations. At the same time, the two sides established secret contacts. Their progress was temporarily interrupted when about 4,000 FLN detainees in France began a hunger strike on Nov 2. Contacts were resumed, and continued

into 1962. On March 7, 1962, negotiations opened at Evian and on March 18, 1962, the two sides signed a cease-fire agreement and a declaration on the future of Algeria.]

On the eve of the Evian talks, the radio stations of Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Mecca and Umdurman each broadcast an essentially identical statement declaring their respective governments' support for the APG, and affirming the Sahara to be part of Algeria (*R. Cairo*, Amman, Umdurman, Baghdad, Beirut, Mecca, May 18-20 [20, 23]; *Ahram*, May 20; *Hayat*, May 20). [There was no such Tunisian statement], and in a broadcast on May 20 President Bourguiba called on the APG to respond favourably to the French "gesture of goodwill." (*R. Tunis*, May 20 [23])

With the suspension of the Evian talks, Cairo Radio said on June 22 that as France had broken off the negotiations, the issue would now be decided on the battlefield. (*R. Cairo*, June 22 [24]; the Cairo press commented in the same vein.)

On June 16 the Arab Joint Defence Council, which met at the time in Cairo [see p 108], issued a statement in support of the APG and called for the immediate resumption of talks. If France did not resume the talks or if they failed, the League Council should meet to consider the implementation of the anti-French measures previously decided upon. (*Hayat*, June 17)

On July 9 President Abdel Nasser received an APG delegation headed by Krim Belkacem, the Deputy PM and FM. An official statement said the delegation had acquainted the UAR with the progress of the Evian talks and their expected developments. The President had reassured the delegation of the unqualified support of the UAR. (*Ahram*, July 11)

Bourguiba's Claim to Sahara Denounced by UAR. [In July President Bourguiba renewed his demands for French evacuation of the Bizeria base and the modification of the border with Algeria so as to annex to Tunisia a part of the Sahara in which there was prospecting for oil.]

A Cairo paper commented that with his claim to the Sahara, Bourguiba had entered as a third party into the Algerian dispute on the side of France. This was a "treacherous blow" to the APG. (*Akhbar*, July 19; see also July 20, 21; *Gumhuriyah*, July 20; *Ahram*, July 21)

36th Ordinary League Council Session. This was attended by a representative of the APG. Resolutions on Algeria passed on Sept 19 called on the member-states to implement promptly previous resolutions, to continue their efforts to secure a UN resolution asserting Algeria's right to independence and territorial integrity, to secure recognition of the APG by additional countries and to convene an emergency session if requested by the APG. (*Hayat*, Sept 15, 20)

Jewish Community in Algeria Denounced for Provocative Activities. On Sept 11 and 12 severe clashes occurred between Jews and Muslims in Oran; one Jew and two Muslims were killed. The FLN (over Tunis Radio) appealed to the Jewish community for calm and asked it not to let itself be "manoeuvred by the colonialists" against the Algerian people as the community itself was part of the people; the Algerian revolution wished the Jews to take part in the life of the Algerian nation. (*R. Paris*, Sept 13 [14]; *Ha'aretz*, Sept 13)

A Tunisian paper appealed to leading Jews of the world to stop the activities of their "ignorant masses" in

order to safeguard their future in Algeria and other parts of the Arab world. (*Sabah, Sept 13*)

A Cairo broadcast accused the Jews of siding with French imperialism, long-standing treachery and ingratitude to the people which had given them shelter. The Jews had passed sentence on themselves by their "savagery aggression," and the day would come when "every criminal aggressor will receive punishment." (*V of A, Sept 13 [15]*)

Arabs Warn the OAS. During Nov and Dec, with the mounting of OAS activity, Arab comments denounced the "criminal activities of the racist European ultras" and warned—in the words of a Tunisian minister—that "our people will come down ruthlessly on those responsible," whether these were in the OAS, "round the OAS," in the French administration in Algeria, or in France. (*R. Tunis, Nov 30 [Dec 2]*; see also various broadcasts by R. Amman, R. Cairo, R. Tunis, during Nov-Dec, *IMB, BBCM*)

The Cairo Voice of the Arabs repeatedly claimed that the OAS was being used as a tool by the French imperialist government to impose its hateful policy on Algeria. (e.g. *V of A, Nov 30, Dec 2 [Dec 2, 5]*)

More Expressions of Solidarity, Celebration of the Algerian Revolution Anniversary. [The Seventh anniversary of the Algerian revolt, Nov 1, was an occasion for renewed professions of support for the Algerian cause by the governments and various organizations of all the Arab countries.]

On Nov 2 about 3,900 FLN detainees in France went on a hunger strike, demanding an improvement in their conditions. The strike ended on Nov 20 when the French Government granted the demands. [The Arab League Secretariat issued an appeal to consider Nov 16 as a "day of solidarity" with the detainees and to stop work for one hour (*Eg. Gaz., Nov 11*). There were reports on work stoppage in Iraq and Jordan for one hour (*Zaman, Falastin, Nov 17*), in the UAR for half an hour (*Ahram, Nov 17*) and in Kuwait for ten minutes (*R. Kuwait, Nov 16 [17]*). Demonstrations, government statements and other expressions of support for the detainees were reported from all Arab countries.]

APG Premier Consults with Abdel Nasser. On Dec 11 Premier Youssef Ben Kheddah of the APG [who had replaced Ferhat Ahbas at the end of August] arrived in Cairo on a tour which also included Libya and Rabat. *Al-Ahram* wrote that the Premier was consulting with President Abdel Nasser on problems unsolved in the secret negotiations then taking place between France and the APG. (*Ahram, Dec 12, 16*)

ARAB AID TO APG

Iraqi Aid. ID2m. was allocated in the Iraqi budget to be paid to the APG during 1961. The sum of ID1m. was paid on July 8 and a similar amount on Nov 24. Qassim declared that Iraq would continue financial aid to Algeria also after it attained independence. (*Zaman, March 17, July 9, Nov 25*)

On April 8 a special APG envoy arrived in Baghdad to inform the government of developments in the Algerian question. (*Zaman, April 9-11*)

On Aug 8 it was officially announced that Iraq was ready to receive "any number" of Algerian students free of charge at her universities and military institutions. Fifteen Algerians were to enter the Iraqi military academy in the coming year. (*ANA, Aug 8 [W 17]*)

In Aug. some hours after the election of the new APG, a special envoy was ordered to leave for Baghdad to "see General Qassim on a special secret mission." (*Zaman, Aug 30*)

In Nov it was reported that some Algerian officers had joined Iraqi military institutions. (*R. Baghdad, Nov 25-IMB, Nov 26*)

Jordanian Aid. On Jan 11 the Jordanian Parliament held a special session to discuss ways and means of supporting the APG. (*Jihad, Jan 12*)

On Jan 26 the sum of JD7,042 was handed by the Jordanian CGS to the APG representative in Amman as a contribution from the armed forces. (*R. Amman, Jan 26-IMB, Jan 26*)

In Feb an official spokesman declared that "tens of students" well trained and equipped, were ready to leave for Algeria at "a moment's notice" (*Falastin, Feb 5*). [There was no report that they did so.]

In Oct there were 40 Algerian students studying in Jordan on Jordanian scholarships. (*ANA, Oct 8 [W 12]*)

In Nov King Hussein made a personal contribution of 1,000 dinars to the Algerian fighters. (*Jihad, Nov 2*)

On Nov 27, Abdelhafid Boussouf, a member of the APG, was received in Amman by King Hussein. (*Jihad, Nov 28*)

Kuwaiti Aid. On March 8 Kuwait handed to the APG a contribution of \$1,350,000 (*Hayat, March 10*) and on Nov 1 a further sum of \$3m. (*Jihad, Nov 2*)

Lebanon Aid. In Jan Philippe Taqla, the Lebanese FM, held "secret talks" in Paris, discussing also the Algerian question. On Jan 30 Krim Belkacem saw Taqla in Beirut "to hear the results of these talks." (*Amwar, Jan 19, 23, 28; Hayat, Jan 28, 31*)

On Feb 9 it was announced in Beirut that a committee comprising representatives of the APG and the Lebanese Foreign Ministry had been formed to register Lebanese volunteers (*Hayat, Feb 10*). On Feb 14 MENA said that 400 volunteers "equipped with the most modern weapons and including a number of experts" were ready to join the Algerian Liberation Army, but were awaiting word from the APG before leaving Lebanon (*MENA, Feb 14 [W 23]; Hayat, Feb 16*). [There was no report that they ever left.]

On March 6 "Algeria Week" opened in Lebanon; committees were set up to collect contributions. Special radio programmes on Algeria were broadcast and rallies were organized in Beirut. The sum of £1220,000 (about \$70,000) was collected. (*Hayat, March 7-15; Siyasah, March 9-13*)

On May 8 the Chamber of Deputies voted £1500,000 (about \$159,000) as Lebanon's official contribution to the APG budget for the year 1961 (*Hayat, May 9*). The payment was made on Sept 26. (*Hayat, Sept 27*)

Syrian Aid. In Nov twenty two Algerian students enrolled at Damascus University on Syrian scholarships. This brought the number of such students to a hundred. (*R. Baghdad, Nov 12 [W 16]*)

UAR Aid. It was reported that fifteen high Algerian officials, including representatives of the APG in the Arab countries, were attending a special course in the Arabic language and in Political Science, organized in Cairo by the UAR Foreign Ministry. (*Musawwar, Dec 23, 1960, Jan 13*)

INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

In Jan it was reported that Port Said dock workers had decided to boycott French ships passing through the Suez Canal for the duration of the Algerian war (*Ahram*, Jan 12). [No further reports on this topic were encountered.]

On Jan 17 APG Premier Ferhat Abbas arrived in Cairo on his way to Indonesia and South East Asia. (*Mid. Mir.*, Jan 21)

On Jan 17 the office of the APG in Damascus was accorded the status of Consulate. (*Ahram*, Jan 18)

In Feb it was reported that 500 youths had volunteered to fight with the Algerian Liberation Army (*R. Damascus*, Feb 13 [16]). [There was no report that they went to Algeria.]

££2m. were set aside in the UAR budget for 1961/2 for aid to the APG. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 12)

On Oct 3 Ben Khedda sent a cable to Abdel Nasser expressing the APG's solidarity with Abdel Nasser in regard to the developments in Syria. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 4-IMB, Oct 5)

THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

SYNOPSIS

NOTE: Detailed synopses have been prefixed to most of the subsections, below. This synopsis therefore charts a general outline of events only.

No significant change took place in the pattern of the Arab-Israel conflict during the year. (Compare MER 1960, p 169 ff)

The terms of the conflict were restated by the two sides, with only slight variations. Israel continued to advocate direct negotiations for a peace settlement with the Arabs, as well as a non-aggression pact and controlled disarmament as preliminary steps. At the same time she continued to regard the build-up of her military power and the strengthening of her international ties both as a deterrent to the Arab threat, and as a means of paving the way to peace by ultimately convincing the Arabs of the futility of their aspiration to destroy Israel.

The Arab countries continued to reject Israel's approaches. For, in their view, Israel had committed the unforgivable crime of evicting the Palestinian Arabs from their homeland; moreover, having been established by aggression and constantly seeking expansion, she endangered the very existence of the Arab nation. In the Arab image, though Israel was a small and weak country, she had powerful allies in imperialism which used Israel as its tool, in world Zionism, and in world Jewry which was depicted—in the images of European anti-Semitism—as a satanic force. Thus the Arabs maintained, in President Abdel Nasser's words, that Israel was "an evil that should be uprooted." Abdel Nasser, who was apparently the only Arab leader to refer to practical aspects of the problem, did not, however, foresee the realization of this aim in the near future. For, in his view, this needed an effective, united Arab force, materially and politically independent.

Such conditions were far from being established. The setting up of a united Arab force was prevented by the inter-Arab disputes which, as in previous years, overshadowed the Arab-Israel conflict (pp 97 ff). The first half of 1961 witnessed a *détente* in inter-Arab disputes. The protagonists of "Arab solidarity," who opposed President Abdel Nasser's idea of "Arab union," and who had promoted the *détente*, had been aided in their efforts by the issues of Israel's nuclear capacity and her progress on the Jordan waters project; these aroused Arab concern and, it was argued, made solidarity imperative. The *détente*, however, was preserved only by the tacit agreement not to discuss at all or to defer matters of contention, a category comprising all the major issues related to the Arab-Israel conflict. This was the case with the "Palestinian-Entity" scheme, sponsored by the UAR and ostensibly designed to represent the "Palestinian people" in the conflict but understood by Jordan to be aimed at her dismemberment (p 109). This was also the case with the question of the Jordan waters and a unified Arab military command which were dealt with by the Arab

League Joint Defence Council, meeting for the first time since 1954.

Even this limited inter-Arab understanding was soon shattered, by Iraq's claim to sovereignty over Kuwait, in June. Three months later the UAR was broken up by a Syrian coup d'état, and prospects for establishing the conditions Abdel Nasser thought necessary for the destruction of Israel were rendered even more remote. Abdel Nasser now declared that the elimination of the Arab "fifth column and reaction" in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere must be accomplished first.

In the crucial field of armaments, a significant development was the appearance of signs that were interpreted as evidence that the UAR and Israel had entered a race for atomic weapons and guided missiles. These signs were the disclosure at the end of 1960 that Israel had started building a large nuclear reactor,—although Israel declared that it would be used for peaceful purposes only; Israel's launching of a meteorological rocket; and guided missile development in the UAR (Egypt), with the aid of German experts. There were, however, no indications that either of the two countries would be able to produce atomic warheads for years to come, nor was it thought likely that the atomic powers would supply them with such weapons. In the field of guided ground-to-ground missiles too observers surmised that both countries had still a long way to go. Thus the practical effects of this development in the short run were psychological and political rather than military; it served to heighten anxieties and tension.

In the field of conventional military power the established balance was apparently maintained, with the Arab forces possessing considerable quantitative preponderance, and the Israel forces an assumed qualitative superiority. The UAR continued to rely exclusively on Soviet arms; Israel obtained hers principally from France, but also from Britain and other Western sources. Neither the East nor the West, however, provided weapons liable to give one side a decisive advantage. In view of this situation, the possibility of independent and uncontrolled weapon development in the area assumed additional significance.

As regards the international aspects of the conflict, the USSR continued to side with the Arabs in every instance. She provided Iraq and Yemen with arms in addition to the UAR. However, while the Soviet Union, like the Arabs, depicted Israel as an aggressive tool of imperialism, she expressed no support for the declared Arab aim of liquidating Israel.

The United States, while abstaining from supplying arms to the principal antagonists, was nevertheless the world power most involved in the conflict.

The US position underwent an appreciable change during the year. President Kennedy in the election campaign the previous year had pledged an effort to seek a solution to the conflict. The US also made it clear that

she wished to probe the possibilities of a solution to the refugee problem. Consequently, both the Arab countries and Israel were apprehensive about being pressed into accepting solutions which they considered disadvantageous. Later, however, the US administration succeeded in promoting confidence in its intentions; on the Arab side this development was helped by a general improvement in the US-UAR relations. Recognizing the deep gulf which separated the two sides in the conflict, the US sought to maintain friendly relations with both and, by helping to keep the balance between them, to preserve the relative tranquillity in the area. Cold war considerations continued to play an important role in US policy on the conflict.

The Arab countries, and in particular the UAR, spent much effort to isolate Israel on the international scene, especially among the African and Asian countries. With increasing emphasis, the Arabs sought to stigmatize Israel as a colonialist creation and a tool of imperialism; Arab propaganda in Africa also employed anti-Semitic themes, including the dissemination of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." The aim of thwarting Israel's "infiltration into Africa" featured prominently, and often exclusively, in the efforts of the Arab League in Africa and in the bilateral relations between Arab and African countries.

The Arabs easily obtained Israel's condemnation as imperialist in the non-governmental Afro-Asian organizations which were largely dominated by the UAR. More important, Israel was so condemned by the Casablanca Conference in January, in which three sub-Saharan countries—Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—joined the UAR, Morocco and the Algerian Provisional Government in a neutralist anti-Western African grouping. The great majority of sub-Saharan African countries, however, which joined together at the Monrovia conference, in June, continued to strengthen their friendly ties with Israel. Nine of these countries co-sponsored at the UN General Assembly an Israeli-backed resolution calling for direct Arab-Israel negotiations. Ethiopia, whose ties with Israel had grown ever closer, accorded Israel *de jure* recognition, notwithstanding Arab opposition.

At the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries which met at Belgrade in September—the first conference of its kind—the Arabs' effort to pass a condemnation of Israel as imperialist was frustrated though nine of the 25 participating countries were Arab.

At the UN General Assembly, the Arab representatives reiterated the theme that Israel was "the embodiment of imperialism." They rejected the renewed Israel proposals for direct negotiations, a non-aggression pact and disarmament on the grounds, among others, that this was mere propaganda, that the establishment of Israel was responsible for Arab rearmament, and that "with Israel

out of the region" total disarmament would automatically follow.

Regarding the Arab refugees, the UN re-endorsed its 1948 resolution calling for repatriation or compensation. The Arab delegations also advocated the implementation of the resolution, but their spokesmen made it clear that in their eyes the true solution of the problem lay in the elimination of Israel. Israel saw the Arab demand to return the refugees as an intent to destroy her and the Knesset (Parliament) resolved that no refugees would return; this resolution constituted a formal hardening rather than a new departure in Israel's attitude on the question. On US initiative a special representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was sent to the ME to probe the possibilities of a settlement of the problem. However, he could only reaffirm that no progress could be made in this direction apart from or in advance of an overall settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict; he also reported that UN assistance would be needed at least a decade. In the end the US attitude at the UN proved material in maintaining the political status quo in face of attempts by both the Arab states and Israel to change it in their favour.

The Arab boycott offices carried on their routine activities in the economic and cultural fields. Arab opinion as to their effectiveness was divided in the face of Israel's obvious economic prosperity and the marked growth in her foreign trade, her tourist industry and in foreign investment. The boycott offices claimed successes, but their Arab critics spoke of failure. The US Congress again attacked an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act directed against the Arab boycott; the US administration, however, maintained that coercive tactics should be avoided.

The Arab-Israeli borders were relatively quiet during the year; the Syrian border remained the most unruly, with rather frequent armed clashes, but no incident on the scale of the Tawafiq raid of 1960 occurred.

The question of Arab reaction to the utilization of the Jordan waters by Israel continued to be a subject of discussion and dispute in Arab councils. The Arab countries found themselves in a dilemma. They were not ready for military action against Israel. Yet to deny Israel the waters, they had either to attack her or divert the headwaters of the river in the immediate vicinity of the border; in the light of Israel warnings against it, the latter course of action, however, was also liable to lead to military involvement. Also, Jordan feared that an Arab joint diversion project might adversely affect her own project. The issue was left in abeyance. Meanwhile both Israel and Jordan carried on with their projects for the utilization of the waters, both of which fitted into the Johnston plan; Israel planned to start pumping from the Sea of Galilee in 1964.

IEWS AND POLICIES

Note: No new departure was discernible during the year in the views and policies publicly expressed by the Arab leaders on the Arab-Israel conflict. Consequently, there have been recorded only the views of the two principal antagonists, the UAR and Israel, of Tunisia, which aroused attention for the first time in 1961, and of Syria, after her secession from the UAR on Sept. 28. An appendix records an Arab image of Judaism, Zionism, and Israel as broadcast to the Arab world by Cairo's state-

directed "Voice of the Arabs." No similar effort to form and disseminate systematically an image of the Arabs was found to have been made in Israel.

UAR VIEWS AND POLICIES

Note: Important pronouncements by President Abdel Nasser on the Arab-Israel conflict were included in his letters to President Kennedy and King Hussein; these are recorded on pp 198-9 and p 143 h respectively.

Synopsis. No new departure was discernible in Abdel Nasser's publicly expressed views and policies on the Arab-Israel conflict. There were only variations and shifts in emphasis in accordance with changing circumstances (compare MER 1960, p 171). The excerpts recorded below from the President's public utterances serve therefore mainly as additional illustration of his views. Abdel Nasser professed to see two dangers in Israel's existence; the one, "the attempt to destroy the Arab people of Palestine," the other, expansionism at the expense of the Arab world. The second danger he claimed to have found confirmed in pronouncements made during the Israeli election campaign. In his letter to President Kennedy, Abdel Nasser said that the large-scale immigration would lead to Israel's expansion (compare below: Israel Views and Policies). Over and above these "dangers," Abdel Nasser attributed to Israel—acting in collaboration with imperialism—the intention to "destroy Arab nationalism," and to keep the Arabs backward.

The Arab aim in the conflict was termed mostly as "the restoration of the rights of the Palestine people," its "return to its homeland." When speaking to non-Arabs, Abdel Nasser consistently abstained from any stronger terms. In his letter to President Kennedy, Abdel Nasser made no reference to a solution of the conflict. When addressing Arab audiences, however, Abdel Nasser also spoke of "the destruction of Zionism," the "inevitable end of Israel"; and in his letter to King Hussein, he said that Israel was an "evil that should be uprooted" (*sharr yajtaala*).

To achieve this aim, Abdel Nasser said in his letter to Hussein that "a comprehensive sovereign Arab force" was needed. (This probably meant an effective united command of the Arab armies, if not the unification of the Arab countries themselves, the material independence of the force from foreign sources, and freedom from international limitations upon its actions to the greatest possible measure.) The UAR was the vanguard in the struggle for Arab union, which was the forerunner of Israel's destruction, Abdel Nasser said; Israel, well aware of this, concentrated her hostile attention on the UAR, as e.g. in her Arabic broadcasts (compare PM Ben-Gurion's views, below).

After the break-up of the UAR Abdel Nasser first concentrated his attention on Egypt's internal affairs (see below for Ben-Gurion commenting on this), but later returned to the Israel theme in the framework of the "struggle against Arab reaction." Reaffirming Egypt's policy of pursuing Arab union, Abdel Nasser said that now the Arab "fifth column and reaction" must be got rid of as a prerequisite for "liberating Palestine." At the same time he said the UAR (Egypt) was now doubling her army so as to enable it to face Israel alone independent of the "Arab fifth column."

In the wake of the Casablanca conference, which stigmatized Israel as an imperialist bridgehead, Abdel Nasser much emphasized what he termed the UAR success in exposing Israel's "imperialist activities" in Africa; he made it clear that Israel's relations with African countries were a main reason for the UAR's efforts in the continent (see e.g. p 675 b).

The President mentioned—though he did so relatively seldom—the competition between the Arabs and Israel for the sympathy of world opinion. He said that Zionism falsified the image of the Arab, and that the Arabs should present to the world what he claimed was the truth about the conflict, to convince the world that the Arabs were right, and that the creation of Israel was a blunder. In his letter to Kennedy, Abdel Nasser said that US policy

on the ME was influenced by "un-American factors" such as "calculation of election votes."

Abdel Nasser took pains to emphasize, in his letter to Kennedy and elsewhere, that his pronouncements on Israel were not meant for "home consumption" and that he expressed the same views to Arab audiences as to foreigners behind closed doors.

The Enemies: Imperialism, Israel, Arab Stoges of Imperialism. Abdel Nasser at NU Rally, Cairo, July 22: "The imperialists, Israel and the agents of imperialism in the Arab world, all of them are the enemies of Arab nationalism. Israel was created by imperialism in the heart of the Arab world to destroy Arab nationalism, strike the Arab nation and prevent the Arab nation from waking up to build itself up socially, economically and politically..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 23)

Abdel Nasser to Syrian Youth Groups, Alexandria, Aug 17: "There was an election battle in Israel last week... In the past nine years, in every election battle, we were able to learn the intentions of Israel from the campaign speeches and articles... [They] show us the intentions of the enemy. The enemy wants western Jordan, the Gaza sector, the region east of Tiberias in Syria. They see that they had chances to attain these objectives, which they now regret. But does this mean that they have abandoned the idea?" The President specifically referred to an article which he said had appeared in *Herut*, the organ of the Herut Movement [for whose attitude on the Arab-Israel conflict see below: Israel Views; party platforms] (*R. Cairo*, Aug 17 [19])

Abdel Nasser in American Television Interview, Aug 25: "... We always saw a double danger in the existence of Israel. The first arises from what the Arab people in Palestine were exposed to; the attempts to destroy them. The second arises from the threat directed by Israel against the Arab nation, a matter which can easily be confirmed by reading the Israeli papers and studying the [election-campaign] speeches..."

"I expect Israel will attack any day. Now, tomorrow or the day after. They are concentrating their forces and they receive assistance from the West and modern weapons principally from France." (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 26)

The UAR—Vanguard in Struggle for Palestine. Abdel Nasser to Palestinians, Damascus, March 13: "The United Arab Republic also serves as the vanguard of the Palestinian people for the sake of the restoration of their rights and country." (*Eg. Mail*, March 4)

The Aim: "To Return Palestine People to Its Homeland, Restore Its Rights—By Employing All Means. Abdel Nasser, at Arab League Conference, Cairo, Feb 1: "Today, when we talk about Palestine, we say we want to liberate the Palestine people and restore their political and social rights..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 2)

Abdel Nasser, to Palestinians, Damascus, March 3: "... Today, we say that the Palestine people must return to its homeland and that it must regain its rights." (*Eg. Mail*, March 4)

Abdel Nasser at NU Rally, Cairo, July 22: "We know our right and insist on it. We shall defend and strive for our right until we will wrest it by all means at our disposal from those who have taken it from us." (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 23)

Abdel Nasser in American television interview, Aug 25: Q: "When Mr. Kennedy sent you his letter, one of the Cairo papers said: 'We believe that the only full and

dignified solution of the Palestine problem is that Israel be obliterated.' Does this represent the view of the government also, or do you believe other solutions are possible?' A. "We believe that the rights of the Arabs of Palestine must be restored. More than a million Arabs have been expelled from their country and must return to their land... The question which should also be asked is what is the point of view of the government of Israel... They say they will not allow any Arab to return, yet surprisingly they advocate Jewish immigration to Palestine... On our part we said at the Bandung Conference and at other conferences that we want the UN resolutions on the question of Palestine implemented... the Israel government... obstinately refused to carry out one resolution."

Q. "It seems that the problem cannot be solved without a struggle, since Israel rejects these conditions while you insist upon them..." A. "There is naturally a problem, and there is a continuing danger and an existing threat." (*Eg. Gaz., Aug 26*)

"Liberation of Palestine," "Destruction of Zionism" After Elimination of "Arab Reaction," Arab Unity. Abdel Nasser, Damascus, Feb 21: "Why does Zionism see a threat in your revolution?" "Planning to seize Palestine, Zionism, in collaboration with imperialism, divided the Arab nation into small weak countries giving a chance to imperialism and the imperialistic stooges to gain more ground and consequently Zionism also gained more ground."

"When the Arab nation once again reverts to its unity with a view to destroying the influence of imperialism as well as the imperialistic stooges, we must destroy [naqdi] Zionism."

"Zionism is aware of this fact, hence it is fighting against this Republic alone. If we listen to the Israeli broadcasts, we find that they only attack this Republic..." (*Ahram, Eg. Gaz., Feb 22*)

[Abdel Nasser returned to the above theme after the break-up of the UAR]:

Abdel Nasser at Port Said, Dec 23: "In 1948 the people [of Egypt] used to say: what have we gained from the Arabs except treason and treachery?... We were constantly fed with a call which advocated that we should isolate ourselves altogether from the Arab East. Brothers, the authors of this talk were imperialism and Zionism... Ben-Gurion... said that the cause for the [1956] aggression and for the collusion with Britain and France was the joint Arab command set up between Egypt, Syria and Jordan. He said that Israel was like a hazelnut in a nutcracker because of this command. The party which will meet its inevitable end at the hands of Arab unity and solidarity is, of course, Israel and Zionism..." (*R. Cairo, Dec 23* [28])

"They claim that there is no hope of liberating Palestine now that the unity [the Egyptian-Syrian union] has failed. They ask: What are you waiting for, Abdel Nasser? Why do you not enter Palestine and liberate it? I am first waiting to get rid of the reactionaries and the fifth column in the Arab countries. How can we enter and ignore the fifth column and reactionism?... We are waiting for the Arab peoples to get rid and purge themselves of the fifth column. When this happens, the time for the Palestine battle will have drawn nearer. Reaction has an alliance with imperialism and Zionism." (*R. Cairo, Dec 23* [28])

UAR to Rely Only on Own, Not on Other Arab Armies. Abdel Nasser, Port Said, Dec 23 [following the dissolu-

tion of the UAR]: "... We are now increasing our army by three divisions, to face imperialism and Zionism. We are now enlarging our army so that we can depend on ourselves. We cannot depend on the fifth columns of treason outside the country. He who asks: 'What are you waiting for, Abdel Nasser, to launch a war against Israel?' is seeking an operation against Israel on our part so that he can stab us in the back..."

"We are naturally strengthening ourselves, because Israel is also saying: 'We have no enemy except the UAR.' Ben-Gurion said these things. Our duty is to fortify ourselves. We are doubling our army, air force and navy. We are manufacturing weapons to enable us to break the neck of anyone who approaches us [applause]..." (*R. Cairo, Dec 23* [28])

Putting the Case before the World. Abdel Nasser at NU Rally, Cairo, July 22: "Is it reasonable to let Ben-Gurion go to America and France and tour the world in an attempt to convince the people that he is in the right and we in the wrong?... It is the duty of everyone of us to try to convince anyone asking this question that we are in the right and that the creation of Israel was a blunder." (*Eg. Gaz., July 23*)

Abdel Nasser to an Arab emigrants' delegation from the US and Canada, Alexandria, July 27: "Zionism managed to mislead and deceive with the aid of money and influence... The Zionists falsify the image of the Arab in the US, Canada and Europe... but we feel that truthfulness is essential so that the world can know the realities of our cause." (*Nasser's Speeches, p 185*)

Fighting Israel in Africa and Asia. Abdel Nasser before National Assembly, Jan 23: "The highlight of the Casablanca conference was, in the words of your message, its anti-colonialist and anti-Zionist aspect."

"... Israel... was not allowed to attend the Bandung conference, although she claimed to be a part of Asia. There was Afro-Asian unanimity to place Israel within the walls of isolation as a source of infection and as a purveyor of the imperialist disease and one of its symptoms. This also happened at the Casablanca conference... the liberated vanguards in Africa have opened their eyes to the truth of Israel and exposed its hidden motives and objectives." (*Eg. Gaz., Jan 24*)

TUNISIAN VIEWS AND POLICIES

Bourguiba on War and Negotiations. On May 11 President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia made a statement on the Arab-Israel conflict at a press conference at UN headquarters in New York. No transcript of the press conference was available, but only newspaper reports. A week before Bourguiba devoted a press conference in Washington mainly to a reckoning with Abdel Nasser; (see p 171 b)

According to *The New York Times*, Bourguiba said that the continuing exercise by Israel of a "right of conquest" and the "concentration camp" treatment of Palestine Arabs, resembling the Nazi persecution of Jews in World War II, made it impossible to negotiate peace in the Middle East.

Israel, like France, he declared, must learn that she will not always be the stronger and that until injustices are remedied bloodshed will continue and Israel's position will remain "precarious."

According to *The Jerusalem Post*, quoting Reuter, Bourguiba predicted a war on the lines of the Algerian conflict if Arab-Israel differences were not settled. "If there emerges a real will for peace and just solutions

in Israel," there was a possibility of negotiating a *modus vivendi*, but Israel had never displayed any desire to abide by UN decisions, he declared. The day Israel "demonstrates any desire to implement these decisions, then perhaps one can speak in terms of negotiations" he said, adding: "But this is a secondary aspect of the big problem imposed by the position of Israel."

Bourguiba said Israel represented a kind of colonialism even worse than that of France in Tunisia; and he attributed "the ease with which Communist influence has invaded the ME" to the Arabs' feelings of frustration and injustice. (NYT, May 13; Jer. Post, May 14)

President Bourguiba's statement was the subject of questions asked in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) and a detailed reply by PM Ben-Gurion, especially in refutation of Bourguiba's remarks on the alleged situation of Israel's Arab citizens. Ben-Gurion also said that in the joint communiqué issued by Presidents Kennedy and Bourguiba a week before the latter's press conference the two had declared that the international problems of Africa and the ME should be solved by direct negotiations between the interested parties. (ICPO/WNB, May 11-16)

According to a New York paper, the communiqué said the two Presidents "believe that negotiations and peaceful application of the principle of self-determination are the key to peace in Algeria and to stability in North Africa and the Mediterranean." (NYHT, May 6-7)

SYRIAN VIEWS AND POLICIES

NOTE: The Syrian Arab Republic, during the first months after the secession from the UAR, was fully occupied with efforts to stabilize the regime. Little was done to elaborate policies on foreign affairs, including the Arab-Israel conflict. Policies during this period were stated in the main not by the head of the provisional government but in various official statements and in a joint declaration by Syrian politicians.

Policy Declarations

Programme of Provisional Government, announced by PM Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari, Sept 29: To strengthen the army to enable it to protect the borders and "carry out its anticipated role in the realization of the aims of Arab nationalism"; participation in the Arab struggle in Palestine and Algeria... (R. Damascus, Sept 29 [Oct 2]; Nasr, Oct 1)

The "Principles and Aims of the People," formulated by the army Revolutionary Command on Oct 2, made no reference to the Arab-Israel conflict. (R. Damascus, Oct 2 [4]; Hayat, Oct 3)

Appeal for Arab Unity, announced by PM Kuzbari in name of the Revolutionary Command and government, Oct 11: Para. 8, specifying the duties of the proposed unified Arab command, said its duties would be to protect the borders, repulse aggression and liberate its "occupied and usurped components and the components suffering from the yoke of imperialism." (R. Damascus, Oct 11 [12])

The *National Charter*, sponsored by the government and signed by representative Syrian politicians, made only a reference in passing to "the liberation of the usurped lands in Palestine, Algeria, Oman" and elsewhere in "the Arab homeland." (R. Damascus, Nov 10 [13]; Nasr, Nov 12)

ISRAEL VIEWS AND POLICIES

As with President Abdel Nasser's views, recorded above, those of PM Ben-Gurion quoted below serve mostly as an

additional illustration of the views set out in MER 1960 (pp 175-6)

The one innovation in Israeli declared policies was the Knesset (Parliament) resolution adopted in Nov that the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel. At the same time the offer made in 1949 to take back 100,000 refugees was officially withdrawn. PM Ben-Gurion said that the "insidious" proposal to grant the refugees freedom of choice between compensation and repatriation was designed to destroy Israel. (See pp 234 b-235.)

The PM saw the UAR, headed by President Abdel Nasser, whom he depicted as the "Egyptian dictator" (*rodan*), as Israel's primary enemy. Recalling the precedents of the slaughter of the Armenians in WWI and of the Jews in WWII, he warned that Israel was faced with a danger of genocide. He claimed to have found the existence of this danger confirmed in Abdel Nasser's admitted "design to destroy Israel" (compare above, Abdel Nasser's views). Israel, Ben-Gurion said, faced the struggle against this danger under conditions of political isolation. While world politics developed into growing interdependence between the nations, Israel did not belong to any group of nations, to any bloc or pact. Thus, Ben-Gurion said, Israel's struggle had two interrelated aspects: maintaining deterrent military strength, and proving the "justice of Israel's cause" to world opinion.

The PM often reiterated Israel's will for peace and expressed his confidence that peace was bound to come. The military deterrent, in preventing war, would pave the way for peace, Ben-Gurion said. Other factors conducive to peace were, in his view, a genuine rapprochement between the world powers and what he described as the "goodwill between the Jews and Arabs in Israel." Ben-Gurion said that the break-up of the UAR might perhaps further the cause of peace, insofar as Abdel Nasser would in fact devote all his efforts to solving Egypt's internal problems as, in the PM's understanding, he had promised to do. (This was apparently a reference to the UAR President's speech of Oct 16, in which he outlined his revolutionary programme and made no mention of Israel or Zionism; see pp 624-5). Ben-Gurion made it clear that he regarded favourably the continued independence of the Arab states in face of Egyptian efforts "to annex" them. He said that Israel's victory in the Sinai campaign of 1956 had decisively helped in preserving their independence and thus, by inducing Abdel Nasser to reconsider his policy, had perhaps helped along the road to peace. (Compare Abdel Nasser's view on Israel's attitude to Arab union.)

Israel continued to advocate direct negotiations with the Arabs, without prior conditions, as a means toward a settlement of the conflict.

The views quoted below include references to the Arab-Israel conflict from the platforms of the Israeli parties issued before the general elections to the Fifth Knesset (Parliament), which took place on Aug 15. These parties held the following positions in the political spectrum, from left to right (number of members elected to the fifth Knesset in brackets; total—120 members: Communists (5), Mapam (9), Ahdut Ha'avodah (8), Mapai (42), National Religious Party (12), Liberal Party (17), Herut Movement (17). The government coalition was formed by the three parties in the centre, headed by Mapai, as well as Poale Agudat Yisrael (4) which had no reference to the conflict in its programme, and 2 Arab parties (4) for which no programme was available. These parties agreed on the government programme, which is also quoted below. The Communists on the one hand and Herut on the other had been in opposition since the in-

ception of the State. The position of the Liberal Party on the conflict was essentially the same as the official position. On the left, Mapam, in calling for an Israel "peace initiative," emphasized the "just rights" of both sides without, however, defining them; (see also p 234 b for the party's attitude on the refugee question). The Communists were the only party demanding for the refugees the freedom of choice between return and compensation, in addition to recognition of the "just national claims of the Arabs." Herut, on the right, was the only party to claim "Israel's right to its historic boundaries," i.e., to lands of the sovereign Arab states.

In its official programme the government said it would take "active initiative for the advancement of peace in the region" and advocated, in advance of a peace agreement, a non-aggression pact and a disarmament agreement between the Arab countries and Israel.

Abdel Nasser Considered Principal Enemy; Israel Seen Threatened with Genocide; Ben-Gurion, May 8: Israel was besieged and several of her neighbours were planning her destruction, Ben-Gurion declared. The "Egyptian dictator" had learned from Hitler and the revelations of the Eichmann trial that "if it was possible to exterminate six million Jews, why should it be impossible to exterminate the two million Jews of Israel?" "We must constantly remind ourselves of the increasing growth of the Arab population and of the UAR armies—guided by Soviet instructors and free supplies of arms," he said. "The danger must be recognized and faced." (*IGPO/WNB, May 17-23*)

Ben-Gurion, Tel-Aviv, June 20: "We must act according to the cruel reality of the situation in which we are placed... a constant threat to Israel, to her actual physical survival." Ben-Gurion recalled the attempt to destroy the Armenian people in WWI and the Jewish people in WWII. "The rulers of the Arab countries during the Second World War were all adherents of Hitler," he declared. He mentioned the Mufti (Amin al-Husseini, the head of the Arab Higher Committee) as Hitler's collaborator, and added that Hitler's disciples were living in Egypt and were advising the Egyptian dictator in the anti-Jewish and anti-Israel propaganda which he was conducting throughout the world.

"It will be disastrous if we deceive ourselves with the assumption that what happened to the Jews of Europe could not happen to us—unless we are defended by the power of the Israel Defence Forces. The Egyptian dictator makes no secret of his design to destroy Israel... I admit that I am not aware of any moral value greater than to safeguard the survival of the Jewish people..." (*IGPO/WNB, June 14-20*)

Policy of Israel: Building Military Deterrent; Winning World Support. PM Ben-Gurion, Oct 29: "We are a small people, surrounded by enemies who wish to destroy us... and only a small part of our people, a sixth, is concentrated in our own country. We are a people without relatives, racial or religious... We do not belong to any pact, to any bloc, or to any family. The race closest to us as far as language is concerned—the Arab race—has since the renewal of the State been our greatest enemy."

"...Our only ally in the world is Diaspora Jewry."
"...Today there is a growing interdependence between all regions and all nations... and some kind of world authority is being gradually created which cannot be ignored."

"In view of all these basic facts, it is clear that Israel faces a struggle that has two interrelated aspects:

military and political, and the struggle will take place in two spheres: the small sphere of the ME and the large sphere of the world. In this struggle we shall have to depend on two things: our military strength and the justice of our cause... We would not be able to survive without deterrent military power—which could ensure victory in case of purely military necessity—but we would not hold our own if the justice of our cause were not proved to decent public opinion in the world and to the human conscience..." (*IGPO/WNB, Oct 25-31*)

Military Strength as Deterrent; Deterrent as Means to Peace; PM Ben-Gurion, June 20: "We do not want to win a war—even if we have complete confidence in victory (and I have such confidence)—for even victory would cost us very dear. We need an army that will serve as a deterrent force and prevent war, for only the prevention of war and an adequate deterrent force will bring about peace—together with other factors, such as the population of the wastelands in the south—the Negev—and the north." (*IGPO/WNB, June 14-20*)

Belief in Peace to Come; PM Ben-Gurion, July 10: "Fate has commanded us to live together in the Semitic area of the ME, and the people of Israel are striving for a peace covenant between Israel and her Arab neighbours on the basis of equality, independence and liberty for each and every nation in this area." Ben-Gurion expressed his belief that "the day will come when the hand that has been stretched out for peace for such a long time will be accepted in friendship by the Arab people, and thus open a new era in this part of the world." The PM expressed his confidence that Israel's neighbours in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, "who declared war on us 15 years ago, will understand that the good-will that has been developed between the Jews and the Arabs in Israel can also be for their benefit." (*IGPO/WNB, July 5-11*)

Peace in the ME through World Peace; Ben-Gurion, Sept 29: "And if in the course of this period [15 years] what we call the Cold War is ended—and I hope that it will be ended without the world blowing up—in twenty years Russia will be a democratic country and America will be a welfare state, and then there will also be peace in the ME... The prerequisite for peace is that there should be no external forces helping our enemies. Peace is bound to come—peace in the world guarantees peace here." (*Israel Digest, Sept 29*)

The Break-up of the UAR and the Prospects for Peace; PM Ben-Gurion, Oct 29: "Perhaps... the Sinai campaign may bring nearer the coming of peace between ourselves and Egypt, no matter how strange this statement may be. Last month a great event happened in the ME: Syria liberated herself from the yoke of Egypt... If... Jordan and Lebanon had been annexed by Egypt... I doubt whether Syria would have been able to regain her freedom. If Jordan and Lebanon have still succeeded in preserving their independence, this is only thanks to our army's... victory in... Sinai..."

"...After the self-liberation of Syria, the Egyptian ruler stated in a very candid and also very wise speech that from now on he would devote all his efforts to solving Egypt's difficult problems, which have not been solved in the course of 5,000 years. If the speech was not delivered only for the purposes of the moment, but is the resolute decision of the Egyptian ruler or rulers, I see a ray of light in the decision. A serious, sincere and con-

sistent approach to the solution of Egypt's internal problems is incompatible with military adventures... They will need peace in the area, and they will be able to obtain assistance in their difficult task from only one of the neighbours, namely Israel."

"Anyone who is well acquainted with... this region... will not build a political policy on the basis of one speech... But we must not ignore even the faintest hope for peace... All our neighbours... may rest assured that there is no resentment in Israel's heart for what they have done to us, if peace and quiet are preserved on the borders from now on... We are helping, to the best of our modest ability, the new countries in Asia and Africa; we shall be prepared to give our neighbours the benefit of our experience in settlement and our technical know-how, and offer all the aid in our power to make the whole region, and any country that makes peace with us, flourish..."

"That is perhaps a dream, but we have a devoted and highly competent army in the Israel Defence Forces, and we may be permitted to dream a dream of peace. Sometimes dreams come true." (IGPO/WNB, Oct 25-31)

Party Platforms. (Parties placed according to strength in Knesset)

Mapai: For peace on basis of respect for integrity and sovereignty of all ME states.

Herut Movement: For efforts at "actual" peace to preclude formal settlement based on "the right of each people to its land."

"The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel within its historic boundaries is eternal and unshakable." The return of the Arab refugees would become possible only after "re-unification of the land of Israel."

Liberal Party: For peace on basis of integrity and sovereignty of Israel.

National Religious Party: For neighbourly relations based on the recognition of a sovereign Israel; for efforts to show the world that Israel's desire for peace is "firm and genuine."

Mapam: For "peace initiative"; for direct negotiations without prior conditions; against "pleas of adventurous activism." For constructive initiative to speedily settle the refugee problem; Israel to contribute to the solution of the problem in the framework of a peace settlement safeguarding the "just rights" of both sides.

Ahdut Ha'avodah: For continued efforts at direct peace talks without prior conditions. Against "free choice" between return and compensation for Arab refugees.

Communists: For peace on basis of "right to self-determination" and Israel's recognition of "the just national claims of Palestine Arabs."

For the right of the Arab refugees to "free choice" between return and compensation.

(Platforms to the Fifth Knesset, prepared by the Central Elections Board 1961; party pamphlets)

Government Programme. The new Israel coalition government, presented to the Knesset by PM Ben-Gurion (Mapai) on Nov 2, adopted as its programme the "Basic Principles of Government Programme," submitted to the Knesset by the former government, on Dec 16, 1959. (Israel Government Yearbook, 1961/2)

The passages in the programme relating to the Arab-Israel conflict read as follows:

Para. 8 (Basic Objectives): "Active initiative for the advancement of peace in the region and in the world, and vigilant attention to the security of the State."

Para. 42: "Israel will propose to all the Arab Governments—even before the establishment of permanent peace between us and the ensuring of political, economic and cultural cooperation—that the armistice agreements be replaced by non-aggression pacts and that all political, economic and military acts of hostility shall cease, with effective guarantees by the United Nations authorities."

Para. 43: "Until general disarmament is accepted and carried out throughout the world, the Government of Israel will propose to all Israel's Arab neighbours—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon—an agreement leading to full disarmament and the abolition of the armed forces in Israel and the above-mentioned Arab States, on condition that constant and unimpeded mutual control of this agreement is assured, and that the borders and sovereignty of all these states shall not be affected." (IGPO, Basic Principles of Government Programme, Dec 16, 1959)

APPENDIX

ARAB VIEWS OF JUDAISM, ZIONISM, ISRAEL

Synopsis. The UAR state-owned radio and press—but not the President—condemned not only Israel and Zionism but also Judaism, which, in the image of European anti-Semitism, they depicted as a satanic force. The notorious "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," fabricated by the Tsarist secret service at the beginning of the century and serving ever since as a corner stone for anti-Semitic literature, was alleged by Cairo spokesmen to constitute the secret protocols of the First Zionist Congress. They were translated in the UAR, as were also what Cairo papers alleged to be "sections from the Talmud," such as that assuring Paradise to the Jew who killed a non-Jew. All this was for dissemination in Africa. Such images, however, were used not only for propaganda purposes abroad but were heard also in broadcasts to the Arab world. The Jews were said to dominate the Western states, especially their economies and information media, having acquired power by devious means. The image of Judaism, Zionism and Israel as inherently immoral found its expression also in such often repeated allegations by UAR and other Arab sources as that Israel was disseminating in Africa copies of a "forged Qur'an" or sending young Israeli girls there to ensnare African leaders (see e.g. pp 202 b-203).

The "Jewish Story" in the "Voice of the Arabs." In March-April, Ahmad Sa'id, the director of the Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" broadcasts, devoted a series of talks to the "Jewish story throughout the world." Following are the major points in these talks as recorded by the BBC Monitoring Service:

The "Depavity of the Jews." Sa'id rejected the claim that Zionism was established to end the persecution of the Jews (V of A, March 4-5 [7]). The Jews, he said, had a traditional solidarity and a hostility to all that was non-Jewish; this went back to rabbinical precepts, which had urged them to disregard all moral considerations in their pursuit of riches (V of A, March 6 [8]). Jews had always been skilled in imposing conditions on the countries and peoples among whom they lived; during wars they welcomed invaders and had themselves caused many wars. (V of A, March 7 [9])

The ancient high priests of Israel (Arabic: *ahbab*) introduced into Judaism things to arouse the feelings of

the Jewish people and prompt them to seek means of dominating the Christians and all other peoples, particularly when the tide of belief in Judaism was halted with the birth of Christ. (*V of A, March 9 [11]*)

The "Immoral Teachings of the Talmud." The Talmud said this to the Children of Israel, Sa'id continued: Every Israelite should endeavour to prevent other nations from becoming sovereigns on earth; the Children of Israel must have absolute authority wherever they may be. Without this they are considered exiles and captives. When the real Messiah comes, the awaited victory will be realized. The Messiah will then accept gifts from all peoples, and reject those of the Christians. The nation of Israel will then be extremely rich, because it will have acquired all the wealth of the world.

The Talmud states, Sa'id continued, that in God's eyes an Israelite is respected more than angels, and that the difference between Israel and other nations is as that between men and animals. According to the Talmud and the high priests of Israel, theft from the foreigner is no theft, but simply a restoration of Israel's property. An Israelite may not make a loan to a foreigner except with interest. Jewish religious authorities said: An Israelite may cheat a customs inspector outside the pale of Israel's laws, and may take a false oath provided he can succeed in his lies. God commanded the Jews to take interest from the Gentile, and not to lend him anything except on this condition; "otherwise, we would be helping him, while it is our duty to harm him." The Israelites meet every week and boast among themselves about the acts of cheating and trickery they have committed. Finally, the Talmud says: The oath taken by an Israelite in his dealings with other peoples is no oath, because he would be making an oath to an animal; and an oath to an animal is no oath.

Sa'id concluded: These are a few of the main points which the high priests introduced into Judaism, revealed in the true Torah. They sought thereby to create a people devoid of moral values, who would rob other peoples of their riches and dominate their fortunes and destinies. (*V of A, March 9 [11]*)

A prominent Shaykh of Al-Azhar attributed similar sayings to the Talmud (*Akhir Sa'ah, Jan 11*, in an article on alleged forgeries of the Qur'an). It was reported in Cairo that parts of the Talmud were being translated for dissemination in Africa; according to this report the Talmud assured of Paradise whoever killed a non-Jew. (*Ahram, Jan 20*)

The "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" — "The Basic Zionist Document." When the Zionist movement began at the end of the 19th century, Ahmad Sa'id said, it had not originally looked on Palestine as a national home for the Jews, but had considered any possible territory, such as Uganda, parts of the USA, and the shores of the Black Sea: Palestine had first been mentioned at the Basle conference in 1897. This conference had adopted both public and secret resolutions. The secret ones, however, had leaked out; they were "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion." The Zionists decided to fight virtue and honesty, to present religion and morality as old-fashioned, to encourage the use of alcohol, to destroy moral sense, to dominate the press, to raise prices to meet wage increases, and to encourage foreign countries to fear their neighbours, so as to make them devote their resources to arms. The "Protocols" had produced a great reaction in all parts of the world, including massacres of Jews and Jewish protests. (*V of A, March 14 [15, 16]*)

Zionism and the Power of World Jewry. Ahmad Sa'id said that Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement, had planned that the Zionists should hold the economic and political reins of the big Powers: statistics showed that the Zionists controlled a great many newspapers and news agencies in Britain, the USA, France and South Africa. (*V of A, March 15 [17]*)

The Jews in France had been able to gain control of the French economy, and consequently of the media of information, including three radio stations, as a result of having pretended to embrace Christianity when threatened with anti-Jewish measures by Louis XII. (*V of A, March 16 [18]*)

In America the Jews became so powerful that as early as 1789 Benjamin Franklin, in one of his speeches, referred to "the Jewish danger." (*V of A, March 17 [20]*)

In Britain there were 450,000 Jews, who despite their small numbers dominated many commercial houses and most of the organizations in direct contact with the public. British Jews, Sa'id said, were more intelligent than Jews elsewhere; they were aware of the British people's dislike of any interference in their affairs, and therefore adopted British nationality. (*V of A, March 19 [21]*)

Sa'id said that Britain had acted as a guardian of world Zionism when it was administering Palestine (*V of A, March 26 [28]*). He said that Zionist propaganda used to allege that the Arabs had sold their land willingly, because of the high prices offered; in truth the British had collaborated with the Zionists to compel the Arabs to sell the land. (*V of A, April 3, 4 [6]*)

"Zionist Plot For World's Nuclear Annihilation." An article in the [semi-official] *Al-Gumhuriyah* attributed to Zionism a plot to annihilate the world with nuclear weapons.

The writer cited four "facts" in support of his theory. (1) The aim of world Zionism, the writer alleged, was to sow destruction in the world in order to dominate it. In support of this "fact" the writer purported to quote Winston Churchill from an alleged article on world Jewry in the "Sunday Herald of Feb 8, 1920" saying that this "hrutal movement" intended to establish "a new world society on the basis of tyranny, hate and sucking the blood of the peoples." Also, a Rabbi had allegedly written in the "American monthly Century of Jan 1928" that the Jews were behind all the wars and great revolutions in history, had sown among the gentiles the seeds of anarchy and despair, and were still ruling them. (2-3) The Jews had originated the atomic bomb—the article mentioned Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer—and in order to make sure of the destruction of the world, the Jewish Rosenberg family had handed the atomic secrets to Russia. (4) President Harry Truman had given the order to drop the atomic bombs on Japan in "his capacity as a Zionist agent."

The writer was not quite certain in his mind as to the final consequences of this "Zionist plot." For, he said, if world Zionism, under the protection of the new US administration headed by a President "whose power derives from the spirit of Israel," found the opportunity to launch a world war in the ME by employing an atomic bomb (built in Israel) in order to achieve world domination, this could mean in practice only that Zionism had resolved to annihilate the Western and the Communist worlds and to commit suicide at the same time. (*Gumhuriyah, Jan 15, 1960*)

Eichmann—An "Old Friend of the Jews." With the

VIEWS AND POLICIES

opening of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, in Israel, Arab papers made the following points, among others: *Al-Gumhuriyah* (Cairo): The world wonders about the views of the Arabs on the Eichmann case. Our opinion is that he is an old friend of those who are today trying him. He visited Palestine in 1938 as the guest of the Haganah. He concluded the secret agreement with world Zionism, according to which he undertook to expel the Jews from Germany, while Zionism undertook to receive those Jews on the shores of Palestine. Our belief is that

had it not been for the legend of Nazi persecution of the Jews, Israel would not have existed.

Al-Jihad (Jordan): In the person of Eichmann the Jews are not trying Nazi Germany alone, but also the Christian world. They will try Eichmann on the soil which they usurped 13 years ago with their own crimes. If the Jewish authorities have the right to try Eichmann, the Arabs have more right to try Ben-Gurion and his gang for the massacres they carried out in Palestine. (*V of A, April 11 [13]*)

THE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AT GENERAL DEBATE IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIXTEENTH SESSION

(September-October)

Synopsis. As in previous UN sessions the debate on the Arab refugee question, which took place in the Special Political Committee in December, (see p 235 ff) was foreshadowed in the speeches of the Arab and Israeli representatives in the course of the general debate in the Assembly plenary at the opening of the session. Most Arab delegates (obviously having in mind the new African members of the UN) strove to stigmatize Israel as an "imperialist" or "colonialist" outgrowth. The Israeli representative, on the other hand, emphasised the need for direct negotiations to settle the conflict.

Only a few of the other speakers at the general debate made any reference to the Arab-Israel conflict.

Arab Speakers: "Israel is the Embodiment of Imperialism." The first of the Arab participants in the General Debate, Lebanon's representative Fu'ad Amoun, said that the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld reminded him of the murder of Count Bernadotte, which had put an end to his efforts to secure the implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine. He called on the UN to act with speed to ensure respect of its resolutions and declared that "the negative attitudes towards the UN, beginning with that relating to Palestine and continuing with those adopted with regard to other problems connected with the ending of colonialism, must be denounced once and for all." (A/PV, 1020, Oct 2)

The representative of Saudi Arabia, Ahmad Shukairy, [in a strongly anti-Western speech], chided the Western powers because to them "divided Berlin is everything, and Jerusalem, the holy, is nothing," although "the Berlin hardships can be found multiplied a thousand times in Palestine." He deplored the plight of "the hundreds of Arabs who are machine-gunned yearly by Israel forces" only because "they attempt to cross to their homes or their fields on the other side of the barbed wire." Addressing himself to the newly-independent nations of Asia and Africa, Shukairy declared that Israel's emergence to independence was not the legitimate establishment of a legitimate state, since Israel was "the embodiment of imperialism, the symbol of colonialism, the fruition of capitalism, and the author... of anti-Semitism." He concluded by denouncing what he termed the United States' "support for this flagrant injustice called Israel" and its treatment of Israel as if it were "the fifth state of the United States." (A/PV, 1022, Oct 3)

The representative of Iraq, Foreign Minister Hashim Jawād, described Israel as "the Trojan horse of imperialism in the ME." He declared that there could be only one way for the removal of "this great injustice": "by removing the source and root of the problem, Israel." (A/PV, 1028, Oct 6)

The UAR delegate, Foreign Minister Mahmūd Fawzi, branding Israel as "the spearhead of imperialism and neo-colonialism," said that "it is on record" that Israel had taken the side of colonialism each time a decision had to be adopted concerning vital problems about Africa — notably Algeria, the Congo, the French nuclear tests and Bizerta. Referring to the issue of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, he said that Israel's

charges in this respect were "a deviationary argumentation" and that the Security Council resolution of Sept 1 1951 could not be separated from its context and singled out for implementation. (A/PV, 1034, Oct 11)

President Ibrahim Abbud of Sudan referred to the Arab-Israel conflict only to state that the Arab refugees' plight was a constant source of anxiety and unrest in the ME and that any search for a solution to their problem must start from "the basic premise" that they must be given freedom of choice between repatriation and compensation. (A/PV, 1036, Oct 13)

Farid Shahlāwi, the representative of Syria [which was readmitted to the UN on Oct 13, following her secession from the UAR], stated, i.e., that Syria "will never forget martyred Palestine." (A/PV, 1036, Oct 13)

Other Arab representatives who made references to the Arab-Israel dispute in a similar vein were those of Libya (A/PV, 1024, Oct 4), Tunisia (A/PV, 1028, Oct 6), Morocco (A/PV, 1032, Oct 10) and Yemen. (A/PV, 1035, Oct 13)

Israel Call for Negotiations, Non-Aggression Pact. The representative of Israel, Foreign Minister Golda Meir, said with reference to the situation in the ME that the majority of the area's inhabitants were non-Arab, and that Israel enjoyed relations of friendship with all ME countries except those belonging to the Arab League. She further pointed out that the Arab-Israel conflict was only one source of tension in the area, hostility to Israel being "largely a means used by Arab leaders to divert the attention of their peoples from their own unsolved problems and hardships." Referring to Shukairy's speech Mrs Meir observed that she "could not help wondering why he did not worry less about other countries and worry more about the state of affairs in his own."

As regards the Arab population of Israel, Mrs Meir stated that she challenged any Arab country to match the social and economic progress achieved by the Israel Arabs. Border incidents, she said, were only the result of Arab belligerence against Israel. Concluding her statement, Mrs Meir declared that "no Israel-Arab issue can be solved without negotiation; every one of the issues can be solved by negotiation." Pending Arab willingness to conclude a final peace settlement, she proposed that there should be an Arab-Israel non-aggression pact and that a fresh effort be made to bring about regional cooperation in development programmes. (A/PV, 1030, Oct 9)

Shukairy-Meir Exchange. Taking the floor again on Oct 17 under the right of reply, Shukairy said that "the lady from Israel" had challenged the Arabs to find fault with the situation of the Israel Arabs. He quoted from a number of newspapers and books to prove his thesis that "the apartheid of South Africa is being practised by Israel" against the Arab minority. He denied Israel's right to try Eichmann since Israel was "another Eichmann in a State." In conclusion Shukairy made three "concrete proposals": the establishment of a UN commission to implement the UN resolutions on Palestine; the appointment of a UN "committee of inquiry" to ascertain the conditions of the Israel Arabs; and an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency of "the true nature of the atomic reactors recently built in Israel." (A/PV, 1038, Oct 17)

In reply to Shukairy, the Israeli FM expressed surprise that "this vicious speech, with its racial incitement... and its outright falsehoods," had been allowed to continue unchecked. [The Assembly President was Mongi Slim of Tunisia]. An equation between Israel and Nazism, she said, could only be made "by someone who is either totally ignorant of what Nazism was, or was indifferent to it." Indeed, she added, Shukairy had once been a member of the Arab Higher Committee whose leader had spent the war years in Germany. As to the suggestion for a commission to investigate the conditions of the Israel Arabs, Mrs Meir declared that she believed "that a rather more urgent investigation would be appropriate in regard to the question of slavery in Saudi Arabia." (A/PV, 1039, Oct 18)

Other Speakers. In passing references to the Arab-Israel conflict the Foreign Ministers of Guinea and Indonesia called on the UN to secure the implementation of its resolutions regarding Palestine (A/PV, 1020, Oct 2; A/PV, 1030, Oct 9). The Foreign Minister of Mali urged the Assembly to find a solution "under which all Arab refugees can recover their land." (A/PV, 1025, Oct 4)

The representative of Niger, on the other hand, expressed the view that "it is through direct and frank negotiations between the Arab States and Israel that a real and peaceful solution can be found." (A/PV, 1032, Oct 10)

ARABS AND ISRAEL AT INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS; CHANGES OF VENUES

International Press Institute Conference in Tel Aviv. At its conference in Tokyo, the Institute decided to hold its next annual conference in May 1961 in Tel Aviv. Consequently the chairman of the journalists association in Lebanon announced his resignation from the Institute and called upon all Lebanese journalists to follow this step; a number of them did so (*Hayat*, March 25; *Kol Israel*, May 29 [31]). Pakistan decided not to participate in the conference because it had not recognized Israel, it was reported by Arab sources (*R. Baghdad*, April 3-IMB, April 6; *Jihad*, April 6). The conference took place in Israel as scheduled. (*Jer. Post*, May 28, 30)

World Conference of Chambers of Commerce. Jordan cancelled its participation in the seventh World Conference of Chambers of Commerce, which was to take place in Holland, because of Israel's participation. Jordan similarly cancelled its participation in an archeological conference which convened in London. (*Manar*, April 5)

Aeronautical Meteorology Conference. The International Civil Aeronautics Organization and the World Meteorological Organization planned a seminar on aeronautical meteorology to be held in Cairo. However, to enable Israel to participate, the conference had to be divided into two parallel meetings. Eighteen nations were to participate in Nicosia, and 18 others in Cairo. (*Ha'aretz*, *Jer. Post*, Nov 20)

International Fiscal Union. Iraq asked Indonesia to frustrate Israel's efforts to hold this congress in Israel (*Manar*, April 28). (The congress took place in Jerusalem in Aug-Sept—*Jer. Post*, Sept 1)

Israel Membership in GATT. The Arab League Secretary requested the Arab countries to exert efforts to prevent Israel's full membership in GATT (*Ruz al-Yusuf*,

July 31). On Dec 9 the contracting parties in GATT agreed to the full membership of Israel—which had been an associate member since 1959. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 10)

THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND VARIOUS STATES

Belgium. The Lebanese FM protested to the Belgian ambassador after it received from the embassy a note on Israel's joining the International Atomic Energy Agency. The note reached Lebanon, as a member of the Agency. A Lebanese official source said that the embassy had violated diplomatic usage, which prescribed that no such note must be delivered to an Arab state which did not recognize the existence of a state named Israel. (*V of A*, April 8-IMB, April 9)

Burma. The Iraqi Ambassador in London, it was reported in Baghdad, had told the Burmese Ambassador there that if Burma wished to maintain good relations with the Arab countries she would have to break all relations with Israel (*Akhbar*, *Baghdad*, Dec 31). (For Burma's position on the conflict see: The Arab-Israel Conflict at the Belgrade Conference (below); Israel, International Relations (Burma).)

Cambodia, Thailand. A Cairo paper claimed that Israel had attempted "in her cheap way" to create difficulties for UAR irrigation engineers who had been invited by Cambodia and Thailand, in order that her own engineers might be given the job, but her efforts had failed. (*Masa*, April 4)

Cyprus. In Feb the British press reported that the UAR Ambassador had made representations to Cyprus over the establishment of Cyprus-Israel diplomatic relations; (see MER 1960, pp 181-2). The UAR embassy in Nicosia issued a statement in which it described the British press report as "completely unfounded." It said that "any widening of the scope of relations between Israel and countries friendly to the UAR, like Cyprus, may harm relations between these friendly countries and the UAR..." but that the UAR preferred "to leave these friendly countries to discover for themselves their attitudes towards it accordingly." The Israel embassy in Nicosia expressed regret at the UAR's "attempt to undermine the friendship existing between Cyprus and Israel." (*Jer. Post*, Feb 28; see also *Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 6)

The Lebanese FM claimed that the efforts of the Arabs had prevented the appointment of a Cyprus Ambassador to Israel. (*R. Amman*, March 9-IMB, March 10)

A Cypriot government delegation, headed by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, visited Lebanon in April. A Lebanese source said the delegation had been invited in accordance with the Arab League programme to stem Israel penetration into Cyprus. (*Falastin*, April 29)

In May a Cairo source claimed that the Arab ambassadors in Nicosia had convinced Cyprus to cancel its recognition of Israel (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, May 15). (The report was proved baseless.)

Eastern Europe; Jewish Immigration. The Arab League SG requested the League member-states to instruct their diplomatic representatives in Eastern Europe to intervene against the spread of Jewish immigration to Israel. (*Akhbar*, April 3)

Ethiopia. Following Ethiopia's *de jure* recognition of Israel, (see: Israel International Relations), Abd al-Halim

Hassūnab, the Arab League SG, met with the Ethiopian Ambassador in Cairo and expressed the dissatisfaction of the League with Ethiopia's step. The Ambassador told a press conference that he was sure that the recognition of Israel would not harm the existing friendship between his country and the Arab countries. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 31)

In Dec Hassūnab urged the League member-states to take a "united and determined" position against Ethiopia for her recognition of Israel. He declared that any country which sided with Israel was "practically conducting an anti-Arab policy" (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 15). At the same time, it was reported that the Arab countries were contacting the Ethiopian government in an effort to persuade it not to exchange diplomatic representation with Israel, or at least not to expand the existing scope of relations. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, Dec 13)

The German Federal Republic. [During the year the GFR maintained her policy of not establishing diplomatic relations with Israel for fear that to do so might provoke the Arab states into recognizing East Germany.] There was continued Arab pressure on Germany not to extend any new aid to Israel. (See MER 1960, pp 180-1; *R. Amman*, March 15-IMB, March 16)

Willy Brandt, the Mayor of West Berlin, and West German socialist leader, who attended the Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities in Tel Aviv (MER 1960, pp 296-7), became a special object of Arab attention. It was reported that he had been asked by an Arab mission not to visit Israel (*Musawwar*, Dec 12, 1960). In Feb, 1961, it was reported that the Arab League Secretariat was organizing a propaganda campaign against Brandt, who was said to be raising funds and selling bonds for Israel. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, Feb 18)

India. India was persistent in not establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. PM Nehru said that "after Suez... it is utterly difficult to lend any recognition whatsoever now." (*Jer. Post*, Sept 5)

Clovis Maksūd, Director of the Arab League office in New Delhi, claimed credit for the non-establishment of relations (*Hayat*, May 20). Later, Maksūd as well as the UAR Ambassador were credited with what was described as India's refusal to permit the mayors of Tel Aviv and Nazareth to visit India (*Ahram*, Oct 17). The visit of the two mayors took place, however, in Dec. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 13)

The Arab League asked India not to use Israeli experts as instructors at cooperative villages. The previous year some 20 Indians had received agricultural training in Israel (*Falastin*, Sept 3). (For India's position on the conflict see also: The Arab Refugees; The Arab-Israel Conflict at the Belgrade Conference.)

Iran. [The Arab countries continued to be concerned with the close relations prevailing between Iran and Israel. A special grievance was the reported export of oil from Iran to Israel, shipped by way of Eilat, Israel's Red Sea port. (No mention of oil exports was made by Israeli or by the available Iranian sources (see also MER 1960, pp 216 ff, 307-8).)]

[The Arab League repeatedly dealt with the question.] The Baghdad Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers adopted a resolution to continue efforts with the Iranian authorities "so that the latter may truly respect relations with the Arab countries when dealing with Israel." (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 4 [6]). In March, in a note to the Arab League Council, the League SG stated that Zionist pene-

tration and influence in Iran were increasing daily. The Arab states must consider this issue especially since the "Zionist penetration" of Iran had extended into the oil area (*V of A*, March 20 [22]). At the League Council meeting of March 21 the UAR recommended that all Arab countries break off diplomatic relations with Iran, whose activity defeated the aim of the economic boycott of Israel (*R. Cairo*, March 27-IMB, March 28). Lebanon, on the other hand, was reported to have recommended signing trade agreements with Iran, to enable the Arabs to supplant Israel in the Iranian markets (*Al-Yaum*, Beirut, April 16; in Oct it was reported that the Lebanese Ambassador in Tehran had urged such a step—*Jaridah*, Oct 26). The Council was reported to have passed confidential resolutions on the issue. (*Hayat*, April 2)

In March it was reported that Iran had made an official promise to Iraq not to permit oil exports to Israel (*Zaman*, March 7). Throughout the year, however, Arab sources continued to report on what they said was the ever closer cooperation between Iran and Israel and the flow of Iranian oil to Eilat, as well as Arab measures to stop this cooperation. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, April 12; *Jaridah*, Nov 17; *Hawadith*, Dec 23)

The celebrations in Nov of the 2,500th anniversary of the reign of Cyrus the Great put the Arab League in a quandary, a Cairo source reported. The ambassadors of Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, and Iraq in Tehran, advised their governments to participate in the celebrations; their absence, they argued, would make it possible for Israel to emphasize her presence. A Cairo paper advised the League to reject the recommendation, while it remarked that Israel would of course attend the celebrations in appreciation of Cyrus returning the Jews to Palestine (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, Sept 9). After the anniversary, the Arab governments which had diplomatic relations with Iran expressed to Tehran their disapproval of the invitation which had been sent to Israeli ambassadors by the Iranian embassies abroad. In Rome the Arab ambassadors who attended the reception at the Iranian embassy had been surprised and embarrassed to find themselves face to face with the Israeli ambassador. (*Ahram*, Dec 12)

Italy. The Arab countries, it was reported, had called the attention of the Italian government to the danger inherent in the teaching of Zionist ideology as a basic course in the Israeli institutes in Italy. They warned that the new Jewish generation thus educated would endanger the existence of Italy. (*Ahram*, July 24)

Malaya. The Arab League called the attention of its member-states to the undesirable outcome which was likely to result from the development of relations between Israel and Malaya. The League suggested that Arab diplomatic efforts be exerted to convince Malaya of the negative aspects of cooperation with Israel (*Zaman*, Baghdad, Aug 5). Earlier the question had been discussed in the League Council. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 28)

Nepal. The Arab League office in India recommended that the Arab countries establish diplomatic relations with Nepal without delay, in order to prevent Israel from extending her activity there. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, June 3)

Switzerland. The Arab League SG asked the Arab governments to urge the Swiss government to reject the Israeli claim to the Jewish heirless assets in Swiss banks (on

which see p 316 b). The director of the Arah information centre in Geneva reportedly told the Swiss FM that to respond to Israel's request would violate Swiss neutrality (*Akhir, Sa'ah, July 5*). The UAR also intervened with the Swiss government on this issue. (*Ahram, Sept 25*)

United Kingdom Centurion Tanks. [At the beginning of the year it was revealed that the UK was shipping Centurion tanks to Israel.] Arab commentators saw in this a sign of the continuing "struggle" between the UAR and Britain and of British enmity towards the Arabs in general. (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 1; MENA, Feb 2 [4]*, quoting various newspapers)

In May in an interview with a *Times* correspondent, Abdel Nasser said that ultimately relations between the UAR and Britain would determine the latter's attitude towards the Arabs and Israel. "We feel," he said, "that you are on the side of Israel" which received from Britain tanks and submarines. But, he said, "Britain is a big power and should be fair and just." (*Times, May 15*)

Vatican. In March it was reported that the Arab ambassadors who met in Bern to discuss Zionist activities in Europe had decided to send a Palestinian mission to the Pope to counter Zionist attempts to infiltrate the Holy See. (*V of A, March 20 [23]*)

Abd al-Halîq Hassûnah, the Arab League SG, had an audience with the Pope on March 10. He later stated that (as reported by the BBC monitoring service) "the Pope had expressed his support for the just rights of the Palestinian people in their usurped homeland." (*R. Baghdad, March 10-IMB, March 12; R. Cairo, March 17-IMB, March 19; R. Damascus, March 20 [22]*; no non-Arab sources on this interview were available to the editor.)

BANNING PERSONALITIES

In March it was reported that the Arab states had decided to prohibit the entry of foreign statesmen and scientists who had maintained contacts with or who had participated in conventions in Israel. Some 100 world-famous personalities would not be allowed into Iraq because they had maintained contact with Israel or because they had taken part in the Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities which was held in Tel Aviv in 1960. Among the names mentioned were those of scientists from Denmark, Iran, and the UK, and ministers from Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, and Chad. (*Falastin, March 8; NE Report, March 15; Anwar, March 25*)

THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

(September)

The conference (Sept 1-6) was attended by heads of state or government of 25 countries; including nine Arab and five non-Arab Muslim countries. Israel was not invited. For participants and proceedings, see pp 56 ff.

During the general debate, the Arab-Israeli conflict was mentioned only by Arab representatives and the representative of Guinea (who mentioned, in passing, "Palestine" as one of the unsolved problems). In the closed session in which the resolutions of the conference were framed, however, the question became a major issue and, after a long-drawn debate, an Arab draft resolution condemning Israel as imperialist was defeated.

Arab Speakers Attack Israel as Imperialist Bridgehead. President Abdel Nasser, the first Arab speaker in the open session, as well as the majority of Arab representatives who followed him, mentioned Israel or the "Palestine question" in the context of colonialist issues. Speaking of the dangers of "neo-colonialism," he recalled that the Casablanca Conference had "branded Israel as a bridgehead of neo-colonialism in Africa and a tool of its ambition." He again referred to Israel when speaking of the UN's failure to enforce its resolutions unless "permitted by the policies of the major powers." There could be no better evidence of this situation, he said, than the fate of the resolutions on the Arab refugees, which had remained "no more than scraps of paper because the policy of certain major powers in our area wished to bolster Israel in defiance of every law and justice." (*Doc. Belg. pp 48, 50*)

These themes were echoed by President Abdudd of Sudan (who used the most extreme language, calling Israel "this cancerous abscess in the Arab world"), PM Sâ'ib Slâm of Lebanon, FM Hâshim Jawîd of Iraq, King Hasan of Morocco and Prince al-Hasan of Yemen, with the difference that they used the term imperialism instead of neo-colonialism. (*Doc. Belg. pp 62, 131, 151, 206, 240*)

Shaykh Suwayl of Saudi Arabia spoke only of the plight of the Arab refugees.

President Bourguiba of Tunisia, speaking of "decolonisation," urged support for the case of "tortured Arab Palestine" and said that "a hasty decision" had led to an "international denial of justice which has left hundreds of thousands... without a country." "We ought not to be afraid of recommending a just solution," he concluded.

The official text of the speech of PM Ben Khedda of Algeria (published after the conclusion of the conference) did not have any reference to the Israel question (*Doc. Belg. pp 234-37*). However, it was reported that at the last moment, after a conversation with Abdel Nasser, he had added to his prepared speech a short passage on the rights of the Arab refugees and support for the national movement of Palestinian Arabs. (*Ma'ariv, Sept 5*)

[None of these speakers proffered any concrete solution, but it was clear by implication that Israel as a "colonialist bridgehead" must be liquidated like colonialism in general.]

Arab Draft Resolution Calls Israel Neo-Colonialist; UAR-Iraqi Differences. The Arab draft resolution was first presented by a UAR representative at a drafting sub-committee headed by Mahmûd Fawî, the UAR Foreign Minister. It condemned Israel as an example of neo-colonialism, and urged the implementation of the UN resolutions by forcing Israel back behind the lines of the 1947 partition plan and by the return of the Arab refugees. The Iraqi delegate, however, demanded that the UN resolution on the partition of Palestine not be mentioned and that the resolution be couched in general terms, stressing the need to solve the Palestine question in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. The UAR insisted, however, and the draft was not changed. (*R. Baghdad, Sept 5-IMB, Sept 6; R. Baghdad, Sept 6 [8]; Ma'ariv, Sept 6*)

The Debate; Afro-Asians, Yugoslavia Oppose Arab Draft. According to an Israeli correspondent in Belgrade, the debate on the Israel question developed as follows: When the committee, after a lengthy debate, failed to reach agreement it referred the issue to the plenary of the

foreign ministers. As their discussion also remained inconclusive, they referred the issue to the heads of state. The latter debated the issue twice, in the closed sessions of Sept 4 and 5.

In the session on Sept 4, the Arab resolution was opposed by Emperor Haile Selassie, King Mahendra of Nepal, President Tito of Yugoslavia, President Nkrumah of Ghana, President Makarios of Cyprus, PM Nehru of India, and PM U Nu of Burma. It was suggested that Tito's attitude was influenced by Abdel Nasser's opposition to a proposal by Tito to call for the recognition of the German Democratic Republic (see p 68 a). No agreement was reached at this session. (*Ma'ariv*, Sept 5, 6)

On Sept 5 the heads of state again sat in closed session for over eight hours—from 5.00 p.m. to 1.15 a.m.—to frame finally and approve the resolutions (*Doc. Belg.* p 14). Half of this time, it was reported, was taken up by the debate on the Israel question. The following details, reported by a *Ma'ariv* correspondent, were essentially substantiated by Arab and Western sources.

Abdel Nasser again described Israel's "imperialist" activities in Africa and urged the conference to condemn Israel for "neo-colonialism." He was followed by Nehru, who now reportedly agreed with "Abdel Nasser's theory that Israel is a threat to the Arabs in the ME," and that "everybody is aware of Israel's imperialist role in Africa." He added, however, it was further reported, that, in line with his views that the conference should not deal with local quarrels (compare p 65 a), he refused to support any documents that contained a condemnation of Israel. Nehru explained that "others are responsible too, but we are not condemning them." He advised the conference to be "practical" and to call upon Israel to implement the UN resolution on the Arab refugees.

PM Mrs Bandaranaike of Ceylon, who had earlier supported the Arabs, now seconded Nehru. Nepal and Cambodia defended Israel, but strongest was U Nu's opposition. He reportedly said that he had hesitated whether to accept the invitation to Belgrade because he knew that the Arabs would raise the Israel question. "I am a friend of the Arabs—but also a friend of Israel," he was quoted to have said, adding that Burma had proved that friendship with both sides was possible. "But your conduct here has shocked me. Each and every one of the Arab leaders has exploited Israel's absence from the conference to ascribe deeds to her which I know she has not committed. If I support your proposal, what will Israel think of my friendship, and what will you think of me? Both sides will accuse me of hypocrisy—and both sides will be right." U Nu concluded that he came to the conference to help relieve world tension and not to intensify the quarrel in the ME.

Dr. Nkrumah, who spoke after U Nu, reportedly declared that he was familiar with Israel's imperialist role from his own experience. He suggested, however, that Abdel Nasser's original proposal be worded in milder language. Tito reportedly supported Nkrumah's proposal and said that "after all Israel joined the imperialists in the Suez war." Mobido Keita also supported Nkrumah's suggestion (according to Beirut Radio, Keita described Israel as a "robber state.") Ethiopia, Cyprus, Indonesia and Afghanistan did not take part in the discussion. (*Ma'ariv*, Sept 5, 6, 7; see also NYHT, Sept 12)

The Lebanese Prime Minister, Beirut Radio reported, warned the Asian countries of the "Israeli danger" and said that they would come to realize it, as the African nations had already done. He told Burma and Ceylon

that countries doing business with Israel would one day, like Ghana, have to take steps to prevent Israel's imperialist penetration. (*R. Beirut*, Sept 6-IMB, Sept 7)

U Nu "Ultimatum" Defeats Arab Resolution. At this point, again according to *Ma'ariv*, PM U Nu presented an ultimatum: if the proposals of Abdel Nasser or Nkrumah were accepted, he declared, "I will not be party to the final communique and I will publicly dissociate myself from this conference." Nehru again intervened to say that a condemnation of Israel had nothing to do with the aims of the conference and suggested that the issue be taken off the agenda. Abdel Nasser asked for a short adjournment, after which he declared that, owing to the opposition to his proposal, he was ready to withdraw it, but suggested that Israel be called upon to comply with UN resolutions, to which the participants agreed. (*Ma'ariv*, Sept 7; *Jer. Post*, Sept 8. NYHT, Sept 12)

The Resolution. The result was the passage in the final resolutions (Part II section 10) which declared: "The participants in the Conference condemn the imperialist policies pursued in the ME, and declare their support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations." (*Doc. Belg.* p 258)

UAR Reactions: No Defeat. [The UAR elaborated the theme that the Arabs had suffered no defeat over the Israel question.] Cairo Radio explained that "as everyone knows, Arab representatives submit strong draft resolutions to obtain eventually resolutions against Israel." Referring to reports of U Nu's ultimatum and other opposition to Abdel Nasser's proposal, the commentary said there had been "no threats and no objections," but "free discussion," and that the Arabs had received more support than Israel, despite the fact that some states received "a high price" from Israel in the form of grants and services. (*R. Cairo in Hebrew*, Sept 8 [12])

Arab Disappointment. In Iraq there was little comment on the Israel question. *Ath-Thawrah* wrote that the Arabs had expected more than a resolution merely calling for compliance with UN resolutions. (*Thawrah*, Sept 8)

The [pro-Western] *Al-Jaridah*, Beirut, said that it was the Arabs' own fault that the Israel question was only a secondary issue at Belgrade, while at former conferences it had occupied a prominent position, and it seemed they would never recover from this setback. "Palestine," the paper concluded, was "the price the Arab countries paid for non-alignment, international conferences and summit talks." (*Jaridah*, Sept 12)

The Jordanian press criticized the "shameful attitude" of India, Burma, Ceylon, Nepal and Congo in defending Israel (*Falastin*, Sept 8). In an exceptionally severe criticism of India's attitude, Nehru was alleged to have persuaded Ceylon, Burma and Congo to support him in such a way that the Arab representatives thought "Ben-Gurion was facing them." The paper attacked Krishna Menon as the originator of India's pro-Israel attitude, and alleged that while living in the US he was paid by Jewish organizations and lived in conditions of luxury and moral degeneration. (*Jihad*, Sept 20)

An "Israel Incident." On Sept 2, Yugoslav security officers suddenly confiscated the press cards earlier granted to Israel journalists attending the conference. They gave no reason, but an Israeli source reported that the UAR had exerted pressure on them to bar the Israelis. Before

the journalists had time to complain, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, who happened to arrive on the scene, instructed the officers to return the cards with apologies. (*Ma'ariv*, Sept 3) -

"Neutralists Neutral in Arab-Israel Conflict; Recognize Israel's Role." *A New York Herald Tribune* correspondent, whose account of the proceedings generally coincided with the above, noted "the failure of the largely Afro-Asian gathering to deliver to... Abdel Nasser a crucial political weapon"—an implied challenge to Israel's existence—which he had reportedly intended to use in a "major-diplomatic offensive" against Israel at the forthcoming UN General Assembly. The UAR had thus suffered a "severe setback." The 4,000-word resolutions included only one "vague sentence" on the Palestine question, while the conference "would not spell out whether Israel fell under its blanket condemnation

of 'imperialist policies.'" The condemnation of imperialism in the ME could apply equally to the powers, or even to "the UAR's periodical display of belligerence towards its neighbours." The reference to the UN resolutions was similarly vague; they also spoke of ending the Arab-Israel dispute while the Arabs were bent on Israel's destruction.

Abdel Nasser had intended to stamp Israel's technical assistance to the Afro-Asian countries as "neo-imperialism," but some observers tended to regard the attitude of the non-Arab delegations as a "quiet recognition... that Israel, in fact, played an important role in liquidating imperialism from the ME, and in rendering significant assistance to new countries of Asia and Africa." "The Belgrade results pointed to a widespread desire among the neutralists to remain neutral in the Arab-Israel dispute," the correspondent concluded. (*NYHT*, Sept 12)

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

SYNOPSIS

While cold war considerations continued to play an important part in US policy on the Arab-Israel conflict, (compare MER 1960, p 103), public policy statements seemed to emphasize such considerations less than in previous years, when policy statements still appeared under reports on the Eisenhower doctrine.

In practice, too, relations between the US and the UAR—Israel's principal antagonist—were influenced more by the UAR involvement in international issues than by the US attitude to the Arab-Israel conflict. Thus, their relations were at low ebb at the beginning of the year over the Congo dispute; they improved in midyear with President Kennedy's opening a correspondence with President Abdel Nasser and other Arab leaders, with the occurrence of a dispute between the UAR and the USSR, and with the adoption by the UAR of a moderate attitude at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

After the election of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency of the US, and particularly, after his inauguration, the Arab countries and Israel were apprehensive of US initiative in trying to settle the Arab-Israel conflict. During the election campaign in 1960, Kennedy had pledged an effort in this field (see MER 1960, pp 108-9), and the US also made it clear that she wished to probe—by means of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC)—the possibilities of a solution to the refugee problem. (For details see: The Arab Refugees.)

The Arab countries and Israel both apparently feared that they might be pressed to accept solutions which they considered disadvantageous. Arab spokesmen, especially from the UAR, warned that any US attempt to impose a settlement "at the expense of the Palestinian people" was tantamount to an alliance with Zionism and to enmity with the Arab nation, and they emphasized that any pressure would be in vain. PM Ben-Gurion of Israel also advised President Kennedy against attempting to impose a settlement. Israel, according to unconfirmed reports, suggested to the US a policy of encouraging non-Nasser forces in the Arab world, of assistance in maintaining the balance of power between Israel and the UAR so that the current relative tranquillity might continue and of resettling the Arab refugees in the Arab countries, with international aid. (US Zionist spokesmen,

on the other hand, as well as Sen. Keating (Rep.-N.Y.), urged the President to take the initiative for a settlement.) President Kennedy and Ben-Gurion discussed the refugee question at an informal meeting in New York, in May.

President Kennedy expressed the US attitude to the conflict in letters sent to six Arab heads of state in May. Referring to Arab-American friendship and mutual respect, the President made the following principal points: The US was willing to assist ME countries desirous of maintaining their independence, progress and peace; the US was ready to contribute to the search for solutions to ME disputes; the US was willing to continue economic aid; the relative tranquillity in the area should be preserved; there was no easy solution to the Arab-Israel conflict, but it could be found, and the US was willing to share in "the labours and burdens" which the search for a solution entailed; in particular the US was ready to assist in resolving the questions of the Jordan waters and the Arab refugees; as to the latter, the US position was firmly based on the UN resolutions and it would fully back the activities of the PCC and the programme it might indicate.

Of the Arab replies to this letter, only that of President Abdel Nasser was made public (and this a year later). Abdel Nasser reiterated his views of Israel as an ever-present danger to the Arab nation, an aggressor, and a tool of imperialism. He described the US attitude to the Arab-Israel conflict as a major—though by no means the only—factor in the deterioration of Egyptian-US relations over the years. He said that US policy on the ME was influenced by US internal politics and suggested that the time had come for the US to view developments in the area with a "purely American outlook." Abdel Nasser emphasized that his statements on the conflict were not meant for home consumption.

By the time these letters were exchanged, the apprehension in the area as to American intentions had apparently begun to subside; there were indications that both the Arabs and Israel now regarded the new Administration's approach to the area with more confidence and—in some cases—even with favour. The question of possible PCC recommendations remained. However, a PCC special representative, appointed to explore means of solving the refugee problem, found that no progress could be made apart from or in advance of an overall

settlement; the Palestine refugees and their need for UN assistance would remain for at least a decade. In the discussion of the refugee question at the UN General Assembly, the US attitude proved in the end material in maintaining the political *status quo* in face of attempts by the Arab states and Israel to change it in their favour (see: The Arab Refugees).

The US stand on the Arab boycott of Israel and freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal gave rise to an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 1962. The anti-discriminatory amendment replaced the more-strongly worded "Freedom of the Seas Amendment," or "Douglas Amendment," to the Mutual Security Act for 1961. The stand of the Administration on the question was that coercive tactics should be avoided: while the US supported the principles of freedom of navigation and trade, any attempt to link US aid to these questions would only help to intensify the restrictions while playing into the hand of the Communists by exacerbating ME tensions. The Administration further pointed out that the boycott was an outgrowth of the basic Arab-Israel conflict and, in this sense, no different from the question of the "plight of the refugees." Again, as in 1960, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was the chief opponent to the amendment in the Senate, on the grounds, among others, that it was offensive to the Arab world.

As for the utilization of the Jordan waters, one of the potentially most explosive problems between the Arab countries and Israel, there were indications that the US viewed favourably the implementation of projects—by both Israel and Jordan—within the framework of the Johnston plan.

The US rejected an Israeli bid for anti-aircraft missiles. (The US was the only Western country making such missiles.) The US was unwilling, as was later officially explained, to bear responsibility for setting off an even more dangerous form of the arms race between the Arab countries and Israel and to open opportunities for new Soviet moves in the area.

The US continued to support, politically and financially, the UN and its instruments in the conflict, and in particular UNTSO, UNEF and UNRWA. In general, an official statement said that the US was convinced of the need for quiet diplomacy in dealing with a complex issue where deep emotions were involved.

ARABS AND ISRAEL APPREHENSIVE OF US INITIATIVE

UAR: Arabs At War with Israel; US Pressure Useless. On Jan 11 a member of the UAR National Assembly asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs a question "on the measures to be taken by the UAR Government in respect of the US President-elect's promise to bring pressure to bear on the Arabs to come to terms on the Palestinian issue and open the Suez Canal to Israel vessels." Hussein Dhu al-Fiqar Sabri, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied that apparently the American leader overlooked the fact that the Arab peoples considered themselves at war with Israel, and were in constant readiness to meet all eventualities inherent in the aggressive "Zionist bastion." The President-elect had likewise forgotten that survival was for the fittest, not for the parasite, which was born to die.

Sabri went on: "I would like to make it plain that the efforts the US [may] contemplate making in the light of Mr. Kennedy's pledge are not an innovation and the pressure the American leader may think he can bring

to bear on the Arabs has already been tried by his predecessors but to no avail." (Eg. Gaz., Jan 12)

"Arab Anxiety." On Jan 14, a week before President Kennedy's inauguration, *Al-Hayati* reported that "an atmosphere of anxiety and tension" marked Arab-American relations. The paper said "certain American personalities" had advised the Arab governments to establish contacts with the new administration—a suitable occasion would be the inauguration ceremony in Washington. Some Arab foreign ministers tended to accept the idea, others doubted its utility. The paper also reported that in inter-Arab consultations, it was decided to adopt a moderate attitude until President Kennedy's policy became apparent. (Hayat, Jan 14)

Arabs Denounce Alleged US Plan. At the end of Feb a Cairo weekly published news of an alleged American plan "bearing the name of Vice-President Lyndon Johnson" for the solution of the Palestine question. The plan was said to envisage: the amending of the old UN partition plan so as to open an Arab corridor linking Sinai with Jordan, and granting access to Israel's port of Eilat to both Jordan and the UAR; forming an international fund for the rehabilitation of the refugees to which the US would contribute \$500m.; returning some of the refugees to Israel; internationalizing both parts of Jerusalem; amending the Johnston plan for the distribution of the Jordan waters to accommodate Arab demands; suspending immigration to Israel for 10 years; a US guarantee for the new borders; opening the Suez Canal to Israeli ships and non-military cargo. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Feb 27)

On March 11 Amman Radio denounced the alleged plan and said that the Arabs rejected any plan which recognized the right of the Jews in any part of Palestine. (*R. Amman*, March 11-*IMB*, March 12)

A MENA comment said that "any attempt by America to impose a settlement of the Palestine question at the expense of the Palestinian people means that Kennedy's Government has begun to involve itself in an open alliance with world Zionism, and in an open enmity with the Arab nation." The commentator continued: "This plan is no more than a redrafting of previous American plans, all of which strive to impose US trusteeship on the Middle East, and to subject the area to the ambitions of Zionism, which is allied with imperialism." (*MENA*, March 13 [15]; for similar comments see *V of A*, March 13, 15-*IMB*, March 14, 16; *Sharq*, Baghdad, March 15; *Jihad*, March 13-15; *Akhbar*, Baghdad, March 16; *Gumhuriyah*, March 16)

UAR: Future Relations with US in Balance. Hassanain Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram* [and generally considered a spokesman of President Abdel Nasser], in an article on "The Future Between the UAR and Kennedy," said that the coming weeks would show whether the US and UAR would find a way to understanding or were heading for a new struggle; Cairo was still trying to avoid a clash.

Amongst other issues between the two countries, such as the Congo conflict and a rumoured Mediterranean anti-UAR pact, Haykal referred to the Arab-Israel conflict. Referring to Kennedy's election statements, the writer said that the UAR did not hold the President responsible for the statements of the candidate. Haykal said that Ben-Gurion had sent a message to the Secretary of State requesting that first Abdel Nasser, and then the UAR, be got rid of. [For report on an Israeli message, see below.] Following this message, Haykal wrote, Ken-

nedy at a press conference personally announced \$25m. aid to Israel [on March 15, see also below]. The article also mentioned other instances purporting to show US support for Israel. (*Ahram*, March 24)

UAR Regards Neutral US Attitude to Arab-Israel Conflict as Unneutral. Coincidentally with the Haykal article, C.L. Sulzberger, of *The New York Times*, concluded, after meeting Abdel Nasser, that Arab-US relations would never be entirely friendly until a solution was found for the Arab-Israel conflict. Israel was the cardinal question for Abdel Nasser who believed that the US was prejudiced against the Arabs. Israel threatened the UAR, Abdel Nasser claimed; any country that helped Israel in the slightest way was therefore regarded as unfriendly. Consequently, "the mere fact... that Washington affects a neutral attitude is seen here as unneutral." (*NYT*, March 29)

Arab Reactions to US Loan to Israel. On March 15 President Kennedy at his press conference announced a \$25m. loan to Israel (*USIS*, March 16; see also p 320 h). [This statement aroused angry Arab reactions such as Haykal's, quoted above.]

The Cairo *Al-Gumhuriyah* said the loan was an act of provocation, an indication that the US was disregarding the Arabs' rights, future and security. The Arabs had become hostile to America because they considered any support for Israel as an act of hostility directed against themselves (*Gumhuriyah*, March 16). Cairo Radio said the loan was a pay-off by President Kennedy for American-Jewish support in the elections. (*R. Cairo*, March 17-*IMB*, March 19)

At the same time Cairo sources claimed that the loan would be of no help to Israel because of her ultimate insolvency. (*R. Cairo*, March 16-*IMB*, March 17; *Akhbar Sa'ah*, March 22)

Damascus Radio attacked President Kennedy for having "forgotten that he is a human being, that he is an American, that he is a Christian, that he is a Catholic who belongs to the Pope's faith, and that he has made a loan available to the gangster state called Israel... Why does Kennedy not follow [in] the steps of the Pope, his spiritual leader, and support the Arab rights against the evil of the Jews?" (The Arab League SG reportedly said, after his reception by the Pope, that the Pope had expressed his support for "the just rights of the Palestine people in their usurped homeland.") (*R. Damascus*, March 20 [22])

A [pro-UAR] Beirut weekly claimed that Arab trade unions had taken a secret decision to boycott American ships and aircraft. (*Kul Shay'*, April 1)

On March 30, Amir Talal, Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia, told the press in Cairo that his country would not renew the Dhahran air base agreement because the US intended to continue aid to Israel. (*Jer. Post*, March 31; *Siyasah*, Beirut, April 2) [In fact the Dhahran issue was connected with different questions. See p 428]

Israel Against Imposing Settlement on ME. Israel's reservations regarding a possible US initiative appeared towards the end of March.

Replying to a journalist's question, PM Ben-Gurion advised President Kennedy against attempting to impose a ME settlement upon Israel and the Arab States. "One must understand that a settlement cannot be imposed by force." (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, March 31)

At the same time, according to *Ha'aretz*, an official note was submitted by Avraham Harman, Israel Am-

bassador to the U.S., to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The note reportedly urged the administration to refrain from dramatic moves in the ME and from taking premature initiatives but rather to make every effort to consolidate the relative stability which prevailed in the region.

The *Jerusalem Post* reported that the note made the following points: a) The Arab League conference in Baghdad during Feb (pp 103 ff) had vindicated the policy of encouraging non-Nasser forces in the Arab world and strengthened Jordan's position through its closer ties with Iraq. b) To assure the present relative tranquillity in Arab-Israel relations, the balance of power between Israel and the UAR should be maintained with the active assistance of the U.S. c) The major outstanding problem, that of the Arab refugees, should be solved through their resettlement in Arab countries with the aid of an international programme in which Israel would be prepared to participate.

Ha'aretz noted that this was practically the opposite approach to that of the American-Jewish community which had urged the President to take the initiative. (US Zionist leaders had been urging the President to make efforts to bring peace to the ME. See e.g. *NYT*, Feb 7; *Eg. Gaz.*, March 12, 21. So did Senator Keating (Rep.-N.Y.) while speaking at a Jewish National Fund convention.—*NYT*, Feb 17)

An Israel FM spokesman denied that any note had been sent to Secretary of State Dean Rusk by FM Golda Meir. (*Ha'aretz*, March 29; *Jer. Post*, March 30)

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND THE ARAB BOYCOTT

(The Douglas Amendment)
(February-August)

Senator Keating's Move. On March 15, Senator Kenneth B. Keating (R-N.Y.) released texts of an exchange of correspondence with the State Department on the implementation of the so-called Freedom of the Seas Amendment (or the Douglas Amendment) to the Mutual Security Appropriation Act (Section 2 F) which he had cosponsored in the Senate the previous year (MER 1960, p 106). Keating told the press that he was "disappointed" with what he regarded as the State Department's lack of effective action to carry out the intention of the amendment.

Keating's letter, dated Feb 2, recalled that the amendment had urged that "the principles of freedom of navigation and economic cooperation between nations be applied in any future negotiations for the use of American Mutual Security funds. It was supported at that time by President Kennedy." Boycotts, blockades and restrictions on the use of international waterways were particularly destructive of economic growth and progress among free nations, Keating wrote. (*USIS*, March 16)

State Department: Implementation of Amendment Would Prove Harmful. On Feb 24, John S. Hogland, 2nd Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations in the State Department, wrote to Keating in reply that the "US has consistently supported the principle of freedom of transit through the Suez Canal for all nations, including Israel." Accordingly, "our diplomatic posts throughout the world were promptly informed of the details of the new amendment and were specifically reminded of the Department's long-standing policy in favour of freedom of navigation. They were reminded that efforts should

continue to be made... to make clear the will of the American government... Special instructions in the same sense sent to our missions in the Near East."

Hogland continued: "Based on views from our field posts, the Department has so far concluded that efforts to link Mutual Security Act and P.L.480 assistance directly to the Suez transit question would only intensify the very trade and transit restrictions... while at the same time playing into the hands of the Communists by exacerbating ME tensions." Hogland added that "we fully share your concern that every effort should be made to ensure that there will be no discrimination to the use of the Suez Canal for Israeli commerce... It remains our view, unanimously supported by the field posts, that avoidance of coercive tactics in such area disputes is more likely to produce an atmosphere conducive to settlement of the basic problem than would unilateral economic pressure by the U.S." Hogland concluded that the UN SG had sought a solution to the Suez transit problem and the US government was giving him the fullest support. The government believed that, through such endeavours on the part of the international community, the problem—in itself an outgrowth of the basic Arab-Israel conflict—could eventually be removed. (*USIS, March 16*)

State Department Minimizes Scope of Boycott: Links Boycott to Refugee Question. During the spring months, the State legislatures of New York and California adopted resolutions asking the Department of State to move against the Arab boycott; Senator Keating (R-N.Y.) transmitted the New York resolution to the Department.

In reply, in a letter to Keating dated May 4, Brooks Hays, Assistant Secretary of State, speaking for the Secretary of State, expressed strong disapproval of the boycott. Hays then explained that the Arab boycott was an outgrowth of the Arab-Israel conflict. He wrote: "As sovereign states, the Arab states assert that they are entitled to establish rules and regulations that proscribe dealings with any individuals or firms in accordance with what they deem to be in the interests of their national security. In the absence of a definite settlement between Israel and the Arab states, including a settlement of the plight of the Arab refugees, the boycott and similar problems continue to manifest themselves."

Hays further said that the New York resolution had erroneously implied that the US government acquiesced in the boycott and also had "portrayed the boycott as more discriminatory than it actually is." Only 25 American ships had been blacklisted for trading with Israel and the blacklist included only vessels carrying war material to Israel, Jewish immigrants or Israel products, and only to firms which operate in Israel or have a connection with Israel commerce. The State Department asserted that boycott regulations are not applied against persons or companies because they are Jewish but rather because they do business with Israel. The Department denied that any department or agency of the US government had sanctioned ship charters barring American flag vessels touching at Israel ports from carrying gifts of surplus American agricultural commodities.

Hays noted that "the Israel Government has included a clause in its Title 1, Public Law 480, cargo charter contracts which forbids the transporting vessels to sail in Arab waters or call at Arab ports prior to discharge."

Near East Report noted that this clause was a "defensive measure, designed to protect cargo destined for Israel from seizure because any cargo destined for Israel is seized if it is found in an Arab port. On the other hand, the provision inserted in the UAR contract dealing

with surplus food shipments is an aggressive blacklisting measure directed against shipowners who do business with Israel, and who are barred from the contract if they do. It provides: Wheat must not be shipped on—(1) vessels blacklisted by the Egyptian Government; (2) any vessels passing through Israeli territorial waters or ports." (*NE Report, May 15*)

The Israel Minister in Washington protested to the State Department in regard to the above letter which, *The Jerusalem Post* noted, "had sought to link the Arab blockade and boycott of Israel with the settlement of the Arab refugee problem." The State Department reportedly replied that the Hays letter did not represent any modification of the US disapproval of the Arab boycott but merely had reviewed its actual effect on American firms. (*Jer. Post, May 11*)

US Stand Re-affirmed. In a letter dated June 2, Assistant Secretary of State Hays assured Representative Seymour Halpern (R-N.Y.) that "every effort should be made to facilitate progress towards a resolution of the boycott problem and to eliminate discrimination in the use of international waterways." (*NE Report, June 15*)

The "Douglas Amendment" in Congress. [The US Congress included in the preamble to the Foreign Assistance Act for fiscal year 1962 a paragraph stating that, in the administration of this act, the principle of non-discrimination between recipient countries should be supported. This paragraph replaced the "Freedom of the Seas Amendment" or "Douglas amendment" to the Mutual Security Act for 1961 which was rather more strongly worded; see MER 1960, p 106.]

The Administration included a statement in the bill declaring the support of Congress for the principles of international economic cooperation, freedom of navigation and non-discrimination of all private persons. (*Near East Report* said the Administration hoped to avoid a repetition of the bitter floor debate which marked the adoption of the 1960 statement in the Senate.) (For sources, see below.)

Senator Fulbright Opposes Statement on Foreign Relations. Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, objected in the Committee on June 12 to the inclusion of the amendment. He said that the statement "expresses a principle we agreed on" but it was not relevant to the Foreign Assistance Act, and it had "an historical significance that is offensive to the Arab world." If it were to remain in the act, the Senator added, there ought to be a further statement to the effect that "until the Israel government—or language that would indicate the same—complies with the UN resolution on refugees, we could deny them tax exemption on contributions, or something like that." In response to his question, two administration witnesses, ICA Director Henry Labouisse and Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot, agreed to the elimination of the phrases in question. There was also opposition to other parts of the Administration's statement of policy. The Committee then tentatively decided to eliminate the entire statement.

Senators Paul H. Douglas (D-Ill.), Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) and Kenneth B. Keating (R-N.Y.) appealed to the Committee members to reconsider their position. Sen. Alexander Wiley (R-Wis.) moved to restore the anti-discriminatory paragraph. John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.) suggested that the entire preamble might be reinstated. It was reported that the Department of State preferred that course to a fight on the issue on the Senate floor. The Committee agreed.

On July 24, when the Committee took final action, Sen. Fulbright and Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) renewed their opposition. Their motion to delete the sentences linking aid to freedom of passage etc. was defeated 8 to 6. Sen. George D. Aiken (R-Vermont) moved to have the paragraph also refer to the press, information and religion. The Committee agreed.

Sen. Fulbright then proposed an additional amendment, which provided that the principles should be supported in such a way as to avoid taking sides between countries having friendly relations with the US.

The House Committee on Foreign Relations had meanwhile combined the 1960 "Douglas amendment" and the Morse-Javits amendment to the 1959 Foreign Aid bill into a strongly worded anti-discrimination statement. (For sources, see below.)

Text of Statement. The following final draft of the statement was agreed on by both the Senate and the House committee: "In addition, the Congress declares that it is the policy of the US to support the principles of increased economic cooperation and trade among countries, freedom of the press, information, and religion, freedom of navigation in international waterways, and recognition of the right of all private persons to travel and pursue their lawful activities without discrimination as to race or religion. In the administration of all parts of this Act, these principles shall be supported in such a way in our relations with countries friendly to the US which are in controversy with each other as to promote an adjudication of the issues involved by means of international law procedures available to the parties."

[The first sentence corresponded to the paragraph proposed by the Administration, with the words "freedom of the press, information and religion" added. The second sentence originated with the Fulbright amendment but excluded the insertion in this amendment after the words "in such a way" of the phrase "as to avoid taking sides in any controversy between countries..." (NE Report, Aug 1, Sept 1)]

THE BEN-GURION VISIT TO THE US AND THE REFUGEE QUESTION

(May-June)

The refugee question was one of the issues discussed by President Kennedy and PM Ben-Gurion in their informal meeting in New York on May 30 (for details of the visit and topics reportedly discussed see pp 319-20).

Ben-Gurion started at a press conference before leaving the US that he had found "a large measure of agreement" with the President on the refugee problem. Ben-Gurion did not elaborate except to say that Kennedy had offered "a suggestion that might be a solution" of the problem if the Arab leaders accepted it. (NYT, June 2)

Press Reports of the Kennedy "Suggestion." According to press reports, the US plan as put by Kennedy to Ben-Gurion provided for the solution of the problem by simultaneous action in three directions: repatriation to Israel (10 per cent of all the refugees, according to *Newsweek*; 25 per cent according to *Le Monde*); emigration to Western countries, including Latin America and the US; and resettlement in Arab countries with US and UN aid. Ben-Gurion was reported to have taken the position that Israel would be willing to take back "perhaps 50,000 or so," but only as part of an overall settlement in which the Arab countries would recognize Israel's sovereignty, terminate the Suez Canal blockade and reach

an agreement on the River Jordan. The US initiative was said to have been motivated primarily by mounting resentment in Congress at the Administration's yearly requests for appropriations for the upkeep of the refugees with no apparent relief in prospect. (*Newsweek*, June 26; *Time*, July 7; *Monde*, June 11; *Ha'aretz*, June 4)

State Department Denial. On June 2, a State Department spokesman said that no specific solution had been discussed. "In the brief informal meeting, President Kennedy raised with Mr. Ben-Gurion the subject of the tragic plight of the Arab refugees. He stressed the importance of Israel cooperating with such efforts as may be initiated by the Palestine Conciliation Commission" (PCC). Since the Commission's work had not yet taken precise form, the spokesman continued, and "since responsibility lies with the parties concerned as they may be assisted by the UN Commission, the question of an understanding between the President and the Prime Minister as to a specific solution did not arise." (*Jer. Post*, June 4)

A Tel Aviv paper wrote that political observers assumed that the State Department had been dissatisfied with Ben-Gurion's reference to the talk, and seemed to have feared that the Arabs would not cooperate with the PCC if they believed that an understanding had already been reached between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion. (*Ha'aretz*, June 7; on the US policy to activate the PCC, see the Kennedy letter, below, and p 228.)

Arabs Not Concerned. [The Arab press and radio stations gave relatively little attention to the meeting and emphasized that the US stand did not favour Israel.] *Al-Hayât* commented favourably on the US attitude as expressed in the State Department statement, and said that it had eased Arab apprehensions (*Hayât*, June 4). A Cairo weekly, quoting "reports received by the American Embassy in Cairo," said the meeting was held "in an official, that is, cold" atmosphere, and that President Kennedy had told Ben-Gurion that no solution could be imposed on the Arabs by force. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, June 5, see also *Akhbar*, June 2)

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S LETTER TO ARAB HEADS OF STATE

(May-August)

On June 2, following the Kennedy-Ben-Gurion meeting, it was reported that President Kennedy had sent letters of goodwill to the heads of state of Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAR. Later it was revealed that a letter had been sent also to the Imam of Yemen. It was immediately assumed that the letters were meant to reassure the Arabs with regard to the Kennedy-Ben-Gurion meeting (NYT, June 3, 5; see also *Time*, July 7; *USIS*, June 27).

[Later, towards the end of June, when the text of the letters leaked out in Beirut, it appeared that they were dated May 11, the date of the announcement of Ben-Gurion's visit to Canada, and eleven days before the official announcement of the forthcoming meeting.]

The text of the letter to King Hussein was obtained by *The New York Times* in Amman and published on June 26. Slightly varying texts in Arabic appeared in *Al-Hayât* (June 24), and in *Al-Ahrâm* (June 21, 1962) which reproduced the text of the letter to President Abdel Nasser and his reply. English translations of the *Al-Ahrâm* version appeared in the *Egyptian Mail* (Sept 22, 1962) and the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, IV (Sept 24, 1962). A synopsis of the letter was published

by *USIS* (June 27). Following is *The New York Times* version; the first part of the letter has been paraphrased.

In the opening paragraphs President Kennedy observed that in recent months the world had witnessed explosive situations, and though, since his inauguration, he had performed been largely occupied with international crises, his thoughts had often turned to the ME. He said that he was proud that the concepts of the American founding patriots and Lincoln, Wilson and F.D. Roosevelt had played such a great part in the emergence of vigorous and respected independent Arab states. The President continued that in recent weeks he had noted some speculation as to the new Administration's ME policy. Saying that as President he intended to uphold the above mentioned concepts, Kennedy continued as per the following text. (Headings inserted by editor; MER abbreviations.)

Readiness to Assist Nations Desirous of Maintaining Independence, Progress, Peace. "First, the US will to the best of its ability lend every appropriate assistance to all ME states that are determined to control their own destiny, to enhance the prosperity of their people and to allow their neighbours to pursue the same fundamental aims."

Readiness to Contribute to Solution of ME Disputes. "Secondly, the US remains ever ready to contribute both within and outside the US (*sic*: should read UN) to the search for solutions to disputes which dissipate the precious energies of the ME states and retard the economic prosperity which all free peoples rightly desire."

Assistance for Development Programmes. "Thirdly, with a view towards improving the welfare of the people of the ME the US is prepared to continue to support national development programs which are effectively designed to make available American commodities under the Food for Peace Program and to encourage educational exchanges and to facilitate political and economic progress."

Relative Tranquillity of ME. "While tensions unfortunately have sharpened in certain other areas of the world the ME during the past three years has been relatively tranquil. This has been due largely to the statesmanship on the part of the area's leaders who have given priority [to] constructive programs of economic development. Secretary [of State Dean] Rusk and I have been struck by the unanimity of views expressed to us by representatives of the various ME states, emphasizing that the present relative tranquillity should be preserved."

Solution of Arab-Israel Conflict Difficult but Possible; US Willing to Assist. "Underlying tensions do, however, remain, not the least of which is the unresolved Arab-Israel controversy. I know deep emotions are involved. No easy solution presents itself. The American Government and people believe that an honorable and humane settlement can be found and are willing to share in the labors and burdens which so difficult an achievement must entail if the parties concerned genuinely desire such participation."

The Arab Refugees and the Jordan Waters. "We are willing to help resolve the tragic Palestine refugee problem on the basis of the principle of repatriation and [or, according to all other sources] compensation for property, to assist them in finding an equitable answer to the question of the Jordan River water resources

development and to be helpful in making progress on other aspects of the complex problem.

"I am pleased the UN General Assembly recently underscored the necessity to implement more [more does not appear in the other sources] rapidly its previous recommendations on the refugee problem. In this connection I wish to state unequivocally that this government's position is anchored and will continue to be anchored in the firm bedrock of support for General Assembly recommendations concerning the refugees... and imperial concern that those resolutions be implemented in a way most beneficial to the refugees."

Full Backing for Palestine Conciliation Committee. "The US as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and as a nation keenly interested in the long-range advancement of the people of the Middle East takes seriously the task entrusted to the Commission and of [instead and of read by, according to other sources] the United Nations. We are determined to use our influence toward a just and peaceful solution.

"What precise steps the Commission may be able to take are of course not yet clear but I can assure you that there will be no lack of US interest in seeing that all parties directly concerned will cooperate fully with whatever program is indicated by the Commission so that the best interests and welfare of all the Arab refugees of Palestine may be protected and advanced."

Attitude of Friendship Towards the Arab People. [At this point the *New York Times* version apparently omitted a sentence. According to the UAR sources, this sentence read: "I also hope that the advantages of my views on the ME will be clear to you." According to *Al-Hayat*: "I sincerely hope that my views on the ME will be of benefit to you."] The text continued:

"Given the long history of friendly relationships between the Arab people and the American people and the interdependence of all men who wish to remain free, I want to be certain that you and other Arab leaders have no misunderstanding of our attitude toward the Arab people. It continues to be one of sincere friendship with mutual respect for the others' point of view, mutual and active concern for the betterment of mankind and mutual striving to eliminate the causes of international tensions. I am sure the future will bring ever friendlier and more productive relationships between our countries and the freedom-loving peoples." (*NYT*, June 26)

Before the last paragraph, there appeared in each letter a passage of special reference to the country concerned. (*Hayat*, June 24; for this passage in the letter to President Abdel Nasser, see the UAR sources mentioned above.)

ABDEL NASSER'S REPLY TO KENNEDY

President Abdel Nasser's reply to President Kennedy dated Aug 8, 1961, was made public in *Al-Ahrām* over a year after it was written, on Sept 21, 1962. Hassanin Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahrām*, wrote that the publication was designed to enlighten the public in connection with accusation made by Akram al-Hurāni (the former UAR Vice-President and a leader of the Syrian Ba'ath party) and others to the effect that the UAR was conspiring with the US "to solve the Palestine question in Israel's favour." (*Ahrām*, Sept 21, 1962)

Abdel Nasser referred to the letters in a revolution anniversary speech, on July 22. He said that certain people had argued that no reply should be sent to President Kennedy as a reply would mean negotiations. [PM Qasim of Iraq publicly took this stand, see below.] But,

he stated, it was a duty to convince any one asking for an opinion on the question "that we are right and that the creation of Israel was a blunder." Foreshadowing a theme which appeared later in his letter, Abdel Nasser said that "we have nothing to hide... in confidential documents as well as in our speeches... we use one and the same language..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 23)

In his detailed letter (which was two and a half times as long as that of President Kennedy) the UAR leader gave his views on the Arab-Israel conflict and a critique of past US policies in the ME.

Palestine Crucial Issue Between UAR and US. Abdel Nasser declared that "the Palestine question and associated problems were not only a main issue affecting world peace in our age," but also "directly connected with the relations between our peoples." Various pronouncements by Kennedy on the Palestine issue before he became President had given Abdel Nasser the feeling "that many angles in the problem need clarification." The President's letter dealing with the subject gave Abdel Nasser an opportunity to state his attitude.

Israel An Aggressor and Ever-Present Danger. Abdel Nasser made the following points:

(1) The entire development in Palestine from the issuance of the Balfour declaration until the present was based on "usurpation."

(2) The US "did not place its might on the side of law and justice" nor did its policy serve American interests. US policy was dominated by internal political considerations such as the attempt by former President Harry S. Truman to gain Jewish votes in the presidential elections.

(3) Certain elements claimed that Israel had gained rights in Palestine by military victory. Such victory was however only a fable created by propaganda. The Israel forces did not occupy land in battle but only during the truce; the Arabs had trusted the justice of the UN to recover this land but they were punished for this trust.

(4) Israel was a continuous threat to the Arabs. Israel was bound to seek expansion because of the large-scale immigration; hence her strong alliance with imperialism. "On the other hand, imperialism has been using Israel as a tool to divide the Arab nation geographically and as a base to threaten any movement which would seek liberation from its domination."

Statements Not for Home Consumption. Abdel Nasser assured President Kennedy that "our attitude towards Israel is not a complex bundle of emotions" but a reflection of past aggression, present dangers and an ambiguous future. Also, he wrote, his statements were not meant for home consumption. He recalled what President Dwight D. Eisenhower had told him in New York on Sept. 26, 1960, "that some Arab politicians were publicly making harsh statements regarding Palestine and then contacting the American Government to alleviate their harshness by saying that their statements were meant for local Arab consumption." This was not the case with him.

US ME Policies Criticized. Abdel Nasser continued that Egypt had often tried to extend her hand to the American nation, but many times her hand had been left hanging in the air. He listed a series of grievances going back to President Wilson's refusal to meet the Egyptian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I. He said that Arab-US relations, which had been dealt a big blow by the US attitude to the Palestine question, had further deteriorated during 1954-5 over the question

of ME defence. During the same period, in Feb 1955, Israel launched the raid on Gaza which became "the turning point in determining the trend of events" and Israel's agents committed acts of sabotage in Egypt. Egypt therefore resolved to arm herself and as the US rejected her bid for arms, she sought them from the Soviet Union. Abdel Nasser wrote: "I assure you that I will continue to keep faith with (*jafā*) the government of the Soviet Union" for this help.

Subsequently the UAR was subjected to psychological warfare, and the US withdrew its offer to finance the Aswan High Dam and did this in a form which "embodied many things which the Arab people of Egypt could not accept."

Egypt appreciated the US attempt to find a peaceful solution to "the problem which appeared after the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company" as well as US support in her struggle against the invasion of her territory by the three powers in Oct 1956. At the same time, when the Suez crisis was over, the US attempted to isolate Egypt by means such as the Eisenhower doctrine. Thereafter the Baghdad Pact tried to undermine Syria but in the end the Baghdad Pact collapsed and with it the US Arab policy. Yet the government did not ask itself what were the reasons for this failure. Abdel Nasser asked "why did the US, which was founded on freedom and on revolution, turn against freedom and revolution?" There was some improvement in relations, but it was punctuated by shocks like the boycott of the "Arab ship Cleopatra". (See MER 1960, p 41 ff)

There were some occasional bright moments, Abdel Nasser continued. In addition to the US attitude during the Suez crisis he mentioned US economic aid and assistance in salvaging the Nubian monuments.

Concluding, the UAR leader said his aim had been to make it clear that the "Arab East question" were closely inter-connected, that the "right of the Palestine refugees is connected with the right of the Palestinian homeland" and that the other Arab countries could not dissociate themselves "from the aggression which befell one of them," as they were threatened by the same fate.

US Asked To Eliminate Internal Politics From Her ME Policy. Abdel Nasser told Kennedy that the US policy on the ME was "influenced by un-American factors in many instances." He therefore said that "the time has come for the US to open its eyes and view the development of events in our region on the basis of a purely American outlook not affected by internal American political considerations or by calculations on election votes." Abdel Nasser warned Kennedy that "it would be a grave mistake" to take the expressions in this letter as "dictated by local Arab political considerations. I meant this letter for you, not for what some of those who claim experience here call local consumption or psychological mobilization." (*Ahram*, Sept 21, 1962; *Eg. Mail*, Sept 22, 1962; *R. Cairo*, Sept 21 [24] 1962)

OTHER REACTIONS TO KENNEDY LETTERS APPREHENSIONS SUBSIDE

Saudi Arabia. The first reports on the Kennedy letters came from Saudi Arabia. On May 23, King Saud was reported to have summoned the Arab ambassadors and informed them that he had received a letter from President Kennedy. The Saudi Arabian government requested that the Arab League Council be convened to deal with the letter. (*R. Cairo*, May 23-IMB, May 23; *Hayat*, May 25)

A Lebanese paper remarked that Saudi Arabian offi-

als had attached special significance to the fact that Kennedy had written to King Saud. They had tried to give the impression that the King was the only important Arab personality who had received such a letter and that the King was actively engaged in solving the Arab-Israel dispute in line with the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. (*Nahar*, June 25)

Arab League Directives? There were conflicting reports as to whether the Arab Defence Council which met in Cairo from June 10-18 (pp 107-8) had adopted recommendations on the replies to be given to the Kennedy letters. On June 20 Cairo Radio said the conference had resolved that each country should answer the letter separately and independently, but two days later the same source said that King Saud was preparing a reply in line with the directives elaborated by the Council (*R. Cairo*, June 20, 22-*IMB*, June 20, 22). The League's "Palestine Experts Committee," apparently proposed some guidelines. (*Ahram*, May 31; see also p 111 a)

Philippe Taqha, the Lebanese PM, reportedly told a Lebanese parliamentary committee that the Arab Defence Council had resolved on the following directives for replies to the Kennedy letter: a) the very existence of Israel was a violation of the principles of justice, for the state was based on religion and race, both imperialistic principles; b) the Arabs were ready to shoulder the responsibility for Palestine and considered foreign interference in the ME as the main cause of the difficulties and disagreements; c) the Arab countries desired stability and security in the ME and they deemed President Kennedy's initiative as timely, for the US Government had declared as its purpose the worldwide introduction of the principles of justice. (*BBG in Arabic*, June 22-*IMB*, June 23)

On June 25, President Shehab sent his reply. (*Hayat*, June 25)

PM Qasim Opposes Reply. PM Qasim in a public speech late in June referring to the Kennedy letter, said that the Arab countries would solve their problems themselves and would not allow foreign countries to interfere in the affairs of the ME. He believed that the very decision to conduct discussions about the fate of Palestine was an abandonment of its future. He said that undoubtedly each Arab state had the right either to reply or not to reply to Kennedy's letter, but the interests of the Arabs did not necessitate a reply. (*R. Baghdad*, June 25-*IMB*, June 26)

King Hussein's Reply. The text of King Hussein's reply was not made public. It was reported that the King had asserted that it was the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homeland, and that peace and stability would prevail in the ME only after a just solution was found to the Palestine problem. Hussein had urged the President to try to apply the principle of self-determination to the refugees. (*NYT*, Aug 24, 25)

Arabs See Change in US Attitude: "More Neutral." [As recorded above, the Arab information media gave relatively little attention to the Kennedy-Ben-Gurion meeting on May 30, and emphasized that the US stand did not favour Israel. In June, and later on, while the Cairo radio station still continued to charge the US with a pro-Israel policy (e.g., *R. Cairo*, June 3 [5]), more opinions appeared to the effect that the Arab-US relations were improving.] A Jordanian paper spoke of the evident rapprochement between the Kennedy administration and the Arab world, Abdel Nasser in particular, which allegedly

disquieted Ben-Gurion. There were reports that American policy towards the Middle East would be "more neutral" than hitherto and observers were even said to believe that the US would allow arms shipments to the UAR. (*Manar*, June 6)

In Aug reports in New York papers said that the Arabs had been favourably impressed by President Kennedy's letters and believed that in principle he did not reject the Arab stand. The Americans had proposed nothing concrete, and neither Israel nor the Arabs had agreed to anything. But the intangible element, called in the diplomatic language "the initial atmosphere," was thought to be not discouraging. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 18)

Kennedy Seen "Abandoning Idea of Personal Mediation"; Failure of 1958 Mediation Mission Recalled. Earlier a Cairo paper reported from an "informed source" that Kennedy had completely abandoned the idea of personally mediating between the Arabs and Israel to find a solution for the Palestine problem. Instead, the UN SG would send a personal envoy to the ME [a reference to the PCC Special Representative]. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, July 31)

At the same time it was revealed in a report in *The New York Times* that in 1958 Robert Anderson, then Defense Under-Secretary, was sent by President Eisenhower on a secret mission to Israel and Cairo to seek a formula for peace. According to the Tel Aviv paper *Ma'ariv*, Anderson spent several days incognito in Jerusalem, under strict guard, and held talks with PM Ben-Gurion. He then flew to Cairo in a special plane, via Athens, and returned several days later to report to Ben-Gurion that Abdel Nasser had refused to budge. (Quoted in *Jer. Post*, Aug 1)

Israel Said to Agree to More US Aid to Arabs. In June a State Department source was quoted as saying that Israel had agreed to American efforts to strengthen her ties with the Arab countries. The source added that courting the Arabs would not result in cooler relations with Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, June 29)

In Nov it was reported from Jerusalem that government circles hinted that Israel was not opposed to Egypt's receiving technical and economic aid which certain powers wished to extend to her. Israel believed that by raising the standard of living, a contribution to the stability of the area would be made. It was assumed that this attitude was communicated to Mr. Phillips Talbot, US Assistant Secretary of State, when he toured the area several weeks before. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 16)

US POLICY STATEMENTS

(June-October)

On June 14, Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on the foreign assistance programme for the Near East and South Asia that US economic and military aid was "indispensable" and "vital" to US security. He noted that "such compelling needs as more education, greater agricultural and industrial productivity, and wider public participation in the responsibilities of government" were general throughout the area. He added: "In most countries these needs now have political as well as economic implications... Through fractional but often decisive US assistance to their own efforts, we helped countries in the area to progress in directions consonant with US goals... the creation of stability wherein freedom, peace and progress based upon respect for the dignity and worth of the individual may

be achieved... Our economic as well as our military aid has also demonstrably strengthened nations of the area against the persistent, heavy pressure of Soviet and Chinese Communist expansionism." (For source, see below.)

"Relative Stability in the ME." Talbot noted that there had been relative stability in the ME during the past year, there had been fewer border incidents and relations between the Arab countries had improved. These "conditions of relative peace" had "not however obscured our recognition of the underlying problems which stand in the way of an Arab-Israeli peace nor lessened our determination to be helpful in achieving progress on these problems." Talbot said "neither the Arabs nor the Israelis have yet shown the degree of willingness to negotiate or compromise which might allow some progress."

The Arab Refugees. Talbot continued that "as a nation we retain deep humanitarian interest in the problem of refugees, a most important element... in the whole Arab-Israeli question." He noted that endeavours—consistent with the desires of the Congress—had been made by UNRWA to correct ration roll abuses and to promote a constructive expansion of the vocational training programme.

Talbot continued: "We have not, however, abandoned our efforts to achieve progress on the overall Arab-Israeli problem... As a member of the PCC, the US takes most seriously its responsibilities to provide by next fall a report which will make constructive contribution to consideration of the refugee problem."

The Arab Boycott and Freedom of Navigation. Talbot continued: "We continue to maintain our support for the principle of freedom of transit through the Suez Canal and our opposition to the Arab boycott of Israel... We

have registered again with the governments involved US views with regard to Arab boycott practices and other discriminatory measures involving US citizens and companies. We believe a better comprehension of the US viewpoint has developed. On the other hand, we are convinced that to press this issue through retaliatory steps would intensify the very restrictions we seek to remove..."

Support for UN Bodies. Talbot continued: "Meanwhile, we are convinced of the need for continuing full support of the instrumentalities of the UN, including UNTSO, UNEF and UNRWA, which now play an important role in preservation of area stability."

Quiet Diplomacy. "The measures described above," Talbot concluded, "are indicative of our determination to contribute to the alleviation of some of the ill-effects of the Arab-Israeli dispute, though in the broader sense we are convinced of the need for stressing the methods of quiet diplomacy in dealing with a complex issue where deep emotions characterize attitudes on both sides." (USIS, June 15)

Senator Humphrey Sees Improved Atmosphere; Against Imposed Solution. "As a result of my talks with the leaders of the Arab nations and Israel, I am more optimistic about the chance for peace in the Middle East than I was after my trip to this area in 1957," Senator Hubert Humphrey, Deputy Majority Leader of the US Senate, declared on Oct 29 at a press conference in Jerusalem, Israel. He said that in his meeting with the leaders of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan he had encountered no rancour, but rather noticed a deep concern about the problems of development in their own countries. He also said it would be a mistake for the US to attempt to force a solution to the problems of the area. (Jer. Post, Oct 30)

THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

SYNOPSIS

The attitude of the Communist countries to the Arab-Israeli conflict continued unchanged from 1960. They backed the Arab case in practically every instance, particularly at the UN (see pp 18-9, 34-5). Soviet arms continued to flow into the UAR and Iraq.

The views of the USSR and the Arabs largely coincided; both depicted Israel as an aggressive tool of Western imperialism in the ME, scheming to usurp the Arab lands, and serving neo-colonialism in Africa. Soviet comments laid much stress on what was described as West German support for Israel's plots and expansionism. (At the same time no Communist support was expressed for the declared Arab aim of liquidating Israel.)

Following are excerpts from Moscow broadcasts in Arabic. (See also: Israel, Foreign Relations (The Communist Bloc).)

MOSCOW BROADCASTS

"Israel Does Not Want Peace." At the close of 1960 a Moscow Radio commentary stated what was to be the basic tenet of the official Soviet view throughout the following year: "The fact is that peace has never prevailed between Israel and the Arab States. Who is guilty of this?... do the Arabs threaten Israel? No, on the contrary! It is the Arab countries which have been sub-

jected more than once to Israeli aggression... At the present moment Israel is harbouring plans to usurp Arab territory. Israel does not want peace with the Arabs, refuses to abandon its usurpation plans, and obstinately continues to carry out... its military preparations against the Arabs." (R. Moscow in Arabic, Dec 31, 1960 [SU, Jan 2, 1961])

US Finances Israel Armaments from Oil Profits. In March Moscow Radio commented on a US Export-Import Bank loan to Israel in the following terms: "Everyone of you knows quite well the reason for this American generosity to the country which is regarded by the US as the fortress of the Western world in the Near East... Israel needs US dollars to buy modern weapons. You know full well against whom the Israelis want to use these weapons... where do the Americans obtain these funds for aiding Israel?... this money cannot be obtained except from one source: the sales of Arab oil. In a word, the income from exploiting Arab natural resources is being spent to buy weapons which may be used against the Arabs." (R. Moscow in Arabic, March 18 [SU 21])

"Imaginary Arab Attacks"—Pretext for Israel Arms Supplies. In connection with PM Ben-Gurion's visit to North America, Britain and France in May-June which coin-

cided with French and Italian press reports of Israel's purchases of tanks and heavy artillery, Moscow Radio declared that "the Israeli rulers had loudly complained about imaginary Arab attacks" and that as a result, the West had been "prompted... to increase the financial and military aid to Israel." (*R. Moscow in Arabic, June 19 [SU 21]*)

Joint Israel-NATO Espionage Alleged. A Moscow Radio commentary on a recent spy trial in Cairo said that the direction of Israeli intelligence activities from Western Germany was proven beyond doubt. The leading accused was a West German citizen. This was a further illustration of West Germany's attitude towards the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. West Germany had paid vast sums in compensation to Israel and Israel had used them to develop her arms industry. (*R. Moscow in Arabic, July 14 [SU 17]*)

A news item on Moscow Radio quoted a Beirut press report that a NATO espionage centre had been set up

in Israel under the direction of an Israeli officer for the purpose of gathering information about ME countries. (*R. Moscow, Sept 5 [SU 7]*)

"The spies operating in Egypt and the other Arab countries," declared Moscow Radio in Nov, "have two masters, NATO... and Israel": coordination of Israel and NATO intelligence activities had recently been extended. (*R. Moscow in Arabic, Nov 9 [SU, 10, 11]*)

Israel "Threatens Arabs with New Power." A statement by a Lebanese Member of Parliament, that a NATO nuclear naval base was to be constructed in Israel, was described as "a warning to the whole of Arab public opinion." There was ground for anxiety that Israel would "continue to pursue an anti-Arab foreign policy, with the encouragement of the Western Powers." Israel, the broadcast continued, "has not yet given up its extremist scheme of grabbing new Arab land. Government officials in Israel talk openly about this, including the Premier, Ben-Gurion, who threatens the Arabs with his new power." (*R. Moscow in Arabic, Nov 11 [SU 14]*)

ARAB ANTI-ISRAELI ACTIVITIES IN NON-ARAB AFRICA

ARAB VIEWS AND PROPAGANDA

Abdel Nasser: Israel, a Tool of New Imperialism, Has Failed in Africa. UAR Main Aim in Africa to Frustrate Israeli Designs. In an address to the UAR National Assembly on Jan 23, Abdel Nasser declared that Israel's infiltration of Africa—which was synonymous with imperialist infiltration—would fail because the UAR was there to guard the continent's eastern gates. He said that the Casablanca resolutions had shown that the Africans now clearly understood Israel's hidden intentions. (*Nasser's Speeches, pp 5, 7*)

On Feb 21 Abdel Nasser said in a speech in Damascus that western imperialism had opened Africa's doors to Israel and was trying to close the countries under its rule to the Arabs. It was the duty of the UAR to warn the African peoples of the new imperialism—the Zionist imperialism—which wished to place them within the imperialist spheres of influence. (*Nasser's Speeches, p 21*)

In his revolution anniversary speech of July 23, Abdel Nasser said that the UAR had "worked for the sake of African solidarity... because imperialism has enabled Israel to infiltrate into Africa..." He reiterated that the "Africans were deceived for some time," but were now fully aware that Israel was a "tool in the hands of the new imperialism." (*Nasser's Speeches, p 139*)

[These themes in Abdel Nasser's speeches were repeated by the UAR information media throughout the year.]

Propaganda in Cairo Broadcasts to Africa. [Anti-Israel propaganda was a major topic and often the main one in Cairo's broadcasts to Africa. Israel was described as a tool of imperialism in general and in Africa in particular.]

A talk in Swahili emphasized the need for African countries to remain united against the spread of Israeli influence, while another was devoted to alleged Israeli maltreatment of Arabs and Christians (*R. Cairo in Swahili, Jan 30 [Feb 1], Feb 1 [3]*). Israel's record of votes on African affairs at the UN was attacked as pro-imperialist (*R. Cairo, April 5 [7]*). In talks on neo-colonialism in Africa, Israel was stigmatized as a stooge of Western imperialism, and the establishment of Israel was compared to the European colonization of Africa, which had driven Africans from their homes. Israel's reputed

imperialist role in Africa was shown by such examples as the alleged supply of 10,000 Israeli-made submachine guns to the Portuguese forces by Western Germany for use in Angola, alleged Israeli help for the French in Algeria, and alleged Israeli ties with South Africa. (*R. Cairo in Swahili, April 11 [13], June 21 [30]*)

To Arabic broadcasts, African leaders who visited Israel were termed agents of imperialism, as in the case of Maurice Yameogo, President of Upper Volta. There was no question of Presidents Touré, Nkrumah, Keita and other "free African leaders" visiting Israel, since they knew better to be an imperialist tool, Cairo Radio said. Thus such visits were no proof of the failure of the UAR's attempts to isolate Israel from Africa, as claimed by Israel Radio. (*V of A, July 15 [17]*)

UAR to Disseminate "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion." *Al-Ahram* reported in Jan that the UAR information department was translating the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" into Arabic, French, and English for dissemination in Africa, in order to "unmask Zionism." "Parts of the Talmud" were also being translated. The Talmud said, this report alleged, that whoever kills a non-Jew would be assured of Paradise; it also permitted the Jews to rob gentiles of their property and to violate their women. (*Ahram, Jan 20*; on the "Protocols" and "quotations" from the Talmud, see also pp 185-6.)

Showing the Refugee Camps. [African visitors to the UAR were often shown the refugee camps in the Gaza strip and Syria] so that they would understand the "Zionist imperialist crime committed against the inhabitants of Arab Palestine" (*Ahram, Feb 16*). In April the delegates at the African Broadcasting Conference held in Cairo were taken on a tour of the refugee camps in Gaza (*R. Cairo, April 29-IMB, April 30*). In May the heads of the African political offices in Cairo were to undertake such a trip after a special meeting on Palestine. (*Ahram, May 10*)

Israeli Intrigues and Plots Alleged; Issue of Forged Qur'ân. A report prepared by the UAR Foreign Ministry on Israeli activities in the new African states found that

Israel and France had jointly plotted to infiltrate into these states, especially the former French ones, commercially, economically, and politically. (*R. Cairo, Jan 3-IMB, Jan 3*)

Cairo sources alleged that Israel was sending teachers of Islam and Arabic to African countries with a Muslim population, and in Sierra Leone she had built a mosque as a gift. The Waqf Ministry had decided to send gramophone records to all places where Israel had sent "forged copies of the Qur'an" (*Gumhuriyah, Jan 5; MENA, Jan 5 [9]*). [There were no African or any other non-Arab reports on any such Israeli activities. Arab allegations that Israel had disseminated forged copies of the Qur'an in Africa had already appeared in 1960.] An Iraqi paper dealt with the "forged Qur'an" issue at length (*Fajr al-Jadid, Jan 27*) while in Sudan, the Shaykh al-Ulamah warned against this "evil trick," which threatened "the holiest of holies" (*R. Umdurman, Feb 9 [11]*). Jordan circulated information of the issue among the Arab states (*R. Amman, April 6-IMB, April 9*) and a UAR minister took 5,000 copies of the Qur'an to Mecca for distribution among the pilgrims, in consequence of the reports of the "forged Qur'an" (*Akhbar, April 23*). [None of the sources available ever reported that a "forged Qur'an" had been produced in evidence.]

A Cairo weekly claimed to have learned from an Israeli paper that 24 "young Israel beauties" had gone to Africa with the aim to marry "any African leader whatsoever" or "to accept their hospitality." (*Musawwar, Dec 8*)

Arab Self-Criticism. The press continued to publish Arab self-criticism on failure in Africa.

In March a Cairo weekly criticized the lack of coordination in Arab efforts against Israeli penetration of Africa. As an example, the paper cited four cases of separate Arab committees and institutions having dealt with the matter and having reached certain decisions without any coordination. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, March 4*)

In June two editorials in *Al-Hayat* described Israel's close relations with Africa. Tel Aviv had become a Mecca for African leaders, and the Africans had high praise for Israel's assistance to their countries. The Arab League meanwhile was passing resolution after resolution to combat Israeli penetration into Africa. (*Hayat, June 7, 20*)

ARAB ACTIVITIES

Note: This section includes only items which have not been recorded elsewhere in this volume. Much of the bilateral relations between the Arab and African countries were concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict. (See bilateral relations between Arab and African countries, Israel and African countries.) "Thwarting Israel's infiltration into Africa" featured also in most Arab League conferences and other inter-Arab meetings and was the subject of almost all activities of the League in Africa. See: Inter-Arab Relations; especially The Arab League Council; The "Palestine Question" (Conference of Heads of Palestine Machineries); Inter-Arab Conferences (i.e. Information Committee).

A delegation of the Arab chambers of commerce, which toured African countries in July-August, was also mostly concerned with combating Israel in Africa (p 102 b).

The Casablanca Conference. In the field of Arab anti-Israeli activities in Africa, the beginning of 1961 was dominated by the Casablanca Conference resolutions which severely condemned Israel. Most of the Arab press and especially that of the UAR hailed the resolutions as a great victory over Israel and a blow to her prestige and influence in Africa (see pp 51-2).

Arab League and Other General Arab Activities. The Arab ministries of education were reported to be consulting on the coordination of cultural activities in Africa against Israel's increasing activity on the continent. (*Hayat, Feb 22*)

Jordan's decision to send a royal delegation on an African tour [in March-April] was described as an important step in combating Israel's efforts on the continent. (*Falastin, Feb 21; Hayat, Feb 28*)

A tour of Africa by a UAR economic delegation was also said to be mainly directed against Israeli activity there. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, March 27*)

An Afro-Arab conference, whose aim would be the discussion of measures to thwart Israeli "penetration of Africa," was planned for the beginning of the summer of 1961 (*Ahram, March 26*). [No such conference took place during 1961.]

The Arab League envisaged the establishment of an Afro-Asian institute to frustrate Israeli cultural expansion. (*Jihad, April 4; Hayat, April 7*)

The League Economic Council, at its meeting in Feb., devoted a special discussion to Israel's economic "penetration" of Africa. (*Falastin, April 12*)

Two representatives of the Arab Higher Committee (on which see p 111) visited Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, Chad, and Sudan. Their intention was to inform on the Palestine problem and the Arab refugees. (*West African Pilot, Enugu, July 5*)

The Arab League prepared plans for the establishment of an Arab trading firm, with the principal objective of combating Israeli goods in African and Asian markets. (*Ahram, Nov 21*)

The League Permanent Committee for Communications, at its meeting in Rabat in Dec., discussed taking over Israeli interests in shipping firms in West Africa, following the alleged success of the League in preventing agreements between Israel and Ghana and Sierra Leone for setting up joint shipping companies. (*Akhir Sa'ah, Dec 13*)

A draft resolution calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states was sponsored at the 16th session of the UN General Assembly by 12 African states, among others. In consequence, the Central Boycott Office of the Arab League asked for stronger coordination and cooperation between the Arab governments, so as to foil Israeli "penetration" of Africa. (*Jihad, Dec 30*)

Arab Refugees in Africa. In April a group of 28 "hungry-looking" Arab refugees from Palestine arrived in Monrovia by car on their way from Ghana to Cairo. They enjoyed the charity of the Monrovia, and their leader told of how they were "booted out of Jerusalem by the Jews." (*Liberian Age, April 7*)

THE ARAB BOYCOTT AGAINST ISRAEL

SYNOPSIS

(For a background note, see MER 1960, pp 186-7)

Information on boycott activities was available almost exclusively from Arab sources; Israeli sources seldom mentioned Arab boycott measures.

The Arab boycott against Israel continued during the year in its set pattern, and there were no outstanding issues or incidents.

Foreign firms and ships continued to be blacklisted, and the names of those who promised to abide by the boycott regulations were removed from the list (only a few cases of blacklisting have been recorded here, as samples). In the cultural sphere Cairo extended the boycott to a US theatre company because Israel too was on its itinerary. In Lebanon the government ordered the name of Israel to be erased from books and maps, even in scientific libraries.

Arab opinion of the effectiveness of the boycott was mixed in face of the obvious economic prosperity in Israel and the marked growth in her foreign trade, the tourist industry, and in foreign investments.

While boycott officials claimed that the boycott was generally effective, others charged the Arab countries, Arab emigrants and the boycott officials themselves with actually hindering the achievement of its aims. The Lebanese government especially was accused of procrastinating in implementing the boycott. There were many Arab reports—some of them said to be inspired by personal motives—that Israeli goods were being sold in the Arab countries themselves.

Similarly, while on the one hand boycott office officials reported the effectiveness of the Arab boycott measures in Africa and indicated that Israel was practically ousted from the African markets, others complained of the entrenched position of the Israelis there and of the ineffectiveness of the boycott.

Several threats of boycott were not carried out, e.g. against BOAC and the Hilton hotel chain (Hilton had a hotel in Cairo and was preparing to build one in Tel Aviv). Jordan continued to permit tourists, pilgrims, and diplomats to cross the border, in spite of a resolution by the boycott officers forbidding this.

The US Congress adopted an anti-discriminatory amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of fiscal year 1962, which replaced the "Douglas Amendment" of the 1961 Act, and stated that in administering this act the principles of the freedoms of trade, information, travel, navigation in international waterways, and others, should be upheld.

16TH CONFERENCE OF ARAB
BOYCOTT OFFICERS

[After several postponements] the conference met in the Old City of Jerusalem on June 5. The meetings were held in secret and lasted three weeks. Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the UAR were represented; the Yemeni representative was expected. Dr Abd al-Karim al-A'zidi, the General Commissioner of the Central Boycott Office, presided. (*Manar*, June 4; *Eg. Gaz.*, June 28)

A major topic on the agenda was how to combat Israel's trade with African countries (*Jihad*, June 13). Amman Radio reported the following items on the agenda: (a) the domination by international Zionism of a number of foreign educational institutions; (b) question of goods

owned by persons in Israel and transported through Arab airspace or in planes landing in Arab airports [?]; (c) blacklisting of foreign firms; (d) raw materials likely to help the Israel war effort. (*R. Amman*, June 7-*IMB*, June 8)

The conference submitted recommendations and resolutions for strengthening the boycott of Israel to the Arab League Council for action by the Arab states (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 28). The next meeting was to take place in Khartoum in Jan 1962; a Jordanian suggestion to make [the Old City of] Jerusalem the permanent seat of the Central Boycott Office or venue of the conference was rejected. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, July 12)

A communiqué issued on June 24, at the conclusion of the conference, said that it had discussed 75 topics under three headings: (a) tightening the boycott by laying down a new basis for it; (b) amending certain boycott measures to suit developments; (c) scrutinizing of documents presented by blacklisted companies. The conference resolved: (1) to remove from the black list 12 firms which had severed connections with Israel; (2) to blacklist 27 firms for dealing with Israel; (3) to complete investigation of nine other firms (*R. Amman*, June 24-*IMB*, June 25; *ANA*, June 24 [27]). Among the "important resolutions" adopted were: to boycott universities and other foreign institutions of higher education which were under Zionist influence; and to act against the Leyland Bus Co., which had established an assembly plant in Israel (*Akhbar*, June 28). The Arab League Council approved the recommendations of the conference. (*Anwar*, Dec 1)

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN SUEZ CANAL,
SHIPPING BOYCOTT; UAR MEASURES

Blacklisting of Ships and Shipping Firms. Fourteen shipping companies—American, British, Spanish, Italian, and Danish—were added to the black list, it was reported in May. Names of ships blacklisted appeared in the following sources, among others: (*R. Cairo*, March 11-*IMB*, March 12; *Akhbar*, May 26; *Jaridah*, May 30)

UAR sources reported on shipping lines and ships which had promised to stop trading with Israel in order to be taken off the black list. (e.g. *R. Cairo*, Feb 24-*IMB*, Feb 24; *Masa*, June 28, Nov 2)

UAR Seizes Israel-Bound Cargo. The UAR authorities announced several times that they had seized cargoes passing through the Suez Canal bound for Israel. There were, for example, a box weighing 40 kilograms, and two tons of horsehair (the latter was requisition Bo. 523). (*R. Cairo*, March 16 [18]; *Ahram*, April 5, June 1; *MENA*, Dec 7 [9]; *R. Baghdad*, April 17-*IMB*, April 18)

In May, Maj.-Gen. Isâm al-Masri, the head of the UAR boycott office [Office of War Mobilization], gave details of the seizure in the past of what he said were disguised weapons destined for Israel, such as 28 tanks disguised as tractors. The boycott regulations for ships in Arab territorial waters were implemented by offices in Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez. Since their establishment they had impounded goods bound for Israel worth ££2m. The case of the impounded cargo went to the Prize Court, "which derived its authority from international law." If the court approved the seizure, the goods were bonded in the name of the Palestinian refugees, or sold by auction. If the tribunal found the

seizure unwarranted, the goods were returned to the owners against certain charges. (*Ahram*, April 5)

Israel-Bound Mail Seized and Rerouted. Seventy bags of mail for Israel, seized in Port Said (in Oct) from a British liner bound for London from Sydney, were to be shipped back to Australia, a spokesman for the Arab Boycott Office announced. In Israel it was expected that a diplomatic protest would be made in Canberra if Egypt did not give Australia a satisfactory explanation of the seizure of the mail. This was the first time the Egyptian authorities had raided a passenger liner travelling through the Suez Canal to seize mail bound for Israel. The mail was to have been off-loaded at Genoa, not Port Said, in order to avoid dispute with the Arab League. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 17, 18)

In April the Cairo authorities impounded seven packages destined for Israel from a Russian plane. This mail was to be sent to Tel Aviv via Tirana (*BBC in Arabic*, April 18-19B, April 19). In Dec there was an additional case of impounding of mail destined for Israel at Cairo airport. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 5)

UAR Sees Israel Countermeasures. In April a Cairo source claimed Israel intended to increase pressure to open the Suez Canal for Israel shipping by means of a stratagem: ships destined to pass the Canal were loaded by "Zionist agents" with goods of no commercial value, so that the UAR would impound them and thus enable Israel to raise the matter in the Security Council. (*Rus al-Yusuf*, April 24)

International Protests. The Foreign Minister of Denmark, Jens Otto Krag, was reported to have declared on a visit to Cairo that his country believed the Suez Canal was to be free for all shipping. (*Ha'aretz*, quoting *AFP*, Feb 26)

A Cairo paper reported that the international congress of stevedores in Geneva (?) had resolved to boycott Arab ships so as to force the Arabs to stop boycotting ships trading with Israel; however, the Arab Boycott Office in Geneva and the Egyptian mission had explained to the delegates the reasons for the boycott. "Congress members were convinced, and gave up their previous stand." (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, Oct 18)

Scandal in Alexandria. It was discovered that in the Alexandria bonded warehouses two firms had violated the boycott regulations by transferring ££48,000 over a two-year period to a Zionist who aided immigration to and invested his money in Israel. This (named) person owned warehouse companies in Geneva which had made a deal with the Alexandria companies. (*Akhbar*, Dec 10)

BOYCOTT OF AIRLINES

Airlines Subjected to Boycott. The permanent legal committee [of the UAR] approved a boycott regulation providing that airplanes passing through Arab countries' airspace may be requested to land, and subjected to search. The Arab governments would have the right to confiscate baggage or cargo belonging to individuals and institutions in Israel. The law stated that the prescribed procedure did not contravene the provisions of international aviation agreements. (For details of the law see *Ahram*, March 6.)

BOAC Warned. The Arab League Boycott Office warned the British Overseas Airways Corporation that unless it abandoned its scheduled stopover in Tel Aviv on its

planned London-Tehran flight, it would be blacklisted (*Masa*, March 12). [Already in Oct 1959 BOAC had inaugurated regular flights London-Tel Aviv-Tehran-Far East, and no boycott measures against the line became known.]

Middle East Airline Company Sued? [The Middle East Airline Co. was a joint British-Lebanese enterprise with a Lebanese as president.] In July it was reported that in response to a request by the Lebanese boycott office the Minister of Economy had sued the company before a military court for violating the boycott regulations. One of the company's aircraft had transported Israeli goods from Rome to London, and when the goods were unloaded people at London Airport had said: "Peace has been concluded between Israel and the Arabs" (*Kul Shay*, July 29). In Aug it was reported that the company would become purely Lebanese, without any foreign capital. (*Akhbar al-Ushu'*, Aug 18)

OIL

In March it was reported that the Arab League secretariat had decided that the boycott offices should apply the boycott rules to foreign oil companies which disregarded the boycott procedure. Previously, boycott rules had not applied to oil companies. (*Anwar*, March 8)

During the same period the Iraqi Minister of Oil wrote to his Venezuelan counterpart asking about reports that Venezuela was about to sell Israel a quantity of crude oil. He told the Venezuelan Minister that as a friend of the Arabs he must not accord Israel any assistance in any field; he warned that "the Arab states will spare no efforts and sacrifices to prevent oil from reaching Israel." On March 13 Iraq announced that Venezuela had officially informed it that it would permit the export of iron and oil to Israel (*R. Baghdad*, March 13 [15]). [According to official Israeli trade statistics, Israel imported from Venezuela neither iron, iron ore nor oil.]

(On the question of oil, see also under Iran, p 190.)

TRAVEL AND TOURISM

Tourists and Diplomats. Jordan opposed a decision, said to have been adopted unanimously by the boycott offices, to close the borders between the Arab states and Israel to foreign diplomats. The boycott offices had proved that certain diplomats travelling between Israel and the Arab states engaged in spying for Israel (*Ha-nadith*, Feb 24). The Chief of the Central Boycott Office said in March that Jordan had not complied with the resolutions and allowed pilgrims, diplomats, and members of UNTSO to move from the "conquered part of Jerusalem" to the Old City. The Syrian Region of the UAR strictly observed the rule (*Masa*, March 12). (Throughout the year, as previously, there was considerable legal traffic—of tourists, pilgrims, diplomats, and others—across the Israel-Jordan border at Jerusalem. Lebanon, on the other hand, closed the border with Israel to diplomatic personnel and others, in Jan. See: Arab-Israel Border Relations.)

Iraq was to bar the entry into Iraq of tourists suspected of having relations with Israel (*Akhbar*, June 29). The Lebanese authorities informed the embassy of a certain Western power that Lebanon would not allow entry of foreigners who had previously been in Israel. The step was caused by an incident with tourists from that country who were turned down at the frontier because they had Israeli visas in their passports. (*Zaman*, Beirut, Aug 1)

In Nov a Lebanese paper published a photocopy of an item in the Tel Aviv paper *Davar* stating that Egypt had instructed its visa officers and frontier police to recognize passports carrying an Israeli visa. (*Manar, Jordan, Nov 22*)

To Divert Tourism from Israel. The UAR authorities were to discuss a report that Israel was attracting tourists by spreading false information, especially about the holy places. The report suggested means of depriving Israel of her income from tourism and of attracting these tourists to Arab countries (*Akhbar al-Yaum, Aug 19*). The Central Boycott Office asked the Arab states to increase propaganda in Europe in order to counteract Israel's appeal to tourists and to prevent it from becoming the foremost tourist country in the Middle East. (*Jihad, Nov 18*)

[159,624 tourists visited Israel in 1961, compared with 117,600 in the previous year.]

CULTURAL BOYCOTT

Books Banned. In Jordan the censor banned 65 books which were "distributed by Zionists in Germany in order to influence public opinion in favour of Israel." (*Jihad, April 20*)

Periodicals. In Jordan an order was issued to impound any issue of *Time* magazine containing "propaganda for Israel." (*Difa, Dec 6*)

In Lebanon an investigation was opened to establish the responsibility for the distribution in the country of an issue of *Jours de France* containing pages of "Israeli fashions and propaganda." (*Siyasah, Dec 31*)

Theatre. Plans to present in Cairo the American Theatre Guild Company led by Helen Hayes were dropped because UAR authorities objected to the fact that Israel was on the troupe's itinerary. The scheduled performances were hailed as the first major American cultural attraction to be offered in Egypt in several years, and the authorities in Cairo first welcomed the visit enthusiastically. The company, which was travelling under State Department auspices, was to visit Beirut instead. *The New York Times* commented: "The childish bad manners of the Cairo ban on Miss Hayes and her devoted fellow players makes [Abdel] Nasser's 'culture' a laughingstock." (*NYT, March 20*)

Films. Twenty films "containing Israeli propaganda" were blacklisted in Baghdad in the second half of 1960 (*R. Amman, March 5-IMB, March 5*). MENA reported the intention of urging the Arab boycott officers' conference to arrange for films to be made under Arab League supervision, "to counter Israeli propaganda." It was likely that the conference would discuss blacklisting studios which produced films harmful to Arab interests (*R. Cairo, Jan 21 [24]*). [There was no report as to whether the conference (in June—see above) discussed this issue.] The Central Boycott Office intended to investigate the matter of Jack Warner, owner of the Warner film studios, who was also the chairman of a society aiding Israel (*Hadaf, Beirut, May 16*). Jordan approved a Lebanese suggestion to exchange lists of films whose showing would be prohibited (*Manar, Oct 13*). Film importers in Lebanon asked that the ban on films starring blacklisted artists, including Elizabeth Taylor and Jerry Lewis, be lifted. (*Anwar, Oct 18*)

Television. The Lebanese authorities were reportedly expecting a television station in Israel to begin operation

shortly and were making a technical survey to prepare the jamming of the Israel television broadcasts, but it was feared that the jamming might interfere with UAR broadcasts (*Hawadith, Aug 23*). [There was no television station in Israel, but a growing number of television sets, which received broadcasts from neighbouring Arab television stations only.]

Records. Cases were reported where records were confiscated because they allegedly contained Israeli songs or because the musician was a "Zionist." (*Jaridah, June 2; Akhbar, June 4*)

Erasing Name of Israel from Books, Maps. Kamil Junhlat, the Lebanese Minister of Education, asked all schools to delete, from all books used by the students, everything which was connected with Israel; this was to include books in scientific libraries. The pages which contained the offending information were to be torn out of the books and kept in closed archives. (*R. Amman, March 1-IMB, March 2*)

The libraries of the American University of Beirut and the British Council of Beirut were also subjected to this order. The director of the latter complained: "We have been careful in selecting our books to avoid giving offence. But if your library includes an encyclopedia, it obviously contains references to Israel. We have made representations direct to the Ministry of Education that the British Council library is a centre of research and not here for the propagation of views." (*Daily Telegraph, April 8*)

In Dec the security service searched libraries and bookstores for books and maps containing references to the existence of Israel. It reportedly discovered that such books and maps had been introduced into Lebanon by Zionist organizations. (*Siyasah, Dec 10*; see also *Hawadith, Feb 10*)

LEBANON

Views on Harms and Benefits of Boycott to Lebanon. At the beginning of the year the case of the *SS Mars* continued to disturb Lebanon. There was much criticism of the conduct of the boycott, particularly in that it was harming the Lebanese economy. (See MER 1960, p 188.)

Thereupon, the Minister of Economy stated that the boycott would confer benefits on the Lebanese economy: "We say that we forbid Lebanese merchants to deal with a firm which produces certain kind of goods because that firm cooperates with Israel. If all the producers of that particular commodity cooperated with Israel, all Lebanese financiers would unite to produce that commodity in Lebanon. New enterprises would spring up in Lebanon, and the Lebanese economy would gain solidity in every field." (*Anwar, Jan 20*)

Issue of "Star of David" on Merchandise. Security personnel impounded French-made spectacles bearing the "Zionist emblem" [the Star of David] from two stores, one of them co-owned by Deputy Adnan al-Hakim, the [extremist pan-Arab and pro-UAR] leader of the Najjādh. Hakim stated that the raid on his store was a hostile act against himself. The authorities had not tried to prevent the importing of the spectacles, but publicized their presence in his store, although similar spectacles were sold in many stores in Lebanon. Sulayman al-Ali, the Minister of Economy, and Nadim Hallaq, the head of the boycott office, denied any knowledge of the matter. (*Nahar, April 6*)

In Nov it was reported that after receiving information that reputable sweet shops sold sweet boxes decorated with the Star of David, security officers had detained the shopkeepers and had impounded a great number of Israeli sweets. (*Nahar*, Nov 29)

Blacklisting; Government Said Procrastinating in Boycott Implementation. In the second half of 1960, 162 firms were put on the black list of the Lebanese boycott office; 26 firms were removed from the list. Thirty-five ships were blacklisted, whereas nine were removed from the list. Sixteen firms were prohibited. The office was studying the case of 326 firms and 189 other boycott matters. (*Jarideh*, Jan 12)

In Dec it was reported that ten firms under investigation for dealings with Israel, including one Japanese and some American firms, were operating in Lebanon under assumed names, after they had been prohibited from importing goods into Lebanon and other Arab countries. (*Siyasah*, Dec 31)

It was reported that the government procrastinated in approving the recommendations of the boycott office for blacklisting; at the end of the year 130 recommendations were awaiting action. (*Anwar*, Aug 6; *Hayat*, Sept 7; *Siyasah*, Dec 31; see also below: Questions of Boycott's Effectiveness.)

Competition in Fruit Marketing. There were several reports that the marketing of Lebanese fruit abroad suffered because of Israeli competition. Citrus importers in Europe tended to buy Israeli fruit and to boycott Lebanese produce, it was reported in Lebanon in Feb. The Director of the Lebanese Fruit Office said Lebanon would approach the countries concerned on an official level, as well as contact the importers, to put an end to that situation "by all possible means." (*Anwar*, Feb 4)

At the same time the director of the Fruit Office was reported to have disclosed that Israeli citrus fruit was being introduced to Arab countries, mostly to the Syrian Region, via Turkey. He added that the Foreign Ministry had sent a representative to Damascus to discuss the matter (*Amal*, Feb 4). Some days later the Fruit Office denied this as well as the report that the Damascus authorities were impeding the sale of Lebanese fruit. (*Hayat*, Feb 11)

In Dec it was reported that farmers and exporters complained about the stiff competition from Italy and Israel, which the Lebanese produce encountered. It was said to have been proved by Lebanese investigations that Israel was dumping large quantities of citrus fruit in order to eliminate the Lebanese fruit from the markets. The pressure of "Zionist financiers" was also seen as a serious impediment. (*Anwar*, Dec 14)

Foreign Banks and Companies in Lebanon Reported Tied to Israel and Aided by Former Lebanese Boycott Head. Reports appeared several times about alleged contacts with Israel of (unnamed foreign) banks operating in Lebanon. Deputy Muhaim Slim was reported to have alleged in the Chamber that Lebanon had informed the Arab League of her refusal to put into effect the boycott regulations against such banks. A report by one of Lebanon's security services was said to have established the following facts: Foreign firms in Lebanon, which were reputed to market 60% of all imported goods in the country, were dodging taxes and engaging in other illegal practices; it was proved that several of them had Israel capital in them. Some of them had been blacklisted, but continued to market their goods by illegal

methods. Among the latter was a Japanese firm, which distributed 85% of all Japanese goods sold in Lebanon. A spokesman of the Ministry of Finance said the boycott law would be implemented against these firms, "in pursuance of the interests of Lebanon." (*Jarideh*, Aug 11)

According to a memorandum from the "Third Boycott Congress in Kuwait," it was reported, the names of foreign firms in Lebanon which cooperated with Israel had been selected for removal from the black list with the aid of Shams ad-Din Najim, then director of the boycott office in Beirut. When this was brought to the attention of the then PM, Rasid Karkam, at the 14th meeting of the boycott office in Beirut [1959], he transferred Shams ad-Din to another government job. The latter then began cooperating with blacklisted foreign firms in order to create difficulties for the boycott office. (*Siyasah*, April 9)

Lebanese Firm Said Israeli-Owned. In April it was reported that the Lebanese boycott office had officially informed the Central Office in Damascus that the Bafqa Chocolate and Sweets Company would be sued before a military tribunal after it had been proved that the Israel firm of Elite owned 51% of its shares. It transpired that the managers of Bafqa were contacting highly placed circles in order to quash the accusation (*Siyasah*, April 6). The Bafqa company, however, announced that it was a purely Lebanese firm. (*Hadaf*, April 1; see also *Falastin*, March 28, *Haq'e'iq*, Aug 3.)

Lebanese Consul Accused. The Honorary Consul of Lebanon in Toronto was accused, in a letter sent by the President of the Friends of the Middle East in Canada, of giving material and moral assistance to Zionism. The President asked that the Consul be relieved of his post, as he was "the worst enemy of the Arabs in Canada" (*Anwar*, Nov 19). The Lebanese Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had instructed the embassy in Canada to investigate the matter. The Ministry added that it would have preferred receiving the letter before its publication in the press. It was stressed that the Ministry occasionally received similar letters; the writers were motivated by private or political interests (*Hayat*, Nov 21). The Arab League also instructed its representative in Canada to report on the matter. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, Dec 2)

ADEN AND THE PERSIAN GULF

Aden Colony and Protectorates. A boycott committee, headed by Abdallah as-Salafi, was active in Aden. In Nov it opened an office in Sbaykh Uthman (*BBCM*, Feb 1; *R. Cairo*, Nov 14 [16]). Cairo sources repeatedly claimed, sometimes in the name of the Aden committee, that Israeli goods were marketed in quantity in Aden and in Southern Arabia in general. The alleged Israeli goods were said to bear forged trade marks or none at all, and the inhabitants were urged to be vigilant in this respect. Some people, however, were said to display open sympathy for Israel, among them the Chairman of the Aden Chamber of Commerce. Israeli trade in Aden was said to amount to half a million shillings a year. (*R. Cairo*, March 19 [21], April 6 [8], Dec 12 [14]; *Haq'e'iq*, April 7; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, Aug 14; *Akhbar Sa'ah*, Dec 6)

The Aden boycott committee contacted some Hadhramis with the object of opening a branch in the Hadhramaut. The Hadhramaut paper *At-Taf'ah* was the first to support the idea. (*R. Cairo*, Feb 27 [March 1])

The Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" said that an Imam

in a mosque in the Mu'alla district gave a speech praising the boycott. "We hope that all other ulama' in Aden will undertake their duties in this respect," the commentator added. The station also broadcast an appeal from the Aden boycott committee to the people of Djibouti not to deal with Israel. (*R. Cairo, Feb 11 [14]*)

Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms. A boycott office had begun operations in Qatar, it was reported in April. (*Al-Yawm, Beirut, April 19*)

In Feb. Abd al-Karim al-A'idi, Chief of the Central Boycott Office, accompanied the League SG on a tour of the Gulf Shaykhdoms and had talks in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar on the establishment of boycott offices there. (*R. Cairo, Feb 5, 8-IMB, Feb 6, 9; R. Amman, Feb 20-IMB, Feb 21*). The Abu Dhabi and Sharjah shaykhdoms were reported to have decided to implement the boycott following the visit. (*Falastin, Feb 21; R. Baghdad, April 3 [6]*)

The Kuwaiti Director-General of the ports and customs, who was also in charge of the boycott, stated in Jordan—where he met with the Chief of the Central Boycott Office—that Kuwait would play an important role in the boycott implementation. (*Falastin, Oct 2*)

AFRICA AND ASIA

(See also The Arab League and Africa, pp 102-3; and the sections on the Arab countries' and Israel's relations with African and Asian countries.)

Arab Estimations of Situation. Isâm Hilmi al-Masri, director of the UAR boycott office, stated that after Israel had felt the increased economic pressure exerted upon her by the Arab states, and in view of the anticipated termination of German reparations, she turned to the markets of Asian and African countries. Because these countries lacked hard currency and technical know-how, Israel succeeded initially. However, Israel was driven out of these countries by the appearance of Arab products made of better raw materials, as well as by Arab diplomatic successes such as the Afro-Asian conferences which adopted anti-Israel resolutions. (*Heqa'iq, June 1*)

On the other hand, F. Albina, a Jordanian merchant, who together with a group of merchants from other Arab countries made a goodwill tour of African states, reported that Israeli exports and commercial agents were to be found "everywhere" in Africa, and that the Arab boycott had apparently failed dismally. (*Jer. Post, Aug 18*)

(The value of Israel's exports to sub-Saharan African countries, excluding South Africa, grew from \$3.2m. in 1960 to \$5.4m. in 1961. See: The ME Foreign Trade.)

Kâmil ash-Sharif, Deputy Secretary-General of the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem, complained that Israel had made progress in Nigeria through her economic assistance programme, through visits of Israelis, and through the circulation of Israeli books, magazines, and pamphlets. Sharif wrote that many Nigerians had asked him the "unanswerable" question: "You ask us to cooperate with us [you] and to refuse to cooperate with Israel. But have you helped yourselves and have you closed the routes by which Israel is reaching us?" Sharif remarked that the question of the Gulf of Adaba was of utmost importance. (*Middle East Forum, Jan*)

Lebanese Emigrants in Africa Said Cooperating With Israel. A draft bill was reportedly prepared in Lebanon for the punishment of Lebanese emigrants who maintained ties with Israeli enterprises. Many Arab emigrants

in Africa and America maintained close ties with Jewish enterprises which, in turn, had ties with Israel. (*Nahar, Jan 27*)

Later it was reported that Lebanese emigrants who cooperated with Israel would be arrested when they returned to Lebanon and would be tried by a military tribunal. The names of 12 emigrants who cooperated with Israel in Africa had been received from the Lebanese ambassador in Guinea. (*Al-Yawm, Beirut, April 30*)

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE US

Germany. The Arab League suggested to its members to establish an Arab exhibition in West Germany to counter the Israel mobile exhibition shown there. (*Difa, Feb 13*)

Italy. The Arab ambassadors in Rome resolved to co-ordinate their activities to counter Israel's economic relations with Italy, to enforce the boycott, and to promote Arab-Italian trade. (*Falastin, March 2*)

Netherlands. Dutch government officials in Amsterdam criticized the UAR threat to blacklist Dutch shipping. Debating the question in Parliament, a government spokesman condemned Dutch exporters who yielded to Arab pressure in order to do business with the UAR. Members of Parliament had expressed anxiety over the UAR demands and called on Foreign Minister Joseph Luns to ignore the Arab warnings and to extend credit facilities to Dutch firms trading with Israel. (*NE Report, March 1*)

Spain. The Lebanese Ambassador in Madrid was said to have reported that Spain had become a market for Israeli goods and for exploitation by Jewish capital; Israel's success was the result of competitive prices of her products and the ineffectiveness of the Arab boycott. (*Answer, July 12*)

The United Kingdom. The declared policy of the British government was to reject the Arab boycott of Israel, and the British investments in Israel were the best practical refutation of the boycott, the British commercial attaché in Israel stated in June. (*Ha'aretz, June 18*)

The United States. (For US policy on Freedom of Navigation and the Arab Boycott see: The US and the Arab-Israel Conflict.)

A US cigarette company, the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Co. of Louisville, Kentucky, which four years previously had stopped supplying Israel with the brands it manufactured and distributed, decided to end its boycott of Israel following the pressure exerted on it by various American organizations, most recently by the Italian-American Democratic Organizations of New York State. (*Jer. Post, Aug 7, 8, Oct 15; Ha'aretz, Oct 15*)

It was reported from Amman that Jordan had forbidden all transactions with the Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation of the US and its affiliates throughout the world because of alleged business deals with Israel. (*Jer. Post, Dec 31*)

The Secretariat of the Arab League asked member states to boycott the US firm which had participated in the erection of the first atomic reactor in Israel. (*Akhar, July 3*)

Hilton Rejects Threat. Alfred Lilienthal, secretary of the American-Arab Association for Commerce and Industry, wrote to Conrad Hilton of the Hilton Hotels chain and warned him in the name of the Central Boycott Office:

"If you build a hotel in Israel, it means the loss of your holdings in Cairo, and the end of any plans you might have in Tunis, Baghdad, Jerusalem or any Arab country. In addition, the Saudi Royal family, Egyptian businessmen, Arab and American companies who service the Arab states will not stop at your hotels in America or any part of the world." To this Hilton replied: "As Americans we consider Arabs and Jews our friends... There was no threat from Israel when we built our Cairo hotel. Does your committee also propose to boycott the United States Government because it maintains diplomatic relations with Israel?" (*Daily Telegraph, Dec 30*). [The construction of the Hilton hotel in Tel Aviv was started on May 1, 1962; no boycott measures against the Hilton hotel in Cairo—or elsewhere—were reported.]

QUESTIONS OF BOYCOTT'S EFFECTIVENESS

NOTE: Additional items related to the question of the boycott's effectiveness will be found under other headings, and especially: Lebanon, Africa and Asia, Aden and the Persian Gulf.

Boycott as Legitimate Weapon. Maj-Gen Isâm al-Masri, director of the UAR boycott office, claimed that the US recognized the principle of economic boycott and employed it against companies trading with China or with Soviet bloc countries. (*Ahram, April 5*)

Reported Consequences of Boycott. In April Cairo Radio reported that as a result of the Arab boycott 300 companies had stopped trading with Israel; 270 ships and tankers had ceased calling at Israeli ports; 150 commercial enterprises in Israel were closed in 1960, and the country had suffered a loss of \$70m. in addition to \$20m. which Israel spent in establishing an office to fight the boycott. (*V of A, April 21-IMB, April 23*)

A Lebanese paper claimed that an Israeli secret report said that the Arab boycott would bring Israel to the verge of economic catastrophe by the end of 1963. In addition to \$20m. openly earmarked to fight the Arab boycott, Israel would spend \$200m. of secret funds for this purpose. (*Kul Shay, Aug 1, 2*)

Eilat Port Seen Frustrating Boycott. Israel's Red Sea port of Eilat was reducing the impact of the Arab boycott, a member of the Lebanese parliamentary committee on foreign affairs stated: because of Eilat, Israel's exports had risen from \$60m. to \$320m. A Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that after the International Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva would adopt a decision [on the Arab demand to extend the limit of territorial waters in the Gulf of Aqaba to twelve miles; see MER 1960, p 179] the Arab world would have to consider political and military measures about Eilat. He was of the opinion that Israel's exports had increased because the big powers aided her. (*Anwar, Jan 25*)

Complaints of Obstruction and Ineffectiveness. In Jan the Baghdad paper *As-Siyasi Al-Jadid* referred to reports that attempts were being made somewhere in the Arab countries to obstruct the boycott. (Quoted in *Iraq Times, Jan 27*)

In Feb another Baghdad paper, complaining about ineffectiveness of the boycott, said this was the result of lax enforcement. The boycott administration was showing signs of negligence. Israeli products were being dumped in the markets of the Arab countries; land and air routes

between Israel and the Arab states were open to Israeli goods. Israeli coins were capturing the rows of money changers in the market. Ships and firms on the black list disappeared from it after a short time, throwing suspicion on the seriousness of the boycott. The present administration of the boycott helped the prosperity of Israel. Boycott activity should be drastic and widespread in order for the Arabs to save face, considering that the boycott was, for the time being, the only battlefield between the Arabs and Israel. (*Fajr al-Jadid, Feb 29*)

After the breakup of the UAR a [pro-UAR] Beirut daily reported that many activities of the boycott offices had stopped completely as a result of the lack of communications with the main office in Damascus. (*Anwar, Oct 10*)

Arabs Said to Trade With Israel. In June, a Cairo paper claimed that in Aden merchants had steady relations with Israeli agents and bought goods marked "Made in Jerusalem." In Beirut, the names of people who smuggled sheep into Israel were on everybody's mouth. In other places on Arab soil there were Israeli agents, and many merchants who sold enemy goods after substituting the trade marks. (*Haq'iq, Cairo, June 15*; see also under: Lebanon, above)

Between 1958 and 1960 Israel was said to have been smuggling into Lebanon and other Arab countries electrical appliances and other goods which she had not been able to sell abroad. When this was discovered, Israel sold its products to European firms which re-exported them to Arab countries as European-made. (*Nahar, July 12*)

(For additional items on alleged Israeli penetration of Arab markets, see: Lebanon; Africa and Asia.)

Corrupt Practices of Office Heads Alleged. In Feb a [pro-UAR] Lebanese daily reported a scandal in the boycott offices, and accused some of the office directors of betraying the aim of the boycott. According to the newspaper, several heads of the boycott offices were profiteering from the boycott by working on behalf of some Arab firms against others. A letter written by one regional office director, in which he falsely accused "a respected Arab enterprise" of cooperating with Israel, "accidentally" reached a rival enterprise, which promptly printed the letter and disseminated thousands of copies. A military investigation proved the charges false; that however, was unimportant, for the aim obviously was that the letter reach the rival enterprise. A report by another office director accused a highly respected personage of working on behalf of Israel. The Director-General of the Central Boycott Office in Damascus, Abd al-Karim al-A'idi, for whom the paper had high praise, had decided to investigate several regional directors in this connection. (*Anwar, Feb 8*)

An American Assessment. *Fortune* magazine reported in July 1961 that the Arabs had blacklisted over 300 firms from all over the world, more than twice as many as four years ago. The number of US firms on the list had risen from about 20 in 1957 to nearly four times that figure. The magazine remarked that "the lengthening black list is actually an indication that the boycott is nothing like the tightening noose around Israel that Arab propagandists claim it to be. In fact, the Israeli economy is steadily improving, despite Arab efforts to strangle it." (*Fortune, July*)

Complaints of Lebanese Procrastinations. At the beginning of the year the case of the SS *Mars* (see MER 1960, p 188) continued to agitate Lebanon.

A new Lebanese draft bill on the organization of the Boycott of Israel Office was to have been submitted to the Council of Ministers before being proposed to the Arab League (*MENA, March 17 [20]*). The draft, however, was "frozen in the Cabinet." (*Anwar, Sept 5*)

In Dec the [pro-UAR] weekly *Kul Shay'* reported that a political crisis was about to occur in the Arab League because of Lebanon's attitude on the boycott. The Lebanese boycott office had failed to act on some 130

boycott decisions executed by all other Arab countries, for only in Lebanon did boycott decisions require the approval of the government; the government, however, was procrastinating, and Israel was exploiting the situation. As a result, the boycott offices had decided to place the issue on the political level, and had requested the Arab League to convene an emergency session to deal with it. (*Kul Shay', Dec 9*; see also under: Lebanon, above)

ARAB-ISRAEL BORDER RELATIONS

NOTE: See MER 1960, p 189, for notes on sources and background information.

SYNOPSIS

BORDER RELATIONS IN GENERAL

1961 was a relatively quiet year on the Arab-Israeli border. The Syrian border remained the most unruly. Recurrent armed encounters, though on a small scale, were sparked mostly by fire from Syrian positions at Israelis cultivating in the demilitarized zones, and by interference with Israeli fishing in the Sea of Galilee. The Lebanese border remained the most quiet; Lebanon, however, restricted even further legal traffic over the border. Jordan was still the only Arab country to permit large-scale personal traffic over the border. Jordan complained to the Security Council over a violation of the Armistice Agreement by Israel through bringing heavy arms into Jerusalem for a military parade. The greatest number of armed infiltrators into Israel were intercepted in the vicinity of the Gaza strip and Sinai. Except for an aerial encounter, however, no clashes took place between the regular forces of Israel and the UAR.

Casualties reported in the incidents recorded below were as follows: three Israelis, one of them a border policeman, were killed—all in the vicinity of the Syrian border; five Israelis were wounded in this area; three Israeli policemen were wounded on the Jordanian border and two civilians were wounded by infiltrators from Jordan. Twenty-four armed infiltrators were killed on Israeli territory. These included 18 in the vicinity of the Gaza strip and Sinai—three of whom were identified as intelligence agents—as well as three intelligence agents from Syria, two infiltrators from Jordan, and one from Lebanon. A number of infiltrators were wounded and captured. One Jordanian soldier was killed on Israeli territory.

THE ISRAEL-SYRIAN BORDER

Synopsis. Although no armed clash occurred between Israel and Syria on the scale of the Tawafiq incident in 1960 (MER 1960, p 197), tension remained high. There were frequent shooting incidents when Syrian positions opened fire on Israelis cultivating fields in the demilitarized zones, which the Syrians regarded as aggression. Such incidents often led to an exchange of fire between units of the armed forces of the two countries; a spate of such incidents in June ended only after the intervention of the UNTSO Chief of Staff with the Syrian and Israeli governments. Vehicles in the Israeli border area repeatedly hit mines which, Israel alleged, had been laid by Syrians. Syrian interference with Israeli fishing in the north-eastern part of the Sea of Galilee continued as in former years and also led to shooting

incidents. Persons identified by the Israeli authorities as Syrian intelligence agents were intercepted in Israel. Syria charged Israel with violating Syrian airspace.

At the end of the year, Cairo charged that from the break-up of the UAR (Sept 28) the Syrian government had adopted a weak stand on border issues. Available reports, however, indicated that Syrian intransigence on the border had continued unchanged.

Border Incidents (January-June). NOTE: The majority of the incidents recorded below were reported by Israeli sources only, as far as could be established.

On Jan 9 the Syrians penetrated into what was termed the [northern] "Israel sovereign demilitarized zone" near She'ar Yashuv, and attempted to cultivate lands there, in full view of UNTSO observers at Tel Hanzir. They were covered by Syrian soldiers from the Tel Aziziyat stronghold. Israel lodged a complaint with UNTSO (*Ma'ariv, Jan 9*). A similar attempt by Syrians in the southern DZ was prevented by an Israeli patrol. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 19*)

On Feb 5, an Israeli tractor driver escaped injury when he was fired on by Syrian positions at Tawafiq [southern DZ]. Israel lodged a complaint with the MAC. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 6*)

On Feb 12 Syrian positions near Bahariyat opened machine-gun fire on Shamir [Jordan valley] which continued for 15 minutes. Several buildings were hit (*Ha'aretz, Feb 13*). On Feb 24 an Israeli tractor hit a mine near Sha'ar Hagolan [Jordan Valley]. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 26*)

On March 8 Israeli sources reported that two tractors working near She'ar Yashuv came under heavy machine-gun fire from positions at Tel Aziziyat and Bahariyat. Israeli forces returned the fire, which lasted about four hours. One Israeli was slightly wounded (*Kol Israel, March 8 [W 16]*; *Ha'aretz, March 9*). UAR sources reported the incident as follows: two Israeli tractors, guarded by an infantry detachment and two armoured vehicles, had crossed the Syrian border at Tel Ubaydat, whereupon they were intercepted by farmers. The Israelis opened fire, which the Syrian positions returned; there were no Syrian casualties. (*R. Cairo, March 8 [W 16]*)

On May 30 an Israeli border policeman was killed by fire opened up by Syrians across the border and aimed at the Mishmar Hayarden [Jordan valley] police station. UN observers investigated the incident. (*IGPO/WNB, May 31-June 6*)

On June 6 Israel complained to the MAC that the Syrians had cut off the water from a spring irrigating the fields of Shamir. (*Kol Israel, June 6 [W 15]*; *Ha'aretz, June 9*)

Heightened Tension (June 19-26). On June 20 the Israeli military spokesman announced that Syrian posi-

THE ISRAEL-SYRIAN BORDER



tions at Tel Arziyot had opened machine-gun fire on June 19 and 20 on Israeli workers and tractor drivers engaged in cultivation near She'ar Yashuv. Three attacks took place on June 19; in response, the second and heaviest, Israeli forces silenced the Syrian fire. On the same day, guards of the national water carrier near Kibbutz Huqoq [north of the Sea of Galilee] were attacked by a group of armed Syrians. A shepherd who was with the guards was killed and a watchman was wounded (*Ha'aretz*, June 20, 21, 22). On the following evening (June 20) Syrian positions opened fire on a tractor working in Israeli territory near She'ar Yashuv. Israeli forces returned the fire until the Syrians requested a cease-fire through the UNTSO. Israel lodged complaints with the MAC on both incidents. (*IGPO/WNB*, June 14-20).

On June 21 Syrian positions at Tel Hilal and Jalabina, east of the Hula region, again fired on three tractor drivers in the DZ and hit a car. The UNTSO investigated. (*Ha'aretz*, June 22)

The UAR version of the three days' incidents was that on June 19, 20 and 21 an Israeli tractor entered the "Arab demilitarized zone", "thus committing aggression." It was accordingly fired on until it withdrew. (R. Damascus, June 21 [W 29])

On the night of June 21-22 Syrian army positions opened up four times with automatic fire across the border between Dardara and Bnot Ya'aqov Bridge in the central DZ, according to Israeli sources. Damascus, however, claimed that the Israelis had tried to attack the Dardara position, but had been fired on and driven off. The Israeli military spokesman denied that an attack had been attempted. (IGPO/WNB, June 21-28; R. Damascus, Kol Israel, June 22 [W 29])

On June 22 Syrian positions opened fire on farmers of Dan [near the northern DZ], who together with UN observers were trying to put out a fire next to the UN observations post at Tel el Qadi. On the same day fire was directed by positions at Dorqiat towards Mishmar Hayarden. The firing continued at intervals throughout the night. The Israeli side did not return the fire. (IGPO/WNB, June 21-28)

On the night of June 23 fire from a Syrian military position was directed at Gadot, Ashmura and at the police station of Mishmar Hayarden [central DZ]. On June 25 Syrian positions at Tel Hilal and Jalabina opened fire on Israeli villages. Buildings at Ashmura were hit but there were no casualties.

The Syrians lodged a complaint with the MAC on Israeli armed penetration into Syrian territory near Misha-mar Haymed. This was denied by the Israel military spokesman (*Hayat, Ha'aretz*, June 23). Continuous consultations were said to be taking place between Damascus and Cairo (*Hayat*, June 25); Israel was reported to be concentrating troops on the Syrian border. (*Hayat*, June 29)

On June 23 Israel sent a letter to the Security Council advising that the situation on the north-eastern frontier was "liable to cause a serious threat to peace in the area." The letter stressed that these (Syrian) actions, which had occurred over a number of days and along 30 kilometres of frontier, must be regarded as resulting from a deliberate Syrian policy "which was out to intensify active hostility towards Israel" (S/4843). Before sending the letter, Israel Foreign Ministry officials had discussed the situation with Maj-Gen von Horn, UNTSO Chief-of-Staff. It was assumed that Israel was not satisfied with the outcome of the talks, hence the letter to the SC (*Ha'aretz*, June 23). *Ha'aretz* wrote that the

Syrians were trying to create tension in the area in order to sabotage Israel's water development schemes. (*Ha'aretz*, June 22)

UAR commentators ascribed the incidents to Israeli aggression, which, they said, was connected with internal difficulties in Israel or aimed at inducing the UN to enforce peace between Israel and the Arab states (*Akhbar, Gummuriyah*, June 21, 25; *R. Cairo*, June 23 [26]). *Al-Hayât* was of the opinion that Israel was out to sabotage the conference of the Arab Joint Defence Council then taking place, and to cover her intended diversion of the Jordan waters. (*Hayat*, June 27, 29)

On June 28 Maj-Gen von Horn, having discussed the situation with the Syrian authorities, met Golda Meir, the Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs (*Ha'aretz*, June 29). [Thereafter tension subsided into normalcy]; on June 28, for the first time since the shooting had begun, no incidents were reported. (*Jer. Post*, June 29)

Border Incidents (July-December). On July 4, 13 and 24, Syrian positions near the Bnot Ya'aqov bridge sniped at various targets across the border. (*Jer. Post*, July 5; *Ha'aretz*, July 14; *Kol Israel*, July 25 [W Aug 3])

In Sept a tractor driver from Gadot was severely wounded when his tractor hit a Syrian mine, said to have been recently laid by Syrians. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 3)

In Sept, after coordination with Syria through UNTSO, Israeli workers cleared the drainage ditch to the west of Tawafiq in the southern DZ (on which see MER 1960, pp 191 (map) 197). (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 21)

On Oct 30 and Nov 1 an Israeli tractor working near Tel Katzir [southern DZ] was fired at from Syrian positions, according to both Arab and Israeli sources. (*IGPO/WNB*, Oct 25-31, Nov 1-7; *R. Damascus*, Oct 30 [Nov 1], Nov 1 [3]; *Hayat*, Oct 31, Nov 2)

On Nov 3 Israeli sources reported that Syrians had opened machine-gun fire on Dardara village (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 5). On Nov 15 an armoured vehicle of the Israel Border Police struck a mine near Mishmar Hayarden. No casualties were reported. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 16)

On Nov 17 an Israeli army officer was wounded when the UN car in which he and a UN Observer were travelling struck a mine near the Syrian border. The mine was thought to have been laid the previous night. Investigations revealed the footprints of two men leading to a Syrian position. Half an hour later, Syrian soldiers opened rifle and machine-gun fire on a tractor driver at work in the Tel Katzir area; an exchange of fire lasting 30 minutes followed. Israel complained to the MAC (*IGPO/WNB*, Nov 15-21). On Dec 7 a tractor hit a mine on a road leading to Korzim village, which had suffered no Syrian attack since May. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 8)

Incidents on Sea of Galilee [The whole of the Sea of Galilee is in Israel territory, including a demilitarized 10-metre wide strip on the north-eastern shore.]

On March 26 the MAC investigated an Israeli complaint that Syrians had stolen fishing nets near the north-eastern shores of the Sea of Galilee. (*Ha'aretz*, March 27)

The thefts continued during the following weeks. Israeli fishing vessels were also shot at by Syrian positions on the shore. On April 25, according to Israeli sources, an Israeli patrol boat came to the aid of the fishermen; an exchange of fire lasting for half an hour followed between the boat and the Syrian position on the shore. No Israeli casualties were reported. According to UAR sources, an Israeli force had attempted to land on the eastern shore of the lake but it was obstructed by Arab

villagers. Thereupon the Israeli soldiers had opened fire, which was returned; two Israeli soldiers had been injured. (*Ha'aretz*, April 24, 26; *R. Cairo*, April 27-IMB, April 28)

In Sept fishing nets were again stolen by the Syrians. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 13)

Aerial Incidents—June-Sept. On June 23 [at the time of heightened tension on the Syrian border] an Arab International Airlines aircraft bound for Damascus was reported to have been molested by Israeli military aircraft outside the airspace of "occupied Palestine." (*R. Damascus*, June 23 [W 29])

On July 27 a First [Syrian] Army spokesman said that two Israeli aircraft had crossed into Syrian airspace in the direction of Damascus, where sirens were sounded; anti-aircraft guns had driven the aircraft off (*ANA*, July 27 [W Aug 3]). An Israel military spokesman denied that Israeli aircraft had violated Syrian airspace. (*Ha'aretz*, July 30)

An Israel military spokesman announced that on the night of Sept 27 several "enemy aircraft" had penetrated Israel airspace for aerial photography; they were driven off by Israeli fighter planes after a brief exchange of fire. It was reported that the enemy aircraft had exploded flares over different places to enable photographs to be taken. [It appears that these aircraft were based in Egypt and Syria.] (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 29)

UAR Intelligence Agents Intercepted. On Jan 5 two infiltrators armed with a submachine gun and hand grenades were killed in a clash with an Israeli patrol in central Galilee, while a third managed to escape. According to Israeli sources, the men were Syrian intelligence agents who had penetrated into Israel through Lebanese territory, and it was suspected that they had been active in the area for some time. (*Jer. Post*, Jan 8; *Ma'ariv*, Jan 17)

In Nov an Arab infiltrator was killed near Kfar Giladi. It was revealed that the man had worked for the Syrian intelligence and penetrated into Israel several times. He had been caught in 1956 but had managed to escape. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 6)

On April 12 two Israelis, who had defected to Syria in 1960, were caught re-crossing into Israel. They said they had been held in prison, but were vague as to their sudden release. (*Ha'aretz*, April 14)

Various Incidents. On May 25 an Israeli Arab was killed by Syrian soldiers while trying to enter Syria. (*Ha'aretz*, May 28)

In July the Syrians informed the MAC that they were holding an Israeli who had escaped from prison in Israel, where he had been serving a life sentence for murder. In May Israel asked for his return. The Syrians offered to exchange him for six Syrian seamen detained in Israel since April (when they were taken with a Lebanese vessel in Israel territorial waters.) Israel rejected this offer on the grounds that the fishermen were still awaiting trial. (*Ha'aretz*, July 3, 12)

Cairo Accuses Syria of Weak Stand on Border Questions. In Dec, after the break-up of the UAR, a Cairo paper attacked the Syrian government, claiming that since its separation from Egypt, Syria had been busy with separatist activity and discontinued resisting Israeli attempts to reclaim agricultural lands in the DZ. The paper also said that Maj-Gen von Horn, who was in Damascus, had entered into discussions with the Syrian authorities

for the purpose of removing the army from fortified positions, near the Sea of Galilee which had been occupied during the Egyptian-Syrian union. (*Masa', Dec. 13*)

THE ISRAEL-UAR (EGYPTIAN) BORDER

Synopsis. The frontier was quiet throughout the year. The UN Emergency Force remained stationed along the border on UAR territory—in the Gaza strip and Sinai, and at the Straits of Tiran. There were, however, a number of reported violations of airspace by both sides: in one case an air battle ensued over the border area. A number of armed encounters took place inside Israel territory between Israeli patrols and UAR intelligence squads and other armed infiltrators, who suffered a considerable number of fatalities: Israeli villages sustained much damage from thefts by infiltrators. Some Israeli citizens illegally crossed the armistice line into the Gaza strip; none were reported to have been returned by the UAR authorities, except in secret for intelligence purposes. There was no legal traffic across the border, apart from UNTSO officers.

Armed Infiltrators Killed in Israel Territory. Israeli sources reported the following casualties inflicted by Israeli patrols on armed infiltrators in Israel territory.

In the vicinity of the Gaza strip: On Jan 31—2 Bedouin killed, 1 wounded; on Feb 17—1 killed; in April—1 killed; on May 16—1 killed, 2 captured; on May 19—1 killed; on July 11—2 killed.

Opposite Sinai: On Jan 25—1 killed, in a clash with a band of armed Bedouin; on July 22—2 killed; on Aug 26—1 killed; on Dec 17—3 killed, 1 captured. (Additional loss of life was suffered by intelligence squads—for which see below.) (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 26, Feb 2, 19, July 13, Dec 18; *Kol Israel*, May 1 [W 4], 17, 21 [W 25], July 13 [W 20], 24 [W 27], Aug 28 [W Sept 7])

Egyptian Intelligence Squads Intercepted. (See MER 1960, p 193, for background note.) On Sept 28 two members of a squad of armed Arabs were killed in a clash with an Israeli border patrol in the Negev; a third escaped into the Gaza strip. Ammunition and documents were found on the bodies, and it was reported that the object of the incursion had been to return to Israel a former Israeli citizen as an agent. (*NYT*, Sept 30; *Kol Israel*, Sept 29, 30 [W Oct 5])

On Oct 2 two infiltrators were intercepted in the Negev. One was killed and the other captured. They carried Carl-Gustav machine guns and field glasses. The prisoner admitted that both were sent to Israel for intelligence purposes; both had been residents of the Rafah refugees camp. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 3)

On Oct 3 an Arab infiltrator from the Gaza strip surrendered to an Israeli patrol. An Israeli citizen, he had first crossed into the Gaza strip two months earlier and had since re-crossed into Israel on intelligence missions. He said he had tried to disengage from intelligence work; when not allowed to do so, he had crossed into Israel on his own accord to give himself up. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 5)

Aerial Incidents. On March 7 the MAC passed a resolution condemning Israel over an Egyptian complaint alleging that Israeli aircraft had fired on flocks in the Quseima area, in Sinai (*R. Cairo*, March 7 [W 16]). [Israel had not participated in the MAC with Egypt since 1956.] The text of the resolution was forwarded by the UAR to the UN Secretary General on March

16 to be circulated among the members of the Security Council. (*S/4770*)

On April 28 an Israeli military spokesman announced that an Egyptian MIG 17 jet fighter had been shot down that day by an Israeli Super-Mystère jet fighter in a fight over the Halutza area in the Negev. The Egyptian pilot had been seen parachuting on the border line, and fragments of the plane had been seen a few hundred metres inside the Egyptian border. Another Egyptian fighter had escaped. The Israeli planes had suffered no damage. A day before, four Egyptian MIG fighters were reported to have been driven off Israeli airspace over Nitzana. A UAR military spokesman said that Israeli fighters had flown over the border at Auja [Nitzana, not far from Halutza] and had been intercepted by UAR aircraft. In the air battle one UAR aircraft was hit but the pilot returned safely. Later that day, however, he said that after Israeli aircraft had crossed over the armistice line an air battle had ensued between 12 Israeli and eight UAR aircraft. One Israeli aircraft was shot down, and the rest withdrew. This was denied by Israeli army sources. (*Kol Israel*, *R. Cairo*, April 28 [May 1]; *NYT*, April 29; *Ha'aretz*, April 30)

On July 26 the UAR lodged protests with the MAC against an alleged violation of Gaza strip airspace at different points by 14 Israeli aircraft on July 25. An Israeli military spokesman denied the allegation. (*Hayat*, *Jer. Post*, July 27)

On the night of Sept 27 "enemy aircraft" penetrated Israel's airspace at several points for aerial photography. They were intercepted and driven off by Israeli fighters after an exchange of fire. [It appears that these were UAR aircraft.] (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 29)

On Nov 2 two Israeli aircraft were reported to have penetrated Gaza airspace. (*MENA*, Nov 2 [W 16])

Incidents on the Sea. On Feb 1 eight Israeli fishermen caught by the Egyptians in Oct 1960 near the Gaza shore were reported sentenced to 2 years imprisonment; their two boats were confiscated. (*Hayat*, *Ha'aretz*, Feb 2) (See also MER 1960, p 194.)

Three fishermen from Gaza in a dingy bound for Lebanon were picked up by a Danish ship on the high seas and handed over to the Israel coastguard, who escorted them to the border of Lebanese territorial waters. (*Hayat*, June 20; *Ha'aretz*, June 21)

Infiltration into Israel for Criminal Purposes. Theft, etc. Infiltration into Israel for purposes of theft which did not involve casualties were reported from time to time, as well as prison sentences imposed for such offences. (e.g., *Ha'aretz*, Jan 4, 9, Feb 21, Nov 20; *Ma'ariv*, Jan 19; *Kol Israel*, Jan 8 [W 12])

Israeli villages in the Western Negev opposite the Gaza strip suffered considerable damage from thefts by infiltrators. It was reported in Oct that such damage sustained by Nahal Oz amounted to about £115,000 and by Kfar Azza to £120,000 annually. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 10)

Crossings from Israel. Cases were occasionally reported of Israeli residents—both Arabs and Jews—illegally leaving Israel for Egypt by crossing the armistice line. (*Iraq Times*, Jan 31; *R. Cairo*, June 24-IMB, June 25; *Akhbar Sa'ah*, Sept 27, Dec 27; *Ha'aretz*, Oct 10, Nov 29, Dec 31; *Al-Yaum*, Beirut, Dec 28)

THE ISRAEL-JORDANIAN BORDER

Synopsis. In general, the border remained quiet during the year. Legal border crossings, by tourists as well as

by Christian Israeli citizens at Christmas and Easter, continued on the established lines. So did illegal border crossings, whether accidental or for criminal purposes; as reported, the latter were into Israel only. Persons who crossed the line with no criminal intent were returned to their country after some lapse of time. A number of armed encounters with infiltrators took place inside Israel, as did two minor clashes between security personnel of the two sides. There were some casualties.

Jordan complained to the Security Council against Israel's decision to hold her Independence Day military parade in Jerusalem with the participation of heavy arms of a strength beyond that permitted by the Armistice Agreement. The Security Council endorsed a resolution by the MAC requesting Israel to comply with the Agreement in this respect and also enjoined the members of the MAC (i.e., both Jordan and Israel) to cooperate so as to ensure that the Agreement would be complied with. Israel thereupon declared that she would call off the parade only if Jordan fully complied with all provisions of the Armistice Agreement, including those dealing with access to the Jewish holy places in the Old City and to Mount Scopus. Israel representatives walked out of a MAC meeting after the chairman (an UNTSO officer) abstained on an Israel draft resolution for dealing with the issue on these lines. The parade took place as planned, with no incident, and the heavy arms participating were removed from Jerusalem immediately afterwards.

Other issues which arose during the year were Jordanian allegations of Israeli aggression and provocations on Mount Scopus, Israel allegations of the desecration of Jewish holy places in Jordan, and a Jordanian complaint that Israel had constructed on Jordanian territory salt pans for her potash works at Sedom, on the southern shore of the Dead Sea.

Issue of Israel's Independence Day Parade in Jerusalem (March-April). In mid-March Israel had informed Jordan and the UN that the Independence Day parade would take place in Jerusalem on April 20 and would include heavy equipment of a strength beyond that allowed by the Armistice Agreement, but that this equipment would remain in Jerusalem for a few hours only. Jordan thereupon lodged a complaint with the MAC against Israel, as she had done on similar occasions in the past. (*Ha'aretz*, *Jer. Post*, March 16)

On March 17 Israel brought to Jerusalem heavy equipment for "a few hours' rehearsal" whereupon Jordan complained to the MAC that Israel had been massing forbidden equipment in Jerusalem (*Ha'aretz*, March 21; *Hayat*, March 23). On March 20 the MAC resolved by the votes of Jordan and the MAC Chairman that Israel take definite steps to prevent the re-occurrence of such a breach of the Armistice Agreement. (*S/PV 948*)

On April 1 Jordan complained to the Security Council (SC) that Israel was implementing its plans for the military parade in Jerusalem in spite of the MAC decision. Jordan asked that the SC be convened as soon as possible to discuss the Israeli "acts of military provocations which threaten international peace and security" (*S/4777*). Israel political circles said this was routine practice for Jordan each time an Israeli military parade took place in Jerusalem. They thought that this time it was a gesture to convince Abdel Nasser of King Hussein's "toughness" in view of the rapprochement between them (for which see: *Inter-Arab Relations*) (*Ha'aretz*, April 2, 3). Amman Radio, on the other hand, said that the

Israeli action had been timed to influence the new US administration. (*R. Amman*, April 5 [7])

In a letter to the chairman of the SC on April 2, Israel recalled a decision taken by the MAC in 1958 according to which heavy arms, under UN inspection, were allowed to take part in the parade provided they were not supplied with ammunition. The letter cited four cases in which Jordan had brought heavy arms to the Old City. Israel was ready, it said, to cooperate in any way to ease Jordan's apprehensions "however ill-founded they might be" (*S/4778*). It was reported that several Western powers, among them the US, were trying to persuade Israel not to include heavy arms in the parade. Israel, however, was determined to go ahead with the parade as scheduled. (*Ha'aretz*, April 4, 9)

The SC met on April 6. The Jordanian representative said that the Israeli military parade was meant to intimidate Jordan. The Israel representative denied this, saying that Jordan's complaint concerned a mere technicality. He assured the SC that the parade would be held under UN observation and that all the equipment would be removed from Jerusalem soon after the parade was over. He repeated the points raised in his letter to the Chairman and again stressed that the arms would not be provided with ammunition. He also suggested that discussion of this matter be referred again to the MAC. The representatives of the UAR and the USSR supported Jordan and demanded that the MAC decision be complied with. The discussion was then adjourned.

The Council resumed its discussions on April 10. The UAR representative presented on behalf of his government and of that of Ceylon a draft resolution endorsing the MAC decision of March 20 and urging Israel to comply with it (*S/4784*). The French representative said that the parade could under no circumstances be regarded as a provocation and that Israel was ready to furnish the MAC and Jordan with assurances as to the peaceful nature of the parade. The British representative argued that the SC should uphold the MAC decision, even if it accepted Israel's assurance that the equipment was only for ceremonial purposes and that she did not intend to endanger peace in Jerusalem. The same view was expressed by the Chinese representative. The Israel representative said that the SC decision on this issue would be "an inflation of something which no member of the Council has seriously suggested is really a threat to international peace," while serious violations by Jordan had in the past been ignored by the SC. (*S/PV 948*)

On April 11 the US representative proposed an amendment to the UAR-Ceylon draft resolution to the effect that the SC request members of the MAC "to cooperate so as to ensure that the General Armistice Agreement will be complied with" (*S/4785*). The US representative said that Israel's act was contrary to the Armistice Agreement even if in substance it need not constitute a threat to peace. The question was, he said, "what effect such violation had on the force of the Armistice Agreement." The same view was voiced by the representatives of Chile, Ecuador and China.

Jordan, the UAR, and Ceylon opposed the American amendment on the grounds that it put Jordan on the same footing with Israel as violator of the Armistice Agreement. However, the amended resolution was accepted with the votes of eight members [US, UK, France, China, Turkey, Chile, Ecuador, and Liberia]. The USSR, the UAR, and Ceylon abstained. (*S/PV 949*)

On the same day an Israel spokesman said that the military parade in Jerusalem would take place in spite

of the SC resolution, as Israel considered it to be a ceremonial event only (*Ha'aretz*, April 12). On April 12 a FM spokesman said that Israel would cancel the parade only if Jordan would fully comply with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, including those dealing with free access to the Jewish holy places in the Old City and to Mount Scopus. This attitude was also expressed in an interview given by FM Ben-Gurion to a *New York Times* correspondent. (*Ha'aretz*, April 13; *Kal Israel*, April 14 [17])

On April 13 Israel lodged a complaint with the MAC against the concentration of Jordanian forces in the Old City of Jerusalem. The MAC met on April 14, 17, 18 and 19. Israel presented five proposals designed to help in securing compliance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the SC resolution. These were rejected by the Jordanians and the chairman [an UNTSO officer]. Israel then presented a draft resolution proposing that the MAC members should cooperate in fully implementing all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The Jordanians voted against this draft, and the chairman abstained; at this point the Israel delegation walked out of the meeting. In Israel's absence the meeting adopted a Jordanian resolution condemning Israel for bringing heavy arms to Jerusalem (*Ha'aretz*, April 16, 17, 18, 19, 21). A statement by the Israel Foreign Ministry said that the Israel representatives had been compelled to take this "drastic step" [of walking out] because of the "non-cooperative attitude displayed throughout the meeting by the other MAC members." (*Jer. Post*, April 21)

On April 19 SG Hammarskjöld presented to the SC a report from Maj-Gen von Horn, UNTSO Chief of Staff, on the proceedings of the MAC meeting. The report said that it "soon appeared that what Israel wanted to consider was the question of cooperation arising out of the SC resolution," and that Jordan considered that the Israel representative was "filibustering" the meeting. The attitude of the MAC chairman, according to the report, was that the MAC should not state principles concerning the observance of international obligations, and this attitude had prompted Israel to leave the meeting. (*S/4792 add f*)

On April 20 the Israeli parade, including heavy weapons, took place in Jerusalem as scheduled. There were no incidents. The heavy weapons were removed from Jerusalem immediately after the parade. (*Ha'aretz*, April 21, 23)

On April 21 the MAC adopted, in the absence of Israel, a resolution that Israel had violated the Armistice Agreement. The UN SG informed the SC to this effect. (*Ha'aretz*, April 23)

The press and radio services of the Arab states vigorously supported Jordan throughout the affair, although the Cairo *Al-Gumhuriyah* implied that Jordan did not show enough determination. (e.g. *Gumhuriyah*, April 6, 16, 19; *R. Baghdad*, April 8 [1]; *Zaman*, *Baghdad*, April 14; *Hayat*, April 20)

In Sept it was reported that the Arab League had decided to draw up a plan to "guard against the menace" which the introduction of heavy arms to "occupied Jerusalem" constituted to Arab security. (*Nasr*, *Damascus*, Sept 17)

Jordan Alleges Israeli Provocations on Mount Scopus (July-Oct): On July 18, a Jordanian source reported that Jordan had asked her UN representative to inform the SG of Israeli aggression on Mount Scopus [see map, MER 1960, p 191]. The Jordanian Minister of De-

fence was reported to have met with Maj-Gen von Horn a fortnight earlier in an effort to stop the said [unspecified] provocations (*Jihad*, July 18). On Oct 5 it was again reported that Jordan was concerned with Israeli "aggression and provocations" against "Arab residents" of Mount Scopus [presumably a reference to Isawiyah village; see MER 1960, p 194] and would take "drastic steps" unless the UN succeeded in stopping these activities (*Jihad*, Oct 5). Official Israeli sources denied any knowledge of the alleged incidents, and said that the situation on Mount Scopus was, and had been, completely tranquil. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 26)

Israel Alleges Desecration of Holy Places (Nov): On Nov 15 FM Golda Meir said in the Knesset that the Government had information regarding the desecration of Rachel's Tomb and the Mount of Olives [Jewish] cemetery in Jordanian territory [both in the vicinity of Jerusalem]. Appeals to the UN had proved fruitless. The source of this evil, she pointed out, was Jordan's failure to honour Paragraph 8 of the Armistice Agreement providing for access to Jewish holy places in Jordan. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 16)

Jordanian Complaint of Armistice Agreement Violation by Israel in Dead Sea Area. On Dec 4 Jordan complained to the MAC that Israel had constructed salt pans on Jordanian soil to the South of the Dead Sea [where Israeli potash works exploiting the Dead Sea deposits were located]. On Dec 12 the MAC found that Israel had constructed salt pans 300-900 metres within Jordan, and that Israeli army units had crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line (DL) in this area. The resolution considered both these facts violations of the Armistice Agreement and called upon Israel "to stop immediately the use of and the work on the salt pans... across the DL on the Jordan side" and "to prevent the crossing of any Israeli military forces or civilians" into the area. The resolution was circulated by Jordan among SC members on July 20, 1962, together with a letter explaining that Israel had not complied with it. (*S/5144*)

The Israeli case was put in a letter to the SC on Aug 1, 1962. It explained that the salt pans had been constructed in 1936 as part of a larger area of solar evaporation pans, under a concession from the Palestine government, for the extraction of mineral salts from the Dead Sea. They were restored in 1953-4, after the Jordanian delegation to the MAC had been officially informed in writing before commencement of work there. There was no Jordanian response to the communication, which also proposed to carry out a joint demarcation of the armistice line in this area. In Dec 1954 Jordan lodged a complaint with the MAC but withdrew it after informal discussions. Although the salt pans in question had been in continuous operation since then, no objection was raised by Jordan until 1961.

The Israeli letter also explained that the armistice demarcation line in the area coincided with the former boundary between Palestine and Transjordan, but that the line was never demarcated—neither during mandatory times nor after—and that in Feb 1962 Israel had again informed Jordan that she was prepared to co-operate in a joint demarcation of the boundary to avoid further differences in this region (*S/5152*). [No further developments were reported during 1962.]

Infiltration into Israel for Criminal Purposes; Armed Clashes. Some cases of infiltration from Jordan into Israel for criminal purposes—theft, smuggling, or kid-

napping—were reported during the year. A number of armed clashes with infiltrators inside Israel as well as between security personnel of both sides also occurred. (*Ma'ariv*, Jan 9; *Manar*, Jordan, Feb 28; *Kol Israel*, May 1 [W 4], July 11 [W 20], Dec 7 [W 14]; *Jer. Post*, Nov 23, 27, Dec 7)

Following are incidents reported which involved casualties.

On Feb 11 an Israeli patrol intercepted two armed Jordanian soldiers inside Israeli territory near Kibbutz Eyal [N. of Qalqiya]; at the same time the patrol came under fire from across the border. In the exchange of fire which ensued, a Jordanian soldier was killed (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 12). A Jordanian military spokesman said the soldier killed had crossed the border inadvertently. (*Jer. Times*, Feb 14; *R. Amman*, Feb 12-13; *Feb 13*)

On July 28 two Israeli border policemen were wounded when they encountered armed infiltrators near Tayiba (S. of Tulkarm); the infiltrators escaped. On Aug 18, in the same area, an infiltrator from Jordan armed with a submachine gun was killed in an exchange of fire with an Israeli patrol. (*Kol Israel*, July 29, Aug 19 [W Aug 3, 24])

On Aug 22 two Israeli farmers in the Lakhish region were severely wounded and robbed by infiltrators armed with (a) Carl-Gustav submachine gun(s); tracks led to the Jordanian border. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 24; *Kol Israel*, Aug 23, 24 [W Sept 7])

On Oct 13 an Arab infiltrator was killed, and another wounded, in a clash with an Israeli patrol in the Beit Shean area [Jordan valley]. (*Kol Israel*, Oct 14 [W 19]; *Ha'aretz*, Oct 15)

On Nov 22, according to Israeli sources, a policeman from Eilat was wounded by Jordanian fire from across the border and kidnapped by Jordanians inside Israel territory. The latter fact was established in an investigation by UN observers. The policeman was returned to Israel on Dec 14. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 23; *R. Amman*, Nov 23, *Kol Israel*, Nov 23 [W Nov 30]; *Jer. Post*, Dec 17).

Other Illegal Border Crossings. In a number of cases Israelis and tourists visiting Israel accidentally crossed the border into Jordan. They were returned by the Jordanian authorities after periods ranging from one day (in a case of small boys) to several weeks. (*Jer. Post*, Jan 15, 16, Feb 19, Dec 29; *Ha'aretz*, Feb 6, 10, 14, 26, 27, March 3, May 9, Sept 17, Oct 15)

Similarly Israel returned to Jordan seven Bedouin boys who had been picked up in Israel territory. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 17)

A number of Israeli Arabs and three Jews who had illegally crossed into Jordan, and were either caught on their return or were returned by the Jordanian authorities, were detained for questioning; others were sentenced to prison terms by Israeli courts. In court they often cited family quarrels as their reason for crossing the border. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 19, 30, May 28, Oct 9, Nov 13, 20; *Jer. Post*, Jan 26, April 17, Sept 1)

An Israeli Jew who crossed the border into Jordan was killed by a Jordanian patrol after having failed to observe a command to halt, according to a Jordanian notification to the MAC (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 10). Jordanian sources reported the crossing of two more Israeli Jews into Jordan for personal or alleged political reasons. One of them was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. (*R. Amman*, Nov 23 [30]; *Difa*, Dec 18)

The Nablu [Jordan] district commissioner sentenced "several people" who had infiltrated into Jordan from

"occupied Palestine" to terms of imprisonment. (*Falastin*, Dec 1)

On Sept 14 Dr. Robert Lindsay, an American Baptist missionary residing in Israel, and an Arab youth were severely injured by a mine explosion in no man's land in the Jerusalem sector, and captured by the Jordanians. The boy had grown up in a Baptist youth village in Israel and crossed legally into Jordan at Christmas 1960 for a visit. There he met his father, who refused to let him return. Dr. Lindsay had crossed the border with the aim of smuggling the boy back. He was later returned to Israel. (*ANA*, Sept 14 [W 21]; *NYT*, Sept 15; *Ha'aretz*, Sept 17, 19, Oct 6)

Legal Border Crossings. [As in former years, Israel and Jordan permitted certain categories of persons to cross the armistice line at the Mandelbaum Gate in Jerusalem. These were mainly tourists crossing from Jordan into Israel (Jordan did not normally permit crossings from Israel), Christian residents and tourists from Israel at Christmas and Easter for a brief sojourn in Jordan, and weekly family reunions in no man's land. (See also MER 1960, p. 195.)]

On Jan 6 some 1,800 pilgrims crossed into Jordan for the Orthodox Christmas. The Jordanian authorities refused to permit the passage of a Russian Orthodox group. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 4; *Jer. Post*, Jan 8)

On Jan 18 about 700 Armenians from Israel crossed into Jordan to celebrate the Armenian Christmas. Some 20 Armenians whose crossing had already been approved were turned back by the Jordanians without an explanation. (*Jer. Post*, Jan 19)

Jordan permitted some 150 Christian non-residents from Israel to cross the line for Easter. Unlike former years, traffic was to be in one direction only, as Jordan refused to allow a return to Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, March 30)

The weekly family reunions in no man's land continued every Monday. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 10)

On Dec 24 nearly 3,000 pilgrims crossed into Jordan for a 36-hour stay at Christmas. A Jordanian spokesman said that about 250 applications had been rejected on security grounds. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 24, 25, 26)

Feb-June: Jordan Complaints of Airspace Infringements. Jordan lodged several complaints with the MAC alleging flight of Israeli aircraft over Jordanian villages near Jerusalem. (*Jer. Times*, Feb 19; *Jihad*, Feb 23, March 9; *Manar*, March 1, June 6; *Falastin*, March 2, 8, May 10, June 23)

THE ISRAEL-LEBANESE BORDER

Synopsis. The border remained quiet; no single shooting incident in the border area was reported. Routine incidents included illegal border crossings in both directions: these took place by accident, for personal reasons, for grazing flocks, and for criminal purposes—mostly theft (in Israel only) and smuggling. Violations of territorial waters also occurred, inadvertently, by *force majeure*, or for fishing—the latter only by Lebanese. Persons who crossed the borders or violated territorial waters with no criminal purpose were usually returned to their country after some lapse of time. Legal border crossings which were mostly confined to members of the diplomatic and consular corps and UN personnel were further restricted by Lebanon, allegedly because diplomats had been found to engage in narcotic traffic. (In 1960 Lebanon had already stopped the traditional periodical reunions of Arab families on the border.) There was a case of cooperation between the two countries to safeguard life

and property in Lebanese territory endangered by Israeli blasting operations on the border.

Jan: Lebanon Closes Border to Diplomats. On Jan 15 the Lebanese PM Sa'ib Slim announced that "for security reasons" the border between Lebanon and "occupied Palestine" had been closed as of midnight Jan 14 to members of the diplomatic and consular corps, the UN and "certain men of religion" (*MENA*, Jan 15 [17]). Earlier it was reported that UN personnel would be allowed passage by special permit only and would be subject to search. It was explained that diplomatic bags were being used to convey military information to Israel and to smuggle narcotics. (*Nahar*, Jan 13; *R. Cairo*, Jan 22 [24]).

Two months later "official sources" were quoted as saying that smuggling, especially that of narcotics, had decreased as a result of this measure (*Anwar*, April 1). [The order stayed in force, although Lebanon granted occasional permits to members of the diplomatic corps and their families (see e.g. *Nahar*, June 7)].

Cooperation in the Border Area. The Jewish National Fund and Lebanese authorities concluded an agreement through the MAC for the safeguarding of life and property during the execution of a land development project in the Israel border area. The project, which involved a blasting operation near the Metulla-Beirut road, was to be concluded within a fortnight. The Lebanese authorities diverted traffic and took other precautions, while the J.N.F. undertook to pay for any damage caused by the blasting operations. (*Jer. Post*, Aug 11)

Incidents in Territorial Waters. [By formal agreement, Israel and Lebanon were immediately to return boats and their crews which had entered the other country's territorial waters by force majeure.] Lebanese fishing and cargo boats were repeatedly intercepted in Israeli territorial waters (*Jer. Post*, Feb 20; *Ha'aretz*, April 14). In March the Lebanese Defence Ministry issued a warning to such vessels not to approach "enemy territorial waters," on pain of trial by military court. Crews would not be held liable only if they could prove that they had been driven to "enemy ports" by force majeure. (*Hayat*, March 17)

In Sept, two Israelis whose sailing boat had been blown into Lebanese territorial waters were released and their vessel returned after four days. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 13, 14, 15)

Alleged Smuggling of Jews from Lebanon to Israel. There were repeated reports on the arrests in Lebanon of persons—Jews and others—allegedly engaged in the smuggling of Jews from Lebanon and from other Arab countries via Lebanon into Israel. (*Siyasah*, April 9, July 7; *Ha'aretz*, April 21; *Hawadith*, May 16; *Anwar*, Dec 22)

Illegal Border Crossings; Thefts, Smuggling. Illegal crossings of Israeli Arabs and Jews into Lebanon for personal reasons and often also their return by the Lebanese authorities were reported by sources of both countries. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 9, 12, 20, Feb 24, Nov 19, 20, Dec 5, 6; *Jaridah*, March 25; *Anwar*, Oct 25)

Lebanese papers reported in great detail alleged interrogations by the security authorities of two Israelis who were said to have crossed into Lebanon because of dissatisfaction with life in Israel (*Siyasah*, Aug 15, 24, 26, Sept 13; *Anwar*, Sept 13). The Lebanese authorities, however, denied any knowledge of these alleged infiltrators. (*Amal*, Sept 21)

Flocks from Lebanon with or without their shepherds were repeatedly chased away from or caught on Israel territory; sometimes their return to Lebanon by the Israeli authorities was reported. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 9, March 27, April 2)

Israeli sources reported thefts and attempted thefts of livestock from villages in Galilee, with the tracks leading to the Lebanese border. In Nov one infiltrator was killed in an attempt to break into a village. (*Ha'aretz*, May 8, Oct 20, Nov 7; *Kol Israel*, Nov 1, 6 [W 16])

Arab sources reported on the arrest and trial of persons charged with smuggling goods to and from Israel. Lebanese papers also alleged that Lebanese smugglers had brought in heroin from Israel. [No official Lebanese announcement to this effect was found.] (*V of A*, Jan 25-IMB, Jan 26; *Nahar*, Sept 8; *Siyasah*, Sept 14; *Hayat*, Nov 14, Dec 3)

UTILIZATION OF JORDAN WATERS—POLITICAL ASPECTS

SYNOPSIS

During 1961, both Israel and Jordan continued work on their projects for the utilization of the Jordan river waters, both of which fitted into the Johnston plan (MER 1960, pp 805-6). Jordan actually started to divert the Yarmuk, a Jordan tributary, as part of her Eastern Ghor project. Israel thus lost a source of water she had utilized to irrigate the Jordan and Beyt Shean valleys, but she had already partially completed a pipeline to carry water from the Sea of Galilee to the affected areas, and there was no public Israeli reaction. Meanwhile work continued in Israel on her National Water Carrier, designed to convey part of the Jordan waters to the south from a point on the Sea of Galilee well inside Israeli territory; pumping was planned to begin in 1964.

In May a Jordanian spokesman again brought up the 1955 "Arab plan" to divert the Jordan headwaters from Lebanon and Syria into the Yarmuk, which he

now called the "Greater Yarmuk Project." But nothing more was publicly heard of this plan.

During the first half of the year the Arab League continued to discuss the issue. While in 1960 it had considered both military action and preventive diversion to deny the waters to Israel, and a technical committee had been appointed to work out a joint diversion plan, in 1961 the League concentrated on a military solution. One reason given was that Israel had warned in 1960 that any Arab attempt to divert the Jordan headwaters would constitute a threat to peace, and military action was therefore unavoidable in any case. The Arabs, however, did not appear to be ready for a military encounter with Israel.

The Arab League's Defence Council which convened in June, after having been inactive for several years, merely adopted, according to unofficial reports, a resolution restating the "right to self-defence" in the event

of an Israeli diversion, and the intention to counter with collective military action any use of force by Israel to prevent Arab diversion. There were no reports of any concrete measures in preparation for such eventualities.

For the next three months the issue lay dormant, overshadowed by the Kuwait crisis. After the breakup of the UAR, however, it became a theme in Cairo propaganda attacks on Syria. The Damascus government was accused of betraying Arab interests by allowing Israel to draw the waters (though no new development had taken place). Cairo Radio demanded that the Israeli works be shelled by Syrian artillery. Syria replied by promising to use force if Israel attempted to divert the Jordan.

Jordan supported Syria in the propaganda campaign and asked for the re-establishment of their joint Yarmuk waters committee. This was done in Jan 1962.

Lebanon made no significant move on the Hasbani diversion project, which had been much in the news in 1960.

An individual note in the inter-Arab discussion was provided by PM Qassim of Iraq, who said that an Israeli diversion would not matter, as the Palestinians would recapture the country in any case.

The US continued to aid in carrying out the Eastern Ghor project and there were other indications that she viewed favourably the implementation of projects within the framework of the Johnston plan.

ARAB REACTIONS TO ISRAEL PROGRESS ON PROJECT

(January)

Arab Threats and Frustrations. The announcement on Jan 3 that the Israel Development Budget for 1961/62 allocated IL43 million for the National Water Carrier prompted Arab reactions. MENA's political commentator said that just as the UAR's vigilance had prevented Israel from carrying out her original project to divert the Jordan in the northern demilitarized zone, so it would prevent her from implementing the new plan to pump the waters from the Sea of Galilee. (MENA, R. Cairo, Jan 4—IMB, Jan 5. See also *Ahram*, Jan 5)

Amman Radio, on the other hand, criticized the Arab League and the UAR for inactivity. "Woe to us Arabs!" the commentator exclaimed. "Israel implements her aggressive projects while we intrigue against each other." (R. Amman, Jan 5—IMB, Jan 6)

Falastin said that the project would fill the Negev with Jewish immigrants and thus reinforce Israel's fighting strength; this was even more serious than the rumours about an Israeli atomic bomb. (Falastin, Jan 5)

Al-Hayât, Beirut, commented that both Israel and the Arab League were intensely active: Israel in implementing her projects, and the League in studying and preparing projects and counter-projects. "Experience has accustomed us to the results: Israel has accomplished a new *fait accompli* while the League is still studying!" (Hayât, Jan 6)

THE ISSUE IN THE ARAB LEAGUE

(January-June)

Baghdad Conference Resolves on Solution by Force; Shelves Joint Diversion Projects. The Jordan water issue was a major topic at the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference in Baghdad (Jan 30—Feb 4). (*Ahram*, Zaman, Feb 3-5. See also p 104 b.) The final communiqué stated that the ministers had agreed on the course to be taken to prevent Israel diverting the river. (Zaman, Feb 5)

Salim Habâqi, Al-Hayât special correspondent at the conference, reported that the ministers had been arguing in a "vicious circle": whether to prevent by force any Israeli attempt to divert the river, or to deny Israel the use of the waters by Arab diversions, as both possibilities involved the certainty of Israeli retaliatory action.

The delegates finally passed secret resolutions confirming a 1960 League resolution to use military force to prevent Israel diverting the Jordan [which, however, also spoke of the exploitation of the Jordan waters for the benefit of the Arabs. See MER 1960, p 208], asking Iraq and the UAR to convene, by the end of Feb, the Consultative Military Committee of the League's Defence Council to study ways and means of implementing this decision [the Council had been inactive ever since 1955]; and asking the Arab Foreign Ministers to warn the UN Secretariat of the consequences of Israel's activities. (Hayât, Feb 3-5)

Justifying military measures instead of diverting Jordan tributaries, Habâqi reported the representative of the Arab Higher Committee inquiring: "What will happen when Palestine will be retaken from the Jews? We would have to divert back the tributaries so that the Palestinians could benefit from the river."

Another reason was given by informants to a *New York Times* correspondent in Baghdad; as Israel had warned that any Arab move to divert the Jordan, headwaters would be regarded as "a threat to peace" [see MER 1960, p 209], and an Israeli attack was to be expected in such a case, "it would be more realistic to use force at the point of conflict—wherever the Israelis decided to tap the Jordan for their pipeline." [This "point of conflict" was, however, located on the north-western shore of the Sea of Galilee (see MER 1960, p 205, map), well inside Israel territory, a fact known to the Arabs—see above: Arab Reactions to Israel Progress.] (NYT, Feb 6)

"Highly reliable sources" reportedly explained, however, that the Arab states were not yet ready to face a military conflict; the conference had asked the Permanent Military Commission to prepare a "unified, well-studied and highly coordinated plan which would be acceptable to all Arab countries." (Siyasah, Feb 18)

The *New York Times* correspondent reported that as the decision to recommend the use of force had been freely leaked to American and British correspondents, it was thought that "some ministers wished to stir alarm in the West" to bring international pressure to bear on Israel. (NYT, Feb 6)

UAR-Jordan Disagreement. According to the Cairo press, the conference rejected, on UAR insistence, a Jordanian demand to invite a Jordanian water engineer to inform the conference of Jordan's activities and needs, and practical measures to prevent Israel diverting the Jordan waters. The UAR delegate argued that the conference was dealing with policy, and could not go into details, especially when "it is known that Jordan is actually implementing part of the Johnston plan and thus obstructing Arab counter-plans to divert Jordan tributaries." (*Ahram*, Feb 3, 5, 7; *Gumhuriyah*, Feb 4; *Akhbar*, Feb 3-5, see also *Hawadith*, Feb 3)

The League Military Consultative Committee met in Cairo from April 22 to 26 to work out a unified Arab plan and adopted secret recommendations which were submitted to the Arab Defence Council. (*Ahram*, April 27)

Arab Defence Council Reaffirms Use of Force. The Arab Defence Council, meeting in Cairo between June 10-18 (pp 107-8), agreed on the use of force to prevent Israel diverting the Jordan waters (*Jihad, Falastin, Manar, June 13-15*). The conference had also resolved on a joint scheme to divert the sources of the river in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, with all the Arab countries paying the cost, another source said. (*Falastin, June 15*)

An *Al-Hayat* correspondent reported from Cairo that the conference had agreed that (a) any attempt to divert the flow of the Jordan or draw waters from the Sea of Galilee would be considered an act of aggression, entitling the Arab States to exercise the right of self-defence; (b) if Israel employed force to divert the water or to prevent the diversion of the tributaries in Syria, Lebanon or Jordan, the Arabs would counter with their collective power; (c) the diversion of the river would be an imperialist act as it would enable Israel to settle three million persons in the Negev. (*Hayat, June 15*)

The official communiqué stated only that the conference had studied various subjects and unanimously passed resolutions safeguarding the common Arab interest. (*Ahram, June 19*)

[There were no further reports during the year on Arab League activities regarding the Jordan water question.]

LEBANON

(February-April)

No Independent Lebanese Diversion Project. On Feb 15 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies discussed the diversion of the Jordan. Several deputies suggested referring the issue to the International Court of Justice, while others called for the diversion of the tributaries originating in Lebanon. The Foreign Minister, concluding the discussion, said that an overall Arab plan to divert the Jordan tributaries was under consideration and that Lebanon could not take unilateral action. (*Hayat, Feb 16; R. Amman, Feb 16-17; IMB, Feb 17*)

JORDAN DIVERTS YARMUK RIVER

(August-December)

Plan to Divert Jordan Head Waters Into Yarmuk? In May Dr Hāzim Nusaybah, SG of the Jordanian Development Council, stated that Jordan was exploring the possibility of financing the "Greater Yarmuk Project" from foreign sources. It would cost twenty times as much as the present [East Ghor] project, and it would enable 52,000 hectares of the Jordanian Jordan Valley to be irrigated. (See MER 1960, p 206: The Jordanian Project.)

This project, Nusaybah continued, was based on co-operation with the Syrian Region of the UAR. Dams to be constructed on the Yarmuk at Makarin and Wadi Khalid would store the waters of the Yarmuk, as well as those of the Hasbani and Banias (two of the three sources of the Jordan), which would be diverted by a canal passing through Wadi Ar-Raqqa into the Yarmuk.

One advantage of this project, Nusaybah said, was that it would deny the Yarmuk waters [but of course most of the Jordan waters as well] to Israel, who intended to divert them to the Negev. (See map, MER 1960, p 205.)


The whole three-stage Ghor project, which would cost JD49m., would constitute one of the three stages of the greater project, Nusaybah said. [This "Greater

Yarmuk Project" corresponded to the "Arah Plan" of 1955, designed to deny Israel the Jordan waters (see MER 1960, p 206: UAR Plans Unilateral Diversion; p 205, map) and contradicted the Johnston plan's provisions. Up to the end of 1961 no practical steps had been taken to implement it.]

In a report on the East Ghor project, its director, Nikolai Simansky, urged the Jordanian government to reactivate the joint Jordanian-Syrian Yarmuk committee. (*Falastin, May 2*)

First Stage of Yarmuk Project Completed. On Aug 5 the East Ghor Canal Authority announced that on that day the waters of the Yarmuk river had flowed for the first time through the first 23-km. section of the Eastern Ghor Canal to irrigate some 30,000 dunams of farmland, and that it had already distributed 148 plots to farmers in the area (*Falastin, Aug 6*). [The Yarmuk is the major Jordan river tributary; for details see MER 1960, pp 204 ff.]

JORDAN'S EAST GHOR PROJECT



Israel's Water Supply Affected. Measurements of the Yarmuk river in Israel following the Jordanian diversion showed a drop of 5,000 cubic metres per hour, about a fifth of the flow, affecting the farmers in the Jordan and Beyt Shean valley areas of Israel, who drew most of their irrigation water from the Yarmuk. The Director of Tahal, the Israel Water Planning Authority, declared that the partly completed Sea of Galilee-Beyt Shean pipeline would provide an alternative to the Yarmuk waters, but the water would be more expensive. The complete diversion by Jordan of the Yarmuk waters, a step expected for late 1962, would cost Israel some 30 million cubic metres per annum, the quantity now utilized for irrigation south of the Sea of Galilee. Moreover, the waters in this region would be rendered unfit for irrigation, since their mineral content would rise to up to 700 milligram per litre (about 450 milligram was considered the limit for irrigation). (*Jer. Post*, Aug 22, 25, Oct 5) [No official Israel reaction to the Jordanian diversion was reported.]

Reactivation of Syrian-Jordanian Yarmuk Committee. After the break-up of the UAR, Jordan made it known that she wished to reactivate the Syrian-Jordanian committee for joint utilization of the Yarmuk river. [The committee was formed in 1953 to supervise the implementation of an agreement between the two countries of June 4, 1953, for the joint utilization of the Yarmuk waters for irrigation and hydro-electric power. It was based on a plan to construct a dam at Makarin (see map) to store the winter flow. In 1954/55 the committee helped to prepare the unified Arab plan submitted to Eric Johnston. During 1956 it occupied itself mostly with the Eastern Ghor project. In 1957, when political relations between the two countries deteriorated, the committee was dissolved on Jordan's initiative—the official reason being that after the implementation of Jordan's Eastern Ghor project, no benefit would be derived from the committee's activity.]

A Syrian delegation attended the official inauguration of the Ghor project on Oct 16 and held talks with the Jordanian authorities on possible future cooperation (*Jihad*, Oct 17; *Nasr*, Oct 20). The committee was re-established at the beginning of 1962 at the level of Directors-General and was expected to start work immediately. (*Nahar*, Beirut, Jan 9, 1962)

U.S. Support for Ghor Project. See below: Attitude of Powers.

THE JORDAN WATERS IN THE INTER-ARAB CONFLICT

(October–December)

Issue in Cairo Propaganda Against Damascus. [Following the dissolution of the UAR, Cairo utilized the Jordan water issue in its attacks on the new Syrian government.]

When Israel announced the partial completion of the Jordan valley pipeline, Cairo radio commented that it was the break-up of Egyptian-Syrian unity that "bad given Israel the courage to resume work on the project." [The pipeline in question was, however, only a local project unconnected with Israel's National Water Carrier and had been partially completed well before the break-up of the UAR.] The Damascus regime, Cairo radio said, was weak, reactionary and imperialist-ridden and consequently unable to resist Israel. (*Voice of the Arabs*, Oct 23–IMB, Oct 24)

A [pro-Egyptian] Lebanese paper alleged that Israel

was "changing the features of the northern demilitarized zone" by constructing a road and diverting the course of the Jordan, without opposition from the Syrian government, while during the union "the smallest attempts of this kind were met with decisive measures." (*Siyasah*, Oct 25)

Cairo: Plot Prevents Syrian Shelling of Israeli Works. Cairo Radio followed up this report with a four-day concentrated attack on the Kuzbari government in Syria. Ahmad Sa'id, commentator of the *Voice of the Arabs*, called on the "heroes of the Syrian army" to revolt, to save the rights of the Palestine Arabs and stop Israel's "aggressive action in diverting the Jordan" (*Voice of the Arabs*, Oct 26 [28]; see also *R. Cairo*, Oct 24–27 [25–29]). In another comment, Ahmad Sa'id claimed that the diversion work was going on within the range of heavy Syrian artillery, which could "destroy the attempts of Israel in one hour." [The site of the pumping station of Israel's National Water Carrier was in fact within the range of medium artillery positioned on Syrian territory. See MER 1960, p 205, map.] This artillery, which used to shell the Zionists and their settlements, remained silent, Sa'id said, because of a plot: Israel and the imperialists had made Kuzbari the President of the Syrian Republic. "The arrest of hundreds of faithful Syrian officers of the Syrian front" was in preparation for Israel's diversion work under the gunsights of the Syrian artillery. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 26 [28])

UAR and pro-UAR papers claimed that Gen. von Horn, the UNTSO Chief of Staff, had officially informed the Arab League Secretariat of the completion of Israel's diversion plans and of the imminent inauguration ceremony (*Siyasah*, Nov 29; *Ahram*, Nov 30). This was denied by a UNTSO spokesman as totally baseless. (*Ha-yot*, Dec 6)

Damascus: No New Works by Israel; Army Chief Says Syrian Army Will Fight. On Oct 29 Damascus Radio described the Cairo claims as "cheap lies." No new developments had taken place in the demilitarized zone and consequently "there was no need to open fire." The "liberated" Syrian army was alert to any "Jewish aggression" and would not hesitate to open fire. The commentator warned Cairo Radio to desist from such attacks; otherwise "we are ready to publish secret documents proving that the Egyptian High Command had always evaded giving orders to open fire on the Jews." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 29–IMB, Oct 30)

On Nov 5 Maj.-Gen. Abd al-Karim Zahr ad-Din, the Syrian Army Chief of Staff, told the press that the Syrian Army "would open fire at once" against any Israeli attempt to divert the Jordan river, as Syria's foremost national aspiration was to do away with Israel, and Israel's life and existence were linked with the realization of the water project. (*R. Damascus*, Nov 6–IMB Nov 7; see also Jundi, Nov 5)

Jordan Supports Syria. On Nov 8 Amman Radio accused Cairo of "fabricating news regarding alleged Israeli attempts to divert the Jordan." Though Israel's "aggressive plans" had been known for a long time, no action was taken to frustrate them so long as Egypt "dominated Syria," but "now that the Egyptians have been kicked out" Cairo was reproaching the Syrian army for inactivity in a non-existent case. (*R. Amman*, Nov 8, 11–IMB, Nov 9, 13)

On Nov 12 it was announced in Amman that the

Jordanian government had sent a note to the Syrian government pledging full military support should Israel attempt to divert the Jordan. (*Jihad*, Nov 13)

PM Qassim: Diversion Unimportant, "Palestine" will be Reoccupied. On Nov 20 PM Qassim of Iraq, in a special statement, warned the Arabs not to be distracted from their objectives by reports of Israeli attempts to divert the Jordan; this would not matter, because the Palestinians would return to reoccupy all their lands, he said. (*Thawrah*, Nov 21)

ATTITUDE OF POWERS

US Support for Implementation of Projects Under Johnston Plan. President Kennedy's letter to President Abdel Nasser in May 1961 (pp 197-8) included, according to an unofficial text, the following passage: "We are also willing to help find an equitable and a reasonable solution for the problem resulting from the project to promote the sources of the river Jordan" (*R. Cairo*, Sept 21, [24] 1962)

[There were several indications that the US regarded with favour the implementation of projects that fitted into the Johnston water allocation plan for which see MER 1960, p 206.]

The Eastern Ghor project was being financed by the US. On Jan 26, it was reported, the US and Jordan signed an agreement providing for US aid to the tune

of JD 1,104,857 for the second stage of the Ghor project, which was under construction during the year [apparently in the framework of the \$6.6 million grant for economic and technical assistance for the financial year 1961/62—see p 75]. In addition, the US allocated to the second stage \$1 million from the proceeds of the sale of US surplus foods under PL 480 (*Jer. Times*, Jan 5; *R. Amman*, Jan 26—*IMB*, Jan 27). USOM engineers were advising on the project. (*Jer. Times*, Oct 16)

In Nov Akram Hurani, one time Vice-President of the UAR, recalled that President Abdel Nasser had told his ministers that the US had requested the UAR to consent to the Jordan diversion. (*Jaridah*, Nov 28)

[There were no published official US references to Israel's well-publicized progress on the National Water Carrier or to the above Arab reactions.]

Britain Advocates Mediation. On June 19 Joseph Godber, UK Foreign Under-Secretary, replying in the House of Commons to a question by William Yates (Con) about "Israel's violation of the neutral zones and its abstraction of the Jordan waters," said that "there was no violation whatsoever insofar as this particular matter is concerned" and expressed his hope that "the UN could be used to get agreement between Israel and Jordan over the Jordan water disputes." (*Hansard C*, Vol. 527, Col. 924, June 19)

THE ARMS RACE

BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS

Background. Ever since the Arab-Israel war of 1948 both sides had engaged in an arms race. However, during the first few years neither side made any real progress, primarily because the Western powers, especially the UK, held a virtual monopoly on the arms supplies to the ME. Some relatively modern weapons such as the British Centurion heavy tank and British jet fighter-aircraft made their appearance first in the Arab countries, and the aircraft later and in smaller numbers also in Israel. However up to 1955 the armies of both the Arab countries and of Israel were basically engaged in a process of reorganization and modernization. No drastic change in strength took place.

In the autumn of 1955 all this changed. The Communist bloc began to supply Egypt with arms and the Arab-Israel arena became a major theatre of the cold war. (Actually Syria had been the first ME country to buy arms from the Communist bloc, but it was on a comparatively small scale.) Egypt obtained—at exceedingly low prices and on easy credit terms—modern Soviet arms: jet aircraft, medium and heavy tanks and other armour, all types of artillery, infantry weapons, destroyers and submarines, electronic equipment and other military requirements, in quantities which could not but have a revolutionary effect on the Arab-Israel arena.

Israel's effort to confront this challenge met with some success when she obtained jet aircraft, light tanks and anti-tank guided missiles from France, but she had to pay the full price for these arms. In the Sinai campaign the new weapons of both sides appeared; while in the 1948 war very little armour was employed, in 1956 both sides used hundreds of tanks. During the following years, Egypt and Syria relied exclusively on Soviet supplies and Yemen also started to buy Soviet arms. Iraq and Jordan

continued to obtain arms mostly from Britain, and Saudi Arabia from the US. After the 1958 coup d'état Iraq also began to equip her forces with Soviet arms.

Egypt, later the UAR, however, remained the major contestant in the arms race on the Arab side. She always had had the largest Arab army, and when in 1955 the arms race acquired the new large-scale dimensions, Egypt became the Arab country which could best marshal the technical and other resources required by the great amount of complicated equipment.

Both Egypt and Israel also developed arms industries which manufactured mainly ammunition, light arms, and spare parts; they both also developed means of adapting acquired weapons to local conditions, and means of modifying them. The UAR also attempted to develop, with the aid of German experts, its own modern jet fighter and to manufacture armoured carriers. President Abdel Nasser declared that the dependence on foreign powers for arms supplies during the 1948 war had taught the UAR to regard the manufacture of arms, such as tanks and jet aircraft, as a prerequisite for the "final... liberation of Palestine." (See, e.g. MER 1960, p 173.)

Both countries also had departments of military scientific research.

Up to the end of 1960 the main objective of the arms race was to acquire the most modern weapons of the "conventional type." Thus while in 1948 both sides fought mostly with antiquated weapons, by 1961 the Arab and Israeli armies were equipped with or had ordered up-to-date conventional weapons in use by the forces of the big powers themselves. Syria, Iraq and Egypt acquired the Soviet T54 medium tank, while Israel who fought the Sinai campaign in 1956 with second-hand modified American "Sherman" tanks of WWII vintage now obtained British "Centurion" tanks.

In the air, the Arabs progressed from the Soviet subsonic Mig 15 fighter to ever more modern types—the Mig 17, still subsonic, the supersonic Mig 19, and by 1961 they had on order the Mig 21 with a speed close to mach 2. Israel reacted by acquiring the most modern French aircraft, progressing from the subsonic Ouragan and Mystère, to the transonic Super Mystère B 2, and in 1961 she had on order the Mirage III which belonged of the same class of jet-fighters as the Mig 21.

The UAR and Israel also acquired jet-bombers, the Soviet Ilyushin 28 and the French Vautour respectively, both subsonic. The UAR had on order also a heavy, long-range Soviet bomber, the Tupolev 16. At the same time the two sides sought to perfect their aircraft detection systems.

The UAR put great emphasis on sea power, and by 1961 had acquired a fleet of nine submarines, six destroyers and other craft. Israel's navy was the least powerful arm of her forces, with two destroyers and two submarines among other craft, all rather outdated, acquired from Britain.

Total manpower of the armed forces of the Arab countries in the ME was generally estimated at about half a million; the total manpower potential of the Israel Defence Forces was given as approximately 250,000. Israel's forces were built on reserve lines; she had a very small standing army. The Arab forces, on the other hand, were built on standing armies. Egypt's standing army was approximately 150,000 men, that of Iraq 85,000, Syria 70,000 and Jordan 35,000. Egypt could mobilize some additional 50,000 men in reserve formations and Syria—some 30,000. Jordan had some 30,000 men organized in national guard units whose task it was to defend localities on the Western Bank. The armies of Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen were of secondary significance.

According to official figures, Israel's defence budget in 1960/1 amounted to \$175m, while the defence budgets of Israel's Arab neighbours and Iraq totalled \$541m, as follows: The UAR—\$337m (of which \$40m for the armament industry); Iraq—\$135m; Jordan—\$52m; Lebanon—\$17m.

Synopsis. At the end of 1960 and during 1961 signs appeared which were interpreted both in the ME and outside it as evidence that the arms race was acquiring new and graver dimensions; namely, that it was becoming a race for atomic weapons and guided missiles.

Various rumours about the capability and intention of Israel and the UAR to produce atomic weapons had appeared previously but the matter broke into headlines in Dec 1960 when the US addressed a public request to Israel for clarification of reports that she was constructing a second nuclear reactor; and the US Central Intelligence Agency stated that Israel might be developing atomic weapons. Earlier, Israel had built a small atomic research reactor with US aid (at Nahal Rubin, see MER 1960, pp 287, 299; this volume, p 321 b) and the UAR was building such a reactor with Soviet aid (at Inshas, see MER 1960 p 85; this volume p 659 b).

The Israel PM confirmed that Israel was building the reactor with a capacity of 24,000 thermal kilowatts, but said that it was for peaceful use only and termed the report that Israel was producing an atomic bomb as a falsehood. The State Department declared itself satisfied with Israel's public assurances. The Arab reaction was ambivalent; they showed deep concern, but also endeavoured to minimize Israel's achievement. President Abdel Nasser hinted that Israel was spreading the re-

ports as propaganda, yet emphasized that the UAR could not allow Israel to build an atomic bomb; the UAR would have to attack the "base of aggression" and if the powers supplied Israel with such a bomb, the UAR would obtain atomic weapons too. The issue was discussed at the Baghdad meeting of the Arab foreign ministers in Feb, and it again caught world attention when news appeared about rocket development in Israel and in the UAR.

Foreign observers were of the opinion that Israel's military interest was to keep atomic weapons out of the ME and that the Negev reactor was no part of a bomb programme; Israel might however be working towards an option to produce atomic weapons as a final deterrent in case the Arabs obtained the support of a great power in developing a fighting force capable of overwhelming Israel. Israel might also be interested in gaining the reputation of nuclear capability as a psychological deterrent. (L. Beaton and J. Maddox: *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*)

In 1961, no guided missiles—whether ground-to-ground, ground- or sea-to-air or air-to-air—were known to be in the possession of an Arab country or Israel (with the exception of short-range anti-tank missiles, an infantry weapon of French make, in the hands of the Israel army.)

In July, Israel scientists sent aloft a meteorological non-guided rocket of relatively small capacity named Shavit II. While the rocket in itself was no weapon carrier, it was widely accepted as an indication that Israel was developing or had the scientific potential to develop guided missiles for military purposes. Qualified observers, however, tended to think that Israel had still a very long way to go to produce such missiles. The UAR belittled the Israel achievement, Iraq virtually ignored it, but concern was expressed in Lebanon and Jordan.

Immediately after the launching of Shavit II it was announced in the US that licences had been granted to export research rockets to the UAR. The UAR, various sources claimed, had wished to launch them on its revolution anniversary, July 23, to enhance its prestige—this was vehemently denied in the UAR—and because she knew of the imminent launching of an Israel rocket. In Israel, on the other hand, it was reported that the timing of the Shavit II shot and the publicity accompanying it had been designed to forestall the UAR (though the opponents of Mapai—the ruling party—also claimed that they might have been designed to help the latter in the election campaign).

During the same period it became known that an Israel bid to purchase anti-aircraft rockets in the US—the only Western country making them—had been rejected. The US was unwilling, as was later officially explained, to bear responsibility for setting off an even more dangerous form of the arms race. Israel's desire for such missiles was explained by her vulnerability to a UAR surprise attack in view of her small territory, high population concentration, few airfields and reserve nature of her army.

The serious effort of the UAR in the missile field became public knowledge in Nov when four rocket experts in West Germany were dismissed from their posts for working on rocket development for Egypt. Rocket parts had also been exported to Egypt. Cairo reports stated that a successful missile test under the supervision of the German experts had been conducted "during the past six months." Cairo gave no concrete details on what it called the "Arab rocket" but gave it extensive publicity and claimed that the rocket had caused panic in Israel. Israel

sources tended to doubt that a successful test had indeed been conducted and thought that the publicity given the affair by Cairo was intended to recoup some of the prestige lost by President Abdel Nasser through the Israel missile shot and the break-up of the UAR.

Thus it appeared that Israel and the UAR had joined in a race for "unconventional" arms. However, the practical effects of this development for the present and the near future were psychological and political rather than military. There were no indications that for years to come either of the two countries could produce atomic warheads nor was it thought likely that the atomic powers would supply them with such. In the field of guided missiles observers tended to assume that both countries had still a long way to go, and even if they succeeded in producing operative guided ground-to-ground missiles, they would remain, without atomic warheads, only conventional weapons.

QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR CAPACITY

Additional Arab Reactions. The issue of Israel's nuclear capacity arose in Dec 1960 when the US made it public that Israel was constructing a nuclear reactor in the Negev (see: MER 1960, pp 286-8). Throughout January-February, the Arab press continued to give prominence to the issue, commenting in the same vein as in December 1960 (see MER 1960, pp 286-8). Following are some representative arguments:

The whole issue was mere propaganda, aimed at frightening the Arabs and inducing them to make peace with Israel (*Ahali, Baghdad, Jan 2; Bayan, Baghdad, Jan 16; Mustaqbal, Baghdad, Jan 22*). Israel was incapable of manufacturing a bomb without the assistance of the Western powers (*Gumhuriyah, Jan 3; Ahali, Jan 5*); and specifically France (*Falastin, Jan 1; Manar, Jan 4; Difa, Jan 15*). The Arab states, and especially the UAR, Iraq, and Lebanon, were also capable of manufacturing an atomic bomb (*Siyyash, Dec 23, 1960; Hayat, Dec 30, 1960*). Israel would not be able to employ an atomic bomb, because of the danger of contamination in her own territory by nuclear fallout (*Hayat, Jan 8; Sayyud, Beirut, Dec 23, 1960*). Israel intended to use the reactor to promote her economy (*Jaridah, Dec 23, 1960*). The Arab states should coordinate their efforts to prevent Israeli nuclear superiority (*Manar, Jan 13; Difa, Jan 15; Taqqadum, Baghdad, Jan 4*). The Arab countries should initiate a "preventive war" against Israel. (*Ayyam, Damascus, Jan 1, 18; Siyyash, Jan 22*)

On Dec 31, 1960, Gen. Qassim, the Iraqi PM, told a group of officers: "Israel may possess this atom bomb but that state's extermination before obtaining this bomb is something inevitable, and even after obtaining it. The important matter in this connection is that we denounce the use of the atom bomb. We shall never use an atom bomb, and we shall not even think of possessing it. We shall use nuclear energy, as reflected in our prospects for peaceful purposes." (*R. Baghdad, Jan 1 [3]*)

A resolution of the Baghdad Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in Feb said that the conference had considered the League SG's report on French aid to Israel in the nuclear field, and the opinions on the subject of the Arab representatives at the UN, and had approved the plan which must be followed in this respect. (*MENA, Feb 4 [6]*)

It was reported that the Arab representatives were to urge the UN to entrust the International Atomic Energy Agency with investigating the Israeli situation. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, March 18*)

Haykal: Issue Demands Arab Independent Response. Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, commented on "a rumour spread among a number of foreign diplomats in Cairo" that in view of Israel's reported possession of an atomic bomb, the UAR might, if only temporarily, abandon its policy of positive neutrality. Haykal said that this was unthinkable; that policy was fundamental and immutable. Haykal said that he could not answer the question of what would be if Israel "is proved to be trying to manufacture an atomic bomb." However, "I do know that asking the US to press Israel to abandon the manufacture of the atomic bomb... is at best unprecedented naïveté. Israel... is of American manufacture itself. In any case, the Arab position, and the strength of this position alone can force a reply to this question." (*Ahram, Jan 27; R. Cairo, Jan 27 [28]*)

Evaluation of Israel's Policy and Capability: "Israel Working towards Atomic Option." Following is an evaluation of Israel's policy and capabilities by Western experts. There was evidence, in their opinion, that Israel was "working towards an option to produce these [atomic] weapons at some future date if it should think them necessary..." They thought that such evidence could be traced to the possibility—which for the present they considered unlikely—that a powerful Arab leader might obtain the support of a great power in developing a fighting force capable of overwhelming Israel; in such a case atomic weapons might emerge as a final deterrent.

Analyzing the scientific and technical problems involved as well as that of the provision of uranium and raw materials, the authors concluded that the reactor at Dimona "appears at present to be no part of a bomb programme and that it will be difficult to turn it over to weapon development without this fact becoming obvious." An Israeli bomb could be ruled out for many years, but never entirely. (Leonard Beaton and John Maddox: *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, Chatto and Windus, London, For The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961)

ROCKETS IN ISRAEL

A Meteorological Rocket. On July 5, at dawn, Israel launched a meteorological rocket. According to information released it was a solid-fuel multi-stage non-guided rocket weighing about 250 kg. (550 lb.); it reached an altitude of more than 80 km (50 miles) and released a sodium cloud. The rocket was designed and built by scientists of the Ministry of Defence Research Department. It was stressed that the propellant had been prepared in Israel from an original formula, and chiefly from local materials. The rocket trajectory was traced and photographed by a number of observation posts. The rocket was named Shavit II. This was the first successful test of a meteorological rocket in Israel.

The launching was attended by PM Ben-Gurion, as well as the Foreign Minister, the Deputy Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff.

Meteorological rockets had been launched, it was reported, by the US, the USSR, France, Britain, Italy and Japan. Sweden and the GFR were understood to be preparing the launching of such rockets.

More advanced rockets equipped with measuring apparatus were expected to be launched at a later stage. (*Israel Press, July 6; IGPO/WNB, No. 16, July*)

Political and Military Implications. PM Ben-Gurion told the press that the Shavit II launching had no military aim and had purely scientific purposes. The rocket was

launched for exploration purposes in connection with the International Geophysical Year. It was a great scientific achievement and an indication of Israel's potential. When asked whether modifications of such rockets could give them military value, Ben-Gurion replied that these were questions which he was not prepared to discuss. (*Jer. Post, Ha'aretz, July 6*)

Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres, however, was quoted to have told the press that Israel gave priority to its rockets' programme because of "grave defence problems," but, he said, "if other countries would change their belligerent policies we could change our priorities." He added that the rocket was cheaply built and did not use the best fuel available in the country; more rockets were to be produced but there were no immediate plans for mass production. (*Times, July 7*)

The Israel press unanimously welcomed the news both as an Israel scientific achievement and as an indication of Israel's capacity to build missiles for military purposes and expressed the hope that this might serve as a deterrent to Arab aggressive intentions.

Great enthusiasm was reported among the Israel public. A survey of public opinion, *Ha'aretz* said, showed a "feeling of power and pride." (*Israeli Press, July 6*)

As regards the timing of the launching and the attendant publicity, PM Ben-Gurion was reported to have told the Cabinet that they were intended to forestall the Egyptians who had planned on July 23, the revolution anniversary, to launch rockets bought in the US claiming them as their own. Mapai's coalition partners on the other hand intimated that the timing and the publicity might have been designed to help Mapai in the current election campaign. (*Ma'ariv, July 10*)

Some press comments maintained that Israel would have been wiser to allow the UAR to launch rockets first; then she would have obviated charges that she was starting a new arms race and she would have made it more difficult for those who were trying to justify the supply of rockets to the UAR. (See e.g. *Al-Hamishmar, July 12*)

Misgivings were also expressed that the publicity of the launching might drive the Arabs to new efforts in the arms race, which Israel would be obliged to counter at great expense. (*Ma'ariv, July 9*)

Foreign Observers' Scientific and Military Evaluation. *The Times* science correspondent commented that "technically it is quite a good effort on the part of the Israelis to have developed their own research rocket" though not much novelty was left in this field. Although the height reached was comparatively modest, this was not necessarily significant in the absence of other relevant information. The correspondent noted that only "a fine line" separated interest in research rockets from an entry to techniques of military character.

Another correspondent added that even if Israel possessed rockets of military value, that in itself would not alter the military situation. They would require nuclear warheads and there was no likelihood that Israel could produce these. (*Times, July 6*)

The Economist remarked that "for a small state with few resources, Israel's sally into space is a brilliant feat." But the rocket was small and "in its present form... almost certainly a harmless research instrument." Israeli scientists had not yet divulged skills needed to build military rockets. The paper thought that Israel was probably getting technical advice from France. (*Economist, July 8*)

The aviation correspondent of *The Guardian* also did

not feel that Israel was close to producing any efficient military weapon based on rockets. (*Guardian, July 6*)

An official of the US National Aeronautic and Space Administration termed the launching "a wonderful job." He and other scientists said that if Israel intended to launch satellites it would require many years. US scientists launched sounding rockets in 1946 and only twelve years later their first satellite. (*NYT, July 16*)

Arabs Disparage Achievement, Express Concern. UAR comment disparaged the Israel rocket-launching while Lebanese and Jordanian comment expressed concern over the security implications.

The first Cairo Radio report, on July 5, said that Israel had launched "a small rocket" (*IMB, July 6*). A later radio commentary said Shavit II resembled American children's toys. Israel wished to develop anti-aircraft rockets because she was afraid of the UAR bombers. (*IMB, July 9*)

Authoritative UAR sources were quoted as stating that they had not been surprised by the launching which had only a propaganda value. (*Masa', July 7*)

Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, wrote that Shavit II was in fact a French rocket about which Israel had spread lies and which scared no one. (*Ahram, July 12*)

Bahjat al-Talhuni, the Jordanian PM, on the other hand, stated that he saw in the rocket "a new threat to the Arabs in the form of an alleged scientific achievement" and he appealed to the Arabs to protect themselves by solidarity. (*R. Amman, July 6 [8]*)

FM Taqla of Lebanon called for Arab solidarity in face of the Israel danger (*Hayat, July 8*). Similarly, the Lebanese press deplored Arab disunity and lack of purpose in face of Israel's efforts and exhorted them to change their ways. (*Hayat, Nahar, Kifah, Beirut-al-Masa', July 6*)

The Iraqi press and radio, which were occupied with the Kuwait conflict, gave only the scantest attention to the issue. Baghdad Radio commented that it was no coincidence that the "state of the Zionist gangs" had launched the rocket when Iraq was preoccupied with repulsing "the British attack on her territory." (*IMB, July 9*)

Concern in West Over Shavit II, Effects on Arms Race. [While the rocket shot was appreciated in the West as an achievement of Israel science and technology, concern was expressed regarding its possible effects on the arms race in the ME.]

There was no official comment in Washington. A spokesman for the State Department said the department had no advance knowledge of the rocket shot. An unidentified State Department source was quoted as having said that the shot was "presumptuous" and that Israel should have devoted her energies to the pursuit of peace, rather than having embarked on an obvious drive for nuclear rockets. To him the launching indicated a tendency towards militarism.

American press reaction, *The Jerusalem Post* reported, focused on the military implications of the firing. (*Reuters, INA as quoted by Jer. Post, July 7*)

In London, *The Times* congratulated Israel on her "technical achievement" but said that "for psychological reasons, it would have been better if Israel's scientific research had remained grounded." "Mr. Ben-Gurion and his colleagues know very well," the editorial said, "that it is the military implications of the launching which will be studied by Israel's neighbours... It may be that the Israel authorities intend to make the Arabs' flesh

creep... The rocket will be taken [by the Arabs] as fresh evidence that the cunning Israelis, perhaps with outside help, are up to mischief.

"The danger, of course is that tension in an already over-tense region is heightened as much by rumours of arms deliveries as by real deliveries. Most Arabs are convinced that Israel is building an atomic bomb, and that when this has been completed they will be compelled to solicit one of their own, presumably from Russia." (*Times*, July 6)

The Economist, on the other hand, wrote that "Israel has the right of any believably threatened country to argue that its best defence lies in a display of strength. Nor can scientists anywhere be expected to argue that the problem of local diplomacy should stand in the path of scientific research." However, the paper expressed concern lest a nuclear arms race develop in the ME; even if Israel only gave the impression of looking to France for aid in this field, the Arabs might seek assistance from Russia. (*Economist*, July 8)

Soviet Reactions. Similarly to the Soviet comment on the reports on Israel's second atomic reactor (see MER 1960 p 288) Moscow Radio in Arabic declared that the US, and especially the German Federal Republic, "who both use Israel as a strategic bridgehead for extending their influence over the Arab East, have supported all the scientific research going on in Israel for military purposes." The launching of the rocket had given a boost to war hysteria in the Middle East. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, July 13 [SU 15])

A broadcast in Russian quoting *Krasnaya Zvezda* said that the launching was also intended to raise the morale of the Israeli people who had become disillusioned with the policy of the Ben-Gurion Government. (*R. Moscow*, July 26 [SU 28])

US Rejects Israeli Bid for Anti-Aircraft Missiles. In July Cyrus L. Sulzberger, *The New York Times* correspondent, reported from Jerusalem that Israel had been trying without success to buy American Hawk and Nike anti-aircraft missiles from the US. He said that Israel's policy now was "not to seek any formal treaties of alliance but to get permission to buy defensive" anti-aircraft missiles. This was a change from the policy Israel had followed prior to the Suez conflict when it sought from the US a mutual security pact, but failed. Israel counted heavily on implied French military support "and on more generalized American sympathies." But it felt that if Abdel Nasser should try to implement by surprise attack his pledge to squash Israel, "eventual aid from the US and France might be too late." In view of her small territory and her few airfields on the one hand and the modern Russian aircraft at the UAR's disposal on the other, Israel was especially vulnerable to a surprise air attack. Thus the foremost objective of Israel's foreign policy was to obtain guided anti-aircraft missiles and the US was the only Western country making such missiles. (*NYT*, July 30 as quoted in *Ha'aretz*, *Jer. Post*, July 31)

ROCKETS AND MISSILES IN THE UAR

US Agrees to Sell UAR Experimental Rockets. On July 6, the day after the firing of the Israel rocket, the US Space Administration confirmed that it had been approached by "Cairo scientists" in an effort to obtain rockets. *The New York Times* said that the approach was made "earlier this year" (in June, see below). The UAR may have wished to achieve a launching on July

23, the revolution anniversary; it presumably also knew of the Israeli preparations for launching the Shavit II and wished to rival this programme. The Space Administration had replied that it was unable to participate in a programme on such short notice; however, it would like to have Cairo join the international programme of rocket research. Washington must also be pleased, *The New York Times* added, that Cairo had turned to the US rather than to the USSR for its rockets. (*NYT*, July 7)

The State Department spokesman said on July 7 that export licences would be granted to enable the UAR to buy experimental rockets for meteorological purposes; "appropriate assurance" had been received from the UAR that the rockets would be used solely for peaceful purposes. The UAR approach had been made in June. Asked whether Israel would be able to purchase similar rockets from the US, the spokesman said Israel had never applied.

From a US Embassy source in Tel Aviv it was learned that the UAR had bought three rockets at \$15,000 each. It was understood that they had been bought from a private firm which had been prepared to supply them on shorter notice than the Space Administration (*Ahram*, July 8; *Ha'aretz*, *Jer. Post*, July 9, 10). [It became known later that the rockets in question were of the "Viper" and "Javelin" types.]

On July 12 Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, the editor of *Al-Ahram*, said that "Israel backed by American propaganda" had distorted the whole picture. The facts were that the request for US missiles had been made by a scientific organization and not by the UAR government; the missile requested had a maximum altitude of only 8 km. and was devoid of any military value; it was also inconceivable that the UAR could have entertained the thought of launching US rockets on her revolution anniversary as this would have become known, and thus would have caused a moral catastrophe.

Furthermore, if the UAR depended on the US to counter Israel, this would be tantamount to capitulating to Israel, for if the US gave the UAR one missile, it would throw open its whole arsenal to Israel. (*Ahram*, July 12)

It would appear that in the end the UAR did not buy the American rockets. A Cairo source said in Nov that the agreement for the purchase had been cancelled. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Nov 20)

UAR Developing Guided Missiles with Aid of West German Experts. At the beginning of Nov it became known that four West German scientists had been dismissed from their posts in a German state-owned research institute for having worked on rocket development in the UAR.

Concerned in the matter was the Forschungsinstitut für Physik der Strahlentriebe (research institute for jet propulsion physics), in Stuttgart, which was financed by the Federal Republic and by the Länder. The dismissed were: Professor Eugen Sänger, Professor Paul Goercke, Engineer Wolfgang Pilz and Dr Heinz Krug.

Professor Sänger, at the time 53 years old, was the scientific director of the institute. He was described as a leading international expert on rocket motors. Under the Nazi regime, in 1936, he established a rocket research institute and during WWII he worked mainly on the development of jet fighter aircraft. After 1945 he continued scientific work for the French Ministry of Aviation and in 1954 he became the Director of the Stuttgart institute. According to German press reports. Prof.

Sänger had encountered professional difficulties in Germany and his work had been disparaged there. His wife, Dr. Irene Sänger-Bredt, served as deputy director of the institute.

In a letter to Sänger the Federal Minister of Transport stated that the government considered the professor's research work for the Egyptians as exceeding the extent of the subsidiary work he was permitted under his contract.

W. Pilz, who, it was reported, had settled permanently in Cairo, had earlier participated in the development of the French research rocket Veronique.

Dr Krug was the business manager of the Stuttgart institute; at the same time he was Director of his own firm, INTRA, also located in Stuttgart. This firm, *Wehr und Wirtschaft* reported, was "flourishing extraordinarily." [It became known later that INTRA was engaged in supplying experts and materials for missile development in the UAR.]

According to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, a fifth person, Prof. Dadieu, who had also worked for the UAR, remained on the staff of the institute.

The reports available did not state at which time Sänger and his fellow scientists had started work for the UAR. Sänger said he had worked in Egypt only during his vacations and only on purely scientific subjects; he had disclosed no secret information. Members of the institute were, however, reported to have pointed out that he had been paid by the UAR government DM600,000 (\$150,000), a rather high fee for purely scientific lectures and laboratory work. (*Wehr und Wirtschaft*, Nov; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Nov 6; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nov 6, 7; *Die Welt*, Nov 10; *Times*, Nov 7)

A Cairo source said that all that Prof. Sänger and his colleagues had done in the UAR was to instruct some Egyptian scientists; all research on the Egyptian missiles was 100% Egyptian. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Nov 20)

In Dee, the Baden-Württemberg Minister of Economy, in answer to a parliamentary question, said that Sänger and his colleagues had been promised DM2m. (\$500,000) in connection with the production of rockets for Egypt. He said he understood that about half the amount had already been paid. He confirmed that Sänger himself was to have received DM600,000. He added that a firm had been formed in West Germany to carry out the Egyptian order (probably a reference to INTRA) and rocket parts had been exported to Egypt. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 3)

Missile Test in the UAR? Immediately after the news broke over the dismissal of the German experts, it was reported from Cairo that "during the past six months" an Egyptian rocket had been successfully tested. *The Times* correspondent reported that Cairo officials refused to disclose details. (*Times*, Nov 8)

At the same time the Cairo Radio and press began talking of an "Arab rocket" (*isrâkîh arabî*) as an accomplished fact, without, however, reporting any concrete news. Quoting Israeli papers and the world press, these sources said that the rocket had struck terror in the heart of Israel, and, in the words of *Al-Ahram*, the whole world was talking about the Arab rocket. Cairo Radio said in its Hebrew comment that the UAR was not to blame for the arms race in the ME; Israel, under imperialist influence, had been the first to introduce missiles in the area. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 7, 8 [10]; *IMB*, Nov 7, 8, 9; *Ahram*, *Gumhuriyah*, Nov 7)

Lebanese [pro UAR] papers said that the missile tested

was of the V-2 type which the Germans employed against Britain during WWI. The launching had been supervised by German experts. (*Kul Shay*, Nov 11; *Al-Ushu' al-Arabi*, quoted by Cairo television, Nov 16-IMB, Nov 17)

A Cairo source said that the rocket propellant had been produced in Egypt by Egyptians and from Egyptian materials. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Nov 20)

The Cairo press and radio claimed that Israel and French pressure on Bonn, exercised through NATO, had caused the dismissal of Prof. Sänger. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 8-IMB, Nov 9; *Ahram*, Nov 9)

Israeli scientific sources and the press doubted that a missile had successfully been launched in Egypt. It was thought that the publicity given by Cairo to the reports was aimed at boosting the prestige of President Abdel Nasser which had been declining because of the breakup of the UAR. (*Ma'ariv*, Nov 9; *Ha'aretz*, *Haboker*, Nov 10)

"Missile Race" Seen. *The Times* thought that the reported missile test was a response to the firing of Shavit II. "Reports that Egypt had been testing rockets of West German origin are not unexpected," the paper commented, "but are a grim reminder of the competition in arms going on all the time in the ME. When Israel fired her home-made rocket fifty miles into the ionosphere last July the Arabs could hardly be blamed for thinking that this was not a piece of disinterested research into the weather. It was, in fact, an example of Israel's research for a deterrent with which to offset her disadvantages in numbers. Egypt has predictably responded by trying to catch up." (*Times*, Nov 10)

THE US ATTITUDE DEFINED

The State Department's views on the question of rockets and missiles were made known in a letter from Assistant Secretary of State Brooks Hays to Senator Kenneth B. Keating (Rep.—N.Y.). The letter sought to explain why the US gave licences to export US experimental rockets to the UAR but rejected an Israeli application to purchase anti-aircraft missiles. Mr. Hays said that "in accordance with its policy of avoiding measures which might stimulate an arms race in the Near East, the US has refrained from supplying (military) missiles to any of the countries of that region." Hays said that "at present no nation in the Near East possesses missile-type weapons. It would indeed be inconsistent with our desire to see peace reinforced and progress achieved towards the settlement of the difficult Near Eastern problems were this country to bear first responsibility for setting off a new and more dangerous form of arms competition in that area. It would also be unfortunate were this country by actions of this kind to open opportunities for Soviet moves inevitably aimed at increasing tensions in the area and advancing the Communist cause. This would be neither in Israel's interest nor in our own." Justifying the sale of "Viper" and "Javelin" rockets to the UAR, Hays said, "they are of negligible military importance and similar types are manufactured in several countries." They were provided to the UAR for meteorological research purposes. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 8)

THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT

Background Note: In August 1949, following the signing of armistice agreements between Israel and her neighbours, the UN lifted the arms embargo (including an inspection system) which it had imposed on the area for the duration of the war.

While Israel suggested that some form of international arms control should be maintained, the Western Powers tended to consider the armistice agreements as sufficient. When an arms race developed in the ME, the UK, France, and the US restated their policies in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950: they stress, 'their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab countries and Israel, and specified considerations that would govern arms supplies to the ME. (See MER 1960, p 93.)

Israeli spokesmen at the UN repeatedly advocated a ME disarmament, first in the framework of a peace settlement (e.g., Ambassador Abba Eban on Dec 1, 1952), and, from 1957 on, independently and in advance of such a settlement, in the form of a convention endorsed by the UN and guaranteed in any appropriate way (M. Comay at the 829th meeting of the First Committee, Jan 25, 1957). This proposal was repeated several times. On Dec 16, 1959, a newly formed Israel government, headed by PM Ben-Gurion, included a disarmament proposal in its "Basic Principles" (programme), which was endorsed by the Knesset (the Parliament). It said that Israel would propose to all her Arab neighbours an agreement leading to full disarmament and the abolition of the armed forces in Israel and the Arab states, on condition that control of this agreement was assured and that the borders and sovereignty of these states were not affected. Israel's Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, reiterated Israel's attitude at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly. (See Subject Index for MER 1960.)

The only reaction of the Arab countries to these proposals was to reject them outright, charging that they were mere propaganda, or else asserting that the Arabs could not possibly disarm in face of what they described as Israeli aggression. In fact, as the Arab countries refused to recognize even the existence of Israel, refused to have any dealings with her, claimed belligerent rights and asserted that they were preparing for Israel's liquidation, disarmament agreements were for them inconceivable.

Vice-President Johnson Hopes for Reduction of Armaments; ME Reactions. In a speech to a Zionist audience in New York on Feb 5, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson stressed the need for disarmament in the ME: "For the people of the ME the margin of bare survival is too narrow to make tolerable the maintenance of costly burdens of arms. We hope the day will quickly come when these burdens can be reduced. This is essential not only to world peace but to the improvement of the lives of the people of the Middle East."

Replying to a press inquiry the following day, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that this was "one of the fields where preliminary or premature public comment would not be helpful." (N.E. Report, Feb 15)

On March 20, Mrs. Meir, the Israel FM, referred to Johnson's statement in a speech in the Knesset, and said: "I want to affirm that, in moving towards that objec-

tive, Washington will find a loyal partner in the Government of Israel." (Jer. Post, March 21)

A Cairo commentator, reacting to Mrs. Meir's statement, cited instances of Israel's arming and asked whether this was part of a campaign for peace and the reduction in armaments. He asked who had told Golda Meir that the Arabs would agree to reduce their arms while "the gangster state is on our border?" As long as Israel remained what it was at present, force would be the only means to come to an understanding with it and the Arabs would sacrifice everything in order to acquire more modern and mightier weapons. (R. Cairo, March 21 [22])

Israel Reiterates Disarmament Proposals. On Oct 1, 1961, at the 16th session of the UN General Assembly, Mrs. Meir, the Israel FM said: "We propose, that, simultaneously with the search for a general agreement on disarmament, we should seek to reach agreement also on disarmament with mutual inspection and control for specific zones or situations of international tension... Israel is prepared to elaborate a programme to that end, and we call upon the Arab states to cooperate with us in this venture." She said Israel admitted that the preservation of the country's security constituted a heavy financial burden. However, she continued, "we will do everything within our power to be able to defend our country if attacked. But we once more ask our neighbours—where is all this leading? We seek no military victories, all we want is peace. We want the development of our country and a decent life for our people. Is not this what the Arab masses need as well?" (A/PV 1030)

Arab Spokesmen Reject Bid, Hold Israel's Existence Responsible for Arms Race. Mahmūd Fawzi, the UAR FM, called Israel "a spearhead of imperialism and neocolonialism," and continued: "None of this has, however, deterred the Israel spokesmen from repeating to the Assembly, one year after another, the same refrain of claimed Israeli innocence, immaculate record and deep love for peace... but it cannot possibly deceive the fair-minded or the well-informed." (A/PV 1634)

Ahmad Shukairy, the representative of Saudi Arabia, made the following remarks on "the proposal of disarmament which the lady has put forward to the Arab states. Let me say outright that coming from Israel the word 'disarmament' is a mockery of disarmament. It was the establishment of Israel in the ME that led to rearmament in the Arab states. Since that time, defence expenditures in the Arab states have risen from one to twenty... Without Israel there would have been in the region nothing except simple security forces; and with Israel out of the region there will be total and general disarmament in the area... without any need for the lady to make any proposal." (A/PV 1039)

[The representatives of Morocco, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan and Syria took part in the debate but did not refer to Mrs. Meir's speech.]

THE ARAB REFUGEES

SYNOPSIS

NOTE: [All US involvements in the refugee question outside the UN and the Palestine Conciliation Commission are dealt with under: The US and Arab-Israel Conflict (pp 193 ff).]

No major changes were noted in the Arab refugee problem during the year. The UN re-endorsed its 1948 resolution calling for repatriation or compensation. The Arab delegations also advocated the implementation of the resolution, but their spokesmen made it clear—at the UN and especially at home—that as far as they were concerned the true solution of the problem lay in the elimination of Israel. Israel saw in the Arab demand to return the refugees an aim to destroy her and she publicly resolved that no refugees would return.

For a time there was evidence of an American effort to move towards a settlement of the problem; however, nothing came of this initiative. In the end the US attitude proved material in maintaining the political *status quo* in face of attempts by both the Arab states and Israel to change it in their favour.

In April the 15th UN session resumed the debate on the refugees which it had failed to conclude in Nov 1960 (MER 1960, pp 212-3). The Arab delegations had then advocated two measures: (1) the appointment of a custodian for properties the refugees had left behind in Israel and (2) the enlargement of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) by adding representatives of the Eastern bloc and of uncommitted nations. When the session resumed, an Arab-backed draft resolution sponsored by Muslim countries was introduced; it included the second demand only though the first was to come up again at the 16th session. The "property rights" protection proposal which was supported by the USSR was strongly objected to by Israel on the grounds—among others—that the UN had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. The US and several other countries also opposed it. Though it was approved by the Special Political Committee, it failed to be adopted by the plenary; the Arabs accused the US of behind-the-scenes tactics in securing its failure.

The resolution adopted by the plenary (1604 XV) requested the PCC to make efforts to secure the implementation of para 11 of GA resolution 194 (III) (see MER 1960, p 211) and report thereon not later than Oct 15, 1961. The revival of the PCC, an effort which had begun in 1959 after many years of the commission's dormancy, was wished for by both the Arabs and the US.

The specific date for the PCC report had originally been proposed by the US. In the months following the 15th session the US made it even clearer that it meant to probe the possibilities of a solution to the refugee problem and that it wished to do so through the PCC. During the presidential election campaign Kennedy had promised to make an effort to bring about an Arab-Israel settlement (MER 1960, pp 108-9), and after his inauguration some American initiative had been expected. The wish to ease congressional resentment against appropriating each year large sums for the upkeep of the refugees (\$24.3 million for the year 1961) was thought also to have influenced the administration. Both the Arab countries and Israel watched the American moves with apprehension.

In May President Kennedy sent letters to six Arab heads of state which outlined the US position on ME questions and put emphasis on the refugee issue. He said that the US was determined to use its influence toward a just and peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel controversy. The US was willing to help resolve the refugee problem on the basis of repatriation or compensation and in a way most beneficial to the refugees. He made it clear that the US wished to work through the PCC.

Three weeks later the issue was discussed by President Kennedy and PM Ben-Gurion during an informal meeting in New York. The Israeli PM said the President had offered "a suggestion that may be a solution" to the problem; according to press reports—repatriation of a certain percentage and resettlement and emigration of the remainder. The State Department immediately denied that there had been any understanding on a specific solution. In July Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressly denied that the administration had suggested the repatriation of a specific number of refugees or, indeed, that the Department had any specific plan at all in mind.

In May the PCC (comprising France, Turkey and the US) decided to appoint a Special Representative "to explore with host governments and with Israel practical means of seeking progress on the... refugee problem" pursuant to resolution 1604 (XV), mentioned above. In June a high State Department official reaffirmed that the US was taking "most seriously" its responsibilities to provide in time the PCC report which, it hoped, would make a constructive contribution to the consideration of the problem. During the same period US press reports said the administration thought the political situation in the ME favourable to a new approach to the problem. In Aug the PCC appointed as its Special Representative Joseph E. Johnson, a US citizen; earlier it was reported that a Swiss diplomat had refused to undertake the mission as he saw no prospects for progress. A French statement made it clear that the mission was primarily a US enterprise.

Johnson toured the ME in Sept; the conclusions of his report appeared in the PCC's 15th Progress Report, in Oct. The report itself was published in Nov. Johnson found that no progress could be made on the refugee question apart from, or in advance of, an overall settlement. However, he stated that both sides had expressed a willingness—with reservations—to consider a "step-by-step process that might lead to progress of the refugee issue" without prejudice to their positions on related issues. Johnson suggested that the PCC appoint a special representative for another year. He also concluded that there would be Palestine refugees and their need for UN assistance for at least a decade, and that there was needed accelerated economic growth for the area as a whole in which the refugees should have a chance to share. Before publication Johnson had made changes in the report, including deletions of passages on the historical origins of the refugee problem; Israel reportedly expressed its displeasure at these changes.

In Nov, before the 16th UN session took up the issue, Israel clarified her stand when the Knesset resolved that "the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel." At the same time the offer, made in 1949, to take back

100,000 refugees was officially withdrawn. PM Ben-Gurion said that the proposal to grant the refugees freedom of choice was designed to destroy Israel. The passing of the resolution at this time could be traced to Israel's apprehension that pressure would be exerted on her to accept refugees who, she felt, would jeopardize her very existence. This resulted from the US initiative in raising the refugee question which had been in the headlines for a good part of the year. Moreover, the refugee issue had been widely discussed during the Israel Knesset election campaign in the summer. An Arab reaction was that in any case the refugees would not consent to become Israel citizens; they would return as "a result of Israel's non-existence."

The 16th UN session dealt with the refugee issue in Dec, the item on the agenda being, as usual, the "Report of the Director of the UNRWA." The Director, Dr Davis, recapitulated his arguments of the previous year (MER 1960, pp 211-2), maintaining that the responsibility for solving the refugee problem did not rest with the Arab host governments. As there was no "equitable solution" in sight, UN assistance would have to continue. The UNRWA's budget estimate for 1962 was \$39.2 million. Again, as in the previous year, the report was praised by Arab and criticized by Israel spokesmen.

During the debate in the Special Political Committee, the Arab delegations endeavoured, as their chief coordinator stated, to defeat any attempt to liquidate the "issue of a robbed homeland" under "cover of solving the refugee problem."

The Arabs again called for the enlargement of the PCC and for protecting the refugees' "property rights." These demands were presented in amendments by three Muslim countries to a US draft resolution. They were

supported by the Communist countries among others and adopted by the committee.

Israel, on the other hand, backed a draft resolution sponsored by 16 countries, calling for direct negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel. Israel had called for direct negotiations all along while the Arab countries categorically refused to enter into any negotiations. The committee rejected the proposal.

The US opposed both the Israel-backed resolution and the Arab demands.

The plenary rejected the amendments and adopted the original US draft which requested the PCC to intensify its efforts for the implementation of para 11 of resolution 194 (III) and to complete by Sept 1, 1962 the identification and evaluation of Arab refugees' properties in Palestine as of May 15, 1948.

There were no material changes in the status and situation of the refugees themselves. Since in the words of Dr Davis, the Director of UNRWA, the Arabs in general refused to recognize Israel as a "permanent component" of the ME, resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries was not acceptable to them. In addition, Dr Davis and others maintained, there were also economic and social limitations to the absorption of the refugees in the host countries. With the exception of Jordan, the Arab host countries continued their policy of political non-assimilation and economic non-integration of the refugees, though, according to Dr Davis, they were treated generously.

Refugees continued to be a contributing factor to the political instability of their host countries. In Syria, after the break-up of the UAR, refugees engaged in pro-Nasser activities. In Lebanon, on the other hand, refugees participated in the abortive coup d'état of the pan-Syrian, anti-Nasser Nationalist Social Party.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REFUGEE QUESTION

15TH ASSEMBLY RESUMED

Synopsis. The UN Special Political Committee, having failed to conclude the discussion of the Arab refugee item during the first part of the 15th UN Assembly in autumn 1960 (MER 1960, pp 212-3), resumed the debate in the second part of the session between April 11 and 18; the resolution adopted was put to vote in the plenary on April 21.

The debate was dominated by the Arab delegations' insistence on the inclusion of provisions for the protection of the refugees' "property rights" in Israel. This demand was strongly opposed by Israel and also by several other countries headed by the US. The Arab proposals were accepted by the committee but failed to be adopted by the plenary.

Preliminary Talks Collapse on "Property Rights" Issue; US Opposition to Arab Demand. For several weeks prior to the resumption of the debate numerous meetings had taken place between the delegations of the "host countries" (Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon) and the representatives of the US and UK, as the major contributors to UNRWA, in an attempt to work out a draft resolution acceptable to both sides, but no agreement was reached. The main difficulty had been the Arabs' insistence on including provisions for safeguarding the refugees' "property rights" in Israel, to which the West-

ern countries had objected. When the debate was resumed the US representative said that his government's view had been that "the Committee did not need to adopt a resolution unless something in the [UNRWA Director's] report made it necessary, and in point of fact, no such action was needed"; nevertheless, in deference to Arab views, the US had been willing to support a draft resolution "if the terms were essentially non-controversial and did not go beyond the terms of previous resolutions." The Jordanian delegate stated that in the course of the conversations the Arab spokesmen "had accepted changes and deletions and had toned down certain expressions; they had always been ready to agree to a compromise, except where the property rights of the Palestine Arab refugees were concerned." (*Hayat*, April 2; *NYT*, April 15; *A/SPC/SR.247*, 249, April 12, 13)

"Muslim" Draft Resolution; US Amendments. (Note: For text of the resolution and amendments, see appendix, pp 242-3). The Arab-backed resolution, released on April 7, was sponsored by five Muslim States—Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaya, Pakistan and Somalia—and was presented to the Special Political Committee at the opening of the resumed discussion of the refugee question on April 11 by the Indonesian representative. Key provisions proposed that the Assembly should (1) note with regret that the PCC had not yet reported progress

on the task entrusted to it in the previous year's resolution concerning the implementation of para 11 of resolution 194 (III) (MER 1960, p 211), and request the Commission to make efforts for the implementation of the paragraph and report thereon to the 16th session; and (2) recommend to the Assembly at its next session "the establishment of appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights" of the refugees. (A/SPC/L. 61, April 7; A/SPC/SR. 246, April 11; see appendix)

US Amendments: Deleting Property Rights Reference. On April 12, the US representative, Francis Plimpton, told the committee that the US was presenting four amendments to the five-nation draft. Two were designed to delete the reference to "property rights," which, he argued, "would wrongly suggest that 'property rights' must be the central issue at the 16th session" and, furthermore, raised a matter which was the subject of bitter dispute between the parties concerned. Another amendment requested that the PCC report be submitted not later than Oct 15, 1961. (S/SPC/SR. 247, April 12; A/SPC/L. 62, April 12)

The representative of Pakistan announced on the same day that the sponsors did not accept the amendments to the property provisions, but were ready to accept the other changes proposed by the US. (A/SPC/SR. 248, April 12; see appendix)

US Stand Attacked by Arabs. Ahmad Shukairy, the representative of Saudi Arabia, declared that the US amendments "would demolish the very structure" of the five-power draft resolution, since the question of property rights was "the very heart" of the problem. He asserted that the refugees had owned 20 towns and 841 villages, some 288,000 acres of fruit-growing land, 6,000 acres of irrigable land, and 1,135,000 acres of cultivable land; they had produced 80% of Palestine's cereal crops, 98% of its olives and over 50% of its citrus. The revenue from Arab property, Shukairy further claimed, amounted to £47.5 million a year. The course of the debate, he said, had revealed a paradox: "The Soviet Union, although a Communist country, was prepared to respect private ownership as a system for other countries, thus setting an example of peaceful coexistence, whereas the US, a capitalist country, opposed property rights." His delegation, he concluded, would vote against the US amendments, "firstly because they came from the United States," and also because the deletion of any reference to the refugees' property rights was "a shameful betrayal" of the UN Charter. (A/SPC/SR. 247, 252, April 12, 17)

Abd al-Mun'im ar-Rifa'i, the delegate of Jordan, warned that the rejection of the property provisions would convince the refugees more than ever that they would have to find "other means" of securing their rights" (A/SPC/SR. 249, April 13). The UAR representative, Rafiq Asha, claimed that there was "nothing new or controversial" about the question of property rights. He declared that the US amendments were designed to serve the interests of Israel and warned that amendments might give rise to demonstrations and... violence... and the repercussions would not be limited to refugee camps alone but would spread far beyond their confines." (A/SPC/SR. 251, April 14)

The Lebanese representative also said that the question of property rights was not a new one, for the fifth Assembly had directed the Palestine Conciliation

Commission (PCC) to deal with it (A/SPC/SR. 249, April 13). [This claim was not made by the sponsors of the draft resolution.] The representative of Indonesia, in presenting the draft to the committee, stated that the property rights paragraphs constituted a "major departure from previous resolutions" (A/SPC/SR. 246, April 11). The Pakistan representative said that they "introduced an important element that had not been included in the earlier resolution on the subject." (A/SPC/SR. 248, April 12)

Iraq and Libya Introduce Sub-amendments. Addressing the committee on April 12 Adnan Pachachi, the Iraqi representative, termed the US attitude "a somewhat belated effort to salvage Israel's position," and announced that his delegation, together with that of Libya, had decided to submit sub-amendments.

The sub-amendments provided for the inclusion of the two controversial US amendments in the draft resolution while restoring the references to "property rights" which they aimed to suppress. (A/SPC/SR. 248, A/SPC/L. 63, April 12, see appendix pp 242-3)

At a later stage, at the suggestion of the Indian delegate, the Iraqi representative agreed, "in a spirit of compromise," to drop the provision for establishing "machinery" for safeguarding property rights and rest content with a recommendation to the 16th session to consider the welfare of the refugees, "including the means of safeguarding their property rights." (A/SPC/SR. 252, April 17)

Israel's Position: No "Property Rights"; PCC's Functions Not Limited to Paragraph 11. On April 14 Arthur Lourie, Israel's representative, said that it was obvious from the Arab delegates' speeches that "they were not concerned with the solution of the problem of the refugees but only with the dissolution of Israel." He observed that there had been no mention of the fact that half a million Jews had come to Israel from Arabic-speaking countries and that there had actually been an exchange of population between Israel and those countries. As to the property of the Jewish refugees, "no indication has as yet been received that the Arab countries in question were ready to pay compensation, let alone whether they would accept a UN administrator or custodian or machinery to deal with property in their territories."

Lourie stated that para 1 of the draft resolution was unacceptable because it dealt with the functions of the PCC, whereas the item on the agenda was the UNRWA report. Besides, "the attempt to pretend that the Commission's task was to 'implement' one paragraph of resolution 194 (III) torn out of its context, was not only an exercise in futility but a negation of the Commission's primary function [of seeking agreement between the parties], and undermined the basis of all cooperation with it." Property rights were subject to the domestic laws of every state, he said, and the UN had no competence to interfere with such legislation; otherwise "the UN would be involved in the claims of tens of millions of persons throughout the world." Lourie noted that the actual situation was that the lands in question had long since been integrated, in law and in practice, in Israel's reclamation and development schemes. Israel's offer to pay compensation for the property of Arab refugees, he stated, still held good, but it would be subject to "serious reconsideration" if the UN adopted a recommendation of the kind that the Arab countries were trying to obtain. (A/SPC/SR. 250, April 14)

US Surprise Move: Withdraws Amendments, Presents Separate Resolution. Towards the end of the debate, on April 17, the US delegation announced that it had "reluctantly concluded" that the Committee would have to be offered "a clear-cut choice between two resolutions"; it was therefore withdrawing its amendments to the five-nation draft resolution and submitting a draft resolution of its own. The new draft would have had the General Assembly, *La.*, express the belief that the 16th session should give careful consideration to the future welfare of the refugees, "including the safeguarding of their rights set forth in resolution 194 (III), para 11, to repatriation or compensation for properties left behind." (*A/SPC/SR. 252, A/SPC/L. 65, April 17*)

It was generally assumed that this change of tactics had been decided upon by the US without its customary round of prior consultations with friendly governments. Some diplomats even believed that the move had been initiated by the US delegation at the UN without having consulted the State Department. (*NYT, April 18; Haaretz, April 21*)

Arabs and Israel Protest US Draft. Both the Israeli and the Arab representatives, voicing different arguments, immediately protested that the new US draft gave a "twisted" paraphrasing of para 11. The next day the US delegation presented a revised draft which omitted the last eight words: "to repatriation or compensation, for properties left behind." Nevertheless, the representative of Saudi Arabia insisted that the US proposal "was nothing more than an Israel proposal," while the Israel representative declared that his delegation was reserving its position on the US draft, "which gave a selective rendering of resolution 194" and wrongly suggested that the resolution conferred "rights" on the refugees. (*A/SPC/SR. 253, A/SPC/L. 65, Rev. 1, April 18*)

As the withdrawal of the US amendments invalidated the Iraqi-Libyan sub-amendments, the representative of Iraq proposed that the sponsors of the five-nation draft resolution revise it themselves in accordance with the relative sub-amendments. The sponsors accepted the proposal. (*A/SPC/SR. 252, April 17; see appendix*)

States Supporting "Property Rights" Proposal. Unqualified support for the Arab position was voiced by the USSR representative, Platon Morozov, who declared that his delegation was "deeply impressed" by Shukairy's speech and considered Israel's attitude towards the question of property rights "completely intolerable." The US representative commented that he welcomed the Soviet Union's adherence to the principle of private property, and would also welcome a contribution by the Soviet Union "which had not yet found it possible to contribute anything" to the welfare of the Arab refugees. The Soviet representative replied that, since the USSR delegation was not responsible for the failure to implement the UN resolution concerning the Arab refugees, the US representative's remarks were "wide of the mark." (*A/SPC/SR. 248, April 12*)

The "property rights" provisions were also upheld by the delegations of Nigeria, Spain, Argentina and Guinea (*A/SPC/SR. 250, 252, 253, 254, April 14, 17, 18*). The representatives of China, Iran and India, while generally declaring themselves in sympathy with the Arab viewpoint on "property rights," suggested modifications in the relative provisions to make them less unpalatable to other delegations. (*A/SPC/SR. 249, 250, 252, April 13, 14, 17*)

States Opposing "Property Rights" Proposal; Other Attitudes. The delegations of the UK and Colombia supported the US stand (*A/SPC/SR. 248, April 12*). Israel's arguments were echoed in the statements of the representatives of Sweden and Canada, who voiced objections to the five-nation draft resolution both because of its property provisions and because it referred to para 11 of resolution 194 (III) "out of context" (*A/SPC/SR. 252, 253, April 17, 18*), as well as in those of the representatives of Upper Volta, the Central African Republic and Uruguay, who said that progress on the refugee problem could only be achieved through direct negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel with a view to settling all the questions outstanding between them. (*A/SPC/SR. 252, 253, April 17, 18*)

Irish Proposal for Pilot Repatriation, Compensation. The representative of Ireland, elaborating on the proposal made by the Irish delegation in the refugee debate during the first part of the 15th UN session (MER 1960, p. 213), submitted suggestions for the wording of a resolution which he hoped the next UN session might adopt, under which the GA would "call upon the Government of Israel to declare its willingness to carry out at least a pilot repatriation scheme without any other condition than that these refugees should undertake to live at peace with their neighbours"; it would also provide for the compensation of refugees not returning to Israel, to be paid not only in respect of property left behind but also in respect of "disturbance and time spent unproductively in refugee camps"; finally it would call upon UN member-states, and particularly upon Israel, to be ready to contribute to the compensation fund. As for the five-nation draft resolution before the committee, the Irish representative announced that his delegation could not vote for it. (*A/SPC/SR. 254, April 18*)

SPC Approves Five-Nation Draft; Rejects US Draft. On April 18 the Special Political Committee began voting, taking up the "Muslim" draft resolution first. In the separate votes on the various parts of the draft the "property rights" provisions in the last preambular and second operative paragraphs were adopted by 46 votes to 20, with 20 abstentions, and 46 votes to 18, with 22 abstentions, respectively. The 46 affirmative votes were cast by the Arab countries, the sponsors, the Soviet bloc, the African countries excluding countries of the UAM (Union Africaine et Malgache), four Latin-American countries (Argentina, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela), and by Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Cyprus, Greece, India, Iran, Nepal, Philippines, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

The first operative paragraph (as amended on a UK motion—see appendix, pp. 242-3) was approved by 55 votes to none, with 25 abstentions; and the resolution as a whole was adopted by 47 votes to 19, with 20 abstentions. (*A/SPC/SR. 253, April 18*)

The US draft, on the other hand, was rejected by the committee. The result of the roll-call vote was 30 in favour, 31 against, with 15 abstentions. It was opposed by the Arab and Muslim countries, the Soviet bloc, Ceylon, Cuba, Greece, Guinea, India, Mali, Spain, and Yugoslavia. Israel was among the abstainers. (*A/SPC/SR. 254, April 18*)

The Arab delegations applauded when the results of the vote were announced. It was the first time in years that the US was defeated in the UN over the refugee question. This was ascribed to lack of consultation with friendly delegations, prior to the introduction of the draft

resolution, and to the absence of delegations usually supporting the US. Finally, several potential supporters were reported to have been confused by the US speed in modifying its draft resolution to make it less objectionable to the Arabs. (*NYT*, April 19)

Property Provisions Defeated in GA Plenary; Arabs Claim US Pressure. The five-nation draft resolution was put to vote in the plenary on April 21, three days after its adoption by the committee. The Arab delegates, in their statements prior to the vote, addressed themselves in particular to the position of the US, which—according to the Lebanese representative—"in the last three days... has employed all the means at its disposal to exert pressure at the UN and in the various capitals of the world." Israel's representative, on the other hand, declared that the course advocated by the five-nation draft "is a complete dead-end and my government will have nothing to do with it."

The Arab representatives opposed the requests made by some delegations for separate votes on various paragraphs of the draft resolution, so that the first test of force in the plenary related to this procedural issue which, according to GA rules, is decided by a simple majority. By 41 votes to 37, the GA decided to vote separately on the "property rights" paragraphs.

These paragraphs were then put to roll-call votes. The results of the vote on the fourth preambular para were 44 in favour, 35 against, and 12 abstentions; and the vote on the second operative para was 44 to 35, with 15 abstentions. Having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, these paragraphs were not adopted.

[The difference in the results of the votes in the committee and in the plenary was accounted for by the fact that Argentina and the Philippines, which had supported the property provisions in the committee, did not support them this time (the former was absent and the latter abstained). On the other hand, several countries which had abstained in the committee—notably the Latin-American countries: Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, the UAM members: Cameroun, Chad, Congo (B), Dahomey and Upper Volta, and Finland—switched to a negative vote in the plenary.]

The resolution as a whole, without the "property rights" paragraphs, was adopted by 37 votes to 17, with 38 abstentions. The 40-odd countries which had supported the property provisions and had previously voted as a group became disorganized in this last vote. Most of the Arab countries abstained, but Jordan voted against; Malaya voted against whereas the other four sponsors of the resolution voted affirmatively; the USSR, Ukraine and Bulgaria voted in favour while the other Communist countries abstained. Israel voted against (*A/PV. 993*, April 21); (for detailed voting record, see pp 18-9).

Israel Reported Perturbed, Arabs Critical of US. Israel sources ascribed the changes in the plenary vote as compared with the committee vote on the "property rights" paragraphs to intensive Israel lobbying in the intervening days. Even so, official Israeli quarters were reported to be perturbed by the unfriendly or neutral attitude of some of the Latin-American and African countries as expressed by their votes. (*Jer. Post*, April 22; *Ha'aretz*, April 24, May 2)

Veheement criticism by the Jordanian press of the US attitude during the UN debate reportedly induced the US Ambassador in Amman to state that the criticism rested on a "misunderstanding." The fact that the US

had advocated the postponement of the refugee debate to the 16th UN session, he was reported to have said, did not mean that it did not support the refugees' "property rights." (*Falastin*, April 26)

THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION THE JOHNSON MISSION

(June-November)

Appointment of Johnson as Conciliation Commission's "Special Representative" to Tour ME. On Aug 24 it was announced that the PCC had appointed Dr Joseph E. Johnson to be its Special Representative to undertake a visit to the ME "to explore with host governments and with Israel practical means of seeking progress on the... refugee problem, pursuant to resolution 1604 (XV) of the UN" (which, among other things, requested the Commission "to make further efforts to secure the implementation of para 11 of GA resolution 194 (III) and report thereon not later than Oct 15, 1961"). Johnson, a US citizen, served at the time of the appointment as President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1942 to 1947 he had served in the State Department. (*UN Press Release PAL/876*, Aug 24)

The decision to appoint such a representative, the Commission later reported, had been taken on May 9. (*UN document, A/4921*, Oct 13)

US Initiative. When, at the end of June, first reports appeared on the impending mission, Israel sources said it was initiated by the US. (On the American policy to activate the PCC see also pp 193 ff.)

The Jerusalem Post said that the Special Representative would come "presumably in the name of the long-defunct Palestine Conciliation Commission, and quite possibly he will not be an American national. Nevertheless, he will come, in the wide sense, as an emissary of the State Department or possibly of President Kennedy himself." Noting the letters of President Kennedy to Arab heads of state which had been leaked to the press shortly before (see pp 197-8), the paper thought that President Kennedy's "peace offensive" seemed to gain momentum. (*Jer. Post*, June 19)

Initially, it was reported, the US had proposed that Augustus Lindt, the Swiss Ambassador to Washington and a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, undertake the mission but he declined on the grounds that he could see no prospects for progress. (*Jer. Post*, Aug 25)

[A French statement made it clear that France had no part in initiating the mission.] A Quai d'Orsay spokesman said that the US had explained to the French government that the Johnson mission would be of an exploratory nature only. There was no question of Johnson trying to implement UN resolutions or acting as advocate of any particular thesis. Under the circumstances, the spokesman added, France, as a PCC member, saw no reason to raise any objections, though it did not entertain any illusions as to the results which might be expected of "this American initiative." (*Jer. Post*, Aug 29; *Difa*, Aug 30)

The Johnson Mission. Johnson left UN headquarters for the ME tour on Aug 31 and returned on Sept 20. He came to Beirut on Sept 1; went to Amman via Damascus on Sept 4; returned to Beirut on Sept 8; went to Cairo on Sept 9; entered Israel from the Gaza Strip on Sept 13; and on Sept 16 crossed to the Arab part of Jerusalem, whence he left for New York. He had talks, i.e., with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Lebanon, Jordan

and Israel, King Hussein, the UAR Foreign Minister, the SG of the Arab League, and the Director of UNRWA. (*Hayat*, Sept 2, 9, 11; *Falastin*, Sept 5-10; *Jer. Post*, Sept 14-17; *Johnson report*, see reference below.)

Statements and Reports on Stands Taken at Johnson Talks. The Lebanese FM, Philippe Taqia, said that he had explained to Johnson that the refugee problem could only be solved within the framework of an overall solution of the Palestine problem. Similarly, the Arab League SG, Hassanah, said that he had told Johnson that the refugee problem was merely a part of the Palestine problem. (*Falastin*, Sept 10; *Hayat*, Sept 12; *Times*, Sept 11)

Bahjat al-Talhuni, the Jordanian PM, declared at a press conference that the Jordan government had told Johnson that no solution of the refugee problem was acceptable unless Israel withdrew from areas beyond the boundaries delimited by the UN partition resolution. This, he added, would in itself enable a major proportion of the refugees to return to their former homes; the question of granting the refugees a choice between return and compensation arose only in respect of those refugees who had formerly lived in the areas allocated to Israel under the partition resolution. (*Falastin*, Sept 19)

[In Israel, there was no official comment on the substance of the talks held with Johnson.] *Ha'aretz* thought it "probable" that the Israeli leaders had told Johnson that, while they were ready to contribute to the solution of the problem by the payment of compensation and through other means, they could not agree to the mass return of refugees to Israel or recognize that the refugees were entitled to a "free choice" between returning to Israel and remaining in the Arab countries. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 15)

PCC's Report on the Johnson Mission. The PCC's 19th Progress Report was published on Oct 13. It said that Johnson, since his return to UN headquarters, had been holding further conversations with Arab and Israeli representatives. He had informed the commission that Arab and Israeli high officials "had expressed the view that it might be possible to take practical steps with regard to the refugee problem without prejudice to the positions of the governments on other aspects of the 'Palestine question.'" At the same time the report stated that "it clearly would not be possible at this stage to develop an acceptable set of detailed proposals," though the commission hoped, in the light of Johnson's report, to be able to make suggestions in the near future on "methods of procedure" that might lead to progress on the problem.

Regarding its other activities, the commission reported that its secretariat had prepared two working papers representing a "Historical survey of efforts of the PCC to secure the implementation of para 11 of resolution 194 (11)." (The papers, bearing the sub-titles "The Question of Reintegration by Repatriation or Resettlement" and "The Question of Compensation," were dated Oct 2 and published as UN documents A/AC. 25/W. 81/Rev. 2 and A/AC. 25/W. 82/Rev. 1, respectively.) With respect to the identification and valuation programme of abandoned Arab properties in Israel, the report noted that the work of identification, involving approximately 450,000 separate parcels of land, was virtually completed, and that work was proceeding on the valuation of the individual properties. Lastly, the report gave details of the progress of release of Arab refugee bank accounts and deposits blocked in Israel (see p 240 a). (*UN document A/4921*, Oct 13)

Johnson's Report. Johnson's report was published by the PCC on Nov 24 (a few days before the start of the debate on the refugee question at the 16th UN session) as an addendum to its own Progress Report. After a survey of the origins of the refugee problem and the history of UN efforts to deal with it, Johnson noted in his "findings and conclusions" that there were many indications that no progress could be made on the refugee question apart from, or in advance of, an overall settlement. Nevertheless he thought that a continuation of the PCC's efforts was worth while in view of the fact that "both sides expressed a willingness—though with much reservation and scepticism—to consider a step-by-step process that might lead to progress on the refugee issue without prejudice to the positions of the respective governments on the other related issues." He suggested, therefore, that the PCC should appoint an individual to serve as its special representative for another year. That individual, Johnson added, should "understand from the start that odds will not be in his favour," but, to state the matter in the most negative way, "the signs that no progress is possible are not so conclusive as to justify a decision not to try."

Johnson also concluded that it would be unwise to plan UN policies "on any other assumption than that there will be Palestine refugees for at least a decade," and that there will be continuing need for generous UN assistance for them. His last conclusion was that an implementation of the letter alone of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 would be "meaningless" without the implementation of its "spirit." This would require accelerated economic growth for the area as a whole during the 'sixties, and "it would be only elementary justice that refugees have a chance to share in it." (*UN document A/4921/Add. 1*, Nov 24)

Changes Introduced in Published Version of Johnson's Report. The report included a footnote which said that he had transmitted advance copies of the report to the Arab and Israeli representatives, and that while he had not invited comment, he had informed them that he would be available for inquiries. Following "some suggestions" from Arab representatives, he said, he had decided "upon reflection" to make certain changes which were incorporated in the published version. He emphasized that "these are my own changes" and that, furthermore, there had not been any essential modification of the findings and conclusions. (*UN document A/4921/Add. 1*, Nov 24)

However, the 13 changes introduced in the original version of the report included, i.e., deletions of such statements as that the Arabs had rejected the Partition plan whereas the Jews had accepted it; that the Arab armies had invaded Israel in 1948; and that Israel had accepted and the Arabs rejected the Hammarskjöld proposals of 1959 regarding the refugee problem.

The Israel Foreign Ministry was said to have sent two letters to Johnson expressing its displeasure with the changes made in the report. At the same time, Israeli "diplomatic observers" were reported to feel that, despite the changes, the "general spirit" of the document might constitute a basis for further discussions. (*Ha'aretz*, *Hayat*, Nov 28; *Jer. Post*, Nov 29)

(For Arab reactions to Johnson's report, see below.)

ANNUAL REPORT OF UNRWA DIRECTOR

The annual report of the Director of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), Dr

John Davis, for the period July 1, 1960—June 30, 1961, was published in Sept. (*UN document A/4861*)

Obstacles to Rehabilitation; Solution Does Not Rest with Arab Governments. Recapitulating the main themes of the previous year's report (MER 1960, pp 211-2), Davis wrote "that the rehabilitation of the refugees has proved to be a much more difficult and a much longer-term task than was at first envisaged." This, he added, was partly due to the fact that projects for the purpose of direct resettlement were in principle "unacceptable to the refugees... to the Arab people generally, and therefore to the Arab Governments"; and, in a large measure, it was also due to the economic and social limitations of absorbing the refugee population in "countries which themselves possessed limited natural resources." Thus there was "little mystery as to why these unfortunate people have continued to remain as refugees," and "it seems clearly unrealistic to assume that the major responsibility for solving the refugee problem should now rest with the host governments." Since, however, an "equitable solution" to the problem was not in prospect for the immediate future, Davis suggested that "for some time to come, there may well be no practical alternative" to continuing relief and educational services. (*Report*, pp 1, 2, 4)

Progress on Three-Year Programme. The report noted that UNRWA's three-year programme (July 1, 1960 to June 30, 1963) was moving ahead nearly on schedule. Under the programme, first presented to the 15th UN session, UNRWA intended to hold relief services at about the *per capita* level of 1960 while at the same time expanding vocational training to be able to turn out 2,000 graduates per year (as compared with 300 in 1960), increasing the annual number of university scholarships from 90 to 180, and improving the Agency's elementary and secondary education programme. During the period under review vocational and teacher training centres were completed at Wadi as-Sir and Ramallah, both in Jordan, while those at Siblun (Lebanon) and Damascus were nearing completion. (*Report*, pp 2, 11)

UNRWA's estimate of expenditure for the calendar year 1962 was \$39.2 million, of which \$28.2 million was to be allocated for basic relief services, \$8.5 million for general education, \$2.3 million for vocational and university education, and \$166,000 for self-support projects (*Report*, p 27). (For statistics on UNRWA activities, see: Refugees' Status and Situation, below.)

Israel Criticizes, Arabs Praise Report. An Israel UN delegation spokesman stated that the UNRWA director's report was a political document far overstepping the jurisdiction of the Agency. He recalled the 1959 report on the refugee question by SG Dag Hammarskjöld which had stressed the prospect of "final absorption of the refugees through economic growth in the region," (MER 1960, p 210) and noted that Davis had made no mention of the report. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 5)

On the other hand Arab representatives, in their speeches during the UN refugee debate, commented approvingly on the views expressed in the UNRWA report and paid tribute to Dr Davis (see below).

Other Statements by Davis on Refugee Question. Speaking in Geneva on Jan 18 at a conference marking the conclusion of the World Refugee Year, Davis attacked as a "misconception" the idea that the Arab refugee problem could have been solved but for the "conniving

of unprincipled Arab politicians." The Arab governments' attitude was based on a refusal to accept Israel as a "permanent component" of the ME. Their treatment of the refugees however was "sympathetic and generous." (*NYT*, Jan 19)

In a speech at the Middle East Institute in Washington on April 8, Davis declared that a solution of the refugee problem must be allowed to evolve from the region itself, and not be imposed from outside. Observers outside the ME tended to treat "altogether too lightly" the Arab people's refusal "to accept the permanence of Israel as now constituted" as well as the determination on the Israeli side to preserve Israel against any odds at all costs. (*Mid. Mirror*, April 15)

ISRAEL RESOLVES REFUGEES NOT TO RETURN

(October-November)

Ben-Gurion: "Free Choice for Refugees Designed to Destroy Israel." Replying in the Knesset to a motion by the Herut party requesting a debate on the Arab refugee question, FM David Ben-Gurion declared on Oct 11 that "Israel categorically rejects the insidious proposal of freedom of choice for the refugees, for she is convinced that this proposal is designed and calculated only to destroy Israel." Comparing the Arab refugees' lot with Israel's treatment of the Jews who had left the Arab countries, he said that the persistence of the Arab refugee problem was the result of the "violation of the UN Charter by the Arab rulers and their callous treatment of their own people," whereas Israel had not waited for the Arab rulers to return the property of the Jewish refugees and had immediately taken measures to absorb them. He concluded that if the Arab rulers would enter into direct talks with Israel for a peace settlement, Israel would give all possible assistance to the settlement of the refugees among their own people. (For source, see below.)

Party Attitudes; Mapam for Conditional Partial Return. When the debate was resumed on Nov 6, spokesmen of most parties—including Herut, Liberals, NRP, Achdut Ha'avoda and Agudat Israel—associated themselves with the government's line against the admission of the Arab refugees to Israel. The Mapam spokesman, while rejecting the idea of "freedom of choice" and declaring that the great majority of the refugees must be settled in the Arab countries, called upon the government to state its readiness to admit "an agreed number" of refugees should the Arab states consent to negotiate with Israel on a peace treaty. The Communist party spokesmen demanded that all the refugees who wished to return should be allowed to do so. (For source, see below.)

1949 Proposals for Return of 100 Thousand Withdrawn. Winding up the debate, FM Golda Meir stated that Israel was willing, even in the absence of an overall peace settlement, to negotiate with the Arabs on a solution of the refugee problem by their settlement in the Arab countries and on the question of mutual compensation. Israel's offer in 1949 to take back up to 100,000 refugees, she noted, had been ignored at the time and "it no longer stood." She pointed out, however, that Israel's position had never been that "not a single refugee" be returned. (For source, see below.)

Knesset Resolves Arab Refugees Should Not Be Returned to Israel. On Mapai's motion, the Knesset on Nov 6 adopted a resolution endorsing the statements of the

PM and FM and stating that "the Knesset resolves that the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel territory, and that the sole solution to their problem is their settlement in the Arab countries." The vote was 68 to 7, with only Mapam and the Communists voting against. A Mapam resolution re-stating the views expressed by its spokesman during the debate was defeated by 60 votes to 7; some Liberals and NRP members abstained. Also defeated was a Communist party resolution, having obtained only two Communist votes. (*Divrei Hakeset*, Oct 9-11, pp 86-9, Nov 6-8, pp 257-80; *Jer. Post*, Nov 7)

Arab Comment: No Peaceful Return. Commenting on the Knesset resolution, the Cairo daily *Al-Gumhuriyah* wrote: "We will return not on Israel's decision but as a result of Israel's non-existence. We will return on the ruins of the Knesset... We do not consent to return to Palestine in order to become citizens of Israel." The Jordanian *Falastin* said that the Knesset decision proved once again that Palestine could be regained only by war; "every day that passes with Palestine in the hands of the Jews increases their strength and bolsters their position." The Lebanese *Al-Hayat* said that the new element in the Knesset decision was the proof it afforded that the defiance of UN resolutions regarding the refugees was not confined to Israel's ruling circles, but extended to the legislature as a whole. (*Gumhuriyah*, *Falastin*, Nov 8; *Hayat*, Nov 9)

"Times" Comment. The London *Times* commented that "Israel's policy of toughness, whether with rockets or refugees, brings no nearer the break in the ME deadlock which she needs more than anyone else." (*Times*, Nov 10)

16TH UN ASSEMBLY

(December)

Synopsis. Although the item inscribed on the agenda of the 16th UN session (as in the case of previous UN sessions) merely referred to the "Report of the Director of UNRWA," the debate actually again spilled over to encompass almost each and every aspect of the Arab-Israel conflict. This time new elements were injected by the appearance of the Johnson report and by the presentation of a draft resolution calling for a negotiated settlement of all Arab-Israeli issues.

The debate was held in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee between Dec 4 and 19, followed by a vote in the plenary on Dec 20. At its conclusion, both the Israeli-backed draft resolution on negotiations and the Arab-backed amendments regarding the "reconstitution" of the PCC and the safeguarding of the refugees' "property rights" were defeated, and a resolution proposed by the US was adopted without change. This resolution provided the basis for the continuation of Dr Johnson's mission through 1962 by requesting the PCC "to intensify its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III)."

Arab Plans and Preparations prior to the Debate. The Arab League Secretariat was reported to have circulated a memorandum among its member-states in which it recommended that the Arab representatives should stress UN responsibility for the "Palestine tragedy" and its moral duty to continue international assistance for the refugees. The representatives were further directed to oppose any attempt to transfer UNRWA's responsibilities to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and act for

the extension of UNRWA's mandate. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Aug 16, Nov 8)

The Arab delegations at the UN formed a committee, headed by Akram Zu'aytar of Jordan, to coordinate Arab preparations for the debate. Referring to the planned Arab line of action, Zu'aytar declared to *Al-Hayat* that, while the item on the UN agenda would permit the discussion of the UNRWA and Johnson reports only, "it is our task to transform it into an issue of a robbed homeland... and to defeat any attempt to liquidate that issue under cover of solving the refugee problem." (*Hayat*, Oct 18, 26)

Some Arab circles voiced the criticism that the Arab delegations, although numerous and comprising many members, betrayed a lack of coordination and drive in the face of "the Zionist campaign" among non-committed delegations. This was attributed in part to the recent disputes among Arab governments, particularly following Syria's secession from the UAR. (*Hayat*, Oct 26, 27)

Arabs Request Hearing for "The Palestine Arab Delegation." In a letter dated Oct 9 the representatives of ten Arab member-states in the UN asked the chairman of the Special Political Committee that "the Palestine Arab Delegation" be heard by the committee during the discussion of the refugee question. The delegation was to be composed of Emile Ghuri, Izzat Tannus, Isa Nakhlah, Umar Azzini, Yusuf Ghanam, Ishaq Abd as-Salam al-Husseini and Musa Abu as-Sa'ud (*A/SPC/58*, Nov 23). The Arab Higher Committee bureau in Beirut described this delegation as "the official delegation of the Palestine Arabs" and termed Emile Ghuri its "chief." (*Hayat*, Oct 20)

Later, another delegation arrived from the Gaza Strip. It was composed of Munir ar-Rayis (Mayor of Gaza), Ibrahim Abu Sittah (Mayor of Khan Yunis) and Dr Mustafa Abd as-Shafi. After a number of meetings between them, the two delegations agreed to merge into a single delegation. Accordingly, on Nov 2 the Arab representatives notified the committee chairman of the addition of the three persons from the Gaza Strip to "the Palestine Arab Delegation." (*A/SPC/58/Add. 1*, Nov 23; *Akhir Sa'ah*, Nov 1; *Hayat*, Nov 7)

Committee Grants Hearing to "the Spokesman of the Group." The discussion of the UNRWA report began in the Special Political Committee on Dec 4. Following a brief address by Dr Davis in which he repeated the main conclusions of his report, the committee chairman stated that, unless objections were raised, he proposed "at the appropriate stage, in accordance with past practice, to invite the spokesman of the group in question" to make a statement.

There was no objection, except that the Israel representative hoped that the spokesman would limit himself to the item on the agenda, while the Saudi Arabian representative remarked that it would be "inhuman" to limit the spokesman's freedom of expression. (*A/SPC/SR. 306*, Dec 4)

According to *Ha'aretz*, the Israel delegation did not object to the chairman's decision because it meant, in effect, that the "refugee spokesmen" were granted the hearing as "individuals," and not in any representative capacity. It was also reported that the Arab delegations had intended to force a show-down over the issue, but gave up when it became clear that they could not muster a majority for their viewpoint. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 5)

In the course of the debate, the committee heard

statements by Ghūri, Tannūs and ar-Rayyā. (*A/SPC/SR. 311, 318, 321, Dec 7, 15, 18*)

The US Draft Resolution. On Dec 11 the US delegation introduced a draft resolution which repeated the three preambular paragraphs of resolution 1604 (XV) (see p 242) with the following technical changes: In the first para it added resolution 1604 (XV) to the resolutions recalled and in the second para it noted the latest report of the Director of UNRWA, covering the period July 1, 1960 to June 30, 1961. Operative para 1 read:

[The General Assembly] 1. Takes note of the efforts of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine pursuant to the request contained in General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV) and 1604 (XV), to secure the implementation of para 11 of resolution 194 (III); and

(a) requests the Commission to intensify its efforts for the implementation of para 11 of resolution 194 (III) and urges the Arab host governments and Israel to cooperate with the Commission in this regard;

(b) further requests the Commission to intensify its work on the identification and evaluation of Arab refugees' immovable properties in Palestine as of 15 May 1948, and to make every effort to complete this work by 1 Sept 1962;

(c) requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission such additional staff and administrative facilities as may be required.

Operative para 2 urged governments to contribute or increase their contributions to UNRWA and para 3 expressed thanks to the Director and staff of the Agency, repeating the text of operative para 3 and 4 respectively of resolution 1604 (XV). (*A/SPC/L. 79, Dec 11, and Rev. 1, Dec 18*)

Three Muslim States Introduce Amendments on Reconstitution of PCC and Protection of Refugee Property. On Dec 14 Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and Ghana introduced amendments to the US draft resolution which were in line with some of the demands voiced by the Arab delegates in the course of the debate.

The following were added as para 3 and 4 of the operative part, and the last operative paragraph was to be renumbered. "3. decides that the Conciliation Commission shall be composed of five members and requests the President of the General Assembly to present, before the end of the present session for the approval of the General Assembly, a proposal concerning the new composition of the Commission;

4. requests the reconstituted Conciliation Commission to take measures for the protection of the rights, property and interests of the Palestine Arab refugees." (*A/SPC/L. 81, Dec 14; A/SPC/SR. 322, Dec 18*)

On Dec 15, however, Ghana's name was deleted from the list of sponsors, and the Ghanaian representative explained that his country's name had been inserted into the list "by misunderstanding." (*A/SPC/L. 81/Corr. 1, Dec 15*)

According to Arab sources the Arab delegations had considered the advisability of introducing a separate draft resolution calling explicitly for the appointment of an "international custodian" over refugee property in Israel—a demand repeatedly voiced by Arab speakers in the 15th Assembly (MER 1960, p 212-3) as well as during the present debate—but eventually decided against its introduction. Most of the Arab delegates judged that the chances of obtaining the required majority would improve if they contented themselves with amendments to the US draft only vaguely referring to the issue of

refugee property. It was then that the Muslim delegations were "entrusted" with the task of sponsoring the amendments. Another factor was an alleged US promise to oppose the draft resolution on Arab-Israel negotiations in return for an Arab undertaking not to press the custodian issue. (*Hayet, Dec 14, 19*)

Sixteen-State Draft Resolution Calls for Direct Arab-Israel Negotiations to Settle Dispute. Simultaneously with the introduction of the US draft, another draft resolution, calling for direct negotiations between the Arab states and Israel, was presented by 15 countries in the Special Political Committee: The Central African Republic, Chile, Congo (B), Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Netherlands, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta and Uruguay. On Dec 18 Gabon and Niger joined the list of sponsors, and the following day Togo withdrew its sponsorship, with the result that the final draft was endorsed by 16 countries. Togo withdrew—its representative told the committee—"because 'the discussion had shown that the aim of reconciliation pursued by the sponsors... was in danger of being jeopardized.'" The draft resolution, after taking note of the Annual Report of the UNRWA Director, read:

"Recognizing that the establishment of peaceful relations between the Arab states and Israel would do much to facilitate a solution of the problem of the Arab refugees;

Recalling that, under the Charter, it is the fundamental duty of all States Members of the United Nations to endeavour to settle all international disputes by peaceful means;

Considering the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in particular General Assembly resolution 194 (III), calling upon Israel and the Arab States to settle the questions in dispute between them as soon as possible and by common agreement, so that peaceful relations may be established between them;

Considering that such peaceful relations would promote the well-being of all the peoples concerned and would make an important contribution to peace and security in the Middle East and in the whole world;

Renews its appeal to the Governments concerned to undertake direct negotiations—with the assistance of the Conciliation Commissions for Palestine, if they so desire—with a view to finding a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned, for all the questions in dispute between them."

The revised, final draft provided for the addition at the end of this paragraph of the words "particularly the question of the Arab refugees." (*A/SPC/L. 80, Dec 11, Rev. 1, Dec 14, Corr. 1, Dec 19; A/SPC/SR. 324, Dec 19*)

This revision was made, as the representative of Guatemala, one of the sponsors, stated in the committee, "to relate the resolution more explicitly to the item" on the agenda. (*A/SPC/SR. 323, Dec 19*)

According to Israeli sources, the idea of presenting a draft resolution on direct negotiations was first embraced by 12 African countries in Oct. Subsequently a few African countries dropped out and some Latin-American countries and the Netherlands joined as sponsors. Israel was reported to have been actively canvassing support for the resolution. (*Ha'aretz, Oct 17, Dec 5, 15; Jer. Post, Dec 15*)

Arab sources reported that the delegations of Mauritania and Tunisia were particularly active in attempts to dissuade African countries from supporting "the Israel

cause." Mauritania was instrumental in arranging a meeting between the "Palestine Arab delegation" and the UAM representatives with the aim of persuading the latter to withdraw their sponsorship of the resolution on direct negotiations. A similar meeting took place between the "Palestine Arab delegation" and 16 Latin-American representatives under the auspices of the Libyan delegation. (*Hayat, Dec 9, 14*)

Course of Debate: Arab Stand. [With varying degrees of emphasis all Arab representatives engaged in an all-out attack on Israel, denying her very right to exist; criticized the PCC and the Johnson mission, while praising Davis' report; called for the unconditional repatriation of the refugees; demanded the appointment of an international custodian to supervise refugee property in Israel and collect the revenues from that property for the account of the refugees; and voiced strong opposition to the negotiations proposal.]

Ahmad Shukairy, the representative of Saudi Arabia, described Zionism as "nastier than Fascism, uglier than Nazism, more hateful than imperialism, more dangerous than colonialism." He said that unless the UN "met its responsibility" to protect the Israel Arabs, "there would soon be 250,000 more refugees." He accused the PCC of "deliberate inactivity" with regard to the implementation of para 11 of resolution 194 and, while not questioning Johnson's goodwill, he thought that his appointment had been unnecessary and that his report betrayed a tendency "to reduce the refugee problem to nothingness." The PCC, Shukairy stated, should be, if not abolished, at least reconstituted to assure "equitable geographical and ideological representation." Finally, he rejected the call for direct negotiations with Israel as "futile and sterile," and urged the delegations sponsoring it to seek fresh instructions from their governments. (*A/SPC/SR. 307, 308, 310, 323, Dec 5, 6, 19*)

Adib Da'udi, the representative of Syria, while paying tribute to Davis for "the remarkable work" done by UNRWA, stated that the PCC was continuing to follow a policy of "evading all responsibility." He regretted that the Commission's report put so much stress on the question of compensation for refugee property—a question which, in his view, was "purely secondary" to the question of repatriation. He thought that the Commission had put Johnson "on the wrong road": he should have been instructed to proceed directly to negotiations with Israel on implementing the repatriation of the refugees instead of dealing with such questions as the development of the ME. Johnson himself was to blame because he had not pinpointed in his report Israel's responsibility for the failure to carry out the provisions of para 11. (*A/SPC/SR. 312, Dec 8*)

Akram Zu'aytar, the Jordan representative, stated that, before offering the refugees a choice between repatriation and compensation, the UN should adopt a resolution calling on Israel to evacuate the areas it was controlling in excess of the territory allocated to it under the 1947 Partition resolution. As half of the refugees came from these areas, their return there would by itself solve half of the refugee problem. He further suggested that Davis might be a "good choice" for the role of custodian of refugee property in Israel. (*A/SPC/SR. 312, Dec 8*)

Adnan Pachachi, Iraq's representative, rejected the call for negotiations with Israel because "the Arab States were not entitled to negotiate on the refugees' rights": the dispute was not one between Israel and the Arab states, but between Israel and the refugees. (*A/SPC/SR. 324, Dec 19*)

Hasan Sabri al-Khuli, the representative of the UAR, stated that the African countries which had sponsored the draft resolution on Arab-Israel negotiations had erred in their judgment of Israel's motives. Nevertheless, he declared, "the Arab countries would spare no effort to maintain their ties of friendship with the African States in question." (*A/SPC/SR. 322, Dec 18*)

Other Arab delegates who participated in the debate were those from Libya (*A/SPC/SR. 313, Dec 11*), Lebanon (*A/SPC/SR. 316, Dec 13*), Yemen (*A/SPC/SR. 319, Dec 15*), Sudan (*A/SPC/SR. 321, Dec 18*), Tunisia (*A/SPC/SR. 314, Dec 11*) and Morocco. (*A/SPC/SR. 319, Dec 15*)

Israel's Stand. Golda Meir, Israel's Foreign Minister, declared that her delegation supported the draft resolution on negotiations, which was "the only way towards progress." While the Israel government had always believed that the solution of the refugee problem lay in the refugees' resettlement in the Arab countries, she noted, "it had never said that not a single refugee would ever in any circumstances be allowed to return to Israel." With regard to compensation, Mrs Meir said that any settlement of this issue would have to take into account Jewish abandoned properties in the Arab countries and in the Arab-controlled parts of Palestine. She thought that the proposed changes in the composition of the PCC would serve no useful purpose. She commended UNRWA's humanitarian work but contended that Davis' report "had trespassed on highly controversial ground" when it referred to para 11. Mrs Meir stated that Israel had some reservations regarding the Johnson report but did not elaborate. (*A/SPC/SR. 318, Dec 15*)

Another Israeli representative, Michael Comay, expressed the view that the US and the 16-nation draft resolutions were not inconsistent but rather supplementary. Israel, however, had reservations regarding those parts of the US draft which stressed para 11 in disregard of the other functions of the PCC. (*A/SPC/SR. 323, Dec 19*)

US Stand. Francis Plimpton, the US representative, declared that his country "firmly supported" the provisions of para 11 and had given "unqualified support" for the Johnson mission. The US would oppose "any proposals or action that might prejudice the results of that initiative." (*A/SPC/SR. 311, 323, Dec 7, 19*)

Attitudes of Other Countries. The UK, Italy, Norway, Greece and Iran reiterated in general the arguments advanced by the US, particularly with regard to the need of upholding Johnson's efforts. Objection to the Arab criticism of the PCC was taken by the two other members of the commission, Turkey and France. The French representative pointed out that while much had been said about Israel's intransigence, "those who uttered that reproach had nothing but intransigent proposals." At the same time [in an obvious allusion to the 16-nation draft resolution], he stated that France could not support any draft "which, however well-intended, was likely to give rise to political reactions which would cause it to remain a dead letter."

The representatives of the USSR, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Ethiopia, Ceylon and Cambodia made statements which, with varying degrees of emphasis, favoured the three-nation amendments and opposed the negotiations resolution. Zenon Rossides, the representative of Cyprus, also expressed himself against the negotiations resolution; with regard to repatriation

he advocated, as "a first step," the return of a limited number of refugees, in line with the suggestions made by Ireland and New Zealand at previous debates on the refugee question. (See MER 1960, p. 213.)

The representatives of Nigeria, China and India underlined the need to grant the refugees a choice between repatriation and compensation. The Indian delegate mentioned his own country's experience with resettling nine million refugees from Pakistan, and went on to argue that the Arab refugee problem, too, could have been solved "by purely economic methods" were it not for the Arab refugees' strong desire to return to their former homes.

Mexico and Peru expressed reservations with regard to both the three-nation amendments and the negotiations proposal. The Mexican delegate said that the sponsors of that proposal "were proposing the best of all solutions," but he added that he could not support it because of Arab opposition.

Statements favouring the negotiations proposal and opposing the three-nation amendments were made by several of the sponsors of the 16-nation draft, as well as by Denmark and Congo (L). The delegations of Australia and New Zealand expressed similar views by stating that, in dealing with para 11, it should not be overlooked that this resolution also included paragraphs 5 and 6 on negotiations and the settlement of all outstanding disputes. [The New Zealand delegation did not reiterate this time the proposal it had made during the 15th UN session regarding a "pilot" repatriation scheme (MER 1960, p. 213), but urged Israel to demonstrate its good intentions by making provision for compensation and for the return of "a number" of refugees "subject to the normal requirements of national law."] (A/SPC/SR. 310-324, Dec 6-19)

Most active among the sponsors in defending the negotiations resolution against vehement Arab attacks were Arsène Assouan Usher, the representative of the Ivory Coast and Frédéric Guirma of Upper Volta. At one point there was an uproar when the Saudi Arabian representative, Shukairy, used the French word *vendu* (sold) when speaking of the 16-nation draft. The Ivory Coast representative, for his part, touched off a furor when he commented reportedly that Shukairy "may be used to buying Negroes, but he cannot buy us." (*Ha'aretz*, *Jer. Post*, Dec 15)

Vote in Committee. On Dec 18 the representative of Senegal proposed the adjournment of the debate to the resumed UN session in 1962. The proposal was rejected, with only Senegal voting for it. (A/SPC/SR. 322, Dec 18)

The next day the committee proceeded to vote, taking up first the three-nation amendments to the US draft resolution.

The first of the amendments (on the reconstitution of the PCC) was passed by 47 votes to 27, with 24 abstentions. It was supported by the Arab, Muslim and Soviet Bloc countries and by Cuba, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Brazil, Cyprus, Spain, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, India, Japan, Cameroun, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Senegal.

The second amendment (calling for the protection of refugee property) was adopted by 42 votes to 36, with 20 abstentions. [Some delegations which supported the previous amendment abstained, notably those of Brazil, China, Cyprus, Ivory Coast, Japan and Nigeria. The only case of a switch in the opposite direction was Iran, which abstained on the first amendment but supported

the second. Furthermore, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Uruguay, Canada, New Zealand and Congo (L), which had abstained on the reconstitution of the PCC, voted against the property paragraph.] (For sources, see below.)

Amended US Resolution Adopted, Negotiations Resolution Rejected. The US draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 74 votes to 1 (Israel), with 23 abstentions. The US and UK representatives declared immediately after the vote that although they had voted for the amended resolution, they opposed the amendments and hoped they would be rejected by the plenary.

The draft resolution on Arab-Israel negotiations was rejected: it obtained 34 affirmative as against 44 negative votes, with 20 abstentions. The affirmative votes were cast by the sponsors, Israel, most West-European and "White Commonwealth" countries (Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Sweden abstained); the US, the UK, Italy, Turkey, Cyprus and Spain voted against, as well as the majority of Latin-American and UAM countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Congo (L), Senegal and Togo abstained). (A/SPC/SR. 324, Dec 19; A/5068, Dec 19)

Israel sources reported that the US considered the negotiations proposal impractical and therefore unsound. It was thought that the negative attitude of the US had influenced a number of other countries. Criticism of the American stand was reported to have been voiced in the Israel cabinet.

France's "neutral" stand was termed in Israel "disappointing," but the explanation was advanced that, as a member of the PCC, France could not support a resolution which was claimed by the US to be prejudicing the Commission's efforts to solve the refugee problem.

Satisfaction however, was expressed in Israel that a considerable number of states—even though a minority—had for the first time backed an approach to the problem which Israel had been advocating all along. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 17, Dec 5, 15; *Jer. Post*, Dec 15, 20)

Plenary Rejects Amendments. On Dec 20 the GA plenary held separate votes on the amended US draft resolution. The results of the vote were, in respect of the first amendment (reconstitution of PCC), 44 in favour, 29 against, and 25 abstentions, and in respect of the second amendment (property protection) 40 in favour, 37 against, and 21 abstentions. The two amendments were thus rejected, having failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.

[The reduction in the number of affirmative votes as compared with the committee vote was accounted for by the switch to abstention by Cambodia, Cameroun and Dahomey on the first amendment, and by the latter two only on the second. Australia and New Zealand, who abstained on the first amendment in the committee, voted against it in the plenary.]

Operative para 1 of the US draft (calling, i.e., for the intensification of the PCC's efforts for the implementation of para 11) was adopted by 64 votes to 14, with 21 abstentions. The Arab countries voted against it, while Israel and the Soviet Bloc countries abstained.

Finally, the US draft resolution, without the three-nation amendments, was approved by 62 votes to none, with 37 abstentions. The Arabs and most of the delegations which supported them in the previous votes abstained, whereas Israel voted affirmatively. (A/PV. 1086, Dec 20)

Comments on Debate. Arab delegation circles in New York were reported to have summed up the results of the debate as "neither a failure, nor a gain" from the Arab viewpoint (*Hayat, Dec 27*). Press comments in Jordan and Lebanon, however, said that the outcome was a "defeat" which they attributed to the Arab governments' lack of preparation and lack of ability to gain friends in the world. (*Hayat, Dec 21; Falastin, Dec 22*) Israeli diplomatic quarters were said to have described

what happened at the debate as a "psychological reverse" for the Arabs. They pointed out that the vote on "property rights" had been less favourable to the Arabs than in the previous session, and that this had been the first time that several countries had come out openly in support of Israel's position on direct negotiations and had taken a firm stand against Arab attacks. There was strong resentment at the US's "active opposition" to the negotiations proposal. (*Ha'aretz, Jer. Post, Dec 22*)

THE REFUGEES' STATUS AND CONDITIONS

Statistics of Refugees and UNRWA Activities. In June 1961, 1,151,024 people were registered as refugees with UNRWA, as compared with 1,120,889 in June 1960. The UNRWA report noted, however, that those figures "are based on the Agency's registration records which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as the high rate of unreported deaths and undetected false registration." (*Director of UNRWA, Annual Report, July 1960-June 1961, UN, A/4861, p. 14*; further referred to as *Report*.)

According to Arnold Hottinger, the ME correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, the UNRWA lists contained the names of at least 100,000 deceased persons and the official number of refugees registered with UNRWA—as recorded above—exceeded "the actual figure by at least 150,000 but not more than 200,000." (*Swiss Review of World Affairs, Nov*)

Roy Lucas, UNRWA chief in Jordan, stated in Amman on Sept 6 that his agency estimated that the food ration list in Jordan contained some 90,000 deceased persons whose rations were still collected. (*Jihad, Sept 7*)

Of the registered refugees, 854,268 received full rations and services; 169,730 (mostly children in Jordan) received services, but not rations; and 177,566 received neither rations nor services. (*Report, p. 14*)

The distribution of registered refugees according to country of residence was given as follows: Jordan—630,725 (of whom 204,544 lived in UNRWA camps); Gaza Strip—261,125 (156,738 in camps); Lebanon—140,201 (61,541 in camps); Syria—118,973 (20,039 in camps). Of the total registered refugees, 38% lived in UNRWA camps. (*Report, p. 16*)

UNRWA, in collaboration with UNESCO, had direct responsibility for 390 schools with 128,501 refugee children, and also paid subsidies for most of the 59,157 refugee children who were educated in government or private schools. (*Report, p. 20*)

In the field of health care, UNRWA operated or subsidized 100 health centres and eight mobile clinics, and was directly responsible for the maintenance of six hospitals. (*Report, p. 7*)

In the four-year period 1957-61, UNRWA assisted financially in the emigration of 1,665 refugees, of whom 595 went to the US, 266 to Venezuela, 508 to Brazil, 86 to Colombia, 44 to Canada, and 166 to other countries. (*Report, p. 26*)

At the end of 1960 UNRWA had a personnel of 10,849, of whom 10,703 were locally recruited staff and 146 international staff. (*Report, p. 26*)

Evaluation of the Refugee Situation. In a review of the refugee situation, Arnold Hottinger, the ME correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, wrote that to understand the particular situation of the Palestinian re-

fugees in the Near East one must first abandon the idea that they constitute a uniformly miserable mass of people. To be sure the camps were still there, and even grew from year to year and they contained a great number of people who were "unemployed, embittered, impoverished, abounding in children, numb and resigned and yet fanatically clinging to the artificially nourished hope of an eventual return to Palestine," yet less than half of all the Palestine refugees were living in camps. "According to UNRWA data their number is 409,223 while 694,507 are living outside the camps."

However, neither those who were in the camps nor those refugees who lived outside the camps determined the general attitude and general policy of the refugees. These were determined by the more educated among them, and by those further removed from the camps and comfortably established throughout the Arab countries as economic elite and government advisers. Hottinger summarized their policy formula: "The refugees are to be left in their miserable condition as a sort of pawn for Arab rights in Palestine; it is not desirable that they adapt themselves to the economic life of their host countries, because that would mean the loss of the strongest lever by which the Arabs hope to move the world to once more put the Palestine question on the agenda."

The question of economic and political assimilation of the refugees in their host countries had two aspects; the attitude and desire of the refugees and the policies and practices of the host countries. Only Jordan had made an effort to assimilate the refugees politically by granting them Jordanian citizenship; Lebanon, Syria and Egypt had rejected such assimilation.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that a new generation of refugees had emerged: half of them consisted of children less than 15 years old, and they were willing to work in the host countries, all of which had made economic progress. The situation, of course, differed from country to country. The refugees in Syria seem to have made the best adaptation to the host country's standard of living, and the economic pattern came close to the experience of the refugees. The situation was less favourable in Lebanon because of the basic economic pattern of the country which was more commercial than agricultural. Although Jordan offered full political acceptance, the economic opportunities for the refugees were very limited; similarly the refugees had very few economic possibilities in the Gaza strip. Economic assimilation was very difficult, although the refugees would have wanted to become integrated.

In none of the host countries, however, had the number of refugees who had been able to make themselves independent kept pace with the growing birth rate. An increase of the refugee population of at least 2½-3% had to be expected. This increase also outstripped the

effect of the considerable UNRWA efforts to provide vocational training.

Three basic conditions were required for a "gradual integration of the refugees within the life of the Near East": a more even distribution of the refugees over a larger area, vocational training of the young, a further improvement of the standard of living of the entire region. (*Swiss Review of World Affairs*, Nov; compare with *Report of the Director of UNRWA*, pp 233-4)

ISRAEL

Release of Blocked Refugees' Accounts. The PCC stated in its 19th Progress Report that under its 1952 agreement with the Israel government for the release of refugees' accounts blocked in the Israeli branches of Barclays and Ottoman Banks, £2,790,045 had been released by mid-1961. (Israel's Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, stated in the UN on Dec 15 that the total released amounted to £3,500,000.) The PCC further reported that, following Israel's decision to release refugees' accounts in all other banks operating in Israel, the Commission had now secured the concurrence of most Arab governments for this new release scheme. (*UN document A/4921*, Oct 13)

JORDAN

Jordan to Facilitate Refugees' Citizenship; UAR Objects. (Compare MER 1960, p 214.) According to a proposal submitted by the Passports Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the Jordan naturalization regulations would be amended to allow "Palestinians" residing in other countries to obtain Jordanian nationality and passports. The amended regulations would consider people of Palestinian origin who went abroad for the purpose of work or studies as "temporarily absent," and would cancel the provisions of Dec 20, 1949 and Feb 16, 1954 which required continuous residence in Jordan for a period of at least five years as a condition to obtaining Jordanian nationality [*Official Gazette Feb 16, 1954* stated that four years were required.] (*Jaridah*, Beirut, Nov 26)

The Cairo *Akhir Sa'ah* attacked the tendency on the part of "certain Arab countries" to facilitate naturalization of refugees, saying that they "disregarded the holy duty" of keeping "the spirit of revenge" alive in the Palestinians' hearts. The granting of citizenship would kill the desire of the Palestinians to return to their homeland and thus help Israel "to liquidate" the Palestine cause. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Dec 13)

Cabinet Decides against Refugee Census. In May the Jordan cabinet decided on a number of principles which would guide its dealings with UNRWA, subject to parliamentary approval. (This followed negotiations with UNRWA in 1960; see MER 1960, pp 214-5.) These included i.a.:

(1) No refugee census would be held in the Kingdom, "taking into consideration the fact that UNRWA has not asked for such a census." (2) The government and the agency should reconsider the scale of income in force [i.e., JD 15 per month, at which income level the refugee was no longer entitled to UNRWA rations]. A committee should be set up to consider the cases of withdrawal of ration-cards on the basis of a temporary income scale pending agreement on a permanent new scale. (3) The cancellation of the names of deceased refugees remaining on UNRWA rolls should be accepted. The resulting surplus rations should be given to refugee children who had not been receiving rations, in accordance with re-

commendations to be submitted by a joint committee. (4) The government should prohibit the sale of ration-cards. (*Difa*, May 16)

Suspension of Individual Self-Support Projects. In April Jordan's Ministry of Development announced that the programme of individual self-support projects for refugees [initiated by UNRWA in 1955] would remain suspended until agreement was reached between the government and UNRWA. It was understood that the government objected to the agency's procedure of verifying the eligibility of the family of the refugee applying for self-support aid, as well as to the agency's insistence on granting aid for agricultural projects only. (*Palestin*, April 6)

Government Schools Ordered to Exclude Refugee Children. In June the Jordanian Minister of Education issued an ordinance which forbade, "in view of the strong pressure on the Ministry's budget," the acceptance of any refugee pupil in government schools except on the Minister's written authorization. The ministry would also ascertain the number of refugee pupils already enrolled in government schools. (*Palestin*, June 28)

Musa Alami's Project in Trough. In May and June, Musa Alami, the director of the Arab Development Society, attempted to raise funds in Britain and the US in order to save the Society from financial collapse. Alami's scheme consisted of a vocational training centre for orphan refugee boys near Jericho; it was said to have been financially dependent on the profits from a nearby experimental farm extending over 800 acres and employing a large number of refugees. The fruit and vegetables of the farm had been sold to Aramco in Saudi Arabia. In Dec 1960, however, at a week's notice and under pressure from the Saudi Arabian government, Aramco cancelled its contract. This threatened the closing of both the farm and the vocational centre.

In a letter published in *The Times*, Dr Arnold Toynbee, Freya Stark and others appealed to the public to raise £100,000 which, they said, were necessary to tide the Society over the two years which it needed to develop new markets. There were also reports that the World Bank was considering Alami's request for a long-term loan. (*Times*, May 25; *Difa*, May 28; *Economist*, June 3; *Manar*, Aug 14)

LEBANON

Granting of Lebanese Nationality to Refugees Suspended. Abdallah Mashnuq, the Minister of the Interior, told *Ash-Sharq News Agency* that his Ministry had either rejected or "frozen" 400 applications by refugees to obtain Lebanese nationality; this was in addition to 1,200 similar applications already "frozen" on instructions from the President.

This indicated a retreat from the previous policy whereby refugee applicants who could prove that they were of Lebanese origin or had been Lebanese nationals in the past were eligible for Lebanese nationality, although "considerations of numerical balance between the communities" had always been taken into account in the issue of naturalization certificates to refugees. While the Minister refused to disclose the reason for the suspension order, the news agency correspondent believed that it was connected with the decisions and recommendation of the Arab Foreign and Defence Ministers' conference and other Arab League conferences, which had

expressed concern at the refugees' eagerness to obtain the nationality of the countries where they were living, a phenomenon liable to lead, with the passage of time, to the disappearance of the "Palestine personality" (*Jaridah*, July 29). There was, however, also a general slowing down of granting of citizenship. (Compare p 377 b)

Government Plans Refugee Census. The Lebanese Minister of the Interior, Kamāl Junblāt, stated at a press conference on Nov 23 that Lebanon was "too much open" to Palestine refugees and that, according to authoritative estimates, some 40,000 refugees had clandestinely entered Lebanon from other countries. He added that his Ministry was planning to hold a census of refugees living outside the camps in order to identify refugee "infiltrators," who would thereupon be turned out of Lebanon. (*Jaridah*, Nov 24; *Falastin*, Nov 25)

Contribution to Refugees Curtailed. The Lebanese government's annual budgetary allocation for aid to Palestine refugees was reduced from £L270,000 to £L85,000. At the same time it was decided that this allocation should be placed at the disposal of the Administration of Refugee Affairs, whereas previously it had been included in the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs. (*Hayat*, Oct 26)

Efforts for Better Treatment of Refugees. In Jan deputy Adnān al-Hakīm called on the government to accord the refugees civil rights similar to those enjoyed by Lebanese citizens. He said many refugees were now persecuted and some were expelled immediately on entering Lebanon. (*Anwar*, Jan 7)

On July 18 an Arab Higher Committee delegation headed by Emīl Ghūrī met Maj.-Gen. Adil Shehab, the commander of the Lebanese army, to ask for easing of the regulation limiting the refugees' freedom of movement. They complained that the refugees' chances of finding work were severely handicapped as they usually had to wait two to three days to obtain a permit for a single journey inside Lebanon. Shehab promised to see what could be done about this. (*Sahafah*, July 19)

Involvement of Refugees in Attempted NSP Coup and measures against them (see p 402 a).

SYRIA

Before Break-up of UAR: Proposals to Strengthen Links between Refugees in Syria and Gaza Strip. Dr Usāmah an-Najīb, the Secretary of the Palestinian National Union in the Syrian Region, announced that contacts were being made with leaders of the Gaza Strip with a view to forming a unified Higher Committee of the Palestinian National Union. He further stated that Col. Abd al-Hamid Sarraj had approved a recommendation to cancel the restrictions on the movement of refugees between the two Regions. (*Mamar*, July 21)

After Secession: Egyptian Reports of Persecution of Refugees in Syria. According to the Egyptian press, the refugees in Syria were suspected by the new regime of disloyalty and placed under constant watch; 75 of them were reported to have been expelled from Syria. Special

arrangements were made to provide new jobs for them in Egypt and the Gaza Strip. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Oct 30, Nov 13; *Musawwar*, Dec 15; *Ahram*, Dec 28)

GAZA STRIP

UNRWA's Attitude towards Political Activity by Employees. Seventy-nine of UNRWA's local employees were reported to have been among those elected in Jan to the Palestinian National Union of the Gaza Strip.

In a press interview the UNRWA representative in Gaza, James Weldon, stated that while he sympathized with the social and cultural aims of the Palestinian National Union, he considered that UNRWA employees, just as other UN employees, should not engage in political activity. (*Economist*, Feb 25; *Falastin*, a Cairo monthly, June)

Views on the Refugee Situation. In Feb, in a statement to MENA, the Egyptian Governor of the Gaza Strip, Lt.-Gen. Ahmad Sālim, charged that since UNRWA supplied the Palestinian people foodstuffs not exceeding 1,500 calories per person daily, which was inadequate for any child over three years of age; and that despite the severe cold and dampness, the agency had allocated one blanket for every six persons, UNRWA must have had a plan "to exterminate the people of Palestine, and to liquidate the Palestine problem." (*MENA*, Feb 16 [20])

Lt.-Gen. Yūsuf al-Agrūdī [who replaced Ahmad Sālim as Governor of the Gaza strip] declared in Sept that the refugees' economic situation had improved materially as a result of the implementation of "the Amer Plan," aimed principally at increasing the Strip's agricultural potential through the reclamation of unproductive lands and increasing the water supply. (*Quwwat al-Musallah*, Egypt, Oct 1)

CARE inaugurated a \$500,000 economic development aid project for the Strip, which would be linked with the UAR government's "Make Gaza Green" project. (*Christian Science Monitor*, June 7)

OTHER COUNTRIES

Iraq: New Dwellings for Refugees. The Ministry of Social Affairs decided to start a building project for Palestine refugees in Za'itaniyah.

The annual allocation for aid to Palestine refugees in the Iraqi budget amounted to ID200,000. (*Zaman*, Sept 28)

Saudi Arabia: Reported Liberalization of Naturalization Procedures. In Sept the Saudi Arabian Information Office announced that instructions had been issued to extend "considerable facilities" to Palestine refugees applying for Saudi Arabian citizenship. (*Siyasah*, Beirut, Sept 27)

Colombia: Palestinians Expelled. In Jan the Colombia government reportedly decided to expel from the country 20 Palestinians of Jordanian nationality. A Colombian official communiqué said, it was reported, that while the persons in question had been admitted to Colombia under the farmers' quota, they actually did not work in agriculture. (*Hayat*, Jan 26; *Akhbar Sa'ah*, Feb 22)

APPENDIX: DRAFTS, AND RESOLUTIONS 1604 (XV)

Notes on Revisions Introduced into Draft Resolution A/SPC/L. 61	Draft Resolution on UNRWA Director's Report by Afghanistan, Federation of Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia, as Put to Vote (Doc. A/SPC/L. 61/Rev. 2, April 17) (Italics indicate parts revised as compared with original draft— A/SPC/L. 61, April 7)	Results of Vote	
		In Committee	In Plenary
	The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 Decem- ber 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 Feb- ruary 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,		
These resolutions were not men- tioned in the original draft, but were added in Revision 1 (April 11).			
Added in accordance with an amendment submitted by the Philippines (April 13).	Noting the annual report of the Di- rector of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 1959—30 June 1960,	64:0:16	
Added in accordance with the first of the US amendments.	Noting with deep regret that repa- triation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph II of Ge- neral Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the pro- gramme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reinte- gration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that therefore the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,		63:2:24
The second of the US amend- ments aimed to replace this para- graph by: "Recognizing that the sixteenth GA is to review the whole problem of the refugees." The Iraqi-Libyan sub-amendment provided that the US amendment be made an additional rather than a substitute paragraph. Finally both amendment and sub-amend- ment were withdrawn.	Recognizing the need to safeguard the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine,	46:20:20	44:38:12 (not adopted)
Added in accordance with the third of the US amendments.	1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet reported progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again re- quests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make efforts to secure the implementation of para- graph II of General Assembly resolu- tion 194 (III) and report thereon not later than 15 October 1961;	53:0:25 (Words "has not yet re- ported" were changed to "has not yet been able to report" on UK mo- tion-26:22:32)	60:9:21

THE ARAB REFUGEES

Notes on Revisions Introduced into Draft Resolution A/SPC/L. 61	Draft Resolution on UNRWA Director's Report by Afghanistan, Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia, as Put to Vote (Doc. A/SPC/L. 61/Rev. 2, April 17) (Italics indicate parts revised as compared with original draft— A/SPC/L. 61, April 7)	Results of Vote	
		(Figures indicate ayes: nays: abstentions, respectively)	
		In Committee	In Plenary
Original draft read: "2. Recommends to the GA at its sixteenth session the establishment of appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine." Revised text embodies the fourth of the US amendments up to the words "future welfare of the refugees themselves." These were to be followed, according to the Iraqi-Libyan sub-amendment of April 12, by a phrase similar to the original text ("and that effective machinery," etc.) On April 17 the sponsors accepted India's suggestion to replace the sub-amendment by the words "including the means," etc.	2. Recommends to the General Assembly that at its sixteenth session primary consideration be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves including the means of safeguarding their property rights;	46:18:22	44:35:15 (not adopted)
	3. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;		
	4. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialised agencies and the many private organisations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.		
	<i>Resolution as a whole:</i>	47:19:20	37:17:38 (after deletion of last preambular and second operative paragraphs).

PART THREE

THE COUNTRIES
OF THE MIDDLE EAST

INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

SYNOPSIS

INTERNAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1961, the first full year of the Republic, was characterized by growing tension between the Greek and the Turkish communities. Major provisions in the Constitution—the 70:30 ratio in the civil service, the establishment in the five major towns of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities, the establishment of the army—were not implemented, in spite of the insistence of the Turkish community. The Turkish representatives in Parliament reacted by vetoing the taxation laws, with the consequence that President Makarios saw himself forced to order the collection of taxation without a lawful basis, and that income tax became a matter for the communal chambers.

There was complete separation between the communities—a kind of apartheid, in the words of President Makarios. Inside the Greek community opposition to President Makarios and his supporters crystallized; their opponents demanded a complete repudiation of the "sinful" Zurich agreements, "real self-determination" and Enosis.

The government continued unchanged from 1960; (see MER 1960, p 228.)

In Feb Cyprus joined the British Commonwealth. Later during the year increasing emphasis was laid on a policy of non-alignment, favoured by the Greek and opposed by the Turkish community.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

[The strained relations between the Greek and Turkish communities were the main internal problem during Cyprus' first year of independence. (According to the 1956 census there were 417,986 Greek Orthodox as against 92,642 Muslims (Turks) and 19,251 others.) Below are some impressions and evaluations by foreign observers of the situation in general, followed by a record of specific issues.]

"No Nationhood Developing"—"Complete Separatism." Writing from Nicosia in March, a *New York Times* correspondent observed that seven months after Cyprus had achieved independence there were no real signs that "a sense of nationhood was developing." "Almost all of the leadership in each community is dedicated to a jealous defense of its rights against the other. Mutual suspicion is still the prevailing mood and in both communities the overriding aim is complete separatism wherever possible." (*NYT*, March 10)

The same point was made later by a correspondent of *The Times*: "Communal separation spreads to the smallest social matters. If you go to a Greek house you take a Greek taxi and are offered a Greek cigarette, and it is the same pattern with Turks. The two communities co-exist but do not mingle."

"Greeks will always be Greeks, and Turks will always be Turks." Archbishop Makarios told the correspondent, who observed that the people of Cyprus were lacking in the will to forge an exclusive loyalty and were investing "half their loyalties" abroad. In comparison, Lebanon, another ME country with a "divided heart," survived "largely because to be a Lebanese means something positive."

Writing on the first anniversary of the Republic, *The*

Economist commented that the Cypriots did not feel moved to celebrate the event; unlike other new countries, the Republic was "unwanted by many of those who belong to it," and it had "not yet acquired enough of a responsibility to inspire them, whether Greek or Turk, with loyalty and enthusiasm." The detailed provisions of the Zurich agreements, *The Economist* observed, tended to separate rather than unite the two communities, as had been proved by the difficult negotiations on the question of the municipalities and the civil service. (For sources, see below.)

Cooperation Between Makarios and Küçük. All the three sources quoted above were united in the opinion that—in the words of *The Economist*—President Makarios and his Turkish Vice-President Küçük provided an "excellent example of cooperation," in this situation of deep divisions. (For sources, see below.)

No Wish to Break Up Settlement For Lack of Peaceful Alternative. With all the difficulties, *The Economist* felt, "at present most Cypriots do not want the settlement to break down, if only because no other peaceful alternative is at present apparent." They knew that they could not look for support in Athens or Ankara.

Similarly, *The Times* correspondent wrote that the Cypriot leaders knew that the world had been happy to get rid of the Cyprus problem, and that the Zurich and London agreements had worked, with all their imperfections. "They are hesitant about trying to change even a comma of them, for fear that this would open the floodgates and wash the whole complicated edifice away." (*NYT*, March 10; *Times*, Aug 25; *Economist*, Sept 12)

Following are the major issues in inter-community relations during the year.

Separation of Municipalities. [Article 173 of the Constitution provided for the establishment of separate sectors and municipalities for the Turkish inhabitants of the five largest towns (Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca, Paphos). In 1960, after independence, no agreement could be reached on the demarcation lines (MER 1960, pp 227-8) and the problem continued to mar inter-community relations in 1961.]

At the beginning of the year it became clear that the joint committees set up in the five towns to work out the new arrangement had reached a deadlock. Thus, in Jan the Greek mayor of Larnaca expressed his opposition to partition "to avoid the trouble and complications that are bound to affect both communities." He argued that partition was not mandatory under the Constitution and that the President and Vice-President who, under the Constitution, would have to review the municipalities issue in four years time, had better do so immediately. On Jan 11 the Greek mayor of Famagusta said that the joint committee for municipal partition had reached a deadlock because of the "exorbitant demands" by Turkish members; no further meetings would take place. (*Cyprus Mail*, Jan 3, 12)

On Feb 9 the Cabinet began debating a bill to end the deadlock. The bill foresaw the operation of two municipal councils in each of the five towns; Greek and Turkish citizens and premises coming under the jurisdiction of a Greek municipality and a Turkish municipality respectively. At the same time the bill would extend the existing municipal arrangements for two months, as by Feb 16 the Municipal Corporations Law would expire. The bill was opposed by the Turkish members on the grounds that "contrary to the Constitution" the bill did not provide for separate regions for the Greek and Turkish municipalities. On Feb 17, however, the House unanimously passed the bill, essentially as proposed. (*Cyprus Mail*, Feb 10, 14, 18)

The existing municipality laws were repeatedly extended, each time for two months (e.g. *Cyprus Mail*, July 16), while further discussions on the delimitation of the municipal community boundaries proved inconclusive. (See e.g. *Cyprus Mail*, July 12.)

Inter-Communal Friction in Parliament. On Feb 3 President Makarios, in the name of the cabinet, asked the House of Representatives to take measures against two of its Turkish members, who, according to press reports, had made "insulting remarks" against Polycarpus Georgiadis (Yorgadjis), the Minister of the Interior. While recently visiting Turkey, these two MPs had attributed to the Minister "responsibility for recent murderous acts in Cyprus, alleging even that the said murders were committed on his orders." At a press conference the following day, the two Turkish MPs denied that they had made such a statement, and deplored the President's letter.

The Greek members of the House also issued a statement of protest. They noted, in addition to the charges made by the President, that a Turkish MP had reportedly said: "We are in the vanguard of duty as wardens and guardians of the border of the Turkish fatherland."

On Feb 6, when the House started to debate the issue, the Turkish members walked out in protest, having argued that the House had no right to debate the matter. The Greek members continued the debate, which concluded in a "declaration" condemning the alleged insulting statement which, not having been denied in the House, "poisons the smooth relations between the two communities and constitutes a provocation to the Greek

Cypriot people." In the debate, a Greek member stated that the "boundaries of Cyprus are Greek, and Greek Cypriots are determined to fight to acquire true self-determination. The threat from Turkey cannot force us to put down the fighting flag... We hope that the day is not far when, free from constitutional or other restrictions, the Cypriot peoples can... decide their future."

On Feb 9 the Greek Communal Chamber passed a resolution expressing its "indignation at the unacceptable statement about the national future of Cyprus" allegedly made in Turkey by representatives of the Turkish community.

On the same day Vice-President Dr. Küçük condemned the "destructive speeches" made on the subject by Greek members of the House. He said that references to "true self-determination for Greek Cypriots" were contrary to the Constitution and had "rightly left us in anxiety." He said that the Turkish Cypriots would remain faithful to the Constitution but would make no concessions in regard to their rights.

On Feb 10, the Greek members of the House, in reply to Dr. Küçük, declared that their statements were only "in defence of the Greek Cypriot rights," and were not intended against Turkey or the Turkish community in Cyprus; they gave assurances that the Greek Cypriots stood for friendship with the Turkish community. On the same day, in an attempt to settle the issue, Archbishop Makarios stated: "The Government is devoted to the faithful implementation of the agreements on which the Republic is built." [The issue thus subsided.] (*Cyprus Mail*, Feb 4, 5, 7, 10, 11; *Athens News Agency*, Feb 11)

Issue of Tax Bills. A tax extension bill, which came before the House of Representatives on March 30, served as an opportunity for the Turkish members to register their dissatisfaction with the non-implementation of the separation of municipalities and the 30:70 ratio in the civil service, as well as with the cut in the army budget. The tax and customs laws of the Republic ceased to have effect from March 31. The government proposed to extend them for three months, and 25 Greek members of the House voted in favour; 11 of the 15 Turkish members, however, voted against. As according to the Constitution all fiscal matters required separate Greek and Turkish majorities, the Turkish vote in fact constituted a veto. Neither the Turkish leaders nor the Turkish press raised any objections to the bill itself, but they made it clear that the vote was meant to exert pressure for the implementation of the municipalities and 30:70 ratio clauses in the Constitution. Before the final vote, five Turkish members proposed an extension of two months on the understanding that these questions would meanwhile be satisfactorily settled, but the Greek members voted against. (*Cyprus Mail*, April 1)

In an official statement, Archbishop Makarios accused the Turks of abusing their rights under the Constitution and, disregarding the vote in the House, instructed the respective officials to continue to collect taxes and customs. He said: "The Constitution exists for the sake of the people, and I am rendering a high service to the Republic of Cyprus, whose salvation constitutes for me the supreme law."

The Turkish Vice-President of the House of Representatives, Dr. Müderrioğlu, dismissed the charges that the Turkish stand on the extension bill constituted blackmail; it was all done by the Greek side, he asserted. He said that the budget and the 30:70 ratio in the civil service were indeed connected: as the Turks were far

from reaching their 30%, they consequently did not receive their proper due in government salaries (*Cyprus Mail*, April 2). The deputy Turkish community leader, Denktas, condemned the action of President Makarios as "illegal and opportunistic," and said all Turkish importers had been advised not to pay taxes and customs. It was initially reported that they complied (*Cyprus Mail*, April 4). The Greek Cypriot press condemned the Turkish position. An editorial in *Eleftheria* emphasized that the income tax bill incident proved that the Cyprus regime could not function, and called for the radical revision of the Zurich Agreements. (*Eleftheria*, April 6)

When the House met again, on April 11, no mention was made of the tax extension bill. On April 13, President Makarios told a press conference that tax collection was normal; there had been no instances of importers refusing to pay duties. He admitted that he had acted unconstitutionally in ordering tax collection, but said that otherwise it would have been impossible for the state to continue to function. He reiterated that the rights of the Turkish community under the Constitution would be fully implemented. (*Cyprus Mail*, April 12, 14)

The tax issue came up again in Dec. On Dec 18, ten of the Turkish members of the House voted against a new income tax bill, while four abstained. At issue was the period of validity of the law: the Turkish members demanded that it be reviewed by the House annually, and subsequently proposed a review every two years. This was rejected by the Greek members, both on the grounds that this was impractical and that it was intended to provide a means of "blackmailing the Greeks."

On Dec 20 President Makarios stated: "I shall disregard any constitutional provision which, if abused, may obstruct the regular functioning of the state." He said that the share of the Turkish community in income tax payments was only one-sixteenth of that of the Greek community; revenue from the tax in 1961 had been estimated at £3.8m., of which £2.4m. was from foreign companies and individuals, £1.32m. was from Greeks, and only £85,000 was from Turks. A special temporary tax would therefore be levied on the Greek community through the Greek Communal Chamber, and a special tax for foreigners would be introduced in the House. The President added that in spite of these measures a depletion in revenues was to be expected, and consequently the implementation of provisions in the Constitution such as the 30:70 ratio in the civil service and the establishment of the army would be delayed.

Rauf Denktas, the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, reacted by calling on the Turkish Cypriots to cease paying taxes to the Republic. He said that arrangements were being made by the Turkish Communal Chamber to collect all direct taxes until a law was properly enacted empowering the government to collect them.

Vice-President Küçük issued a statement severely criticizing President Makarios for his declaration. He added a complaint of his own, namely that he had been denied any say in executive matters, though under the Constitution the powers of the Vice-President and the President were "almost identical." He promised that he would continue to do his utmost to secure respect for the Constitution and to find a solution to the present difficulties.

On Dec 27 the House passed as a matter of urgency a law on income tax for foreign nationals operating in Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish members voting in favour. The matter of income tax for Cypriot nationals

was not dealt with and remained in abeyance. (*Cyprus Mail*, Dec 19, 21, 22, 28)

The issue of the Army proved to be another problem generating tension in inter-communal relations. Under the Constitution, the army should have numbered 2,000 men (1,200 Greeks and 800 Turks). The annual budget envisaged was £1m.

On Jan 20 the House approved the army bill. At the same time, however, it was reported that the government intended to establish in 1961 only two "regiments," of 300 men each; 360 troops would be Greek and 240 Turkish; expenditure would be cut to half a million pounds. In Feb the House approved the budget cut, all Greek members voting for the cut and all Turkish members opposing it. (Turkish opposition was mainly due to reluctance to allow any infringement on the Constitution, since the lower budget would have meant a reduction in the size of the army). Recruitment of the first group of 400 men started on March 3. (*Cyprus Mail*, Jan 21, 22, Feb 8, March 4)

A new crisis over the army issue occurred in Oct when Vice-President Dr Küçük vetoed a decision by the cabinet to establish the army on the basis of mixed Greek-Turkish units throughout. The Defence Minister (a Turkish Cypriot) had proposed that separate Greek and Turkish units be established. The Greek majority in the Cabinet, however, took the above decision on Aug 10, and reiterated it on Sept 21 and on Oct 13. This was the first time Dr Küçük had used his veto right under the Constitution.

Dr Küçük said that if army units were completely mixed, many complications liable to lead to serious communal troubles would occur. He advocated an army of five battalions, each comprising one Greek and one Turkish company. Such an arrangement would also enable the implementation of a provision in the Constitution that forces stationed in territory where members of one community constituted nearly 100% of the population should belong to that community.

In reaction, President Makarios issued a statement saying that the establishment of the army on a basis of segregation was "totally unacceptable," as this could not lead to "a unified Cyprus army as contemplated by the Constitution." In view of the Vice-President's veto, the President added, "I do not think that we should proceed with the formation of an army of 2,000 men as envisaged in the Constitution." (*Cyprus Mail*, Oct 21, 22)

The army bill came up again for a vote in the House of Representatives on Dec 22, when the budget was further cut to £180,000. All Greek members voted for the cut and all Turkish members voted against it. (*Cyprus Mail*, Dec 23)

THE GREEK COMMUNITY

[The political situation within the Greek community was characterized mainly by the lack of an effective political party behind the government while internal strife continued. The group which supported President Makarios' election in 1959, the Patriotic Front, continued to function as a combination of divergent anti-Communist or non-Communist groups, including trade unions, farmers' organizations, businessmen, and professional people.]

The Pan-Cyprian Ex-Fighters Association, a remnant of the former EOKA fighters, opposed to Archbishop Makarios, organized a demonstration on Jan 13, the anniversary of the plebiscite on Enosis held in 1950. The demonstration was in support of General Grivas (former

commander of EOKA) and against PM Constantine Karamanlis of Greece. The Minister of the Interior, George Hadjis, himself a former EOKA commander, instructed the police to break up the demonstration in Nicosia. Before the demonstrations the police raided the Association's headquarters. During the demonstrations participants were attacked and beaten by civilian opponents.

On the occasion of the anniversary, all Greek papers stressed that the Zurich agreements were not what the Greek Cypriots had set out to achieve. The daily *Makhi* [whose editor, Nikos Sampson, was an EOKA hero] declared that "the spirit of Enosis is still alive"; "the pan-Hellenic dream" would be fulfilled. "We shall find the proper time to fulfil our national aspirations." (*Makhi*, Jan 16; *Cyprus Mail*, Jan 17)

On May 1, the EOKA anniversary, the Ex-Fighters Association distributed leaflets throughout the main towns of Cyprus, calling on the Greeks of Cyprus to "smash the Zurich chains" and to continue the struggle towards union with Greece. (*Cyprus Mail*, May 3)

The Murder of Peter Gray, an Englishman working in Cyprus, aroused a wave of indignation throughout the island. The government offered £20,000 for information leading to the arrest of the killers. Among the suspects arrested was Nikos Sampson, the editor of *Makhi*, and another former EOKA member; they were released two days later for lack of evidence. (*Cyprus Mail*, May 13, 14, 17; *Eleftheria*, *Phileleftheros*, May 14)

The Publication of the Memoirs of Gen. Grivas in Cyprus, in Nov, caused considerable uproar. In his memoirs, Gen. Grivas sharply criticized Archbishop Makarios and the Minister of the Interior, George Hadjis, for the role they allegedly played during the EOKA struggle. On Dec 4, three days after the first consignment of the books arrived in Cyprus, President Makarios in a radio broadcast charged Grivas with distorting the truth and sully the EOKA struggle. He said that the memoirs were imbued "not with the honesty and sincerity of a fighter but with the personal motives of a small politician."

Most Greek newspapers reported the President's statement with no comment, whereas *Haraaghi*, the Communist daily, strongly supported him.

Several members of the committee originally formed to distribute the book, amongst them members of Parliament, resigned in protest against the charges made by Grivas, while the Minister of the Interior, denying the charges made against him, accused Grivas of falsifying the truth. The Greek press expressed anxiety over the rift in the Greek community. (*Haraaghi*, Dec 5; *Eleftheria*, *Makhi*, Dec 7; *Phileleftheros*, Dec 7, 12; *Cyprus Mail*, Dec 5, 6, 7, 8)

The Patriotic Front and the Democratic Union. The Patriotic Front—which in 1959 had supported Archbishop Makarios for the Presidency—was to be completely reorganized, it was reported in July. Twenty-eight of the 35 Greek members of the House and 19 of the 22 members of the Greek Communal Chamber belonged to the Front. The Front chairman was to be Glafkos Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives. There would be a policy declaration and the Front would be organized throughout the country in district, regional and executive committees. The decision on the reorganization, which had been contemplated for some time, had been prompted by the "consolidation of the Democratic Front" [Union, which strongly and vocally opposed

President Makarios and his government.] (*Cyprus Mail*, July 15)

The first annual conference of the Cyprus Democratic Union to which the above report referred took place on July 9. The Union was founded by the late John Clerides (father of Glafkos; he died on Jan 17). The chairman of the party, Dr Dervis, ex-mayor of Nicosia and SG of the defunct Cyprus National Party, outlined the party programme. Among other points, he demanded the abolition of the army and the exclusion of the clergy from "politics, banks, and mines" as essential for its prestige. In its resolutions the congress expressed "indignation at the shocking situation" that resulted from the "sinful Zurich regime," opposed the proposed partition of municipalities, and declared that it would continue by all legal means the struggle for the implementation of the Cypriot people's "undeniable right" to self-determination. (*Cyprus Mail*, July 10)

In Dec, Tassos Papadopoulos, the Minister of Labour, brought a libel action against *Ethniki*, the paper of the Democratic Union. In his evidence he emphasized that he had been "one of the few" who had advised Makarios against the signing of the Zurich-London agreements. Dr. Dervis, chairman of the Democratic Union, who gave evidence for the defence, said that "in Cyprus we have serfdom, not democracy." He admitted that in articles he published in *Ethniki* he had referred to the cabinet as [President Makarios'] "children's choir," had called those serving the regime "lackeys," and the regime itself, "the rule of the clergy." Another witness for the defence declared that he was a Communist "and I am proud of it." He said the only good thing that had resulted from the Zurich agreements was that Cyprus now belonged to the UN and could demand of that body to grant it "self-determination," to "get rid of the alliance which I consider unreasonable and immoral." Told that it was unconstitutional to demand this, he said that the call for Enosis had also been unconstitutional. (On Dec 29 the court reserved judgement on the case.) (*Cyprus Mail*, Dec 13, 15, 20, 21, 23, 29)

The Cyprus Communist Party—AKEL. [AKEL, with five (Greek) members in the House of Representatives, and a daily (*Haraaghi*) to voice its opinion, was active during the year. AKEL advocated a policy of positive neutrality, a struggle for the removal of the British bases on the island, and the acceptance of Soviet aid; it voted, however, for Cyprus' joining the Commonwealth.]

In July AKEL called for a conference of all groups in Cyprus to establish a united front to fight imperialism and colonialism. It charged the West and "Anglo-American imperialism with causing the government to stray from its policy of neutrality. In a press interview, President Makarios accused the Communists of trying to undermine the work of the government, and advised them to desist "if they intend to make good use of the lawful rights and liberties granted to them under the Constitution." AKEL complained that the President's "implied threat" was based on a "distorted version" of AKEL's stand for a policy of positive neutrality. The party affirmed its support for this policy, and reserved the right to criticize the government for any deviation from it. (*Haraaghi*, July 15; *Cyprus Mail*, July 25, 27)

AKEL held an October Revolution anniversary meeting in Nicosia. (*Mizan*, Dec)

The SG of AKEL, Papaioannou, participated in the twenty-second CPSU congress in Moscow, in Oct. In his speech he said that the Cypriot people would fight for liquidation of military bases on the island and for

"true national independence," being confident of the "unlimited support" of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries in this struggle. (*Mizan*, Nov)

AKEL planned its tenth congress for March 8, 1962; this was to be the first legal congress since the party was banned by the British in 1955. (*NCNA*, June 12 [FE 17])

THE TURKISH COMMUNITY

[The internal political unity of the Turkish community was evident throughout the year, although in Dec there were signs of dissension.]

In the beginning of Dec, eleven of the 15 Turkish members of the House formed an independent parliamentary group. They had been elected on the ticket of the National Union Federation—led by Vice-President Küçük—which, they said, "had ceased to exist." Greek newspapers speculated that this move could possibly lead to the formation of a new party demanding a firmer line in the defence of Turkish rights. In a press interview, the deputy chairman of the group, Halit Ali Rıza, said that the group did not intend to organize a new party,

but could possibly become the parliamentary group of another party. He said the group would seek to co-operate with the Greek members of the House but the Greeks, on their part, must fully respect the rights of the Turkish community. He added that the group considered itself free to criticize any government act, even if the Turkish government members had concurred in it.

The Greek press, interpreting the formation of this group as a rift in the Turkish leadership, identified it with R. Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Chamber (*Phileleftheros*, Dec 11; *Kypros*, Dec 12). However, in a statement to the press on Dec 11, Denktaş declared that his cooperation with Dr Küçük was "close and cordial" and he was not interested in forming a new party, as the National Union Party under Dr Küçük fulfilled its purposes; he added that the forming of the parliamentary group did not necessarily mean a divergence of opinion on "Turkish national affairs."

On the same day Dr Küçük stated that the new group had "no significance from a community point of view"; it would not take a separate line on "problems of national character" because it could not go against the will of the people. (*Cyprus Mail*, Dec 7, 11, 12)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NOTE: For relations with the Arab countries and Israel, see under these countries.

UN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Joining International Organizations. [In Feb Cyprus decided to associate with UNICEF.] On Dec 12 Cyprus was admitted to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (*UN Yearbook*, 1961)

In May Cyprus was admitted as the 16th member of the Council of Europe. (*Statesman's Yearbook*, 1961)

UN Voting Record. Whereas at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly Cyprus' vote coincided slightly more often with the vote of the US than with that of the Communist countries, the situation was reversed at the 16th session. At both sessions, however, Cyprus' vote coincided much more often with that of non-Arab ME, Afro-Asian, and Latin-American countries—in that order—than with either of the world powers. (For details see pp 4 ff.)

[Zenon Rossides, Cyprus' representative at the UN, took an active part in the proceedings of the Assembly on several occasions.] Thus on Oct 19 he proposed the establishment of a permanent UN military force. (The idea had been advocated by President Kennedy.) (*NYT*, Oct 19)

UN Aid. The UN Special Fund granted Cyprus £250,000 for an agricultural research institute. (*Cyprus Mail*, May 26)

Neutrality and the Belgrade Conference. [The question of Cyprus' international orientation was a major issue dividing the two communities. Whereas the Greek Cypriots repeatedly underlined Cyprus' affinity with the neutralist camp, the Turkish community insisted that Cyprus' place was with the West.] When the Belgrade

Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was announced, the Greek Cypriot press insisted on Cyprus' participation.

Cyprus was invited to the conference only in Aug, after prolonged debates in Cairo as to "who is a neutral." On Aug 22 the Cyprus government approved participation in the conference, overriding the objections of the three Turkish ministers. Vice-President Küçük stated that participation of Cyprus would be against the interest of the Republic, but that he had decided not to use his veto right in the matter. [The President's speech at the conference (Sept 3) was welcomed by most of the Cyprus press], and on his return he was received at Nicosia airport by Vice-President Küçük. (*Cyprus Mail*, Aug 23, 24, 26, Sept 9; see also pp 59b, 62a, 64b, 66a.)

In Oct *Eleftheria* demanded a "radical reappraisal" of Cyprus' foreign policy, and the dismissal of FM Kyprianou, because Western confidence in Cyprus had been shaken. It said that East and West attached different meanings to "unfettered neutrality," and that it was necessary to convince the British people that the Cypriots had no less fervent feelings towards them than towards Presidents Abdel Nasser and Tito, who had been invited to Cyprus.

In reply to a journalist's question, apparently referring to the above editorial, President Makarios said that Cyprus would adhere to a policy of non-alignment.

On the same day a US embassy spokesman said that the US had never connected its attitude to Cyprus with any specific point in the latter's foreign policy. (*Cyprus Mail*, Oct 20)

UNITED KINGDOM

Cypriot Leaders Meet Queen Elizabeth. On Jan 20, President Makarios and Vice-President Dr Küçük were present at the British sovereign base of Akrotiri to welcome Queen Elizabeth II, who stopped there briefly on her way to India. They had separate talks with the Queen; President Makarios' talk lasted over an hour. No statement was issued after the meeting. Earlier, the

UK representative in Cyprus said the meeting would set "the final seal on the restoration of good relations and friendship" between the two countries. (*Cyprus Mail*, Jan 21)

At the beginning of the year, the question of membership in the British Commonwealth was the central theme in foreign policy discussions in Cyprus. In Jan it was reported that the Patriotic Front was divided over the issue. The Cyprus Chamber of Commerce, the Cyprus Association of Manufacturers, and the Turkish Chamber of Commerce all issued statements in support of membership, pointing out the economic advantages that would be derived from such a move. (*Cyprus Mail*, Jan 21, 24, Feb 9)

On Feb 16 the House of Representatives voted to apply for membership in the Commonwealth for a period of five years. Forty-one members of the House voted in favour, and nine, all members of the Patriotic Front, voted against. [On the rift in the Patriotic Front, see above: The Greek Community.] AKEL, which rather unexpectedly voted for membership, explained that although Cyprus must eventually leave the Commonwealth, it must prepare for this by working for economic independence; it must do "what the UAR and Cuba did." (*Cyprus Mail*, Feb 17)

On March 13 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London unanimously approved Cyprus' application, and the Republic of Cyprus thereby became the 12th member of the Commonwealth. The following day President Makarios, accompanied by the Foreign and Defence ministers, left for London to attend the conference. On his return the President stated that he was now "more than ever convinced that our link with the British Commonwealth will be beneficial to Cyprus in all respects." He said that in his talks with the British PM he had met with great understanding. (*Cyprus Mail*, March 14, 23)

Economic Ties; Development Assistance. [In 1960 the UK had granted Cyprus £12m. (\$33.6m.) for the period 1960-5. This sum was regarded in Cyprus as general revenue and not as development assistance.]

In March President Makarios stated that in the framework of a five-year development plan—which would require \$48m. in foreign aid—Britain would be approached for a loan of more than \$30m., to finance electric power development. He would also apply for a \$7m. loan for the enlargement of Famagusta port which the British had undertaken to assist, in the framework of the independence agreement. (Britain retained certain rights in Famagusta port, which served the British military bases.) Britain had already undertaken to grant \$1.4m. for the development of Nicosia airport. (*NYT*, March 11)

Negotiations for the British loan for the electric-power project were conducted in London by the Cypriot Minister of Finance, in May. At first talks were reported to have reached a deadlock, whereupon Cyprus papers charged Britain with going back on her promise for the loan; some advocated the acceptance of Soviet aid. On his return to Cyprus, the Minister stated that Britain had offered a "considerable sum," but had asked for interest at the current rate in the British money market plus commission, which would amount to some 6 percent. (*Cyprus Mail*, May 19, 21, 23, 24, 26)

The British army envisaged spending \$4.5m. in Cyprus during 1961, mostly on works by Cypriot contractors. (*Cyprus Mail*, June 3)

Britain remained by far Cyprus' most important trading partner (see tables of trade, pp 82-5.)

Question of Common Market. The possibility of the UK associating with the European Common Market disturbed public opinion in Cyprus, in that British imports of Cyprus' agricultural produce might be curtailed. On July 8, Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal, arrived in Nicosia to discuss the question in the framework of British consultations with Commonwealth members. In a statement issued at the end of the talks, Heath said that the vital interests of Cyprus would be preserved and her position would be considered in the negotiations with the Common Market. Later in the month President Makarios stated that Britain's association with the Common Market without adequate guarantees to Cyprus would greatly weaken relations between Cyprus and the Commonwealth. Heath had undertaken to report Cypriot apprehensions to his government. (*Cyprus Mail*, July 8, 9, 11, 25)

Emigration. Of 14,589 Cypriots who emigrated in 1960, 13,534 went to Britain, 80.6% of them Greeks and 15.2% Turks.

Sabotage at British Base. (On the bases, see also p 90a.) Between July 26 and Aug 7, a pipeline carrying water to the British sovereign base of Dekhelia was damaged 12 times by saboteurs. The part of the pipeline affected was in Cypriot sovereign territory and was guarded by Cypriot police. The sabotage was believed by the British authorities to be the work of a small group of extremists of either the Left or the Right. Though the independence agreement permitted the British to take measures to ensure the effectiveness of the bases, they felt that any extraordinary step would only appear as a provocation; thus they preferred to leave the matter in the hands of the Cyprus government. The acting British High Commissioner protested to President Makarios. (*NYT*, Aug 4, 8)

GREECE AND TURKEY

Aid to Communities. [Financial aid from Greece and Turkey to Cyprus took the form of grants to the Greek and Turkish communal chambers.]

Greece. In June, addressing a group of Cypriot journalists, PM Karamanlis of Greece called for unity and cooperation in Cyprus. He added that Greece would always be ready to help Cyprus, both morally and financially. He praised both President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük for their moderation. He said it was "essential" that Makarios serve as President during the first stages of the Republic and expressed his confidence that under these two leaders Cyprus could thrive. He further said that Cyprus could play its part in securing peace and stability in the Mediterranean. (*Cyprus Mail*, June 17)

In Sept, in an announcement made in Athens during a brief stopover, Archbishop Makarios said that Greece had offered substantial economic assistance to Cyprus. (*Cyprus Mail*, July 19)

Turkey. In July, in an interview with Greek journalists, President Gürel of Turkey said in answer to a question on the future of intercommunal relations in Cyprus: "I am optimistic about the future of Cyprus and I do believe that the small difficulties that are being faced and may be faced in the future during the application of the Zurich and London agreements could be settled in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding." (*Cyprus Mail*, July 19)

WEST GERMANY, UNITED STATES

German Federal Republic. By the end of 1960, Cyprus and the GFR had exchanged diplomatic representation at the level of embassies.

Three trade and aid agreements were signed on Oct 30. The trade agreement reduced restrictions on German imports of Cypriot wines and agricultural produce. A technical assistance agreement provided, i.e., for a German grant of DM1.3m. for survey work in the island. Economic aid would consist of a German state loan of DM12m. at interest rates of 3½ to 5½%, according to the type of project, and of government guarantees for loans by German private companies up to DM20m. for industrial development. (*Cyprus Mail, Oct 31*)

On Nov 21 it was officially announced that President Makarios would pay a state visit in May 1962. A day later the German ambassador conveyed an invitation to Vice-President Kōçik, who accepted it for a date towards the end of 1962. (*Cyprus Mail, Nov 22, 23*)

United States. By the end of 1960, both the Cyprus ambassador to Washington and the American ambassador to Nicosia had taken up their posts.

An agreement on a US grant to Cyprus of 50,000 tons of grain was concluded in Nov 1960, and on Jan 11, 1961, the first shipment reached Cyprus. (*Cyprus Mail, Jan 12*)

Discussion of further US economic aid to Cyprus continued throughout the year. On Dec 15 the Cyprus Foreign Ministry announced that extensive US government development assistance to Cyprus—both direct from the government and through the World Bank—had been promised to Foreign Minister Kyprianos by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. (*Cyprus Mail, Dec 16*)

USSR AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

USSR—Diplomatic and Political Relations. The USSR recognized Cyprus immediately after the announcement of its independence. The first Soviet ambassador to Cyprus presented his credentials on Dec 31, 1960. (*Cyprus Mail, Jan 1*)

In April, the Cyprus government approved the opening of an embassy in Moscow, without fixing a date. (Cyprus maintained by that time embassies in New York, London, Ankara, Athens, Bonn, and Cairo). A government spokesman denied that the decision was indicative of a "general swing to the left" in Cyprus (*Cyprus Mail, April 28*). [No ambassador to Moscow had been appointed by the end of the year.]

A Cypriot parliamentary delegation, headed by the President of the House of Representatives, visited the USSR from July 23 to Aug 12. (*Mizan, Sept*)

On Oct 22 the Cyprus House of Representatives passed a resolution protesting against the continuation of nuclear tests, and called on the Soviet Union to refrain from testing its 50 megaton bomb. With the exception of the five AKEL members and one other Greek member, all members present voted for the resolution. (*Cyprus Mail, Oct 24*)

Scope of Relations. In March a Cyprus-USSR Friendship society was launched in Moscow. Reporting on this occasion, *New Times* enumerated the following contacts between Cyprus and the USSR: A delegation of Soviet collective farmers had recently visited Nicosia; ships carrying Soviet tourists had called at Famagusta; a Cypriot delegation would attend the World Youth Forum in Moscow, and the Mayor of Limasol had been invited to Moscow. (Quoted in *Mizan, May*.)

Question of Soviet Aid. The question of Soviet aid was a topic of public discussion. AKEL claimed that the USSR had offered economic assistance, but the offer had not been taken up by Cyprus. The Greek ambassador to Cyprus warned against economic ties with the Communist bloc; such ties, he said, "could have social repercussions." (*Cyprus Mail, March 22*)

In May the Cypriot press discussed the aid question in association with two developments: reports that development aid which had been expected from the UK was now in doubt, and the preparations in Cairo for the neutralist meeting in Belgrade. The Communist papers, as well as Greek Cypriot papers advocating a policy of neutralism, insisted that Cyprus must accept economic assistance from both East and West. The Greek-Cypriot *Eleftheria*, however, insisted that Cyprus must accept assistance only from the West. The Turkish-Cypriot press rejected any notion of acceptance of aid from the USSR. Replying to charges that no "concrete" offers for Soviet aid had been made, the Communist daily *Haraaghi* wrote that both Khrushchov and Mikoyan had stated that Cyprus had only to apply for aid, and it would be offered with no strings attached. (Quoted in *Cyprus Mail, May 21, 23, 24, 31, June 2*)

It was reported that the USSR had renewed her offer of aid during the visit there of the Cypriot parliamentary delegation (on which see above). While one Greek-Cypriot paper, *Tharos*, insisted that Cyprus as a neutralist state could benefit from economic assistance from both East and West, *Eleftheria* denounced Soviet aid as a trap intended to ultimately subjugate the country to Communism; in evidence the paper quoted "present Soviet hostility to the UAR." [See relations between the UAR and the USSR: The Great Propaganda Campaign.] (Quoted in *Cyprus Mail, Sept 12, 24*.) [No concrete development in respect of Soviet aid took place in 1961.]

Communist Broadcasts against British Bases. Moscow broadcasts to Cyprus (in Greek) were mostly concerned with the British bases on the island, which, they said, exposed Cyprus to serious danger in the event of a nuclear war, and were baring Cyprus also in peacetime. The broadcasts claimed that the whole population, "even right-wing politicians," had come to recognize this. The British, however, were staging military demonstrations to intimidate the Cypriots and crush their "unanimous resistance" to the presence of the bases.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the promulgation of the Republic of Cyprus, Moscow Radio also denounced the activities in Cyprus of the "US and West German monopolies." The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had consistently supported "the Cypriots' just demands at the UN," was among the first to hail Cyprus' independence, and was now quickly developing cultural, trade, and other relations; [no mention was made of economic aid.] (*R. Moscow in Greek, June 2, 27 [SU 5, 29], July 6 [SU 11], Aug 16 [SU 17]; see also R. Tirana, R. Sofia, July 5 [EE 7]; TASS, April 30 [SU May 2]*)

Trade Agreements. A trade agreement between Cyprus and the USSR for 1962, providing for trade exchange to the value of £800,000 by either side, was signed in Cyprus on Dec 22. (*Cyprus Mail, Dec 23*)

Rumania, Poland. The Rumanian ambassador presented his credentials in May, and the Polish Chargé d'Affaires—in June. In Nov a Polish firm won the tender for the enlargement of Famagusta port. (*Cyprus Mail, May 19, June 15, Nov 3*)

THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

(Al-Jumhuriyah al-Iraqiyyah)

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

SYNOPSIS

The most serious event in Iraq's political history in 1961 was the rising of the Kurdish tribes under Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani. The rebels said they aimed at Kurdish autonomy within Iraq. The rising broke out in the summer and reached a peak in September when the government launched a counter-offensive which succeeded in driving the tribes back, but failed to subdue them. At the end of the year fighting flared up again. (For a detailed synopsis see below: The Kurdish Rising.)

Another important internal political development was the continued persecution and weakening of the Communists, and the growing strength of the nationalists, the regime's implacable enemies.

Observers described the prevailing political atmosphere in Iraq throughout the year as charged with discontent and conflict. Public security continued to be shaky, though perhaps less so than in 1959 when Communist influence was at its peak; in some areas, however, and especially in Mosul, political murders of reputed Communists by nationalists were reported to be a common occurrence. In March, the Baghdad taxi-cab drivers rioted for two days after an increase in the petrol tax. Both nationalist and leftist opponents of the regime fanned the flames. The authorities reacted vigorously, and the disturbances were quickly suppressed, with some loss of life.

There were no reports of plots against the regime nor unrest in the army during the year, though it was assumed that the army harboured disaffected elements, mainly nationalists. At the same time the authorities carried out no purges or large-scale preventive arrests, in contrast to the previous years of the new regime. Qasim was increasingly lenient towards fallen opponents; this policy was highlighted by the release from prison of the pro-UAR Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif, Qasim's junior partner in the revolution (in November), and the pardon granted to the five Ba'ath members who had participated in the attempt on Qasim's life in 1959 (in December).

Insofar as the Iraqi public was not actively opposed to the regime it was said to be apathetic and indifferent, a mood engendered by what was described as the revolution's lack of direction and PM Qasim's methods. While the officially-inspired cult of Gen. Qasim as "the sole leader" was as prominent as ever, he was widely thought to be unpopular; even his sanity was doubted. His standing was considered to have diminished still more following the Kurdish rising, the Kuwait crisis and the unsuccessful oil negotiations with the IPC.

The authorities allowed the press considerable latitude in criticizing the regime—Qasim's personality excepted—and to give expression to the struggle among the various political factions. Among the public, it was reported, derogatory remarks against the regime and Qasim per-

sonally were frequently made without particular fear of consequences, a phenomenon described as "startling in a police state." Primarily, the press voiced a demand for civil liberties and the rule of law, the abolition of military government and, above all, the promulgation of a constitution. The integrity as well as the efficiency of the civil service were also openly criticized as were faults in the implementation of the agrarian reform and the economic situation.

The government underwent minor changes. The Sovereignty Council, which under the 1958 provisional constitution acted as head of state, was reconstituted in November, after the death of its junior member, the Kurd an-Naqshabandi. Qasim appointed two new members, both quite unknown to the public, while Lt.-Gen. Najib ar-Rubay'i remained chairman.

Cabinet changes were made in May: the most significant was the replacement of Dr. Faysal as-Samir, the Minister of Guidance, the sole remaining leftist member, by the anti-Communist Brig. Isma'il Arif. In October Brig. Fu'ad Arif, Minister of State, resigned, presumably in connection with the Kurdish rising. The ministries of guidance and of oil affairs, and the directorate-general of security, were reorganized during the year in the interest of greater efficiency. It was, however, widely alleged that an additional reason for the reorganization of oil affairs was the government's desire to remove Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, a prominent leftist, from his position as Director of the General Board of Oil Affairs. The Board was abolished.

The government took steps to tackle various social problems. Enrolment at institutes of higher learning increased considerably; at the same time there were complaints of academic unemployment and lack of adequate student facilities. Comprehensive social security legislation was discussed a great deal but was not enacted. Agrarian reform progressed as far as expropriation and re-distribution of lands was concerned, but organizationally and socially it was widely held to be unsatisfactory and the authorities implicitly admitted this criticism to be just. The government made far-reaching tax concessions to the peasants. The building of popular housing continued; in the new 5-year plan, introduced in 1961, however, it was given a relatively minor place.

Legalized party life became increasingly more restricted. Four licensed parties were active at the beginning of the year, in varying degrees; all were unfriendly to the regime. Two of them officially ceased to exist in October. The Democratic Party of Kurdistan associated itself with the Kurdish rising, and consequently was prohibited. The National Democratic Party (NDP) suspended its activities after having suffered recurrent dissensions and secessions. The National Progressive Party under Muhammad Hadid, which had seceded from the NDP in April 1960, survived

the year, but seemed quite inactive; its newspaper, the daily *Al-Bayān*, criticized the regime, especially on the absence of democracy. The other party which survived was the minuscule legal Communist Party led by Da'ūd as-Sā'igh, established in 1960 with the aid of the authorities as a rival to the Communist Party proper.

Of more importance were the illegal political groupings. They comprised nationalist pan-Arab groups and the Communists, who were involved in an intense struggle with each other as well as with the government. The general impression was that the nationalists were growing stronger and the Communists weaker, though the latter were still thought to be the best organized political body. One reason for this change was the widespread public resentment and even hatred of the Communists, incurred by what was described as the "red terror" of 1959. The government's attitude was still more important: the Communists were persecuted whereas the nationalists were shown relative leniency. The Communist threat to the regime had appeared in the spring of 1959, after the nationalist opposition had been crushed, for the time being. The Communists had also utilized their ascendancy for entrenching themselves in public life, especially in front organizations: trade unions, peasants' and professional associations, which the nationalists had never done. Thus the government worked all through 1960 and 1961 to oust the Communists from these positions and to weaken them in other ways; the nationalists, the only real alternative civilian political force, benefited from this policy without even having to use much initiative. The government persisted in this policy though the Communists seemed to acquiesce in Qasim's regime for fear of a nationalist take-over while the nationalists clearly aimed at its overthrow.

The nationalists were divided in their attitude to President Abdel Nasser. In 1959 the Ba'ath party had split into pro-Nasserists and those determined on an independent policy, with the latter prevailing. In 1961, Fu'ād Rikābī, the exiled former Secretary-General of the Iraqi Ba'ath, was expelled from the party, and joined a rival pro-Nasser Ba'ath group. There were several pro-UAR groups, among them the "Arab Nationalists" (*qawmiyyūn al-ʿarab*); three of them were said to have formed a clandestine "National Front." Towards the end of the year, a report spoke of a link between the Ba'ath, the Istiqlal party and the *qawmiyyūn*.

The nationalists occasionally demonstrated in the streets, mainly in the nationalist stronghold of the A'zamiyah quarter of Baghdad, and they conducted subversive propaganda among pan-Arab, anti-Communist, and anti-Qasim lines. The professional organizations which had been wrested from Communist control with the government's help and which had been taken over by the nationalists served as outlets for their demands and resentments. The nationalists took the offensive against the Communists wherever they were stronger, especially in the Mosul area where many reputed Communists were reportedly murdered.

The Communists (*ittiḥād aṣṣ-ṣa'ab*) were said to be suffering from internal dissensions; a move to oust the leaders of the dominant pro-Soviet faction was reported in February, and another rift in November. The existence of conflicting tendencies in the party also was made clear by Communist policy pronouncements. The party condemned the government's hostility, the "reactionary in fluences" under which the regime had come, and its "anti-democratic policies." However, while the party depicted the national bourgeoisie—represented by Qasim—as inconsistent and prone to compromise, tendencies

against which the party was called on to struggle, it continued to advocate an alliance in a national front with those bourgeois groups which were hostile to imperialism. Whoever failed to observe these distinctions was condemned, those with "leftist tendencies" who struggled against the bourgeoisie as a whole, and the "defeatists and opportunists" who, because the government was anti-imperialist, failed to combat its reactionary measures.

The authorities persecuted the Communists throughout the year. Communist cells were liquidated and members arrested and tried, their newspapers were suppressed, and they were ousted from the leadership of associations and trade unions by various stratagems. The teachers' and the journalists' associations were wrested from Communist domination in February and in June respectively, the latter with the open assistance of the authorities; the General Federation of Trade Unions went anti-Communist in May. Only the Students' Association was still leftist-led by the end of the year, but at the cost of a split and a continuous struggle with the authorities. Of the front organizations only the Partisans of Peace managed to survive but the authorities closed all their premises; their chairman, Aziz Sharif, was apparently the only prominent Communist or near-Communist who remained on good terms with PM Qasim. The Union of Democratic Youth, another front organization, was dissolved by the authorities and so were a number of provincial branches of the pro-Communist Iraqi Woman's League. It should be mentioned, however, that no death sentences on Communists were carried out, and that Qasim did not publicly abuse them.

Apart from the Kurds, there was little news on the various religious and ethnic groups. The government took care to conciliate Islamic circles—including an amnesty for leaders of the extremist opposition Islamic party who had been imprisoned in October 1960—but apparently found little response. The Shi'is demanded the abolition of the personal status law enacted under the new regime, and they were reported to be extremely anti-Communist as a result of the anti-religious terror of 1959. There were reports of tension and occasional fighting between Turkomans and Kurds, as well as between Yazidis and Bedouin tribes. The authorities made some attempts to improve the situation of the nomads.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY

1961 was a year of planning in the Iraqi economy: in addition to the continued preparation of industrial and other surveys, mostly in the framework of existing agreements with the Communist countries, the government issued a Five-Year Development Plan for 1961-65 which aimed at doubling the national product within 10 years at a cost of JD566m. The government also continued to work out a legal framework for its economic policy in accord with the socio-economic concepts of the Qasim regime.

At the same time, there was no real improvement in the economic situation though agricultural production increased. Apart from administrative shortcomings the fault lay in the inconclusive negotiations with the IPC and political complications, namely the Kurdish rising and the Kuwait dispute. Oil output remained stationary, the agrarian question was far from being solved, industrial growth was unsatisfactory, the budget was once more based on deficit financing, the balance of payments worsened, and the foreign currency reserves continued to shrink.

Population. According to official figures the population of Iraq was 6,637m. The most populated of the 14 provinces were Baghdad—1.43m, Mosul—764,000, Basra—550,000 and Diwaniya—522,000.

Agricultural Output. Agricultural output, which had fallen steeply since 1958 through drought and shortcomings in the Agrarian Reform Organization, rose in 1960/1, as weather conditions improved, but remained lower than in 1957.

PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS
(in 1,000 tons)

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Barley	1,305	954	733	804	900
Wheat	1,118	757	657	529	851
Rice (paddy)	154	137	92	118	115
Cotton (lint)	14	7	4	8	9*
Pulses (chiefly spring)	34	22	27	25	32
Dates	323	324	367	337	not available

* Provisional.

Agricultural Taxation. Important developments took place in agricultural taxation. In March two taxes were abolished: the *Istihlak* tax of 10% on the value of produce reaching the market, and the land tax, ranging between 2% and 15% of the value of production. These taxes were replaced by a direct tax on agricultural lands ranging from 5% to 15% taking into account irrigation methods and disposal of produce; vegetable crops, cotton, jute, oil seeds, sugar beet and sugar cane were exempted for three years, and so were many peasants as individuals.

In Sept this law was rescinded by a new Agricultural Land Tax Law, which was made retroactive from April. All peasants were exempted from paying taxes on their crops; however, the Agrarian Reform Organization was to pay tax for peasants over whom it had authority and the Tobacco Monopoly and Dates Association was to pay 7% on behalf of growers instead of 12%. Landowners were to benefit from a substantial reduction, but were warned not to reimburse themselves from their peasants. The Minister of Finance hoped that the law would simplify administration, lighten the burden on the peasantry and, above all, contribute to checking the serious problem of flight from the land.

Agrarian Reform. The Agrarian Reform Law of Sept 1958 had limited holdings to a maximum of 250 hectares of irrigated, and 500 hectares of unirrigated land. Surplus lands were to be expropriated in return for compensation in the form of 3% debentures redeemable after 20 years, and redistributed to peasants in plots of 7.5 to 15 hectares of irrigated, and 15 to 30 hectares of unirrigated land. According to Iraqi sources the total area covered by the law was over 2.2m. hectares, of which over 1.2m. hectares were expropriated by Aug 31, 1961; only 427,998 hectares, however, had reached the state of "finalized expropriation." The total area distributed by Aug 31, 1961, was 517,210 hectares and 28,877 peasant families had been "fully investigated for the purpose of land redistribution." Furthermore, over 1.5m. hectares were leased to peasants under a temporary administrative arrangement, 58% being state domains and the rest expropriated lands.

The delay in establishing agricultural cooperatives, mistakes in the implementation of the reform and tension between landowners and peasants, as well as the drought, were held responsible by Iraqi critics for the fall in agricultural production.

Irrigation and Agricultural Development. In Nov the Darbandi Khan dam was dedicated although it was to be completed only in 1962/3. The dam was to irrigate the Diyala basin and had a projected storage capacity of 3,000 million cubic metres; its estimated costs were ID26m.

Grain silos were built and large government farms were established under the Soviet aid agreement (see p 298a for details). Numerous demonstration plots and stations for pest control were also established.

Industry. Apart from oil, industry's share in the national product remained low, about 9%. The volume of industrial output was reported to have increased from ID104m. in 1960 to ID110m. in 1961.

Measures were taken to encourage investments in industry and building. In April 30% of inherited industrial shares and properties were freed from inheritance tax; tax exemptions were also granted for new buildings and 50% of Arab capital invested in industry and building. In May, a Law on Capital Investments in Industry gave special concessions to industrial plants with at least ID3,000 worth of machinery if 60% of the capital was in Iraqi hands and at least 90% of the employees were Iraqis, apart from essential foreign experts. The law provided for a 10-year exemption from land tax, stamp duty and profit tax on profits of up to 15% of the paid-up capital, exemption from customs duty on raw materials, the sale or lease of state lands for industrial purposes on favourable terms, and the formation of an Industrial Development Committee to supervise the execution of the law, comprised of representatives of the ministries of finance, trade and industry and the Federation of Industries.

In December the Minister of Trade ordered the 1960 Commercial Agencies' Law to be implemented within 6 to 12 months: all agencies except those dealing with exports were to be confined to Iraqi nationals or companies with majority Iraqi shareholdings, and all foreign-owned agencies transferred to Iraqi ownership. The law affected 663 foreign-owned trade agencies.

In January a step towards industrial cooperation between the private and the public sectors was taken with the formation of the Amara Industries Company (textiles) and the Hilla Industries Company (tannery); each concern with a capital of ID100,000, 40% to be subscribed by the state-owned Industrial Bank and the rest by the public.

The capital of the Industrial Bank, which aimed at encouraging private capital to enter industry, was increased from ID8m. to ID10m.

Despite all the encouragement given to the development of private industry it was only in the public sector that appreciable progress was made, though a cigarette factory in Sulaymaniya was the only major project reported to have been completed. Planning and execution of the various enterprises envisaged in the agreements with the USSR in 1959 and Czechoslovakia in 1960 continued. (Details on pp 296-9.) Tenders were also awarded to US, Dutch and Swiss firms. Planning started on various state-owned enterprises, among them a reed paper mill, the Sulaymaniya sugar refinery and the Kufa shoe plant.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

Official figures showed that industrial production in the private sector retained its lead over the public sector but neither showed much advance: the value of production in the private sector rose from ID80.0m. in 1960 to ID85.4m. in 1961, and the number of workers from 83,000 to 88,000; in the public sector the value increased from ID23.1m. to ID24.5m. and the number of workers rose from 22,000 to 23,000.

For industry in the Five-Year Plan—see below.

Oil. The output of crude oil continued to increase, though at a slower rate:

CRUDE OIL OUTPUT IN IRAQ

Year	Tons (m)	Rate of growth
1959	41.8	
1960	47.5	14%
1961	49.0	3¼%

The 3¼% growth of Iraqi output in 1961 compared with a 7% growth in the Middle East at large. All oil continued to be produced by the IPC and its subsidiaries, except for about 0.5m. tons in the Naft Khaneh field of the state-owned Khanaqin oil company.

The drastic slow-down in the rate of growth was thought to be due to the increase in port dues at Basra and to Qasim's general policy as exemplified in the negotiations with the IPC (pp 291-2). Oil royalties decreased from ID95.1m. in 1960 to ID94.8m. in 1961

because posted prices fell by 2½ to 6% in August 1960.

Development work by the oil companies continued. The "looping" (i.e. laying parallel pipes along an existing pipe-line by using existing pumps) of the pipe-line from the northern fields to the Mediterranean terminals was completed, increasing their annual marketing capacity from 28m. tons in 1959 to 48m. tons. The construction of the floating oil-harbour in the south also progressed. With the completion of these two projects export capacity would rise to 70m. tons per annum.

Foreign experts invited by the government examined the following projects: The development of the state-managed Khanaqin field in eastern Iraq, the erection of a refinery at Basra, and the expansion of the one at Dawra near Baghdad. A tender was issued for the laying of the first section of a pipe-line from Khanaqin to the K3 pumping station of the IPC's Kirkuk-Mediterranean pipe-line via Dawra which would enable oil from Khanaqin to be refined at Dawra and exported.

In March the General Petroleum Administration was liquidated and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Oil Affairs. This step was to streamline administration though political motives were said to have played a part: the desire to deprive the Communist Party of the stronghold it was thought to hold in the General Petroleum Administration.

Budget and Public Finance. Figures for the 1960/61 and 1961/62 budgets appear in the following tables; figures for 1957/8, the last year of the former regime, are included for comparison.

THE BUDGET

(in ID million)

Year (April-March)	Revenue		Expenditure		Deficit	
	Estimate	Actual	Estimate	Actual	Estimate	Actual
1957/8	68.4	61.8	70.7	73.8	2.3	12.0
1960/1	102.1	100.7*	116.3	102.8*	14.2	2.1*
1961/2	112.0		120.7		8.7	—

* provisional.

REVENUES

(in ID thousand)

Item	1957/8		1960/1		1961/2	
	Actual	%	Actual	Estimate	%	
Oil Revenue	14,655	23.7	47,347	49,000	43.7	
Customs and Excise Tax	29,143	47.1	32,173	37,468	33.5	
Income, Excise Profit and Inheritance Taxes	2,710	4.4	4,230	5,300	4.7	
Agricultural Taxes	2,774	4.5	1,903	2,151	1.9	
Property Tax	970	1.6	1,618	1,503	1.4	
Stamp Duties	1,014	1.7	1,167	1,245	1.1	
Post and Telegraph	2,560	4.1	2,779	3,175	2.8	
Other Government Agencies	6,192	10.0	5,994	9,631	8.6	
Miscellaneous	1,833	2.9	3,246	2,571	2.3	

50% of the oil revenue went into the ordinary budget, as compared with 30% under the monarchy. Direct taxation remained low. The increase in the estimated revenue from customs and excise taxes was in part due to the

increased tax on petrol, alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, decreed in March.

Expenditure is shown in the following table.

EXPENDITURES
(in ID thousand)

Item	1957/8		1960/1	1961/2	
	Actual	%	Actual	Estimate	%
National Defence and Security	30,092	40.8	40,311	48,311	40.2
Education	11,238	15.2	23,783	25,815	21.5
Financial and Economic Affairs	9,242	12.5	11,571	8,962	7.5
Health	4,862	6.7	5,865	6,838	5.7
Pensions and Gratuities	3,726	5.0	5,257	6,258	5.2
Social and Municipal Affairs	6,519	8.8	5,393	5,200	4.3
Communications, Public Works and Housing	3,557	4.8	3,895	4,919	4.1
Administration and Justice	2,906	3.9	2,920	3,663	3.1
Foreign Affairs and National Guidance	1,155	1.6	3,575	2,778	2.3
Miscellaneous	488	0.7	194	6,925	6.1 ¹

¹ Incl. errors and omissions.

The increase in defence expenditure is noteworthy.

The Five-Year Plan. The five-year plan for 1961/2-1965/6 was published in Oct. Superseding the interim 5-year plan of 1959, it was intended as the first stage in doubling the national income within 10 years (like the UAR plan for 1960-65).

DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENTS 1961/2-65/6

Branch	Investments in ID million	Investments as % of total	Interim Plan 1959 as % of total
Industry	166.8	30.0	10.3
Agriculture	112.9	20.3	12.7
Communications	136.5	24.5	26.6
Building and Housing	140.1	25.2	50.4
Total	556.3	100.0	100.0

Annual allocations were estimated at ID97.1m. in 1961/2, ID108.1m. in 1962/3, ID117.6m. in 1963/4, ID119.6m. in 1964/5 and ID113.9m. in 1965/6.

The plan was to be financed from the following sources: (1) oil royalties—ID315.8m.; (2) Soviet and Czechoslovak credits for specified projects—ID77.2m.; (3) profits of local authorities and government undertakings—ID30.8m.; (4) loans, internal and foreign—ID142.5m.

It was intended to increase the percentage of oil royalties spent on development from 50% in 1961 to 56% in 1964 and 60% in 1965 (in comparison with 70% under the monarchy).

The main investments envisaged were:

Industry:—Electricity—ID38.1m.; chemical industries (including caustic soda, ethylene, poly-ethylene, P.V.C., fertilizers, paper, rayon yarn, tyres)—ID36.4m.; textiles—ID23.7m.; metals (including a steel mill and an agri-

cultural machinery factory)—ID17.6m.; Basra oil refinery—ID10.6m.; ceramics and glass—ID6m.; geological surveys—ID4.6m.; oil and gas pipelines—ID4.2m.

Additional sums were earmarked for medicines, various consumer goods, atomic energy projects and a centre for industrial training.

Agriculture:—Water storage—ID14.9m.; irrigation and drainage—ID66.4m.; government farms and tractor stations—ID10.8m.; artesian wells—ID5.8m.; silos—ID3.3m. **Communications:**—Railways—ID39.8m.; roads and bridges—ID36.4m.; ports and shipping (including the Umm Qasr port project)—ID18.8m.; Baghdad airport—ID11.2m.; broadcasting and television—ID7.6m.; posts and telegraph (mainly telephone) ID3.5m.

Building and Housing:—Ministry of Defence projects—ID30m.; housing schemes and slum clearance—ID24.1m. (including ID10m. for housing army officers in Baghdad); educational institutions—ID13.8m.; hospitals—ID11.6m.; administrative buildings—ID11.6m.; water supply—ID4.2m.; sewage schemes—ID8.0m.; jails—ID2.2m.

Finance and Prices. In 1961 the means of payment amounted to ID110.2m. as compared with ID107m. in 1960, ID114m. in 1959 and ID98m. in 1958. The rate of currency in relation to demand deposits did not significantly change from the two previous years; in 1961 currency totalled ID75.2m. and demand deposits ID35.0m.

According to Iraqi sources, the wholesale index for Baghdad fell from 110 in 1960 to 109 in 1961 (1953=100); in 1958 and 1959 it had been 97 and 106 respectively. On the other hand the Baghdad cost-of-living index rose slightly from 111 in 1960 to 112 in 1961 and the food index—from 117 to 120.

External Trade and Payments. In 1961 the trade deficit (excluding oil) again grew, mainly because imports increased by ID6.7m. over 1960, despite government efforts to limit them.

ECONOMIC SURVEY
FOREIGN TRADE
(in ID thousand)

Year	Imports	Exports Excluding Oil and Re-exports	Oil Exports	Re-exports	Total Exports
1958	109,796	14,248	185,540	2,458	202,246
1959	116,500	11,465	201,674	3,140	216,279
1960	138,915	7,976	222,626	3,020	233,622
1961	145,671	7,874	223,100	5,381	236,355

Low agricultural production was the principal factor in the decline of exports, and accounted to some extent for the increase in imports. Apart from oil, the main exports were dates (ID2.6m. in 1961 compared to ID3.5m. in 1960), wool, cement, hides and furs, and cotton. There was a new beginning in the export of grain (ID0.8m.). The main imports were motor vehicles (including tractors) and spare parts, electrical machinery and other mechanical equipment, tea, sugar and grain.

83.7% of imports came from the West (85.5% in 1960). Britain maintained her position as Iraq's chief supplier with 22.2% of the total. Combined exports from Communist countries amounted to 12.3%, as compared with 9.7% in 1960. The best customers for Iraqi exports (excluding oil and re-exports) were Lebanon (14.5%), India (9.7%), the USSR (9.5%), the US (7.3%), Saudi Arabia (6.8%) and China (6.8%).

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(in ID million)

Goods and Services	1958	1959	1960	1961
Oil exports	187	202	223	225
Other exports (including re-exports)	16	14	11	12
	203	216	234	237
Imports	-109	-116	-139	-146
Transfers by Oil Companies	-80	-83	-95	-97
Net Balance on Current Accounts	14	17	0	-6
Central Government Transfers, Payments and Loans	2	-3	-5	0
Monetary Movements	-14	1	20	20
Errors and Omissions	-2	-15	-15	-14

Social Legislation and Related Matters. The cost-of-living allowance for government employees earning less than ID10 a month was increased from February 1. In Sept the regulations for the protection of women in industry were tightened. Homes were distributed under various government housing schemes and more extensive measures in this field were promised.

Throughout the year there were reports that extensive social legislation was about to be enacted. In January the Acting Minister of Social Affairs envisaged relief on a national scale for the aged, disabled, orphans and poor in general, which would bring their income to a minimum of 120 fils a day in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, and 100 fils elsewhere. During the latter part of the year, official quarters spoke of plans to replace the 1956 Social In-

surance Law. However, by the end of the year no legislation had been enacted.

Education. Considerable progress was made in education. According to Iraqi statistics, in 1961 63% of the population were illiterate. The number of pupils at primary schools had risen from 413,000 to 860,000 since the revolution; at secondary schools "by 147%"; and at colleges etc. from 5,400 to 14,700.

Among the major difficulties and drawbacks of higher education, the President of Baghdad University listed the inadequate preparedness of secondary-school graduates for university demands, the absence of an overall scheme for the constructive absorption of educated youth, and unemployment among graduates in the humanities and agriculture.

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VIEWS AND POLICIES: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

[Qassim's views on the character of the regime, its aims, and the dangers besetting it had not changed (see MER 1960 pp 232-4). His outlook was optimistic; he strongly stressed the social significance of the July 14 revolution. The chief enemy remained the "imperialists"; during the second half of the year, in the wake of the Kuwait dispute and the Kurdish rising, Qassim's attacks on imperialism became ever more frequent and violent, and these, in contrast to 1960, became in fact the central theme of his statements.]

The Republic Is Safe and Strong. Qassim, Basra, March 26: "We are living in a secure and quiet country..." (*INA, March 26*)

Qassim, Baghdad, Aug 17: "The Iraq Republic, brothers, is today stronger and more firmly established than ever before. As each day passes our republic... adheres more firmly to order, organization and discipline." (*INA, Aug 19*)

Qassim, Baghdad, Nov 21: "Stability now prevails in the country." (*INA, Nov 21*)

Enemies of the Republic Defeated. Qassim, Baghdad, May 6: "Those who have worked against the country's interests are divided into three groups: Some of them worked for the good of imperialism; these... have been defeated and crushed. Another group... were deceived; they have returned to reason... The third group are the opportunists; these will soon return... to cooperate for the sake of God, of the people and of the homeland." (*INA, May 7*)

Qassim, Darbandi Khan, Nov 23: "The catastrophes and the calamities which befell the country, and which were staged by the imperialists, the rank-splitters and the saboteurs after the revolution, are all but bubbles... rash acts which we have overcome with patience and faith." (*INA, Nov 23*)

Improving Social Conditions. Qassim, Baghdad, May 24: "The principles of your revolution stipulate that all the poor and needy should enjoy pure water and electricity in every home; each family should own its house." (*INA, May 24*)

Qassim, Baghdad, Feb 20: "The revolution... has raised the standard of the people... If you follow the trade figures month after month you will notice that they rise. Living conditions are now on a high level; we endeavour to improve them further and help the poor. At present we are working earnestly to do away with slums." (*INA, Feb 20*)

Social Justice to be Achieved but Not at Expense of the Rich. Qassim, Darbandi Khan, Nov 23: "The blessed July 14 Revolution came for the good of the people; it came to strike at imperialism; it came to establish brotherhood and affection; it came to raise the people's standard; it came to guide the poor and the weak, to make them happy... Our revolution came not to lower the just level of the rich, but to raise the level of the poor to that of the rich." (*INA, Nov 23*)

National Unity and Freedom of Religion. Qassim, Basra, March 26: "Our country takes care of the interests of all, without partiality or discrimination; in our country [all] other religions are free..." (*INA, March 26*)

Parties, Sects Contravene National Unity. Qassim, Darbandi Khan, Nov 23: "Do not be disunited in sects and parties; I warn you, if you are divided against the enemy, the imperialists and the traitors lie in wait for you. The country... requires your sincere and continuous efforts, unity and work." (*INA, Nov 23*)

Imperialists the Root of Evil. Qassim blamed agents of imperialism for the Baghdad drivers' strike in March (*INA, April 2*) and for the Kurdish rising. (*INA, Sept 26*)

THE SOVEREIGNTY COUNCIL

[At the beginning of 1961, the Sovereignty Council consisted of only two active members—Lt. Gen. Muhammad Najib ar-Rubay'i as president and Khalid an-Naqshabandi as a member; a third member, Muhammad Mahdi Kubabah, had not made an appearance since Feb 1959, though no formal resignation was ever made public.]

Khalid an-Naqshabandi died at Baghdad on Nov 27. The deceased, a Kurd, was born near Amadiya in 1916. He became an army officer and later joined the civil service. Prior to the Revolution he served as governor of Arbil province. He was appointed a member of the Sovereignty Council on July 14, 1958. (*IT, Nov 28, 29*)

On Dec 1 PM Qassim, in his capacity as C-in-C of the armed forces, issued a notification announcing that the Sovereignty Council had been re-formed as follows: Lt. Gen. Muhammad Najib ar-Rubay'i—president [no change]; Abd al-Majid Kamūnah and Rashid Arif—members. [Kamūnah, a Shi'i, was born at Karbala in 1911; he joined the civil service and until his promotion to the Council served as a member of the Civil Service Board. Rashid Arif, a Kurd, was born in 1910. A judge, he was appointed shortly after the Revolution as a member of the Court of Cassation, in which capacity he acted as chairman of the Higher Purge Committee of 1958. Both new members had hitherto been quite unknown to the public at large.] (*IT, Dec 3*)

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Ministers Criticized as Leftists and Incompetents. In March and April *Ath-Thawrah* attacked the civilian ministers, singling out the ministers of Planning (Shaybani), Guidance (Samiir), Housing (Rifa'at), and Commerce (Zahawi). These ministers were "doomed to failure"; besides inclining towards Communism, they were incompetent. The Minister of Oil Affairs [Salmān] was explicitly exempted from this criticism and praised for being "imbued with the principles of the revolution." (*IT, March 2*)

Later *Ath-Thawrah* criticized the Ministry of Industry [Minister—Abd al-Hamid] for lack of planning and for "manufacturing reports." (*IT, April 27*)

Reshuffle. On May 14 a Republican Decree, signed by the members of the Sovereignty Council and by the PM, announced the following changes in the Cabinet, in the public interest and according to the suggestions of the PM: Mustafa Ali, the Minister of Justice, and Abbas al-Baldawi, the Minister of Municipalities, were relieved from their posts, each "according to his request" and on grounds of health; Fayal al-Samiir, the Minister of Guidance, was relieved of his post because of his appointment to the cadre of the Foreign Ministry. The following

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Ministry	Government on Jan 1, 1961	Changes Introduced During the Year
Prime Minister	Maj.-Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim	
Defence	Maj.-Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim (acting)	
Interior	Brig. Ahmad Muhammad Yahya	
Foreign Affairs	Hāshim Jawād	
Justice	Mustafa Ali	May 14, Rashid Mahmūd
Health	Brig. Ahmad Abd al-Malik ash-Shawwāf	
Planning	Tal'at ash-Shaybāni	
Communications	Dr Hasan at-Talabāni	
Education	Brig. Isma'il Arif	
Guidance	Dr Faysal as-Sāmīr	May 14, Brig. Isma'il Arif (acting)
Commerce	Nāzim az-Zahāwī	
Agrarian Reform	Brig. Ahmad Muhammad Yahya (acting)	
Oil Affairs	Muhammad Salmān	
Housing, Works	Hasan Rif'at	
Municipalities	Albās al-Baldāwī	May 14, Bākir ad-Dujayli
Social Affairs	Dr Hasan at-Talabāni (acting)	
Finance	Dr Muzaffar Hussein Jamil	
Agriculture	Brig. Fu'ād Arif (acting)	May 14, Col. Adil Jalāl
Industry	Brig. Muhi ad-Din Abd al-Hamid	
State	Brig. Fu'ād Arif	Oct 1, Brig. Fu'ād Arif relieved

appointments were made: Rashid Mahmūd, Head of the Codification Department—Minister of Justice; Bākir ad-Dujayli, the Governor of Sulaymaniya province—Minister of Municipalities; Col. Adil Jalāl, the Governor of Diyala province—Minister of Agriculture; and Brig. Isma'il Arif, the Minister of Education—acting Minister of Guidance. (IT, May 15)

The portfolio of Agriculture had been in the hands of Brig. Fu'ād Arif, the Minister of State (see MER 1960, p. 235).

[Faysal as-Sāmīr was widely considered leftist, and was attacked as such.] Writing before the reshuffle, *Ath-Thamrah* said the Ministry of Guidance (as well as that of Housing) had been "a failure from the outset and continued to be filled with opportunists" (quoted in IT, March 2). Sāmīr left Iraq on July 19 to take up his appointment as chargé d'affaires in Jakarta. (IT, July 20)

In July it was reported that Hāshim Jawād, the Foreign Minister, had tendered his resignation to Qasim who refused to accept it; Jawād's step was believed to be connected with the Kuwait crisis. (*Manar, Jordan, July 4*)

On Oct 1 Brig. Fu'ād Arif was relieved of his post as Minister of State "due to his wish and personal circumstances." [The dismissal at this time may have been related to Arif being a Kurd.] (INA, Oct 2)

Ministry of Oil—Reorganization. A law promulgated on March 7 abolished the General Board of Oil Affairs [established in 1959 and since then under the directorship of Abd al-Fattāh Ibrahīm, the prominent leftist politician and initiator of the abortive Republican party; see MER 1960, p. 244]. In its stead an inter-departmental Oil Board was formed, headed by the Minister of Oil Affairs. An explanatory note said the law aimed at unifying all

regulations concerning oil affairs and at ensuring their supervision by the Ministry of Oil, which had been previously impaired by the powers of the Board. (IT, March 8)

[It was widely alleged that an additional reason for the reorganization was the government's desire to remove Abd al-Fattāh Ibrahīm from a post of official authority.]

Criticism of Administration and Civil Service. There was occasional criticism of government administration, efficiency and integrity.

Al-Bayān claimed that the enthusiasm engendered by the revolution was on the wane, as private interests took precedence over public consideration in some government departments; the civil service was growing in numbers, but declining in quality; bribery was rampant and members of the public who refused to comply were penalized (IT, Feb 9). Later in the year the paper claimed that corruption, luxury and indifference, which had characterized the civil service under the monarchy, had gradually returned, mainly because of its great expansion. "In addition to all these there is the distressing government red tape which is causing general resentment and dependency and which encourages maladministration." (IT, Nov 30)

THE ARMY, POLITICAL ASPECTS

Strength and Organization. In 1961 the strength of the Iraqi army was reported as 64,000 officers and men. (*Lamethav, Israel, July 4*, quot. "British intelligence circles.")

At the end of the year there were four infantry and one armoured divisions; viz: inf. divs. 1, 2, 3, 5 and armoured div. 4. The GOCs at that time were—Brig.

Khalil Sa'id, GOC 1st Div; Brig. Mahmūd Abd ar-Razzāq, GOC 2nd Div; Brig. Abd al-Karīm Muhammad, GOC 3rd Div; Brig. Abd al-Jabbār Sa'di, GOC (acting) 4th Div; Brig. Asim Muhammad Amin, GOC (acting) 5th Div. [Brig. Jawād, GOC 5th Div; was in Europe at the time—*Hayat*, Aug 15; *Bilad*, Dec 1] (*R. Baghdad*, Dec 3 [W 7])

Changes in Command. [In contrast to the previous years of the regime, no major purge was known to have taken place in the army.]

In Jan Col. Hasan Abūdi, OC Mosul district, was relieved of his post, and Brig. Qasim Attār Bāshi, GOC 5th Brigade, took over in addition to his existing command. (*Ahali*, Jan 27)

On Feb 21 Brig. Abd al-Jabbār Jawād was appointed GOC Fifth Division (*Ahali*, Feb 22). [He supplanted Maj.-Gen. Ghālīb Abd al-Azīz, who was Asst. CGS.]

In July Brig. Sayyid Hamid Hussein, GOC 1st Div, was relieved of his post and appointed governor of Diyala province. (*Akhbar*, July 30; *IT*, Aug 3)

[In all these changes may be detected a security significance. Brig. Jawād was Qasim's brother-in-law. Brig. Hussein was reputed to have aroused Qasim's suspicion by having accumulated in his hands too much power as *de facto* military ruler over Iraq's seven southern provinces, and being a devout Shi'i in close contact with the religious circles of Karbala and Najaf, he was apparently none too friendly to the regime; a farewell party arranged for Brig. Hussein by Najaf notables was called off "at his personal request" (*Akhbar*, July 30). Col. Abūdi, on the other hand, was reputedly an active Communist, in an area still smarting under the aftermath of the Shawwāf rebellion.]

In Aug, Brig. Sayyid Hamid Sayyid Hussein, the former Commander of the 1st Division [garrisoning the

seven southern provinces of Iraq] took over his new post as Governor of Diyala Province (*IT*, Aug 3). [Brig. Hamid had been known for his ruthless persecution of Communists in the area of his command. Unsubstantiated but wide-spread rumours had made him a rival, if not a would-be successor, to Qasim, perhaps because his energy matched his military resources.]

SECURITY MEASURES

Curfew Abolished. From Army Day 1961 (Jan 6) night curfew was abolished throughout Iraq. (*R. Amman*, Jan 7-*IMB*, Jan 8)

Automatic Weapons Banned. On Jan 25 a comprehensive law regulating the manufacture, possession and bearing of weapons was promulgated. It replaced the law of 1939 and its amendments; the new law was to come into force on April 26 (full text in *Bayan*, Jan 27). On May 14 a clarification of the law was to come into effect; it defined "automatic weapons" as "war weapons," and hence absolutely forbade their possession and carrying. (*INA*, May 13)

Ban on Photographs. An order issued on June 1 forbade the taking of photographs in various places, including dung-hills, market-places, ruins, bridges, graveyards, slaughter-houses, oil pipe-lines and military camps. (*ANA*, June 1 [3])

New Aliens' Residence Law. On June 5 a new aliens' entry and residence law was promulgated replacing the law of 1938, to take effect after three months. The law gave wide powers to the directors of public security; the power to delay the departure of an alien was vested in the Minister of the Interior. (*R. Baghdad*, June 5 [7])

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC

EVALUATION OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION

Following are impressions gained by foreign observers during the course of the year:

General Atmosphere: Insecurity and Apathy. The majority of observers described the atmosphere as charged with suspicion, insecurity and discontent. The varying of nuances, as the year went on, may have been due as much to the differing impressions of the onlookers as to changes in the situation.

An impression published in Jan [though possibly gained in part at the end of 1960] was that "...from the moment your aircraft lands... you feel yourself enveloped in a world of fear, suspicion and conflict. Army officers and green uniformed police dominate the scene." "Bitterness and disillusionment" were everywhere. Political arrests were common, phones tapped and letters opened. All the same, critical and derogatory remarks directed against the regime and Qasim personally were frequently made without particular fear of consequences—a phenomenon "startling in a police state" for which the observer offered no explanation (*Sunday Times*, Jan 29). Another report, from the same period, also mentioned that "people talk with less fear" and added that "the atmosphere in Iraq is saner"; it should, however, be mentioned that the comparison was with the beginning of 1959, when

Communist influence was at its peak. (*Daily Telegraph*, Feb 15)

The atmosphere at Mosul was found to be especially oppressive. Here public security was in a state of deterioration ever since the Shawwāf mutiny of March 1959. Communist atrocities perpetrated during the aftermath of that affair were "still fresh in the public mind and the Nationalists are not willing to wait for the police to act"; in consequence the murder of leftists was an almost daily occurrence. The population was "living in a state of extreme fear." "Even doctors refuse to answer calls at night." Several businessmen interviewed by the observers said that "the situation was so extremely explosive that they were afraid that the violence might spread into large-scale killings." (*Aidan Crawley and Virginia Cowles*, *Sunday Times*, Jan 29)

A report published in July mentioned "significant signs of unrest... directed as much against worsening economic conditions as the strange Messianic posturings of Qasim," and stressed in this connection the "excise riots" (taxi-drivers' riots) at Baghdad in March, the "collapse of farming" and the dissipation of oil revenues. However, this report said that "no one is prepared to speak out openly and condemn the PM." (*Colin Jackson* in *Irish Times*, July 18)

Later reports commented on the lack of popular enthu-

siasm for the July 14 celebrations (*Daily Telegraph*, July 13; *NYT*, July 23; *Guardian*, Aug 1). The *Guardian* analyzed the atmosphere prevailing in Baghdad at that time as one of dejection caused, in the main, by "the revolution's lack of direction"; "now that the revolution has let off the old anti-imperialist head of steam, nobody is sure what the next step should be." Qasim no more than others. Apathy resulted. (*David Holden, Guardian*, Aug 1)

Apathy and inertia, too, were the prevailing sentiments among the Iraqi public towards the end of the year, according to *The Economist*, due to a lack of "enthusiasm for Qasim's method" and wide-spread disbelief in his capability (see also below). This indifference existed side by side with "the barricade of the army, the secret police and ... stringent security arrangements." (*Economist*, Nov 4)

Qasim's Personality, Cult, Tactics, Diminished Standing. On the whole, Qasim's standing was regarded as low.

There was a general feeling that Qasim lived in a world of his own, divorced from reality. His "piercing wild eyes ... with his curious fixed smile" (*Irish Times*, July 18) seemed a key-note to more than his physical appearance alone. One observer was impressed by his inability, or unwillingness, during an interview to "grapple with a single question" put to him, staring all the time into vacancy; in consequence, the reporter "could understand not only the political uncertainty but the economic confusion that prevails in Iraq." (*Sunday Times*, Jan 29)

In Baghdad the officially-inspired Qasim cult was as prominent as ever. His picture was posted on almost every billboard, sometimes "four identical portraits on the same wall," and appeared on triumphal arches and restaurant menus. A new song proclaimed "Oh Karim, He Restored Our Glory." A patriotic sketch broadcast for Revolution Day depicted him slaying with a white sword the villains Imperialism, Treason and Israel. His official appellation was "The Faithful Leader." (*Sunday Times*, Jan 29; *Daily Telegraph*, Feb 15; *Irish Times*, July 18; *Newsweek*, July 24; *Guardian*, Aug 1; see also *MER* 1960, p 236.)

However, as an Iraqi told a British reporter, "the Leader is not popular" (*Sunday Times*, Jan 29); this conclusion appeared to be universally accepted, though one observer thought that Qasim's prestige, in contrast to his popularity, was higher than in 1959, owing to the recession of Communism, a more competent civil service and his handling of the recent Arab League conference in Baghdad (*Daily Telegraph*, Feb 15). In general, Qasim's diminished standing was considered due to his lack of administrative talent, his ignorance of economics, his clemency towards convicted Communists (*Daily Telegraph*, Feb 15); some thought him "a man incapable of rational thought whose only conspicuous talent lies in the field of conspiracy and intrigue" (*Sunday Times*, Jan 29). One reporter stated that many Iraqis doubted his sanity (*Guardian*, July 13). The Kurdish rising harmed his position. (*Financial Times*, Sept 15)

There was a consensus of opinion that Qasim maintained his rule mainly by manoeuvring between opposing political forces, restrictive measures, judiciously applied gestures of encouragement and a complex system of mutual control. Thus, "when he appoints a provincial governor who is a Nationalist, he invariably gives him a military commander who is a Communist" (*Sunday Times*, Jan 29; *NYT*, July 13; *Newsweek*, July 24). The loyalty of the army was, of course, indispensable

to Qasim's existence; though disaffected, mainly nationalist, elements were no doubt present there as well. Qasim seemed able to rely on his intelligence service to forestall any attempted coup against him (*Scotsman*, Jan 14; *NYT*, July 23). A feeling among the public that a change of regime might be for the worse was a factor in Qasim's favour (*Guardian*, Aug 1). The secession of Syria from the UAR was seen, five weeks after the event, as strengthening Qasim's position only marginally. (*Economist*, Nov 4)

Communists, Nationalists and Centre. The general impression was that "the political parties have no scope for activity. Qasim does not wish it." (*Daily Telegraph*, Feb 15)

There was a consensus of opinion that the Communists were out of favour with the authorities, harassed, driven underground and incapable of endangering the regime for the time being. The general public would not forget their excesses during the first year after the revolution; in Mosul and its vicinity, anti-Communist hysteria had reached the point where it was "dangerous for anyone to appear in the streets wearing red" (*Irish Times*, July 18). Trade unions and front organizations also experienced the chicanery to which the Communists were subjected.

Qasim's personal attitude was seen as more ambiguous. Though he had been chiefly responsible for denying victory to the Communists in 1959, and had not seriously tried to impede the anti-Communist tide since then, he needed the Communist support against the nationalists, his more implacable enemies. One British observer called him "a moderate nationalist with a sneaking sympathy for Communists." (*Daily Telegraph*, Feb 15)

At the same time the Communists were held to be the best organized political body in Iraq, too well entrenched to be eliminated. They were lying low; their feeling that they were in no position to take over, and their dread of a nationalist upsurge, made them acquiesce in Qasim's regime with all its drawbacks. The licensed Communist party of Da'ud al-Salhi was regarded as a worthless tool of Qasim. (*Washington Post*, Jan 29; *Time*, Feb 10; *Daily Worker*, Feb 28; *Financial Times*, May 12; *Irish Times*, July 18; *NYT*, July 23; *Guardian*, Aug 1; *Economist*, Nov 4)

Observers did not profess to know very much about the nationalists. Popular feeling in favour of union with the UAR expressed itself in Baghdad on the occasion of the arrival of the UAR Foreign Minister to attend the Arab League Meeting in Jan (Time, Feb 10). An underground "Nationalist Front," still uncommitted, was reported as having been "recently" formed by three nationalist groups, which were not further defined (*Financial Times*, May 12). A later report mentioned the Ba'ath and the "pro-Nasser Arab Nationalists" as working together (*Scotsman*, Oct 28). All nationalists were fanatically anti-Communist. Opinions were divided as to whether they were a match for the Communists in influence and popular strength, as distinct from organization (*Monde*, Feb 5; *Irish Times*, July 18; *Scotsman*, Oct 28) but there seemed to be an impression that Nationalists were growing stronger and the Communists weaker. (*Financial Times*, May 12)

The centre parties were seen as ineffective, partially because of the split in the National Democratic camp, but chiefly because of the generally unfavourable atmosphere. (*Guardian*, Aug 1; *Scotsman*, Oct 28)

Outlook. Observers were wary of forecasts, but feelings

as regards Qasim's chances of survival seemed to be divided. Since he had confounded prophets of woe so often, there was no cogent reason why he should not go on doing so for an indefinite time. (*Daily Telegraph*, Feb 15)

In the summer *The Economist* saw hope for the regime in its recent Arab policy, for which it gave chief credit to Hashim Jawad, the Foreign Minister (*Economist*, June 3). *The Financial Times* too struck a cautiously optimistic note, suggesting that the Iraqi economy "has begun to find its feet" (*Financial Times*, Sept 15). Most observers gave gloomy forecasts, implying that they did not see how Qasim could maintain his rule much longer (*Sunday Times*, Jan 29; *Irish Times*, July 18; *Newsweek*, July 24; *Guardian*, Aug 1; *Economist*, Nov 4). The Kurdish rising further darkened the prospect. Thus *The Economist* commented: "The danger of a better organized, more united Kurdish rebellion has been postponed, not ended; and General Qasim will probably find that having been brutal once, he has no alternative but to be brutal again." (*Economist*, Nov 4)

THE DEMAND FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES CRITICISM OF THE REGIME

[Throughout the year, public opinion—channelled through the press—demanded the implementation of civil liberties: parties, freedom of the press and opinion, abolition of military government, rule of law, and above all, a constitution. Although these requests implied, and sometimes directly expressed, dissatisfaction with the regime, the government allowed the press considerable latitude; only Qasim was sacrosanct. In response, Qasim gave repeated assurances that a permanent constitution was about to be granted.]

Demand for Constitution. In Jan *Al-Bayān* [National Progressive party] asked for the speedy promulgation of a permanent constitution to restore political stability and enable parties to fulfil their obligations to the public (Quot. in *IT*, Jan 20). (The same request, similarly based, appeared *inter alia* in *Sawt al-Ahrār* [leftist], Jan 30; *Ath-Thawrah* [nationalist—pro-Qasim], March 13, Aug 9; *Al-Ahali* [National Democratic party], Oct 5; *Al-Bayān*, Nov 10.)

Government Promises. [Qasim continually gave the impression that this request for a constitution would be met. Following are some examples:] On Feb 20 he said "soon the national parliament will emerge." (*INA*, Feb 20)

In March it was reported that in July Qasim would open the new General Assembly building in Karradat Maryam (*IT*, March 24). [The ceremony did not take place.]

On Nov 12 Qasim declared that the drafting of the constitution would commence within the next few days (*IT*, Nov 15) and on Nov 23 he said that within a few weeks the constitution would be promulgated, and elections would be held for the National Assembly. (*IT*, Nov 24)

In Dec it was reported that the government had asked several countries for the texts of their constitutions, for reference, and that it would shortly set up a committee to draft the constitution (*Zaman*, Dec 16, 19). On Dec 19 an official source said that the members of the committee would be announced before Army Day, Jan 6, 1962. The government would submit a draft, which the

committee might amend, or exchange altogether for a new draft (*IT*, Dec 20). [No such steps were taken.]

Demand for Party Freedom and Elections. Various papers stressed the importance of political parties for a healthy national life and demanded their restoration; see, e.g.: *Sawt al-Ahrār* [leftist], Jan 30; *Al-Ahali* [NDP], Jan 16, Feb 28, Oct 5; *Al-Bayān* [NPP], Jan 28, Aug 10; *Ath-Thawrah* [Nationalist pro-Qasim], March 13, Aug 9; *Al-Mabddā* [Communist], Dec 9.

Al-Bayān analyzed the current political situation in Iraq as a vacuum created by the failure of extremist groups, which in turn had tried to capture the state by violence after the Revolution; it was for democracy to fill this vacuum. (*IT*, March 12 quot. *Bayan*)

The paper accused reactionary elements of having shed all restraint in their endeavour to regain their influence. "It has been established that some heads of sensitive government departments are demonstrating hostility to officials who are members of recognized parties wishing to cooperate ... for attaining the objects of the Revolution." (*IT*, July 31 quot. *Bayan*)

Against Military Government. Military government, and its instruments—the Special Military High Court ("Mahdawi's Court") and the two Military Courts—were attacked as being no longer necessary (*IT*, Feb 10, quot. *Siyasi al-Jadid*; *IT*, Feb 23 quot. *Bayan*; *Ahali*, March 1). *Al-Bayān* also demanded relaxation of the aliens regulations which were vexatious, unnecessary and harmful to the Iraqi economy. (*Bayan*, Jan 25)

Protest Memorandum Handed to Qasim. In May a [pro-UAR] source reported that the presidents of four professional associations—lawyers', engineers', doctors', teachers'—had handed Qasim a memorandum sharply protesting against the character of the regime. They said it was dictatorial, abusive of the rights of the individual, forgetful of its promises, wasteful, and isolationist in regard to the Arab world. Qasim had received the applicants and, having discussed their grievances, had demanded that their démarche should not be published. Its text had subsequently been posted clandestinely in the streets of Baghdad. [The associations mentioned had recently moved from leftist to "nationalist" leadership; see below: Semi-Political Associations, and MER 1960, p. 255.] (*Hawadith*, Beirut, May 12)

THE TAXI DRIVERS' RIOTS

[The only serious disturbance of the peace in 1961—besides the Kurdish troubles—took place towards the end of March when Baghdad taxi-cab drivers rioted for two days, after an increase in the excise duty on petrol. Both nationalist and leftist opponents of the regime fanned the flames. There were a number of fatal casualties, and demonstrators—not all of them taxi drivers—were still in prison at the beginning of May.]

In mid-Sept there were 5,000 registered taxi-cabs in Baghdad province. (*INA*, Oct 7)

Excise Duties Raised. On March 23 an amendment to the excise law raised the retail price of petrol, lubricants, tobacco products and alcoholic drinks by 10% to 25%; the excise on kerosene and diesel oil was not affected. The Minister of Finance explained that the increases were in the public interest, since tobacco and alcohol were unhealthy, bus fares remained unchanged and patrons of taxi-cabs could pay more in any case. (*IT*, March 24, 27)

Iraqi Press Comment. *Khabāt, Sawt al-Ahrār, Al-Ahālī* and *Al-Fajr al-Jadīd* criticized the new duties; the last-mentioned paper claimed that the raising of petrol and tobacco duties was anti-social but supported the increase in the excise on alcoholic beverages. (IT, March 28, 29)

On the other hand, *Ath-Thawrah* (writing after the riots) wrote that the tax increases were moderate and in the public interest. (IT, March 30)

The Riots. [On the morning of March 28 riots broke out in the (nationalist-inclined) A'zamiya quarter of Baghdad. The authorities maintained strict censorship but the gist of events is clear from the following statement.]

On March 28 the Military Governor General issued a proclamation in which he stated that the agents of imperialism were exploiting "slight increases" in the excise duty on petrol to incite "simple people and children" to join them in "anarchist acts" in order to obstruct the operation of motorized traffic. The citizens were called upon to concentrate on their daily tasks and to inform the authorities of all breaches of the peace. No assembly of seven people and over could take place except by special permit and the carrying of all firearms and other weapons was forbidden in Baghdad province (IT, March 29). The same day (March 28) the Military Governor General assured shopkeepers of his full protection against "anarchists and rioters" who might force them to close their premises. (IT, March 30)

The same day curfew was imposed on A'zamiya from 4 pm until further notice. Troops were instructed to fire on any person violating the curfew. On March 30 curfew was imposed from 4 pm till 11 am. (IT, March 29, 31)

Lebanese sources reported riots in Baghdad, in the A'zamiya, Karrada ash-Sharqiya and Hindiya quarters. The taxi-drivers went out in demonstrations, burned a bus and overturned several private cars; they were joined by students and others. Clashes took place with the police, and the army intervened. (R. Beirut, March 29—IMB, March 29; Mid. Mir., April 1, 8)

Casualties were variously given as three dead—"all from firearms discharged by civilians"—(*Thawrah*, April 25), and seven dead and 100 wounded (NYT, April 1) and 19 students dead as well as 40 wounded. (Mid. Mir., April 8)

On April 9 the authorities relaxed the curfew, and on April 16 it was totally lifted (IT, April 10, 17). Seventy students who had been detained after being involved in the riots were released on May 17. (Jihad, Jordan, May 18)

Political Backers. During the rioting Communists and nationalists were said to have "acted in concert in protest against the army for the first time since the revolution" (Mid. Mir., April 8). Sources variously stressed the part played by the nationalists (Mid. Mir., April 1) and by the Communists. (*Thawrah*, March 30, April 2, 5)

Khabāt reported that students' and workers' organizations [under Communist control] had called on "newspapers and parties" to express solidarity with the taxi-drivers. (IT, March 29)

Of the Iraqi newspapers, *Khabāt* and *Al-Ahd al-Jadīd* implied sympathy with the striking taxi-drivers (IT, March 29, April 2); *Ath-Thawrah*, while disapproving of their action, said that they had been exploited by "anarchists." (IT, March 30)

LENIENCY TO OPPONENTS

[Throughout the year, but especially in its second half, Qasim showed conspicuous leniency to opponents, except

Communists, who had been convicted or otherwise penalized; probably he now thought them less dangerous and wished to ease the atmosphere.]

General. In honour of July 14, Qasim reduced all prison sentences by 10%. (Zaman, July 11)

On order from Qasim, a committee was set up at the Ministry of Defence to investigate the problem of detainees; by the end of Aug. 140 persons were reported to have already been set free as a result of the committee's recommendations (*Ahālī*, Sept 1) and in Oct their number was given as 485. (Menar, Jordan, Oct 10 quot. *Ahd al-Jadīd*)

On Oct 24 it was officially announced that "in fulfilment of the desire of Qasim," there was not a single political detainee anywhere in the country (IT, Oct 25). [However, a good number of Communists—if no others—were at the time in prison. See under: The Communist Party, below.]

Leniency to Prominent Personalities of the Old Regime. In March the order impounding the property of the following personalities of the old regime was lifted: Darwish al-Haydari [former Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture], Abdallah al-Damallūji [former Ambassador], Ahmad ar-Rāwī [former Senator and Ambassador], and Yahya Qasim [liberal politician, editor of *Ash-Sha'ab* daily]. (IT, March 5)

On the occasion of July 14, Qasim ordered the release from prison of a number of prominent politicians and high army officers of the old regime. Politicians: Ahmad Mukhtar Babān, Muhammad Fādīl al-Jamālī, Tawfīq as-Suwaydī, [all former PM's] Burhān ad-Dīn Basha yān, Khalīl Kannah [former ministers] and Ibrahīm Hasan [former Ambassador to Cairo] (Zaman, July 14); Jamālī left for Lebanon after his discharge (*Akhbar al-Usbu'*, Jordan, July 18). Officers: Lt.-Gen. Muhammad Rafiq Arif, last CGS under the monarchy, Maj.-Gen. Umar Ali, former GOC 1st Div., Maj.-Gen. Wafiq Arif, former GOC 1st Corps, and Maj.-Gen. Ahmad Mar'i, former Director of Military Intelligence. [These officers were released on the occasion of July 14; later they were reinstated in the army with full rights, but not returned to active service. This decree was considered a response by Qasim to the wishes of army circles. (R. Beirut, Sept 3 [5])]

In Sept, Diyā' Ja'far, another minister under the old regime, was permitted to return to Iraq; he had been abroad during the revolution. (Jihad, Jordan, Sept 4)

It was believed that by July Qasim had already set free almost all the adherents of the old regime who had been arrested after the revolution. (Falastin, Jordan, July 16)

Taha al-Hāshimī Honoured Posthumously. On June 12, Marīah Taha al-Hāshimī died in London. His body was brought to Baghdad for the interment, at which Qasim was represented. The Iraqi press stressed in its obituaries the deceased's military and literary achievements (IT, June 13, 19, 20), [without, however, mentioning his role during the monarchy, when he served for a long time as Chief of Staff and minister. He served as PM on the eve of the Rashīd Ali al-Kaylānī coup in 1941 for two months at the end of which he was forced by the insurgents to resign, his attempts to reconcile the warring factions having failed. Hāshimī was also well-known for his writings on Iraqi geographical and military topics.]

Nationalists—Kaylānī, Arif, Pardoned. In May Abd ar-Rahīm ar-Rāwī, who had been sentenced to death [early

in 1959) for his part in the abortive plot of Rashid Ali al-Kaylani in Dec 1958 and whose sentence Qasim had later commuted to five years' imprisonment, was released on amnesty (*IT*, May 31). Kaylani himself was released from prison in July (*IT*, July 18). In Sept the order impounding the property of Kaylani and Rawi was lifted. (*IT*, Sept 11)

[A major step in Qasim's policy of leniency was the pardon of Col. Abd al-Salam Arif. Arif had cooperated with Qasim in the 1958 coup d'état and during the first weeks of the regime became his second-in-command as deputy C-in-C of the armed forces, deputy PM and deputy Minister of the Interior. Soon, however, Arif revealed himself as an ardent partisan of President Abdel Nasser and of union with the UAR, in contradiction to Qasim's policies. He was demoted, and sent as Ambassador to Bonn, whence he returned without permission. In Dec 1958, in a secret trial, he was sentenced to death for a plot against Qasim and kept in prison ever since.]

On Nov 25 Qasim revoked Arif's death sentence, ordered his release and revoked his dismissal from the army. (*Akhbar*, Nov 26)

In a press interview, Arif said that on his release from prison he was with Qasim from mid-day on Nov 25 until 5 am the next day when Qasim took him for a tour of Baghdad and personally escorted him home. Qasim was still his brother, he said, as brothers remained brothers forever; all [evil] was forgotten and he expressed his thanks to Qasim. (*Taqaddum*, Nov 27)

Qasim ordered Arif to be paid over ID5,000 in pension arrears, as well as his house rent for the years he spent under arrest. (*BBC in Arabic*, Dec 13-14MB, Dec 14)

Nationalists—Shawwaf Plotters, Ba'athists Pardoned, Sweeping Amnesty. On Dec 2 Qasim ordered the release from prison of Munir Fahmi al-Jarrâh, Ibrahim Ali al-Kaylani, Muhammad Sa'ad ash-Shaykh and Yunis Attâr Bâshi, who had been sentenced by the Special High Military Court ["Mahdawi's Court"] for their part in the Shawwaf rebellion of March 1959. (*IT*, Dec 3)

At the same time, the authorities freed the assets and property of retired Brig. Najî Tâlib since he had returned to Iraq and the reasons for impounding his assets no longer existed. [Tâlib, a leader of the Iraqi Ba'ath party, had served in Qasim's first Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. He fled to Lebanon after his attempt on Qasim's life in Oct 1959.] (*IT*, Dec 5)

On Dec 4 (the morrow of "Safety Day") Qasim issued three proclamations providing for a far-reaching amnesty. The five persons [Ba'athists] sentenced to death

on Feb 25 1960 (see MER 1960, p 247) for their part in the attempt on Qasim's life—Iyâd Sa'îd Thâbit, Khâlid Ali Sâlih, Hamid Mar'i, Salim Isa az-Zibâq and Ahmad Taha al-Azzûz—were ordered to be released forthwith. Mar'i, a Syrian, was to be deported. (*INA*, *IT*, Dec 5; *Ahd al-Jadid*, Dec 7)

All other death sentences passed by civil and military courts were commuted to 15 years' imprisonment. Prison sentences were reduced by half. "Internees, detainees and deportees for security reasons" were to be released. The amnesty was not to apply to fugitives from the law (*INA*, *IT*, Dec 5). In consequence of the amnesty, 600 out of 900 prisoners were released from the central prison at Baghdad; at Baquba 150 prisoners were freed. (*IT*, Dec 7)

Forty-two persons under sentence of death were reprieved under the amnesty. (*IT*, Dec 10)

[A number of Communist leaders, who had been detained during the year, were not released. See also below: Arrests of Communist Leaders.]

Festivals. [By 1961 an all year-round cycle of festivals glorifying the regime had been established.]

Army-Day. Jan 6 was declared an official holiday (*IT*, Jan 4). [On Jan 6, 1921 the Iraqi army was established.]

March 24, the anniversary of Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact [in 1959] was celebrated as *Freedom Day* throughout the country. (*IT*, March 24)

May 1, *Labour Day* was again kept as an official holiday. In a two-hour address at a rally in Baghdad, Qasim stressed the regime's striving for social justice. He announced that a social security law was being drafted and would be implemented "at a favourable opportunity." [There was no reference to the traditional significance of May Day.] (*IT*, May 1, 3-5)

July 14, *Revolution Day* passed without untoward incidents, though under heavy security precautions maintained by the army (*IT*, July 15; *Times*, July 16). As in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 237) the authorities warned that no deviation should be made during the processions from the slogans and cheers authorized by the authorities (*IT*, July 7). The 38 "national" slogans praised Qasim and the July 14 revolution, underlined the progress made in Iraqi society and economy and abused imperialism and its works in Palestine, Algeria, Southern Arabia and Kuwait. (For details see *IT*, July 9.)

Dec 3, *Safety Day* (*id al-salâmah wa al-ibtihâth*), the second anniversary of Qasim's return from hospital after the assassination attempt of Oct 7, 1959, was again celebrated all over Iraq as a public holiday. (*IT*, Dec 5)

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES

THE COMMUNISTS

(*Ittihad ash-sha'ab*)

Synopsis. [The Iraqi Communist party, which in 1960 had changed its name to *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* (IS) but failed to secure a licence under either the old or the new name, continued its existence underground throughout the year. The authorities harassed the Communists relentlessly and continued to wrest from their control trade unions and other public associations. (See below: The Government and Semi-Political Associations.)

The Communists themselves seemed to have believed that Qasim personally was less hostile. Consequently, their attitude to the regime was ambivalent. They recognized its hostility and drew the consequences, ideological, polemical and organizational; on the other hand, they made it clear that for the time being they saw no alternative.

Anti-Communist sources reported unsubstantiated dissensions within the party.

The legal Communist party, headed by Da'ud as-

Sā'igh, which had been established in 1960 with official encouragement, dragged on its existence. Towards the end of the year there were indications of some kind of understanding with the IS.]

In Sept a Western observer said that "although the Communists are still better organized and more united than any other political group, no one seriously expects them to be able to seize power." (*Financial Times*, Sept 15)

Communists Support Qasim Despite Persecution. In May a Western observer noted that the Communists were one of the few groups which still supported Qasim, though in the preceding 18 months he had clearly shown that he regarded them as a danger and had arrested many of them; yet the Communists understood that if Qasim were to go, in the present mood of the Iraqi public (for which see below: Anti-Communist Atmosphere) they would be eliminated altogether. (*Irish Times*, July 18)

Party Leadership; Internal Disensions. In Feb it was reported "on good authority" that a serious split had developed within the IS leadership and that there was a movement to expel the leaders of the dominant pro-Soviet faction. The names given were Hussein Radawi, Amir Abdallah, Abd al-Qādir Isma'īl, Jamāl al-Haydari, Baha ad-Din Nūri, Hussein Sūltān, Muḥammad Sāliḥ al-Abīlī [sic] and Nāsir Abū. (*IT*, Feb 27 quot. *Muṭaḥḥal*)

[The party pseudonym of Hussein Radawi, sometimes spelt Rādī, was Salām Adil.] Under the latter name he participated as "First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party" in the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, in Oct (*Pravda*, Oct 25). (In 1960 Radawi (Rādī) appeared on the list of sponsors headed by Zaki Khayrī of the ICP's application, under the Associations Law; see MER 1960, p 239.)

In Nov a rift in the leadership was again reported, reputedly caused, amongst other reasons, by mutual recriminations that the party had latterly not known how to exploit a propitious situation and that the public had been antagonized by injudicious slogans. The leadership was said to have been composed of Baha ad-Din Nūri—general leadership; Hamzah Salmān—intelligentsia; Sādiq Ja'far al-Falāḥī—workers; and Adnān al-Barrāq—students. Jamāl al-Haydari, former member of the Central Committee, had been dropped. (*Sharq*, Nov 9)

Communist Critique of Regime: [An article by M. Salim in *World Marxist Review* of Oct, entitled "Three Years After the Iraqi Revolution," may be taken as reflecting the IS attitude at the time.]

With the 1958 revolution, Salim wrote, power passed into the hands of the "national anti-imperialist bourgeoisie," represented by a group of army officers, but "the working class and the peasants, led by the Communist party, played the cardinal role in the revolution."

"At first," continued Salim, "the Qasim government was obliged to rely on the support of [these] masses," as the republic was in danger from the imperialist powers and pro-imperialist reactionaries. Under these circumstances, the Communists supported Qasim. But after the first year, "the growth of the mass movement... especially in the rural localities" aroused the fears of the national bourgeoisie, which consequently began to repress Communists and democrats. (The article goes on to describe the regime's anti-Communist measures.) At

the same time "the ruling group" compromised with the imperialists and sought the support of "reactionaries and monarchists," while the right-wing nationalists "have gone further, turning for help to the Egyptian bourgeoisie, and calling... for an end to the democratic development."

While the national bourgeoisie was not accused of betraying the revolution, it was "inconsistent, hesitant and prone to compromise." (For sources see below.)

Tactic of "Alliance and Struggle." The Communist tactic vis-à-vis the regime, the article continued, was therefore one of "alliance and struggle": alliance in an anti-imperialist front and struggle against "inconsistencies."

The party differentiated between bourgeois groups according to their attitude to imperialism, in keeping with their economic interests. The article criticized the "left tendencies" of those who failed to make these distinctions, struggled against the bourgeoisie as a whole and so "ignored the united front policy," as well as the "defeatist and opportunist opposition," which refrained from combating the reactionary measures of the government because it was anti-imperialist. (For sources see below.)

Policies: Regarding current tactics, the writer made the following points:

The alliance between workers and peasants must be consolidated. The party stood for radical agrarian reform, the regime having given in to the big landowners who coerced the peasants "all the way to the murder of peasant activists."

In view of the regime's increasingly anti-democratic policy, the party must fight for democracy under the slogan: "Build a national administration on democratic foundations."

The party demanded "self-government for the Kurds" but combated "nationalist-extremist tendencies among the Kurds."

The Kuwait question should be solved "in keeping with the freely-expressed will of the people"; Kuwait's liberation from imperialism being the main issue at present.

Solidarity and cooperation with the socialist countries provided the best guarantee for the consolidation and development of Iraq's independence.

"The national front policy is the only salvation for Iraq," the article concluded. This was the road to "a state of national democracy," as outlined in the documents of the Moscow meeting of the 81 parties, and conditions were now favourable for Iraq to become such a state. The masses had become aware of the anti-revolutionist tendencies of the national bourgeoisie, whose prestige was "rapidly declining," and the people were looking for "genuine revolutionary leadership." (*W. Marx. Rev.*, Oct pp 37-43)

Criticism of Social and Economic Conditions. [The Communists were more critical of social and economic conditions than they had ever been since 1958. Herewith follows, a statement, from a leftist source, on the change of attitude, and two petitions for redress, identified by their terminology and sources as Communist-inspired.]

In Oct *Saut al-Ahrār* recalled that the patriotic (in this context, leftist) press used to gloss over the people's living conditions during the early days of the Republic, for fear of diverting the government from its main task of protecting the revolution. Now, however, the

patriotic forces could no longer shut their eyes to the relevance of living conditions to the general political framework. (Quoted in *IT*, Oct 13.)

In Jan "the masses of Amara" addressed a petition to Qasim with 4,296 signatures, drawing his attention to the following grievances: the lack of doctors, the mounting prices of food and the need for popular housing schemes. (*Itiglal*, Jan 26)

In Dec a petition bearing 9,467 names and signed "Deputation of the Basra Masses" complained to the authorities about the economic crisis—crop failure, unemployment, and housing conditions—as well as dismissals and detentions. (*Mabda'*, Dec 16)

Clandestine Communist Activities, Demonstrations, Distribution of Leaflets. On Feb 3 a Communist demonstration, about 10,000 strong, took place in Baghdad, ostensibly in support of the FLN but in reality to counterbalance an earlier pro-Nasser demonstration which had welcomed the UAR Foreign Minister. The demonstration was dispersed near the Ministry of Defence by the military, "who showed much more energy than when they faced the nationalist demonstration" [a few days before]. (*Monda*, Feb 5)

[The distribution of leaflets was a favourite Communist activity throughout the year.]

On April 4 Communist leaflets were distributed in Baghdad, attacking the new excise duties and praising the *Al-Itiglal*, *Al-In'aniyah*, *Ar-Ra'y al-Amm* and *Khabat* newspapers for their attitude in the matter. (*IT*, April 12 quot. *Ahd al-Jadid*)

In July 400 Communist leaflets were confiscated at al-Hāritha [Basra]. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, July 7)

In Nov two men were arrested in Baghdad while distributing Communist leaflets signed "The organization of *sa'at al-qā'idah*." [A pre-revolution Iraqi Communist group was known as *al-qā'idah*.] (*ANA*, Nov 27 [29])

On Dec 23 a man was arrested for distributing Communist leaflets in the Bab ash-Shaykh quarter. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, Dec 25)

Government Persecution of Communists and Near-Communists. In Oct. Salām Adil (alias Hussein Radawi) stated at the CPSU congress in Moscow that "at the present time over 50 fighters sentenced to death for displaying heroism in the struggle against reactionary forces" were in prison. "286 valiant fighters—Communists and democrats—were killed in broad daylight." (*Pravda*, Oct 25)

In Dec a Communist source reported that a "Committee in Defence of Democratic Rights and Liberties in Iraq" had published a pamphlet entitled "Stop the Terror!" which gave figures on "patriots and democrats" persecuted by the Qasim regime and concluded that things were far worse than under Nuri Sa'īd. Between mid-1959 [when the anti-Communist reaction set in] and May 1961, 112 persons had been sentenced to death and 770 to imprisonment by military courts; 7,000 active trade unionists had been "victimized, and many arrested"; 3,260 peasant societies had been denied licences "under various pretexts"; and "democrats" had been made to suffer for the disturbances at Kirkuk (July 1959), which had been "provoked by stooges of oil monopolies." (*W. Marx. Rev.*, Dec)

Liquidation of Communist Cells. The discovery and liquidation of the following Communist cells and hide-outs was reported: at Awayna and at Sarrafīya [Baghdad]; at the latter place Diyāla Maryūsh, "a well-

known Communist," was arrested with others (*Thawrah*, April 25); at Abu al-Khasib [Basra] (*Manar*, Jordan, May 5 quot. *Zaman*); at Saraj ad-Din [Baghdad] (*Sharg*, June 19); at Azamiya [Baghdad] (*Thawrah*, June 26); the Communist headquarters at Basra, where 40 arrests were made, including "long-sought" Wall Karim (*IT*, Oct 22); at Mosul, where the membership list of the local committee was found, and arrests carried out accordingly. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, Nov 29)

At the beginning of May Yahya as-Sa'ūdi, director of television programmes, was suspended for investigation, and five Baghdad radio announcers were dismissed "for the public good." The [nationalist] *Al-Fajr al-Jadid* welcomed these measures as a step towards a thorough purge of the Ministry of Guidance and hinted that the persons concerned had misused their offices for "propaganda in favour of certain interests" (*Fajr al-Jadid*, May 4, 9; *Akhbar*, May 10). [The wording of these comments, as well as the subsequent demotion of the Minister of Guidance, indicate that a purge of leftists was taking place.]

In accordance with the Associations Law 1960, a Basra Court dissolved the Central Sports Union Club and the Mahdāwi Sports Club, both in Basra, since they had ceased to function for over a year. [Both had been centres of Communist and pro-Communist activity during the first year after the Revolution, and had been harassed in 1960 by the local authorities until they suspended their activities.] (*IT*, Aug 29)

The Ar-Rābiṭah Press at Baghdad was closed by the authorities following a search which produced pro-Communist material (*IT*, March 6 quot. *Mustaqbal*). [This press, reputedly the largest in private hands in Iraq, belonged to the leftist politician Abd al-Fatḥ Ibrahim, till lately Director General of the government oil administration (see p 261).] Apparently, the press was later reopened, as the company increased its capital from ID20,000 to ID100,000. (*IT*, Dec 11)

Arrests of Communist Leaders. [Several Communist and near-Communist leaders were arrested.] At the end of March Muḥammad Mahdī al-Jawāhiri, publisher of [leftist] *Ar-Ra'y al-Amm*, Khalaf al-Tā'i, editor of [leftist] *Al-Itiglal*, Kāzim as-Samāwi and Tawfīq al-Aḥsā, publisher and editor of [leftist] *Al-In'aniyah*, were arrested for inciting to demonstrations during the drivers' strike; Tā'i was deported to Nuqtah Salman prison [near the Saudi Arabian border] (*R. Cairo*, March 30 quot. *Ahd al-Jadid*—*IMB*, March 31; *BBC in Arabic*, April 1—*IMB*, April 2). [Samāwi was set free on Aug 8 (*Bilad*, Aug 9).]

On May 1 a procession organized by the Federation of Trade Unions [then still Communist-led—see below] took place in Baghdad. A permit had been applied for at the beginning of April but was received only after the demonstrations. In consequence, Ali Shukur, Abd al-Qādir Ayyāsh, Khayrān Sālih, Hussein Alwān, Sādiq al-Falāhi and other GFLU leaders were committed to prison on May 2. (*Bilad*, April 11; *Fajr al-Jadid*, May 3; a letter of explanation signed by the detainees—*Mabda'*, Oct 7)

In Oct the detainees protested the prison conditions (*Mabda'*, Nov 11). In Dec these and other Communist detainees, including Ma'rūf Barzinji and Abd as-Zahrā' Ghadibān, sent telegrams to Qasim and Maj.-Gen. Abdi praising the recent amnesty [see above: Leniency to Opponents] and asking that their cases also be considered (*Mabda'*, Dec 9; *Sawt al-Ahrar*, Dec 12). [They were still detained at the end of the year.]

Trials of Communists. [The courts, particularly the military ones, sentenced Communists in great numbers; the charges convey a certain picture of Communist activity. Some typical cases in the first months of the year are quoted below; trials of this character continued unabated until the end of the year.]

On Dec 31, 1960, the secretary of the Union of Commercial Stores Employees at Basra was sentenced in a civil slander suit to six months' "rigorous imprisonment" and ID1,000 damages, payable to the three plaintiffs. [Basra trade union officials at that time were generally Communists.] (*IT*, Jan 1)

The following is a list of prison sentences passed by military courts: In Jan—a teacher was sentenced to one year for having incited soldiers at the Habaniya military base against Brig. Sadiq Hasan, Commander of the 4th Div. [Brig Hasan was retired in Nov 1960; he was reputedly a "nationalist"; see MER 1960, p 236.] (*Zaman*, Jan 5); 76 persons to between six months and two years for disturbances at a cement factory in 1960 [during a Communist-organized strike for a wage increase]; 67 were released on bail (*Falastin*, Jordan, Jan 10); seven Communists to terms of imprisonment for assaulting members of the National Democratic Party (*Zaman*, Jan 17); in Feb—eight persons to up to 18 months for forcible extraction of contributions for "the illegal Communist Party" (*Fajr al-Jadid*, Feb 8); the assistant headmaster of Basra school to six months for tearing down a fatwa [religious decree] against Communism from the school wall (*Zaman*, Feb 14); a villager from Dohuk to three years for Communist propaganda and maintaining that Qasim was a Communist (*Zaman*, Feb 23); three teachers to six months for spreading rumours among villagers that the government was distributing poisoned wheat; the accused admitted that they had been members of the *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* group, but as they were now "reformed" the court decided to defer the sentence (*Zaman*, Feb 28); in March—six persons to from two to five months for slandering candidates of the Independent list as "spies, traitors and agents of the Anglo-Americans" during elections for the Oil Workers Union in Sept 1960 [the Independent list, which emerged victorious, stood for the anti-Communists; see also MER 1960, p 252] (*IT*, March 3); six persons charged with assembling to discuss the [banned] book "The Tasks of the Communist Party in the Post-Independence Era" were bound over for one year on ID500 (*IT*, March 3); an inhabitant of Basra to six months for having in his possession 36 copies of Lenin's speeches (*Akhbar*, March 12); a "proved anarchist" to one year for having incited workers at a Mosul textile store in Aug 1960 to strike for higher wages. (*IT*, March 13)

Five persons were remanded for trial in April for inciting peasants to deny landowners their rights in defiance of the law (*Mustaqbal*, April 19); a similar trial had been held in Jan, involving the secretary of the "Partisans of Peace" branch at Hay (*Fajr al-Jadid*, Jan 20). Three Basra teachers were remanded for trial for spreading Communist propaganda and beating their headmaster, who had tried to argue with them. (*Mustaqbal*, April 21)

In April an art student was sentenced to three and a half years for being in possession of Communist pamphlets (*ANA*, April 23 [25]) and another to nine months for having been in possession of Communist party records. (*Zaman*, April 26)

Death Sentences for 1959 Massacres. [Trials continued of persons, mainly Communists, charged with murder

during the 1959 riots, but death sentences passed were not carried out.]

In Jan leftist papers published editorials and readers' letters urging that death sentences recently passed in connection with the aftermath of the Mosul mutiny (spring 1959; see MER 1960, p 242) be commuted, or that retrials be held (e.g., *Bilad*, Jan 5; *Ittihad*, Jan 3, 8, 20). Anti-Communist papers published letters denying that the writers had ever supported such demands (e.g., *Zaman*, Feb 19; *Fajr al-Jadid*, Feb 22). Distributors of leaflets attacking the government for holding these trials were arrested. (*Falastin*, Jordan, Jan 10)

On April 26 three people, including a soldier, were sentenced to death, and six others to various terms of imprisonment, for "dragging" and murdering the district commissioner (*qa'imqam*), the medical officer and the police commander of Dohuk (Mosul province) in March 1959 (*IT*, April 27; *Falastin*, Jordan, April 28). On May 8 four soldiers—one an officer—and a civilian were sentenced to death and four others to long terms of imprisonment for the murder of two Turkomans at Kirkuk during the July 1959 riots there. (*IT*, May 10)

Leftist Papers Suppressed. On Jan 4 [the leftist] *Al-Ittihad* analyzed the total volume of notices and advertisements published by the Ministry of Defence in the Baghdad dailies, on the previous day, and alleged discrimination against the leftist press. The published schedule ran: *Al-Ittihad*; *Sawt al-Ahrar*; *Al-Bilad*; *Khabat*; *Al-Siyasi al-Jadid* and *Al-Akhbar*—nil; *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*—ID13,500; *Al-Mustaqbal*, *Al-Ahadi*, *Al-Bayan*—ID7,500 each; *Al-Ahd al-Jadid*—ID6,000; *Al-Zaman*—ID4,500. [All the neglected papers were pro-Communist, with the exemption of *Al-Akhbar*.] (*Ittihad*, Jan 4)

Al-Ittihad was closed down by the authorities on or about Jan 25 and was to reappear about March 5. [This may be connected with the above charges.] (*Bilad*, March 1, 3). [*Al-Insaniyah*, *Ar-Ra'y al-Amm* and *Al-Ittihad* were apparently closed down at the end of March] and their owners and/or editors arrested for supporting the drivers' strike (*Mid. Mir.*, April 1; see also above: Arrest of Communist Leaders). *Al-Siyasi al-Jadid* had its licence revoked on April 18, no reason being given. (*IT*, April 20)

During the year the military Governor-General revoked licences of several newspapers, most of which had been closed down during 1960; among them were: *Sawt al-Ummah*, *Ittihad al-Umal*, *Al-Yaqah*, *Kifah ash-Sha'ab*, *Ath-Thaqafah al-Jadidah*, *Sawt al-Tallah* (*IT*, Aug 7); *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, *Sawt al-Akhd*, *Al-Hadharah* (*IT*, Aug 28); *Ash-Shabab*, *Al-Haqiqah* (*IT*, Aug 8); *Nidd' al-Tallah* (*IT*, Oct 31). The last-named had been licensed as a weekly in Feb by the Ministry of Guidance [then still under leftist influence]. (*Bilad*, Feb 19)

In Oct Mahmud Shawkat, publisher of the leftist paper *Ath-Thabir*, which had been closed down in Nov 1960 (see MER 1960, p 243), petitioned Qasim, after his appeal had been rejected. (*Bilad*, Oct 10)

Anti-Communist Atmosphere. [There were reports from various parts of the country of violent popular hatred for the Communists.] A Western observer found that "everybody except the Communists" referred to 1959 as the year of the "Red Terror." (*Financial Times*, Sept 15)

In Mosul acts of revenge on "the perpetrators of the 1959 massacres" were said to occur almost daily (*Hayat*, March 14). In Dec a [pro-Communist] daily reported that a women's delegation from Mosul had petitioned

Qassim for "the restoration of security" in their home town (*Bi'ad*, Dec 28). A Lebanese journalist reported outbursts of hatred against the Communists in the Shi'i region about Karbala, also in reaction to the 1959 Communist atrocities (*Hayat*, Jan 18). [See also Evaluation of Internal Situation; the Nationalists in General (Disturbances in Mosul); Government and Islam (Anti-Communism Rampant among Shi'is).]

THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY

(*Da'ud as-Sa'igh*)

Hostility of Right, Left and Government. After it reappeared as a weekly on Feb 4 (see MER 1960, p 244), *Al-Mabda'*, the party organ, complained that it was engulfed by hostility, its ideological growth stunted, and its readers intimidated and insulted in public. Whereas the Right directed its attacks on "democratic movements" in general, the party's enemies on the left (the *Ittihad al-Sha'ab* Communists) were making hysterical attacks upon it. However, the party was conscious of its mission and would do its duty. (*Mabda'*, Feb 4, 23)

In Oct (?) the authorities at Kut closed the local branch of the [legal] Communist party for being inactive, in accordance with the Associations Law of 1960. (*Jihad*, Jordan, Oct 11 quot. *Ahd al-Jadid*)

In Nov, on its second anniversary, *Al-Mabda'* ascribed the crisis which had beset the paper—and the party—in the previous year to the unfavourable circumstances affecting "the whole democratic movement" in Iraq and the "obstinacy of the reluctant comrades [viz., the leaders of the IS Communists] to join their Communist party." As a result, *Al-Mabda'* had appeared only 22 times in its second year. (*Mabda'*, Nov 25)

Party Branches, Conventions. The last two months of the year were devoted to internal conferences and elections. At the beginning of Nov *Al-Mabda'* asked the authorities to expedite the granting of permission for the Baghdad, Arbil and Basra branches to hold meetings so that the party's eight branches might prepare for the party conference (*Mabda'*, Nov 4). On Nov 17 the Baghdad branch elected its nine-man committee, headed by Fālih Hasan (*Mabda'*, Nov 18). On Nov 28 Qassim received Da'ud as-Sa'igh, chairman of the party. (*IT*, Nov 30)

On Dec 2 the annual conference took place with 120 delegates in attendance [as against 160 in 1960; see MER 1960, p 244]. The following were elected to the executive committee: Da'ud as-Sa'igh—chairman, Sa'ad Muhsin, Ali Hādi, Abd al-Jabbār Mājīd, Ibrahim Abd al-Hussein, Ghaddān Hamzah, Muhammad Jawād Ta'mah, Abd al-Karīm al-Asadi, Umar Sūf, Karīm Nasīf, Zuhayr al-Tā'i, Turkī Abd al-Jafūr, Fālih Hasan, Khalil as-Sālihi, Jāsim Ismā'il, Anwar Taha, Abd al-Jabbār Hasan. (*Mabda'*, Dec 1; *Taqaddum*, Dec 3)

Towards the end of the year *Al-Mabda'* published telegrams to Qassim from imprisoned IS Communists (*Mabda'*, Dec 9). [It was not clear whether this indicated a rapprochement between the two groups.]

THE NATIONALISTS IN GENERAL

Synopsis. [The "nationalist" in Iraq could only loosely be defined as those who were sharply anti-Communist and pro-pan-Arab, though not necessarily adherents of Abdel Nasser. Their political organizations were entirely clandestine; strongest among them was apparently the Ba'ath party. The authorities paid them much less hostile

attention than in 1960, perhaps because they were considered less dangerous.]

Revival of Pro-Nasser Influences. In July a Western observer said that "any visitor to Baghdad now must notice the revival in the influence of the pro-Nasser forces," at a time when Communist influence was at an all-time low. (*Irish Times*, July 18)

"Nationalist Front" Formed. In May three "young nationalist groups" were reported "recently" to have formed an underground Nationalist Front, based on common opposition to the Communists and to Qassim, their former supporter, and on a desire for closer links with the UAR. The Front was said to be as yet ill-cemented and undecided on what approach to make to Abdel Nasser if Qassim were to be overthrown. [The three constituent groups were not further defined.] (*Financial Times*, May 12)

Towards the end of the year, three underground anti-Communist parties were said to have been conspiring for Qassim's overthrow: the Istiqlāl, the Ba'ath and the "pro-Nasser Arab Nationalists [*al-qawmiyyūn al-arab*] who have links with Syria." (*Scotsman*, Oct 28)

"Party of the Arab Struggle" (*hizb al-kifāh al-arabi*). Among the messages of support received by Qassim for his Kuwait policy was one from "the prisoners convicted in the case of the Arab Struggle Party" (see MER 1960, p 250). The cable concluded "Death to all those who stand in the face of liberation from enslavement." (*IT*, July 10)

Various Nationalist and Pro-UAR Manifestations. On Jan 29 the UAR Foreign Minister on his arrival at Baghdad for the Arab League session was received by an "enthusiastic crowd," estimated by one source as 10,000 people, shouting "union under Abdel Nasser soon!" (*R. Beirut*, Feb 5—*IMB*, Feb 6; *Time*, Feb 10)

In March 171 teachers at Baghdad University urged Qassim to purge the university of "opportunists" and "party politicians preaching the class struggle" who were threatening the country with disaster. (*Manar*, Jordan, March 9)

On Sept 23, Qassim announced the elimination of a spy cell, which had attempted to stage a symbolic funeral at Azamiya on Sept 20 in support of Arab nationalism and "those who were executed for participation in a rebellion against the safety of Iraq" [obviously a reference to the officers who were hanged on Sept 20, 1959, for their part in the Shawwāf mutiny]. (*IT*, Sept 28)

In Oct, the Medical, Lawyers, Writers, Teachers and Economists associations strongly condemned "the group of traitors, agents of imperialism, slaves of gold, opportunists and other reactionary elements" as responsible for the dissolution of the UAR (*IT*, Oct 3); the same associations addressed a memorandum to Qassim strongly criticizing the government, *inter alia*, for its isolationist Arab policy. [The above-mentioned associations were by this time all "nationalist" led.]

In Nov eight fugitives were ordered to appear before a Military Court on a charge of forming a clandestine organization and distributing leaflets. [The address of six of them was given as Azamiya, the solidly nationalist quarter of Baghdad.] (*IT*, Nov 5)

Disturbances in Mosul. In March it was reported that not a day passed in the north of Iraq without an act of

revenge on "the perpetrators of the 1959 massacres" [a term widely held to stand for the Communists]. (*Hayat, March 14*)

At the end of the year, it was reported that many women's delegations from Mosul had latterly called upon the authorities at Baghdad, to ask for the suppression of "unlawful occurrences" in their hometown, and for the restoration of security and stability (*Biad, Dec 28*). [The source and general context suggest that the delegations were complaining of anti-Communist violence.]

The Government and the Nationalist Press. The whole "nationalist" press increasingly and violently attacked the Iraqi Communists (see especially *Ath-Thawrah, Al-Fajr al-Jadid, Al-Mustaqbal*, passim).

On Jan 22 a new daily, *Ash-Sharg* [which proved to be sharply anti-Communist], first appeared. (*Akhbar, Jan 21; Istiqal, Jan 23*)

Ath-Thawrah [violently anti-Communist and sympathetic to Arab nationalism, but professing loyalty to Qasim] reappeared on Feb 16, having gone into "voluntary suspension" on Sept 20, 1960, because of "savagely Communist attacks" (*Thawrah, Feb 16; IT, Feb 17*; see also MER 1960, p 248-9). In May *Ath-Thawrah* again "voluntarily suspended publication" for three days, after its editor Yunis at-Tā'i had been called upon to explain to the authorities an article which appeared on April 25. (*Ahd al-Jadid, April 27; ANA, May 21 [23]*)

Among the papers the licences of which were withdrawn by the Military Governor-General during 1961, after having ceased publication earlier, were the following nationalist organs: *Al-Watani, Al-Hiyad (IT, Aug 7); Al-Hurriyah, Al-Fayha' (IT, Aug 22)*. [*Al-Fayha'* of Hilla was closed down after publishing on Oct 16, 1960, a statement by the Islamic party sharply attacking Qasim; see MER 1960, p 249.]

The authorities suspended [the nationalist] daily *Al-Fajr al-Jadid* as from Oct 26 (*IT, Oct 27*). [Contrary to official Iraqi government policy, the paper had continuously accused the new Syrian leadership of betraying the Arab cause.]

THE BA'ATH PARTY

(*hizb al-ba'ath al-arabi al-istirdaki*)

Synopsis. The Ba'ath party apparently continued to be the leading nationalist party, though it had split into at least two factions: pro-Nasserites versus "Aflaqites" (Michel Aflaq, Syrian co-founder of the party, stood for an independent policy). The split which rent the party as a whole and had its origin in the disillusionment of the party's Syrian leadership with the UAR regime, had already come out into the open at the party's convention in Beirut in Aug 1959. Abdallah Rimawi, SG of the party in Jordan, was then deprived of his post and later formed a dissident pro-Nasser Ba'athist party.

A public exchange between Fu'ad ar-Rikabi, former SG of the "Regional Command" of the Iraqi Ba'ath, and the "National Command"—the supreme leadership—of the party in Beirut in June 1961, made it clear that the party split in Iraq had begun at about the same time. Apparently, in this internal struggle the "Aflaqites" got the upper hand.

[Little was known on the organization of the Iraqi Ba'ath.] Hans E. Tuetsch, a Swiss journalist, reported that the party mainly followed the Communist cell pattern, but had not enforced "democratic centralism" to the same degree. (*Indian Express, Feb 7*)

Split Between Pro-Nasserites and "Aflaqites." In June Fu'ad ar-Rikabi clashed openly with the party's "National Command" in Beirut.

On June 24 Rikabi called a press conference in Beirut, and announced that the party in Iraq had severed relations with the "deviationist, so-called National Command." He read what he said was a statement by the Iraqi Regional Command, of June 14, explaining that after a year and a half of attempts to correct the deviations of the Beirut party leadership from within, the Iraqi Regional Command of the Ba'ath saw no alternative but to sever relations with the so-called National Command in Beirut. The National Command was distorting the party's principles by driving it into a clash with the UAR, seeking to cooperate with enemies of Arab nationalism including the Communists, and removing members "possessed of nationalist-revolutionary consciousness." By pursuing this line, the National Command had broken the unity of the party and placed itself beyond the pale, and it was the duty of Arab nationalists to expose its true role.

Moreover, while the party in Iraq was involved in a fateful struggle after the Mosul uprising (March 1959), the National Command had plotted against it, acting as the preparatory committee for the party convention in Beirut (Aug 1959). They had sent messages to "some youths" in Iraq expressing doubts regarding the UAR and calling for the removal of the party's leadership [i.e. Rikabi]. Finally they had helped opportunists to capture the Iraqi party's leadership by devious methods.

[Thus while Rikabi purported to make this statement in the name of the Iraqi Ba'ath, he confirmed the claims made by the National Command (cited further below) that the Regional Command of the Iraqi Ba'ath had been wrested from his control.]

Answering questions, Rikabi claimed that certain members of the "Beirut group" were in contact with British intelligence; but he refrained from mentioning their names. He denied being a member of the "Rimawi group" [the "Ba'ath Revolutionary Command"; see also below]. (*Answer; Nahar, Lebanon; Ahram, June 25*)

In reply, the Ba'ath National Command declared Rikabi entirely unqualified to speak for the party. It maintained that Rikabi had ceased to be SG of the Iraqi Regional Command, when it dissolved itself on Nov 29, 1959. The temporary Regional Command which was subsequently established passed a resolution, on Feb 2, 1960, in the presence of Rikabi, specifically excluding him from its membership. [Talib Hussein ash-Shalibi was apparently appointed SG.] The party's regional conference which opened in Baghdad in July 1960 preferred severe charges against Rikabi and called upon the national leadership to investigate them. In Aug 1960 the fourth national conference at Beirut, in which Rikabi participated, censured him for his behaviour while responsible in Iraq "and thenceforth he had no responsibility whatsoever in party affairs." On Oct 14, 1960, the party requested Rikabi to reply to certain specific accusations which had been forwarded by the Iraqi party congress. Finally, on June 15, 1961, Rikabi's party membership was cancelled as he had not replied to the accusations. The statement added that the declaration issued by Rikabi, after he had joined the "opportunistic Rimawi group," had not been distributed through party channels and that all Rikabi's allegations were totally untrue. (*Nahar, Beirut, June 25*)

[The proximity of the dates given for the statement issued by Rikabi and his expulsion from the party

poses the question whether the two events were inter-related and which in fact came first.]

In Sept it was reported that party material confiscated by the Iraqi authorities in two Ba'ath cells discovered in Baghdad indicated a split within the party and contained an attack on Fu'ad al-Rikabi, the deposed regional leader. (*Hayat*, Sept 2 quot. *Mustaqbal*)

Rikabi Joins Rimawi in Rival Pro-Nasser Ba'ath Party. Three days after the exchange between Rikabi and the National Command, Abdallah ar-Rimawi published a statement in the name of the "National Revolutionary Command" of the Ba'ath expressing very strong support for the secession of the Iraqi Ba'ath from the "deviationist" leadership in Beirut. Rimawi especially attacked Michel Aflaq, who, he said, was responsible for the deviationist party congress in Beirut in Aug 1959. (*Anwar*, June 28)

After the breakup of the UAR, Cairo Radio quoted Rikabi, "SG of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party of Iraq," and Dr Fayal al-Wa'ili, of that party, as supporting the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 3 [5]). The following day "the territorial (regional) Command of the Ba'ath party in Iraq" was quoted to the same effect. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 4 [6])

At the beginning of 1962 Rikabi was reported a member of the "Revolutionary Command (al-qiyadah al-thawriyah) of the Ba'ath Party" which saw in Egypt "the basis of the Arab struggle"; Abdallah Rimawi was another member mentioned. (*Ahram*, Jan 2, 1962)

Authorities Lenient Towards Party Members. The Iraqi authorities were lenient in their attitude to a number of Ba'ath and pro-Ba'ath personalities who had earlier fallen foul of the regime, such as Col. Abd as-Salam Arif, Brig. Najj Talih and the six persons condemned to death in Feb 1960 for having attempted to assassinate Qasim in Oct 1959. (For details see above: Leniency to Opponents—Nationalists.)

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

[The National Democratic party, already seriously weakened by the split in its ranks in 1960 (MER 1960, p 245), suffered further from dissension and secession, and in Oct suspended its activities. As in 1960, the personality of Kamil al-Chadirchi, the veteran leader, was apparently the main reason for the party's inability to keep its ranks intact. The party's opposition to the regime made itself felt through its organ *Al-Ahali*.]

Dissensions and Secessions, Branches Close. On March 7 the Central Administrative Committee of the National Democratic party unanimously rejected the resignation submitted by Kamil Chadirchi from the party chairmanship and membership of the Committee. (*IT*, March 9)

On April 15 an extraordinary meeting of the NDP was held in Baghdad, presided over by Chadirchi, at which the resignations of the following leading members of the party were accepted after prolonged discussion: Hussein Jamil, Muzhir Fahmi al-Azzawi and Awad Ali an-Najm (*Ahd al-Jadid*, *Alkhar*, April 16). Jamil said that the resignations were due to differences "in the views and attitudes" between the party's President and the resigning members (*ANA*, April 16, [18]). Kamil Chadirchi and his deputy Hudayb al-Hajji Hammud also resigned, it was later reported, but their resignation "could not be considered because of the lack of a quorum." (*IT*, May 18)

A nationalist paper reported that the secession occurred

because of the party chairman's desire to cooperate with the IS Communists and his slighting references to the pan-Arab movement (*Ahd al-Jadid*, April 16). Hussein Jamil in a letter to the editor denied the second part of this report [but did not mention Chadirchi's alleged pro-Communism]. (*Zaman*, April 19)

In April all 56 members of the Kasimiya branch of the NDP were reported to have resigned their membership (*Ahd al-Jadid*, April 16), while the Basra branch decided to suspend all party activity. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, April 26)

A nationalist paper attributed the "demise" of the NDP to the varying moods of its "dictator," Chadirchi, and to the realization that the time had passed for the breeding of Communism and opportunism, in which the party specialized. (*IT*, April 19 quot. *Fajr al-Jadid*)

The NDP and the Communists. [The party evidently suffered from its relative nearness to the Communists.] On Jan 1 in a memorandum to Qasim, Ja'far al-Badr, chairman of the Basra branch, complained that party members had been arbitrarily dismissed by the Railways and Ports administrations. Gen. Salih Zaki Tawfiq, Director General of Railways, replied that the dismissed men had "committed sabotage and spread anarchy" and that "experiences in this establishment... have confirmed that anarchists put on different cloaks." In reply, *Al-Ahali* reassured that the dismissed men were bona fide NDP members and law-abiding citizens. (*Aheli*, Jan 2, 4, 12; *IT*, Jan 4)

In Aug the NDP denied rumours that its chairman or any one else on its behalf was engaged in secret negotiations for the formation of a "National Front," though, the announcement added, the party did not see anything objectionable in such efforts. (*Zaman*, Aug 30)

Extraordinary Conference, New Central Committee. On May 19 the party held an extraordinary congress to elect a new Central Administrative Committee. Delegates to the congress were to be those who had participated in the Seventh Party Congress in Nov 1960 (see MER 1960, pp 245-6.)

The following were elected to the Committee: Ja'far al-Badr—Deputy Leader; Dr Sadiq Mahdi as-Sa'id—Secretary General; Abd al-Wahhab at-Tai—Assistant Secretary General; Abd ar-Rahim as-Sadawi—Treasurer; Abd ar-Ra'uf al-Hajji Mahdi; Muhammad Abd al-Mashabi, Jawad Kazzim al-Khayyat; Muhammad Riza as-Salman. Kamil al-Chadirchi who was at the time absent from Iraq was unanimously elected party leader by the new Committee. (*IT*, May 17, 18, 21)

Only 197 of the 779 delegates which had attended the Seventh Congress appeared this time. It was reported, and this was seen as indicative of the NDP's decline and of Chadirchi's standing within it. (*IT*, May 29, quot. *Ahd al-Jadid*)

Al-Ahali and the Government. [With the resignation from the party in April of Azzawi, editor of *Al-Ahali*, the paper had to close down pending government confirmation of a new editor, in accordance with the law. Since, apparently, the authorities were not in a hurry to take this step, the party tried stop-gap action which failed.] Khalid Ahd ar-Rahim, editor of the Amara paper *Sani al-Ahali*, was detained because he had published his paper in Baghdad in contravention of the terms of his licence. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, April 28)

In Aug the government approved Amjad Hamid as chief editor of *Al-Ahali*, at the request of the NDP (*IT*,

Aug 15). On Aug 20 the paper reappeared with an editorial stressing the importance of a free press and of free party life in a free and developing society. (*Ahali*, Aug 20)

On Oct 13, the paper announced that it would cease publication as of Oct 14, in accordance with the executive's decision to cease all party activities (see below). (*Ahali*, Oct 13)

NDP Suspend Activities. "In view of conditions in Iraq." In Oct it was reported from "reliable quarters" that the NDP was expected to suspend activities. Heads and members of various branches of the party assembled in Baghdad on Oct 5 to discuss the resignation submitted by Chadirihi. If the decision to suspend activities were taken, the annual congress scheduled for Nov 2 would not take place. (*IT*, Oct 9)

On Oct 13 *Al-Ahali* confirmed the suspension of party activities "in view of conditions in Iraq nowadays" (*Ahali*, Oct 13). [The congress mentioned above did not take place.]

THE NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY

[This party, founded in 1960 by a splinter group of the NDP, was formally active throughout the year, but little was heard of it. Its chairman, Muhammad Hadid, did not hold office, but acted as adviser to the government on oil questions.]

Local Branches. On Jan 20 the party branch at Kazimiya (Baghdad) was opened (*Bayan*, Jan 22). On Jan 27 the Basra branch held its first conference. (*Bayan*, Jan 29, 30)

Party Conference, Criticism of Regime. The second annual congress of the NPP was held on Dec 27-28 at Baghdad, in the presence of 357 delegates. Resolutions called for a speedier implementation of agrarian reform, increased efficiency in government services and the restoration of normal political life, including the safeguarding of civic and constitutional liberties. The government's stand against the oil companies was approved and the Kurdish rising condemned. The members of the new Central Administrative Committee were Muhammad Hadid, Khadduri Khadduri, Na'il Samhri, Arak az-Zakani, Muhammad Sa'adun, Salman al-Azzawi, Dr Riza Hillawi, Hajj Abbas al-Jadi and Abd ar-Razzak Muhammad. (*IT*, Dec 28, 30; *Mustaqbal*, Dec 29)

[Throughout the year *al-Bayan's* attitude to political questions was generally in line with the above resolutions.

Since its criticism reflected a section of opinion wider than the NPP, it is described in more detail under: The Demand for Civil Liberties.]

OTHER PARTIES

The Islamic Party Liquidated. [This party had obtained its licence in 1960 through an appeal to the Court of Cassation, but its bitter criticism of the regime had led to its suppression and the imprisonment of its leaders; see MER 1960, p 249.] At the beginning of the year, Ulama' of Baghdad, Kirkuk and Arbil petitioned Qasim to release the leaders of the Islamic party, arguing that according to Qasim himself, fair criticism should not be punished (*Fajr al-Jadid*, Jan 24, Feb 9, 19). A similar appeal appeared in the [nationalist] *Ath-Thawrah*, March 2.

On March 15 Qasim ordered the release from prison of Nu'man Abd ar-Razzak az-Samarra'i, the chairman, and of seven other members of the party, and received the group for a four hours' talk. (*Zaman*, March 16)

Al-Haydi commented that the Islamic party was less of a political party than a rallying centre for the faithful against the flood of disbelief which was engulfing Iraq since the revolution. This explained both the party's attraction and its clash with the regime. The paper expressed the hope that with the release of the party's leaders from prison, better days were approaching for religion in Iraq. (*Hayat*, March 17)

Soon afterwards the government ordered the liquidation of the party. It was suggested to its leaders that they should apply for a licence to form an association (*Ahali*, March 23; *Falastin*, Jordan, March 23). [Nothing was heard of this proposal later on.]

Proposed Party of Arah Brotherhood and Solidarity. (*hizb al-ikhā wa al-ta'āwun al-araḥi*) In Feb and April, "extensive contacts" were reported for the formation of such a party by inhabitants of Baghdad and Najaf. The initiators were not as yet prepared to make a detailed statement but asserted that the party "would play an important role in the service of the Arah nation" (*Ahali*, Feb 6; *Thaqafah al-Islamiyah*, April 22). [Apparently a Shi'i project; nothing further seemed to have developed.]

No "Congress Party". In Sept Hussein Jamil, former SG of the National Democratic party, denied that he and other former members of the NDP intended to found a new party to be called *al-mu'tamar* (The Congress). (*IT*, Sept 18)

THE GOVERNMENT AND SEMI-POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS

[During the year the government continued to purge the trade unions, professional and other public associations, of Communists and near-Communists.]

THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF LABOUR UNIONS

(*al-ittihād al-amm li-niqābat al-ummāl*)

[The "de-communisation" of the General Federation of Labour Unions (GFLU), begun in 1960 (see MER 1960, pp 251-3), reached a decisive stage. At the second general convention of the federation held in May, the Communist leadership was ousted; the leftist president and secretary had been arrested a fortnight earlier, and

were thenceforth kept in prison. Additional unions were wrested from Communist control, and trade unionists persecuted.]

A Communist source described the technique employed by the authorities to prevent "militant workers" from occupying trade union posts: they were dismissed from their jobs and then declared to be ineligible as they were no longer engaged in that industry. (*Daily Worker*, Feb 28)

Communists Lose Control of Unions, Leaders Arrested. Throughout the year there were cases of Communists losing control of trade unions in elections, e.g. the

Post and Telecommunication workers, (*Istiqal*, Jan 26), the leather workers, the agricultural labourers (*Fajr al-Jadid*, Feb 28), the irrigation workers and the Ministry of Works employees. In the two last-mentioned cases protests alleging fraud were addressed to the authorities, and re-elections demanded. (*Mabda'*, Dec 30)

Leftist trade unions were harassed. In Ali Ali al-Ghazali, secretary of the Tailoring Workers Union [a well-known Communist], was detained "without any accusation raised against him," as his trade union complained to the Military Governor-General (*Re'y al-Amm*, Feb 2). In March three trade unionists from Karbala were sentenced to eight months in prison for sending Qassim a memorandum "slandering... the police and administrative authorities, and... describing in a distorted manner the experiences to which trade unions there were exposed." (*IT*, March 8)

In April a former secretary of the Leather Workers Union was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for slandering a rival unionist by calling him a paid spy of imperialism and "Point Four agent" (*Ahd al-Jadid*, April 4). Military courts sentenced ten workers to prison for participation in strikes (e.g. *Istiqal*, Jan 26) and various "anarchist activities" (e.g. *Thawrah*, March 1). (For additional cases see also: The Communists pp 268-9.)

Communist Ousted From Leadership at General Convention. Following upon a dispute between the authorities and the GFLU as regards the date of elections to the executive committee, the former demanding a convention by Feb, and the latter arguing that elections were not due till 1962, the Military Governor-General postponed the elections for the time being. (*Bilad*, Jan 26, 10; *Fajr al-Jadid*, Feb 6)

Meanwhile Ali Shukur and Sadiq Falahi, president and secretary of the GFLU, were arrested for taking part in an unauthorized May Day demonstration. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, May 3; see also: The Communists (Arrests of Communist Leaders).)

Two weeks later, the convention opened in Baghdad (May 15-18). Qassim opened the convention with a speech stressing the freedom of delegates to elect whatever representation they wished. Afterwards several unions criticised the executive for its "subservience to a certain political group."

The elections to the 35-man executive on May 16 were won by the [anti-Communist] Independent list. Chief officers elected were: Hajj Ibrahim Jawad—president of the Oil Industries Workers' Union—president; Azhar Ibrahim an-Nadawi, president of the Railway Union—vice-president; Yusuf Isma'il al-Ani, president of the Plasterers' Union—secretary-general; Hashim as-Sayyid Abid—treasurer; Muhammad Raddi—organizational secretary; Karim Salmān—"national relations"; Badri Ahmad al-Ubaydi, of the Union of Municipal Employees—responsible for economic affairs; Fayal Sarhid, president of Vegetables Oil and Soap Makers Union—industrial relations. (*INA*, May 15; *Zaman*, May 16; *IT*, May 16-22)

A "nationalist" source stated with satisfaction that the trade unions had seen through the phrases and lies of the anarchists [i.e. Communists] and freed themselves from their influence. (*IT*, May 23 quot. *Fajr al-Jadid*)

Leftist sources alleged that the authorities had influenced the election results by force and fraud. Thus the Building Workers' Union delegates were said to have been arrested on the very first day of the convention, and thereby deprived of their vote. (*Mabda'*, Oct 7)

On Aug 2 Qassim ordered the payment of ID10,000 to the GFLU, on the occasion of an audience granted by him to the Federation's new president, who said that the previous leadership had left the GFLU treasury empty despite considerable contributions from government and trade unions. (*IT*, Aug 6)

On Nov 14 the GFLU executive deposed Azhar Ibrahim an-Nadawi, its vice-president, "for negligence in carrying out his duties"; Hikmat Amin Abdallah was elected in his place. (*Akhbar*, Nov 22)

THE JOURNALISTS' UNION

(*niqbat as-suhufiyyin*)

[At the beginning of the year the Journalists' Union was still led by leftist circles. By mid-year an anti-Communist executive had been put in its place with the open assistance of the authorities, but dissension continued within the leadership.]

Communist Control Eliminated. In Feb the Union's president, Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri [a celebrated poet and reputed Communist; see MER 1960, p 254], tendered his resignation which was rejected by the executive council (*Zaman*, Feb 8, 10). [Jawahiri apparently ceased to be active in the Union thereafter; at the end of March he was arrested—see p 268b.]

At the beginning of March, four [anti-Communist] dailies, *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, *As-Zaman*, *Al-Ahd al-Jadid* and *Al-Mustaqbal*, published a memorandum which they had addressed to the Military Governor-General, asking his help in purging the Union of "foreign elements and narrow partisanship." A list was attached of 151 Union members, who were stated to be non-journalists and whose membership was therefore claimed to be invalid according to law.

[Anti-Communists had argued for some time that the Communists had achieved, and were maintaining, domination of the union by packing it with non-professionals; see MER 1960, p 254.] *Al-Mustaqbal* commented that the union should get rid of Communists and outsiders. (*Zaman*, March 2; *IT*, March 3)

On March 8 the Military Governor-General appointed an investigation committee to enquire into the state of the Union; he had its accounts impounded and the executive restrained from handling its assets. On March 10, 45 journalists elected, "with the approval of the Military Governor-General," a liaison committee to cooperate with the investigation committee for the conversion of the Union into a purely professional body. (*IT*, March 12, 14, 15)

At the end of May the committee presented its conclusions, which led to 72 members being excluded from the Union; another 27 members were excluded upon a request from the Military Governor-General to deny membership to "accountants and subscription collectors" (*IT*, June 2). [Thus approximately 40% of the members were excluded.]

The third annual congress of the Union (which had been postponed by the authorities until the committee concluded its work) opened on June 3, preceded and accompanied by fierce electioneering from the anti-Communist press (e.g. *Ahd al-Jadid*, May 31; *Thawrah*, June 2; *Zaman*, June 2, 4). After the opening addresses the congress adjourned until June 8 and again, for lack of a quorum, to June 9 when elections for the administrative committee were held. One hundred three out of 149 eligible members voted. The candidates of the Independent List were victorious; Taha al-Fayyad, owner of the

[strongly nationalist] daily *Al-Fajr al-Jadid* was elected president by 50 votes against 41 cast for [the outgoing vice-president] Hasan al-Asadi; Tawfiq as-Sam'ani, publisher of [the moderate anti-Communist daily] *As-Zaman*, was elected vice-president by 50 votes against Fā'iq al-Buti, who received 39 votes; Rusmi al-Amil, editor of *Al-Mustaqbal*, was elected secretary. In his acceptance speech, the new president attacked the outgoing committee for its support of "foreign organizations and countries, while it neglected to support common Arab tasks." (IT, June 6, 9, 11)

Later Disturbances. On Nov 20 Rusmi al-Amil resigned in protest against "the autocratic and partisan attitude" of the Union's president Fayyād, "which did not permit the union to fulfil its true duty to the profession" (Bayan; *Mustaqbal*, Nov 22); Zaki Ahmad was appointed secretary in his place (*Bilad* Nov 25). On Dec 9 Fayyād submitted his own resignation to the executive, which refused to accept it (IT, Dec 10; *Zaman*, Dec 16). [Fayyād's daily, *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, had been suspended by the Military Governor-General on Oct 26—apparently because of its attacks on the Syrian "secessionists." Fayyād was still active as president of the Union at the end of the year.]

Towards the end of Dec, Na'imah al-Wakil, Sālih Salīmān and Yūsuf Awdid resigned from the executive in protest against its "undemocratic procedures" (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, Dec 26; *Mustaqbal*, Dec 29). [Na'imah al-Wakil was the owner-editor of the pro-Communist weekly *14 Tammuz*.]

Government Benefits. The authorities allocated 125 housing plots to members of the Journalists' Union housing cooperative. (INA, Sept 25)

THE TEACHERS' UNION

(niqābat al-mu'allimīn)

[This important union passed from leftist to nationalist control.]

Pro-Communists Defeated in Elections. On Feb 10, elections took place in the Teachers' Union.

The nationalist *Al-Fajr al-Jadid* strongly supported the United Educational Front (UEF) implying that its rival, the United Professional List (UPL), was a Communist instrument. (IT, Feb 10 quot. *Fajr al-Jadid*)

The UEF won a majority in nine provinces, namely Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Ramadi, Kut, Hilla, Karbala, Diwaniya. The UPL won a majority in four provinces, namely Arbil, Sulaymaniya, Amara and Basra. Results for Nasiriya province were not published at the time (IT, Feb 12). The results were enthusiastically welcomed by the nationalist press (e.g. IT, Feb 13 quot. *Fajr al-Jadid*) and cautiously deplored by leftist papers (e.g. IT, Feb 16 quot. *Sawt al-Ahrar*).

Following the elections, the third congress of the Teachers' Union took place in Baghdad on Feb 20-23, attended by 620 delegates. In elections for the Union's Executive, the UEF candidates were victorious; Dr Muhammad Nāsir was elected president, Abbās Abd al-Latif and Ahmad Mārūt—vice presidents. (INA, Feb 19, 20; IT, Feb 22, 26)

[Najib Muhi ad-Din, the outgoing president, had been a sponsor of the leftist Republican Party in Feb 1960—see, MER 1960, p 244.]

Government Attitudes. The Minister of Education decided on a grant of 1D24,000 to the Teachers' Union in

order to "cement the cooperation between the Union and the Ministry." (IT, March 27)

In Dec, the courts closed the club house of the Union's Sulaymaniya branch [which had returned a leftist committee at the elections] for "acting in a manner incompatible with its licensed aims." (Bayan, Dec 26)

THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF STUDENTS

(ittihād al-tullāb al-amm)

[Despite government harassment the left continued to dominate the Federation throughout the year. Towards the end of the year nationalist elements seceded and founded a new organization.]

Internal Orientation. In July the General Federation of Students (GFS) issued a statement condemning "imperialist intrigue" in Kuwait. (IT, July 9)

In Nov the Federation lauded the [Moscow-orientated] International Union of Students "for its anti-reactionary struggle," on the occasion of its 15th anniversary. (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, Nov 20)

Struggle With Authorities—Branches Closed. In March a "responsible source" at the Ministry of Education declared that elections for the GFS [which had been due since Nov 1960; see MER 1960, p 253] would be held "in due course," after "some problems... relating to the Union" had been solved (INA, March 4). In fact, elections were not held and towards the end of the year the GFS repeatedly asked the authorities to license elections (14 Tammuz, Nov 27; *Bilad*, Dec 8, 27). [The attitude of the GFS and the authorities may perhaps have been founded on the assumption that the leftists in the GFS were still in the majority.]

In Jan the authorities closed the Students' Union at the College of Education because of "acts of provocation" (IT, Jan 5), as well as the Basra branch. (*Difa*, Jordan, Jan 2)

In April the branches in Karbala, Diwaniya and Kirkuk provinces were closed down for having "neglected the proper affairs of the students and busied themselves overmuch with politics." (Akhhbar, April 2; *Falastin*, Jordan, April 27)

Disensions, Secessions; Rival Union Established. In April a "nationalist" source stated that among the many corporate withdrawals from the GFS were the Ramadi Students Union and two (named) secondary schools at A'zamiya. [Both Ramadi (Western Iraq) and A'zamiya (Baghdad) were "nationalist" centres.] (*Fajr al-Jadid*, April 20)

In Dec a GFS statement condemned the "Founders' Congress of the National Union of Iraqi Students" which had been held at the Medical College, "under cover of the 'fight against Communism.'" (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, Dec 7; *Mabda'*, Dec 9). Fights broke out between the two factions at the Law and Medical colleges. (Akhhbar, Bayan, Dec 12; *Mabda'*, Dec 16)

THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF PEASANTS' SOCIETIES

(al-ittihād al-amm lil-jum'iyyāt al-fallāhiyyah)

General. The number of licensed peasants' societies in Iraq was given as 3537 (INA, Aug 16). (In Feb 1960 it had been given as 3577—see MER 1960, p 255.)

First Congress. The 1st congress of the General Federation of Peasants' Societies (GFPS) assembled on Jan 14 at Baghdad, headed by its president Arīk as-Zakam. At

the congress, Qassim stated that the government would continue land distribution and issued a warning to opponents of agrarian reform.

Congress resolutions urged that peasants should sit on the inspection bodies planned by the government to expedite the implementation of the agrarian reform law and that women should have equal rights as beneficiaries of land distribution, recommended triennial instead of annual elections for peasant societies and the Federation, and pledged loyalty to Qassim. (*Bayan, Zaman, IT, Jan 13-16*)

A leftist source accused Zakam of dictatorial tendencies and questioned the democratic character of the congress (*Itiqat, Jan 24*); Zakam rejected these allegations (*Bayan, Jan 30*). Zakam was a founder member of the National Progressive Party, whose organ was *Al-Bayan*—see MER 1960, p 246.]

Relations with the Authorities. In March, Zakam sent a cable to Qassim on behalf of the GFPS, thanking him for the abolition of duties on crops (*istihlak*) and land tax (on which see: Economic and Social Survey, above; *IT, March 31*.)

In Aug the Ministry of Finance allocated to the GFPS the sum of ID7,000. (*IT, Aug 9*)

On Sept 5 the Peasants' Society's Law was amended to provide for biennial elections to their administrative bodies. (*IT, Sept 5*; see also above.)

At the end of the year, a letter to the editor complained that officials had lately shown hostility to peasant societies and cooperated with land owners, "the enemies of the revolution." (*Bayan, Dec 1*)

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Lawyers' Union (*niqabat al-muhamin*). [The Union had been nationalist-led, with pronounced UAR tendencies, since 1959.] In Jan five members of the executive handed in their resignation to the Society's president, Abd ar-Razzaq Shahib, reportedly in protest against his decision to limit to 202 the number of Iraqi lawyers attending the forthcoming Arab Lawyers' Congress in Cairo. (*IT, Jan 19*)

At the annual elections on Oct 20 Shahib was elected president for the third time running; Nu'man al-Ani and Mahdi Qassim Kubba were elected first and second vice-presidents, respectively. Of the other two contestants for the presidency, Shukri Salih Zaki was ruled out by court order as not having 15 years' law practice to his credit and Abbas Hasan Jum'ah withdrew on election day (*Bilad, Oct 21*; *IT, Oct 22*). A leftist paper reported that there were many abstentions, and that the vote was taken "under the supervision of an official authority." (*Bilad, Oct 21*)

Industrialists' Association (*ittihad al-sina'at al-iraqiyah*). On Dec 19 elections took place for the executive of the Iraqi Industrialists' Association. Nuri Fattah was reelected president; Khadduri Khadduri [vice-chairman of the National Progressive Party] was elected vice-president. (*Zaman, Dec 20*)

Chamber of Commerce. On Nov 26 elections were held for the committee of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce. Muhammad Ja'far ash-Shahibi was elected president for the 12th time running. (*Zaman, Nov 28*)

Engineers' Union; Leftists Lose Control. The third congress of the Engineers' Union took place in Baghdad

on Jan 17-20. In the elections for the presidency, Adib al-Jadir, heading the Professional List, defeated the incumbent president, Abd ar-Razzaq Mutar, of the Engineers' Solidarity List. [In Iraq, since the revolution, "solidarity" lists represented leftist interests.] (*INA, Jan 21*; *IT, Jan 17-24*)

The Medical Union; Leftists Lose Control. In Jan, elections for the executive and regional committees of the union resulted in a "historic" victory for the [nationalist] Independent Professional List, when its candidate Dr Ahmad Kamal Arif was elected chairman by 900 votes against 339 votes secured by Dr Hashim Dugramachi of the [leftist] Cooperative List. (*Fajr al-Jadid, Jan 23*)

Economists' Society Under Nationalist Control. On Dec 1 elections for the Iraqi Economists' Society resulted in the victory of the Professional List headed by Dr Hasan ath-Thamir, the incumbent chairman, with 486 votes as against 335 votes for the Democratic List (*INA, Dec 2*). [This was an affirmation of anti-Communist control.]

Writers' League under Nationalist Control. The League elections resulted as follows: Dr Abd al-Aziz ad-Duri—president; Dr Abd ar-Razzaq Muhi ad-Din—vice-president; Dr Yusuf Izz ad-Din—secretary; Shadih Taqah—treasurer [all personalities holding "nationalist" views]. (*Akhbar, Dec 6*)

THE PARTISANS OF PEACE

(*ansar al-salam*)

[The operations of this Communist front organization were severely restricted but it was not officially dissolved and maintained some activity until the end of the year.]

Government Activities Against Movement. At the beginning of the year, a leftist paper described the Peace Partisans as "the broadest, most solid and fastest growing anti-imperialist movement in Iraq." (*IT, Feb 5* quot. *Sawt al-Ahrar*)

In Jan Aziz Sharif, secretary-general, addressed a memorandum to Qassim asking him to remove the obstacles which had been put in the way of the movement, e.g. closing of provincial branches and detention of members. Among prominent members mentioned as detained without trial were Tawfiq Munir, the deputy SG; Dr Abdallah Bustani [brother of Abd al-Qadir Isma'il Bustani, publisher of the Communist party organ *Ittihad ash-She'ab*]; Ma'ruf al-Karzanji. (*Nida', Lebanon, Jan 20* quot. *Itiqat, Jan 6*)

In March the Mosul branch of the movement was reported closed by the authorities. (*Difa', Manar, Jordan, March 14*)

In May the Military Governor-General ordered the closing of all Peace Partisans premises throughout Iraq [but not the dissolution of the organization as such]. The reason stated was that the aims of the organization were the concern of the entire Iraqi people, and not of one section. The order added that the organization might apply for permission to hold meetings. (*Zaman, May 9*)

The [nationalist] paper *Al-Fajr al-Jadid* commended this measure taken against "a vicious group which set traps for simple people to lure them into the underground world of anarchy." (*IT, May 10*)

Activities Continue. In the spring Aziz Sharif paid a visit to Cuba where he met Dr Fidel Castro, and attended the conference of the World Peace Council at New Delhi. (*Bilad, May 3*)

In the summer Sharif issued statements on behalf of the movement supporting Qasim on the Kuwait question and thanking him for his stand on the "Ban the Bomb" issue. (*IT*, July 7, Aug 9)

The authorities licensed the holding of a meeting of the Peace Partisans in Baghdad on Aug 18, in support of the "Anti-Atom-Bomb Council" of Japan (*IT*, Aug 13); the meeting took place on that date (*Akhbar*, Aug 19). In Sept the movement sent its greetings to the Belgrade Conference, and later welcomed its resolutions. (*IT*, Sept 6, 10)

On Nov 30 Qasim received Sharif in audience, prior to his departure for Stockholm as Iraqi representative at a meeting of the World Peace Council there. According to a movement bulletin, Qasim had praised it and stressed that he was supporting it as before. (*IT*, Dec 3)

On Dec 8 the movement held its fourth annual conference in Baghdad. The SG described the international scene and stressed his loyalty to Qasim. (*Sawt al-Ahrar*; *Bilad*, Dec 12)

THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH

(*al-ittihad al-amm li ash-shabibah ad-dimuqratiyah*)
(*Corrigendum*: MER 1960, p 255: The name of the organization in Arabic should be read as above.)

[This Communist front organization which had been severely harassed by the authorities in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 255-6) was finally liquidated.]

In March a petition was addressed to the authorities for the release of Sami Mahjub al-Husseini al-Hurani, member of the secretariat, who had been detained by them for over four months. (*Bilad*, March 16; *Istiqal*, March 19)

In April the authorities closed down all the Union's branches for "having deviated from its legitimate purpose of doing true service to youth," and for having received financial aid "from a political party" (*Ahd al-Jadid*; *Falastin*, Jordan, April 27). At the same time the "Democratic Youth" programme of Baghdad Radio was discontinued (*Mustaqbal*, April 30) and the licence

of the Union's magazine, *Alam ash-Shabibah*, was withdrawn. (*Zaman*, May 9)

An appeal by the dissolved Union to the Court of Cassation was rejected, and an official receiver was appointed to liquidate its property. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, June 29)

In Dec Dr Rahim Ajinah, secretary of the Union, petitioned Qasim to withdraw the order of dissolution. (*Madba*, Dec 29, 30)

WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

Authorities Close Women's League Branches. The [pro-Communist] Iraqi Women's League, whose activities had been curbed in 1960 (MER 1960, p 256), had a number of its provincial branches closed down by the authorities "for intervening in politics and deviating from the principles for which it had been licensed"; these centres were—Basra (*Ahali*, Jan 3); Mosul, closed down on March 21, dissolved on May 29 (*Ahali*, March 22, May 30); Diwaniya (BBC in Ar, March 26-IMB, March 27); Kirkuk (*Haganah*, June 6); Arbil (*Bayan*, Dec 26). In Dec the League petitioned Qasim to permit the reactivation of the branches closed down. (*Bilad*, Dec 22)

Rival Organization Active. The [anti-Communist] Republican Women's Organization (*munazzamat nisa' al-jumhuriyah*) (see MER 1960, p 256) continued its philanthropic activities, such as sewing clothes for infants in Karakh hospital. (*Akhbar*, Jan 20)

In May an organization called the Women's League of the Iraqi Republic (*jum'iyat nisa' al-jumhuriyah al-irakiyah*) was welcomed to join the Arab Women's Federation (*al-ittihad an-nisa' al-arabi*), headed by the Lebanese Ibtihaj Qadurah. (*Zaman*, May 20)

The Muslim Women's Club (*muntada al-mar'ah al-muslimah*) of Baghdad was licensed by the Minister of the Interior on April 20; the application had been signed by Najiyah Khidir (*Akhbar*, April 21). On July 9 elections for the committee took place, and Mrs Adwiyah ash-Shawwaf was elected president (*Zaman*, July 22). The club arranged charity bazaars, which the organizers described as highly successful. (*Bayan*, Oct 13)

THE GOVERNMENT AND ISLAM, MINORITIES

GOVERNMENT AND ISLAM

[The government took care to show its eagerness to promote the interests of Islam.]

Islam to Remain Official Religion. On July 18 Qasim said that the article in the provisional constitution of 1958, declaring Islam the state religion, would also be included in the permanent constitution. (*IT*, July 19)

Government Encourages Islam. The Muslim Youth Society received a ID7,000 government grant, "to erect a building and further its aims." (*Ahali*, Jan 30)

An official source stated that Qasim had agreed to grant teachers going on pilgrimage seventeen days paid leave instead of seven days as previously. (*IT*, April 25)

In July it was announced that the [Shi'i] holy shrines at Karbala would not be charged for electricity. (*IT*, July 26)

In Sept the Ministry of Finance allotted ID54,000 for the repair of various [Shi'i] holy shrines, in fulfilment of Qasim's desire. (*IT*, Sept 22)

In Oct the Awqaf Advisory Council allocated ID30,000 for the establishment of a public library in Mosul. (*Zaman*, Oct 24)

[At the same time the government stressed its positive attitude towards Islam by demonstrating hostility towards its detractors. The following are typical examples:] The authorities banned the book "Materialism and Idealism" by George Lohidzev, translated by Isma'il al-Mahdawi, for being anti-religious (*IT*, Aug 29). A labourer was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for blaspheming the Prophet and the Holy Qur'an. (*Zaman*, March 10)

Shi'i Leader Demands Repeal of Personal Status Law. [The response of at least one prominent Islamic personage to government overtures was lukewarm:] An *Al-Hayat* reporter interviewed the Shi'i divine, Muhsin al-Hakim of Najaf (see MER 1960, p 257), whom he described as "the strongest popular personality in Iraq... the most powerful man outside government circles," regarded by the Islamic party as "their spiritual father" and by anti-Communists as "their first protector in the

had days of the past." When asked about his attitude to the government, Hakim replied that he had no personal attitude, but that Muslims in general wanted Qasim to abolish the personal status law enacted during "the red period" (*Hayat, Jan 19*). [This was, as reported, Muhsin al-Kakim's only reference to Iraqi affairs in an extensive interview.] [The Personal Status Law of Dec 30, 1959 sought to establish a unified legal basis in this matter while modernizing a number of traditional Muslim concepts. The law provided, i.e., for a minimum age for marriage (18 years; in special cases 16 years, by permission of a Qādi); prohibited polygamy on pain of a prison sentence, except if especially permitted by a Qādi for reasons laid down in the law; provided for a compulsory marriage contract allowing for divorce proceedings by the wife if broken by the husband, and made divorce subject to court decision. The law was designed with intent to give the least offence to the traditionally-minded; religious courts were not interfered with and in cases of doubt judges were instructed to rely upon precedents based on religious law. Nonetheless, religious circles resented the law as an intrusion of secularism.] [For text of the law see *Al-Waqif al-Iraqiyyah, Dec 30, 1959.*]

Anti-Communism Rampant among Shi'is. The reporter quoted above was struck by the spontaneous outbursts of hatred at Karbala against the Communists, who were held responsible for the anti-religious terror of 1959. He described a mass meeting at which Brig. Sayyid Hamid Sayyid Hussein, Commander of the 1st division, inveighed against the faithless. After the meeting, the mob dragged an effigy of Khrushchov through the streets. (*Hayat, Jan 19*)

Shari'ah College Attached to Baghdad University, Women Admitted. By order of Qasim the Shari'ah College was attached to Baghdad University as from April 1 (*IT, April 6*). In 1961 the College admitted thirty women secondary school graduates, to its first class, out of a total of 120 students. A separate class-room was provided for the girl students. Women graduates of the College might teach Arabic at government secondary schools, the dean said. (*INA, Oct 24; Zaman, Oct 25*)

NOMADIC TRIBES

Synopsis. No occurrences of particular significance were reported. The government continued its policy of assimilating Bedouin law and custom to state law. Steps were taken, within the framework of agrarian reform, to promote the settlement of nomad tribes. Measures were taken to alleviate distress, presumably due to years of drought.

The press reported declarations of loyalty to the regime by heads of the most important tribal groups.

Tribal Custom Reference Removed from Penal Code. A law was published on Feb 23 amending the Baghdad Penal Code by deleting Art 41, which gave judges discretion to refer to tribal custom and commute sentences

accordingly. "Although the Judiciary never applied Art 41..., its inclusion in the code was inconsistent with the aims of the Revolution," INA commented. (*INA, Feb 23; Zaman, Feb 24*)

Bedouin Settlement. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform set up a special committee for the settlement of Bedouin (*Sawt al-Ahali, April 20; Bayan, May 8*). In June its chairman announced that 500,000 dunams would be distributed among the Shammar tribes in N.W. Iraq, in a concerted project to settle them on the land; reports showed the Shammar to be favourably inclined towards these plans. (*IT, June 7*)

Relief Measures. "By order of the Prime Minister," ID5,000 were allocated for the relief of Bedouin tribes in Mosul and Diwaniya provinces. A committee was appointed to purchase food and clothing for the needy. (*Bilad, Jan 26; Zaman, Feb 12*)

Tribes Pledge Loyalty to Qasim. On April 22 Qasim received a delegation from the Shammar tribes which assured him of their absolute support and especially for his stand vis-à-vis the IPC (*IT, April 24*). [In March 1959 the Shammar tribes participated in the Shawwaf rebellion and suffered heavily during and after its suppression.]

On Aug 5 delegations from the Shammar and Anaiza tribes were received by Qasim whom they thanked for the agricultural and medical projects undertaken in their interests. (*IT, Aug 7*)

Tribal Clashes. In March three people were reported killed in clashes "due to ancient enmity," between Shammar and Harsa bedouin on the one side, and Yazidis on the other. (*Falastin, Jordan, March 10*)

MINORITIES

[On the Kurdish rising and clashes between Turkomans and Kurds—see below. No other events or developments of particular significance were reported.]

Churches Against Communism. The heads of the Christian communities in the Mosul area published a condemnation of "atheist materialist Communism" which they adjured Christians to shun. (*Fajr al-Jadid, Jan 19*)

Qasim Present at Ceremony at Christian Institution. On June 10 Qasim addressed the second graduation ceremony of the [Jesuit-sponsored] *Al-Hikmah* University at Baghdad, stressing his reverence for learning and culture. (*IT, June 12*)

Yazidi Pledge to Qasim. On April 29 a Yazidi delegation called on Qasim and pledged loyalty to the homeland. (*IT, May 1*)

Jews. In May Sassoon Kadoori, Rabbi of Baghdad, blessed Qasim on *id al-adha* festival in the name of the "Mosaic community" (*Zaman, May 24*). [The Jewish community was estimated at approximately 5,000.]

THE KURDISH RISING


BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS

Background. The Kurds inhabit a compact mountainous area extending over the borders of Iran, Iraq and Turkey and smaller strips of Syria and the USSR. They number four to five million, according to informed neutral estimates; numbers given by interested parties vary widely—from three to 15 million.

The great majority are Sunni Muslims. The Kurdish language is Indo-European, split into branches practically unintelligible to each other. Written literature is of recent date; both Latin and Arabic scripts are employed.

As an identifiable ethnic group the Kurds are very

ancient; there is little doubt that they are referred to in Sumerian records of not later than 2000 B.C. Though they are one of the oldest autochthonous peoples of the region, their political consciousness as a nation is comparatively recent, dating approximately from the Young Turks revolution. For many reasons Kurdish nationalism has been slow to take root. The geographical situation of their homeland as well as its topographical character make the Kurds turn outwards for economic and cultural contacts, rather than to each other; their politically more advanced neighbours, while adopting different attitudes at different times, were all hostile to Kurdish aspirations, and great power interests as well as the gene-



ral diplomatic situation in the ME were almost always unfavourable. Yet the main reason is social. Isolated from the outer world, and with mountain barriers criss-crossing their own territory, the Kurds have maintained a primarily tribal organization, and in consequence put tribal loyalties—and animosities—above all others.

Nonetheless there has been a constant development of nationalist feeling amongst a slowly-growing urban (largely expatriated) intelligentsia which developed mutual links with the tribal society. Thus, traditional tribal uprisings against distant governments and local tax-collectors gradually acquired nationalist overtones. In one outstanding case, a permanent alliance was achieved between the Barazani tribe and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (on which see below). In the aftermath of the two World Wars, when the great powers struggled for positions in the ME, Kurdish nationalist aspirations were encouraged for short periods. In 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire provided for an autonomous Kurdish area in S.E. Anatolia and envisaged ultimate independence, but there was no trace of these provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923 by the Allies and the Kemalist government. This was due, on the one hand, to Kemalist hostility towards all separatist movements north of the Arah area, and on the other, to the close alignment of British and Iraq-Hashimite interests in the area. A Kurdish state was set up under Soviet protection in the aftermath of the Second World War, this time at the expense of Iran.

The Kurds of Iraq are estimated at about one million people. They speak mainly Kurmanji, the southern branch of the Kurdish language, though the differences in dialect are great. All levels of socio-economic development from the nomadic to the urban-industrialized are represented; the majority of the population is probably semi-nomadic, with a regular trend towards settlement, and some are urbanized. The Iraqi Kurds form the bulk of the population in the provinces of Arbil and Sulaymaniyah, and are strongly represented in the provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk. A considerable and politically important Kurdish community is also to be found in Baghdad. The traditional capital of Iraqi Kurdistan is Sulaymaniyah.

The attitude of the royal government of Iraq to its Kurdish subjects was conciliatory up to a point, mainly due to precedents set by the British military authorities immediately after the First World War, and to obligations incurred in international settlements, under the British mandate. In Dec 1925 the Council of the League of Nations awarded the Mosul vilayet to Iraq—over Turkish claims—subject to guarantees that regard would be paid to "the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the language of all these services." In 1932, when the League Council considered Iraq's admission, it required and received from the Iraqi government a written Declaration, which was to rank as part of the Constitution, reaffirming its undertakings in regard to the minorities. A special law was enacted defining the areas within which Kurdish and Turkish should be the languages of the local administration, of the law courts, and of primary education.

Various promises concerning cultural autonomy and administration by Kurdish officials were made, and to some degree implemented. While Kurds not identified with Kurdish nationalism and society served in the high-

est government positions including the premiership, no prospects were held out for Kurdish autonomy and no all-Kurdish political parties or movements were permitted.

The Kurdish tribes as a whole were restive. While tribes could generally be found to cooperate with Baghdad, there was always a threat of major uprisings, which often did break out. During the years of the mandate, resistance to the central government was spearheaded by Shaykh Mahmud al-Barzani of Sulaymaniyah. When he was exiled in 1931, his place was taken by the brothers Ahmad and Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani, heads of the Barazani tribe, located north-west of Ruwanduz.

Ahmad, born about 1885, and Mulla Mustafa (called Mulla after a maternal uncle), born about 1903, belonged to a family that had led the Barazanis for 1,200 years, according to Mulla Mustafa. Their grandfather, father and a brother were executed by the Turks for rebellion. Shaykh Ahmad came eventually to believe that "his greatest duty was to spare his war-torn tribe from further suffering and to solve its problems by negotiation and compromise" (NYT, Sept 11, 1962). Mulla Mustafa, on the other hand, was convinced that the Barazanis, and the Kurds in general, must fight or be destroyed.

Since the Barazanis operated from a permanent territorial base which was remote and inaccessible, their subjection was extremely difficult. In 1932 an Iraqi ground force was saved only by RAF intervention. After intermittent risings and pacifications, a major Barazani rebellion broke out in 1943. In Oct 1943, Shaykh Ahmad and Mulla Mustafa, harassed by government forces and rival tribes, but attracted by promising developments in Iran, crossed the borders with hundreds of their armed followers, women and children. In Iran, Mulla Mustafa became the military commander of the "Kurdish People's Government" at Mahabad, established under Zaki Muhammad at the end of 1945 upon Soviet initiative. Mulla Mustafa later asserted that the "republic" tried to maintain its independence against Soviet attempts at interference. The political basis of this Kurdish "republic" was the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) which developed out of the "Rusdari Kurd," itself a "Popular Front" merger of various left-wing nationalist bodies, and Kurdish Communists. When the Soviet forces evacuated Azerbaijan in May 1946 and the Iranian government reasserted itself in the area, the Mahabad "government" disintegrated and Zaki Muhammad was put to death at Tehran in March 1947. Mulla Mustafa became the leader of what remained of its political and military forces. His attempt to return to Iraq was beaten back by the Iraqi army, and in the summer of 1947 he and his followers forced their way through Turkey and Iran to the USSR, where they were received with honour and settled down to wait for better days. Shaykh Ahmad surrendered to the Iraqi authorities and was imprisoned until 1958.

Meanwhile Iraqi Kurdistan remained relatively quiet. The DPK carried on underground activities among the Kurdish intellectuals of the north and Baghdad. A significant development was the secession from the party of the Communist wing, which did not or was not permitted to share the primary stress on the "national" struggle in contrast to the "anti-imperialist" one.

The revolution of July 14, 1958, brought the Barazani-DPK combination into prominence. The tribal rivals of the Barazanis—the Zibari, Baradost and Herki Kurds—who had collaborated with PM Nuri Sa'id, preferred to stay in Iran to await further developments. On the other hand, the Kurdish intelligentsia and especially DPK

circles shared the widespread enthusiasm at the downfall of the old regime and were encouraged by the reference to the Kurds in the provisional constitution as "partners" of the Arabs in the Iraqi republic. For the first time, Kurdish parties were permitted to work openly in Iraq and the DPK naturally stepped on to the scene. Mulla Mustafa returned from the Soviet Union in Sept 1958 and was warmly welcomed by PM Qasim who kept him in Baghdad, either as his Kurdish adviser and intermediary, or as a pledge of good behaviour. Qasim stated in Sept 1961, after the Kurdish rising, that Mulla Mustafa received a monthly salary of ID500, while every bachelor or head of family among the repatriates received from ID35 to 50 monthly. A vigorous Kurdish press quickly developed.

The Iraqi Communists acclaimed Mulla Mustafa's return and continued afterwards to regard him as their ally; but he never adopted any other stance than that of a Kurdish nationalist, though his interests ran parallel with the Communists' against the Arab nationalists, and for a time Communist influence was strong in the DPK. During the Shawwaf rebellion in March 1959, the Barazani Kurds and the DPK—like the Communists—vigorously supported Qasim, and Mulla Mustafa left Baghdad for a time to assist in beating down nationalist influences in the north.

In Feb 1960, the DPK was legalized under the Associations Law, but by then relations between the regime and the DPK-Barazani combination had started to cool off. Even if he had wished—and of this he gave no sign—Qasim could not possibly fulfil the extravagant hopes which he had inspired in Kurdish nationalist circles. In practice, he applied his balancing tactics to the Kurdish question. The tribal rivals of the Barazanis gradually returned from Iran, and Qasim made it clear that the Barazanis had no monopoly of his affections or of government aid. As early as May 1959, inter-tribal violence started, mainly between the Barazanis and the Zibaris, each side accusing the other of aggression. By 1960, the Zibaris seemed likely to supplant the Barazanis as the favourites of Baghdad. At the same time, relations between the DPK and the regime deteriorated to a point of hostility. An anti-Communist purge of the party at about that time—initiated by Mulla Mustafa as he later claimed—did not cause the authorities to assume a more positive attitude. In Nov Mulla Mustafa left on an extended and ostensibly non-political visit to the USSR, but this was taken as a sign that relations between him and Qasim were at the breaking point.

Synopsis. Early in 1961, government harassment of the DPK continued. At the same time, PM Qasim and the government-inspired press endeavoured to deny, mostly by implication, the Kurdish claim to constitute a separate people or nation. This evoked angry retorts from *Khebdî*, the DPK-Barazani organ.

Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani returned from the USSR in Jan and went to Baghdad, but a month or two later he left for his mountain stronghold, the village of Barazan, where he started to collect men and arms for a rising.

There were differing versions as to his ultimate aims. It was claimed that he strove to set up an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, but he and his followers said they aimed at Kurdish autonomy within Iraq and a fair share of the oil revenue for Kurdish needs.

The first stage of the rising took the form of inter-tribal warfare, with the Barazanis on the offensive. At the source of the conflict were ancient rivalries as well

as new irritations including government interference. As mentioned, tribal fighting had taken place in 1959 and again towards the end of 1960. The Barazanis probably aimed at establishing their hegemony in the Kurdish area by overcoming their foes and the potential allies of the government before rising against the government itself.

The first incident to attract attention was the murder in Feb of Sadiq Miran, chief of the Khosh-Naw tribe, in which a prominent member of the DPK was suspected of being involved. In May or early June, hostilities broke out in Kurdistan and by July the Barazanis and their allies were launching full-scale attacks on their tribal rivals, forcing them to flee and looting and burning their villages.

The Barazanis, it was reported, were joined at various times by the Balik, the Duuki, the Nerva, the Mamash under Abbas Mamand-Agha, and the Ako tribes. The Barazanis' major rivals were the Zibari and Baradost tribes, joined by the Herki, Raika and Surhi. The Barazanis' rivals were apparently armed by the government when the army command decided on a major action against the insurgents.

In July or Aug, the insurgents began to take over government posts and police stations, mostly without open clashes, either by the use of various stratagems or simply by show of force. All through this period, government forces remained passive except for some minor interventions by local garrisons.

By the beginning of Sept several sizable towns in the mountain area were partly or wholly occupied by the insurgents who were on the offensive in the whole mountain crescent of Iraqi Kurdistan stretching for some 600 kms from the meeting-point of the borders of Iraq, Turkey and Syria in the N.W. to the Darbandi Khan area near the Iranian border in the S.E. Zakho, Iraq's northernmost town, familiarized by Qasim's Iraqi unity slogan: "From Zakho in the north to Kuwait in the south," was in the hands of the insurgents. They then attacked army units which were moving to the counteroffensive.

PM Qasim later spoke of a serious attack on an army column on Sept 12 which, he said, was the day the army action started. With the help of the Air Force which, by many accounts, ruthlessly harried rebel concentrations and bombed towns and villages, and the assistance of rival tribes, the Barazanis were gradually driven back towards their mountain stronghold. By mid-Oct, after some five weeks of the government offensive, Qasim claimed that Barazani itself had been occupied and the insurgents defeated. At the same time, the government purged the army and administration of Kurdish personnel of doubtful loyalty, dissolved the DPK, and closed down institutions which seemed to sympathize with the latter. The funds of these bodies and of their prominent members were confiscated. A committee of investigation was set up to inquire into the insurrection.

In the second half of Nov reports appeared which indicated that the government claims of victory had been premature. The mopping-up operations had never been fully effective and by the end of Dec heavy fighting was again reported. Qasim himself stated that the rebellion had broken out afresh.

There were no reliable reports on any foreign interference though Qasim accused the British and "their American partners" of having instigated the insurrection, while some Western and Arab papers reported that Barazani was receiving arms and other aid from the Com-

munist bloc. (See also below under: Question of Foreign Interference.)

PRELUDE TO THE RISING (POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS)

(January-June)

Reasons for Kurdish Discontent. After the outbreak of the rising, *The Economist* summed up the background as follows: The Kurdish leaders had high hopes for General Qasim's Arab and Kurdish republic. But there had been a long series of disappointments, arising mainly from the procrastination and tactlessness of the central government. The Kurds were irritated by the inefficiency of the land reform scheme, by the order to stop tobacco growing in the area, by new tax laws and by the transfer of Kurdish officials to other parts of Iraq.

Their gradually increasing discontent showed itself at first in inter-tribal jealousies and warfare. (*Economist*, Sept 23)

Government Harasses DPK. [As already mentioned, the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan (DPK) was closely linked to the Barazani.] *Khabat*, organ of the DPK, asserted that members of the party were frequently arrested, deported or deprived of their livelihood, and in general handicapped in their freedom of action, and this despite the party's loyalty which had been recognized by Qasim himself. The paper also demanded the repeal of the emergency measures. (Quoted in *Sa'at al-Ahrar*, Jan 11, 24)

In March *Khabat* urged "patriotic forces" to show solidarity with "our ... party in the face of the campaign of vexation to which it is exposed." The paper listed examples. (*IT*, March 16)

On March 9 a warrant of arrest was reported issued against Ibrahim Ahmad, editor of *Khabat*, and SG of the DPK Central Committee, on suspicion of being privy to the murder of Shaykh Sadiq Miran, a leader of the Kurdish Khosh-Naw tribe at Shaqlawa (Arbil province) in Feb. The DPK vehemently denied the allegation and asked for a commission of enquiry into Miran's death (*Ahali*, Feb 26, March 14; *Fajr al-Jadid*, March 9). The warrant was reported withdrawn on March 10, but Ahmad went into hiding. (*ANA*, March 10 [13]; *Fajr al-Jadid*, March 30)

Owing to Ahmad's flight, it was reported, *Khabat* ceased to appear. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, March 30)

Earlier however, on March 4, a new Kurdish newspaper, *Kurdistan*, appeared; its owner was Ibrahim Ahmad, SG of the DPK. (*Manar*, Jordan, March 6)

In April, the authorities closed down the DPK branches in Mosul and Kirkuk "for deviating from the objectives for which they had been licensed" (*Mustaqbal*, April 18), and in June the branch at Darbandji Khan (*IT*, June 22). [For the banning of the party after the outbreak of the rising, see below: Government Counter Activities.]

Questions of National Status. In Jan, the Teachers' Association [then still under leftist leadership] called on the Minister of Education to encourage the development of Kurdish culture and expressed its regrets that the Directorate-General of Kurdish Education had not yet become active. *Al-Ahali* and *Sa'at al-Ahrar* associated themselves with this demand, which was repeated a fortnight later by the Arbil branch of the Teachers' Association. (*IT*, Jan 4; *Ahali*, Jan 5; *Bilad*, Jan 20 quot. *Sa'at al-Ahrar*)

On Feb 20, in a public speech, Qasim suggested by implication that the Kurds did not historically constitute

a separate people but were basically "Iraqis". He made no mention in this speech of the "Kurdish nationality" (*qawmiah*), a term he used frequently in 1960 (see MER 1960, pp 119, 232) and infrequently also later in 1961. Qasim said that Iraq was a partnership between Arabs, Kurds and other minorities, but that this "partnership is indivisible." "I will tell you," Qasim continued, "why our brother Kurds are called by this name": The name derived from the Persian Kurdu, a title bestowed by the Kings of Assyria and Babylon on valiant warriors; with the advent of Islam these warriors fused with the Muslim army. Qasim went on to stress that the Kurds belonged to the oldest inhabitants of Iraq. "We are one nation," he said, and "whoever tries to disrupt our ranks is not of Iraq" (*Zaman* Feb 22: *IT*, Feb 23). [*The Encyclopedia Britannica* (edition of 1951, article Kurdistan) mentions "Gutü or Küti, later on called Kürti by the Assyrians" as peopling the region of the middle Tigris not later than 2000 BC; it does not give the origin of the name, beyond connecting it with "Jebel Judi" in that area.]

Shortly afterwards [the pro-government] *Ath-Thawrah* published an article headed "Our people—Undivided" which argued that Iraq was not a "conglomerate of peoples" (*majma'at al-shu'ub*) made up of Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans and others, but one indivisible nation (*umma*). (*Thawrah*, March 2)

Khabat protested in the strongest terms against this "attempt to melt down the Kurdish nation" and demanded that the government reiterate its determination to preserve the equality of status of Arabs and Kurds in the Iraqi state. (*Khabat*, March 6, 7)

Later, *Khabat* noted that Qasim had not disapproved of the statements made in *Ath-Thawrah*. (Quot. in *IT*, March 17)

Barazani's Aims: Autonomy Within Iraq. [Although non-Kurdish sources alleged that the rebels were out to establish an independent state, Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani himself did not go beyond autonomy within Iraq.]

[The following item from a UAR source was unconfirmed.] *MENA* reported that the insurrectionist movement began early in March when the Kurds set up a state in Arbil province, and hoisted the Kurdish flag—a dagger and a rope against a yellow background. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 17 [19])

Towards the end of Sept it was reported in Iraq that the diary of Ibrahim Ahmad, SG of "the traitorous DPK," proved that his party had intended to set up a separate Kurdish state in northern Iraq. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, Sept 27)

In contrast, Mulla Mustafa was quoted in a press interview a month after his return to Iraq as saying that he wanted "legitimate Kurdish aspirations realized" without harming "the existence and integrity of the Iraqi Republic." (*Nahdah*, Beirut, Feb 20, quot. by S.E. van Rooy, *Survey*, London, Aug 26)

A journalist who visited Kurdistan during the same period quoted a wealthy Kurd, and supporter of Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani—described by an official as "an important Kurdish nationalist" who could raise 200 armed men—as saying: "We may talk a lot about national sovereignty but all we realistically hope for is more control over local affairs and a fairer share of the oil revenue." He complained that not a single state or person had a word to say about the plight of the Kurds. "We are a people. We have rights." (*Scotman*, Feb 18)

[Eighteen months of mounting tension and open warfare appeared to effect little change in the Barazani's

aims.] In Aug 1962 the American reporter Dana Adams Schmidt, who visited the rebellious area and interviewed Mulla Mustafa, defined the Kurds' aim as "to force Qasim to grant the Kurds an autonomous state of Kurdistan within Iraq." (NYT, Sept 13, 1962)

THE RISING—FIRST STAGE INTER-TRIBAL WARFARE

Earlier Tribal Clashes: As already mentioned, in autumn 1960, the Zibāri tribes under Shaykh Mahmūd and the Baradost tribes under Shaykh Rashīd Loīān were reported to have raided villages belonging to the followers of Mulla Mustafa Barazāni. Qasim, it was reported, had established contacts with these tribes and refrained from prosecuting those responsible for the raids. (NYT, Dec 28, 30, 1960; Monde, Sept 26; see also MER 1960, p 251.)

[Corrigendum: The names of these two tribes in MER 1960 should be corrected as spelled here.]

Barazāni Prepares Rising. Mulla Mustafa al-Barazāni returned from the USSR to Iraq on Jan 13. (Ahali, Jan 15)

Some time in the spring, probably in Feb or March, Mulla Mustafa left Baghdad for Barazān, where according to an account published later in *Al-Hayāt* he started his preparations for the rising. He had in his possession large sums of money which he used to buy arms, even at very high prices. Leaders of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and Kurdish Communists from the towns joined Barazāni's ranks; the latter brought with them automatic weapons and mortars which had fallen into their hands at the time of the Shawwāf rising in March 1959. He also sent emissaries to Beirut to solicit the support of the Kurds there for the intended rising which was aimed at partial autonomy within Iraq, if not an independent Kurdish state in the north of the country. (Hayat, Sept 20)

A UAR source said Qasim himself had armed the Barazānis with 1,200 rifles "when they cooperated with the Communists after the Shawwāf revolt" in 1959.

This source also claimed that "Kurds in Arbil" had set up a Kurdish state early in March and hoisted the Kurdish flag. [This was not confirmed.] (R. Damascus, Sept 17 [19])

The Barazāni Offensive. After full-scale insurrection had broken out, a UAR source, MENA, gave the following account: The disturbances took a violent turn at the beginning of May in the areas of Amadiya, Dohuk and Zakho in the northern area of the great Zab river. Led by Mulla Mustafa and supported by the Duskī and Nerva tribes, the Barazānis attacked the Zibāri tribes, led by Mahmūd az-Zibāri—and their supporters, the Raika and Surchi tribes—and burned their villages. Consequently, the Zibāris were forced to move to adjoining districts to seek the state's protection; others moved over to Turkish soil. The security forces intervened and many incidents occurred; by mid-Sept the security forces were not yet in control of the situation. (R. Damascus, Sept 17 [19])

On May 17 Qasim received a delegation of Zibār Kurds and discussed with them their problems. Qasim assured the delegation that he was acting for the good of all, without discrimination, an official bulletin said. (IT; Sant al-Ahrar, May 19)

That there were already inter-tribal troubles in the area as early as May, or at the latest, the beginning of June, was also born out by Shaykh Ahmad, Mulla Mustafa's brother, who called on Qasim early in June, as

he said, after he had "learned of some disputes between some Kurdish tribes." (IT, June 12)

According to a *Le Monde* correspondent "the Barazānis reacted on June 8." On that day Mulla Mustafa carried out an attack on the Zibāris which gave him most of the weapons with which the Zibāris had been armed "by the Baghdad authorities." At the same time Mulla Mustafa addressed a note to Qasim demanding the liberation of political prisoners, cessation of repressive measures, and "the fulfilment of promises for autonomy"; no reply was received. [A second note was dispatched on August 30. This time Qasim asked—through the governor of Arbil province—for a fortnight to reflect on the request. However, on September 10 the Iraqi army started its offensive against the insurgents (see below).] (Monde, Sept 26)]

A summary of events in *Al-Hayāt* placed the beginning of the Barazāni offensive in July when, after completing his preparations, Mulla Mustafa left Barazān and first attacked the tribe of Kalhi Agha in the Amadiya area. Though the tribe offered strong resistance, the Barazānis, with the advantage of modern weapons, defeated it and destroyed 25 villages. (Hayat, Sept 20)

According to Turkish sources, 83 families, counting 750 souls, of the Kalhi (spelled here Kelha) tribe (*ashlrah*) which belonged to the Baradost tribal federation (*qabūlah*), crossed into Turkey in mid-July. The tribe's chief, Kalhi Agha, said they had resisted the Barazānis for several days; only 60 soldiers had come to their assistance and "naturally" they were of no help (*Cumhuriyet*, July 23, 24, 27). The tribe returned in Oct, according to a Baghdad report. (Ahd al-Jadid, Oct 8)

Turkmen Attacked. During the same period it was reported that following upon clashes between Turkmen tribesmen and Kurdish followers of Mustafa al-Barazāni, 800 Turkmen had taken refuge in Turkey. (Times, July 24)

[There was no corroboration that Turkmen had crossed into Turkey, whereas on the same day the Turkish press reported that 750 Kurds had crossed the border—the *Al-Hayāt* report, quoted above, also made no mention of the involvement of Turkmen.]

MENA claimed, however, that the government had also armed Turkmen alongside Kurds to fight the Barazānis, but this report apparently referred to a later date. (R. Damascus, Sept 17 [19])

Clashes between Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk were reported some six months earlier; three Turkmen had been killed and several wounded on March 6 (Hayat, March 25); [there was no indication whether this incident was related to the rising.]

The Barazāni Offensive—Continued. Having defeated the Kalhi Agha tribe, the *Al-Hayāt* report continued, the Barazānis attacked the Zibāris [apparently at the end of July or in Aug], overcame their resistance and burned their villages.

The chiefs of the affected tribes sent a delegation to the governor at Mosul and to Baghdad asking for government intervention, but to no avail.

Meanwhile, all through Aug, Barazāni steadily widened his field of operation, attacked police stations as far as the town of Shaqlawa, took policemen prisoners while others joined his ranks, exacted tribute and took hostages. He then occupied the towns of Zakho and Dohuk; the army units there withdrew to Mosul, since they had no orders to fight.

During the same period, another tribe, the Mamash under Abbas Mamand Agha of Raziya, joined the Barazanis in the rising. Eight Kurdish officers were reported to have deserted the Iraqi army and joined the Barazanis. (*Monde*, Sept 26; *Hayat*, Sept 20)

[Following are reports which would indicate that large-scale fighting started in July, as reported by *Al-Hayat*, though minor clashes may have started earlier. The earliest report on tribal fighting in 1961 available to the editor was that of July 27, quoted above, on the flight of the Kalhi tribe.]

At the end of July the [pro-UAR] Lebanese paper *Al-Siyasah* reported heavy fighting between the Barazanis and their Kurdish opponents headed by "Shaykh Ala ad-Din al-Uthmani, the head of the Naqshabandi sect" (*Siyasah*, July 30). Further reports in this paper at the beginning of Aug claimed that there had been 1,000 killed and 500 wounded, and that the Iraqi army had failed to separate the rival forces and had been completely forced out of the Dohuk-Agra-Amadiya area. (*Siyasah*, Aug 9). The next day, the paper claimed that the Iraqi air force had bombed the rebel area (*Siyasah*, Aug 10). [There were no other reports on bombing during this period.]

Later in the month, a Cairo source reported that 100 persons had been killed and 20 villages burnt in fighting between the Barazanis and the Zibaris. (*Haq'a'iq*, Aug 17)

The Iraqi government twice denied these reports as completely untrue. (*Hayat*, Aug 16, 24)

At the end of Aug, the [clandestine Communist] station, *Our Radio*, broadcasting in Turkish, spoke of "significant clashes... between popular Kurdish forces and reactionary Kurds." The Democratic Party of Kurdistan had enlisted about 11,000 fighters in the Barazan area, commanded by Mustafa Barazani. Feudal Kurdish leaders who had betrayed the Kurdish cause and some of their men, 170 in all, had been annihilated. The reactionaries had been armed by Qasim. The situation was tense. "Fighting may break out any minute between the progressive Kurdish forces and the Middle Eastern reactionaries." (*Our Radio*, Aug 29 [Sept 1])

Army Remains Passive. [All through the period recorded above and until approximately Sept 10, the Iraqi army apparently remained passive, save for some attempts at intervention by local garrisons. This state of affairs emerges quite clearly from the above reports and the fact acknowledged by PM Qasim himself that by the beginning of Sept the insurgents had attacked and at times occupied towns in the greater part of Iraqi Kurdistan.] *Al-Hayat* said that the government first treated the tribal fighting as an internal Kurdish conflict. When the Barazanis became active outside their own area and the situation worsened, army units commenced patrolling the main roads. Only the occupation of Zakho and Dohuk and the attack on an army unit on the "Darbandi Khan road" in the first week of Sept decided the army command to intervene in force. (*Hayat*, Sept 20)

[Apparently referring to these events] PM Qasim said in his press conference on Sept 23, after describing the attacks of the insurgents: "We were merciful towards them so as to bring them back to the track of reason..." (*IT*, Sept 28)

Reasons Behind Tribal Warfare. [The general picture emerging from the reports was that the tribal warfare was related to old tribal rivalries which had become identified to a certain extent with varying attitudes towards the government and Kurdish national aspirations. From

the point of view of Mulla Mustafa, overpowering the anti-Barazani or pro-government tribes was a necessary preliminary to the anti-government struggle, aimed, as mentioned earlier, at Kurdish autonomy.]

A UAR source attributed the conflict between the Barazanis and the Zibaris to "old tribal reasons connected with leadership" but added that this took a violent turn in May after "the Communist Kurds, who are cultured Barazani Kurds known as *Al-Bartiyân* [i.e. party people—members of *Al-Bart* (The Party), the popular name of the DPK] incited the Kurdish youth to proclaim an independent Kurdish Republic. The armed Zibari, Raika and Surchi tribes did not support Barazani's separatist movement but, exploiting his dispute with Qasim, "they began struggling against atheism with a view to achieving the unity of Iraq and of the Arab nation" (*R. Damascus*, Sept 17 [19]). [The MENA report is obviously garbled. The same source said that in May 1961 it was the Barazanis who took the offensive (quoted above). Perhaps the last sentence here should be read as referring to the Zibari attacks on the Barazanis in the autumn of 1960.]

A [clandestine Communist] station described the conflict as one between popular and progressive Kurdish forces—the Barazanis on the one hand, and reactionaries, armed by Qasim, on the other. (*Our Radio in Turkish*, Aug 29 [Sept 1])

Western papers, however, thought that the description of the background as an anti-Communist struggle against the allegedly pro-Communist Mulla Mustafa was an oversimplification. They did not regard Barazani as a pro-Communist but as a Kurdish nationalist who made use of Communist support for the nationalist cause and for serving his own interests and those of his tribe. It was thought that the Barazanis were trying to impose their will on less disaffected tribes. (*Scottman*, Sept 5, 20; *Guardian*, Sept 18; *Economist*, Sept 23; *Observer*, Sept 24)

The conflict between the major antagonists, the Barazanis and the Zibaris, reportedly went back to 1945, when the Zibaris, who had originally joined the Barazanis in the rising against the government, changed sides. When the Barazanis left the country, first for Iran and in 1946 for the USSR, the government gave their lands and houses to the Zibaris; but when the Zibaris crossed the border in 1958 for fear of the new regime while the Barazanis returned, the latter repossessed their lands. [Note: Mulla Mustafa's wife and mother of five of his sons was the daughter of Shaykh Mahmud, the Zibari chief.] (*Hayat*, Sept 20; *Scottman*, Sept 5; *NYT*, Sept 11, 1962; see also above: Background.)

Insurgents Aided by Kurdish Tribes from Iran and Turkey? Brig. Mahmud Abd ar-Razzaq, GOC 2nd Div. [Northern Iraq], related that during the rising 2,000 Kurds of the Covan tribes of Turkey, and 1,500 Kurds of the Mankur tribes of Iran, had crossed the frontiers into Iraq, "at the suggestion of well-known quarters which have been exposed by the Leader" [i.e. Britain and the USA]. CENTO was not pleased with the progress of Iraq, Abd ar-Razzaq said, and therefore resorted to conspiracies. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, Sept 26)

THE RISING—SECOND STAGE THE BARAZANIS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT (September)

Position in the Barazani Camp. At the beginning of Sept, the Barazanis apparently turned what had hitherto been

mainly tribal warfare into open insurrection against the government.

According to Mulla Mustafa, quoted by Dana Adams Schmidt, an American reporter who interviewed him a year later, Mulla Mustafa had withdrawn to his tribal area after Qassim, in July, had rejected a petition listing grievances from a Kurdish delegation. He felt then that the time was not ripe for revolt; younger [DPK] party leaders in Sulaymaniya and the Darbandi Khan area, who began a revolt against his advice, were quickly suppressed [apparently in Sept]. The government then bombed the village of Barazani, apparently on the assumption that the Barazanis must be involved in any trouble in Kurdistan. Shaykh Ahmad [Mulla Mustafa's brother] hurried to Baghdad to renew his pledges of loyalty to Qassim and proclaim the neutrality of the Barazani tribal area. Once more, Mulla Mustafa disagreed with his brother and decided to fight back. His call attracted 7,000 to 8,000 Barazanis (NYT, Sept 11, 1962). (The sequence of events listed by Barazani is contrary to all other reports; it is quoted here as an account of the origin of the rising as given by its leader.)

As far back as June, Shaykh Ahmad expressed his support for Qassim and his reservations regarding "tribal disputes" when he was received by Qassim. He later told the press that he had come to listen to Qassim's counsel after learning of "some disputes between some Kurdish tribes." As requested by Qassim, Shaykh Ahmad would call for the surrender of accused fugitives. He concluded by declaring his complete loyalty to Qassim and his desire to prevent the activity of divisive elements in the Kurdish area. (Zaman, June 11, 13; IT, June 12)

Later, he sent Qassim a message of support of his claims to Kuwait, in the name of "all sincere Barazanis." (IT, July 10)

Nonetheless, in an account of the rising on Sept 23 Qassim included Shakh Ahmad among the fugitive rebels. (IT, Oct 1)

The Barazani Offensive. According to MENA, on Sept 9 the Barazanis blocked the roads in the Dohuk-Zakho-Amadiya area. Within a day or two, police patrols had either been captured or forced off the roads, and by Sept 11 "the security forces had lost control." The insurgents occupied Zakho town, still in their possession at the time of the report (Sept 17), Barazani village, and a large number of police posts from the Zakho area to Halabja [about 100 kms NNE of Khanaqin]. On Sept 12 government buildings were occupied in the towns of Amadiya and Halabja, and further police posts were taken, particularly in the Ruwanduz and Penjin regions [near the Iranian frontier, north of Halabja]. Road and telephone communication in the entire region was at that time said to be at the mercy of the rebels. The Balik tribe was mentioned as a confederate of the Barazanis, active north of Sulaymaniya (R. Damascus, Sept 17 [19]). The Ako tribe was also mentioned as allied to the Barazanis. (Times, Nov 1)

A similar report in a Jordanian paper [possibly relying on a common source] also giving Sept 9 as the date of the concerted attacks and announcing rebel occupation of Zakho, Amadiya and Dohuk, stated that large numbers of Kurdish army officers and other ranks had deserted to the rebels. (Jihadd, Jordan, Oct 11)

According to a reputed Iraqi army lieutenant who had deserted to Kuwait, the Kurds were besieging Kirkuk, Shaqlawa, Salah ad-Din and Sarsank on Sept 10. (R. Kuwait, Sept 16 [19])

A [sketchy] account of the events was also given by

PM. Qassim, in a five-hour-long press conference on Sept 23. He gave no date for the outbreak of hostilities but said that on Sept 12 the rebels had launched a "general attack on the army" near Baryan, while it was moving from Kirkuk to Sulaymaniya; there were 23 casualties "and a number of officers and NCO's became victims of treachery and tension." On the same day, Qassim said, "the army achieved full control." The area affected by the rising, he said, covered Zakho, Amadiya, Dohuk, Merga Sur, Rayat, Shaqlawa and Koy Sanjaq. Altogether 500 villages had been attacked, besides a large number of police posts and government offices and installations. Police posts had been shelled by mortars. At Merga Sur, the rebels had stolen ID11,000 from the Treasury and there had been looting and burning of houses in the villages.

A rise employed by these "highwaymen" was to call at government offices, ostensibly on official business, and take over control by surprise.

The "Darbandi Khan US company," Qassim said, had complained to him that "some local troops had stopped work there by force from Sept 6-10 and the tunnel had been damaged." [The huge Darbandi Khan dam was at the time in the final stages of construction.]

At one time Zakho, Swara Tuka and Sarsank were in rebel hands, and the senior officials at Zakho were imprisoned. Qassim indicated that the whole crescent between Zakho and Kirkuk was cut off by the rebels, until the army counterattacked. (IT, Sept 24-Oct 2; INA, Sept 26)

In Aug 1962 Mulla Mustafa told the American reporter Dana Adams Schmidt of the traditional guerrilla tactics used by his forces, which had cost them only one man to every forty lost by the enemy. He estimated that the rebels had killed 4,000 enemy soldiers "in the last year" and had taken the same number of prisoners. (NYT, Sept 10, 1962)

Hostile sources claimed that in order to compel recruits to join their movement, the "rebels" had shot and kidnapped people. (Ahd al-Jadid, Sept 19)

GOVERNMENT COUNTER ACTIVITIES

(September-December)

The Counter Offensive. In his press conference on Sept 23 Qassim said that the army had moved in "and restored security about a week ago." Yet, he asserted that on Sept 12 the armed forces had "achieved complete control over the situation in no more than 24 hours." Since then all the strongholds occupied by the rebels had been retaken, the roads opened, and prisoners freed. The rebels had been reduced to "vagabonds pursued by the army," trying to escape to Iran and Turkey. Others had surrendered, including Ahbās Mamand Agha. At present, Qassim declared, "we are pursuing the masterminds of treason; the defeated evildoers are still in two small areas," and in a day or two they would be finally destroyed. (INA, Sept 26; IT, Sept 28)

Role of Air Force. The Iraqi air force apparently played a prominent role in the government offensive. The Barazani area and the approaches to Zakho and Dohuk were said to have been bombed on Sept 12; the next day rockets were used against targets in the Amadiya area, and rebel concentrations were strafed with machine-gun fire. (R. Damascus, Sept 17 [19])

In Dohuk, according to another source, the insurgents had entrenched themselves in the water and electricity works on the assumption that the government would not

want to destroy them, but they were bombed and over 100 insurgents were killed. The survivors had to evacuate the town.

In Amadiya, some 140 policemen had entrenched themselves in the fortress, in the centre of the town. To evict them, the insurgents had positioned machineguns on a minaret of the mosque, which was consequently destroyed by the airforce. The fortress was supplied by parachute drops. (*Hayat*, Sept 20)

Ground forces too received close air support. (*Jihad*, Jordan, Oct 11)

There were numerous reports of indiscriminate air attacks on villages in the affected area, causing heavy loss of life among non-combatants. (*Daily Telegraph*, Oct 10; *Times*, Nov 1; *World Marxist Review*, March 1962)

In Oct, an Iraqi source reported that the rebels had suffered heavily from air attacks while crossing the Great Zab river during their withdrawal in the direction of Barazani. The air force was assisting in mopping-up operations in the Barazani area. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, Oct 8)

"Rebels Defeated" But Pockets Holding Out. At the beginning of Oct the Iraqi press reported that loyal Kurds "continued to chase the remnants of the insurrectionists... assisted by the patriotic authorities"; a rebel leader, Mustafa Wallah, had surrendered somewhere in the Ruwanduz district with 100 of his followers. (*IT*, Oct 3)

A few days later, it was reported that the rebels had withdrawn towards the Barazani area and the government forces were in pursuit. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, Oct 8)

On Oct 8 Qassim was reported to have stated that the army was now in control of Barazani and that the pursuit of the remnants of the rebel forces had been completed. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, Oct 9; see also *Zaman*, Oct 12)

[There were reports at the time—later proved untrue—that Mulla Mustafa was captured or killed.]

PM Qassim was reported "to be delighted and in high spirits over the results of his offensive which he has been personally directing." It was believed that the rebels had been counting on the defection of Kurds from the army but the latter had remained loyal. Suspected units had been transferred to other parts of Iraq. (*Daily Telegraph*, Oct 10)

During this time and again in Nov, Kurdish refugees were reported to have returned from Turkey. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, Oct 8; *Ulus*, Ankara, Nov 16)

At the beginning of Nov, an Iraqi source said that some rebel pockets were still holding out. (*Bayan*, Nov 8)

Later in the month reports indicated that although "the fire has been subdued, the embers have been scattered rather than stamped out." But, concluded a foreign observer, the movement had proved premature. "The Kurds, although capable of creating a major nuisance, are no match for the Iraqi army and air force." (*Scotman*, Nov 22)

[At this time however, there were already reports of a renewed flareup for which see below: Renewed Heavy Fighting.]

Kurdish Support for Regime. [Qassim in his press conference of Sept 23, quoted above, and the Iraqi press throughout the remaining months of the year, referred to "loyal Kurds" who continued to pursue the rebels in cooperation with the authorities.]

It was reported that the government had armed the Zibari tribes, the Turkomans and the "Black Arabs of Huwayjah" (*R. Damaic*, Sept 17 [19]). *Al-Hayat* said that the army command permitted the arming of a limited

number of the Barazani's Kurdish foes only after it had decided to launch its offensive. (*Jayat*, Sept 20)

The press published many cables of support from Kurdish chiefs, prominently those of the Zibari and Baradost tribes, the Barazani's traditional rivals, whom the government had reportedly armed (see above). Cables were quoted from Mahmud Agha az-Zibari and Rashid Lolani "the chief of the Baradost tribe" (*IT*, Sept 22), dozens of other named Kurdish tribes, the mayor of Shaqlawa, a spokesman for the people of Ruwanduz, "the farmers of Arbil province" and others. (*IT*, Sept 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 27, 29; *Oct*, 2, 5, 6, 8, 13, 16)

The government also claimed support from Barazani and released for publication on Oct 7 a cable sent to Qassim by Shaykh Ahmad al-Barazani, Mulla Mustafa's brother, in which he renewed his allegiance, denounced his brother's subversive activity and stated that he had sent his own son Muhammad Khalid to cooperate with the Iraqi army. (*IT*, Oct 8)

A few days later the support was announced of Muhammad Mahmud al-Barazani, Mukhtar of Andala village "and his group of fifty", as well as that of nine more Barazani notables with their followers. (*IT*, Oct 12)

Various Government Measures. [Apart from operational measures proper, the authorities reacted to the insurrection by dissolving the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK), deporting persons of doubtful loyalty, ordering confiscations and closing down local clubs suspected of sympathy with the insurgents.]

[Qassim announced an amnesty for rebels surrendering to the authorities. Various news items released were evidently designed to show the regime's concern for Kurdish culture. At the same time, the authorities stressed the ingratitude which, they said, lay behind the Kurdish rising.]

Kurdish "Ingratitude." An official handout stressed that since the Revolution greater progress in various social and economic fields had been achieved in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Ahil and Sulaymaniya than in the country at large. (*INA*, Sept 21)

In his press conference of Sept 23, Qassim detailed the benefits, which he said, the Barazani had obtained under his government. Every Barazani who had returned from exile had been paid until that very day a monthly salary. A total amount of ID522,183 had been spent on the development of the Barazani area. The government had intended to implement the "Rizan agricultural project" designed "to change the nature of the Barazani from that of aggressiveness (*fajdah*) to a civilized conduct"; the evildoers however had realized the danger to their designs in such a development and had therefore returned to their previous professions as highwaymen and agents of British imperialism. (*Zaman*, Sept 24; *INA*, Sept 26)

Higher Investigation Board. A Higher Investigation Board was set up to inquire into the Kurdish insurrection, with Brig. Hammudah Mahdi, 1st Division, as chairman. (*Ahd al-Jadid*, Sept 27, Nov 6)

The DPK Dissolved. [As the DPK had had its fortunes linked with those of the Barazani at least since 1958 its dissolution by the authorities was a foregone conclusion.]

At his press conference on Sept 23, Qassim announced the dissolution of the DPK for contravening the Associations Law by not holding its annual conference, or

even a single meeting for over a year. (IT, Sept 24; INA, Sept 26)

On Sept 26 the party headquarters at Sulaymaniya were closed. (Ahd al-Jadid, Sept 27)

In Oct, the party was dissolved by court order and its entire property confiscated, in accordance with para. 4 of the Associations Law, "for having sown discord among the people" (Ahlal, Oct 10). Subsequently, the licence of *Ahbab*, the DPK's daily, was revoked. (Mustaqbal, Oct 30)

Confiscations, Deportations and Related Measures. A number of inhabitants of Arbil province, among them officials, were exiled from the area. (Ahd al-Jadid, Oct 26)

The property of persons implicated in the insurrection was confiscated (Ahd al-Jadid, Sept 19, Oct 8, 30; Hayat, Nov 8; Jihad, Jordan, Nov 21). Persons affected included the fugitive Umar Mustafa, called Umar Dabbab, member of the Political Bureau of the dissolved DPK, as well as five sons of Mulla Mustafa—Ubaydallah, Nu'man, Idris, Mas'ud and Sabir, and five daughters. (IT, Nov 27)

A headmaster and a teacher in the north were dismissed in connection with the rising. (Ahd al-Jadid, Nov 10)

Various clubs in Arbil and Sulaymaniya were closed by court order "for deviating from the purpose for which they were established." (Zaman, Dec 26)

Army Personnel Detained. Col. Taha Bamirri and Lieut. Ahmad Mulla Hussein were ordered to be detained until Nov 25. Col. Bamirri was once Commander of the People's Resistance Forces. (Zaman, Nov 15)

Amnesty. On Nov 23 Qassim announced a pardon to "the poor and the peasants who had been deceived into participating in the recent insurrection," once they had surrendered to the authorities. This announcement released a flood of messages thanking Qassim for his magnanimity. (Zaman, Nov 24, 25; IT, Nov 26, 27, 28, 29)

Kurdish Education Fostered. The Ministry of Education added two Kurdish lessons per week to the primary schools' curriculum [in which Kurdish was taught] (Bilad, Oct 6). The Kurdish language was made a compulsory subject of study in teachers' colleges (Akhbar, Oct 31). It was reported that Muhammad al-Khal Hachi, member of the Iraqi Academy of Sciences, was compiling the first commentary on the Qur'an in Kurdish, in the tradition of Muhammad Abduh. (Zaman, Oct 21)

RENEWED HEAVY FIGHTING

(December)

Already at the beginning of Nov foreign sources anticipated a renewal of the Kurdish rebellion, though heavy fighting was not expected during the winter. *The Economist* wrote: "The Kurdish revolt in the north was halted last month by ruthless bombing, and the sizable guerrilla force hiding in the mountains, still led by Mulla Mustafa Barazani, is unlikely to make much headway during the winter. Militarily effective as they were, General Qassim's brutal tactics will have done nothing to endear him to his Kurdish subjects. The danger of a better organized, more united Kurdish rebellion has been postponed, not ended; and General Qassim will probably find that having been brutal once, he has no alternative but to be brutal again." (Economist, Nov 4)

In mid-Nov it was reported that the insurrection had broken out again. (Hawadith, Beirut, Nov 17)

On Dec 18 an ultimatum scattered by aircraft called on "all those who evade until now justice after the crushing of the abortive imperialistic insurrection in the north—the outlaws, brigands and gangsters—to surrender forthwith unconditionally, in which case they would be included in the recent amnesty. (IT, Dec 19)

At the end of Dec, fierce fighting was reported from the northern frontier between rebellious tribes and Iraqi army units advancing from Mosul Command to subdue them.

Military operations supported by aircraft were estimated to have resulted in the death of 400 tribesmen and about 40 military.

Latest reports were that Kurdish nationalists had consolidated positions along the whole massif from Zakho to the Iranian border, and that Mulla Mustafa Barazani had retaken Mahdiya [Amadiya?], where he had established a Kurdish administration.

The Kurds between Zakho and Barazani had fallen back into the snowbound mountains where steep passes lead into Turkey. (Daily Telegraph, Dec 30)

A Turkish paper reported at the beginning of Jan 1962 that Kurdish tribes had crossed the border from Iraq, fighting among themselves, and had left 30 dead on Turkish soil. (Dunya, Istanbul, Jan 2, 1962)

PM Qassim himself affirmed that the rebellion had broken out again. The rebels had exploited the partial withdrawal of the army from the area to renew their attacks on government offices, police posts and villages; Mustafa al-Barazani had refused to surrender. Qassim added that these provocations were evidence of the alliance between the rebels and the imperialists; however, Iraq was prepared to stand fast. (Thaurah, Dec 31)

QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN ATTITUDES

AND INTERFERENCE

[PM Qassim accused the British and "their American partners" of having instigated the insurgents in order to place Iraq at a disadvantage in the oil negotiations and the Kuwait dispute; at the same time he explicitly exonerated the USSR. Some Western and Arab papers thought however that Moscow might be involved. No verifiable proof was offered either way and Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani denied any foreign assistance. The UK protested Qassim's charges.]

[Communist sources praised the insurgents as progressives fighting against reaction but expressed themselves forcefully against any intention to establish an independent Kurdish state; they called for a joint struggle of Kurds and progressive forces on behalf of "democracy and progress" inside the existing states and advocated local autonomy for the Kurds.]

Qassim Accuses UK, US, Exonerates USSR. At his press conference on Sept 23 PM Qassim accused the British of backing the Kurdish rebellion: "His entire statement was couched in terms of a denunciation of 'British imperialism.' Behind the rising are the British themselves and their stooges among the Americans; there are no other sides," Qassim said. The British embassy [in Baghdad] was "the mother" of the "mutinous movement, and the Americans its partners." Mustafa al-Barazani and his brother had cooperated with British imperialism as early as 1933 and again in 1945; Qassim quoted at length what he said were letters exchanged between Mulla Mustafa and the British and documents proving this claim. Now the British were aiming to distract Iraq from pursuing her oil rights and to tie up her army in the

north while they schemed against her in Kuwait. The British believed that it would take no less than three years to quell the insurrection. Iraq might be forced to close the British embassy if it did not stop interfering, and "put an end to the disgraceful acts against the safety" of Iraq, Qasim warned.

In reply to a question Qasim said that it was definitely established that the USSR was not involved in the Kurdish rebellion. (IT, Sept 24, 27; INA Sept 26)

UK Protests Rejected, Britons Arrested. As reported in Baghdad, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry rejected a protest made by the British Ambassador on Sept 25 against accusations of British complicity in the Kurdish rising. (IT, Sept 28)

On Oct 16 it was officially announced that two British engineers working for the IPC had been arrested in connection with the Kurdish rising (IT, Oct 17, 18). On Nov 11 Iraq "strongly rejected" a British protest over the matter (IT, Nov 12). The two men were set free "as an act of clemency on the approach of Christmas" [together with the three British service men captured earlier near the Kuwait border] and they left Iraq for the UK on Dec 13. (IT, Dec 12, 14)

Soviet Interests Seen in Kurdish Rising. Western commentators were inclined to see a Soviet interest in an independent Kurdistan as a means of gaining a foothold inside the "northern tier"-CENTO countries or, at least, to keep the Kurdish question alive as an irritant to Turkey and Iran—the allies of the West. (See e.g. H.A.R. Philby in *Scotsman*, Nov 22; *New Republic*, NY, Oct 23)

Communist Financial Aid Alleged. After the insurrection had broken out, Lebanese newspapers alleged that the insurgents had bought weapons and ammunition with money obtained by Mulla Mustafa from the Communist bloc. (*Kul Shay*, Sept 16; *Hayat*, Sept 20)

Communists Demand Arab-Kurdish Joint Struggle for Progress, Support Local Autonomy, Oppose Independent Kurdistan. The Kurdish rising was not reported in the Soviet press. (*Mizan*, Nov)

Salām Adil (alias Hussein Radawi), first secretary of the Iraqi Communist party, stated at the CPSU Congress in Moscow in Oct that the Arabs and the Kurds—the "two main nationalities" which represent "our Iraqi people"

—were "convinced of the necessity of strengthening their joint struggle for democracy against imperialist plots aimed at the disruption of the nationalist ranks, against the policy of repression and persecution of the Kurdish people of Iraq..." (*Pravda*, Oct 25; *Mizan*, Nov)

[Other Communist comment and statements not emanating directly from Moscow were more explicit on the themes included in Adil's statement.]

In Aug as quoted above (see The Barazāni Offensive Continued), Our Radio, the clandestine Communist station broadcasting in Turkish, hailed the Barazāni as progressives who were fighting reactionaries armed by Qasim.

In Oct, an article in a Communist publication detailing the policies and tactics of the Iraqi CP said it upheld "the right of self-determination for the Kurd nation (now divided between Iraq, Iran and Turkey)" but combated both "nationalist-extremist tendencies among the Kurds" and "Arab chauvinism." (*W. Marx Rev.*, Oct)

During the same period a Communist broadcast in Persian said that the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria and the creation of a Kurdish government was a scheme of Anglo-American imperialism and the Shah of Iran who was to head such a government. The DPK in Iraq had posed demands: to end the despotic one-man government and to honour para. 3 of the provisional constitution which said that the Iraqi republic was the common homeland of Arabs and Kurds. [The para. in question said they were "partners in the country".] The government, however, had rejected these legitimate demands, savagely attacked the Kurds and armed treacherous tribal chiefs. Granting democratic rights in Iraq should put an end to the civil war. The true freedom of the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Turkey could only be achieved through a joint struggle with their "brother nationalists" to free these countries from the "slavery of reaction and imperialism." (*Payk-e Iran*, Berlin (GDR), Oct 21 [EE 30])

Turkey. *Hürriyet* reported from Ankara that Mulla Mustafa al-Barazāni would be arrested by Turkish authorities should he attempt to enter Turkey. Furthermore, an Iraqi-Turkish agreement provided for the return to Iraq of inhabitants of the north of that country who had sought asylum in Turkey (*Hürriyet*, Sept 27). (On crossings of the Turkish frontier by combatants and refugees from Iraq, see above under various headings.)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYNOPSIS

The event that most influenced Iraq's international position in 1961 was the Kuwait crisis, which ensued when PM Abd al-Karim Qasim claimed the newly independent State of Kuwait as an Iraqi district. (For a detailed synopsis on the crisis, see pp. 117 ff)

In Arab affairs Iraq continued to advocate inter-Arab solidarity instead of the unification of Arab countries, for which the UAR strove. (Iraq did not regard her claim to Kuwait as contravening this policy for she regarded her an integral part of her territory.) The Baghdad

conference of Arab foreign ministers (January) was in line with this policy. Iraq's efforts prior to the conference helped substantially in bringing Tunisia back into the League and thus strengthened the advocates of Arab solidarity. At the conference itself PM Qasim and FM Jawād exerted more efforts to strengthen the spirit of solidarity. During the year, the consistency of Iraq's policy was demonstrated in her attitude to various inter-Arab issues. Thus Iraq proposed to strengthen the League Charter while providing for more equality among its

signatories (i.e. to make the League less dependent on Cairo.) On the other hand, Iraq opposed the UAR's scheme for economic union and recommended cooperation through the League's Economic Council. As regards the "Palestine Entity," Iraq continued to urge the former Palestinian Arabs to rely on their own efforts "like the Algerians" and to work towards the establishment of the "eternal Palestinian republic." Iraq continued to foster her "Palestinian Liberation Army"—a small unit attached to the Iraqi army—as well as maintaining good relations with Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the head of the Arab Higher Committee, who had fallen out with the UAR.

The crisis that ensued from Iraq's claim to Kuwait again isolated her in the Arab League. Relations between Iraq and individual Arab states, however, did not noticeably deteriorate over the crisis apart from those with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait's other neighbour.

Iraq demonstrated her sympathies with Syria soon after the latter's secession from the UAR though she delayed recognition until after President Abdel Nasser had lifted his diplomatic blockade on the new republic. In the breakup of the UAR Qasim found justification for his views on Arab unity; he remarked that Arab as well as other empires had always been doomed to failure. Iraq and Syria concluded an economic agreement which, they claimed, represented real Arab solidarity. Otherwise Iraq made no move to improve her inter-Arab position in the new situation where Cairo was isolated from most of the Arab countries.

As far as the world powers were concerned, Iraq continued to pursue her own brand of positive neutralism or non-alignment, (see MER 1960, p 258). In the second half of the year, however, Iraqi pronouncements became increasingly anti-Western and pro-USSR in the wake of three developments: the IPC refused to accede to Iraqi demands in the oil negotiations (see below); the regime professed to see the hands of Britain and the US in the Kurdish rising (p 287 h); and the Kuwait crisis found Iraq and the West, especially the UK, on opposite sides, whilst the USSR supported Iraq.

At both the 15th and 16th sessions of the UN General Assembly, Iraq was one of the Arab countries that had the lowest voting coincidence with the US and the highest with the Communist countries, (the others being Morocco, the UAR and Yemen.) At the 16th session, Iraq had the highest rate of coincidence with the Communist countries of any ME and North African country.

Iraq's anti-Western sentiments found expression at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries where she was represented by Foreign Minister Hashim Jawād. Her attitude was especially conspicuous as the UAR was among the leading moderates at the conference. Unlike Abdel Nasser, Jawād made no mention of the USSR's resumption of nuclear tests, an issue that agitated the conference; he charged the Western powers with fraudulently justifying the cold war on the pretext of a Communist conspiracy and utilizing it to continue colonialist domination; Iraq was also the only ME country to demand recognition of the two German states.

At the Security Council, when the USSR vetoed Kuwait's admittance to the UN (November 30), Jawād

praised the USSR as the "friend of the weak" and the only big power which used the veto to strengthen the UN, protect peace and justice in the world, and combat imperialism.

Iraq continued to be the only Arab country which received economic and technical assistance exclusively from the Communist countries.

Nonetheless, relations between Iraq and the Western countries were by no means as bad as the anti-Western pronouncements suggested.

The UK continued to be Iraq's most important trading partner and principal host to Iraqis studying abroad; in both respects she was followed by the US and West Germany. At the beginning of the year Iraq and the US concluded a cultural agreement—negotiated in 1960—which was the first formal agreement between the two countries since the 1958 revolution. For the first time since 1959, two senior Iraqi officers visited the US in the spring.

The closeness of the USSR and Iraq in international affairs was not reflected on the question of the Iraqi Communists. While the Iraqi government continued to persecute the local Communists (see Synopsis of Internal Affairs), Soviet and other Communist papers and organizations stigmatized these proceedings as unjust and an infringement of democracy, mainly in the first half of the year. Some Communist criticism was also voiced on other Iraqi internal affairs.

Soviet economic and technical aid continued in the framework of the 1959 and 1960 agreements. The first project to be completed was a radio station at Baghdad. Government farms and tractor stations were already reported to be operating. A number of contracts were signed for the establishment of industrial plants. It was thought that the Iraqis were somewhat dissatisfied with what was described as the slow pace and high cost of Soviet aid; (see also MER 1960, p 73). The USSR, it may be assumed, continued to supply Iraq with arms (though no reports on this topic were encountered).

The development credit extended in 1960 made Czechoslovakia the other Communist country with widely developed economic contacts with Iraq. Relations with the other Communist countries, including China, continued on friendly terms, and there were contacts in the economic and cultural fields.

In February Iraq resisted Iran's attempt to change the existing oil arrangements in the Shatt al-Arab. As a result oil exports from Abadan practically ceased until the end of April when Iran agreed to return to the earlier arrangement. The two countries gave the affair next to no publicity. Otherwise relations between Iraq and her GENTO neighbours seem to have been uneventful; and they were not reported to have been affected by the Kurdish rising (Kurds reside in the adjacent border areas of Iran, Iraq and Turkey.)

Iraq, like other Arab countries, endeavoured to strengthen her relations with African countries; however, only a few new contacts were reported and these mainly in the sphere of Islam and teaching of Arabic. An embassy was opened in Lagos.

Routine relations continued with other countries.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

GENERAL

Iraqi Students Abroad. In July 1962 an official Iraqi source published the following figures on Iraqi students abroad. The categories as listed below are:

- a — students at Iraqi government expense, "present number of enrolment";
 - b — do., as estimated for 1961/62;
 - c — students at private expense receiving government aid, "present number of enrolment";
 - d — do., as estimated for 1961/62;
 - e — students on grants offered by foreign governments.
- (Students abroad not receiving government aid were not included.)

Country	a	b	c	d	e
Albania	—	—	—	—	3
Austria	—	—	11	7	—
Belgium	20	20	—	—	—
Bulgaria	13	13	—	—	27
China (People's Rep.)	—	—	—	—	7
Czechoslovakia	81	69	11	11	81
GDR	36	34	3	3	61
GFR	145	197	278	266	45
Hungary	4	4	—	—	20
India	—	1	—	—	3
Iran	—	1	—	—	—
Italy	29	31	1	1	3
Japan	—	2	—	—	—
Lebanon	34	32	10	9	—
Pakistan	—	—	—	—	1
Poland	19	19	1	1	20
Rumania	16	16	—	—	9
Spain	—	—	1	1	—
Sweden	1	2	—	—	—
Switzerland	8	2	5	2	—
Syria	—	—	5	4	—
Turkey	—	—	211	211	16
UAR	10	14	42	30	—
UK	704	779	170	168	25
USA	225	305	158	132	35
USSR	216	210	—	—	145
Yugoslavia	27	27	—	—	32

(Compiled from *The Iraqi Revolution In Its Fourth Year*, Baghdad, 1962.)

[The expression "present number of enrolment" seems to refer to 1960/61.]

NATO, WESTERN AND COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

Austria. Iraq and Austria decided to raise their legations to embassy level. (*INA*, Dec 30)

Belgium. An Iraqi official reportedly declined an invitation to visit Belgium as guest of the government because of Belgian policy in the Congo. (*Zaman*, Aug 18)

Canada. Paul Beaulieu, the first Canadian Ambassador to Baghdad, presented his credentials, on June 27. (*INA*, June 27; *IT*, June 29)

Denmark. A Danish trade centre was to be opened in Baghdad under the management of O.W. Kryger to assist

in implementing the trade agreement between the two countries (MER 1960, p 262). (*INA*, March 13)

Finland. A trade agreement was signed between the two countries on March 14 and ratified by Iraq on Oct 23. (*R. Baghdad*, March 14 [W, 23]; *INA*, Oct 24)

France. [There were no diplomatic relations between the two countries throughout the year. France was constantly attacked by Iraqi politicians and by the press over the Algerian question—e.g. *Bayan*, April 6; *Akhbar*, May 31; *Sawt al-Ahrar*, Nov 20.]

On Jan 1 the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission condemned the detonation by France of her third A-bomb in the Sahara. (*INA*, Jan 1)

German Federal Republic. On Jan 6 Lt.-Col. Tschaschel, a special envoy of the Federal Republic's Defence Minister, arrived in Baghdad, where he was received by Qasim and Gen. Abdil. (*Zaman*, Jan 6-7)

In Jan the Iraqi director of broadcasting and television programmes returned from a three-week visit to the GFR, where he had discussed cooperation in this field. (*Zaman*, Jan 18)

Brig. Fu'ad Arif, Minister of State, and Muhammad Salim, Minister of Oil Affairs, visited the GFR by government invitation. (*INA*, April 24; *IT*, Nov 27)

It was reported that the press attaché at the GFR embassy in Baghdad would not return to his post from leave, by request of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. He had publicly criticized Dr Nkrumah's views on the German problem as expressed at Belgrade, and embarrassed Iraq in its stand on German affairs. (*Hayat*, Dec 19)

Greece. On Aug 15 a Greek parliamentary delegation arrived at Baghdad, on a ME tour. (*Zaman*, Aug 17)

In Oct a decision to close down the hon. consulate of Greece in Baghdad was reported. (*Zaman*, Oct 22)

Italy. In Aug, three Italian oil experts were reported to have arrived in Baghdad to advise the government on oil affairs. (*Zaman*, Aug 3)

The Italian Federation of Industries agreed to arrange for Iraqis to complete their professional training with Italian firms. (*Zaman*, July 21)

Luxembourg. On March 14 an air agreement between the two countries was signed in Baghdad. (*R. Baghdad*, March 14 [W, 23])

Netherlands. Iraq and the Netherlands decided to raise their diplomatic representations to the rank of embassies. (*Zaman*, Jan 12)

Spain. The Spanish chargé d'affaires at Baghdad announced that his country was considering a trade agreement with Iraq. (*Zaman*, Oct 10)

Spain awarded five scholarships to Iraqi students. (*Zaman*, Oct. 10)

Union of South Africa. [There were no diplomatic relations between the two countries.]

On June 3 the Iraqi FM declared that the main reason for Iraq's "non-recognition" of the Union of South Africa was "its aggressive policy towards the real inhabitants of the country." (*INA*, 3 June)

Switzerland. Iraq and Switzerland raised their legations to embassy level. (*INA, March 16, May 6*)

In April a Swiss expert started a year's tour of duty as programmes adviser to the Iraqi Television Service. (*Zaman, April 7*)

Four Swiss firms were appointed consulting engineers for the electrical network in southern Iraq. (*INA, May 14*)

United Kingdom. Relations were dominated by the oil negotiations (see below) and the Kuwait issue (pp 117 ff). Qassim also publicly charged the UK with the responsibility for the Kurdish insurrection (see above).

Between Feb 2-8 a British trade mission held talks with governmental and business representatives in Baghdad (*Zaman, Feb 3, 7, 10*). On July 2 Nāzim az-Zahāwī, Minister of Commerce, arrived in London for a fortnight's visit. His declared aim was to increase Iraq's exports to Britain, which were "out of proportion" to her imports from Britain. (*IT, July 3*, compare also table: ME Foreign Trade.)

Twenty-six students of aeronautical engineering and aviation were detailed to be sent to England. (*INA, Dec 20*)

On Nov 6 Maj.-Gen. Abdi, Military Governor General, left for London for medical treatment. (*INA, Nov 6*)

USA. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry notified the US embassy that information handouts to the Iraqi press must be channelled through the Foreign Ministry. (*Akhbar, Jan 13; Zaman, Jan 18*)

Towards the end of May FM Hāshim Jawād declared to Tass Agency: "President Kennedy... must adopt new tendencies... differing in essence from those followed by his predecessor." (*INA, May 25*)

On Jan 23 a cultural agreement between Iraq and the USA was signed in Baghdad, to be in force for an indefinite period. This was the first formal agreement concluded between the two countries since the 1958 Revolution. (*R. Baghdad, Jan 23 [W 26]; Dept. of State Bul., Feb 13*)

[Corrigendum: The quotation in MER 1960, p 262, according to which the agreement was ratified on July 1, 1960, was erroneous.]

In Feb William D. Douglas, US Supreme Court Justice, and Philip C. Jessup, Judge on the International Court of Justice, arrived in Iraq on a goodwill tour at the invitation of the Foreign Ministry, in cooperation with the American Friends of the ME. (*Zaman, Feb 9, 12*)

In Feb six police officers went to the US for a year's training to be followed later by 14 more. (*Hayat, Feb 24*)

On Feb 15 an Iraqi mission led by Col. Sa'dūn al-Madfa'i [Director of Military Intelligence] and Col. Muhsin ar-Rifā'i left for a tour of US military installations; it returned on April 5 (*IT; Hayat, Feb 16; INA, April 5*). This was said to have been the first contact between the two countries on military matters since Iraq had renounced her military aid agreements with the US on June 1, 1959. (*Scotman, Feb 21*)

(Iraq supported Cuba over the invasion attempt—see below under: Cuba.)

(Qassim associated the US with the Kurdish insurrection—see p 287 b.)

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IPC

Synopsis. The negotiations between the Iraqi government and the IPC, which had been conducted on and off since 1958, broke finally down in November.

The first round of the year's negotiations took place in Baghdad at the beginning of April. The IPC delegation was presented with a formidable list of Iraqi demands. Iraq's main claims were for participation in the company's share capital, an increase in the share of net profits and relinquishment by IPC of the unexploited part of its concession area. The talks broke down on a comparatively minor issue, the refund of "dead rents"—the sums paid to Iraq during the period before oil production commenced on a commercial scale.

The second round opened in Aug, after the concessionaires had yielded on the "dead rents" issue and a new delegation had been appointed, on which the IPC share-holding companies were strongly represented. The first phase of this round terminated with the oil companies asking for time to consider Iraq's insistence on participation in the IPC's share capital, although not much hope of agreement was held out. The talks were resumed at the end of Sept, but concluded in total deadlock, without agreement being reached on any issue. A last-minute proposal by Qassim, which did not include participation in the IPC's capital, was not even seriously considered.

On Dec 11 the Iraqi government unilaterally terminated the concession of the IPC and its subsidiaries in all areas not actually under exploitation, i.e. over 99% of the concession. The companies protested, but it was clear that neither side to the dispute would interfere with actual oil production.

From March and throughout the year the Iraqi government and press conducted a vigorous publicity campaign on this issue.

Iraqi Demands. On April 10 an Iraqi statement enumerated the following demands:

1. a new calculation of oil production to secure the rights of Iraq;
2. a new calculation of the prices on which Iraqi oil revenues were based;
3. abolition of the discount received by the oil companies [amounting to 1% of posted price on account of "sales expenses"];
4. appointment of Iraqi directors to the Board in London;
5. gradual Iraqization of personnel;
6. relinquishment by the companies of unexploited territories, as a preliminary to their exploitation by Iraq;
7. companies to relinquish the natural gas surplus for utilization by Iraq;
8. guarantee to use Iraqi tankers [there were none throughout the year];
9. Iraqi participation of at least 20% in the companies' share capital;
10. increase of Iraqi share in oil revenues [above the present 50% of net profits];
11. payment of revenues in convertible currency;
12. removal of ambiguous provisions in former agreements, which were harmful to Iraq [not specified]. (*IT, April 11*; compare also MER 1960, p 264.)

Negotiations: The First Round. The IPC delegation was again led by G.H. Herridge, the company's managing director; the Iraqi delegation by Qassim himself.

Meetings took place on April 2 and 6, after which talks were suspended. (*Financial Times, April 11; IT, April 12*)

The talks broke down over the comparatively minor question of "dead rents"—the sums totalling nearly ID10

million which the Mosul and Basra Oil Companies had paid Iraq before commercial exploitation of their concession area had started. The companies were deducting this total from the royalties at the rate of 5% annually, in spite of Iraq's protest that the "dead rents" were an unrecoverable bonus. The IPC delegation did not agree to the Iraqi request that deductions be stopped forthwith, with no time limit set for eventual arbitration. (IT, April 18; *Financial Times*, May 1, June 20)

Following the breakdown of talks, Qasim forbade the companies to continue explorations outside the actual drilling areas, as he had threatened at the second meeting. The companies complied. Oil production went on unimpaired. (IT, April 11, 17; *Financial Times*, May 30)

[For examples of Iraqi publicity given to the negotiations during this period, see Ministry of Oil handouts in IT, April 18, 21, 23, 24, 25; editorials—in *Thawrah*, April 17; *Bayan*, April 10; *Saut al-Ahrar*, April 13; *Mustaqbal*, April 11.]

IPC Initiative to Renew Talks. On April 28 Viscount Monckton, IPC chairman, asked Qasim by cable to consider favourably a request by IPC shareholders for resumption of negotiations. Qasim replied that first "a clear written reply" must be given to the Iraqi demands. (IT; *Financial Times*, May 1)

On June 9 the concessionaires conceded two points in order to facilitate resumption of talks:

1. IPC agreed, pending arbitration, to stop deduction of "dead rents" from royalties retroactively from Jan 1, 1960;

2. a new negotiating team was set up, drawn chiefly from the IPC shareholding companies and led by H.W. Fisher, a director of Standard Oil of New Jersey. (IT, *Financial Times*, June 20)

The Second Round. On Aug 24 the talks were renewed but at the oil companies' request they were suspended on Aug 30. This time the crisis came over Iraq's demand for at least 20% participation in the IPC's capital. The companies' attitude *prima facie* was negative, but they asked for a few weeks' break for further consideration and the preparation of a reasoned memorandum. General expectation in London was that the companies would definitely reject the Iraqi request because of the difficulty in calculating a realistic price [since the shares were not on the market]. (IT, Aug 25, 27, 29, 31, Oct 18; *Financial Times*, Sept 1, 2; *Petroleum Times*, Sept 22)

On Sept 28 talks reopened in Baghdad. The companies declared their inability to increase Iraq's share of net profits above the present 50% or to allow Iraqi participation in the IPC's capital. On the other hand, they offered to relinquish 90% of the concession area—75% immediately—but they would make the choice. The offer was rejected by Iraq as utterly inadequate.

On Oct 11, after many hours of discussion, Qasim made a "final suggestion":

1. the IPC should relinquish 90% of the concession area immediately;

2. existing wells should remain the oil companies' exclusive property, but Iraq's share in profits should be increased;

3. the Iraqi government should participate in the exploitation of wells to be drilled in the remaining 10% of the concession area, on a basis to be determined later.

[The claim to participation in the IPC's share capital was inferentially dropped.]

The companies' chief negotiator gave an unenthusiastic and non-committal reply, whereupon Qasim instantly

stated that he considered the talks finally to have broken down. His parting statement was that IPC would not be disturbed in the exploitation of existing wells, but that legislation had been prepared for the taking over of all reserve areas. (Minutes of negotiations—IT, Sept 29, Oct 4, 9, 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 22-27, 30, 31, Nov 1; Iraqi official statement—INA, Oct 17; IT, Oct 18; British comments—*Financial Times*, Oct 13, 14)

Oil Legislation—Concession Area Cut. On Dec 11 the Iraqi government promulgated Law No. 80/1961 incorporating the measures forecast by Qasim (see above). IPC and its two subsidiaries, MPC and BPC, had their combined concession area curtailed to about 1,938 sq.kms.; the law authorized the government to allocate additional areas totalling about 1,950 sq.kms., if necessary, as reserves to the companies. The remaining areas, i.e. over 99% of the original concessions, reverted to the Iraqi government.

The law also ordered the companies to make available to the Iraqi government without payment within three months all data concerning the relinquished areas. (IT, Dec 13, 15, 17, 18; *Times*, Dec 13, 14)

In London an IPC spokesman said that Iraq's action "confronted with the rights of the three companies and we are urgently considering the position." (*Times*, Dec 13)

[No further major developments were reported as having occurred by the end of the year.]

OPEC Supports Iraqi Stand. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, it was reported, reiterated its full support for Iraq. (*Financial Times*, Nov 16)

NON-ARAB ME COUNTRIES

Cyprus. An official committee was set up to examine the possibilities of strengthening economic cooperation with Cyprus; the Foreign Ministry and the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce appealed to Iraqi merchants to increase their purchases from Cyprus. (*Zaman*, Dec 23, 27)

Ethiopia. On Dec 21, 1960, the Deputy PM and FM of Ethiopia cabled his thanks to Gen. Qasim for his declaration after the attempted coup d'état in Ethiopia in Dec 1960 (see MER 1960, p 263). (*Akhbar*, Baghdad, Jan 13; *R. Baghdad*, Jan 12 [14])

Iran: The Shatt al-Arab Issue. On Feb 16 Iranian oil exports from Abadan refineries through the Shatt al-Arab stopped because of an Iranian decision affecting the status quo. The facts were not entirely clear, as both Iran and Iraq imposed a strict new black-out over the affair. (For an earlier dispute over rights in the Shatt al-Arab, see MER 1960, p 262.)

The Shatt al-Arab waterway was under Iraqi sovereignty, except for a five km. strip on the eastern shore at Abadan where the frontier ran in mid-channel. The piloting of tankers between Abadan and the Persian Gulf had been the responsibility of the Basra Port Authority, which had lately replaced its British pilots with Iraqis. These pilots had also fulfilled the duties of berthing masters in Abadan Port.

In Feb the Iranian government gave orders that only Iranian staff should handle shipping within Abadan waters. The Basra Port Authority promptly announced that any change of the status quo at Abadan would cause stoppage of piloting services along the Shatt. Accordingly,



International Boundary ——— Road ——— Principal Towns

Width of Shatt al Arab has been exaggerated to show boundary clearly

on Feb 16, tankers ceased moving between Abadan and the Gulf. The refinery tanks filled up rapidly and by the end of the month, refining at Abadan had to be cut down to the comparatively insignificant amount of oil absorbed by the local market. (*Economist*, Feb 25, March 25; *MEED*, March 3; *Petroleum Press Service*, April)

Intense diplomatic activity followed between Baghdad and Tehran. (*INA*, Feb 21, 23, 26; March 5, 11; *Peygham-e Emruz*, Tehran, Feb 23, 26 quot. in *Iran Presse*, Tehran, Feb 24, 27; *Ettela'at*, Tehran, March 27 quot. in *Iran Presse*, Tehran, March 28)

Since Iraq refused to compromise, and Iran would not risk trespass into Iraqi territorial waters, a deadlock ensued, which was of great cost to Iran. The latter attempted to ease the situation by pumping refined oil to the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Mahshur. (*MEED*, March 10)

[Finally, Iran agreed to the status quo ante pending negotiations, and shipping between Abadan and the Persian Gulf was resumed on April 23.] On April 22 an Iraqi source quoted "circles close to the Foreign Ministry" as saying that "high-level talks for the settlement of the conflict between Iraq and Iran regarding piloting rights on the Shatt al-Arab would be transferred from Baghdad to Tehran as a sign of Iraqi goodwill." The talks had been taking place in Baghdad for several weeks (*Zaman*, April 22). The following day the Iranian Foreign Minister announced that an Iraqi delegation would leave for Tehran in the second half of May to negotiate the settlement of differences. The dispute concerning the Shatt al-Arab had been resolved, and shipping resumed as from that day. The newspaper publishing the statement added that the difficulties had arisen after the promulgation of an Iranian decree concerning piloting on the Shatt al-Arab which involved the exclusion of Iraqi pilots from Abadan port. It had now been decided to resume shipping according to the previous arrangement, while

talks aiming at a permanent solution would commence in Tehran, "probably before May 21." (*Kayhan*, Tehran, April 23 quot. in *Iran Presse*, Tehran, April 24)

[The talks did not take place.] On May 14 AFP reported from Tehran that the departure of the Iraqi delegation for Tehran had been postponed owing to continued disagreement between Iraq and Iran. (*Ha'aretz*, May 15)

On June 18 "reliable sources" were quoted as saying in Tehran that "talks between Iran and Iraq on the Shatt al-Arab dispute have been suspended and are not expected to be resumed in the near future" (*Kayhan*, Tehran, June 19). [No more was heard of the dispute in 1961.]

The stoppage was calculated as having caused Iran a loss of £2 million a month. (*MEED*, April 28)

Iran—Miscellaneous. In May, Iran and Iraq set up a committee to work out an agreement on grazing rights in the border region. (*INA*, May 15)

In Dec, an Iraqi military delegation took part in Iran's Army Day celebrations and visited military installations there. (*INA*, Dec 25)

Somalia. In April the Iraqi cabinet approved the acceptance of Somali students in Iraqi institutes of learning. (*Thawrah*, April 12)

On April 17, in a speech at the military college, Qasim said he was happy to see among the cadets "our brothers from Somalia" (*Mustaqbal*, April 18). In Nov, five Somalis arrived in Baghdad to enroll at the military college at the expense of Iraq. (*Akhbar*, Nov 25)

In April it was reported in Baghdad that the government would shortly approve a plan for medical aid to Somalia. [There were no further reports on this topic.] (*Zaman*, April 12)

Turkey. In Sept, Talib Mushtaq, Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, denied any intentions of amending the 1946 Iraqi-Turkish treaty of friendship. Since the (Turkish) May revolution relations between the two countries had become close, and were expected to improve still further. The two sides were ready to renew trade relations which had been frozen under the old regime and to draft a trade agreement. Four hundred Iraqi students were then studying at Turkish universities. (*Zaman*, Sept 9)

It was reported that from Jan 1 to Sept 15 the unprecedented number of 3,111 tourist and student visas had been granted to Iraqi citizens to enter Turkey. (*Zaman*, Sept 23)

(See also: The Kurdish Rising, p 288 b.)

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Plans to Strengthen Relations. The Iraqi government was reportedly preparing plans for strengthening relations with African countries. The embassy in Lagos (opened in Sept, see below), together with the embassy in Accra, were seen as the nucleus of Iraq's representation in Africa, to be developed in the future. (*Zaman*, Sept 23)

On the basis of reports submitted by the Iraqi members of an Arab League commercial delegation to Africa (*Zaman*, Jan 12, 20; *Ahali*, Sept 24), a committee was set up by the Foreign Ministry to recommend measures for strengthening relations with Africa. Its recommendations included the dispatch of teachers and the opening of schools on the continent, an increase in the number of African students in Iraqi institutions and a special "Voice of Africa" radio programme. (*Akhbar*, Iraq, Oct 14)

Iraq appointed Lebanese emigrants living in Conakry and Dakar as honorary consuls; more such appointments were to be made in African countries. (*Anwar, Beirut, Oct 5*)

Educational Assistance. The Iraqi authorities reportedly decided to set up two elementary schools, one each in Ghana and in Senegal, in which Arabic and Islamic subjects would be taught, in addition to the regular curriculum. The establishment of more such schools was under consideration. (*Ahd al-Jadid, Oct 8*)

[Iraq granted 95 scholarships to African countries as follows: Sudan—20; Somalia—10; Guinea—10; Ghana—10; Mali—15; Senegal—10; Uganda—5; Chad—3; Congo (L)—5; Nigeria—3; Ethiopia—2.] (See also below, under countries.)

Ghana. Qur'ans and informative material on Iraq were sent to Ghana at the request of the Islamic Council in Accra (*R. Baghdad, Jan 21 [23]*). (See also above: Educational Assistance.)

Guinea. The Iraqi chargé d'affaires in Accra was to visit Guinea to convey to President Sekou Touré a verbal message from Gen. Qasim, thanking him for Guinea's stand on the questions of Algeria and Palestine and conveying Iraq's desire for continued cooperation between the two countries. (*R. Baghdad, Jan 25-IMB, Jan 26; IT, Jan 26*)

It was reported that Guinea was to purchase 48,000 tons of oil yearly from Iraq. (*Zaman, July 27, Aug 9; Akhbar Sa'ah, Sept 13*)

It was reported that Iraq had presented Guinea with ten scholarships and 50 tons of dates. (*Akhbar Sa'ah, Sept 13*)

Nigeria. In Sept the first members of the Iraqi embassy in Lagos left for their posts. The embassy was the second to be opened in the new African states. [The first was in Ghana.] (*Hayat, Sept 6*)

In Oct, an [unofficial, Northern] Nigerian delegation, headed by Hajj Ibrahim Imam, "leader of the opposition in Northern Nigeria's national assembly", arrived in Baghdad, on a tour of Muslim states. Imam declared that joint Arab-Muslim efforts should be made "to contain Israeli penetrations." He also asked for the opening of schools in Nigeria to spread Islam and teach Arabic. (*Bilad, Oct 5; Mustangal, Oct 9; Zaman, Oct 10*)

Senegal. In a conference of Arabic teachers held on Dec 23-25, 1960 in Senegal, it was mentioned that Iraq as well as several other Arab states had presented scholarships to Senegalese students. (*Zaman, Jan 14*)

At the end of March, a five-man Islamic delegation from Senegal led by Shaykh Ibrahim Niyasse visited Iraq for six days after visiting the U.S. Niyasse praised Gen. Qasim's work in the service of Islam, and declared Israel "my enemy, as I am a Muslim." The delegation was received by Qasim. (*R. Baghdad, March 30 [April 5]; R. Baghdad, March 27, April 1-IMB, March 28, April 2*)

Following the visit PM Qasim donated ID10,000 towards the cost of building a school of Islamic studies and/or a mosque in Senegal. (*IT, April 20; Bayan, Aug 22*)

Sierra Leone. Two Sierra Leone teachers of Arabic were

awarded scholarships by a Lebanese trader for a five-year course in Iraq. (*Shekpendeh, Freetown, Aug 9*)

French Somaliland (Djibouti). Ahmad Qumnah, described as "head of the nationalist movement" in French Somaliland, visited Iraq in June (*R. Baghdad, June 13 [15]*). After meeting Gen. Qasim, Qumnah said the PM had expressed his country's support for the nationalist movement in French Somaliland and his readiness to grant scholarships to Somali youths for studies at Baghdad university and Iraqi military institutions. (*R. Baghdad, June 22 [24]*)

ASIAN COUNTRIES

Ceylon. On Feb 20 the first trade agreement between the two countries was signed in Baghdad, by their Ministers of Trade. The instruments of ratification were exchanged on Oct 2. (*INA, Feb 19, April 13, Oct 26; IT, Feb 19-21*)

The first Ceylonese ambassador to Iraq presented his credentials on Feb 22 (*Zaman, Feb 23*) while Iraq's first ambassador to Ceylon presented his credentials at the end of Sept. (*Zaman, Oct 3*)

India. On Jan 28 a military delegation left for a fortnight's visit to India. (*IT, Jan 29*)

From Feb to May talks took place between Iraqi Airways and Indian Airlines Corporation with a view to the employment of Indian pilots, engineers and technicians by Iraq. (*IT, Feb 16; INA, April 22, May 6*)

On May 3 Qasim discussed the strengthening of Islamic links with Muhammad Ali Salmin, a council member of the "Indian Supreme Islamic Federation." (*INA, May 4; IT, May 5*)

The 1959 Iraqi-Indian trade agreement was extended for another year from May 17. (*INA, July 2*)

The Iraqi FM praised India's action on Goa as liberation from imperialism. (*IT, Dec 22*)

Indonesia. On Sept 7 the Indonesian Minister of Industry, Mining and Development arrived in Baghdad for a three-day visit to discuss oil questions with Qasim and the Minister of Oil. (*INA, Sept 7, 9, 10*)

On Dec 14 the instruments of ratification of the trade agreement signed between the two countries in 1960 (MER 1960, p 262) were exchanged in Jakarta. (*INA, Dec 16, 18*)

Japan. A Japanese shipyard was awarded a tender for the construction of two merchant ships. (*INA, Feb 13, May 14*)

Iraq decided to discuss with Japan the removal of restrictions on Japanese imports. (*INA, Aug 14; IT, Aug 16*)

Philippines. On Nov 9 the President of the Sovereignty Council received two delegates of the Muslim community of the Philippines who handed him a personal message from the President of the Philippines. It was reported that the delegates asked for Iraqi participation in Islamic projects in their country. (*INA, Nov 9; IT, Nov 15*)

Nepal. It was reported that Iraq and Nepal had agreed to establish diplomatic relations. (*Zaman, March 2*)

Pakistan. FM Hashim Jawad accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan, at an unspecified date. (*INA, Jan 29*)

LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Brazil. Contacts were taking place between the two countries with a view to the conclusion of a trade agreement. (*Zaman*, June 17)

Cuba. In Jan after the end of the second OPEC (oil) conference which took place in Caracas, the Iraqi Minister of Oil Affairs visited Cuba. (*IT*, Jan 25)

In a public speech on April 18 Qasim called the [US-directed] invasion attempt of Cuba by anti-Castro forces "an instance of bestial slaves falling upon the peoples when they see them enjoying freedom and independence." (*IT*, April 20)

On April 20 a demonstration took place in Baghdad in support of Cuba. (*Zaman*, April 21)

On April 26 Dr Fidel Castro sent Qasim his thanks for his "support and solidarity with the Cuban cause." (*INA*, April 29)

Mexico. In Jan-Feb the Iraqi Minister of Oil Affairs visited Mexico at the invitation of the Mexican government. (*INA*, Jan 30, Feb 5)

Venezuela. In Jan the Minister of Oil Affairs led the Iraqi delegates to the second OPEC (oil) conference at Caracas. (*INA*, Jan 26)

On Nov 2 Dr Juan P. Alfonso, the Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, arrived in Baghdad on a two-day visit for talks with the Iraqi Minister of Oil Affairs. (*IT*, Zaman, Nov 5)

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

COMMUNIST VIEWS ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ

Statement by Iraqi Communist Leader. [The increasingly critical position assumed in 1961 by Communist countries towards the internal policies of the Iraqi government is reflected in the following passage from the speech of Salim Adil (the pseudonym of Hussein Radawi), first secretary of the Iraqi Communist party, delivered at the 22nd congress of the CPSU in Oct:] "For no reason at all state-of-war conditions still exist in the country. Every kind of party activity is persecuted and the legitimate activities of the Communist party are forbidden above all. Time and again sweeping campaigns of arrest are carried out. Several thousand persons are constantly in prison. At the present time over 50 fighters, sentenced to death by a military tribunal for displaying heroism in the struggle against reactionary forces at the time of the imperialist intrigues, are languishing in prisons. And 286 valiant fighters—Communists and democrats—were killed in broad daylight. The country's economic situation is deteriorating, the standard of living is falling, unemployment is on the increase and feudal domination is once again rising in the countryside. The government avoids implementation of the law on land reform and has not worked out any programme of industrialization, while state funds are being spent on secondary objectives." (*Pravda*, Oct 25)

"Persecutions" of Communists and Other "Patriots." On Feb 8 *Pravda* reported from Baghdad that a group of Iraqi journalists, lawyers and "peace defenders" had asked Col. Mahdawi, President of the Higher Military Tribunal, to intervene for the release of prisoners held without charge, and had secured his promise to bring the matter to FM Qasim's attention.

On Feb 10 *Pravda* printed the text of a telegram sent to Qasim by the Soviet-Asian Solidarity Committee, under the heading "We cannot keep silent." The telegram referred to the Soviet public's "profound alarm and indignation" at the sentences passed on "dozens of the best sons of the brotherly Iraqi people" and characterized them as "unjust repressions" which could only benefit the designs of imperialist agents. The Committee called on Qasim to release the imprisoned "fighters of the national liberation movement, and not to allow the shining ideals of the Iraqi revolution to be stained by the blood of its most loyal and staunchest defenders."

Other telegrams, similar in tone, were addressed to

Qasim by a number of Soviet "social" organizations, and their texts reported in the Soviet press and radio. (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Feb 8; *Pravda*, Feb 8, 10; *Trud*, Feb 12, 15; *R. Moscow in English*, Feb 7 [SU, 9]; *R. Moscow*, Feb 8 [SU, 10]; *R. Moscow*, Tass in English, Feb 14 [SU, 16]; *Mizan*, March)

Protests were also sent by Chinese lawyers (*R. Peking in Arabic*, March 6 [FE 11]) and Bulgarian organizations. (*R. Sofia in Arabic*, March 8 [EE, 10])

In April an article in *New Times* headed "Persecution of Patriots in Iraq," quoted varied sources which alleged repressive measures of the Iraqi authorities against trade unionists, Communists and other "patriotic elements" who had defended the republic at the time of the Mosul "counter-revolution" and cited protest from several countries. (*New Times*, No. 14, April)

In May *Trud* accused the Iraqi authorities of the falsification of trade union elections and the arrest and imprisonment of the organizers of a May Day demonstration (see p 268b), describing the conduct of the Iraqi authorities as "another outrage against the working class." (*Trud*, May 16; for a Bulgarian protest, see *R. Sofia*, May 20 [EE, 23])

In July, the Soviet journal for Afro-Asian affairs described the suppression of demonstrations, held in sympathy with a strike of Baghdad "bus and taxi-drivers" (see p 264 b) thus: "The streets of Baghdad became red with the blood of workers." Referring to the internal situation in Iraq in general, the report asserted: "The position of the patriots becomes more complicated with every day that passes. The wave of reactionary poison has spread throughout the country. Inveterate reactionaries and the dregs of society... have crawled out from dark corners and gateways." (*Asiya i Afrika Segodnya*, July)

The Suppression of the "Democratic Press." The "fate of the Iraqi democratic press" in general, and that of Communist party publications in particular, formed the subject of two articles in *Asiya i Afrika Segodnya* by P. Donskoy. After outlining the growth of the "progressive" press which followed the 1958 revolution, the author stated: "However, in the beginning of 1960 the reaction, supported by imperialist circles, was able to pass over to the offensive. Around ten different right-wing, Black Hundred-type newspapers made their appearance. Some of them were patently financed by Western propaganda centres... In Oct and Nov a series of brutal blows des-

cended upon the progressive press. And as always happens in such cases, the Communists were the first targets." The author then relates the proscription of the Communist party organ *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* and the arrest of its editor, Abd al-Qadir Isma'il al-Bustani (see MER 1960, p 243), as well as the suppression of several other "progressive" papers, including the organ of the trade union movement, *Ittihad al-Ummal*. As a result, "the democratic forces are deprived of all publications" and the Kurdish papers were also disappearing. What remained of the Iraqi press were "*Al-Ahd al-Jadid*, *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, *Al-Mustaqbal* and *Ath-Thawrah*, which specialize in the baiting of patriots and are not above concocting slander against the Soviet Union; some bourgeois information sheets and periodicals; and *Al-Bayān*, the organ of the bourgeois National Progressive party." (*Asiya i Afrika Segodnya*, March, July)

(Two of the above-mentioned papers had earlier attacked Soviet intervention in Iraq's internal affairs. An article in *Al-Fajr al-Jadid* of May 19 stated *inter alia*: "We are not the enemies of imperialism in order to become the slaves of international Communism..." A similar attack in *Al-Mustaqbal* called forth a sharp rejoinder by Moscow Radio which accused the paper of slanderous fabrications "aimed at harming friendly relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union." (*R. Moscow*, March 9 [*SU*, 11]))

Iraq's Oil Policy. The Iraq government's oil policy was critically examined by Yu. N. Andreyev in *Problemy Vostokovedeniya*. In contrast to earlier Soviet accounts which were generally commendatory and, in particular, laid stress on Iraq's efforts to engage in independent exploitation of its oil resources, Andreyev took issue with Iraqi policy on the ground that it was not sufficiently radical towards the oil companies. "The ruling circles of the country," wrote Andreyev, "under pressure from both democratic and reactionary forces, do not always pursue a consistent and resolute policy towards the imperialist oil monopolies." "Reaction began to raise its head" from the second half of 1959 onwards. "In Iraq it did not pass unnoticed that the persecution of democratic elements was intensified at the time of the government's negotiations with the oil company.... Not a few officials who had served under Nuri as-Sa'id returned to the administration; some of them re-established their links with the oil monopolies and prevented the implementation of progressive measures by the government." The author did not challenge the "progressive" character of the Iraqi government's policy objectives. The burden of his strictures was rather that "the opportunities created by the July revolution" were not being exploited with sufficient vigour, and that the "enslaving" concession agreement of 1952, "concluded with a feudal and semi-colonial Iraq" was still in force. (*Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, Jan; *Mizon*, May)

Agrarian Reform. Soviet appraisals of Iraq's land reform measures were similarly concerned with the slow rate of implementation. One account noted that at the current rate of progress only a third of all needy peasants would receive land by Sept 1963, when the re-distribution of land must be completed under the existing law. (*Sovremennyy Vostok*, Jan)

The reform was also criticized on the ground that it did not provide for the confiscation of lands belonging to "traitors who previously collaborated actively with the imperialists." Also "many officials who earlier collaborated with the imperialists" were still serving in the state apparatus

and in a number of cases deliberately impeded the implementation of the reform. (*Voprosy Istorii*, May; *Mizon*, Dec)

The Communist Approach to the Kurdish Question. See pp 287 b-288.

USSR-IRAQ: POLITICAL AND TRADE RELATIONS

Political Relations. The Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani, whose arrival in the USSR was reported in Nov 1960 (MER 1960, p 72), returned to Iraq in Jan. (*Ahali*, Jan 15)

An Iraqi military delegation led by Brig. Jalal Ja'far al-Awqati was received by Khrushchov on Sept 16. The USSR Minister of Defence was present, among others. (*Pravda*, Sept 17; *IT*, Sept 18)

In a message to Khrushchov on the occasion of the 44th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution Qasim stressed the influence of the revolution on "the spiritual and material life of many peoples" and lauded the Soviet Union's "realistic policy" in the "strengthening of peace and the struggle against imperialism." (*Pravda*, Nov 10)

On Nov 26 the head of the Near East Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, E. Kisseliev, arrived in Baghdad for a three-day visit. (*INA*, Nov 27)

Trade with the USSR and the Communist Bloc. The volume of Iraq-USSR trade in 1961 was: Iraqi exports \$2.1 million, imports \$21.2 million, as compared with \$1.1 million and \$7.3 million respectively in 1960.

Iraqi trade with all Communist Bloc countries, excluding Yugoslavia, in 1961 amounted to 12.3% of her total imports and 0.7% of her total exports (including oil exports) as compared with 9.7% and 0.6% respectively in 1960.

If oil exports are excluded, the share of Communist Bloc countries in Iraq's exports trade were 21.4% in 1961 as against 17.5% in 1960. (See tables: The ME Foreign Trade.)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE USSR-IRAQ ECONOMIC AID AGREEMENT

Soviet Statement on Progress. On April 4, the second anniversary of the signing of the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between Iraq and the Soviet Union, a member of the Soviet embassy in Baghdad reported progress under the agreement as follows:

The first stage of the implementation of the agreement involved mainly the drawing up of plans and estimates and was currently nearing completion. A comprehensive survey of the Euphrates and Tigris river basins and the construction of large water reservoirs constituted essential preliminaries in an irrigation project which would "exceed the cost and size of the Aswan Dam in the UAR." Mineral surveys so far completed indicated the existence of natural resources necessary for the construction of an industrial base. Sand suitable for the manufacture of glass had been discovered in sufficient quantities for the operation of a glass factory at Ramadi. A successful survey of phosphorous mines was being carried out in the vicinity of Rutbah. Several thick strata containing sulphur had been discovered near Mosul; deposits of lead and zinc had been found in the north of the country, while manganese, copper, lead and iron ore had been discovered in other mountainous areas.

The Iraqi government had so far approved ten out of the 14 projects for which plans had been drawn up by Soviet experts. Work had begun on two projects, the

central broadcasting station at Salman Pak and the Baghdad-Basra railway line. The former would be the first project to be completed under the aid agreement. (*R. Baghdad, April 4 [6]*)

Iraq Reported Dissatisfied With High Cost, Slow Pace of Soviet Aid. In Jan, a Western observer adduced Iraqi dissatisfaction with the implementation of its aid agreement with the USSR from the scant publicity given in Iraq to the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the aid agreement on Aug 18, 1960, which took place in Moscow on Jan 9. (See below: Baghdad-Basra Railway.) Nor had PM Qasim referred to Soviet aid in his speech on Army Day, Jan 6, in which he had reviewed the state of the country at some length. It was believed that Iraqi reticence on the subject of Soviet aid might have been due to difficulties experienced with the Soviet experts, some 700 in number. The few Iraqi interpreters available lacked the necessary technical qualifications for negotiations with the Soviet side, while those Soviet experts who spoke Arabic were suspected of being spies and agitators in disguise. On the other hand, the observer noted that the reason for Iraqi silence could simply have been that anything else would have contrasted strangely with current measures against local Communists (*Scotsman, Jan 13, 17*). [See also the NYT report on the speeding up of work on the Salman Pak radio station—below.]

On Feb 11 M. Malakhov, the Soviet Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, left Baghdad after a stay of several weeks, during which he was received by PM Qasim. His purpose was, in his words, to "study the implementation" of the aid agreement (*INA, Feb 11; R. Moscow, March 23 [SU 24]*). According to Iraqi sources the discussions between Malakhov and the Iraqi authorities had centred among others on the cost of Soviet aid projects. Iraqi studies of the final reports on factories to be constructed under the agreement had shown that it was possible to reduce cost by 8-12%. As a result of the discussions it had been decided to adopt the views of the Iraqi experts. (*INA, Feb 11; R. Baghdad, Feb 11 [14]*)

Later Qasim was reported to have stated at a press conference that Soviet machinery and equipment was being sold to Iraq "at the lowest international prices." (*ANA, Feb 27 [March 1]*)

Baghdad-Basra Railway. On Jan 9 instruments of ratification of the economic agreement of Aug 18, 1960, were exchanged in Moscow (see MER 1960, p 73). Under this agreement the Soviet Union was to provide Iraq with a loan of R180 million for the construction of the Baghdad-Basra standard gauge railway line (*INA, Jan 11*). The Director-General of Iraqi Railways said that an agreement had been concluded with *Tekhnosport*, for the supply of rails and earth works equipment to the value of ID4 million. Negotiations were in progress with the Soviet Union for the construction of a concrete sleepers factory in Iraq. (*INA, Jan 11; R. Baghdad, Jan 11 [13]*)

In Aug A. Osipov, the chief Soviet engineer of the Baghdad-Basra railway project, described the construction of the line as the "biggest project" undertaken in Iraq with the help of the Soviet Union. Work was proceeding along the entire line; materials so far supplied from the USSR included 20,000 rails, equipment for the construction of a railway depot, signalling and communications apparatus and two track-layers. Forty-two Soviet engineers were engaged in the project and another 60

were expected to arrive in Iraq within the next few months. (*R. Moscow, Aug 29 [SU, 31]*)

Kirkuk-Sulaymaniya Railway Survey. In Jan twelve Soviet experts arrived in Baghdad to carry out surveys for the construction of a new railway line to link the Kirkuk oilfields with the town of Sulaymaniya. (*IT, Jan 11*)

Atomic Reactor. On May 17 a contract was signed in Baghdad between the USSR and Iraq for the construction of and the supply of equipment for a 2,000 kw. atomic reactor and attached isotope laboratory. (*INA, May 18*)

[Plans for the erection of the reactor and laboratory, the so-called "July 14 Project" at Tawatha, had been approved in 1960—see MER 1960, p 73.]

Contracts Signed For Construction of Factories. Contracts were signed during the first half of the year for the construction of several factories most of which had been authorized by the Iraqi Economic Planning Board in the course of 1960. (See MER 1960, p 73.)

In Feb representatives of *Tekhnosport* and the Iraqi Ministry of Industry signed contracts for the construction of a cotton mill and a knitwear/hosiery factory at Kut and a textile mill at Baghdad (*Ivestia, Feb 10; INA, Feb 11*). Work on the cotton mill was due to begin in mid-1961 and to be completed in 1963. The mill was to employ a total of 2,400 workers and to produce over 30 million sq. metres of fabric and over 630 tons of yarn per annum. Sixteen Iraqis were currently training in Soviet textile plants and a further 36 were to be trained later (*R. Baghdad, March 6 [W, 9]*). Soviet equipment for the mill was to include 60,000 spindles and 1,200 looms. (*R. Moscow in English, May 10 [SU, 12]*)

On April 22 representatives of *Prommashexport* signed contracts with the Iraqi Ministry of Industry for the erection of an electrical equipment factory at Waziriya in Baghdad. Construction was due to begin in 1961 and to be completed in 1963. Annual output was scheduled to include 42,000 transformers, 40,000 electric motors with capacities of up to 67 HP, coils, starters and various kinds of switches, plugs and cables. Iraqi technicians were to be trained in the USSR. (*R. Baghdad, April 23 [25]; R. Moscow, April 24 [SU, 26]; see also INA, Jan 16*)

Contracts were also signed for the construction of a factory of agricultural implements at Iskandariya, planned for an annual output of 30,000 units of tilling and harvesting equipment for use with tractors. Forty Iraqi engineers and technicians were to be trained in the USSR; the total labour force was anticipated to number 3,000. (*R. Moscow, April 24 [SU, 26]; R. Moscow, May 6 [SU, 9]; Krasnaya Zvezda, April 25*)

Other contracts signed in the first half of 1961 provided for Soviet aid in the construction of a canning factory at Karbala with an annual output of three million tins, a pharmaceutical factory at Samarra and an artificial limbs and medical footwear factory in Baghdad. (*INA, Feb 11; R. Baghdad, March 12 [W, 30]; R. Moscow in Arabic, May 28 [SU, 30]*)

Planned Industrial Projects. In Jan it was announced that an electric bulb factory would be established near Dawra, to begin production in 1963 with a labour force of close on 800. Initial output was set at 15 million bulbs per annum and was expected to meet Iraq's home consumption (*R. Baghdad, Jan 24 [W, Feb 2]; R. Moscow, May 6 [SU, 9]*). The USSR was also to take part

in the construction at Basra of a petrochemical plant for the production of nitrogenous fertilizers from natural gas. The undertaking was projected to lay the foundation for Iraq's petrochemical industry. (*Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, Jan)

Opening of Salman Pak Radio Station. The first project to be completed under the aid agreement was the Freedom (*al-hurriyah*) radio station in the Baghdad suburb of Salman Pak. The construction of the station was completed according to schedule (see MER 1960, p 73) and the inauguration ceremony took place on July 16 in the presence of PM Qasim and S.G. Lapin, Foreign Minister of the RSFSR, who headed the Soviet delegation to the anniversary celebrations of the Iraqi revolution. (*Pravda*, July 18, 19)

The *New York Times* reported that work on the station had been speeded up in the last weeks and equipment flown from the USSR in an effort to fulfil the original time-schedule to meet Iraqi criticisms as regards tardiness in the implementation of the Soviet aid programme generally. (*NYT*, July 17)

The station's eight 50-watt short-wave transmitters were supplied by the USSR and assembled under the supervision of 60 Soviet specialists. (*R. Moscow in English*, July 17 [SU, 18])

Contracts for Grain Silos. In Feb contracts were signed under the USSR-Iraq aid agreement for the erection of two grain silos, at Baghdad and at Kut, with a capacity of 12,000 tons each. (See also MER 1960, p 74.) Equipment was to be supplied by the USSR at a cost of over ID190,000 for the Baghdad silo and of close on ID268,000 for the Kut silo. The silos were scheduled to come into operation in the first half of 1963. (*IT*, Feb 16; *R. Baghdad*, Feb 15 [W, 23])

Government Farms and Agricultural Machine Stations in Operation. In March it was reported from Moscow that five government farms established under the aid agreement (see MER 1960, p 74) were in operation and growing rice, grain, cotton, sugar beet and medical herbs (*R. Moscow*, March 4 [SU, 9]). Deliveries of Soviet farm machinery were due to be completed by Oct. (*R. Moscow*, April 7 [SU, 10])

Also in operation were the four agricultural machinery for hire stations authorized in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 74). Deliveries of Soviet harvester combines and tractors were reported in April; further deliveries were expected in May. (*Mizan*, April; *R. Moscow*, April 7 [SU, 10])

Oil Prospecting and Mineral Surveys. Under an agreement between the Iraqi government and *Tekhnookisport*, Soviet geologists were to prospect for oil on the territory of the Khanaqin Oil Company's former concession [now nationalized]. (*Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, Jan)

In June PM Qasim was reported to have stated that deposits of gold, silver and uranium had been discovered in Iraq with the aid of Soviet prospectors (*Hayat*, June 16). [There was no confirmation of such discoveries.] (On prospecting see also above: Soviet Statement on Progress.)

USSR-IRAQ CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

The 1961 Working Plan of the Cultural Agreement was signed in Baghdad on Jan 26. It provided for mutual visits of scientists, teachers, students, artists and athletes,

as well as for the exchange of publications, radio and television recordings and technical and scientific information. (*INA*, Jan 26)

Soviet Cultural Missions. On Jan 13 M. Prokofiev, the USSR Deputy Minister of Education, arrived in Baghdad at the head of a five-man delegation for a one-week visit at the invitation of the Iraq-USSR Friendship Society (*IT*, Jan 15, 20). A delegation of Soviet writers arrived in Baghdad on Jan 14 as guests of the Iraqi Writers' Association (*Bilad*, Jan 15); the Secretary of the Soviet Artists' Union spent over a month in Iraq meeting artists and intellectuals and collecting material for an exhibition about Iraq to be held in the Soviet Union. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Feb 12 [SU, 24])

Technical Training Centres. In Jan an Iraqi mission left for the USSR to tour vocational training centres; it was to make recommendations regarding the establishment of similar institutions in Iraq. (*IT*, Jan 13; *R. Baghdad*, Jan 12 [W, 19])

In Feb it was reported that the Iraqi government had authorized the erection of seven technical training centres as part of the aid agreement with the USSR. (*Mus-taqbal*, Feb 19)

Iraqi Students in the USSR. Some 45 Iraqis were training in the oil industry in Baku. (*R. Baku in Arabic*, Jan 30 [SU, Feb 3])

In Oct it was reported that 50 Iraqis were among the first students attending the newly-opened course for foreign students at Tashkent University. (*Mizan*, Dec)

Soviet Cultural Centre for Baghdad. On Dec 25 the Iraqi government authorized the establishment of a Soviet Cultural Centre in Baghdad. The Centre's activities were to be confined to "purely scientific and cultural affairs." (*INA*, Dec 26)

OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Albania. In Jan it was reported that Iraq had authorized the formation of an Iraqi-Albanian Friendship Society. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, Jan 2)

On Aug 3 representatives of Albania and Iraq signed in Baghdad a working plan for cultural cooperation during 1961-62. (*INA*, Aug 5)

Bulgaria. In Jan the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, D. Alekseyev, held talks in Baghdad to explore possibilities for improving economic relations. At a press conference he declared Bulgaria's readiness to aid Iraq by providing her with industrial equipment and technical advice (*INA*, Jan 18; *R. Sofia in English*, Jan 21 [EE, 25]). Economic relations were further discussed by an Iraqi official in Bulgaria, in June. (*R. Sofia*, June 7 [EE, 9])

An agreement for cooperation in the fields of radio, television, cinema, theatre and news was signed in Baghdad on May 7 and ratified on July 10. (*INA*, May 7, July 10)

A Bulgarian delegation led by Deputy PM Z. Zhivkov arrived in Baghdad on Nov 4 for a six-day stay. (*INA*, Nov 5-11)

Czechoslovakia. On Feb 13 the instruments of ratification of the Iraqi-Czechoslovak Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement of Oct 23, 1960 (MER 1960, p 75) were exchanged in Baghdad. (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 13 -IMB, Feb 14)

Later it was reported that Iraq would negotiate for six major projects under the agreement, *viz.*, an oil refinery in Basra, a tyre factory, an artificial dentures factory, an electric power station at Samarra, a slaughterhouse and a ceramics factory. (*R. Baghdad, March 27 [W, 30]*)

The contract for the first of these projects, the power station, was signed on June 18 with the Prague *Tekhnosport* which was to submit preliminary plans for the project within four months. Tenders for engineering works would be examined by Czechoslovak experts. *Tekhnosport* was to have the first option on the supply of equipment. The Czechoslovaks would train Iraqi engineers and technicians for work on the project. The station was to consist of three to four generators, each of approx. 25,000 kw. capacity. The first unit was scheduled to go into operation during the first half of 1965. (*INA, July 1*)

A Czechoslovak was appointed controlling engineer of the Northern Area Electric Power Station for the period of one year. (*IT, Jan 25*)

A Czechoslovak organization was to act as consulting engineers to a sugar refinery at Sulaymaniya. (*R. Baghdad, March 27 [W, 30]; IT, Aug 22*)

On Feb 20, an exhibition of Czechoslovak chemical products was opened in Baghdad. (*IT, Feb 21*)

In Aug, Nāzim az-Zahāwī, the Iraqi Minister of Commerce, visited Prague (*R. Prague, Aug 2 [EE 4]*). In Nov a Czechoslovak trade mission arrived in Baghdad (*INA, Nov 21*). On Dec 6 a trade protocol was signed in Baghdad which envisaged an increase in Iraq's exports to the value of 50% of her imports from Czechoslovakia (*INA, Dec 6*). [Iraq's imports from Czechoslovakia totalled \$9.3 million in 1961 while her exports stood at \$700,000—see table: ME Foreign Trade.]

Seven Iraqis were to be sent to Prague to train for the management of the Kufa shoe factory (*IT, Feb 3*). [The factory was being established with Czechoslovak aid; see MER 1960, p. 74.]

German Democratic Republic. In Feb, a GDR trade official, asked at a press conference in Baghdad about Moscow's recent criticism of Iraqi internal policy, was quoted to have replied: "The capital of the GDR is Berlin and not Moscow." (*INA; IT, Feb 25*)

In Oct the head of the GDR Trade Mission in Iraq stated that there were 100 Iraqis in the GDR training in industry and that the GDR had offered to accept a further 50 trainees for the current year. (*IT, Oct 6*)

On Aug 24 an agreement for the exchange of news was signed between the Iraqi News Agency (*INA*) and the GDR state news agency (*ADN*). (*INA, Aug 24*)

An official Iraqi delegation headed by Col. Wasfi Tāhīr, PM Qasīm's Chief A.D.C., attended the 12th anniversary celebration of the GDR. (*IT, Oct 6, 12*)

Hungary. On Jan 14 the air transport agreement between Iraq and Hungary, signed on March 2, 1960 (MER 1960, p. 76), was ratified. (*Zaman, Jan 15*)

On March 2 the third exhibition of Hungarian goods was opened in Baghdad (*INA, March 2*). An exhibition of Hungarian machinery was opened in Baghdad on Nov 7. (*INA, Nov 7*)

On Oct 11 Iraq and Hungary signed an agreement for cooperation in the fields of broadcasting, television, cinema, theatre and information services. The agreement [a draft of which had been prepared a year and half previously—see MER 1960, p. 76] was to be valid for one year from the date of ratification. It provided for the exchange of radio programmes publicizing the achieve-

ments of each country and of sound and television musical programmes, coordination of technical work between theatre and cinema directorates as well as for the exchange of theatre and cinema festivals. The two sides would seek to improve news dissemination and exchange scholarships. (*R. Baghdad, Oct 11 [13]*)

N. Korea. On July 27 a cultural cooperation agreement between North Korea and Iraq was signed in Baghdad. (*IT, Aug 2*)

Mongolia. On April 10 the instruments of ratification of the cultural agreement concluded between Iraq and Mongolia on May 5, 1960 (MER 1960, p. 77), were exchanged in Peking. (*R. Baghdad, April 12 [W 20]; IT, April 13*)

People's Republic of China. The delegation of ten Iraqi engineers which arrived in China on Dec 10, 1960 (MER 1960, p. 76) left in Jan after a stay of four weeks; its spokesman stated that he was "amazed" at Chinese achievements and "filled with admiration." (*IT, Jan 10*)

On Oct 18 an agreement was signed in Baghdad extending the China-Iraq trade agreement of May 1960 (MER 1960, p. 77) for another year: Iraq was to sell China dates, crude oil, oil products and wool and buy Chinese industrial equipment, electrical appliances, silk and cotton fabrics, steel, timber and other goods. (*R. Peking, Oct 18 [FE, 20]*)

A working plan for cultural cooperation during 1961-62 was signed in Baghdad on Nov 25. (*INA, Nov 25*)

Poland. A three week exhibition of Polish goods was opened in Baghdad on Feb 9. (*R. Baghdad, Feb 9 [11]*)

At the end of July Nāzim az-Zahāwī, the Iraqi Minister of Commerce, held talks in Warsaw on "basic problems of economic cooperation between the two countries." (*R. Warsaw, July 26 [EE, 28]; R. Warsaw in English, Aug 1 [EE, 3]*)

A Polish-Iraqi air agreement was signed in Baghdad on July 27. (*IT, July 28*)

Poland offered five scholarships to Iraqi students for the academic year 1961/62 in addition to 20 scholarships granted earlier under the cultural agreement. (*IT, Feb 28*)

Rumania. Abd al-Latif ash-Shawwāf visited Rumania in April at the invitation of the Rumanian government and State Bank. (*R. Bucharest in English, April 14 [EE 17]*)

N. Vietnam. On Aug 6 the instruments of ratification of the cultural agreement concluded between Iraq and N. Vietnam in May 1960 (MER 1960, p. 77), were exchanged in Baghdad. (*IT, Aug 7*)

YUGOSLAVIA

In May, a Yugoslav cultural delegation visited Iraq. (*Tanyug in English, April 28 [EE, May 1]; INA, May 9*)

On Aug 30 the 1961/62 working plan of the Iraqi-Yugoslav cultural cooperation agreement was signed in Baghdad. (*INA, Aug 30*)

Iraq's first diplomatic representative to Yugoslavia, a chargé d'affaires, was expected to leave Baghdad in Aug. (*Zaman, Aug 16, 18*)

On Sept 13 the Iraqi Minister of Industry arrived in Belgrade for talks with his Yugoslav colleagues. (*Tanyug in English, Sept 14 [EE, 18]; IT, Sept 25*)

On Oct 15 a Yugoslav industrial fair was opened in Baghdad in the presence of the Ministers of Trade of the two countries. (*IT, Oct 15, 16*)

THE STATE OF ISRAEL

(Medinat Ysrael)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYNOPSIS

The objectives of Israel's foreign policy and the pattern of relations remained the same as in 1960; (see MER 1960, p 265 ff.). Israel's chief concern was the security problem which derived from her conflict with the Arabs. She continued to regard the maintenance of adequate military power and the strengthening of her international ties both as a deterrent to the Arab threat to her existence and as a means of paving the way to peace by ultimately convincing the Arabs of the futility of their aspirations to destroy Israel. (See: The Arab-Israel Conflict)

Technical and economic cooperation continued to be regarded by Israel as a most important means of her foreign policy, especially in Africa, and Asia. 1,250 trainees from 71 countries studied in Israel in 1961, and 256 Israel experts served abroad. In the words of her Foreign Minister, Israel, in extending aid, did not seek to establish vested interests but to give a practical expression of her friendship.

Despite her expanding ties with individual countries, including the great majority of the newly-independent African countries, Israel remained isolated from the world groupings and camps, because of the weight the Arab countries exercised in international councils (pp 43-5).

In Israel's relations with the two world blocs there was no change: she enjoyed support in the West, while Soviet Russia rejected her bids to improve relations. PM Ben-Gurion, however, reiterated his views that an understanding between the world powers was a vital prerequisite for peace in the ME, and he reiterated his suggestion for a joint East-West guarantee of ME borders.

Israel obtained arms and economic aid in the West only. Her trade was overwhelmingly with the West but a slow growth of trade with the Communist countries could be noted.

Israel's international position emerged quite clearly in her voting record at the UN General Assembly. Her vote coincided most often with the votes of the US and other Western countries, as well as with non-Arab Middle East and Latin American countries; it coincided least often with the vote of the Communist countries (less even than with that of the Arab countries). On questions of colonialism, however, Israel voted considerably more often with the Afro-Asian countries and the Communist countries than with the West.

The USSR, in much the same vein as the Arabs, denounced Israel as an aggressor in the ME and a tool of neo-imperialism in Africa. Communist propaganda put special emphasis on Israel-West-German ties and alleged collusion between the two governments to prevent the exposure of Nazi criminals in West Germany during the Eichmann trial. The USSR continued to supply arms to the Arab countries, including the UAR, Israel's principal antagonist. The Communist countries supported the Arab case against Israel in practically every instance, at the UN and elsewhere. There was, however, no Soviet expression of support for the Arab aim of eliminating Israel.

Israel continued to be concerned with the fate of Jewry in the USSR. The USSR, on the other hand, accused Israeli diplomats of disseminating hostile propaganda among Jews in the Soviet Union and of espionage, and she expelled one diplomat on these grounds (which Israel termed a tissue of falsehoods).

Relations with the other Communist countries continued on the pattern of the previous years; Czechoslovakia followed the USSR's policy towards Israel most closely; on the other end of the scale, friendly relations continued between Israel and Poland.

Friendly ties were maintained between Israel and Yugoslavia (though the latter cooperated closely with the UAR), and the volume of trade between the two countries grew considerably.

Israel's friendly ties with the Western powers were underlined by visits of PM Ben-Gurion to Canada, and France (official), and to the US and Britain (unofficial) in May-June. The visit to Canada was primarily an affirmation of the existing friendship between the two countries and there was no Israeli request for military or economic assistance.

In the US, PM Ben-Gurion met President Kennedy. Their talk was concerned with the situation in the ME in general and, reportedly, with the Arab refugee question and the balance of armaments in particular. In his election campaign President Kennedy had pledged an effort to seek a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict, and the US had also made it clear that she wished to probe the possibilities of a solution to the refugee problem. Consequently Israel, like the Arab countries, had demonstrated apprehensions lest she be pressed into accepting solutions which she considered disadvantageous. After his talk with the President, PM Ben-Gurion stated that they had found a large measure of agreement, whereupon the State Department declared that no agreement on any particular solution had been reached. In the field of armaments, Israel reportedly felt that she had gained US understanding and that, if the US preferred not to supply arms herself, she would be prepared to consider economic means that might help Israel to meet her defence needs from other sources. An Israeli bid for the purchase of anti-aircraft rockets in the US—the only Western country making them—was rejected. Israel, on her part, showed understanding for the US policy of maintaining friendly relations with both sides in the Arab-Israel conflict, though not for all the practical steps which derived from this policy, (see: The Arab-Israel Conflict). US economic assistance to Israel was further reduced, *pari passu* with the growth of Israel's economy. The two countries maintained close and varied cooperation in the fields of trade—the US being Israel's most important trading partner—investments, science and culture. American Jewry, the largest Jewish community in the world, continued to be of considerable assistance to Israel in many fields.

In PM Ben-Gurion's visit to France and his talk with President de Gaulle the "unwritten alliance" between the two countries was reaffirmed. France remained Israel's major source of arms, especially as regards aircraft. Ties with France in the economic, cultural and scientific fields steadily expanded. The friendship between the two countries, it was noted, was not limited to the government; it was deepened and made more secure by encompassing a great many personalities on both sides, in various fields of endeavour and of different political outlooks.

The United Kingdom sold Israel Centurion tanks, while she also continued to supply arms to Arab states. There were many friendly contacts between the two countries. Economic ties expanded, with Britain maintaining her position as the second-best customer of Israeli goods; British investments in Israel also grew.

The German Federal Republic maintained her policy of not establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, in response to Arab pressure. Otherwise, the ties between the two countries grew closer, a fact which aroused much opposition in Israel. The Knesset (Israel Parliament) debated cultural relations with Germany and a detailed ruling on this issue was issued by the government. PM Ben-Gurion, on his part, reiterated his view that "Adenauer's Germany is not Hitler's Germany." There were further contradictory reports as to whether the GFR would grant Israel a DM500 million loan after the completion of German reparations in 1963; meanwhile Israel's income in foreign currency from German restitution payments to individuals markedly increased. It was also reported that the GFR would supply arms to Israel.

Israel's friendly relations with the Scandinavian countries were underlined by the visit of Mrs. Golda Meir, the Israel Foreign Minister, to Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and the visit of PM Gerhardsen of Norway to Israel.

Relations with the Benelux countries and Italy were marked by the expansion of economic ties. Austria enacted new laws for the indemnifications of Nazi victims which were, however, strongly criticized by the Association of former Austrian Jews in Israel. There were still no diplomatic relations between Israel and Portugal and Spain. Relations with Portugal were affected by the war in Angola; at the UN Israel took a stand against Portugal on the issue, and she rejected a Portuguese request for the sale of sub-machine guns.

Israel's desire for an arrangement with the European Common Market played an increasing role in her European diplomacy. She asked for French support, while encountering Italian and West German opposition. By the end of the year, no progress had been registered.

There was a further growth of friendly ties between Israel and the non-Arab countries in the Middle East. Diplomatic relations were established with Cyprus, Israel's nearest non-Arab neighbour. Several Cypriot ministers visited Israel, trade and technical cooperation expanded, and Israeli tourists flowed into Cyprus in large numbers. Ethiopia extended Israel *de jure* recognition which was regarded as particularly significant because of the strong Arab pressure exerted on her to refrain from this step. It was the consequence of the close and many-faceted ties between the two countries in the economic, technical assistance and other fields. The Shah of Iran defined his country's relations with Israel as "true love" though for political reasons Iran could not recognise Israel *de jure*. Ties between Israel and Iran as well as Israel and Turkey grew steadily in various fields.

In Africa, Israel's ties expanded considerably. At the same time she suffered a diplomatic setback at the Casablanca conference in which three sub-Saharan countries—Ghana, Guinea and Mali—joined three Arab countries—the UAR, Morocco and the Algerian Provisional Government—in condemning Israel as an imperialist bridgehead. The resolution, however, had been adopted only after strong prodding by the UAR. Israel's ties with Ghana were maintained in a variety of fields, particularly in technical cooperation. Israel continued to extend technical aid also to Mali.

On the other hand, Israel's relations with the great majority of African countries grew ever closer. At the UN General Assembly nine African nations co-sponsored an Israel-backed resolution calling for Arab-Israel negotiations. Three Presidents and two Prime Ministers were among the many African leaders visiting Israel during the year: Presidents Maurice Yamengo of Upper Volta, Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic and Herbert Maga of Dahomey, and Prime Ministers Dr. Okpara of Eastern Nigeria and Chief Akintola of Western Nigeria. In joint communiqués with their Israeli hosts the African Presidents declared their support for a peaceful settlement in the ME and the principle of direct negotiations; they signed treaties of friendship with Israel.

Israel opened embassies in the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika; signed new technical agreements with Dahomey, the Malagasy Republic, Togo and Upper Volta, and new trade agreements with the Ivory Coast and Togo. The Entente countries—Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta—opened their embassy in Jerusalem. Israel continued to supply technical assistance to Congo (L) under the auspices of the UN agencies; she supported the UN resolution on the Congo, and its activities there.

Israel's economic cooperation with and technical assistance to African countries expanded steadily. 876 trainees from 36 African countries and territories studied in Israel during the year, and 195 Israel experts worked in the continent.

In Asia Israel maintained friendly relations with the majority of the non-Muslim and non-Communist countries. Technical cooperation continued to expand. 267 trainees from 11 Asian countries studied in Israel and 46 Israeli experts worked in Asian countries. Relations remained especially close with Burma. PM Ben-Gurion visited the country, and at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries PM U Nu's stand was reported to have been decisive in defeating an Arab proposal for the condemnation of Israel as imperialist. PM Nehru of India, on the other hand, reaffirmed his policy of not establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, giving the Suez campaign of 1956 as his reason.

In Latin America Israel continued to strengthen her friendly ties. There was an expansion of technical cooperation; nine countries sent trainees to Israel, and a number of Israeli experts worked in Latin America. An agreement on technical cooperation was signed with Bolivia, and a number of other countries showed interest in similar agreements. Cultural agreements were signed with Bolivia and Guatemala. Chile and Colombia appointed their first ambassadors to Israel. The level of Israel's diplomatic representation with Bolivia and Panama was raised from legation to embassy. The PM of British Guiana, Cheddi Jagan, and a considerable number of Latin American public figures visited Israel.

GENERAL

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The following are general figures and information on the technical assistance extended by Israel to foreign countries, supplied by the Israel Foreign Ministry. Additional information will be found under individual countries, below.

Foreign Trainees in Israel. 1250 trainees studied in Israel during 1961 under her international cooperation programmes. They came from:

Africa: 876 from 36 countries and territories, including Ethiopia;

Asia: 267 from 11 countries;

Latin America: 17 from 9 countries;

Mediterranean and Middle East: 90 from 7 countries, excluding Ethiopia.

The trainees attended courses and seminars in the following subjects: Poultry husbandry (two courses), irrigation techniques, irrigation in sub-tropical regions, rural planning, agricultural instructors, youth leadership (two courses), ORT (Organization for Rehabilitation and Training) vocational training, telecommunications (for Nigerians), training of building foremen, physical education (Wingate Institute), the role of women in a developing society, midwifery course (Brazzaville nurses), medicine (in the Hebrew University medical school), role of the student in developing countries, cooperation and trade unionism (two seminars at the Afro-Asian Institute). In addition there were 85 students in individual training in a wide variety of subjects.

Israeli Experts Abroad. 257 Israeli experts served abroad during 1961 under Israel's international cooperation programme. 195 experts worked in Africa, 46 in Asia and the ME and 5 in Latin America; in addition, a number of experts went abroad on special missions.

The Israel experts worked in the following fields: water engineering; drilling for water; flight instruction; aviation mechanics; banking; agricultural instruction including fish-breeding, poultry breeding, dairy cattle breeding, field crops; naval school; wireless telegraphy; census of population; lecturing in universities and technical institutes; architecture; public transport; mechanical engineering; electrical engineering; ophthalmology; irrigation; sport; geological surveys; agricultural statistics; conduct of industrial seminar; medicine, pharmacology; training of laboratory assistants; public health; housing planning; the hotel industry; survey for establishment of government import and export company; teaching of scientific subjects in secondary schools.

In addition, Israelis conducted surveys for foreign governments in municipal institutions, agriculture, the hotel industry, health services, housing, public transport, printing, state lottery, vocational education and education of the blind. (Information supplied by the Israel Foreign Ministry.)

Following are details on some of the courses and seminars conducted in Israel:

Afro-Asian Institute. (See also MER 1960, p 302.) On March 21 the Institute's first class in labour economics and cooperation, consisting of 64 students from 24 countries (mistakenly reported in MER 1960 as 15), graduated. They were from Burma, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, India,

Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, the Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, and Upper Volta.

On Sept 4 the second course graduated. The 49 participants came from Cameroun, Chad, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Léopoldville), the Malagasy Republic, Mauritius, Nepal, Northern Rhodesia, the Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, South Africa, Thailand, Uganda, and Upper Volta. (IGPO/WNB, No. 9, May, No. 24, Sept)

Child Welfare Seminar. This ten-week seminar, jointly sponsored by the International Union for Child Welfare and Youth Aliya (the Jewish Agency's Youth Immigration Department), opened in Jerusalem on April 16, with over 20 participants from Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Ethiopia, [France], Hong Kong, India, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, [Thailand, Turkey], Upper Volta. (IGPO/WNB, No. 4, April)

Seminar on the Role of Women in a Developing Society. In April this six-week seminar opened in Haifa, with 62 women from 21 African and Asian countries. (IGPO/WNB, No. 6, April)

[They were from Burma, Cameroun, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Thailand.]

African and Asian Youth Leaders' Courses. The first four and a half-month course for veteran youth leaders from African and Asian countries to be organized by the Gadna Youth Corps ended on May 9. The 57 participants came from the Central African Republic, both Congo Republics, Ghana, Liberia, the Malagasy Republic, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Singapore, and Togo.

A second course opened on Sept 8 at the request of African governments following the reports of the participants in the first course. There were 71 participants from 11 African countries: Cameroun, Chad, the Congos, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Upper Volta, and Zanzibar. (IGPO/WNB, No. 7, May, No. 26, Sept)

Course on Poultry Breeding for Afro-Asian Trainees, lasting four months, the second of its kind, opened in Oct at the Ruppin Agriculture School near Natanya with participants from Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Iran, Laos and Sierra Leone. (IGPO/WNB, No. 29, Oct)

Seminar on Rural Planning. On Oct 12 this six-week international seminar opened at Herzliya. The 40 [39] participants from 22 countries included: A. Gomes Moreira, Minister of Education, Brazil; Edouardo Montes, Minister of Agriculture, El Salvador; J.B. Mockey, the Ivory Coast Ambassador to Israel, and officials and experts from Burma, the Congos, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Israel, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines, Singapore, Tanganyika, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay. (IGPO/WNB, No. 29, Oct)

International Seminar on the Role of the Student in Developing Countries. This two-week seminar opened in

Jerusalem on Dec 20 and was attended by 40 [44] overseas delegates, from Basutoland, Burma, Cameroun, Canada, Ceylon, Congo (Léopoldville), Greece, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, West Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, Kenya, Liberia, Malaya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, S. Rhodesia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanganyika, Turkey, Uganda. The president-in-exile of the proscribed Portuguese students' organization and a Hungarian emigré representative also attended. (*IGPO/WNB, No. 39, Dec; Jer. Post, Dec 19, 27*)

INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS IN ISRAEL

In April some 50 representatives from 16 European countries and five international organizations attended a two-week conference in Herzliya of the FAO European Commission on Agriculture, Subcommittee on the Use of Soil and Water. (*Jer. Post, April 26*)

The Fourth Congress of the Association for the Advancement of Science opened in Rehovot on April 2. Twenty-two affiliated organizations with more than 2,500 members were represented. (*IGPO/WNB, No. 2, April*)

In May over 600 sportsmen from 32 countries participated in the seventh Hapoel Workers' Sports Festival, together with more than 6,000 Israel sportsmen. They came from Austria, Belgium, Burma, Cyprus, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Malagasy Republic, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, the US and Yugoslavia. (*Ha'aretz, April 30, May 8; Jer. Post, March 8, May 8*)

In May over 2500 members of Pentecostal churches attended their Sixty World Conference in Jerusalem. (*Jer. Post, May 26*)

In May the Tenth Congress of the International Press Institute took place in Tel Aviv. (*Jer. Post, May 28, 30, 31, June 2*)

The fourth Zimriya choir festival in July was attended by choirs from Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, the UK, the US and Yugoslavia. (*Israel Digest, March 7, Aug 4*)

In July engineers from Australia, South Africa, Spain and Israel met at the Technion (Israel Institute of Technology) Haifa, to discuss engineering problems arising from swelling soils. (*Israel Digest, Aug 4*)

In July the Third World Congress of Jewish Studies was attended by a large number of non-Jewish as well as Jewish scholars. (*Israel Digest, Sept 1*)

In July 60 teachers from 16 countries participated in the 30th Congress of the International Federation of Teachers Associations, in Klar Saba. (*Jer. Post, July 25, 27; Israel Digest, Aug 4*)

In Aug-Sept 550 experts attended the 15th Congress of the International Fiscal Union in Jerusalem. (*Israel Digest; Jer. Post, Sept 1*)

On Sept 2 a Conference on Population Genetics in Israel opened at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem as a preliminary to the Second Conference on Human Genetics scheduled for Sept 7 in Rome. About 40 geneticists from Europe, the US, Latin America, Algeria, India, Japan, South Africa and Turkey took part. (*Jer. Post, Sept 3*)

The first international course in advanced radiobiology held under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Israel Atomic Energy Committee opened in Israel on Oct 24. It was attended by scientists from Argentina, Australia, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. (*IGPO/WNB, No. 30, Oct*)

On Oct 3 the Second International Bible contest was held in Jerusalem; the 19 contenders came from Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland, the UK (Wales), Uruguay, and the US. (*Jer. Post, Oct 3, 4*)

On Nov 13, the Council of the International Hotel Association met in Tel Aviv. There were 170 participants from Western and Northern Europe, Canada, Chad, Cyprus, Turkey, the US and Israel. (*Jer. Post, Nov 13, 14, 17*)

ISRAEL ACCESSION TO GATT

On Dec 9, in Geneva, the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreed to Israel's accession, to be effective 30 days after her signature of the accession protocols. In the secret ballot one vote was cast against her admission.

Israel applied for membership to GATT on March 26, 1959 and on May 30, 1959 became an associate member on a provisional basis. (*Ha'aretz, May 31, 1959; Jer. Post, Dec 10; Israel Digest, Dec 22; Kitzur Amanah, 449*)

NATO, WESTERN EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

[Israel's desire for an arrangement with the EEC played a growing role during the year in her European diplomacy. She asked for French support, while encountering Italian and West German opposition. By the end of the year, however, no progress had been registered.]

Trade with the EEC countries in 1960 and 1961 amounted to approximately 30% of Israel's imports (\$145 million in 1960 and \$180 million in 1961) and 28% of her exports (\$62 million in 1960 and \$69 million in 1961). (*IFT, 1961*)

Association or Agreement with EEC Considered Vital in Israel. On June 14 Mrs Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, told the press in Jerusalem that "joining" the

Common Market was absolutely essential for Israel's economic future. Complex problems stood in the way, but the nations concerned understood the importance of the Market for Israel, and she was optimistic that a way would be found to overcome the remaining obstacles. (*Jer. Post, June 15*)

The press was gravely concerned lest, if Israel remained outside the EEC while the UK and Spain came in, she might lose her citrus export market in the UK, which would have to give preference to Spanish citrus. (*Jer. Post, June 11*)

On Dec 3 Pinhas Sapiro, Minister of Commerce and Industry, stated in the Knesset, in answer to Communist and Liberal motions for a debate on the issue: "It would seem to me that we have not said that we wished to

become a member-state of the Common Market... If they were prepared to admit us today we would have been unable to meet the conditions... Greece has been admitted as an associate member... We have said, and are saying, that what we want is not to be discriminated against by the fact of the establishment of the Common Market." Israel's representatives, Sapir continued, pose only this one demand: "a mutual trade arrangement... This could be an arrangement as in the case of Greece or some other arrangement." Israel was not devoid of bargaining power, Sapir added, because of her considerable imports from the EEC countries. The Knesset decided not to hold a debate. (*Dirrei Haknesset, Dec 11-13, pp 644-7*)

European Attitudes; No Association? (On the attitude of France, see p 307; of the GFR—p 309 b; of Italy—MER 1960, p 294.) In Oct Robert Lemaigen, member of the Commission of the EEC and Chairman of its Fund for Overseas Development, visited Israel in connection with plans for Israel's cooperation in overseas development. He told the press that since Israel's citrus and other exports might be adversely affected by the establishment of a common tariff in Europe, it was reasonable for the Israel government to raise this point for discussion with the EEC authorities. Application for associate membership would "raise a host of problems," including the EEC members' desire to preserve the specifically European and regional character of the Community, and he appeared confident that a better solution could be found. (*Jer. Post, Oct 13, 17*)

Socialist members of the European Parliamentary Assembly said in a communiqué in Dec that negotiations should be started "without delay" to reach an agreement "solving economic problems existing between the European Community and Israel." The communiqué made no mention of a possible association of Israel with the EEC and gave no details of the agreement envisaged. (*Jer. Post, Dec 20, quoting Reuter, from Strasbourg*)

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND

Australia. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Australian trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$885,000 and imports \$246,000, compared with \$1,177,000 and \$397,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

In Sept goods from Australia were shown at the International Exhibition of Applied Arts in Tel Aviv. (*Jer. Post, Sept 14*)

New Zealand. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-New Zealand trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$34,000 and imports \$102,000, compared with \$71,000 and \$79,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*) (For New Zealand's stand on the Arab refugee issue, see p 238 a.)

AUSTRIA

Compensation for Victims of Nazis. (See also MER 1960, p 294.) At the beginning of 1961 Israel and Jewish organizations continued to press the Austrian government for a speedy settlement of the restitution question.

Jewish losses in Austria under the Nazis were estimated by Jewish survivors at \$1,000-1,200 million. Of the 200,000 Austrian Jews at the time of the Anschluss, 75,000 survived, 20,000 of them in Israel.

At the beginning of Jan Israel asked Austria, in a note handed to the Austrian Ambassador, for "speedy

and sufficient restitution" to all victims of Nazi persecution in Austria. It was disclosed that an Israeli note on the subject in May 1960 had remained unanswered (*Jer. Post, Jan 11*). [A reply was received in Jerusalem on Aug 14.]

On March 20 Mrs Golda Meir, the Israeli FM, speaking in the Knesset, expressed the hope for speedy restitution. (*Ha'aretz, March 21; Dirrei Haknesset, March 20-23, p 1363*)

On March 22 Austrian indemnification laws were supplemented and amended by Parliament, providing for compensation for loss of livelihood, property and education by Jews who had escaped from the Austrian part of the Nazi Reich. These laws were not to come into force, however, before ratification of an agreement on a West German contribution. (Text in *Bundesgesetzblatt No. 23 of April 21*) On Nov 27, Austria and West Germany agreed on a German contribution of DM321 million to Austrian restitution payments (*Jer. Post, Dec 26*). The agreement was ratified by the German Bundestag on May 11, 1962. (*Deutscher Bundestag, 4 Wahlperiode; Drucksache IV/392*)

The indemnification laws met with sharp criticism from the World Association of Former Austrian Jews, Israel branch. They rejected the Austrian argument that Austria herself had been a victim of the Nazis (see below) alleging, *inter alia*, that 30% of the SS had been Austrians, though the latter were only 10% of the Reich's population. They claimed that the rate of compensation for loss of livelihood was only 7% per head of that paid by the GFR, "a discrimination for which there is no legal or moral justification."

They also criticized the ceiling on restitution payable through a special Austrian fund for the loss of bank accounts, cash, securities, mortgages and valuables etc. This was set, it was claimed, at 20,000 Austrian schillings (£11,600), which was "nothing short of cynical." (*Ha'aretz, May 8; Jer. Post, July 26, Dec 26*)

[No official reaction to the indemnification laws by Israeli authorities was reported.]

In a letter to *Ha'aretz*, an Austrian embassy official stated that, in the Austrian government's view, Austria was not capable of acting as an independent state between the Anschluss in March 1938 and the end of the war in Europe in May 1945. In the Austrian State Treaty, he argued, the Allies had recognized this by declaring Austria to have been forcibly occupied by Hitler's Germany, and completely exempted Austria from paying compensation to the Allies, thus "absolving her from legal responsibility for the events of the war and its consequences." There must be a clear differentiation between return of property and compensation, the writer stated; the State Treaty, as well as "exemplary Austrian legislation," obliged Austria to restore property still in Austria, but compensation was only a question of free Austrian choice and "should be recognized as a gesture of goodwill." The writer declared that the figure of \$1000 million for Jewish losses was unsubstantiated, and that Austria had already refunded, by return of property and various payments, "hundreds of millions of dollars." (*Ha'aretz, May 8*)

War Criminals. Survivors from Vilna (Lithuania) in Israel hooded the Austrian Ambassador a memorandum demanding the arrest and trial of Franz Murer, "the murderer of 80,000 Vilna Jews." He was said to have been sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment but was reported to be free and serving as a bank director. (*Ha'aretz March 20, April 11*)

At a press conference in Vienna on May 17, Dr Hans Christian Broda, the Austrian Minister of Justice, said that the Austrian courts had convicted 14,000 ex-Nazis, and had sentenced 439 to death.

On May 18 he denied that the arrest of Eichmann's "assistants," Franz Murer and two others, was a result of Eichmann's trial; six others suspected as Nazi criminals were also under arrest. (*Ha'aretz*, May 19)

Various Contacts. In April the first organized group of 56 Austrian tourists arrived in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, April 24)

On Oct 10, an extradition agreement was signed between Israel and Austria in Vienna. (*Kivrei Amnash*, 454)

Trade. The volume of Israeli-Austrian trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$1,692,000; imports \$3,376,000, compared with \$1,487,000 and \$3,825,000 in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

BELGIUM

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Belgium trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$15,047,000 and imports \$11,249,000, compared with \$13,364,000 and \$11,383,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

In Aug the first shop for the sale of Israeli products, called Sabra, was opened in Brussels. (*L'Information*, *Tel Aviv*, Aug 14)

On Oct 12 an Israel-Belgium Chamber of Commerce was established in Tel Aviv. (*L'Information*, *Tel Aviv*, Oct 13)

Belgian Investments. At the end of April Jean Poncelet, Director-General of Fabri-Metal (a trade association of metal factories), visited Israel as guest of the government. He said he hoped to interest Belgian metal industrialists in the establishment of factories in Israel, geared for export, in cooperation with local capital. A textile machinery plant had been constructed in Ashdod by Metapic (mistakenly described as a textile factory in *MER* 1960, p 224), in partnership with a Belgian firm. A Belgian shipyard was negotiating for participation in the Haifa shipyard project. A Belgian engineer would study the possibility of producing railway carriages and equipment in Israel. (*Jer. Post*, May 4, 5)

Restitution for Israelis. The Foreign Ministry was conducting negotiations with the Belgian authorities on behalf of Israelis who during World War II were citizens of Nazi-occupied countries and were eligible for restitution under the 1960 agreement between Germany and Belgium. Germany had made a lump-sum payment to be distributed at Belgium's discretion. An Israel Foreign Ministry source said there were no difficulties in this case with regard to Belgian citizens in Israel, since Belgium allowed dual citizenship. (*Jer. Post*, June 22)

Cooperation in Arms Manufacture. During a discussion in the Knesset on the alleged appearance of Israeli-designed Uzi submachine guns in the hands of Portuguese soldiers in Angola (see: Portugal), Shimon Peres, the Deputy Minister of Defence, disclosed that much of the Israeli army's light arms were manufactured by the Belgian Fabrique Nationale. There was an agreement for the exchange of know-how in the manufacture of parts for the automatic [FN] rifle in Israel and the Uzi machine gun in Belgium. Consultation was required before sales to a third party. (*Diivri Haknesset*, Nov 27-29, p 509)

Gestures of Friendship; Visitors. In Jan the Israel-Belgium Association announced the planting of the Boudouin Forest in Israel and congratulated King Baudouin on his marriage (which took place on Dec 15, 1960). The Belgian Court thanked the Association in the name of the King and Queen. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 20)

In Feb Brig. Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff, visited Belgium and met the Army Quartermaster General. (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 20)

In Aug the Israel government sent a letter of condolence on the death of Cardinal Van Roey, who had courageously resisted Nazi persecution of the Jews. (*ICPO/PR*, Aug 16)

In Aug a delegation of 30 Belgian scouts toured Israel. (*Jer. Post*, Aug 2)

CANADA

Israeli PM Cordially Received on Visit to Canada. PM David Ben-Gurion visited Canada from May 24 to 28 on the invitation of PM John George Diefenbaker; the first two days constituted an official visit.

The visit was officially announced in Jerusalem and Ottawa on May 11. In the Canadian Parliament the PM, Lester B. Pearson, leader of the opposition, and Hazen Argue, the Socialist leader, hailed Ben-Gurion as the distinguished leader of a young democratic state in the ME which had achieved rapid progress.

PM Ben-Gurion said he was confident that the visit would strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries and their determination to make their contribution towards world peace. (*Jer. Post*, May 12). [Ben-Gurion had not been to Canada since he trained there during the First World War as a soldier in the Jewish battalion of the British army. Diefenbaker, then leader of the opposition, had visited Israel in 1954.]

On May 24 Ben-Gurion was welcomed at Ottawa airport by the Canadian PM. The two statesmen stressed the affinity and the close ties between the two countries in history, democracy, culture, faith and pioneering.

Ben-Gurion had a private lunch with the Governor-General, George Vanier, and a series of talks with the Canadian PM. He was also received by the Canadian Parliament. (For sources, see below.)

Joint Communiqué. A joint communiqué, issued on May 25, stated: "The two PMs reviewed a wide range of international problems, including the pressing need for controlled world disarmament, the Congo, tensions in various areas and the general situation in the Middle East."

"Mr Ben-Gurion outlined his views on the Middle Eastern problems and the particular difficulties for his country which have resulted from the failure to reach a peaceful solution of Arab-Israeli differences in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. At the same time Mr Ben-Gurion expressed his conviction that peace ultimately will be achieved. The two Prime Ministers agreed that an eventual solution to the problem would have to envisage the right of all countries in the area to live in peace and security. Both agreed that a relaxation of tension would improve prospects of peace in the world including the Middle East."

"The Prime Ministers agreed on the vital necessity for economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries in all parts of the world. Mr Ben-Gurion took the opportunity to explain the nature and scope of the technical assistance Israel had been able to provide to other countries." (*Israel Digest*, June 9)

Ben-Gurion Advocates East-West Accord on ME. Ben-Gurion told the press in Montreal on May 26 that a joint declaration by the Soviet Union and the West in favour of the integrity and independence of the ME countries would ease tension in the area. (For sources, see below.)

No Israeli Requests for Military or Economic Aid. Ben-Gurion stated at the same time that Canada could help Israel by sending pioneering Jewish youth to Israel and using its "moral power to bring peace to the world."

PM Diefenbaker told Parliament on May 26 that Ben-Gurion had made no request for military assistance, "either directly or indirectly." The same point was made by the Israeli PM at press conferences in Ottawa and Montreal. He said that some years previously Israel had asked for fighter aircraft from Canada but had later withdrawn the request, preferring to rely on one country [France] as a source of supply.

On May 26 Ben-Gurion visited Quebec City and Montreal, where he was warmly welcomed by the mayors and the Jewish communities.

Following the official visit, Ben-Gurion stayed in Montreal, and left for New York on May 28.

On his return to Israel Ben-Gurion paid tribute to the exceptionally warm welcome he had received in Canada and Canadian Jewry's devotion to Israel.

Ben-Gurion was accompanied by Pinhas Sapir, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, who held talks with the Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce, George Hees. An Israeli spokesman stated that there had been no discussion of a Canadian loan or economic aid to Israel. The objective of the talks had been to strengthen trade ties; Israel had purchased \$6.5 million worth of Canadian food and goods in 1960 and exported to Canada only \$2.5 million worth. Sapir proposed the exchange of trade study missions. (*Jer. Post*, May 12, 28; *June 9*; *Ha'aretz*, May 28, 29; *Israel Digest*, June 9; *External Affairs, Canada*, July; *Presse Montreal*; *Montreal Star*, May 24, 25, 26, 27)

Various Contacts. Israel opened a consulate in Toronto on April 13. (*Jer. Post*, April 18)

On Jan 24 PM Diefenbaker was awarded the Canada-Israel Friendship award for 1960. (*Jer. Post*, Jan 26)

In April a delegation from the National Defence College of Canada visited Israel, and was received by PM Ben-Gurion and Maj.-Gen. Tzur, the Chief of Staff. (*Jer. Post*, April 12, 13)

In June it was announced that scientists from Canada were to engage in research at the Weizmann Institute during the coming academic year. (*Jer. Post*, June 20)

On Oct 31 an exhibition of Israeli paintings was opened in Ottawa. (*Ottawa Citizen*, Ontario, Nov 1)

In Nov the Israeli Minister of the Interior and Health, Haim Moshe Shapiro, visited Canada. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 22)

Economic Ties. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israeli-Canadian trade in 1961 was: exports \$3,324,000; imports \$9,206,000. In 1960 the figures were \$2,634,000 and \$6,738,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

In 1961 investments in Israel to the amount of \$12 million were promoted in Canada by the Israel Investment Authority. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 10)

An Israeli trade mission toured Canada in the autumn and was received by PM Diefenbaker. Members said that Israel's development plans might provide an important market for Canadian construction equipment. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 22, Nov 16, 19, 29, 30; *Telegram*, Toronto, Nov 27)

On Dec 7 George Hees, the Canadian Trade Minister, announced that the Canadian Trade Commissioner Services would open a post in Tel Aviv in Jan 1962. (*Canadian Weekly Bulletin*, Dec 13)

FRANCE

Premier Ben-Gurion Visits France; Friendship Reaffirmed. PM David Ben-Gurion visited France between June 5-8, after visiting Canada, the US and the UK, almost exactly a year after his previous visit (June 13-20, 1960; see MER 1960, pp 292-3).

In the Elysée Palace communiqué the visit was described as official but without public ceremonies. It was indicated that Ben-Gurion did not intend raising any particular request or question, as there were no hitches whatever in Franco-Israeli relations. (*Jer. Post*, May 30)

On his arrival in Paris Ben-Gurion said that he was convinced that his talks with Gen. de Gaulle and the French PM would be "useful and fruitful." He continued: "I rejoice at the close bonds uniting our two peoples and I congratulate myself on the full understanding which we have always met with the leaders of this great country."

Mrs Golda Meir, the Israeli FM, and Shimon Peres, the Deputy Defence Minister, joined Ben-Gurion in Paris, together with the Ambassador to Brussels and the EEC. (Peres had conducted talks in Paris in Jan—*Ma'ariv*, Feb 1.)

De Gaulle: "Israel, Our Friend and Ally." The talks between the PM and President de Gaulle, on June 6, lasted an hour instead of the half-hour allotted. At a luncheon at the Elysée on June 6, President de Gaulle said: "At this juncture of world affairs it is always good for men of goodwill to see each other and reach agreement... This is true in all respects, and particularly in respect of Israel, whose merits and grandeur we know and whose difficulties and preoccupations we understand. We wish to assure you of our solidarity and our friendship. I raise my glass to Israel, our friend and ally."

PM Ben-Gurion replied: "We are grateful to France for the message of liberty and equality which she has given the world and for the aid which she extended us before the creation of the State, and afterwards." He emphasized the "gratitude of the people and government of Israel and my personal admiration for France and President de Gaulle, the man who today leads France and dedicates all his strength to her grandeur. He strives for the peace of the entire world in developing the noble sentiments which are inherent in the French people. Vive la France!" (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 11, June)

Ben-Gurion dined with PM Michel Debré. Leading French public men attended a banquet in his honour, including Guy Mollet and Pierre Mendès-France, former PMs; Couve de Murville, the FM; Lucien Paye, Minister of Education; Edmond Michelet, the Minister of Justice; Pierre Gorce, Secretary of State for African Affairs; Maurice Schumann, President of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee; General Martin, Chief of the General Staff; General Lavaud, Director of Armament Supplies, and Prof. Francis Perrin, High Commissioner for Atomic Energy. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 11, June; *Jer. Post*, June 7)

Topics of Talks. A despatch from Paris said "it was to be assumed" that PM Ben-Gurion would emphasize that two conditions were vital for progress towards peace, or at least for the avoidance of war, in the ME, so that the Arabs might realize that Israel could not be elimi-

nated: the balance of power must be safeguarded and Israel must achieve economic independence. The despatch added that it might be assumed that the French appreciated the importance of Israel as "the only bastion of democracy and friendship in the ME." (*Ha'aretz*, June 4)

Le Monde wrote on June 6 that the talks would concern supply matters, atomic research and the strengthening of the cultural agreement. (Talks on the implementation of this agreement were conducted in Paris on the eve of Ben-Gurion's visit. See below: Cultural Relations.) (*Ha'aretz*, June 7)

The question of Israel's relations with the EEC was a main topic of discussion in Ben-Gurion's meetings with PM Debré and Guy Mollet (with whom he had an hour's talk on June 7) and in Mrs. Meir's meeting with FM Couve de Murville on June 8. (*Jer. Post*, June 8, 9)

On June 5 Peres had an hour's meeting with Pierre Messmer, the Defence Minister, who reportedly showed full understanding for Israel's needs and anxieties. (*Ha'aretz*, June 7)

(Additional sources on the visit: *Figaro*, June 6, 7, 9; *Monde*, June 7, 8)

Evaluation of Visit: Continued French Assistance to Israel "Assured." On leaving Paris on June 8 for Israel, Ben-Gurion stated that he had "found a very great understanding of Israel's problems and needs and a great appreciation of her achievements" in Canada, the US, Britain and France. "But nowhere was this understanding and sympathy more clearly expressed than at my meeting with General de Gaulle and those who work with him." Ben-Gurion stressed that in the countries he had visited he had found a deep admiration for General de Gaulle and a great appreciation of France's important position in the international field. "I am leaving your country with the deep feeling that France is Israel's faithful friend and the champion of man's liberty and of world peace." (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 11, June)

"Responsible observers" in Paris thought, as the visit ended, that Israel's vital needs would be met by France as far as possible. (*Jer. Post*, June 8)

Summing up his visit on June 13 in Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion said: "If France achieves a solution of the Algerian problem, a thing that I wish with all my heart, there will be no change in Franco-Israel relations." (*Ha'aretz*, June 14)

Peres said: "The future of several issues vital to the State of Israel has been assured" (*Jer. Post*, June 16). On a later occasion he said that Franco-Israel relations were further strengthened by the visit. France was unconditionally extending to Israel much vital assistance. She had twice helped Israel to maintain her liberty and existence—not because of French interests in the area, but because of common values and identity of aspirations. (*Ha'aretz*, July 14)

Israel Asks French Support in Negotiations with Common Market. On several occasions during the year Israeli representatives asked for French support in her negotiations for a form of association with the Common Market. (See also pp 303-4.) The matter was raised by Ben-Gurion and Mrs. Meir during their visit to France in June. (*Jer. Post*, June 6, 7)

In Nov the Israeli parliamentary delegation (see below) repeatedly raised the issue. FM de Murville replied [non-committally] that he was "convinced that Israel, with her splendid human capital, will surmount all obstacles." (*Jer. Post*, Nov 11)

On Nov 22 Raymond Schmittlein, President of the

Gaullist UNR, addressing a meeting of the Committee for Franco-Israel Alliance (of which he and PM Michel Debré, among others, were founding members), urged his government to "stretch out a hand to Israel and bring her into the European Common Market." (*Jer. Post*, Nov 23)

On Nov 15, while on a visit to Paris, Pinhas Sapir, Israeli Minister of Commerce and Industry, met Jean Marcel Jeanneney, the French Minister of Trade, in a bid to secure French support. Jeanneney expressed understanding for Israel difficulties, it was reported, but dwelt on the wider aspects of the problem and the need for consultations with other Common Market member-countries and French economic leaders.

At a press conference in Paris, Sapir said: "Actually, though not intentionally, the Common Market Organization applies a quasi-boycott to Israel. This is an injustice that I am convinced France will wish to correct." (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, Nov 16, 17)

"Algérie Française" Organ's Anti-Jewish and Anti-Israel Allegations. In March Rivoire, leading organ of "Algérie Française," devoted a whole page to allegations that Algerian Jews were fighting together with Israelis on the side of European extremists against the authorities and the FLN (*Jer. Post*, March 23). The *Jerusalem Post* commented that the aim was to plant suspicions that Israel was engaged in a conspiracy to undermine the Gaullist regime, prevent peace in Algeria and prolong the strife indefinitely. Such a suspicion, even if only a fragment of it stuck, might do irreparable harm to Franco-Israel relations, and at the same time irritate Muslim Algerians. "This peril requires immediate and earnest attention" (*Jer. Post*, March 23). On March 24 Daniel Mayer, president of the French League of Human Rights, described the allegations as a "deliberate provocation designed to poison the relations between Jews and Muslims." (*Jer. Post*, March 26)

Following the arrest of Jean Ghnassia, an Algerian Jew described as a top leader of the anti-Gaullist Secret Army Organization (OAS), *France Soir* reported that the police were investigating a rumour that Ghnassia had been in touch with Israeli agents. (*Jer. Post*, May 18)

Israel and North-Africa. On Aug 25, at the third UN special session on the Bizerta question, Israel abstained in the vote on the Afro-Asian motion, in accordance with a Cabinet decision. (*Ha'aretz*, July 14, 23, 24, Aug 28; *A/PV*, 1006, Aug 25; see also text of resolution, p 24.)

On Oct 24 it was learned in Paris that France and Israel had opened negotiations to secure the indemnification rights of Jews who were leaving Algeria and wished to settle in Israel instead of France. It was reported that the French showed understanding of Israel's wishes and agreement was envisaged soon. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 25)

At a meeting in Tel Aviv with African leaders in Nov, PM Ben-Gurion declared that Israel supported the right of the Algerians, like that of every other people, to self-determination. This did not mean, however, that Israel supported any particular demands of the Algerian nationalists. The right of the Algerian people to self-determination, he added, was part of French policy as stated by General de Gaulle. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 6)

Knesset Delegation's Visit to France. On Nov 6 a nine-member Knesset delegation, headed by David Hacohen (Mapai), left for a two-week visit to France at the in-

vation of Chaban-Delmas, Speaker of the National Assembly.

On Nov 9, Louis Terrenoire, Minister of State, told the delegation that friendship with Israel was one of the fundamentals of French policy, "which we shall never give up, no matter what happens." This was interpreted as an allusion to the situation that would arise after the solution of the Algerian problem. In his reply, Hacothen called on France to help Israel become associated with the Common Market.

The delegation also met Pierre Pflimlin, Mayor of Strasbourg and former PM, and Raymond Schmittlein, chairman of the Gaullist UNR and president of the Parliamentary Franco-Israel Friendship Committee.

PM Debré told the delegation on Nov 16: "Israel is the living symbol of liberty and devotion to the cause of peace and democracy, and serves these great ideals in the spirit of the highest dedication." Hacothen replied that nowhere else in the world had he met such warm, unreserved and deep friendship towards Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 5, Nov 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 20; *Jer. Post*, Nov 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 17)

Negotiations on Restitution. Israel negotiated with France on the eligibility of Israelis who had been French citizens under Nazi occupation to restitution payments under a French-German agreement in 1960. Germany had made a lump-sum payment, to be distributed at French discretion. As France allowed dual citizenship, no difficulties were envisaged. (*Jer. Post*, June 22)

Economic Relations; Trade. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-French trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$4,677,000; imports \$46,803,000. In 1960 the figures were \$4,479,000 and \$25,425,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

[The increasing trade gap had been the subject of prolonged negotiations in 1960, which continued throughout 1961.] The trade protocol signed at the end of the year lifted most French restrictions, however.

On Dec 29, 1960, the 1961 protocol of the 1953 trade agreement was signed in Paris. It renewed the terms of the previous protocol; France and the French Community were to import \$10 million worth of Israel produce during the year, while French exports to Israel were to be largely unrestricted. The protocol was made out in the name of all member-states of the French Community except Mauritania, and was also signed by representatives of the Central African Republic, Gabon, Malagasy Republic and Chad. (*Kitvei Amanah*, 417; *Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, Jan 2)

In March the Assistant Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry said that if no agreement was reached during the forthcoming GATT consultations, a complaint against France for maintaining quantitative restrictions on Israel imports, in contradiction to GATT's policy of trade liberalization, would be addressed to GATT. (*Jer. Post*, March 12). [Apparently, no such complaint was raised.]

In mid-Nov, Pinbas Sapir, Israeli Minister of Commerce and Industry, discussed trade relations in Paris. A complaint about discrimination against Israeli industrial products, which did not benefit from the preferential quotas extended by France to certain countries outside the Common Market, and double taxation were also discussed. M. Jeanneney, the French Minister of Trade, was reported to be sympathetic to Israel's case. Prominent French businessmen also promised a joint

effort to make larger purchases in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 16, 17)

On Dec 5 Israel, France and the countries of the French Community (except Mauritania, Senegal and the Ivory Coast—the latter concluded a separate agreement with Israel) signed the trade protocol for 1962, according to which Israel for the first time became free to sell industrial products in France without administrative restrictions, while France retained a similar right in Israel. Quotas were established for Israeli citrus fruit and for certain categories of Israeli farm produce till then excluded from the French market. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 6; *Kitvei Amanah*, 424)

On March 6 the French Minister of Finance opened the Israel pavilion at the Lyons fair. (*Ha'aretz*, March 7)

A number of ships were built in French shipyards for Israeli firms. In April, and again in May, the French Deputy Minister for Merchant Marine visited Israel for talks on Israel shipbuilding orders. *Shalom*, Zim Israel Navigation Co.'s 23,000-ton transatlantic passenger liner, was to be built at the Atlantique shipyard in St. Nazaire at a cost of about \$16 million. (*Jer. Post*, April 24, May 4, 15). A 13,000-ton freighter for Israel was launched in France in March. (*Jer. Post*, March 21). In Aug Zim reached an agreement for the building of two freighters for \$2.5 million—80% of which was to be covered by a five-year loan at 5% interest. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 13). On Aug 11 the 7,300-ton liner *Moladet* was delivered to Zim at Nantes. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 11, Sept 8)

Negotiations on El Al's transatlantic flights through Paris were started in May and successfully concluded in Sept. (*Ha'aretz*, May 15, June 19, Sept 19)

On Sept 24 six members of the French Centre for the Advancement of Business arrived in Israel for a week's stay as guests of the Foreign and Defence Ministries on their first organized trip outside France. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 26, Sept)

In Oct the Israeli Transport Ministry rejected the application of an import agency for permission to sell Renault-Dauphine cars. The reason, it was thought, was that in 1959 Renault had unilaterally terminated, under Arab pressure, the assembly of vehicles in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 3)

Cultural Relations. In a survey on the implementation of the 1959 Franco-Israel cultural agreement, published on May 19, the Cultural Advisor of the French embassy in Tel Aviv stated that the exchange of visits by scientists was continuing, a chair of French studies was to be established at the University of Tel Aviv, and French was taught as a second foreign language in most Israeli secondary schools. (*Ha'aretz*, May 19)

On May 29-30 the Franco-Israel joint committee for the application of the cultural agreement met in Paris for the second time (see MER 1960, p 296). It was agreed that France and Israel would encourage the study of each other's language and culture throughout the school system. In addition to Israeli measures to this end (the same as detailed in MER 1960, p 296), French secondary school students would be able to choose Hebrew as the first foreign language; the Sorbonne would establish a chair for Jewish studies and Hebrew culture; lectureships in Hebrew and Hebrew culture would be established at the universities of Rennes, Lyons, Toulouse and Montpellier, and a chair in Hebrew at Lille; the University of Strasbourg would train Hebrew teachers for French secondary schools. Joint French-Israel research enterprises and symposiums were to be established in

physics, chemistry and mathematics. The exchange of students was to be encouraged. (*Ha'aretz*, June 4, 7)

French Visitors to Israel included: Edouard Bonnefous, member of the Senate (*Jer. Post*, March 6); Senator Edgar Faure (March) (*Jer. Post*, March 26, 27, 28, April 5); Henri Michel, Inspector-General of Public Education, to lecture under the auspices of the Israel-France Friendship League (May-June) (*Jer. Post*, May 31); Paul Minot, the Mayor of Paris (Nov) (*Jer. Post*, Oct 30, 31, Nov 2, 3); René Mayer, ex-PM and vice-president of the Alliance Israélite Universelle and of the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) (*Jer. Post*, Oct 16, 18, 20, 25); [a number of French scholars, especially in Jewish studies, and scientists] and 50 French students of the "Know Israel" organization, for a month's stay under the auspices of the Histadrut (July). (*Jer. Post*, June 30; *Ha'aretz*, July 17)

Israeli Visitors to France included: Brig. Ezer Weizmann, Commander of the Air Force (March), who met his French counterpart and officials of the Foreign and Defence Ministries (*Ha'aretz*, March 5); Shimon Peres, the Deputy Defence Minister, to visit (with Brig. Weizmann) the International Air Exhibition (May-June) (*Jer. Post*, *Ha'aretz*, June 2); Yohai Bin-Nun, C-in-C. Navy (July), to meet the French Navy Commander (for an exchange of views) (*Jer. Post*, July 4); a delegation from the town of Holon for the declaration of Holon and Suresnes as twin cities (May) (see MER 1960, p 296). (*Ha'aretz*, May 8, 12, 16)

Gestures of Friendship. French and Israel warships exchanged courtesy visits. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 20; *Jer. Post*, Sept 6)

In May a memorial plaque was unveiled on the front of the Hotel de Castille, in Paris, where Theodor Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement, wrote his novel *Altneuland*. Dr Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, the Israeli Ambassador and the Mayor of Paris were present. (*Ha'aretz*, May 16)

In Sept President Ben-Zvi and PM Ben-Gurion congratulated President de Gaulle on the failure of the attempt on his life. De Gaulle thanked them for their good wishes. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 13, 14)

In Oct Israel Friendship Days were held in France — with lectures, performances by dance troupes, an Israeli section in the second biennale of young painters, sales exhibitions in nine cities and the premiere of the film "Exodus." (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 12)

THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Unfavourable GFR Attitude Reported on Diplomatic Relations and Israeli Ties with EEC. [During 1961, in response to Arab pressure, the GFR maintained its policy of not establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. See also MER 1960, pp 180-1.]

On Sept 3 the London *Sunday Telegraph* reported from Tel Aviv that relations with Bonn had cooled after the rejection in July of Israel's application for association with the Common Market on the same terms as Greece owing to West Germany's proposal to refer it for further consideration. Bonn was turning a deaf ear to Israel's approaches for diplomatic relations. Israel, for whose goodwill Dr Adenauer would have been prepared to pay a high price only a few years ago, was now of only secondary importance to Bonn, the report concluded. (*Sunday Telegraph*, London, Sept 3)

An Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman said that, "if somewhat exaggerated, the report also contains some truth." Germany's attitude on both these issues was "not overly friendly", and this had not been received with "complete understanding" on Israel's part. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 4)

In Sept Dr Yahlil, Director-General of the Israel Foreign Ministry, stated that West Germany's attitude to Israel had been "disappointing" recently, but he described the British press reports as "greatly exaggerated." He said that, according to unofficial information, the GFR had raised political objections to Israel's request. "We must assume that Bonn's attitude is dictated by real or presumed interests in the Arab countries," he added. "It is known to us that the Arabs are exerting strong pressure against any positive relationship between Israel and the Market." However, Israel's trade relations with West Germany were "very satisfactory," Dr Yahlil said. (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, München, Sept 16)

A German press report said that in the official GFR view the Reparations Agreement was adequate compensation to Israel, and establishment of diplomatic relations could be postponed indefinitely; the leaders of the opposition German Social Democrats favoured them in the near future, it was reported (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 8). [However, the reported attitude of Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin, the party's candidate for the Premiership, was somewhat equivocal.] He was reported to have told an Israeli correspondent: "The Social Democratic Party is interested in the development of the best possible relations between Germany and Israel, and will act accordingly when it achieves power. I am sure we can find a formula for the normalization of relations between our countries in accordance with the special interests of both." (*Davar*, Aug 21)

On Nov 30 Dr Eliezer F. Shinnar, head of the Israel mission in the GFR, said he would continue to represent Israel in West Germany "until normal diplomatic relations are established," though the Reparations Mission would wind up its affairs in the next six months. (See below, Reparations). (*Jer. Post*, Dec 1)

Contradictory Reports on \$300 million Loan. [In March 1960, following PM Ben-Gurion's meeting with Chancellor Adenauer in New York, reports not confirmed in Israel stated that the latter had promised Israel a \$300 million loan. They were also denied by German official sources, especially by German representatives in the Arab countries (MER 1960, pp 180-1, 290). During 1961 there were new reports that such a loan would be granted when reparations ended; these were also denied.]

On Jan 2 the Israeli press reported that in principle the West German government had agreed to the loan to finance development projects as a continuation of reparations. It would be financed by banks and companies, with a government guarantee, and be granted in ten-year \$30-million instalments, mainly for buying industrial equipment. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 2)

This report was immediately denied by Israeli and GFR official sources. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 3, 4, 5)

However, in Aug Israeli government circles were reported to be "disappointed" with the GFR government's intention to grant the loan not in 1961 or 1962, but only after the completion of reparations in 1963. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 20)

Earlier, on July 13, Chancellor Adenauer was reported to have told the press that GFR aid to the UAR "will not be used for attack against Israel," adding that after

the last reparations had been paid in 1963, "the situation will have to be looked into once again. We will stand by our moral obligations towards Israel." (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, July 14)

Reparations Agreement Nearing End; Growing Income from Personal Restitution. [The GFR-Israel Reparations Agreement signed on Sept 10, 1952, was due to expire in 1965. Israel was granted some DM3450 million (\$850 million) as compensation for material damage suffered by Jews at Nazi hands.] At the end of the year it was reported that orders had been placed for most of the \$150 million still to Israel's credit. Only a skeleton staff would remain at the Israel mission in Cologne. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 1)

Earlier, Israeli and West German official sources declared that the agreement would not be extended. On March 2, Dr Shinnar, the head of the Israel mission, said there would be no new purchase under it after the end of 1962, except for some \$90 million for fuel in \$18.7-million yearly instalments. (*Ha'aretz*, March 3)

Heinrich von Brentano, the GFR Foreign Minister, said in a television interview on June 30: "I believe that nobody thinks of extending the Reparations Agreement. It attempted—certainly not to a sufficient extent, because it is impossible to make good with money what happened during the Third Reich—to make a certain compensation and help start the State of Israel." After the treaty expired relations with Israel would be like those with other countries, he added. "Naturally it will then be decided in each individual case how much we will invest there, how far we encourage private investments and how far we are going to guarantee them," he said. (*Jer. Post*, July 2)

Meanwhile, Israel's income in foreign currency from German restitution payments to individuals markedly increased: from \$70.8 million in 1959 to \$100.6 million in 1960 and \$111.5 million in 1961. (*Bank of Israel, Annual Report 1960, May 1961; Report 1961, May 1962*)

Commercial Relations, Investments and Tourism. The volume of Israeli-West German trade in 1961 was Israeli exports \$24,800,000 and imports \$84,808,000, compared with \$21,107,000 and \$71,934,000 respectively in 1960 (*IFT*, 1961). [This made the GFR Israel's second largest supplier—after the US and before the UK—and its third largest customer after the US and the UK. Israeli imports were largely financed by German reparations.]

It was noted in Israel that reports of the export of vehicles from Germany did not include numbers of Volkswagens and Opels sold to Israel. [These makes were prominent in Israeli car imports.] It was assumed that the companies feared the Arab boycott. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 11)

On Jan 14 it was announced in Stuttgart that certain German cities would grant Israel a loan of DM1.5 million (\$275,000) as a token of goodwill. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 15)

On May 17 it was learnt that municipal councils in Bavaria would buy \$255,000 worth of Israeli bonds. (*Ha'aretz*, May 17)

An agreement between Israel and the GFR to abolish dual taxation was initiated in Sept in Jerusalem. It included other fiscal provisions designed to encourage investments.

West German banks and financial institutions, it was reported, had acquired stock in Israeli companies. Legislation granting investment allowances for enterprises in developing countries had also been enacted in the GFR. Israeli Treasury circles expected an increased flow

of private capital from the GFR as a result. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 3; *Ha'aretz*, Sept 4)

According to a German tourist industry source, about 5000 West German tourists visited Israel in 1960. (*Ha'aretz*, July 20)

Visits: German Youth Groups. [A growing number of West German youth groups visited Israel during the year.] In March a visiting group of the Christian Democratic party's youth movement, headed by a member of Parliament, brought a message from Dr Adenauer, asking Israeli youth to regard the group as messengers of goodwill. It expressed the hope that meetings between German and Israeli youth would contribute towards "the conciliation to which German youth aspires." (*Ha'aretz*, March 5)

Youth hostels in Israel were being built by West German municipalities to "facilitate the visit of German youth and to establish cultural ties with Israeli youth." The Deputy Minister of Education stated in the Knesset on March 22. The Anna Frank House at Tel Hay was the first. (*Ha'aretz*, March 23)

Dr Heinrich Gruber, the Lutheran Surrogate Bishop of Berlin, who appeared for the prosecution in the Eichmann trial, visited Israel in Oct. His stay and his views on Germany were widely reported in the Israel press. On Oct 18, he was received by the President, and the first saplings in a 15,000-tree wood in his name, sponsored by his friends, were planted in the Jerusalem Forest by Dr Gruber and his family. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 19)

Ben-Gurion's Attitude. On April 4, in an interview with a German correspondent, PM Ben-Gurion was quoted as saying that the Eichmann trial would cause no deterioration in relations with the GFR. Dr Adenauer, Willy Brandt and other contemporary German leaders, had nothing in common with the leaders of the Third Reich. "We want the German youth of our days to know what happened; that is why Eichmann should be tried." On April 10, Dr Adenauer said in Bonn that he was thankful for Ben-Gurion's pronouncement. (*Ha'aretz*, April 5, 11)

Arms Sales to GFR Opposed in Knesset. (See also MER 1960, pp 296-7.) At the end of May the London *Observer* reported that West Germany had sold Portugal large quantities of Israeli sten guns for use in Angola.

An Israeli spokesman said that Israel did not manufacture sten guns, nor did she sell them to any country. *Ha'aretz* added that the GFR had bought Israel-made Uzi machine guns.

Shimon Peres, the Deputy Defence Minister who was abroad at the time, said that the sales agreement with Israel allowed the GFR to dispose of the arms as she wished. But, he added, he did not believe the *Observer* report. (*Ha'aretz*, June 1, 2, 4, 5)

The report was officially denied in Bonn. (*Ha'aretz*, June 7, 8)

In Nov, during a debate in the UN Trusteeship Committee, a Czechoslovakian delegate quoted a *New York Times* despatch saying that the West German government had supplied Portugal with 10,000 Israel-made machine guns. The Israeli representative denied the charge. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 8)

On Nov 29 the Communist, Herut and Mapam parties presented motions for a debate in the Knesset protesting against arms sales to Germany (the Communist motion spoke of sales "to Hitler's generals"). The Knesset decided not to debate the issue. Achdut Ha'avodah, which belonged to the coalition, abstained. Its spokesman

explained that it opposed the sale of arms to Germany and reserved the right (under the coalition agreement) to abstain in the Knesset on this issue. (*Diorei Haknesset*, Nov 27-29, pp 496-500)

Israel's Security and East-West Tension Over Germany. Relations with Germany were also debated after the formation of the new Israeli government on Nov 2. Menachem Begin, the Herut leader, argued that as there was serious tension between the GFR and Eastern Europe, especially the USSR, who suspected the GFR's intentions and her renewed military power, Israel should not be involved in this delicate situation. Since Soviet Russia's policy in the ME was inimical to Israel she should be extremely careful not to increase this hostility. The Knesset had been assured, Begin continued, that Israel's security was involved, as Germany would supply arms "of a third dimension, which cannot be seen on the surface." Everybody had taken this to mean submarines but Germany had not delivered any. Begin said that even in the US a reappraisal was taking place, the GFR being regarded as a main factor in world tension and Nazism as deeply rooted in the German spirit. Why, therefore, he asked, should Israel be the only country to have no apprehensions regarding Germany?

In answer, PM Ben-Gurion reiterated his stand of 1959 and 1960 (MER 1960, p 291), namely, that "this is not the same Germany: Adenauer's Germany is not Hitler's Germany." Moreover, he added, Germany, like Britain and France, was no longer a world power. "I do not believe the anti-German propaganda emanating from the Eastern bloc," he declared. "I wish to tell the people who assume that there is only one country prepared to sell us arms [France] that this country is an ally of Germany," he said. President de Gaulle certainly remembered the past, but he knew "that France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US must stand together to safeguard peace." Begin's arguments were those of East Germany and her allies, while "I may be permitted to take care of Israel's needs and interests and true peace in the world." (*Diorei Haknesset*, Oct 30, Nov 2, pp 207-8, 249)

Opposition to Cultural Relations with Germany. On June 22 it was learned that the Ministry of Education had sent a teachers' delegation to West Germany, among other countries, to study vocational training methods. (*Ha'aretz*, June 22, 23)

On June 25 the matter was discussed in the Cabinet: FM Golda Meir reportedly admitted that the timing might have been inopportune. The majority of ministers, it was reported, opposed the despatch of the delegation, but PM Ben-Gurion argued that relations with Germany must not differ from relations with other countries. At a press conference, Abba Eban, the Minister of Education, maintained that Israeli government policy was to foster contacts with the GFR. (*Ha'aretz*, June 26, July 2)

There were adverse reactions in the Israeli press. *Hatzofeh* deplored the sending of the delegation during the Eichmann trial, "to imbibe the pedagogical theories of the people of murderers" (June 26). *Ha'aretz* castigated the government for "this harsh assault on the feelings and memories of the people" (July 3). *Lamer-Aav* called the step "a grave mistake" (July 2).

On Nov 28 Eban said, in reply to a Knesset question, that the decision to include West Germany in the delegation's itinerary was taken on the recommendation of the Foreign Ministry in response to an invitation in the

name of the President of the GFR. (*Diorei Haknesset* Nov 27-29, p 494)

On Oct 10 Dr Dickman, a German pastor, visited a class in a Jerusalem high school. The matter was raised in the Knesset on Oct 18 by a Herut spokesman who argued against cultural ties with Germany. Eban then replied that German visitors were not banned from Israeli educational, scientific and cultural institutions. His Ministry had agreed to the school visit of Dr Dickman who had been warmly recommended by the Foreign Ministry, as he had been active in anti-Nazi efforts in Germany.

The Knesset decided by 28 votes (Herut, Mapam, Achdut Ha'avodah and the Communists against Mapai), with many abstentions, to hold a debate on the subject of German visitors to Israeli schools. (*Ier. Post*, Oct 19)

Knesset Debate on Cultural Relations with Germany. The debate took place on Jan 2, 3 and 9, 1962; most speakers dealt with Israeli-German relations in general. Herut, Communists, Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel members, and an NRP member, declared that the German people had no changed since Nazi times and that there should be no cultural relations at all with Germany. Mapai supported relations, while the Liberals, Mapam and Achdut Ha'avodah took positions between these two views. Following are some views expressed:

Avraham Drori (Herut) declared that "another Germany exists only in the imagination of one man in this house" and quoted the Attorney-General in the Eichmann trial, who stated that the Jews would never forget or forgive the murderers. He asked how the schools could explain the Holocaust to the pupils if they were faced with a German telling them of "the good children in Germany."

Menachem Begin, the Herut leader, quoting from Luther among others, argued that the German people as a whole, not just the Nazis, was responsible for the Holocaust, and there must be no cultural relations with them.

Mordechai Nurock (NRP) who made the same point, added that the German teachers were among those who bore the prime responsibility.

Moshe Sneh (Communist) quoted from German textbooks to show that West-German schools treated the Nazi period sympathetically and slurred over its horrors.

Ya'acov Katz (Poalei Agudat Israel) said that even if for "political, security and economic reasons" relations with Germany were necessary, there must be no cultural ties; "the people cannot accept this."

Jona Kesne (Mapai) argued that, though strong Nazi tendencies existed in Germany, there were also weaker anti-Nazi trends, and suggested that Israel should encourage the latter, both for humanitarian reasons and because of Israel's specific and vital interests in relations with Germany "which cannot be detailed here." Why should Israel assume, he asked, that the Israelis would be influenced by the Germans and not vice-versa?

Another Mapai speaker, Meir Argov, argued that while trying to impress knowledge of the Holocaust on the youth, Israel must be very careful not to foster racial hate. To guard against this danger there should be personal contact with such Germans as Pastor Dickman.

Both Kesne and Moshe Kol (Liberal) called for a distinction in relations between states and relations between peoples. Kol said that there could be no normal relations between the generation responsible for the Holocaust and the generation that was its victim, though

he did not argue that there was collective responsibility and that present-day Germany was "the continuation of Nazi Germany." However, there was as yet no "new Germany"; for instance, many thousands of Nazis were still in official positions. Israel should therefore act "naturally" according to the circumstances; if German youth wished to visit Israel and see Yad Vashem, the memorial to the Holocaust, this should be permitted, but there was no need to grant Germany a "certificate of purity."

Emma Talmi (Mapam), who similarly opposed both "the Israel policy of wholesale forgiveness" and "collective punishment," advocated a policy of "no arms sales, no teacher delegations, no cultural ties" but formal relations only. She also said that the commandment "to remember everything and to forget nothing" included those Germans who opposed Hitler and were friendly to the Jews. These should be invited to Israeli schools.

Similar views were expressed by Israel Bar-Yehuda (Achdut Ha'avodah).

Herut, the Communists and Agudat Israel submitted resolutions to terminate all cultural relations with Germany (the Communist proposal read: the German Federal Republic). The Liberal's resolution followed the lines of Kol's speech (above). All these proposals were rejected and the Knesset adopted a government resolution, given below. (*Divrei Hakeseset*, Jan 1-3, 1962, pp 850-64; Jan 8-10, pp 902-12)

Ruling on Cultural Relations. On Jan 9, at the end of the debate, the Knesset "took note of" the following rulings on cultural relations with Germany, presented by the Minister of Education:

Israel may participate in international events in Germany and vice versa. "Suitable" visits by Germans, particularly young persons, would be permitted.

An inter-ministerial committee would choose suitable representatives to disseminate information in Germany. No Germans would be allowed to perform in Israel or Israelis in Germany, insofar as the government was responsible. The inter-ministerial committee would decide on Israeli participation in artistic events in Germany to which an Israeli body was invited.

Study in Germany would not be encouraged and no foreign currency would be allocated for the purpose. German scholarships would not be accepted. Advanced study in Germany would be permitted only where it was vital to the state; technicians would be allowed to study in German plants only in connection with the operation of equipment bought in Germany.

The establishment of branches of German institutions, companies or organizations in Israel would not be permitted but contributions to philanthropic institutions where the contributors took no part in management would be allowed.

Public organizations and institutions invited to send delegations to Germany or wishing to invite Germans, would receive government guidance according to these rulings. (*Divrei Hakeseset*, Jan 8-10, 1962, pp 907, 911-2)

GREECE

Visitors, Gestures of Friendship. In Jan Giorgios Mavros, MP, a former minister, visited Israel as guest of the Knesset and the Foreign Ministry. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 3; *Jer. Post*, Jan 12)

In July two Israeli atomic scientists were invited to participate in the dedication of Greece's atomic reactor. (*Ha'aretz*, July 30)

In Aug a group of 22 Greek scouts participated in the Israeli Jamboree on Mount Carmel. (*Jer. Post*, Aug 2)

In Oct the Municipality of Argostolion in Cephalonia named a street after Israel, in honour of the help extended by the Israel Navy in the 1953 earthquake. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 15)

On Oct 17 two Israel Navy torpedo boats paid an unofficial visit to Rhodes. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 23)

In Dec Princess Georges of Greece spent nine days in Israel as guest of the Foreign Ministry. She was received by the President. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 26, 29, 31)

In Dec P. Markis, SG of the Greek Labour Confederation, and C. Laskaris, director of its Foreign Relations Department, visited Israel as guests of the Histadrut. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 28, 31)

In Dec the Greek champion basketball team, the Panathinaikos of Athens, visited Israel. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 8)

Trade, Economic Ties. The volume of Israeli-Greek trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$3,142,000; imports \$1,954,000. In 1960 the figures were \$3,026,000 and \$1,074,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

In Jan it was reported that Israel was offering Greece cooperation in solar power patents and fertilizer techniques. (*Athens Daily Post*, Jan 6)

In Sept an Israeli pavilion was dedicated by the Greek Minister of Commerce, L. Dertilis, at the 26th International Exhibition in Salonika. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 8)

In Oct Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd., Haifa, completed the erection of an ammonia storage plant in Greece at the border of the Hellenic Chemical Products and Fertilizers Co. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 15)

Question of Restitution Bill. The Israel government protested to the Greek government against its intention to limit German restitution payments to Greek citizens, thus depriving of compensation many Jews in Israel who suffered under the Nazi occupation in Greece. Under an agreement signed on March 18, West Germany was to pay Greece an over-all sum of DM115m. (*Jer. Post*, March 19)

A Foreign Ministry official who had gone to Athens in connection with this matter said on his return that, in response to the Israeli approach, the Greek government was reconsidering its decision and the matter was to be brought before parliament. [No further developments were reported in 1961.] (*Jer. Post*, June 22)

ITALY

Restitution Negotiations. Israel conducted negotiations with Italy on behalf of Israelis who were citizens of Nazi-occupied countries during the Second World War and eligible for restitution under the 1960 agreement under which Germany made a lump sum payment to Italy, to be distributed at the latter's discretion. An Israeli Foreign Ministry source said the negotiations were marked by mutual understanding. (*Jer. Post*, June 22)

Economic Relations. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Italian trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$12,067,000 and imports \$13,925,000, compared with \$10,578,000 and \$13,654,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

The Israeli-Italian trade agreement was renewed [on Feb 3]. The volume of trade was not limited. (*ICYB*, 1961/62)

Israel was the only ME country to participate in the 63rd International Agricultural Fair at Verona. (*Jer. Post*, March 13, 17)

On June 5, following negotiations conducted in Israel by a mission from the Italian Ministry of Finance, an agreement was initiated to avoid double taxation on legacies. It was expected to encourage Italian capital investments. (*Ha'aretz*, June 4, 6)

In Aug an Italian economic survey delegation toured Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 15)

In Sept goods from Italy were exhibited at the International Exhibition of Applied Arts in Tel Aviv. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 14)

In the same month the Italian Minister of Commerce, Emilio Colombo, opened the Israel pavilion at the Levant Fair in Bari. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 13, 22)

On Oct 24 a 25-man delegation of Italian businessmen and industrialists arrived in Israel for a 10-day visit organized by the Italy-Israel Chamber of Commerce of Milan. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 25)

On Oct 25 Israel and Italy signed an agreement to avoid double taxation of incomes. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 26)

Following an Israeli complaint to GATT, Italy agreed to lift restrictions on Israeli exports. (*Ha'aretz*, March 2; *Kol Israel*, Dec 17 [W 21])

Visitors and Various Contacts. An Italian archeological expedition continued excavations at Caesarea for the third season. (*Jer. Post*, March 3)

On March 23 a radio-telephone service between Italy and Israel was inaugurated by the Ministers of Posts of the two countries. (*Ha'aretz*, March 24)

On April 4 Giovanni Laona, Speaker of the Italian Parliament, arrived in Israel with his family for a one-day visit to the holy places in Galilee. (*Ha'aretz*, April 5)

In July a delegation from Livorno visited Israel, when Livorno and Bat Yam (Israel) were declared twin cities. (*Ha'aretz*, July 17, 25; *Jer. Post*, July 25, 26)

On Aug 23, the centenary of the Italian Risorgimento, *War of the Sons of Light*, by the Israeli playwright Moshe Shamir, was staged in Pisa. President Giovanni Gronchi attended. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 25)

On Oct 28 the Italian Minister of Finance, Mr Giuseppe Trabucchi, arrived for a ten-day private visit. He met PM Ben-Gurion and other cabinet members. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, Oct 29)

Italy played Israel at soccer in Ramat Gan (Israel) in Oct, and in Turin in Nov; the Italians won on both occasions. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 12, 30; Nov 2)

MALTA

At the suggestion of Dominic Mintoff, leader of the Malta Labour Party, at the Socialist International Congress in Rome in Oct, a survey mission composed of representatives of the Socialist Parties of Israel, West Germany and Sweden visited Malta to report on the island's demand for independence.

[The State of Malta was brought into being on March 3, 1962.] (*Jer. Post*, Nov 25, Dec 12; *IGFO/WNB*, No. 33, Nov)

In April the SG of the Maltese General Workers Union, J.A. Kingswell, and its Treasurer, J.C. Camilleri, visited Israel. (*Jer. Post*, April 13, 14)

THE NETHERLANDS

Various Contacts, Gestures of Friendship. In Sept the Netherlands Ambassador in Jerusalem told the press that the Netherlands War Graves Commission would shortly publish 38 volumes containing names and particulars of over 115,000 Dutch nationals, of whom about

100,000 were Jews, who perished during the war but whose place of burial was unknown. Copies would be presented to Yad Vashem (the Israel Memorial Authority). (*Jer. Post*, Sept 13; *Ha'aretz*, Nov 14)

In Nov the Municipality of Utrecht presented a booklet on Israel to the graduates of the city's elementary schools. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 15)

In March, 26 marchers from the Netherlands took part in the annual four-day route march to Jerusalem (*Jer. Post*, March 14; *Ha'aretz*, March 13). In July 78 Israelis, soldiers and civilians took part in the traditional four-day route march in the Netherlands (*Jer. Post*, July 23, 30, Aug 4; *Ha'aretz*, July 26, Aug 4). [The Israeli march was instituted several years previously on the Dutch pattern.]

Attempt to Help Moroccan Jews. On May 24 the Netherlands FM, Dr Joseph Luna, said that no success was expected for the Netherlands initiative to ameliorate the situation of the 250,000 Jews in Morocco [who had been subjected to restrictions and violence since Jan]. He advocated further Netherlands steps in the UN. (*Ha'aretz*, May 26)

Restitution for Israelis. Israel conducted negotiations with the Netherlands government on behalf of Israelis who were citizens of Nazi-occupied countries during the Second World War and eligible for restitution under the 1960 agreement under which Germany had made a lump sum payment to the Netherlands, to be distributed by the latter. (*Jer. Post*, June 22)

Military Contacts. In Feb Brigadier Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff, visited the Netherlands. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 23)

In May the Netherlands State Secretary of Defence, Lt.-Gen. Martinus R.H. Calmeijer, visited Israel for ten days as the guest of the Ministry of Defence to study Israeli experience with the French-made AMX light tanks, which his country had ordered recently, and the use of the Israel-made Uzi submachine gun, which the Netherlands was considering buying. He was received by PM Ben-Gurion (also Minister of Defence) and met Shimon Peres, the Deputy Defence Minister.

On Aug 1 the Netherlands ordered from Israel over 100,000 Uzi submachine guns. Half the order was to be delivered by the summer of 1962 and the rest in 1963. (*Ha'aretz*, May 11; *Jer. Post*, May 19, 22, Aug 2)

Economic Relations; Dutch Credits. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israeli-Dutch trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$12,843,000; imports \$23,813,000. In 1960 the figures were \$12,414,000 and \$23,460,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

On Jan 26 the cornerstone for Israel's first shipyard was laid at the Kishon harbour, Haifa Bay. The Dutch firm of De Schelde was to invest \$500,000, do the planning and provide technical assistance. Dutch banks were expected to advance loans totalling \$4m, and the Israel government was to invest £116 million (*Kol Israel* in E, Jan 26 [W, Feb 2]). Further negotiations were conducted by Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the Israeli Minister of Transport, and Dr H.A. Korthals, his Dutch counterpart, in Amsterdam in March. (*Ha'aretz*, March 17)

The Rotterdam shipping company of Phs. Van Ommen announced on Feb 23 that it would no longer act as agents for Zim, the Israel Navigation Co. The firm said this step was due to conflicting commercial interests arising out of Zim's expansion, and not to

reported UAR pressure. (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 24; *Jer. Post*, Feb 24, 26)

In Oct it was learned that favourable credit terms—\$10 million to \$15 million for ten years,—obtained by Israel from the Holland Shipbuilding Association for the construction of twelve 3,000 ton freighters, were largely due to the backing of the Dutch government. As a result, the Netherlands would now become Israel's main supplier of shipping. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 4; *Jer. Post*, Oct 17)

On May 8 an official Dutch delegation arrived in Israel to discuss cooperation in the diamond industry (*Ha'aretz*, May 9, 12, 17). It was later learned that the delegation had expressed misgivings as to government support for the Israeli diamond industry, which, they said, created an unhealthy competitive situation. The delegation's views met with understanding, it was reported. (*Haboker*, Aug 13)

Visitors. In April Derek Roemers, President of the Dutch Trades Union movement, and his wife spent three weeks in Israel as guests of the Histadrut. (*Jer. Post*, April 25)

In April Peter de Vries, SG of the International Transport Workers' Federation, and H. J. Kanne, President of the Dutch Transport Union, attended the meeting of the Federation's executive in Herzliya, Israel. (*Jer. Post*, April 10)

Israeli Stand on West New Guinea. On Nov 27, during the UN General Assembly discussion of the West New Guinea problem, Michael Comay, the Israeli representative, said that though Israel supported direct negotiations in any dispute, the government of Israel did not believe that two countries could decide by bargaining the fate of a third country. The principle of self-determination must be respected, he added, and the final say must rest with the inhabitants of West New Guinea (*A/PV 1066*, Nov 27). (For Israel's voting on the issue, see p 29.)

PORTUGAL

Portugal Criticizes Israel's Stand on Angola. On Jan 3, 1962 the Portuguese FM, Dr Alberto Franco Nogueira, was reported to have told an Israeli correspondent that Portugal was very disappointed with Israel's attitude on the Angola question in the UN (Israel voted for the Afro-Asian draft resolution on the subject—see p 14). Israel, together with the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs, he said, "accused us of genocide and endangering the peace. The Israeli delegation alone charged us with racial discrimination... I do not criticize the Israel government, but your African policy is aimed at gaining the sympathy of young states." Israel needed Western, not African, support in case of an Arab attack, he declared. The Arab countries, he added, had also adopted an unsympathetic attitude to Portugal, but they disclosed a certain understanding and usually kept silent, "while Israel also speaks against us."

Portugal did not recognize Israel *de jure*, he said, according to the correspondent, because "Portuguese public opinion would not agree to our recognizing those who vote against us; politics is not philanthropy, my dear friend, it is give and take." (*Lamherav; Yediot Aharonot*, Jan 4, 1962)

[There was an Israel Consulate-General in Lisbon; Portugal had never established any representation in Israel.]

Israel Refuses to Sell Arms to Portugal. The Angola issue came up in Israel also in connection with the re-

ported appearance of Israeli Uzzi submachine guns in the possession of Portuguese soldiers in Angola.

In Sept it was officially denied that there were any Israel arms in Angola. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 21)

On Nov 28 Shimon Peres, Deputy Defence Minister, stated in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that Israel had not supplied Portugal with arms, directly or indirectly, and that the government had taken steps to ensure that Israel-made arms were not supplied to Portugal by a third party.

The next day, Peres stated in the Knesset, in reply to questions, that the Belgian Fabrique Nationale (FN) which was producing Uzzi guns on licence, had applied for permission to sell them to Portugal, and he read a letter to the company saying that "the Israel Foreign Ministry categorically objects, in accordance with the policy of the Israel government, to the supply of these arms to Portugal... Israel does not wish arms to be supplied to areas of international tension or to colonialist states engaged in suppressing national movements fighting for freedom." FN had stated, Peres continued, that it had supplied no Uzzi guns to Portugal, and experience had shown that the company's communications were completely trustworthy. He also said that Israel had earlier categorically rejected a direct Portuguese request for the sale of these arms. (*Divrei Haknesset*, Nov 27-29, p 508-10)

(There were also allegations that the arms had been supplied to Portugal by Western Germany. See above: German Federal Republic.)

Trade: According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Portuguese trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$291,000 and imports \$4,708,000, compared with \$740,000 and \$3,547,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

SCANDINAVIA

(During May, Mrs Golda Meir, the Israel FM, visited Scandinavia and Iceland.)

In June it was learned that negotiations were being conducted with Denmark and Norway on behalf of Israelis who were citizens of these countries during the Second World War under Nazi occupation and eligible for restitution under the 1960 agreement under which Germany made a lump sum payment to these countries. A Foreign Ministry source stated that sincere efforts were being made by Denmark and Norway to arrive at an equitable solution. (*Jer. Post*, June 22)

DENMARK

Israeli Foreign Minister Visits Denmark. Mrs Golda Meir, the Israeli FM, visited Denmark from May 29 to June 6—the last three days unofficially—on a tour of Scandinavian countries (*Jer. Post*, June 6, 7). She was received by King Frederik IX, laid a wreath on the memorial to Danish resistance fighters, and held talks with PM Viggo Kampmann and FM Jens Otto Krag.

FM Krag stated that "deep mutual understanding exists between Israel and Denmark." Speaking at a state banquet, Mrs Meir said that Israel was proud to think of the Danish nation as a friend, and was grateful for its help and support. She recalled the evidence given at the Eichmann trial on the Danish underground's aid to the Jews during the Nazi occupation.

At an earlier news conference, Mrs Meir said that Israel was anxious to have some kind of association with any European market group, as most of her trade was

with Europe. The Danish FM replied that Denmark was ready to help Israel in any way. (IGPO/WNB, No. 10, May)

On June 3 Mrs Meir lectured at Copenhagen, under the auspices of the Danish-Israel Friendship League, on "Problems of Developing Countries." (Ha'aretz, June 4)

Various Contacts; Gestures of Friendship. In June an Israel-Danish Friendship Association was established in Jerusalem. (Ha'aretz, June 28)

On Oct 5 a ceremony was held in Israel to mark the rescue of Danish Jewry by the Danish people, with Swedish cooperation, in Oct 1943. There was also a religious service on Mount Zion, at which a prayer was offered in memory of King Christian X. (Jer. Post, Oct 5, 6, Nov 1)

On Nov 9 Paul Daniel Steenberger, the first resident Danish Ambassador to Israel, presented his credentials. (Ha'aretz, Nov 10)

On Nov 29 it was announced that PM Viggo Kampmann would visit Israel from Jan 10-16, 1962. (Ha'aretz, Nov 30)

On Dec 28 the Danish Ambassador opened an exhibition dedicated to the Danish philosopher Soeren Kierkegaard in Tel Aviv. (Jer. Post, Dec 29)

Trade. The volume of Israel-Denmark trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$2,628,000; imports \$2,562,000, compared with \$2,368,000 and \$3,208,000 respectively in 1960. (IFT, 1961)

FINLAND, ICELAND

Finland. The planned visit to Finland of Mrs Meir, the Israel FM, during her Scandinavian tour had to be cancelled on account of the sudden death on May 16 of the Finnish FM, Ralf Törngren. (IGPO/WNB, No. 10, May)

On Feb 17 a Finnish delegation signed a trade agreement in Jerusalem providing for mutual most-favoured-nation treatment and listing the goods to be exchanged. Payments were to be settled in convertible currency. The Israel government ratified the agreement on March 26. (Ha'aretz, March 27; Kivvi Amana, 418)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Finland trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$3,344,000; imports \$10,455,000, compared with \$3,120,000 and \$8,752,000 respectively in 1960. (IFT, 1961)

An Israel Week was held in Finland in Oct; exhibitions of Israeli products were arranged in four cities. (Ella Suomen Sanomat, Lahti, Oct 17)

Iceland. Mrs Meir, the Israel FM, visited Iceland during her Scandinavian tour from May 17 to 22. She held talks with FM Gudmundur Gudmundsson who stressed that relations between Israel and Iceland had always been extremely cordial, and lunched with President Asgeir Asgeirsson. She left Iceland on May 22. (IFPO/WNB, No. 10, May; Ha'aretz, May 19)

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Iceland trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$141,000; imports \$253,000. In 1960 exports were \$1,235,000 and imports nil. (IFT, 1961)

NORWAY

Visit of Israel FM. From May 12 to 17 Mrs Meir, the Israel FM, visited Norway. The Norwegian FM, Halvard Lange, said at a dinner on May 12: "We feel convinced that the modern and democratic State of Israel has an important part to play on the world scene, a part which

in the long run can be successfully performed only in cooperation with the neighbouring states."

Mrs Meir met Mrs Aase Bjerkholt, Minister of Family and Consumer Affairs, held talks with FM Lange, and was received by PM Einar Gerhardsen. The talks, described by Mrs Meir at a press conference as "highly satisfactory," touched on the general international situation, UN problems and relations with developing countries. "I was extremely fortunate to be the recipient of all the goodwill which there is among the people of Norway towards the people of Israel," Mrs Meir said. An official communiqué was released on May 16.

In her public appearances, Mrs Meir dwelt mostly on Israel's wish for peace with the Arabs and her cooperation with the African countries.

She was received on May 15 by King Olav, and was the dinner guest of the Speaker of Parliament, N. Langhale. On the following day she was the guest of honour at the Royal Palace, when King Olav took the salute at the National Day parade, and attended a luncheon given by Arne Skaug, Minister of Foreign Trade. (IGPO/WNB, No. 10, May; Ha'aretz, May 14, 16; Jer. Post, May 17)

Norwegian Premier Visits Israel. PM Einar Gerhardsen officially visited Israel on Nov 15-22 (Ha'aretz, Oct 2, Nov 16). He had talks with President Ben-Zvi, FM Ben-Gurion and the FM, and toured the country, being welcomed by the mayors of the principal cities, and leaders of the Histadrut and Mapai (the Israel Labour party). He attended a session of the Knesset and planted a tree in the King Haakon Forest, established in memory of Norway's late king. (Ha'aretz, Nov 17, 20, 22; Jer. Post, Nov 19, 21)

At a dinner on Nov 16, PM Ben-Gurion called him a "worthy representative and leader of a people that loves peace and the liberties of men and nations... a people that has always shown sincere friendship not only in word, but also in deed, to our people and our country." PM Gerhardsen said: "The prominent place which the idea of cooperation has gained [in Israel] indicates a more comprehensive democracy than the one which has materialized in most of the democratic countries." Norway and Israel were both interested in "a state of international justice and security, which will enable us to unite our resources in constructive work for peace. This would also serve the interests of the developing countries, which both Israel and Norway consider it important to help." (IGPO/WNB, No. 34, Nov)

At a farewell dinner given in Jerusalem by Gerhardsen on Nov 21, Ben-Gurion paid a warm tribute to the visitors. PM Gerhardsen replied: "We are particularly grateful for the human contact which we feel we have obtained with the people of Israel, who met us with spontaneous sympathy. A deep impression we carry with us is the national melting-pot process... The fact that a process of this kind can succeed is of extreme importance, not only for Israel but also for the rest of the world, because it demonstrates that language obstacles and social inequality can be overcome provided that there are faith and the will to succeed. It is assuring to know that the democratic labour movement is presented in such a manner in this part of the world." (IGPO/WNB, No. 34, Nov; Ha'aretz; Jer. Post, Nov 22)

Talks: "No Problems." At a press conference on Nov 21, PM Gerhardsen described his talks with Israel government leaders as "general"; there were no problems in the relations between the two countries, he added.

A suggestion by Israel officials for Israeli seamen to be trained in Norway would be taken up by the maritime organizations of the two nations. The efforts of Israel and Norway to cooperate with the emerging nations had been discussed in a general way, and more concrete talks on the subject might take place soon. He declined to comment on ME affairs and the Suez blockade. He invited PM Ben-Gurion to visit Norway. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 22, 23; *IGPO/WNB*, No. 34, Nov)

Lecturing in Oslo in Dec, PM Gerhardsen said it would be good if the Arab nations adopted a realistic attitude towards Israel, for she was a living, positive fact and would continue to exist and develop. Arab-Israel peace would be a blessing to both parties and the whole area. Israel was an example of a free democratic state and could help the Arab nations solve their problems. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 14)

Economic Ties: Proposed Cooperation in Aid to New Countries. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Norway trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$1,985,000; imports \$3,400,000. In 1960 the figures were \$1,573,000 and \$2,235,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

On March 14 Arne Skaug, the Norwegian Minister of Commerce and Shipping, arrived in Israel for a week's official visit at the head of an economic delegation. A joint communiqué issued on March 21 said that there was room to enlarge mutual trade, and it was agreed to hold formal negotiations in June for the renewal of the trade agreement. Economic and technical aid to developing countries was discussed and possibilities of Norwegian-Israeli cooperation—especially exchange of information—in these fields noted. Further study was to follow FM Golda Meir's visit to Norway (see above).

The problem of Israel's relations with the European Free Trade Area was also discussed.

Skaug told the press that Norway insisted that ships of all countries must be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal. He had told the press the same thing in Cairo before leaving for Israel. (*Jer. Post*, March 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22; *Ha'aretz*, March 22, 23)

On June 15 a commercial and payments agreement was signed in Oslo, superseding the agreements of 1953 and 1955. Trade restrictions and the clearing agreement were abolished; payments would be made in free and convertible currency. A joint economic committee was established. (*Kitvei Amanah*, 421)

On March 26 a 600 ton deep-sea trawler, *Az-Gud*, to be operated by Israeli fishermen under a Norwegian master, was delivered by a Norwegian yard to a Canadian-Israeli group. (*Jer. Post*, March 13; *Ha'aretz*, March 26)

In Sept goods from Norway were exhibited at the International Exhibition of Applied Arts in Tel Aviv. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 14)

SWEDEN

Israel Foreign Minister Visits Sweden. FM Golda Meir visited Sweden from May 7 to 12. Her official programme included an audience with King Gustav Adolf, and talks with PM Erlander and FM Uden. She also was a guest of the Stockholm Municipality, the Cooperative Federation and the Trade Union Federation. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, May 8, 10, 11)

Visits, Gestures of Friendship. In May it was reported that the Swedish Fund for Israeli Children had raised

hundreds of thousands of dollars and established youth hostels in Youth Aliya villages in Israel. The Israel-Swedish Friendship Association maintained links between Sweden and these hostels. (*Jer. Post*, May 7)

In June an exhibition of Swedish industrial arts was held at the International Cultural Centre for Youth in Jerusalem. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 13, June)

Starting on July 1, Swedish citizens were exempted from the need for prior entry visas to Israel. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 10, May)

Abba Eban, the Minister of Education, represented Israel at Dag Hammarskjöld's funeral at Uppsala and discussed scientific cooperation with Swedish institutions. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 9; *Jer. Post*, Oct 15)

Arne Geijer, president of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the ICFTU, was a guest of the Histadrut in April. He explained the Swedish Transport Workers' Union's reversal of its decision to boycott Egyptian shipping in connection with the Egyptian closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli trade (see MER 1960, p 41, 298) as due to its discovery that such a boycott was against the law, and the shippers would have brought the matter before the labour court. Dag Hammarskjöld had nothing to do with it, he declared. (*Jer. Post*, April 6)

Other visitors from Sweden included: Mrs Inge Thorsson of the Stockholm Municipality, to study Israel's educational programmes for students from developing countries (Jan) (*Ma'ariv*, Jan 27); a six-man delegation of the Swedish Wood Workers' Union (Sept) (*Jer. Post*, Sept 22, Oct 6) and a five-man delegation of the Swedish Cooperative Federation (Oct), both groups as guest of the Histadrut. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 6)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Sweden trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$4,267,000; imports \$7,740,000. In 1960 the figures were \$4,663,000 and \$7,442,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

SPAIN

[Israel and Spain had no diplomatic or consular relations, although Spain had a consulate in Jerusalem to look after the interests of Spanish institutions and citizens.] The Israeli writer Natan Bialitzky was named correspondent of the Barcelona Academy of Literature for his Hebrew translation of *Don Quixote*. The translation was studied by Prof. Milas Valeriusa, an authority on Hebrew literature, who had translated the Hebrew poetry of Bialik into Spanish. (*Jer. Post*, June 18)

A radio-telephone service was opened between Spain and Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 4)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Spanish trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$147,000; imports \$178,000. In 1960 the figures were \$528,000 and \$90,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

SWITZERLAND

Question of Heirless Assets in Swiss Banks. (Background Note.) The following is the background to this issue, which was not solved during the year, as given in the Israeli press.

During the Hitler period European Jews managed to transfer some of their funds and valuables to Swiss banks and safe deposits. Since this was illegal, and involved great risk, the owners used fictitious names and addresses, in many cases only code numbers.

After the war the Allies held a conference on repa-

rations in Paris. The "Final Act" of the conference stipulated that the unclaimed assets, in neutral countries, of victims of Nazi persecution should be made available for the rehabilitation of non-repatriable survivors. An Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees was empowered to administer the funds thus collected and was directed to work through "appropriate public and private field organizations."

On June 14, 1946, an agreement for the distribution of the funds was signed. It recognized that a majority of the survivors referred to in the "Final Act" were Jews and provided that 95 per cent of the heirless funds were to be allocated for their resettlement.

Shortly afterwards, the American Joint Distribution Committee (which was set up after World War I to meet Jewish needs in war-devastated Eastern Europe) and the Jewish Agency were designated as the appropriate field organizations to administer the rehabilitation of the Jewish victims.

In May 1946 the head of the Swiss delegation negotiating with the Allies stated in a letter to the Allied governments that his government would "examine sympathetically" the question of how to put the heirless property at their disposal. However, all approaches to the Swiss government proved fruitless; it explained that the Swiss banks were opposed to any step that might undermine their traditional policy of strict secrecy.

Following requests by the two Jewish organizations, the government of Israel intervened with the Swiss government in March 1954. (In the summer of 1950, the Director of the International Refugee Organization—the successor to the Inter-Government Committee—in a letter to the Five Powers, noted that the Israel government had undertaken to resettle many of the survivors and that it had a moral right to claim the heirless property.)

The Israel approaches had no noticeable result until March 16, 1959, when the Federal Minister for Justice made a statement in the Swiss Bundestag to the effect that a law was being drafted providing for the ascertainment of heirless property in Switzerland. (*Jer. Post*, May 4, Sept 6)

Bill on Heirless Property Drafted. In June, 1961 the Swiss Ministry circulated a draft bill on the matter among various parties concerned. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 6)

On July 5 Dr Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress, the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, suggested amendments to the bill in meetings with Friedrich Wahlen, the Swiss President, and Ludwig von Moos, head of the Ministry of Justice and Police (*Ha'aretz*, July 6, Sept 10). An Israel Foreign Ministry official went to Switzerland to study the bill there. (*Ha'aretz*, July 11)

The Israeli press commented that the draft bill left responsibility to the banks, which were to decide which of their accounts were affected. Even if the banks could be relied upon to act according to the highest motives, it was argued, how could they decide whether in fact a deposit belonged to a "foreign national or stateless person who suffered religious or racial persecution?"

It was also pointed out that the draft bill made no reference to the 1946 Allied arrangement, but called upon the Federal Assembly, once all the property was collected, to "regulate" its use, "taking account of the origin of the monies." The latter phrase was described as rather vague. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 27; *Jer. Post*, Sept 6)

[No reports on further developments were received during the year.]

Various Contacts, Visa Agreement. From Nov 2 Swiss nationals were not required to present entry visas to Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 5). [There was no reciprocity.]

In April a study group of the Swiss List Society visited Israel. They met Ministers [and agreed with Israel banks and research institutions on cooperation in economic and social research, and showed interest in investment opportunities.] (*Jer. Post*, April 21)

In April it was announced that the Swiss Government would help to finance the training of 17 Israeli foremen in Switzerland under the patronage of the Israel government, the ILO and ORT, within the Swiss government's technical assistance programme. (*Jer. Post*, April 21, 23)

In Nov three professors from Basel University were declared Honorary Fellows of the Weizmann Institute, Rehovot. (*Basler Nachrichten*, Basel, Nov 17)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Swiss trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$13,734,000; imports \$19,660,000. In 1960 the figures were \$12,045,000 and \$21,126,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

UNITED KINGDOM

Supply of Centurion Tanks. On Feb 2 the British Foreign Office announced that Centurion tanks were being supplied to Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 3)

Earlier, Reuter stated, quoting informed sources in London, that this was a fulfilment of a 1958 decision to sell Israel a limited number of tanks, in accordance with Britain's policy of supplying reasonable quantities of arms to Middle East states for legitimate defence needs. The three-year delay in fulfilling the contract was normal. The British government was still in favour of great restraint in the delivery of arms to the Middle East area. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 1). [For Arab reaction see *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 1; see also p 191 a.]

On Feb 10, 14 Centurion tanks from England reached Haifa (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 12). In May a Centurion tank formation took part in manoeuvres in Israel (*Jer. Post*, May 19). In Dec A.P. quoted a UN report of Dec 4 that in the previous year the UK had sold \$896,000 worth of arms to Israel and \$772,000 worth to Jordan. (*Ma'ariv*, Dec 4; *UN Commodity Trade Statistics*, Jan-Dec 1960, Part II, Exports, p 709)

Visa Concession to British Travellers. On Feb 27 it was announced that British subjects residents of the UK, Northern Ireland and the Channel Islands no longer required visas to enter Israel. [Israelis visiting the UK still needed visas. There were similar arrangements with certain other countries.] (*Jer. Post*, Feb 28)

PM Ben-Gurion's Visit to England. Talks on ME, Africa. PM Ben-Gurion visited England on June 2-4 on his way to France after his visits to Canada and the US. The visit was described as a private family week-end, which also enabled him to meet British statesmen. On June 2, Ben-Gurion met the Earl of Home, the Foreign Secretary, for half an hour, and then PM Macmillan. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, June 4)

At both meetings, it was reported, Ben-Gurion spoke mainly about current political tension in the ME and the need to cooperate with the new nations of Africa. He expressed concern at the growing military power of the UAR and drew attention to the stream of Soviet arms still pouring into that country. Diplomatic sources suggested that the two PMs had discussed the possibility of further Israeli arms contracts with Britain, and that Ben-Gurion might also have raised the question of a

declaration on the integrity of the present borders (*Jer. Post*, June 4). (According to press reports Ben-Gurion had discussed this issue also with President Kennedy.)

On June 2 a Foreign Office spokesman said that Ben-Gurion and Lord Home had had a "talk on matters of common interest for half an hour." The following day Foreign Office sources stressed Lord Home's non-committal attitude on the refugee question; the British had not given up hope of a settlement of this issue, which would be jeopardized by taking sides now. In view of Abdel Nasser's tiff with the Soviet Union over the arrests of Communists in Syria, the Foreign Office was being especially careful not to antagonize him. (*Jer. Post*, June 4)

The talk with Macmillan was described by Ben-Gurion's aides as truly cordial; the Israeli PM told reporters that he was "more or less satisfied" with the discussion. However, the *Jerusalem Post* correspondent thought Ben-Gurion had apparently elicited less response than in his earlier conversations in the US and Canada. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, June 4)

Ben-Gurion Meets Churchill. On June 2 Ben-Gurion met Sir Winston Churchill for the first time, although they had long corresponded. They conversed for 25 minutes, surveying milestones of Jewish and British history and Zionism.

After the meeting PM Ben-Gurion expressed his admiration for Sir Winston, "the greatest man of our time." *The Times* wrote: "It was a sentimental journey and an historical occasion: The Israeli Premier paying homage to the greatest living Englishman, who describes himself as a life-long Zionist." (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, June 4)

On June 2 Ben-Gurion met British Zionist leaders. He spent the week-end at Oxford. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 11, 12 June; *Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, June 6)

Status of Jerusalem in British Court. On Sept 29 the question of Jerusalem's status as part of the State of Israel was raised before the Bow Street magistrate's court in the hearing of the Israel government's request for the extradition of Shalom Shtarkes, wanted in a kidnapping case. As the alleged crime had been committed in Jerusalem, Shtarkes' counsel inquired whether the extradition treaty between Israel and Britain (see MER 1960, p 298) covered crimes committed in that city. Counsel for Israel pleaded that in the case of *The Arab Bank vs. Barclays Bank*, in 1955, the House of Lords had ruled that the British government had accorded Israel *de jure* recognition, and had recognized its hold on its part of Jerusalem *de facto*. He argued that for the purpose of extradition *de facto* recognition was sufficient.

On Nov 13, the Chief Magistrate, reportedly following Foreign Office advice, rejected the defence claims that Jerusalem was not covered by the extradition treaty. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 1, 6, Nov 14)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, Israel's exports to the UK in 1961 totalled \$35,756,000; imports were \$80,090,000. In 1960 the figures were \$36,079,000 and \$59,344,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

(The UK held third place in imports to Israel and was the second-best customer for her exports.)

On May 22 a British trade delegation arrived in Israel for a ten-day study tour of Israeli fashions. (*Jer. Post*, May 23)

Investments, Loan, Joint Enterprises. On Jan 17 the cornerstone of Carmel Forge, a joint investment of two

British firms and an Israel government company, was laid at Tirat Hacarmel. The British partners, B.S. Massey of Manchester and Forging and Presswork Ltd., of Birmingham, hold 12½% of the shares each and were to provide know-how and training. The plant was to produce tractor and vehicle parts and tools. (*Jer. Post*, Jan 18)

Another joint enterprise was the Scottish-Israel Machine Tools Co. in Holon. (*Ha'aretz*, May 19)

British financiers lent El Al Israel Airlines close to \$1 million for over seven years at 6½% interest for the purchase of a third Boeing 707 passenger aircraft. (*Jer. Post*, Jan 24)

In Feb B.A. Henderson of the British Railways Advisory Service, visited Israel in connection with a preliminary survey of a project to extend the railway from Beersheba to Eilat (about 150 miles) and to link the Dead Sea Works at Sodom with the Eilat line. There was a British offer (among others) for a 25-year credit for half of the estimated £14 million required for equipment and materials, the other half to be provided by the Israel government. (*Financial Times*, May 2)

In June Pinhas Sapir, the Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, visited Britain, meeting businessmen and prospective investors. (*Ha'aretz*, June 9)

On July 25 the director-general of Bank Leumi le-Israel stated that during the first half of 1961 the Israel Investment Authority had approved investments of more than \$10 million from the UK. (*Ha'aretz*, July 26)

In Oct it was learned that the Leyland Motor Company had agreed in principle to the assembly and progressive manufacture in Israel of its 1,200-c.c. Standard-Triumph passenger cars. The vehicles could be exported; the same applied to trucks and buses to be assembled at the Leyland plant in Ashdod. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 5)

Various Contacts. On June 18 the establishment of the "Bridge" project, for closer relations between British and Israeli youth, was reported. A public committee was set up in Britain, with Col. R. Henriques as Honorary President; it was affiliated to a British committee for youth service headed by the Duke of Edinburgh. An Israeli committee would work in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and the Gadna youth corps. (*Ha'aretz*, June 18)

On Nov 9 England's "under-23" eleven trounced the Israel national youth team in Leeds by 7-1, avenging their 4-0 defeat at Ramat-Gan in May 1960. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 10)

On Nov 20 an exhibition of British books was opened at Tel Aviv, later moving to Haifa. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 21, Dec 12)

British Visitors. British visitors to Israel included: George Brown MP, Deputy Leader of the Labour party (Jan); Sir Myer Galpern, Labour MP (Feb); Lord Henderson and Lord Inman, Labour Peers (March); M.I. Michaels, Under Secretary, Atomic Energy in the Ministry for Science and British Representative on the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (May); Lt-Gen. Richard Neville Anderson, Commander of British Ground Forces in the ME (June); Admiral Sir Alexander Bingley, outgoing C-in-C. of the British Mediterranean Fleet — to bid farewell to the Israel Defence Forces (Aug); Dr Frederick Donald Coggan, the Bishop of Bradford and Archbishop-Designate of York (Aug); Lord Nathan of Churt (Sept); Charles Hill, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Oct); Lord and Lady Gladwyn (Nov);

Sir William Hildred, Director-General of IATA (Nov.); Thomas Frazer and Richard Crossman, Labour MPs (Dec.). (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 1; *Jer. Post*, Feb 21, March 9, 10, 13, May 9, 11, June 14, 16, 20, 21, Aug 2, 6, 7, Sept 3, 28, Oct 1, 3, 4, 6, Nov 1, 6, Dec 12, 13, 17, 19; *Davar*, Nov 23)

In May a British parliamentary delegation headed by Sir Douglas Glover (Conservative) visited Israel for a week, returning the UK visit of a Knesset delegation in 1960 (*MER* 1960, p 298). (*Jer. Post*, May 7, 8, 9, 10, 15)

Visiting groups included 92 British Masons to attend the consecration of Holy Land Lodge No. 50 in Herzliya (Feb); the Bishop of Leicester with a group of 35 on a week's tour (April); 18 students from the London School of Economics as guests of the Israel-British Commonwealth Association (July); 30 scouts for the Israeli

scout jamboree on Mount Carmel (Aug.). (*Jer. Post*, Feb 21, April 23, Aug 2; *Ha'aretz*, July 21)

On 14 and 15 Sept five ships of the British Mediterranean Fleet arrived at Haifa on a six-day courtesy call. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 15, 16, 21)

Israeli Visitors to the UK included: Brig. Ezer Weizmann, Commander of the Air Force, to lecture to Jewish communities (on Feb 28 Julian Amery, the British Air Minister, held a reception in his honour); Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the Transport Minister, on behalf of the Joint Palestine Appeal (March); a five-man Histradut delegation as guests of the British government (Oct-Nov). (*Jer. Post*, Feb 16, March 10, Nov 7; *Ha'aretz*, March 1, 19, 22)

Valetta, Malta, was visited by an Israeli destroyer in Jan, and by two Israeli submarines in May. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 18; *Jer. Post*, May 17)

THE UNITED STATES

Note: All developments primarily related to the Arab-Israeli Conflict have been recorded under that heading, (pp 193 ff, 228 ff).

BEN-GURION'S US VISIT AND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY (May)

The announcement on May 11 that PM Ben-Gurion would pay an official visit to Canada on May 24 prompted the immediate assumption that he would also wish to meet President Kennedy.

In Israel it was thought that the date for the visit was chosen to enable Ben-Gurion to meet the President, presumably in New York, on May 29 or 30, before the latter's scheduled departure for France.

The US announced the forthcoming meeting on May 22. Until then US official spokesmen had refused to comment, and even on May 21 the White House spokesman declared he could say nothing on the subject. (*Jer. Post*, May 14, 22, 23)

Speculation followed on the issues Ben-Gurion intended to raise with the President (e.g. *Jer. Post*, May 22, 24; *NYT*, May 23, 29); those suggested were in general identical with the subjects later reported to have been discussed.

PM Ben-Gurion himself commented, on his return from Canada, the US, the UK and France on June 8, that, with the formation of the new US administration, changes in international relations were to be expected. His objects had been, he said, to explain Israel's attitude on the world situation, the position in the ME, and her own problems, to clarify as far as possible the attitudes of the various government leaders on these questions, and to contact representatives of Jewry. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 12, June)

PM's Activities in the US. Ben-Gurion arrived in New York from Montreal on May 28, and met Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN SG, for a two-hour off-the-record review of international problems, including the ME. On May 29 he conferred with Mayor Wagner of New York and Senator Jacob Javits, and later spoke in Philadelphia on the tenth anniversary of the Israel Bond Drive. As official guest of the state of Pennsylvania, he met

Governor David Lawrence and received the honorary citizenship of Philadelphia.

The following day he conferred with American Jewish leaders, had a telephone conversation with former President Eisenhower, and spoke at a luncheon at the UN, given by Michael Comay, the Israel representative, and attended by leaders of 50 delegations headed by Frederick Boland, President of the General Assembly. In reply to Boland's wishes for Israel's peace and progress, Ben-Gurion expressed his regret that her closest neighbours were not represented. History and geography had linked Israel with the Arabs, and it was his deep conviction that peace would come, he said. He called for a joint Arab-Israel effort to conquer "the real enemies of the ME"—the deserts and wasted water resources.

On June 1 the PM met George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, and other labour leaders; Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of New York; Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson; Arthur Goldberg, US Secretary of Labour; Ogden Reid, former US Ambassador in Israel; Adlai Stevenson, permanent US delegate to the UN; Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General of New York State; and Prof. Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat, Uruguay's permanent representative at the UN. He lunched with Harry Truman, the former US President. (*IGPO/WNB* No. 12, June; *Israel Digest*, June 9)

Talk with President Kennedy. PM Ben-Gurion conferred with the President in New York on May 30, a few hours before the latter's departure for Europe for talks with President de Gaulle and PM Khrushchev.

Ben-Gurion presented the President with the book *A Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, by Count Nicolai Radzivil (an ancestor of the President's brother-in-law), published in 1614.

Also present were Avraham Harman, Israel Ambassador to the US, Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Myer Feldman, Deputy Counsel to the President. The talk lasted for an hour and a half.

The separate official statements made no mention of ME problems. The American statement said the President was happy to have had the opportunity again to get the views of the Israeli PM. The Israeli statement

spoke of a constructive exchange of views on problems affecting the two countries and a review of a number of world problems.

The Arab refugee problem was a main topic of the talks. A statement by PM Ben-Gurion, at a press conference on June 1, that he had found a large measure of agreement with President Kennedy on the problem, evoked a State Department reaction to the effect that, though the issue had been raised, no agreement on any particular solution had been reached. (*NYT*, June 2; *Ha'aretz*, June 4; for details see: The Arab-Israel Conflict, p 197.)

On other topics, the following picture emerged from press reports quoting highly-placed sources:

The two statesmen had agreed that the relative quiet prevailing in the ME at the time must be preserved. Ben-Gurion had said that this tranquillity might prove deceptive and that to preserve it the balance of armaments in the area must not be upset. He had expressed concern over continued Arab intransigence toward Israel, and the continued flow of modern Soviet heavy arms to the Arab states, and called attention to President Abdel Nasser's ambitions to expand his power. He made no request for arms, however.

It was reported that the Israeli side felt that the President, though not making any commitments, understood Israel's armament difficulties, and that even if the US preferred not to supply arms herself, she would be prepared to consider economic measures that might help Israel to meet her defence needs from other sources.

The PM had also spoken of Israel's assistance to the new nations of Asia and Africa, and had touched on the financial burden involved in the aid activities.

Ben-Gurion had expressed Israel's support for Western economic aid for the economic, social and cultural progress of the Arab countries.

The question of Israel's second atomic reactor was not raised.

Israel sources said the PM was impressed by the President's detailed knowledge and intimate understanding of ME problems in general and of Israel's situation in particular.

The President was said to have been generally satisfied with the conversation and impressed by the PM's moderation, and to have discovered a greater similarity of approach to some subjects than he had expected. (*NYT*, May 31, June 2; *Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, June 1, 2)

US Assured Arabs on Meeting? When the possibility of the meeting was first publicly mentioned, President Kennedy sent letters of goodwill to five Arab heads of state touching on US relations with their countries and the Arab-Israel conflict (see p 197 h). A *New York Times* correspondent, reporting from Beirut immediately after the meeting, said the letters were meant to reassure the Arabs that it would not impair US-Arab relations. The paper later wrote that the letters had been sent "ten days before Ben-Gurion's visit" (*NYT*, June 3, 5). The Kennedy letter to President Abdel Nasser, as quoted in *Al-Hayit* and, a year later, in the Cairo press and radio, was, however, dated May 11. (*Eg. Mail*, Sept 22, 1962; *R. Cairo*, Sept 21 [24] 1962), [i.e., the date of the announcement of Ben-Gurion's visit to Canada].

ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, LOANS

New agreements on US economic assistance to Israel concluded during the calendar year 1961 amounted to

\$67.2 million. (For details, see pp 74-5 and compare with aid in 1960—MER 1960, pp 48-9.)

Loans by the Export-Import Bank totalling \$25 million were announced by President Kennedy at a press conference on March 15. He said they were to be used to purchase agricultural machinery, to help consolidate Israel's agricultural settlements and to provide electrical power and construction equipment for the expansion of Israel's seaports. "This decision, I think, will help speed the development of Israel's economy," President Kennedy said. (*NYT*, March 16)

US Grants Terminated, Farm Surplus Allocation Reduced. Israel expected a gradual reduction of US economic assistance. The US grant of \$7.5 million for the US financial year 1960/61, given in the form of surplus grain, was to be the last grant-in-aid (*NE Report*, June 15), and the allocation to Israel of US agricultural surplus under P.L. 480 was reduced to \$25.9 million in 1961 as against \$30.2 million in 1960 and \$37.7 million in 1959.

These reductions were seen in Israel as prompted by a reallocation of priorities in the US to meet urgent needs in Africa and Asia, and also by Israel's improved economic situation.

An official Israeli source stated that the reduction in farm surplus allocations as envisaged in the agreement signed on May 10, was due to three specific causes: The stockpiling of agricultural commodities had reached the limit of Israel's storage capacity; Israel had become self-sufficient in cotton; the Israeli government had chosen to dispense with the use of surplus feed grain for poultry in order to free poultry and eggs from the accompanying export restrictions. (*Jer. Post*, May 18)

On Nov 15, it was officially announced in Israel that £160 million was to be released for her 1961/62 development budget from funds accumulated in Israel by sales of US surplus agricultural commodities (DLF loans, Cooley Fund loans, and Government loans). (*Jer. Post*, Nov 16)

USOM Activities Nearing Conclusion. On Feb 7, at the closing ceremony in Haifa of an exhibition on ten years of US economic aid to Israel (which was displayed in various towns), S. Reed, head of the US Operation Mission, said that the termination of technical aid in June 1962 (see MER 1960, p 299) would not hurt Israel economically. Only two per cent of the \$720 million she had received from the US in various ways during these ten years had come through the Technical Assistance programme. (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 9, April 2, 10)

According to a press survey of USOM activities issued in Dec, 360 experts had come to Israel and 587 Israelis had received grants for studies abroad during ten years of operations; investments had totalled £118 million and \$15 million. (Compare with the figures in MER 1960, p 299). (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 18)

Tax Exemption of Donations to Jewish National Fund Reaffirmed. The US Treasury Department reconfirmed the exemption from taxes of grants and donations to the Jewish National Fund in the US. [All but a small part of these monies were spent in Israel]. The exemption was given on condition that the US National Committee of the JNF was authorized by the Treasury Dept. to supervise the expenditure of the monies. (*Ha'aretz*, June 28, July 3)

TRADE, INVESTMENTS

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-US trade in 1961 was: Israeli imports \$173 million; exports \$39 million, compared with \$146 million and \$29,363,000 million in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*) (The US was Israel's highest supplier and her best customer.)

In Jan the US World Fair Committee visited Israel to negotiate her participation in the New York Fair 1964/65, and met the President and FM Golda Meir. On Jan 8 the Cabinet decided that Israel would participate (*Ha'aretz, Jan 9*) [in 1962 however it reversed this decision]. Israel was represented at the New York World Trade Fair, which opened on May 3 (*Ha'aretz, May 4*), and at the Chicago International Fair, which opened on July 25. (*Jer. Post, July 25*)

Investments. In Jan the Kennedy, Cabbot and Partners investment company of California began selling Israel securities, in which, the company's president stated, interest had grown lately in the US because of the high profits they offered. (*Ha'aretz, Jan 3*)

On Feb 12 the Israel Cabinet decided to sell to a group of US investors 74 percent of the government's shares in Fertilizers and Chemicals, Ltd., Haifa. In the first stage they were to invest \$6 million. (*Kol Israel, Feb 12 [W 16]*)

The following joint enterprises and industrial cooperation agreements were reported:

The American-Israel Phosphates Company was granted exploration rights in the Negev and was to start prospecting in May. (*Financial Times, May 18*)

An agreement was signed between Negev Phosphates Ltd. and a major US concern (unnamed) for the manufacture of animal fodder additives; annual production was expected to total 40,000 tons. The US partner was to invest half the £14 million required in foreign currency. (*Jer. Post, Sept 15*)

A know-how agreement was concluded between United Carbon of Houston, Texas, and Petrochemical Enterprises, Haifa, for the establishment of a carbon black plant in Israel. This marked the final stage in the Israeli company's initial development of petrochemical industry. (*Financial Times, Dec 13*)

CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC RELATIONS, AID

Chairs in American Culture in Israel Universities. In March Robert Frost, the noted American poet, inaugurated the chair of American Culture and Civilization at the Hebrew University. He was received by President Ben-Zvi. (*NYT, March 10; Jer. Post, March 12, 13, 14*)

In June an agreement for the establishment of a chair of American Literature was signed between the US embassy and Tel Aviv University. (*Ha'aretz, June 18*)

Cultural Aid Funds. On April 29 the US and Israel governments jointly announced that the US Educational Foundation programme in Israel had been extended for a further five years. Its annual budget had been increased from \$100,000 to \$150,000. In four years the foundation, conducted by a board of six—three from each country—had enabled 53 Israelis to study for one to five years in the US, while 66 Americans had received grants to study in Israel. (*Kol Israel, April 30 [W, May 4]; Ha'aretz, April 30*)

In July the President of the Association of Universities in New York State visited Israel and met Abba Eban, the Minister of Education and Culture. He said that the Association intended to continue aid to institutes

of higher education in Israel after the termination of the USOM programme in 1962 (see MER 1960, p 299). (*Ha'aretz, July 27*)

Nuclear Research. The US continued aid to Israel's atomic research reactor at Nahal Sorek (Rubin) which had been built with US assistance under the agreement on Cooperation on Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes. (See also MER 1960, pp 287, 299.) On July 10 it was officially stated in Washington that the US would supply safety equipment for the reactor worth about \$30,000, under the technical aid plan of the International Atomic Energy Agency (*Kol Israel, July 10 [W, 20]; NYT; Ha'aretz, July 11*). On Oct 11 it was officially announced in Washington that the US government had granted \$350,000 towards the cost of the reactor. (*Kol Israel in English, Oct 12 [W 19]; Ha'aretz, Oct 12*)

On Oct 12 the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission said that US scientists were to instruct Israelis in Israeli atomic installations (*Ha'aretz, Oct 13, 15*). Two American experts had spent four days advising on scientific problems at the Nahal Sorek reactor in Aug. (*Jer. Post, Aug 17*)

Desalination Plant. The Fairbanks Whitney Corporation of New York entered into partnership with the government of Israel to develop the Zarchin system of sea water desalination (invented by an Israeli engineer). (*Ha'aretz, Jan 15, April 4; Kol Israel, March 29 [W, April 6]*)

Space Research. On Feb 13 it was announced that a satellite-tracking station had been set up at the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, and would operate in coordination with the Smithsonian Institute observatory in the US. (*Kol Israel, Feb 13 [W 16]; Ha'aretz, Feb 14, 20*)

On July 6 the US Government Space Agency and the US National Academy of Sciences expressed appreciation of the launching of the Israeli rocket (see p 223) and the hope that all the scientific information would be communicated to the international scientific community. (*Ha'aretz, July 7*)

US Studies in Israel. On June 9 the US Deputy Commissioner of Social Security told a congressional subcommittee that as there was probably less juvenile delinquency in Israel than in other countries, the Research and Training Branch of the US Social Security Administration was to spend \$120,000 during the next two years on research into Israeli achievements in this field. (*Jer. Post, June 11*)

In April 50 US physicians began a clinical postgraduate course in tropical and regional diseases in Israel sponsored by the University of California (Los Angeles) School of Medicine. (*Jer. Post, March 14, April 28*)

In July-Aug 150 US dentists attended a dental seminar in Jerusalem. (*Israel Digest, Sept 1*)

Research Grants, Guest Lecturers. New research grants to Israel physicians by US public and private funds reported during the year in the press amounted to \$253,400. (*Jer. Post, May 25, Sept 13, Nov 21; Ha'aretz, Nov 15*)

Many Israeli scientists were awarded grants for research in various fields under US Public Law 480. The grants reported in the press amounted to \$257,000 and £12,669,300. (*Jer. Post, Jan 20, Feb 7, 24, Aug 27, Sept 6; Ha'aretz, April 17, 30, Aug 14, Oct 31; JGPO/WNB, No. 25 Sept; Kol Israel in English, July 26 [W Aug 3]*)

A number of Israeli scientists were invited to lecture in US academic institutions. (See e.g. *Ha'aretz*, April 27; *Jer. Post*, June 11; *IGPO/WNB*, No. 26, Sept)

CONTACTS AND VISITS

Labour Contacts. US labour leaders visiting Israel included Joseph Curran, President of the American National Maritime Union and Vice-President of the AFL-CIO, to attend a meeting of the International Transport Workers Federation at Herzlia, in April (*Jer. Post*, April 10); Walter Reuther, President of the United Automobile Workers and Vice-President of the AFL-CIO, attended a cornerstone-laying of a youth centre to bear his name and was received by PM Ben-Gurion, in May. (*Jer. Post*, May 15, 16, 19)

George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, and George Harrison, Vice-President, came in Sept. They were received by President Ben-Zvi and PM Ben-Gurion, met cabinet members and labour leaders, and attended the cornerstone-laying of a sports stadium at Nazareth to bear Meany's name. On Sept 17 the Histadrut announced that a donation of \$25,000 had been received from an American labour union for the stadium and that its completion would be financed by US workmen (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 18). Meany said he was encouraged by the initial work of the Histadrut's Afro-Asian Institute (towards which the AFL-CIO contributed 60 scholarships—see also MER 1960, p 302), and the expansion of its activities would be discussed shortly. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 10, 13, 14, 15)

On June 4, at a dinner in Washington attended by 600 trade union officials, sponsored by the US National Committee for Labour to mark the Histadrut's fortieth anniversary, G. Meany received the Histadrut Pioneering Award. (*NYT*, June 5)

Gestures of Friendship; Various Contacts. The Los Angeles City Council declared Feb 9 Israel Day, to coincide with an Israel Bonds Committee occasion in the city (*Jer. Post*, Feb 9). The State of New York and New York City officially marked Israel Independence Day, April 20. Governor Nelson Rockefeller noted the friendly relations between Israel and the US, and Mayor Robert Wagner announced the ceremonies that were to be held. (*Ha'aretz*, April 14)

On June 10, Senators J. Javits, Philip Hart and Gale

McGee announced the formation of a committee to raise \$2 million for the erection of a statue of liberty at Haifa Bay as a gift of the American people. (*Ha'aretz*, June 11)

In July five members of the Gadna Youth Corps air division left for the US as guests of the US Civil Air Patrol. A similar US unit visited Israel. (*Kol Israel* in A, July 19 [17]; *IGPO/WNB*, No. 18, July; *Kol Israel*, July 19 [W 27])

One hundred American scouts took part in the Eighth Israel Scout Jamboree in July. (*Jer. Post*, July 27, Aug 2)

Israeli Visitors to the US included: Binyamin Mintz, Minister of Posts (Jan) (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 8); Moshe Dayan, Minister of Agriculture, and Abba Eban, Minister of Education (March) (*Jer. Post*, March 9, 14; *Ha'aretz*, March 14, 19); Mordechai Bentov, Minister of Development (May) (*Kol Israel*, May 28 [30]; *Ha'aretz*, May 15, 25); Giora Josephthal, Minister of Development and Housing (Dec.). (*Jer. Post*, Nov 23; *Ha'aretz*, Dec 24)

Visitors from the US included: A four-man American Legion delegation, headed by National Commander William Burke (March) (*Jer. Post*, March 19); R. Strong of the US State Department (July) (*Ha'aretz*, July 30); Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Oct) (*Jer. Post*, Oct 29); Senator Hubert Humphrey and a group of Congressmen (Oct); (For details see p 201b-IGPO/WNB No. 31, Oct); Senator Stuart Symington, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Chairman of its ME subcommittee (Oct) (*Jer. Post*, Oct 30, 31); a group of 21 on behalf of the Fund for the Republic, headed by its President, Dr Robert Hutchins (Oct) (*Jer. Post*, Oct 30); Senator Estes Kefauver (Nov), who, at a press conference on Nov 22, supported the Johnston Plan for the diversion of the Jordan Waters (see MER 1960, p 206), and said that US Senate opinion generally was not satisfied with the continuation of UNRWA activity and thought a solution to the refugee problem should be found; he was also interested in Israeli experiments in water desalination (*Jer. Post*, Nov 20, 24; *Ha'aretz*, Nov 23, 24); Representatives William S. Moorhead and William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania, members of the House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Currency (Dec.). (*USIS*, Nov 29, Dec 5; *Ha'aretz*, Jan 7, 1962)

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

COMMUNIST VIEWS ON ISRAEL

Israel's Elections and Mapai's "Militarist Policy." [Apart from sporadic references to the "bankruptcy" of the Ben-Gurion government, the Soviet press and radio paid little attention to the general elections to the Knesset in Aug. They figured prominently, however, in two critical articles.]

An article in *New Times*, entitled "Reactions in the Zionist Camp," attributed the elections to PM Ben-Gurion's "loss of influence," which was "a logical sequel to the widespread discontent with the policies of his Labour Party (Mapai)." Quoting Shimon Peres, the deputy Defence Minister, on Israel's need for a "psychological deterrent" vis-à-vis the Arab states, the article charged the Mapai leadership with having "set off a

wave of war hysteria" that had "produced 20 incidents on the Israeli-Arab border in April-July, 17 of which had led to bloodshed." The Mapai leaders were fighting the elections "on a militarist and cold-war platform. War hysteria, they believe, will help their pre-election machinations. And that is understandable, for Ben-Gurion's support comes chiefly from quarters outside Israel, from the Western imperialists, who are utterly indifferent to the interests of Israel and to its people, both of which are regarded as pawns in an aggressive 'global strategy.'" (*New Times*, Aug 16)

Commenting in a similar vein, an earlier article in *Krasnaya Zvezda* linked the firing of the Shavit rocket (see p 223) with the forthcoming elections, "By timing the launching of the rocket for this period," declared

the paper, "the Israel ruling group counted on raising the flagging prestige of the Mapai party," but the "militarist policy of the Ben-Gurion government, which is in the service of the imperialist forces, will be defeated... and cannot be saved by [such] sensational measures." (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 27)

"West German Aid for Israel's Expansionist Plans." In Sept Moscow Radio, in a talk entitled, "What Brings West Germany and Israel Close Together," referred to a "new financial agreement" concluded on Sept 3, which, although "primarily of a technical character... represents a new and serious threat to the Arabs." (The agreement abolished double taxation and included other fiscal provisions designed to encourage investments—*Ha'aretz*, Sept 4.) Describing West Germany as an "active partner in the arms race in Israel," the broadcast said that German reparation payments had contributed to the "rapid establishment of a vast Israeli industry, including the war industry." The Bonn government had a great interest in this, for it was equipping its army with Israeli arms, while the extremist, aggressive Israeli circles hoped to use the arms in carrying out their aggressive, expansionist plans against the Arabs. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Sept 5 [SU 8])

"NATO Encourages Israeli Production of Atomic Weapons." An article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, which accused the Israel government of a provocative intensification of military preparedness—citing the holding of an army parade in Jerusalem (p 214) and other instances—referred to the construction of Israel's second nuclear research reactor, "which, according to foreign press reports, was intended for the purpose of work on the creation of atomic weapons." (See also MER 1960, p 89.) Israel, the paper said, was clearly unable to finance such an undertaking, and the financial sources were "in Washington, London, Paris, Bonn and other capitals of NATO member-states." "This senseless adventure," the article warned, "is extremely dangerous to the countries of Asia and Africa and no less dangerous to Israel herself." (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 21)

Links between Israel and NATO military objectives were also alleged in an article in *New Times*: "There have been more frequent border incidents since Ben-Gurion's visit to NATO countries [in May-June to Canada, the US, the UK and France] and more talk in Tel Aviv about producing atomic weapons. Secret work in that direction is being conducted in the Negev desert at NATO expense and with the help of NATO experts... Of course, the imperialists are pursuing their own aims in encouraging Ben-Gurion to intensify his adventurist policy. A short while ago Israel was visited by representatives of the US naval command. They inspected the construction of the new port at Ashdod Yam, near the UAR frontier, a joint Israeli-American project. The port will be used as a base for the US Sixth Fleet." (*New Times*, Aug 16) [Ashdod port was designed to serve as the commercial outlet for Israel's southern areas.]

Israel's Cooperation with Afro-Asian States. — "In the Service of Imperialism." The expanding scope of economic and technical cooperation between Israel and other new states in Africa and Asia continued to come under strong attack in the Soviet press and radio, with Israel invariably cast as the Trojan horse of "Western imperialism." (Compare MER 1960, p 89.) An article in *International Affairs* described Israel as "the servant of neo-colonialism in Africa" and maintained that, since

her economy was severely strained, her leaders could only "impose their 'aid' on the African countries" because of the assistance they received from United States capitalism: "All the Israeli firms... operating in Africa are directly dependent on American capital. The US monopolists control their activities through the so-called Jewish Agency and the Histadrut, reactionary Israeli trade unions, which are holders of shares in... Israeli companies operating in African countries." Part of the aid received by Israel since 1948 "from United States capitalists... has passed through the hands of the colonialist henchmen in the Mapai Party, [and] was earmarked as bait for those who can be taken in by Israel's alleged anti-colonialism." (*International Affairs*, Moscow, Jan)

Similarly, an article in *Trud*, entitled "Colonizer's Bridge," cited Walter Reuther, the American trade union leader, as having declared that, since the new states in Africa and Asia did not suspect Israel and the Histadrut of colonialist designs, she should utilize this untainted image in order to build a "bridge" between the Afro-Asian world and the West. Western social democratic leaders had asked their Israeli colleagues, the article said, to assume the leadership of social democracy in Africa and Asia so as to "enslave these countries economically and to undermine the front of the liberation struggle." However, the article added, the resolution of the Casablanca Conference in Jan showed that the Afro-Asian nations were not deceived by Israel's protestations of friendship, but recognized her as an "accomplice of the colonial powers." (*Trud*, May 26)

The Eichmann Trial: "Israel Covers Up For Nazis in the GFR." No Soviet journalist attended the trial of Adolf Eichmann and it was only briefly noticed in the USSR press. Soviet reactions mainly emphasized the limited scope of the proceedings, which, it was claimed, merely indicted one man, while seeking to exonerate those of his former superiors and associates who now occupied important posts in the GFR. Israel's "ruling circles" in general, and PM Ben-Gurion in particular, were accused of having connived at the suppression of evidence that would have incriminated highly-placed persons in West Germany and revealed the "neo-Nazi character" of its government. "The arrest of Eichmann," declared the *Pravda* article, "caused serious concern in Bonn ruling circles, who fear that the trial... may expose many former Nazis who presently occupy responsible positions in the GFR and in NATO... And the ruling circles in Bonn spare no efforts to transform the trial of Eichmann into a farce. They have found allies among Israel's ruling clique."

As a result of a meeting between Ben-Gurion and West German representatives in Brussels in June, 1960, and "in order to avoid strained relations," the Israel PM had ordered a curtailment in the publication of material relating to the investigation and promised to acquaint the GFR government with this material in advance, the article alleged. The Israel government, it added, had thus "entered into collusion with revanchist circles in the GFR" and was trying "to protect other Hitlerite criminals from exposure" but "the agreement... will not escape attention. That trick won't work." (*Pravda*, April 28)

These charges were reiterated in the central and provincial press. (See *Mizan*, June.)

A cartoon in *Pravda* of May 5 depicted "Hitlerites under cover [of a judge's robe] in Jerusalem and in Bonn." In June, a *Pravda* article claimed that it was "no accident that both the court and the representatives of the bourgeois press prefer to speak only of the dead—

the dead victims of Nazism and the dead Nazi Führers." The article repeated a Communist press charge that Ben-Gurion had assured Chancellor Adenauer in a personal letter that the Israel government would do "everything possible in order not to impair Bonn's prestige in the course of the trial." In return, Israel expected "to meet with understanding from the GFR in matters of economic aid and the supply of arms." But public demand in Israel was growing for the punishment of "Eichmann's accomplices who occupy leading posts in . . . West Germany," the article declared, and "neither the Israeli nor the Bonn defenders of Fascist criminals will succeed in shielding the Hitlerite murderers." (*Pravda*, June 23)

An article in *Izvestia* by an East German journalist who attended the trial, followed the general line of Soviet comment, but added that, "contrary to the wishes of its organizers and despite the efforts of Bonn," the trial had incriminated "the present German militarist state, which follows in the footsteps of the Hitlerite criminals." (*Izvestia*, Sept 3)

On Nov 28 the Israel Minister of Justice stated in the Knesset that the USSR had not responded to Israel's request for documentary material relating to the Eichmann trial; documents had, however, been received from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. (*Divrei Hakeneset*, Nov 28, p 471)

The "Pernicious Character" of Zionism and the Class Struggle in Israel. The fundamental Communist thesis on Zionism was recapitulated by Z. Sheinis in the *Jan New Times*. Recalling Lenin's opposition to the separatist aspirations of the Bund (the non-Zionist Jewish Socialist party), the author denied the national character of the Jewish people, and declared that Zionism, as "the ideology and political banner of the Jewish bourgeoisie," was unable to resolve class antagonisms. The notion of "a single world-wide Jewish nation is simply absurd," he declared, and "the Jews are not a homogeneous entity as to class character." Consequently, "it is not by assembling in a national 'home' that the Jewish people can break out of capitalist exploitation . . . but by fighting in labour's common ranks against the exploiters, for the final defeat of imperialism." This attitude was exemplified by the Israel Communist Party, which was "tirelessly combating Zionism and exposing its pernicious character." Israel's leaders, "who have the impudence to call themselves Socialists," were trying to delude the masses with talk about a chimerical national unity: "...unity of exploiters and exploited, are we to understand? But no sooner do the workers demand better conditions and back up their demands with strike action than these Zionist rulers call out the police to beat them up and throw them behind bars." (*New Times*, No. 4 Jan)

The alleged intensification of the class struggle in Israel, and such manifestations of it as strikes and demonstrations, received comparatively wide publicity in the Soviet press. In the words of one writer, "the strike movement in Israel is embracing wider and wider sections of the population and the consciousness and political maturity of Israeli workers is growing." (*Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, May; see also *Trud*, July 4, 8; *Izvestia*, Nov 15)

USSR-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Israel Policy Statements; Ben-Gurion Advocates East-West Guarantee for ME Borders. Commenting on Israeli relations with the Soviet Union, the Israel Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, declared in the Knesset on

March 20 that it was precisely their "static" character which was undesirable. "For our part," said Mrs. Meir, "we shall spare no efforts to bring about mutual understanding, for we are firm in our desire for an improvement in the atmosphere." (*Divrei Hakeneset*, March 20, p 1363)

PM Ben-Gurion told the press, on May 26, during his visit to Canada, that Israel would welcome Soviet participation in a big-power guarantee of ME borders. (*NYT*, May 27; *Ha'aretz*, May 28)

[He was also reported to have raised such a proposal in his talks with President Kennedy and PM Macmillan. Ben-Gurion had advocated such a measure in 1960. (See MER 1960, pp 3-4, 88.)]

Russian Jewry and Israel. Speaking in the Knesset on Nov 15, the Israel FM, Mrs. Golda Meir, expressed the government's "deep anxiety" over the prison sentences imposed on six Jewish community leaders in Moscow and Leningrad on charges of espionage. "We were shocked to read the accusations levelled against these Jews," declared Mrs. Meir. She emphasized that Israel had always sought friendship with the USSR, as with all other states. Israel demanded the same of the USSR as of any other state, namely, that the Jews living in it should be accorded: "(1) the possibility of a free national-cultural life like all the other nationalities of the USSR, and (2) freedom to leave for every Jew who wishes to join his family and his people in the State of Israel." A resolution embodying these demands and expressing anxiety over the fate of the Russian Jewish community, following the prison sentences, was unanimously passed by the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset on Dec 5. (*Divrei Hakeneset*, Nov 15, p 364; *Ha'aretz*, Dec 6)

Justice Hayim Cohen of the Israel Supreme Court, who had been a member of the UN Human Rights Commission, stated in Tel Aviv that each year the Commission received thousands of complaints from Israeli citizens, charging the USSR with infringing human rights by refusing to allow their relatives to join them in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, April 23)

Expulsion of Israeli Diplomat on Espionage Charges; Israel Reaction: "A Tissue of Falsehoods." On June 29 Tass announced that the Soviet government had demanded the recall of Ya'acov Sharett, First Secretary at the Israel embassy in Moscow, on charges of "espionage activity." Tass said that he had "established espionage contacts and illegally distributed anti-Soviet Zionist literature" in the course of visits to various regions of the USSR and had been "caught red-handed" while attempting to obtain secret documents. (*Pravda*, *Izvestia*, June 30)

An Israel Foreign Ministry statement of June 30 described the charges as a "tissue of falsehoods from beginning to end." It denied that Sharett or any other Israeli diplomat had ever engaged in espionage or the dissemination of anti-Soviet material in the Soviet Union, and declared: "This is a case of flagrant provocation by the secret police. The propaganda aims of the statement are obvious and it is unlikely to deceive anyone." (*Jer. Post*, July 2)

Sharett described his arrest as having been carried out "in classical style" in a Riga hotel where he was staying with his family. He and his wife had been taken to police headquarters and interrogated for approximately three hours. "We were given some rough treatment and my

wife still has bruises," he said. He described the affair as "a complete frame-up." (*Jer. Post*, July 2)

[Ya'acov Sharett is the son of Moshe Sharett, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive and one-time Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel.]

Some months previously, another member of the Israel embassy staff in Moscow was attacked in *Trud* for having used "every opportunity to palm off on the Soviet people... the worst kind of anti-Soviet literature" and accused of disseminating hostile propaganda material in synagogues (*Trud*, March 16). A spokesman of the Israel Foreign Ministry denied the charges. (*Jer. Post*, March 17)

Cultural Exchanges; Visits. Three musicians from the Soviet Union gave a series of concerts in Israel between June 11 and July 6. The arrival of the musicians, who were the guest of the Israel-Soviet Friendship League, was widely greeted in Israel as the first such appearance of Soviet artists since the establishment of the State. An editorial in *The Jerusalem Post* referred to Israel's prolonged and hitherto vain efforts for cultural exchanges with the USSR, and expressed the hope that the present visit was the "harbinger of a new era of normal artistic exchanges between Israel and the Soviet Union." The artists were reported to have been greatly impressed by their enthusiastic reception by the Israel public. (*Ha'aretz*, June 12, July 17; *Jer. Post*, June 21)

In Nov a Kharkov Opera singer appeared with the Israel National Opera. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 6, Dec 4)

The import of Russian books into Israel had been rising constantly, it was reported, and Israel was believed to occupy third or fourth place among purchasers of USSR books (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 7). Israeli imports of Soviet books, newspapers and periodicals amounted to \$53,600 in 1961 (*IFT*, 1961). [The Israel Programme for Scientific Translations was engaged in the translation of Russian scientific works into English.]

Israeli delegations attended international congresses in the USSR on irrigation and biochemistry. (*Ha'aretz*, July 26, Aug 24)

An Israeli official was to take part in a seminar for fisheries administration in the USSR organized by the Soviet government and the FAO. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 6)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-USSR trade in 1961 was: Israeli imports \$263,000 and exports \$406,000, compared with \$108,000 and \$312,000 respectively in 1960. Israel's main import in 1961 was asbestos and her main export textiles. (*IFT*, 1961)

BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR, HUNGARY, ROMANIA

Bulgaria. Israel's claim to compensation for the shooting down of an El-Al airliner in 1955 (see MER 1960, p 91), was under continuing negotiation (*IGYB*, 1961/62)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Bulgaria trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$1,304,000; imports \$1,419,000 compared with \$465,000 and \$1,384,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

In Dec the Bulgarian state folk song and dance troupe, Koutev, arrived in Israel for a three-week tour. (*Jer. Post*, Dec. 20)

Czechoslovakia. An official Israeli source summed up relations with Czechoslovakia as follows: "There was no change for the better; trade has been at a standstill for

years; cultural exchanges made no progress; the problem of divided families is yet unsolved." (*IGYB* 1961/62; see also MER 1960, p 91)

According to Israeli statistics, Israel-Czechoslovakia trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$3,000, imports \$171,000 compared with \$103,000 and \$110,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

German Democratic Republic. There were no official relations between Israel and the GDR.

According to Israeli statistics, Israel-GDR trade in 1961 was: exports \$70,000 and no imports, compared with \$1,000 imports in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

Hungary. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israeli-Hungarian trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$1,653,000; imports \$2,244,000 compared with \$781,000 and \$806,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

On Dec 19 a protocol for the extension of the trade and payments agreements was signed in Jerusalem. (*Kitvei Amanah*, 435; *Ha'aretz*, Dec 4, 20)

Hungarians attended the Eichmann trial as journalists and observers. (*Jer. Post*, June 9, 11)

In Nov the Israel Foreign Ministry intervened, after investigation, in a dispute between a Tel Aviv sports association and a Hungarian trainer who had been invited through the Israel legation in Hungary, supporting the Hungarian view. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 8)

An Israeli official source summed up relations as follows: "The problem of the reunion of divided Jewish families still mars relations to some extent. Trade, however, is satisfactory." (*IGYB* 1961/62, p 167)

Romania. According to Israeli statistics, Israel-Romania trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$2,775,000; imports \$957,000 compared with \$1,635,000 and \$572,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

Notes extending the Israel-Romania trade agreement for one year were exchanged in Geneva in Sept. The agreement, signed on Oct 31, 1957, called for the exchange of \$4.5 million worth of goods, with technical credits of \$500,000. (*Kitvei Amanah*, 423)

POLAND

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Poland trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$795,000, imports \$1,069,000 compared with \$581,000 and \$953,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

On March 29 the Israel-Poland trade agreement was extended for another year, providing for Israeli exports worth \$4,335,000, mainly citrus, phosphates and various manufactures, and imports of \$5,060,000 mainly metals and chemicals. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, March 31; *Kitvei Amanah*, 420)

In Nov it was learned that there were difficulties in implementing the agreement, and ways were being sought to fill the quota by barter. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 19)

Political Relations, Miscellaneous. In June, at a farewell luncheon in Warsaw, the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, praised Rehavam Amir, the outgoing Israel Minister for his "outstanding contribution to the strengthening of the ties" between Israel and Poland, which, he said, "share an unparalleled experience of suffering." (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, June 19)

In July it was learned that the Polish National Insurance Institute would pay adequate indemnities to those insured in such institutes before 1939. The date

for forwarding claims was extended till July 31. (*Ha'aretz*, July 17)

Cultural Relations. On Dec 27, 1960 a street in Jerusalem was named after the Polish composer Frédéric Chopin. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 28, 1960; *Stolica*, Warsaw, Jan 29)

In Aug-Sept Israeli stage artists appeared on the Polish stage for the first time, performing in Yiddish. They said that their reception had been extraordinarily cordial, which they attributed to the yearning of the Jewish communities for the sound of the Yiddish language and the understanding of the Polish people and government for Israel's problems as a result of their own suffering under the Nazis. Polish officials had repeatedly expressed a desire for closer cultural relations between the two countries. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 6, 14; *Ha'aretz*, Aug 13, 24, Sept 18)

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia and the Arab-Israel Conflict (See pp 192-3, 231 b, 237 b, 238 a.)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Yugoslav trade in 1961 was: exports \$3,721,000; imports \$7,974,000. In 1960 the figures were \$1,962,000 and \$3,096,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

On March 14 an agreement to extend the Israeli-Yugoslav trade agreement for two years was signed in Jerusalem. (*Ha'aretz*, March 17)

In Sept 30 Israeli exporters exhibited in the Israel

pavilion at the International Fair in Zagreb. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 14)

Visits, Technical Assistance. On March 12 a three-man delegation of the Yugoslavia League of Cooperative Societies, headed by Nazim Firuz, visited Israel for ten days as guests of the Histadrut. (*Ha'aretz*, March 13; *Jer. Post*, March 24)

In July eight Yugoslav youth leaders arrived as the guests of the Israeli labour parties to study youth movements, labour organization and the collective villages. (*Kol Israel*, July 26 [W, Aug 3])

In Aug an Israeli fish-breeding expert went to Yugoslavia for three months under USOM auspices to advise on carp breeding. In the same month six Yugoslav officials arrived in Israel for a fish-breeding study-tour. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 4, 25). [The Jewish farmers in the pre-state period originally learned carp breeding from Yugoslavia.]

In Sept David Horowitz, governor of the Bank of Israel, visited Yugoslavia on official invitation from the governor of the State Bank of Yugoslavia and met the Yugoslav Finance Minister. He described the visit as "purely routine." (*Ha'aretz*, Sept 8, Oct 3, 4; *Jer. Post*, Sept 8, 24)

In Dec a Yugoslav government official visited Israel to study UNICEF and FAO activities. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 20)

On Dec 14 the Yugoslav soccer team defeated the Israel eleven 2-0 at the Ramat Gan stadium. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 15)

NON-ARAB MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

CYPRUS

Diplomatic Relations. The Cyprus government agreed on Aug 17, 1960, the day after Cyprus became independent, to the establishment of diplomatic relations on ambassadorial level, but Israel's first Ambassador, Zev Levin, did not present his credentials to President Makarios until Jan 20, 1961. During the ceremony, Archbishop Makarios reiterated his policy of friendship with all nations, especially Cyprus' neighbours, and said that the establishment of diplomatic relations would be to the common interest of the two countries. (*Cyprus Mail*, Jan 21; see also *MER* 1960, pp 181-2)

On the occasion of Israel's Independence Day, April 21, several Cypriot papers, both Greek and Turkish, emphasized the close relations between the two countries and the need to strengthen them further; President Makarios, Vice-President Kūčkū and the entire cabinet attended the Israel embassy reception.

In Sept Osman Örek, the Minister of Defence, visited Israel for four days as a guest of the government. He met PM Ben-Gurion, cabinet ministers and the Chief of Staff, and visited the Weizmann Institute, the Nahal Sorek atomic reactor and military industry installations. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 19)

[Andreas Papadopoulos, Minister of Communications, also visited Israel in Sept.]

In Nov Mrs Stella Souliotou, the Minister of Justice, paid a five-day visit. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 24, 25, 27, 29, 30)

In Oct, the Director-General of the Israel Foreign Ministry visited Cyprus. (*Cyprus Mail*, Oct 4)

Technical Cooperation. In Feb the Israel Ambassador to Cyprus said in Jerusalem that the operations of Vered, the Israel water development company in Cyprus, were to be extended, and several Cypriot trainees were to study agriculture and fishing in Israel. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 14)

Two model farms were established in Cyprus by the Israel government in cooperation with the Cyprus Ministry of Agriculture. Hundreds of farmers visited them to study modern techniques. (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 22)

[Representatives of the Pan-Cypriot Farmers' Organization (PEK) visited Israel in March to explore the possibility of establishing a model cooperative village in Cyprus.] A delegation of the Turkish Communal Chamber, headed by its President, R. Denktas, went to Israel for a similar purpose. (*Halkin Sesi*, July 24)

In Dec a nine-man delegation, headed by Dafnis Pakayides, MP, visited Israel as guests of the Foreign Ministry's International Cooperation Department. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 6)

Trade, Tourism. According to Israeli statistics, Israel-Cyprus trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$2,660,000 and imports \$336,000, compared with \$1,778,000 and \$421,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

The Israel Ambassador to Cyprus said on Feb 15 that Israel was encouraging tourism to close the large trade gap. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 16)

[Israeli tourists in Cyprus during 1961 totalled 18,400, the largest number from any one country.]

Various Contacts. In Feb, 31 Turkish-Cypriot teachers

came for a week's study tour in Israel. (*Jer. Post, Feb 3*)

In April the Limassol soccer team visited Israel, accompanied by the mayor and municipal councillors. (*Jer. Post, April 4*)

On Aug 30 Cypriot scouts participated in the Israeli Scout Jamboree on Mount Carmel. (*Jer. Post, Aug 2*)

ETHIOPIA

De Jure Recognition; Declarations of Friendship Between "Sister Countries." On Oct 24 it was announced that Ethiopia had extended *de jure* recognition to Israel. A cable from Ato Ketema Yifru, Acting Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, to the Israeli FM, stated: "...The Imperial Ethiopian Government has accorded full recognition to the State of Israel. May I on this occasion express... my conviction that the most cordial and friendly relations which characterized the relations between our two sister countries will be all the more strengthened by this recognition. It is also my hope that this will pave the way for closer and more fruitful collaboration between our two Governments in all fields of human endeavour."

Mrs Meir, in reply, expressed Israel's "profound satisfaction and sincere appreciation" of the Ethiopian step and continued: "I am convinced as you are that this recognition will further contribute to the most cordial and friendly relations which so happily exist between our two sister countries. The Government and people of Israel will make every attempt to deepen this relationship and to strengthen active collaboration between the two countries for their common benefit, in the spirit of their traditional friendship and their historic bonds. It is our sincere belief that such collaboration will serve the aims of peace, security and prosperity in our region." (*IGPO/WNB, No. 10, Oct; L'Ethiopie d'Aujourd'hui, Oct 28*)

An Ethiopian paper commented that Ethiopia, who was linked to Israel by ancient affinities as well as by economic interest, was guided by the principle of the interdependence of nations and the spirit of non-alignment and justice in international politics. She had also taken into account the problems of peace and security in a region constantly troubled by political and economic instability. Ethiopia had therefore finally normalized her relations with Israel, who was accepted by virtually all nations except the Arab states.

Ethiopia had been considering this step since 1956, when the Israeli Consulate was established in Addis Ababa, but had reserved her attitude because Israel was a new state which "had to prove herself" and, even more, because of the susceptibility of Israel's Arab neighbours.

Time had done its work, however, and Israel had won the admiration of the Presidents of Upper Volta, Madagascar and other African states, some of them Muslim, who had friendly and normal relations with her. The Africans, who, like the Jews, had suffered from discrimination, were struck by the admirable reconstruction work carried out by ex-inmates of Nazi concentration camps.

The paper mentioned the expanding commercial and shipping ties between the two countries, whose economies, it said, were complementary, the work of Israeli experts in Ethiopia, and the studies of Ethiopians in Israel.

The long time Ethiopia had taken to recognize Israel had not been without embarrassment for her, as a profound believer in international morality, the paper concluded. But this was rectified now. Ethiopia aspired

to a durable peace between Israel and her neighbours, both of whom had everything to gain from cooperation in a spirit of coexistence. (*L'Ethiopie d'Aujourd'hui, Oct 28*)

Israeli Foreign Ministry officials regarded the Ethiopian decision as particularly significant in view of Arab pressure to prevent it. It was felt that the Ethiopian government's resistance to this pressure reflected its self-confidence and stability, as well as the close and many-faceted relations between Ethiopia and Israel. A number of Israeli missions in Ethiopia were working in agriculture, fishing, construction, education and public health; the Ethiopian Government Hospital at Massawa and the Technical College at Addis Ababa were under the direction of Israelis and commercial relations had been expanded. The hope was also expressed that Ethiopia's recognition might serve as an example for Greece and Iran, who had been hesitant to recognize Israel *de jure*. (*Jer. Post, Oct 25*) (Iranian papers, in fact, presented the Ethiopian step as an example to Iran; see below: Iran.)

It was assumed in Israel that mutual representation (hitherto by Consulates-General) would be raised to embassy rank. (*Ha'aretz, Oct 26*)

The Israeli press welcomed Ethiopia's step. (*Davar; Al-Hamishmar; Omer; Hatzevo; Lamerhav; Jer. Post; Oct 25, 26, 27*) (For Arab reactions see p 189 a.)

Economic Cooperation. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Ethiopia trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$1,071,000 and imports \$1,665,000, as compared with \$1,003,000 and \$1,822,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

The Israel deep sea fishing fleet in the Red Sea was reinforced, and by the end of the year six Israel trawlers and one refrigerating ship were based on Massawa. Yotvat, the Israel Red Sea fishing company, was also building a fishmeal plant in Massawa. The main reasons for the move to the Red Sea were the limited fishing grounds and the poor hauls in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aqaba; however, Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Agriculture, was reported to have stressed also its political importance for close contact with Ethiopia. (*Ma'ariv, June 20; Jer. Post, Oct 12*)

Following the 1960 proposal for cooperation in establishing industrial-crop farms in Ethiopia (MER 1960, p 307), the Israel government decided, on April 24, to guarantee the investments of Yakhin-Hakal (an agricultural contracting company) in Ethiopia, and ratified its agreement with the Ethiopian government for the establishment of a 10,000-hectare farm to produce peanuts, cotton, oil seeds and sugar beet. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 6, March 8; April 26*)

In April Vered, the Israel Water Resources Development Company, announced that it would resume its activities in Ethiopia, which had been stopped during the insurrection of Dec 1960. (*Ha'aretz, April 26*)

Following on the work in Ethiopia of Israeli advisors on public transport in 1960 (MER 1960, p 306), the Ethiopian National Transport Company agreed in June 1961 to buy 75 buses to be built in Israel on English chassis. Egged [the major Israel passenger bus company] undertook to supply experts for five years, and two of its experts left for Ethiopia. (*Ha'aretz, June 7, 9, 12*)

In view of Israel's ties with Ethiopia, the government opposed the proposed sale of the Israel-owned Incode meat freezing and canning factory in that country (MER 1960, p 307) to a British group. The company, in which the government had some investments, had undergone a series of financial crises in the ten years of its existence

and its factory had been shut down for about six months for lack of funds. The government would not invest any more funds in the enterprise but agreed to cancel its claims on Incode to enable it to apply for an Ethiopian bank loan. (*Jer. Post, Nov 1, 2, 8; Ha'aretz, Nov 1, 8*)

On Nov 13 the Reynolds Company of New York, in which Soteli Boneh, the Israeli Histadrut-owned contracting company, was a partner, signed a \$2.8 million contract for the construction of four airport terminals for the Ethiopian Air Lines at Addis Ababa, Asmara and two smaller towns. (*Jer. Post, Nov 16*)

Various Contacts; Visitors. In Feb the Israel National Library sent a collection of books on tropical diseases as a present to the Government Hospital in Massawa. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 2*)

In March the Ethiopian national eleven played two matches against the Israel eleven as part of the World Cup Series. (*Jer. Post, March 15, 20*)

On April 16 an exhibition of Ethiopian folklore and art, under the patronage of the Consul-General of Ethiopia, was opened in Jerusalem. (*Jer. Post, April 17*)

On May 17, 20 agricultural students from Ethiopia finished a post-graduate course in cattle and poultry breeding, industrial crops and seed growing, and instructional methods, at the Ruppstein Institute. (See MER 1960, p 307.) (*Ha'aretz, May 18*)

In return for a present of the Bible in Amharic from Emperor Haile Selassie, President Ben-Zvi sent him the book *Views of the Biblical World*. On Nov 24 the Ethiopian Consul-General handed the President a personal letter of thanks from the Emperor. (*Ha'aretz, Oct 29, Nov 26*)

In Nov an Israeli doctor was summoned to Ethiopia to attend the Empress. (*Jer. Post, Dec 6*)

On Dec 25 an exhibition, "Ethiopia Mirrored in Books," opened in Tel Aviv. (*Jer. Post, Dec 26*)

In Dec, Israel sent a shipment of medicine for the relief of the flood victims of Ogaden. (*Ethiopian Herald, Dec 26*)

Ethiopian visitors to Israel included Haddis Alemayehoo, Minister of State and Acting Minister of Education (March); Araya Wassih, Deputy Minister of Health (April); Tadessa Ya'acov, Deputy Minister of Agriculture (July); Kebede Anissa, of the Minister of National Culture (Oct). (*Jer. Post, March 24, April 30, July 11, Oct 6*)

IRAN

No De Jure Recognition But Close Ties. [In 1960 the question of Iran's recognition of Israel was given by the UAR as grounds for breaking off diplomatic relations—MER 1960, pp 216 ff.] On March 3 an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman denied Baghdad press allegations that Iran intended to withdraw *de facto* recognition of Israel (accorded in 1950). The situation remained as repeatedly stated by his government, he said. (*Jer. Post, March 5*)

Following Ethiopia's *de jure* recognition of Israel, announced on Oct 24, a number of Iranian papers called on the government to follow suit.

Israel was an obstacle in the way of Egypt's expansionist ambitions and a stabilizing factor in the ME, wrote *Peygham-e Emruz*. Iran was a Muslim but not an Arab country, and though friendly with the Arabs she could not sacrifice her interests to their inflexible policy. With the decline of Abdel Nasser's power, the Arabs would come to recognize Israel as an established fact, the paper

believed. It asked the Foreign Ministry to consider all these factors and concluded that conservatism and irresolution on this question were detrimental to the national interest (*Peygham-e Emruz, Oct 30*); for similar opinions see also *Poste Tehran, Ainyaye Javan, Oct 31*). *Kayhan* said that the Ethiopian step was regarded by official and political circles in Tehran as an important development and a defeat for Abdel Nasser. It was believed that other countries might now follow suit. (*Kayhan, Oct 30*)

At the end of the year the Shah reportedly replied to a correspondent who asked why Iran did not grant *de jure* recognition to Israel: "Iran's relations with Israel are like the true love that exists between two people outside of wedlock. Iran is strengthening its ties with Israel, but for political reasons it cannot recognize Israel *de jure*." (*Jer. Post, Dec 31*)

Israeli Premier's Stopover in Tehran. On Dec 5 PM Ben-Gurion, on his way to Burma (see p 329), spent the night at the Shah's villa at Tehran airport and met senior government officials. There was no comment from the Iranian PM's office on rumours that he had met Ben-Gurion. (*Ha'aretz, Dec 6, 7*)

Economic Ties. No separate statistics for Israel's trade with Iran were made public. (*IFT, 1961*)

On Jan 2 the Director-General of Vared, the Israel Water Resources Development Company, said that the possibility of Israeli participation in large-scale water development projects in Iran were being examined (*Ha'aretz, Jan 3*). In mid-April Vared began installing a central sewerage system in Isfahan, assuming full responsibility for the first stage of the project, to cost \$1.25 million. (*Israel Digest, May 12*)

Various Contacts; Visitors. In Jan an Israeli pavilion was opened in the Women's International Exhibition in Tehran and was visited by the Queen. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 9*)

On March 26 PM Ben-Gurion spoke at the conference of the Israel Bible Research Society on "The Personality of Cyrus," on the 2500th anniversary of King Cyrus the Great's proclamation sanctioning the return of the Jewish exiles from Babylon (*Jer. Post, March 27*). In Nov the anniversary was celebrated in Tel Aviv. A telegram of congratulations was sent to the Shah, who replied with thanks for the good wishes. (*Ha'aretz, Nov 21*) (See also MER 1960, p 307)

Iranian Visitors to Israel included ex-Deputy PM Mustafa Alamouti, MP; Dr Mo'adel, MP; Dr R. Human, ex-Minister of Justice; Haji Nuri, a former member of the Senate and an editor of *Kayhan* (March) (*Jer. Post, March 22; Ha'aretz, March 27, 28*); Princess Safieh Firouz, President of the Iranian Council of Women (July) (*Jer. Post, July 24, 26*); Ebrahim Mahdavi, Governor of Khuzistan and former Minister of Agriculture (Oct) (*Ha'aretz, Oct 19*); and a troupe of musicians, for a week's performances (Nov) (*Ha'aretz, Nov 7*).

Israeli visitors to Iran included a number of scientists. (*IGPO/WNB, Na. 18, July*)

TURKEY

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Turkey trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$7,325,000 and imports \$5,981,000, compared with \$8,921,000 and \$7,655,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

ASIAN COUNTRIES

In Sept Israel participated in the Izmir fair (*Yeni Gün, Ankara, Sept 2; Ha'aretz, Aug 20, Sept 13, Oct 18*).

Various Contacts. In Feb the football and basketball teams of the Istanbul Galatasaray Club played a series of matches in Israel (*Jer. Post, Feb 14, 21*); return games were held in Istanbul in Aug. (*Cumhuriyet, Istanbul, Aug 29, 30*)

In March an Israeli delegation of Gadna air cadets visited Turkey as guests of the Turkish Aviation Organization (Türk Hava Kurumu), and a five-man Turkish delegation, headed by General Adan Özsoy, Commander of the Turkish Aviation Organization, paid a return visit. Another Gadna delegation visited Turkey in July as guests of the Turkish Aviation Organization. (*Jer. Post, March 10, July 23; Ha'aretz, March 29*)

In March the trawler *Shanuit*, detained in Turkey for over a year (see MER 1960 p 308), returned to Haifa. (*Jer. Post March 10*)

In June the Director-General of the Israel Tourist Corporation visited Turkey for talks on cooperation in tourism. In Nov the Turkish Navigation Company an-

nounced that in 1962 it would open a department for tourism between Turkey and Israel. (*Ha'aretz, June 2, Sept 6; Kol Israel in Arabic, Nov 4 [W 9]*)

A series of articles on Israel and, in particular, the moshav, the kibbutz and the cooperative movement, appeared in an Istanbul paper. (*Cumhuriyet, June 30, July 1, 3, 4*)

Turkish Visitors included: Prof. Kemal Yetkin, Rector of the University of Ankara, and Fuat Pekin, an art and music critic (June) (*Jer. Post, June 6, 12, 16*); Brig.-Gen. Nuri Teoman, Governor and Mayor of Ankara (Sept), who said on his return that Israel could set an example to other countries in agriculture and rural development (*Cumhuriyet, Sept 4; Onu, Sept 18*); Seyfi Demiroz, head of the General Confederation of Turkish Workers' Syndicates (Oct) — the first official visit of a representative of the Turkish labour movement, who wrote a series of articles on his impressions in the new labour daily, *Türkiye Birlik* (*Jer. Post, Oct 3, 6*); Albert Karasu, editor of the Istanbul *Journal d'Orient* (Nov). (*Jer. Post, Nov 15*)

ASIAN COUNTRIES

GENERAL

(For relations between Israel and Asian Communist countries, see under Communist Countries.)

Technical Cooperation. [In 1961 there were 275 trainees from 12 Asian countries (excluding Asian ME countries) in Israel, while 35 Israeli experts worked in Asian countries in various fields: 22 in Burma, 3 in Nepal, 4 in the Philippines and 6 in Singapore. For details see p 302 and under individual countries.]

Asian Youth Hostel Conference in Jerusalem. The Third Asian Youth Hostel Conference opened in Jerusalem on Oct 9. Delegates from Ceylon, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey, as well as observers from Burma and the Philippines, attended. There were also observers from Austria, England, France, Greece and Italy. (*Jer. Post, Oct 9, 10, 11*)

Issue of Israeli Participation in Asian Games at Jakarta. On Dec 16 the Organizing Secretary of the Fourth Asian Games Sports Committee, an Indonesian, told a *Jerusalem Post* correspondent in Rangoon: "We shall certainly invite Israel to participate in the forthcoming Asian Games in Jakarta" (scheduled to start on Aug 29, 1962). However, it was suspected that the Indonesian authorities would refuse to extend visas to the Israeli sportsmen. It was understood that in 1960 the Indonesian Foreign Ministry had promised the Iraqi Ambassador that Israel would be excluded from participation. (*Jer. Post, Dec 17*)

BURMA

PM Ben-Gurion's Visit to Burma; Friendship Reaffirmed. PM Ben-Gurion arrived in Rangoon on Dec 3 for a 16-day visit to Burma as the guest of the government. The first plans for the visit had been announced at the beginning of Nov. (*Jer. Post, Nov 2, 17*)

(PM U Nu of Burma had been the first PM to visit Israel, in May 1955. Gen. Ne Win also visited Israel as PM, in June 1959. President Ben-Zvi of Israel paid a state visit to Burma in Oct 1959.)

PM U Nu, welcoming Ben-Gurion at Rangoon airport, declared that the relations between Israel and Burma were based on "firm foundations of mutual trust and respect, of friendly and profitable cooperation"; the understanding and goodwill between the two governments were reflected in the friendship between their peoples.

PM Ben-Gurion replied: "There are much more than the ordinary bonds of goodwill and fraternal foreign relations between Israel and Burma. There is a profound affinity between the moral heritage of our ages and those of Burma." (*Jer. Post, Dec 6*)

On Dec 6, at a state dinner, U Nu, recalling his visit to Israel, said that it was "inspiring to see a modern nation spring out of the desert" and "impossible not to feel proud of the achievements of these fellow human beings." Both Burma and Israel, he continued, had emerged as independent states in the same year; both were democratic and under the imperative necessity of development; therefore both needed and fervently desired peace. (*Jer. Post, Dec 7; Burma Weekly Bulletin, Dec 14*)

In Rangoon Ben-Gurion had talks with government and opposition leaders, including President U Win Maung, Gen. Ne Win, the Chief of Staff, and U Ba Swe, leader of the Socialist opposition party. He also had conversations about Buddhism with Burmese religious leaders. (*Jer. Post, Dec 7, 8*)

The FM left for a three-day tour of northern and central Burma on Dec 8, accompanied by the FM, Sao Hkun Hkio. He spent a night in a village planned with the assistance of Israeli advisers, and farmed by ex-soldiers trained in Israeli collective and cooperative villages. (Compare MER, 1960, p 303.) The official visit ended on Dec 12 and Ben-Gurion started a week of Buddhist meditation as the personal guest of U Nu. (*Jer. Post, Dec 12, 13*)

At Rangoon University, on Dec 20 the degree of Honorary Doctor of Law was conferred upon Ben-Gurion, who delivered a lecture on "Israel Faces a World in Transformation." (*Jer. Post, Dec 21*)

Joint Communiqué: "Mutual Beneficial Relations." In a

joint statement on Dec 21, Ben-Gurion and U Nu announced that Israeli agricultural experts would be sent to assist in the development of Burma's arid zone, at Israel's expense.

The two PMs noted with pleasure that the mutually beneficial relations "between Burma and Israel have grown steadily from year to year, both in scope and in spirit, on the basis of mutual trust and respect and in harmonious cooperation. They expressed their conviction that cooperation of this nature among nations large and small would be conducive to the attainment of a greater measure of peace and prosperity in the world.

"They affirmed their confident hope that these relations would continue to grow and that Burmese-Israeli cooperation would continue to expand in the near future in the context of Burma's developing economy. They also emphasized their desire further to encourage cultural exchanges."

"The two PMs reaffirmed their full support of, and adherence to, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations," the communiqué continued, "They noted with satisfaction the great strides being made in the emancipation of subjected peoples from colonial rule. They also expressed their hope that the total emancipation of all colonial peoples would be achieved in the near future. They reaffirmed their resolute opposition to all forms of domination and to all manifestations of racial discrimination."

They expressed great concern at the continued world arms race and especially "at the adverse effects on human beings of radioactive fallout resulting from nuclear weapons tests, as well as the constant threat to the maintenance of peace which the continuation of such tests constitutes." They declared firm support for complete and early world disarmament under effective supervision, and appealed to all the nuclear powers "to work for an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests under effective inspection and control, and pending the conclusion of such an agreement, to voluntarily suspend all such tests."

"The two PMs expressed their view that the wide gap in living standards between the rich and the poor nations of the world constitutes a perennial danger to world peace and called upon the wealthy and technologically advanced nations to work selflessly for the advancement of the less developed countries."

U Nu accepted Ben-Gurion's invitation to visit Israel again, at any convenient date. (Full text in *Burma Weekly Bulletin*, Jan 4, 1962; details of the visit in *Nation*, *Rangoon*, Dec 6, 7, 10, 12-14, 19, 21-25; *Guardian*, *Rangoon*, Dec 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 21, 22.)

Burma and the Arab-Israel Conflict. On leaving Lydda airport for Rangoon on Dec 4, Ben-Gurion said that, while maintaining friendly relations with the Arab states, Burma was outstanding for her "courageous friendship" with Israel. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 5)

During the year, Premier U Nu twice made public statements on the Arab-Israel conflict.

At the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Sept U Nu strongly opposed an Arab proposal—backed by some other countries—to condemn Israel. (See p 192.) PM Ben-Gurion sent a cable to U Nu praising his stand "not only as a friend of Israel and a friend of the truth but as a true Buddhist." Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim also cabled U Nu in this connection. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 8, Nov 2; *IGPO*, Sept 9)

On Dec 25, four days after Ben-Gurion concluded

his visit to Burma, U Nu arrived in Cairo for a five-day visit. (p 670)

In a joint communiqué released on Dec 29 the paragraph on Palestine said: "President Gamal Abdel Nasser explained developments in the ME as well as different phases of the Palestine question.

"The President and the PM condemned the imperialist policies pursued in the ME and declared their support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the UN." (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 30)

It was reported that this paragraph was received in Jerusalem with mixed feelings but it was later found to be a verbatim copy of the Palestine paragraph in the resolutions of the Belgrade Conference [compare p 192 b], which was formulated following U Nu's resolute pro-Israel intervention. It therefore did not signify any new departure in U Nu's position. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, Dec 31)

PM Ben-Gurion was reported to have told the Cabinet that the communiqué was an unpleasant surprise to him but did not change his esteem for U Nu and his confidence in U Nu's true friendship for Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 1, 1962)

On Jan 2, 1962 Ben-Gurion told the Mapai Central Committee that Abdel Nasser, who knew U Nu's sympathy for Israel, had apparently refrained from attacking Israel, concentrating his arguments on the refugee problem and the need to implement UN resolutions. As this was a mere repetition of the Belgrade Declaration U Nu could not but agree. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 3, 1962)

At the end of Jan 1962 it was reported that Ben-Gurion had received a letter from U Nu explaining the paragraph. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 29, 1962)

Economic and Technical Cooperation; Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Burma trade in 1961 was: Israel's exports \$1,232,000; imports \$784,000. In 1960 the figures were \$183,000 and \$744,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

[During the year, 22 Israeli experts served in Burma.] On June 6, 68 of the 103 Burmese army personnel and their families who had spent over a year in Israel, studying cooperative farming, returned to Burma. (See *MER* 1960, p 303; *Hanthawaddy*, *Rangoon*, June 7)

On July 2 it was announced in Jerusalem that David Horowitz, the governor of the Bank of Israel, and David Kochav, the head of its Research Department, had submitted recommendations on development plans to the Burmese government. (*Jer. Post*, June 17, July 3)

On Aug 3 the Burma Economic Development Corporation signed an agreement with Fedem Enterprises, the Israeli hostellers, to manage the 240-room Inya Lake Hotel, constructed as a Soviet gift to Burma. (*Guardian*, *Rangoon*, Aug 4; *Israel Digest*, Sept 1)

On Sept 29 an Israel gift of 600 lbs of drugs and medical supplies for flood victims was presented to Burma. (*Guardian*, *Rangoon*, Sept 30)

In Oct a group of Burmese officers and soldiers completed a nine-month fish-breeding course in Israel. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 31, Oct)

Israel Product Week, the first foreign undertaking of its kind, opened in Rangoon on Dec 18. U Rashid, Burmese Minister of Industry, Mines and Labour, said: "We are looking forward to expanding trade ties with Israel, a country with which we have not only close political relations but which has already helped provide Burma with cheap and good products."

£10,000 of Israeli goods were bought by Oppen-

heimer General Stores (owned by the Defence Services Institute) and offered for sale in Rangoon. (*Jer Post*, Dec 19)

Burmese Visitors to Israel included: Capt. B. O. Barber, Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, U Thi Han, Director of Procurement, and Col. Ba Kyin, Chairman of the Five-Star Line [managed by Zim (Israel)] (in Feb) (*Jer. Post*, Feb 7); Col. Kim U, the head of the Burmese forces' training branch, in May (*Kol Israel*, May 2 [W 11]); Dr Saw Hla Tun, Head of the Karen State and Minister of Karen State Affairs in the government of Burma, and the Director-General of the Ministry, Saw Morgan Win (in June) (*Jer. Post*, June 6, 11); a four-man parliamentary delegation headed by Thakin Cbit (in Oct) (*Jer. Post*, Oct 6, 9); Aung Ye Myint, son of Premier U Nu, for a year of study in Israel (*Jer. Post*, Nov 12); U Than Swe, Parliamentary Secretary of the Burma Finance Ministry, and U Saw Maung, MP (in Dec). (*Jer. Post*, Dec 27)

Israeli Visitors. In Feb the Minister of Health, Israel Barzilai, spent a week in Burma. He presented the Burmese Minister of Health, U Ba Saw, with 15,000 assorted vaccine units and offered to send a medical team to help to deal with the high rate of infant mortality. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 3, 15; *Burma Weekly Bulletin*, Rangoon, Feb 17, March 2)

In Dec the Burmese Chief of Staff, Gen. Ne Win, invited his Israel counterpart, Maj-Gen. Zvi Tzur, and Asher Ben-Natan, Director-General of the Defence Ministry, to visit Burma in 1962. Yoseph Nahmias, the Inspector-General of Police, had been invited previously. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 14)

CEYLON

[The non-resident Ceylon Minister to Israel handed his letter of recall to the Israel Ambassador in Rome on Jan 27. (See MER 1960, p 180.)]

Visitors, Various Contacts. There was one Ceylonese in each of the following courses in Israel: the second course of the Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and Co-operation, and seminars on educational and social services for children, and on the role of women in a developing society. (*Israel Legation in Ceylon, Press Release*, No. 4, May 1961)

V. C. Jayasuriya, Permanent Secretary of the Ceylon Ministry of Local Government and Housing, visited Israel to study building methods. Israel offered to cooperate in large-scale low-cost construction. (*Ceylon Daily News*, Colombo, Oct 2, 9, 13)

Other official visitors included Dr W. A. Karunaratne, director of Ceylonese Health Services (in Oct) (*Ceylon Daily News*, Oct 26), and A. Richards, Permanent Secretary of the Ceylonese Ministry of Agriculture (in Nov). (*Jer. Post*, Nov 25)

[Ceylonese trade union officials who visited Israel included: T. B. Dissanayake, President of the government Clerical Service Union (in Feb); M. P. Sundaram, a secretary of the Workers' Congress (in June); Chandrasena Munawera, MP, secretary for international affairs of the trade unions affiliated to the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom party (in Nov).]

Mayors Mordechai Namir of Tel Aviv and Sayf al-Din Zu'bi of Nazareth visited Colombo in Dec as guests of the Mayor. They were received by Mrs Sirinavo Bandaranaike, the PM. On his return Namir said: "The

openly displayed affection by the Ceylonese (and Indian) public and political personalities towards us is in complete contrast to the official attitude towards Israel." (*Jer. Post*, Dec 12, 13, 26, 27)

Trade. According to Israel statistics the volume of Israel-Ceylon trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$82,000; imports \$63,000. In 1960 the figures were \$34,000 and \$58,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

HONG KONG

Israeli visitors to Hong Kong included Israel Barzilai, the Minister of Health (in Feb); Mayors Namir of Tel Aviv and Zu'bi of Nazareth (in Dec). (*Jer. Post*, Feb 26, Dec 26)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of trade between Israel and Hong Kong in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$7,984,000, imports \$90,000. In 1960 the figures were \$7,545,000 and \$18,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

INDIA

Diplomatic Contacts. In Feb Israel Barzilai, the Israeli Health Minister, headed the Israel delegation to the Assembly of the World Health Organization in New Delhi. He was joined by Gideon Rafael, an Assistant Director-General of the Foreign Ministry.

Rafael was received by PM Nehru at the initiative of the Indian Foreign Ministry and met V.K. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, and Mrs Lakshmi Menon, the Deputy Foreign Minister. It was understood that the talks showed that relations could be improved by mutual assistance in agriculture, health and development of water resources. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 3, March 13)

Nehru: No Diplomatic Relations with Israel. At a press conference in London PM Nehru reportedly said that India had recognized Israel ten years ago [*de jure*, in Sept 1950], but had no mission in Israel. "It was not logical but it was practical." (*Times*, March 18)

While attending the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Sept, Nehru declared at a press conference that it was "utterly difficult" for his country to recognize Israel. [He apparently referred to the establishment of diplomatic relations.] "Before Suez we had consulates and our relations were increasing, although no diplomatic relations had been established," he was quoted as saying. (*The Jerusalem Post* commented that Nehru erred, as India had never opened a consulate in Israel.) "However, after Suez I personally felt terribly frustrated by the event and it is utterly difficult to lend any recognition whatsoever now." (*Jer. Post*, Sept 5)

India and the Arab-Israel Conflict. (See p 190a)

Visitors to Israel Included: [Mr Sinha, SG of the Miners Union in Bihar State (in Jan); P.C. Rebeja, Director-General of the Arid Zone Research Institute (in March); the Director-General of the Punjab State Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperation (in April); and M.V. Krishnappa, Deputy Minister of Food and Agriculture (in June), who was principally interested in poultry raising, dairy farming and agricultural cooperatives and was expected to propose sending more students to Israel (*Jer. Post*, June 27, 29); a delegation of farm and cooperative leaders (in Nov). (*Jer. Post*, Nov 24)]

Israeli Visitors to India included: Mrs Ester Herlitz, director of the International Department of Mapai (in April) (*Ha'aretz*, April 19); Mayors Namir of Tel Aviv

and Zubi of Nazareth (in Dec) (*Jer. Post, Nov 27; Dec 13*); Eliahu Elath, former Israel Ambassador to London and co-chairman of the Afro-Asian Institute in Tel Aviv on a lecture tour (Dec 1961-Jan 1962)—he was received by Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, then Vice President (later President) of India, and PM Nehru. (*Stoterman, Delhi, Dec 6*; see *Davar, Feb 16, 23, 26, March 2, 12, 1962* for his impressions on the visit.)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Indian trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$98,000, imports \$122,000. In 1960 the figures were \$82,000 and \$81,000 respectively. (*IFT, 1961*)

JAPAN, KOREA

Economic Ties with Japan. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Japan trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$3,937,000; imports \$2,457,000. In 1960 the figures were \$1,863,000 and \$8,866,000 respectively. (*IFT, 1961*)

Copper, cement, phosphates, potash and cut diamonds were Israel's main exports (*IFT, 1961*). However, there were difficulties in the shipment of bulk cargoes owing to high shipping rates caused by empty home runs to Eilat. In May, and again in the autumn, shipping stopped. Negotiations for west-bound cargoes and transshipment across Israel of various Europe-bound cargoes continued, however, and shipments were renewed in the winter. (*Jer. Post, May 22; Davar, Sept 15; Ha'aretz, Sept 17, Oct 17; Nation, Japan, Aug 6, Sept 4, 13, 14*) It was learned in April that the Israel pavilion at the Tokyo Fair had succeeded in interesting prospective buyers. (*Ha'aretz, April 25*)

In June it was announced that Israel had placed orders for five freighters, two of 30,000 tons and three of 10,000 tons, with Japanese shipyards. (*Kol Israel, June 6 [W 15]*)

In Sept Japanese goods were exhibited at the International Exhibition of Applied Arts in Tel Aviv. (*Jer. Post, Sept 14*)

Japanese Visitors to Israel included: a handball team (in April) (*Jer. Post, April 4*); a seven-member parliamentary delegation as part of an Economic Committee mission to several countries (in July) (*Jer. Post, July 13, 14, 16, 17*); an archeological team from Tokyo University, which found a skeleton of Neanderthal man in Galilee; [a number of other scientists]. (*Jer. Post, May 9, Sept 5; Ha'aretz, July 18, 19*)

Korea. A four-man delegation from South Korea headed by Yong Shik Kim, the Ambassador in London, paid a goodwill visit to Israel on July 10-12. (*Jer. Post, July 9, 12, 13*)

The South Korean and Israeli national soccer teams met on Oct 22 in Israel, and drew 1-1. (In two previous games in 1956 and 1960 the Korean team had beaten Israel.) (*Jer. Post, Oct 20, 22, 23*)

[Korean visitors to Israel included a number of journalists.]

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, in 1961 Israel exported \$9,000 of goods to South Korea; there were no imports. In 1960 there were no trade relations. (*IFT, 1961*)

NEPAL

Ambassador Named. On June 11 the Israel Foreign Ministry announced that the Nepalese Ambassador in Rome

had been named non-resident Ambassador to Israel (*Jer. Post, June 12*). (The non-resident Israel Ambassador to Nepal presented his credentials in Sept 1960—MER 1960, p. 305.)

[An Israel-Nepal Friendship League was established in Kathmandu.]

Joint Enterprise. On Aug 13 an agreement was signed between the government of Nepal and Solel Boneh, the Israeli Histadrut-owned contracting company, setting up the Nepal National Construction Company Ltd. on a partnership basis. The Nepalese partner was to subscribe 51% of the \$400,000 capital. The board of directors held its first meeting on Oct 29. (The intention to set up joint enterprises was mentioned in 1960 in the joint communiqué of PM Koirala and PM Ben-Gurion; see MER 1960, p. 305.) (*Ha'aretz, April 5; Motherland, Kathmandu, Aug 14, Oct 30*)

Nepalese Study Missions and Student Groups to Israel included: a delegation of the National Planning Council, headed by Dr Singh Amatiya (in Oct), on their way from the USSR, for a ten-day study tour (*Jer. Post, Oct 11*); a first group of 12 students for 15 months' training as instructors in agriculture, building, metal and woodwork and electrical work under the joint auspices of the USOM and the Israel Government. (*Jer. Post, Oct 18*)

It was announced in Nov that five Nepalese students had been granted Israeli scholarships in medicine and technology. (*The Commoner, Kathmandu, Nov 17*)

[Three Israel experts worked in Nepal during the year.]

Nepalese Visitors to Israel included: D. N. Proddhan, director of the Nepal Tourist Corporation (*Jer. Post, Dec 19*) [and Janaki Prasad Pradhan, Director of Agriculture in the Ministry of Agriculture], both in Dec.

Medicine Sent to Nepal. In answer to a request by the Nepalese Public Welfare Organization, a shipment of medicine was sent by the Magen David Adom (Israeli equivalent of the Red Cross). (*IGPO/WNB, No. 33, Nov*)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics Israel exported \$3,000 worth of goods to Nepal in 1961; no statistics were available for 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

THE PHILIPPINES

[In 1961 four Israeli experts worked in the Philippines.]

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israeli-Philippine trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$110,000; imports \$8,000. The 1960 figures were \$391,000 and \$18,000 respectively. (*IFT, 1961*)

[Visitors from the Philippines included a number of scientists, especially in the field of agriculture, labour experts and journalists.]

SOUTH EAST ASIA

Cambodia. According to Israeli statistics, Israeli exports to Cambodia in 1961 totalled \$93,000; there were no imports. There were no statistics for 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

Laos. Shipments of medicine were sent by Magen David Adom (the Israeli equivalent of the Red Cross) to Laos in response to an official appeal, for 50,000 refugees who had flocked into Vientiane from battle areas. (*IGPO/WNB, No. 33, Nov*)

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Malaya. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israeli-Malayan trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$91,000; imports \$155,000. In 1960 the figures were \$29,000 and \$397,000 respectively. (*IFT, 1961*)

[Dr Tan Chee Koon, deputy president of the Malaya Socialist Front and president of the Labour party, visited Israel in Aug.]

Singapore. Israel Barzilai, the Israel Minister of Health, visited Singapore in Feb. He offered to train Singapore doctors in Israel (*Jer. Post, Feb 26, March 5*). [Following his visit four Israeli physicians began work in Singapore.]

A four-member delegation from Singapore, headed by Chan Sun Wing, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the PM, took part in the first youth leadership course in Israel, organized by the Gadna (youth corps). (*Jer. Post, March 27; IGPO/WNB, No. 7, May*)

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Singapore trade in 1961 was: exports \$1,846,000; imports \$392,000. In 1960 the figures were \$802,000 and \$88,000 respectively. (*IFT, 1961*)

Thailand. [Thai visitors to Israel included: a number of senior government officials from the Ministries of Health, Education, Interior (Public Welfare), and the Customs, as well as the director of the Thai Industrial Development Bank.]

Israeli visitors to Thailand included Israel Barzilai, Minister of Health (in March), and Mayor Namir of Tel Aviv (in Dec). (*Jer. Post, March 5, Dec 15*)

The first student in electrical engineering under the offer of scholarships presented to the Mekong River project committee by the Israeli government in Nov 1960 reached Israel in Sept. (*USIS press release, Thailand, Sept 5*)

Three Thai doctors were engaged in post-graduate work at the Hadasah-Hebrew University Medical Centre. (*Jer. Post, Sept 17*)

Israeli experts in Thailand undertook a water and agriculture survey, and the establishment of a model farm. (*IGYB, 1961/62*)

According to Israeli statistics, Israel exported \$503,000 worth of goods to Thailand in 1961 as against \$226,000 in 1960. There were no imports. (*IFT, 1961*)

South Vietnam. A water survey was conducted in South Vietnam by Israeli experts and the government indicated that it might need more experts for a longer period. (*IGYB 1961/62*)

[In July Nguyen Hun Chinh, SG of the Teachers Union and Chairman of the Education Committee of the National Assembly, visited Israel.]

According to Israeli statistics, Israel exported \$71,000 worth of goods to South Vietnam in 1961, compared with \$2,000 in 1960. No imports were reported. (*IFT, 1961*)

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

CAMEROON

The daughter of President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon arrived in Israel on June 28 for a year's study of social welfare. (*Jer. Post, June 29*)

Jean Akassou, Minister of Posts and Communications, visited Israel in July. (*R. Brazzaville, June 14 (17)*)

On July 17, nine students, the first from Cameroon, arrived for a Gadna (youth corps) course. (*Jer. Post, July 18*)

Yitzhak Bavli, an Israeli engineer, former Ambassador to South Africa, was appointed by the UN Technical Assistance Agency as industrial advisor to the government of Cameroon. (*Ha'aretz, Nov 28*)

Rene Okala, Chairman of the Cameroon Socialist Party, visited Israel in Dec. (*Jer. Post, Dec 12*)

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Cameroon trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$10,000 and imports \$36,000, compared with Israeli exports of \$38,000 and no imports in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Israel Ambassador Confirmed. In Nov the government of the CAR agreed to the appointment of Ephraim Ben-Haim as Israel's first Ambassador to the Republic. (*Jer. Post, Nov 10*)

Technical Assistance. Fifty trainees from the CAR, most of them under 20, arrived in Israel on Jan 8, following Israel's grant of scholarships on the occasion of the Republic's independence in Dec 1960. They were to study agriculture, irrigation, fishing, cooperation and youth training. (*Ha'aretz, Jan 9, 20*)

An official delegation from the CAR, headed by Mar-

cel Douzima, Minister of State, visited Israel in April. They met ministers and officials, toured the country and met students from their country. (*Jer. Post, April 26, 27*)

CHAD

Israel Ambassador Accredited. The Israel Ambassador to Chad, Ephraim Ben-Haim, presented his letters of credence to President François Tombalbaye on Jan 10. (*IGPO/DNB, Jan 12*)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation; Trade. A six-man delegation from Chad, headed by Adoum Tchéré, Minister of Agriculture, and including Hadji Mahamat Brahimi, Vice-President of the National Assembly, arrived in Israel on Feb 2. They were received by President Ben-Zvi and met the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture. A joint communiqué issued on Feb 18 said that the delegation had studied agricultural development and planning, education for citizenship and vocational training, and that the visit would strengthen the friendly ties and cooperation between the two countries. (*Jer. Post, Feb 3, 19*)

On Aug 27 an Israeli mission left for Chad to survey agricultural and irrigation possibilities. (*Jer. Post, Aug 28*)

Two officials from Chad trained at Israel labour exchanges. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 20*)

Young people from Chad attended an African youth leaders course which started on Dec 12. (*IGPO/WNB, No. 38, Dec*)

According to Israeli statistics, Israeli exports to Chad in 1961 were \$11,000. There were no figures for imports. (*IFT, 1961*)

CONGO (Brazzaville)

Israeli President to Visit Congo. It was officially announced on July 6 that President Ben-Zvi had accepted an invitation from President Youlou to visit Congo (Brazzaville) (*Jer. Post*, July 7). [The visit took place in 1962.]

Israeli Aid in Organizing Independence Celebrations. Four members of Hapoel, an Israeli sports organization, helped to organize Congo's third independence day celebrations, and were decorated by President Youlou for their efforts (*Jer. Post*, Dec 12). Israel had a special representative at the celebrations. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 23)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation; Medical Aid; Trade. Following a request by President Youlou during his visit to Israel in 1960 (see MER 1960, pp 309-10), an Israeli experts' mission arrived in Brazzaville on Jan 5, and conducted a survey on rural development, town planning, public works, and navigation. Another mission had conducted an industrial survey there at the end of 1960. (*Agence France-Presse*, *Bulletin d'Information*, Jan 23; *Le Courrier d'Afrique* Jan 7, 8)

During a week's visit by a three-man government delegation from Congo, headed by Raymond Mahouta, Minister of Health, it was announced that Israel, in consultation with the WHO, would send personnel and drugs to Congo to help combat the polio epidemic, tuberculosis and malaria, and train medical personnel. An Israeli medical team had spent nine weeks in Congo at the beginning of the year to survey health problems. (*Jer. Post*, March 24, May 8)

A five-member Congolese study mission, including Simon Pierre Kikounga N'got, Minister of the Economy, and Germain Samba, Minister of Agriculture, arrived in Israel on May 25 for a nine-day visit. They toured agricultural settlements and investigated the possibility of setting up joint industrial enterprises (*Jer. Post*, June 5). Upon their return, they reported that Israel had agreed to send experts to set up experimental agricultural settlements and undertake irrigation schemes in the development area of Niari. (*L'Homme Nouveau*, Brazzaville, Aug)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Congo trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$19,000; imports \$147,000. There were no figures for 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

CONGO (Léopoldville)

Israel continued to supply technical assistance to Congo (Léopoldville) under the auspices of the UN agencies. (See MER 1960, pp 36-7.) Congolese cabinet ministers and a parliamentary delegation visited Israel during the year. Israeli experts went to Congo, and Congolese trainees came to Israel.

Political Developments. After the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the former Premier, in Feb, Israel refrained from any official comment on developments in Congo. She did not recognize the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville, on the grounds that, as the UN had recognized Kasavubu as President, he alone was authorized to nominate the prime minister. (For background see MER 1960, pp 25-6; see also p 637 b.) Several demonstrations and memorial gatherings took place in Israel after Lumumba's death; some were organized by African students in training and by the Mapam party. (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 16, 27)

On Aug 3 PM Ben-Gurion and FM Golda Meir cabled

Cyrille Adoula their congratulations on his taking office as Prime Minister. (President Kasavubu had asked him to form a cabinet on the resignation of Iléo, and be received; a vote of confidence in Parliament on Aug 2; Gizenga became Vice-PM.) Congratulations were also sent by Histadrut officials who had been Adoula's hosts during his visit to Israel in June 1960 (see MER 1960, p 36). (*Jer. Post*, Aug 4)

Visits. Pascal Nkay and Esare Kuyena, Province of Léopoldville Ministers of Finance and of Civil Service respectively, and Senator Emmanuel Bamba visited Israel in March-April. (*Jer. Post*, March 27, April 6)

In May Celestin Kalwangana, Minister of Agriculture, came for a ten-day visit, accompanied by two assistants. They toured the country and army installations. (*Jer. Post*, May 11, 15)

Sebastian Balongi, the Federal Minister of Planning and the Middle Classes, visited Israel in Sept and met Mrs Meir. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 1)

Joseph Dianginda, head of the Kimbango Christian sect, arrived in Israel on Oct 29 with five colleagues. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 29, 30)

M.S.Y. Kapongo, Minister of State, head of the Congolese delegation to the UN, accompanied by two members of the delegation, visited Israel in Dec. He declared that Israel had shown great understanding for Congo in her travail and did not hesitate to help her, despite her own rehabilitation problems. He said that reports of the supply of arms by Israel to Katanga were "utter fiction." (*Jer. Post*, Dec 31)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation. On the departure of some 40 Congolese trainees to attend courses in public administration, agriculture, rural development, youth movements and sports instruction in Israel, the Léopoldville paper *Actualités Africaines* wrote that European countries and the US "lacked the advantages, the secret of which was held by small countries." This was proved, the paper said, by the activities of the Israel embassy, which responded to Congo's urgent needs and supplied training facilities in all fields. (*Actualités Africaines*, Léopoldville, Jan 1)

In Jan, four members of the Congolese parliament spent four weeks in Israel studying problems of industry and cooperative organizations.

An Israeli civil aviation radio technician and a signaller left to work at Léopoldville airport under a six-month contract with the UN Emergency Force. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 8)

Twenty-one agricultural instructors and union leaders from Congo and Ruanda-Urundi arrived on May 15 for a five-week study visit as guests of the Moshav (cooperative settlement) movement. They studied at the village of Kfar Hess. (*Jer. Post*, May 16; *Kol Israel*, May 31 [June 2])

In June, two Congolese trainees arrived for a month's advanced radio training at the Kol Israel radio station. (*Jer. Post*, June 20)

Ten Congolese nurses trained in Israel during the year. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 15)

The Magen David Adom (equivalent of Red Cross) sent medical supplies for refugees in South Kasai. (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 12; *Actualités Africaines*, Feb 11-2)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of trade between Israel and Congo in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$54,000 and imports \$5,000, compared with \$78,000 and \$20,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

ENTENTE COUNTRIES

Ambassadors Exchanged. Jean-Baptiste Mockey was accredited as Ambassador of each of the four Entente countries: for the Ivory Coast on May 24, for Upper Volta on July 5, for Niger on Nov 9 and for Dahomey on Dec 5. (*Jer. Post, May 24, July 26; Ha'aretz, Dec 6; IGPO/WNE No. 33, Nov*)

[Shlomo Hillel was accredited as Israel Ambassador to each of the four countries.]

DAHOMY

President's Visit to Israel. President Hubert Maga arrived in Israel on Sept 21 for an eight-day state visit, accompanied by Oké Assogba, the Foreign Minister, Sebastian Dassi, Minister of Agriculture, and others. Among subjects discussed in his talks with PM Ben-Gurion were world problems, ties between the two countries and the question of neutralism. President Ben-Zvi and PM Ben-Gurion were presented by President Maga with the Grand-Croix Dahoméenne, his country's highest order. (*Jer. Post, Post, Sept 22, 24, 26*)

Treaty of Friendship and Technical Assistance Pact Signed. On Sept 28 a Treaty of Friendship and a Mutual Technical Assistance Pact between Israel and Dahomey were signed in Jerusalem in the presence of Presidents Maga and Ben-Zvi. The Treaty affirmed the close ties between the two nations and their determination to solve by peaceful means, including UN mediation, any differences that might arise between them. (*Kitvei Amanah, 447*)

The Mutual Assistance Pact called for cooperation in agriculture, fishing, industrial and mineral development, youth training, medicine, vocational training, communications and transportation. Israel undertook to provide scholarships in these fields for Dahomeyan students and to send out experts and advisors. (*Kitvei Amanah, 436*)

Joint Communiqué Expresses Mutual Esteem. A joint communiqué issued by President Maga and PM Ben-Gurion on Sept 27, expressed the President's appreciation of "the pioneering spirit of the state of Israel, which has found special expression in her relations with the newly independent states of Africa and Asia," and PM Ben-Gurion's esteem for "the great work of peace and upbuilding" of the nations of the Conseil de l'Entente and the UAM. The two leaders reaffirmed that all governments should "refrain from the use of threats and force" and observe the principle of direct negotiation for the peaceful settlement of differences. (*Israel Digest, Oct 13*)

On his return home, President Maga declared that he was impressed with Israel's achievements and wished his people to have the same "faith in their destiny" as the Israelis. (*L'Aube Nouvelle, Oct 7*)

Ambassadors Exchanged. See above: Entente Countries.

Visitors. Father Georges Yaoogo arrived in Israel on Dec 17 to study problems of development and social services. (*Ha'aretz, Dec 18*)

IVORY COAST

Political and Diplomatic Relations. Visiting an Israel exhibition in Abidjan on April 11, President Houphouët-Boigny was reported to have said that Israel's example should be copied, so that the Ivory Coast might reach the same stage of development. Israel had never lost

her courage "in the face of persistent hostility by enemies on her borders," he declared (*Ha'aretz, April 12*). The exhibition, "Ancient Nation—Young State," was opened on April 8 by Coffi Gadeau, the Minister of the Interior. (*Abidjan Matin, April 4*)

Israel was represented by a special ambassador at the celebrations on the first anniversary of the Ivory Coast's independence. (*Jer. Post, Aug 7*)

The visit of President Houphouët-Boigny to Israel, scheduled for Nov, was postponed to 1962 (*Jer. Post, Oct 12*). [The visit took place in July 1962.]

(On the exchange of Ambassadors see above: Entente Countries.)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation. On May 4 Charles Donwahi, the Minister of Agriculture, arrived for a 14-day visit to inspect agricultural enterprises, and signed a technical assistance agreement for the exchange of agricultural experts and the training of students. (*Jer. Post, May 5, 15*)

Jean Banny, the Minister of Defence, arrived in Israel on Aug 20 for a ten-day visit. He met PM Ben-Gurion, FM Golda Meir and the Chief of Staff, and visited army and Gadhna centres. Before his departure he signed an agreement for the setting up of Nahal- and Gadhna-type youth organizations in the Ivory Coast. (*Jer. Post, Aug 21, 30*)

The director of the Ivory Coast Broadcasting service visited Israel in June and discussed cooperation with the Israeli radio. (*Jer. Post, June 5; Kol Israel, June 11, [13]*)

Economic Relations, Trade Agreement, Israeli Loan. A \$5.4 million trade agreement for a one-year period was signed between Israel and the Ivory Coast in Feb during a visit to the Ivory Coast by the Director-General of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Michael Tsaur. He said on March 1 that under the agreement Israel would purchase 2.7 million worth of goods: diamonds (\$1.5 million), timber (\$700,000), cocoa (\$250,000) and coffee (\$250,000). She would export industrial products, building materials, tires and foodstuffs.

Israel would also lend the Ivory Coast \$1.5 million in the form of supplies for the construction of a \$6-million hotel in Abidjan to be built by Meyer Bros. of Israel. (*Jer. Post, March 2*)

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Ivory Coast trade in 1961 was: Israel exports \$32,000 and imports \$1,141,000. There were no figures for 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

Sport. Athletes from the Ivory Coast participated in the Hapoel Workers' Sports Festival, which began on May 7. (*Ha'aretz, May 8*)

NIGER

Niger Ambassador Accredited. See above: Entente Countries.

Israel Represented at Independence Anniversary. The Minister for Social Welfare, Dr Yosef Burg, represented Israel on Dec 14 at the independence anniversary celebrations in Niger. He was received by President Hamani Diori, to whom he delivered a gift from President Ben-Zvi. (*Jer. Post, Dec 14, 21*)

On Oct 11 the Israel Foreign Ministry stated that President Diori's visit to Israel, scheduled for Nov, had been postponed to the beginning of 1962, owing to

difficulties in the schedules of the heads of states. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 12)

UPPER VOLTA

President Yameogo Visits Israel. President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta arrived in Israel on July 4, for an eight-day state visit, having been invited by President Ben-Zvi in June, accompanied by Lompolo Koné, the Foreign Minister, Denis Yameogo, Minister of Defence and the Interior, and Frederic Guirra, Ambassador to the UN. He visited the main cities and was the guest of the Israel Defence Forces. (*Ha'aretz*, July 6, 7)

At a banquet given in his honour by President Ben-Zvi, Yameogo spoke of "l'amitié inconditionnelle" (the friendship without strings), between his country and the peoples of Africa, and Israel. He said he had come to "draw from the well of your experience and dynamism". (*Jer. Post*, July 5, 6)

Support For Israel's Quest for Peace. On another occasion Yameogo said he was aware of the complexities of Israel's political circumstances; his country was prepared, without hesitation, to stand at Israel's side in her quest for peace. (*Jer. Post*, July 6)

Israel was "a precious example of what man can accomplish when he decides to fight the desert," he declared. "It seems legitimate to us that this experiment should be protected and defended against any attempt to annihilate it." He added: "We have not found anywhere armies ready to attack, but we have seen a country ready to defend itself, animated by a spirit of true socialism and devoting itself entirely to the development of its resources". (*IGPO/WNB*, July 5-11)

Friendship Treaty Signed. On July 11 President Yameogo and FM Golda Meir signed a treaty of friendship in Jerusalem, undertaking to settle by peaceful means all differences that might arise between the two countries. The treaty also provided for the establishment of consular services, guaranteed the accepted rights and immunities of the representatives of the two states, and accorded their citizens the right to travel, trade and own property in each other's country. (*Kitov Amana*, 433)

Joint Communiqué Stresses Friendly Relations; Anti-Colonialism, Peaceful ME Settlement. President Yameogo and PM Ben-Gurion, in a joint communiqué issued on July 11, "reiterated and affirmed their desire to strengthen even further the close and friendly relations that unite both nations, and to cooperate in the development of their economic resources and their social and cultural ties." "Particular attention" had been paid in their talks to the problems of Africa and the ME. The two statesmen expressed satisfaction at Africa's progress in abolishing colonial rule, and support for the 1960 UN declaration on colonialism. They deplored the situation in Angola and the apartheid policy in South Africa. There was "complete agreement" that "the nations of the ME, Africa and other areas refrain from all threats and from all use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any nation, and that they should abandon all policies of systematic hostility and make recourse to direct negotiation in order to settle all outstanding problems." (*Jer. Post*, July 12)

For descriptions of the visit see also *Dakar Matin*; *Carrefour Africain* July 9; *Abidjan Matin*, July 5, 11, 13.)

Ambassadors Accredited. See above: Entente Countries.

Gestures of Friendship. In Oct, the UN representative of Upper Volta gave a reception in honour of the Israeli FM, Golda Meir. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 15)

Dr Yosef Burg, the Minister of Social Welfare, represented Israel at Upper Volta's first independence day celebrations. In Jerusalem, a street chosen by Upper Volta's Ambassador was named after his country. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 12, 14)

Technical Assistance Agreement Signed. Before President Yameogo's visit, a mutual technical assistance agreement was signed in Jerusalem on June 11 by FM Golda Meir and Upper Volta's Minister of National Economy, Antoine Yameogo, who had arrived in Israel on June 5. It provided for the training in Israel of Upper Volta students in agriculture, medicine, public health, education, communications and transportation. Israel was to send experts to Upper Volta to advise in these fields as well as in the development of industry and natural resources, and the training of skilled workers and technicians. Israel was to pay the students' expenses, while Upper Volta would pay salaries and transportation of Israeli experts staying over two months. (*Jer. Post*, June 6, 12; *Kitov Amana*, 433)

Israeli Agricultural Survey in Upper Volta. On Aug 12 a group of Israeli experts left for Upper Volta to conduct an agricultural survey, with particular attention to cattle raising and the development of water resources (*Ha'aretz*, Aug 28). Upon the completion of its survey in Sept, the mission was praised by the Minister of National Economy, Antoine Yameogo, for its "perfect success". (*Abidjan Matin*, Sept 28)

In Nov, following the report of the mission, the Israel Ministry of Agriculture proposed the establishment in Upper Volta of a large-scale model agricultural farm to introduce the use of modern agricultural and irrigation methods and the development of poultry raising in small holdings. A senior agricultural expert was to coordinate the programme (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 26). [He left at the end of the year.]

Joint Engineering Company. The establishment of a joint engineering company in Upper Volta was approved in Nov by Hevrat Ovdim [the controlling body of Histadrut enterprises]. The partners were to be the Upper Volta government, Solel Boneh [the Histadrut contracting company], and Tahal [the Israel water planning company] (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 28). [The plan had not yet been implemented by the end of the year.]

GABON, GAMBIA

Gabon. On March 11 Yerahmiel Ram Yaron was accredited as Israel's Ambassador to Gabon (*Ha'aretz*, March 12). [The Gabon Ambassador to Israel was accredited in March 1962.]

Two officials from Gabon attended a four-month seminar on public administration in Israel. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 5, April)

Israel was represented by a special ambassador at the celebrations of the first anniversary of Gabon's independence, on Aug 17. (*Jer. Post*, Aug 18)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Gabon trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$11,000 and imports \$3,003,000. There were no figures for 1960. Since 1960 Israel had been Gabon's third-largest customer for timber. (*Ha'aretz*, April 4; *IFT*, 1961)

Gambia. At the end of the year, Israel opened a consulate in Bathurst, the capital of Gambia. (*Jer. Post, Dec 17*)

GHANA

Ghana-Israel Relations Following the Casablanca Conference. Following the adoption of the anti-Israel resolution at the Casablanca Conference in Jan, to which Ghana was a signatory (p 48 ff), the Israeli Ambassador in Accra, Moshe Bitan, met President Nkrumah on Jan 14. Bitan was reported to have pointed out the contrast between the Casablanca condemnation of Israel and Ghana's pro-Israeli declarations at the UN shortly before (see MER 1960, pp 178, 311) (*Ha'aretz, Jan 16*). Nkrumah, it was reported, assured the Israeli Ambassador that there had been no change in Ghana's relations with Israel, but affirmed his support for the Casablanca resolution on Jan 18. (*Ghana News, Accra, Jan 19*)

While UAR sources said that Ghana was winding up her relations with Israel (*MENA, Jan 25 [26], Feb 9 [10]*), Israeli papers, not content with Nkrumah's assurances, demanded that Ghana define clearly her relations with Israel. (See e.g. *Davar, Jan 18; Haboker, Jan 19*.) *Ma'ariv* claimed that the Israel government was reconsidering her aid programme to Ghana, but *Ha'aretz* reported that the sending of Israeli experts continued as scheduled, and that the Foreign Ministry did not rule out the possibility of further Ghanaian requests even after the Casablanca resolution. (*Ma'ariv, Jan 20; Ha'aretz, Feb 10*)

Declarations of Friendship and Cooperation: On Feb 20 Nkrumah was reported to have said that he looked forward to closer cooperation with Israel on future development projects. He was speaking at a farewell party at his residence for Israeli instructors who had completed their service in setting up and operating Ghana's Air Force School (see MER 1960, p 311; *Jer. Post, Feb 22*). He also said he was impressed with the Israeli government's role in the development of Ghana's air services. (*Daily Graphic, Accra, Feb 22*)

The Ghanaian Ambassador to Israel, Bediako Poku, said on Feb 22 that the government and people of Ghana had not changed their friendly attitude towards Israel. "We know what you have done for our young country and what you shall still do in the future," he said, adding: "We shall be the last to stand by and let Israel be destroyed." What Ghana wanted, he said, was "to be friends to all and enemies to none." (*Jer. Post, Feb 23*)

On March 9, an Israel Foreign Ministry source said that Israel's cooperation with Ghana was proceeding smoothly, although each country retained an independent point of view in choosing friends and in its approach to world affairs. (*Jer. Post, March 10*)

On July 4 at the opening of the second session of the Ghanaian parliament, President Nkrumah was reported to have praised Israel as one of the ten "friendly nations" that had offered Ghana financial aid, and to have made no reference to the Casablanca Conference or the UAR. (*Ha'aretz, July 6, 24*)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation. The Permanent Secretary of the Ghanaian Ministry of Agriculture visited Israel in Jan to study its agricultural systems. (*Kol Israel, Jan 11 [13]*)

Three out of eight Israeli specialists to take up medical posts with the Ghana government arrived in Accra on Jan 4 (*Daily Graphic, Accra, Jan 5*). Another

doctor left for Ghana in Feb to spend a year as head of a children's clinic there (*Ha'aretz, Feb 24*). On April 24, Dr Daniel Brachot left for Ghana to take up a post as Health Adviser to President Nkrumah. (*Jer. Post, April 25*)

Two Ghanaian banking officials arrived in Israel in Feb for a period of training at the Bank of Israel, following an agreement between the latter and the Bank of Ghana. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 21*)

A Ghanaian cooperatives administrator received training at the Israeli Ministry of Finance. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 26*)

Sixty young Ghanaians arrived in Israel on March 14 to study at a technical school on scholarships granted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. (*Kol Israel, March 14 [W 23]*)

An agreement on Israel participation in agricultural and development schemes was reached in Accra in July. Israeli experts were to conduct an irrigation survey of a large area in northern Ghana, as well as an agricultural survey. Other projects included a compost plant, a plant for chemical fertilizers and a cattle ranch (*Ha'aretz, July 21*). [The plan was implemented during 1961-62, when two model farms were established in the area, and agricultural and irrigation surveys conducted.]

The Commander of the Ghanaian Builders' Brigade, Jones Ababio, visited Israel in Aug to study the possibility of adopting Israeli agricultural methods to the Builders' farming scheme (*Jer. Post, Aug 28*). [Israeli Nahal instructors had been advising the Brigade since Jan 1960 (see MER 1960, p 310).]

Trade Union Cooperation. On Jan 21 the Trade Union Congress of Ghana and the Histadrut signed an agreement on cooperation in the organizational field. The agreement was signed for the Israeli side by a Histadrut official, who spent three months in Ghana in the organization of the Trade Union Congress (*Ha'aretz, Jan 23*). Histadrut officials continued as advisers to the Congress throughout the year. (*Jer. Post, March 13, Nov 21*)

Israeli Firms Relinquish Shares, Continue Management of Ghana Companies. The Ghanaian government decided to discontinue its partnership with Solel Boneh [the Histadrut contracting company] in the Ghana National Construction Company, though the contract had been due to expire only in mid-1963. Solel Boneh agreed to sell its 40% holding to the Ghanaian government and to continue managing the firm. (*Ha'aretz, Sept 13*)

A Sierra Leone newspaper wrote that this move was in line with Ghana's nationalization policy, which had also involved Israel's sale of her Black Star Line shares in 1960 (see below). It stressed that Israel's declared policy was to "give African and Asian firms the chance to work on an independent basis." (*Shependeh, Free-town, Sept 25*)

A member of the Zim Israel Navigation Co. Board of Directors declared that relations with Ghana continued smoothly in accordance with the contracts signed. [Zim's shares in the Black Star Line were purchased in 1960 by the Ghanaian government, which retained Zim's services as managing agent; see MER 1960, p 310.] He said that most of the cooperation with the Black Star Company was now in the field of know-how and the maintenance of joint lines. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 12*)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Ghana trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$2,074,000

and imports \$1,173,000, compared with \$1,987,000 and \$1,445,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

Cultural Relations; Various Contacts. President Nkrumah visited the Israel exhibition "Ancient Nation—Young State" in Accra on Jan. 16. The exhibition, officially opened on Jan. 17 by Kojo Botsio, Minister of Agriculture, was visited by some 40,000 persons. It described life and development in Israel and included commercial exhibits. The *Ghanaian Times* of Jan. 25 published a nine-page supplement on Israel in connection with the exhibition. (*Davar*, Jan. 27; *Ha'aretz*, Jan. 29; *Ghanaian Times*, Jan. 18, 25)

PM Ben-Gurion and cabinet ministers attended a Ghanaian embassy Independence Day celebration on July 3. (*Ha'aretz*, July 4)

President Nkrumah and members of his cabinet attended the official opening of the Ghana Dramatic Studio, the establishment of which had been encouraged by the first Israeli Ambassador in Accra, Ehud Avriel. A tribute was paid to Avriel by the company director. (*Jer. Post*, Oct. 23)

Athletes from Ghana took part in the Hapoel Workers' Sports Festival, which began on May 7. (*Ha'aretz*, May 8)

GUINEA

Political Relations. After the adoption of the anti-Israel declaration at Casablanca in Jan., to which Guinea was a signatory, Shlomo Hillel, the Israeli Ambassador to Guinea, was instructed to deliver a protest to President Sekou Touré, but was unable to secure an interview with him. (*Ha'aretz*, Feb. 10; *Ma'ariv*, March 14)

At a special session of the Egyptian National Assembly in honour of Sekou Touré, on May 13, the Speaker, Anwar as-Saadat, spoke of Israel (as well as Algeria and Laos), as a springboard for imperialism. In his reply, Touré ignored these references and spoke about the struggle against imperialism in general terms. (Texts in *Ahram*, May 14)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Guinea trade in 1961 was: Israel exports \$5,000 and imports \$1,580,000, compared with nil and \$506,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

KENYA

Political Relations. Ronald Ngala, President of KADU, told an Israel correspondent on April 9 that Israel could help Kenya towards independence by offering facilities for study, technical cooperation and the opportunity to study her cooperative methods. He said that independent Kenya would wish to remain neutral and receive assistance from all friendly countries—without strings. He stressed that the African people would not submit to UAR pressure and would preserve their friendship for all nations. (*Kol Israel*, April 9, [1])

On Aug. 18 FM Golda Meir sent congratulations to Jomo Kenyatta, the Kenyan leader, on his release from detention (*Jer. Post*, Aug. 20). On Aug. 20 Kenyatta accepted an invitation to visit Israel. He said that "Israel and Kenya have much in common historically," and expressed appreciation for Israel's assistance to Kenya in the form of training courses and seminars. (*Jer. Post*, Aug. 23)

A personal invitation from PM Ben-Gurion was delivered to Kenyatta by Ehud Avriel and Aharon Remez, senior Foreign Ministry officials, during a visit to Kenya

in Oct. Avriel later said that Kenyatta had voiced hopes for future Israel-Kenya cooperation (*Jer. Post*, Oct. 11). A personal message from Kenyatta was delivered to PM Ben-Gurion on Oct. 22. (*Jer. Post*, Oct. 23)

In Nov. and again in Dec., Cairo sources reported denials by Kenyatta that he would visit Israel. (*R. Cairo*, Nov. 15-16; *Nov. 16*; *Ahram*, Dec. 10)

Technical Cooperation. An economic delegation headed by Pinhas Sapir, Minister of Commerce and Industry, left on Oct. 15 for Kenya to discuss economic assistance and cooperation. (*Jer. Post*, Oct. 16)

Jeremias Nyegah, the Kenyan Deputy Speaker, visited Israel in Oct. in connection with technical assistance programmes and the study of educational systems. He met PM Ben-Gurion and cabinet ministers. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct. 3; *Jer. Post*, Oct. 12)

The Director of the Mixed Farming Department in the Kenya Ministry of Agriculture came to Israel in June for a ten-day visit. (*Jer. Post*, June 4)

Seventy-five visitors from Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar arrived in Israel on Oct. 21 for two weeks as guests of the Histadrut. They were seen off personally by Kenyatta and Tom Mboya, Secretary of KANU. (*Jer. Post*, Oct. 22)

Rachel Towett, the wife of the Kenyan Labour Minister, attended the Seminar on the Role of Women in Developing Society. (*Jer. Post*, Aug. 10)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Kenya trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$363,000 and imports \$2,031,000, compared with \$664,000 and \$1,797,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

LIBERIA

Israel-Liberia Friendship Pact Ratified. Notes ratifying the Israel-Liberia Friendship Pact, signed in April 1959 in Monrovia, were exchanged in Jerusalem on Oct. 31 (*Jer. Post*, Nov. 1). It provided for a perpetual friendship between the two countries, the exchange of diplomatic immunities and privileges, and the signature of other treaties dealing with commerce, navigation and extradition. (*Liberian Age*, Monrovia, April 9, 1959)

On the occasion of the ratification, FM Mrs Golda Meir expressed Israel's gratitude for Liberia's "decisive vote" on the partition resolution at the UN General Assembly in 1947. Ernest Jerome Yancy, the Liberian Ambassador, replied that his country had considered this merely repayment of an old debt to the Jewish people—for Benjamin Disraeli, "a son of the Jewish race," had initiated recognition of Liberia by the UK. (*Jer. Post*, Nov. 1)

Economic Cooperation and Trade. Charles Sherman, the Liberian Minister of Finance, visited Israel from March 4-9 for talks on economic cooperation. (*Jer. Post*, March 5, 6, 10)

Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the Israeli Minister of Transport, visited Liberia in April to discuss civil aviation questions. (*Jer. Post*, April 23)

In Dec. 1960 a joint Dutch-Israeli-Liberian shipping line was established in Monrovia, Liberia holding a 50% interest and the Dutch and Israelis 25% each. (*Jer. Post*, Jan. 2)

In Dec. the inauguration of the new Treasury building built by the Liberian Construction Corporation, a joint Israeli-Liberian firm, took place in Monrovia. (*Liberian Age*, Monrovia, Dec. 11)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation. [An Israeli veterinary expert conducted a veterinary survey in Liberia, and in Oct presented his proposals for the establishment of a bureau of animal health and breeding in Liberia.]

Trainees from Liberia attended a six-week seminar on rural planning, and a physical training course at the Wingate Institute, both opening in Oct. (*IGPO/WNB, Nos. 29, 33, Oct, Nov*)

Mrs Helen Mills Scarbrough, member of the Liberian parliament and former Deputy Minister of Education, lectured at the International Seminar on the Role of Women in Developing Society held in Israel (April 23—June 7), which was attended by several prominent Liberian women. (*Jer. Post, June 6*)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Liberian trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$477,000 and imports \$188,000, compared with \$661,000 and \$2,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

MALAGASY REPUBLIC

President's Visit to Israel. President Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic arrived in Israel on Aug 22 for an eight-day state visit [his first to a non-African state except France], accompanied by his family, FM Albert Sylva, Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa, Chief of Staff, and senior officials. He had been invited a year earlier (*Ha'aretz, Aug 21*). He met President Ben-Zvi and PM Ben-Gurion, and toured the country.

At a Histadrut reception on Aug 25 President Tsiranana said that Israel's socialism would serve as an example for his people, adding: "As soon as I came to your country, I felt that I was among working men building a society based on equality and a highly developed respect for the common man." He asked for more training facilities (*Jer. Post, Aug 23-27*). (In 1960, Israel had granted 25 scholarships—MER 1960, p 312.)

Treaties of Amity and Technical Cooperation. During the visit, on Aug 27, Israel and Malagasy signed a Treaty of Amity recording their wish to strengthen their friendly ties and undertaking to solve all differences by peaceful means, including UN mediation, as well as a Technical Cooperation Treaty. The latter provided for cooperation in: agricultural and industrial development, education and youth training, public health and medical training, vocational and scientific training in communications, transportation and other public services. Israel agreed to offer scholarships to Malagasy students and send experts and advisors as requested. (*Kitvei Amanah 435, 446*)

Joint Communiqué Calls for Freedom of Navigation and Direct Negotiations. In a joint communiqué issued on Aug 27, President Tsiranana and PM Ben-Gurion declared that, "in recognition of the two nations' desire to develop fully their economic ties, and in recognition of their geographical location and special interest in sea transport, the two leaders affirmed their support of the principle of freedom of passage on the high seas and in international sea lanes." The two leaders also expressed their desire to "advance the principle of direct negotiations as the only means of solving quarrels between nations and governments," deplored arms races, and urged the nations of the ME, Africa and other areas to refrain from the use of force, abandon all "policies of systematic hostility" and resort to direct negotiations to settle outstanding problems. (*Jer. Post, Aug 28*)

Asked at a press conference whether other members of the 12-nation Brazzaville group would support Israel's right to use the Suez Canal, Tsiranana said that the request for free passage accorded with the moral principles of the Brazzaville nations, and that all nations of the group would wish to associate themselves "each in its own way" with the joint statement. (*Jer. Post, Aug 29*)

Discussing the visit, the Sierra Leone newspaper *Shekpendeh* wrote that the relationship between Israel and African nations stemmed from "a feeling of mutual trust and reciprocal sympathy." It was due to Israel's understanding of the problems of African nations and her readiness to share with them the benefit of her experience, and to "the sympathy on the part of the African people towards Israel's struggle for the reconstruction of its homeland and the rehabilitation of its people. It was natural," the paper wrote, "that the leaders of African nations felt the identity of purpose and the unity of aim of the peoples with those of Israel." (*Shekpendeh, Freetown, Aug 31*)

Technical Cooperation; Trade. André Ranarivelo, director of the Malagasy Civil Service, arrived on Aug 12 for three weeks' study. (*Jer. Post, Aug 13*)

Georges Rakotonisa, who was to become the director of the Malagasy Cooperative Association, arrived on Nov 24 under the terms of the Technical Cooperation Treaty for a two-month study of cooperation and Histadrut enterprises. (*Jer. Post, Nov 25*)

Under the trade agreement with France and the French Community (p 308), Israel sold Malagasy cement and jeeps, and bought rice and spices. (*Ha'aretz, Aug 21*)

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Malagasy trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$175,000 and imports \$7,000, compared with \$1,002,000 and \$10,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

MALI

Deterioration in Political Relations; Aid Continues. Following the adoption of the anti-Israel resolutions, to which Mali was a signatory, at the Casablanca Conference in Jan, Maurice Fisher, an Israeli diplomat, was sent to Mali to lodge Israel's protest. President Keita rejected the protest, but Israel decided to continue her aid to Mali. Fisher was again received by President Keita and introduced to him a five-man Israeli medical team which had come to conduct a survey on sanitation, water purification and the combating of infectious diseases. (*Ha'aretz, Jan 17, 27*)

In Jan B.S. Diallo, Commander of the Mali Militia, was the guest of the Israeli Ministry of Defence for a study tour of Nahal. (*Ha'aretz, Jan 5*)

A survey mission on transportation problems, and an expert on agricultural development left for Mali at the beginning of the year. (*Ha'aretz, Jan 27, 29*)

After the joint Abdel Nasser-Keita declaration in June, in which Israel was again denounced as "a bridgehead of imperialism" (see p 687 b), an Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Israel did not intend to revise her aid programme to Mali and that the communiqué did not accurately reflect the actual relations between Israel and Mali, which would continue on good terms. (*Jer. Post, June 19*)

Amadou Hamba Ba, a writer and cultural leader, who was in charge of the Department of Cultural Relations in the Mali Foreign Ministry, visited Israel in June as guest of the Hebrew University. He was received

by President Ben-Zvi and FM Meir. (*Jer. Post, June 5, 21; Abidjan Matin, July 24*)

In Oct a Mali trainee concluded a year of instruction as flight inspector at Lydda airport. (*Ha'aretz, Oct 27*)

FEDERATION OF NIGERIA

Technical Assistance and Cooperation. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Governor-General of the Federation of Nigeria, speaking at an independence day reception at the Israel embassy in Lagos, said he appreciated Israel's assistance to Nigeria and hoped it would be further extended and strengthened. (*Ha'aretz, April 20*)

Israeli-Nigerian cooperation was discussed in the Federal Parliament during the debate on economic and budgetary problems and Israel's constructive contribution to Nigeria's five-year development plan was stressed. A member suggested entrusting the training of the Nigerian air force to Israeli instructors. The Minister of Finance announced that the Federal government intended to ask for Israeli experts to help in combating income tax evasion and smuggling. A Northern Region representative suggested Israeli assistance in reducing the cost of electric power. Members of the ruling coalition, as well as some of the opposition, proposed that the government thank Israel for the loan of £3 million for economic development extended in 1960. (*Ha'aretz, June 22*)

The Federal Minister of Communications and Posts, Olu Akinfeso, arrived in Israel on March 11, accompanied by Ministry engineers, to study Israel's telecommunication and postal services and possibilities of recruiting trained personnel. In May the Deputy Director of Postal Services came for three weeks' study and in Oct telephone technicians arrived for six months' training. (*Jer. Post, March 12; Kol Israel, March 16 [W 18]; Jer. Post, May 28; Ha'aretz, Oct 20*)

On July 31 Joseph Johnson, the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs, Labour and Welfare arrived in Israel at the completion of a wider tour and discussed questions relating to his ministry and the operation of cooperatives. (*Jer. Post, Aug 2, 3*)

On Dec 11 Dr Moses A. Majekodunmi, Federal Minister of Health, came for a week's visit accompanied by senior officials. He visited medical institutions, especially in rural areas. (*Jer. Post, Dec 12-18*)

An Israeli public health administrator left for Nigeria on Nov 29 to advise the Federal government on sanitary engineering. (*Ha'aretz, Nov 30*)

The President of the Nigerian Trade Union Federation, A.H.P. Adebola, arrived in Israel on Sept 13 as guest of the Histadrut, and met its SG, Aharon Becker, who announced that the Histadrut would offer five scholarships to Nigerians for study at the Afro-Asian Institute. (*Jer. Post, Sept 14, 18*)

Thirty-six scholarships for young Nigerians of all three regions were granted by the Israel government for study at the ORT vocational school in Natanya (*Sunday Times, Lagos, April 2*). A celebration at the ORT school on Sept 30, marking the first anniversary of Nigeria's independence, was attended by some 100 Nigerian students. (*Jer. Post, Oct 1*)

Cultural Relations; Sport. On Feb 20 the Federal Minister of Trade and Industry, Mallam Zanna Bakar Dipecharima, opened in Lagos the Israeli exhibition "Ancient Nation—Young State," which was attended by 40,000 people. (*Ha'aretz, Feb 21, March 10*)

During a visit in Nov by Inka Olomida of the Nigerian broadcasting service, Israel and Nigeria agreed to exchange radio programmes. (*Ha'aretz, Nov 19*)

Nigerian athletes took part in the Hapoel sports festival in May. (*Jer. Post, May 8*)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Nigeria trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$2,874,000 and imports \$282,000, compared with \$1,913,000 and \$88,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

NIGERIA—WESTERN REGION

Premier's Visit to Israel. On Oct 9 Chief Samuel Akinola, PM of Western Nigeria, arrived in Israel for a week's visit as part of a tour of Europe, the ME and North America, accompanied by the Ministers of Finance and of Commerce and Industry, and senior officials. He was received by President Ben-Zvi, met PM Ben-Gurion and cabinet ministers and toured the country. He invited Ben-Gurion to pay a visit to Nigeria.

Chief Akinola said that developing countries got on better with "countries like Israel," which were more objective than the big powers and offered aid without strings. Nigeria was looking forward to Israeli advice and scholarships and wished to increase trade. "There have always been special relations between Israel and West Nigeria," he said, and implied that Western Nigerian influence had prompted the establishment of friendly relations between the Federation and Israel. (*Jer. Post, Oct 10-16; West African Pilot, Nigerian Tribune, Oct 16*)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation; Ministerial Visits. Dr S. D. Onabamiro, West Nigerian Minister of Education, and Kessington Momoh, Minister of Labour, visited Israel in Jan. Onabamiro was interested in engaging Israeli graduates to teach science in Western Nigeria's secondary schools and its new university. (*Kol Israel, Jan 4, [6]*)

Upon his return to Nigeria, he said he had been greatly impressed with Israel's methods of linking education with the economy. He had been "much struck" by the Histadrut—"an inspiring example of what workers can achieve by applying the principles of cooperation and idealism to improve the national economy." (*African Daily News, Jan 30*)

Chief M.S. Sowole, Chairman of the West Nigerian Industrial Promotion Commission, arrived in Israel on July 27 to discuss joint economic ventures with the Israel government. (*Jer. Post, July 30*)

On Aug 6 S. Samuel Olusami Sogbein, Minister of Public Works, came to study road building and water supply. (*Jer. Post, Aug 7*)

Israel's largest project in Western Nigeria was a survey for a general plan of water resources utilization, conducted by Tahal, the Israel Water Planning Authority. Vered, the Israel water development company, carried out several projects and its work was commended by the Nigerian authorities. (*Ha'aretz, Oct 12; Nigerian Tribune, Nov 20*)

Nigersol, a joint construction company in which Solel Boneh, the Israel construction company, was the [minor] partner, was carrying out large-scale road building in Western Nigeria with the help of some 100 Israeli experts. (*Kol Israel, Jan 8 [W 12]*)

The Israel government Director of Public Works, who came to Western Nigeria to inspect the works, received the thanks of the Minister of Public Works, Sogbein. In ten months Nigersol had built 390 miles of roads out of the 650 scheduled until March 1962. (*Nigerian Tribune, July 21*)

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

A £110-million contract, for construction works to be executed by Nigersol in Western Nigeria, was signed in Nov by Solel Boneh. It included the planning and construction of a university. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 13, 15)

James O. Adigun, the Minister of Housing, arrived in Israel on Aug 19 to study town planning and housing projects. (*Jer. Post*, Aug 22)

A Bank of Israel official left for Western Nigeria on Dec 18 to spend a year as financial advisor to the government following PM Akintola's request, made during his visit, for Israeli expert aid in large-scale economic development planning. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 13; *Jer. Post*, Dec 19)

In June the Mid West Nigerian Marketing Association held a meeting with the Israel Ambassador, Hanan Yavor, to discuss Israeli help in agricultural and marketing training for farmers. A director of the Association said that Israel had shown true friendship for Nigeria; considering the short time she had been operating there, she had offered more scholarships than "other government agencies put together." (*Mid-West Echo*, June 21)

NIGERIA—EASTERN REGION

Visit of East Nigerian Premier. Dr Michael I. Okpara, PM of Eastern Nigeria, arrived in Israel on June 14 for a week's visit at the beginning of a tour of Asia and Europe. He was accompanied by Chief John U. Nwodo, Minister of Commerce, and senior officials. On arrival, he said that Israel was "the obvious place in the ME to learn how modern man is tackling problems of our time."

He was received by President Ben-Zvi, met PM Ben-Gurion for talks on joint development programmes and visited vocational training centres, the Weizmann Institute, the Jordan diversion project and industrial enterprises.

PM Okpara said that he would welcome Israel's assistance in agricultural settlement and vocational training.

At a Histadrut reception on June 19, he said that Israel had created "a new and unique" concept of trade-unionism, which Eastern Nigeria would want to adopt. SG Aharon Becker said that any Histadrut project deemed adaptable to Nigeria would be put at its disposal. (*Jer. Post*, June 15-12; *Nigerian Outlook*, Enugu, June 20)

Okpara: Israel No Bridgehead of Imperialism. PM Okpara said that there were warm feelings for Israel in Eastern Nigeria; both peoples had the same inherent quality of frankness, which was already promoting a spirit of confidence and mutual trust between them. (*Eastern Nigeria News*, Enugu, June 16)

At a press conference on June 21, he declared in reply to a question about the recent Abdel Nasser—Keita communiqué (see p 687 b): "If we thought Israel was a bridgehead of imperialism we would not have come here... I have seen no sign of imperialism here and the history of the Israeli people makes such an idea unthinkable." (*Jer. Post*, June 22; *Nigerian Outlook*, June 23)

Technical Assistance, Aid. Okpara discussed in Israel the possibility of receiving aid for the establishment of a technical college and textile, ceramics and asbestos factories. The Israel Ministry of Agriculture agreed to send a top Israeli expert to help in the establishment of cooperative agricultural settlements on the moshav

model. Preliminary plans had already been made by two Israeli experts, and irrigation projects were being carried out by the Vered water development company (see also MER 1960, p 313). Before his departure Okpara said in a radio interview that Israel had offered to help in the dispersion of Nigeria's large-scale industries in smaller plants throughout the country. (*Jer. Post*, June 18, 22; *Kol Israel*, June 21 [23])

P.N. Okeke, the Minister of Education, visited Israel late in Dec 1960, mainly to recruit teachers. (*Kol Israel*, Dec 28, 1960 [W Jan 5, 1961])

Two members of the Eastern Nigerian Construction Company left for Israel on Jan 16 for a four-month course for foremen. (*Daily Telegraph*, Nigeria, Jan 20)

The Weizmann Institute and the Technion offered scholarships for East Nigerian post-graduate students. (*Nigerian Outlook*, June 21, 26)

In June an Israeli expert investigated problems of technical education in Eastern Nigeria. (*Nigerian Outlook*, June 29)

Some 50 Eastern Nigerian students were training in Israel at the Hebrew University, as well as at vocational and agricultural schools. (*Jer. Post*, June 22)

In Nov, upon the termination of the two years' service of an Israeli town planning advisor, his work was praised by PM Okpara and Chief E. Emele, Minister of Town Planning. (*Nigerian Outlook*, Nov 25)

On Nov 17 it was reported that the East Nigerian government had approved the results of the agricultural survey conducted by Israeli experts, and that the two governments were taking the first steps to implement it. (*Ha'aretz*, Nov 17)

Athletes from Nigeria participated in the Hapoel Workers' Sports Festival, which began on May 7. (*Ha'aretz*, May 8)

NIGERIA—NORTHERN REGION

[Relations with the Northern Region, predominantly Muslim, were less close than those with Nigeria in general.]

On Jan 12 Sir Ahmadu Bello, PM of North Nigeria, received an official Israeli representative for the first time, when the Israel Ambassador to Lagos, Hanan Yavor, paid a two-day formal visit to Kano, capital of the Northern Region. Yavor, it was reported, was given "a most cordial reception" and his visit was featured over the Northern Region's radio and in the government bulletin. (*Jer. Post*, Jan 17)

After the visit the PM was reported to have declared that Israel's interest in the development of Nigeria was appreciated and that he hoped for further cooperation between the two countries. (*Ha'aretz*, April 20)

On March 10, in a Friday programme for Muslim listeners, the Israel radio broadcast an Id Al-Fitr message by a North Nigerian student in Israel. (*Kol Israel*, March 10 [13])

On a reported anti-Israeli statement by Sir Ahmadu Bello during his visit to Cairo in July, which evoked adverse Nigerian reactions—see The UAR: International Relations (Nigeria.)

SENEGAL

Israel Represented at Independence Celebrations. Israel's Deputy Minister of Defence, Shimon Peres, represented his country at Senegal's first independence anniversary (*Jer. Post*, April 9). PM Mamadou Dia was reported to have told the Israel Ambassador that he would like to visit Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, May 8)

Technical Assistance and Economic Cooperation. Valdivio N'diaye, Minister of Defence and the Interior, arrived in Israel on Jan 8 to study the army's role in development. He met the Chief of Staff and senior officers and visited army and Nahal installations.

Before his departure he said that no great importance should be attached to the Casablanca Conference (which had adopted an anti-Israel resolution—see pp 48 ff), the real significance of which could only be shown by the future actions of the states represented. All the new African states, he said, wished Israel well and wanted friendly relations with her. He promised to do his utmost to bring about closer relations between Senegal and Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 9, 11, 12)

A Senegalese army delegation, headed by Commandant Mustafa Diouf, visited Israel during Jan (Jan 1—Feb 2) and inspected army organization methods. Diouf said that Senegal intended to adopt the Nahal system for the establishment of soldiers' agricultural settlements on the Guinea and Mali borders. He thought Senegal should also adopt Israeli paratrooper methods. (*Ma'ariv*, Jan 29; *Kol Israel*, Jan 29 [Feb 2]; *Jer. Post*, Feb 3)

On Jan 9, the Senegalese government approved the creation of an experimental agricultural regional centre with the aid of Israeli experts. (*APS (Agence de Presse Sénégalaise)*, Dakar, Jan 16)

An Israeli economic mission visited Senegal in Jan to study possibilities of economic cooperation. (*APS*, Jan 22, 23, 26)

The Israeli Hazera seed cultivation company was requested by Senegal to establish a cultivation farm in Senegal. (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 20)

Israel's Minister of Transport, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, visited Senegal in May. (*Jer. Post*, May 10)

A delegation of trade union representatives from Senegal visited Israel in Nov. They met Foreign Ministry and Histadrut officials and inspected welfare schemes. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 12, 16)

SIERRA LEONE

Celebration of Sierra Leone's Independence. Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the Minister of Transport, represented Israel at Sierra Leone's independence celebrations on April 27. He presented PM Milton Margai with a complete unit for dental surgery and invited him to visit Israel. PM Margai declared that Sierra Leone would not forget Israel's willingness to give aid and advice before any other government. (*Jer. Post*, April 28; *Kol Israel*, April 27 [29])

In Israel a special radio programme was devoted to the occasion (*Kol Israel*, April 26 [29]) and celebrations were held on the shores of the Sea of Galilee, attended by FM Meir and 20 agricultural trainees from Sierra Leone. (*Jer. Post*, April 28)

Israel Ambassador Accredited. In June, Ya'akov Avnon, Israel's Ambassador, was the first head of a diplomatic mission to present his credentials to the Governor-General, Sir Maurice Dorman. (*Shekpendeh*, June 1; *Daily Mail*, Freetown, June 2)

Technical Assistance. On Feb 26 Tapfima Ngobeh, Sierra Leone's Minister of Health, accompanied by his Director-General, arrived in Israel to discuss medical aid. At a luncheon given in his honour by FM Golda Meir, he praised the growing friendship between Israel and Sierra Leone, in whose economic development Israel was playing an important part. He singled out the work of Israeli instructors and technicians in the Sierra Leone National

Construction Company, in which Solef Boneh was a minority partner (See MER 1960, pp 315-6). (*Ha'aretz*, Feb 27; *Jer. Post*, Feb 28, March 2)

Two Israeli experts, a health officer and an architect, left for Freetown on June 26 to advise the Ministry of Health on the establishment of a new hospital. (*Ha'aretz*, June 27)

On June 12 Albert M. Margai, the Minister of Natural Resources, came for an official visit and met PM Ben-Gurion, cabinet ministers and Ministry of Agriculture officials. The visit was mainly exploratory, and was expected to lead to joint training projects in poultry raising, irrigation, agricultural settlement and cold storage. On leaving, he expressed the hope that his report on his visit would induce his brother, PM Milton Margai, to visit Israel himself. (*Jer. Post*, June 13, 26)

Michael Cole, the Minister of Development, arrived in Israel on Oct 2 for a week's visit. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 9)

The Weizmann Institute at Rehovot established a three-year scholarship in memory of the Rev. Solomon B. Caulker, who was killed in a plane crash on his way home from the Rehovot Science Conference in 1960. (*Shekpendeh*, Dec 5; MER 1960, p 315)

Israel allocated scholarships to Sierra Leoneans in agriculture, science, geography and geology. (*Shekpendeh*, April 7)

Sierra Leoneans attending a Gadna (youth corps) course in Israel expressed their satisfaction in a letter to the Israeli Ambassador in Sierra Leone. (*Daily Mail*, Freetown, Sept 22)

Economic Relations. An Israeli trade delegation arrived in Freetown on Jan 25. They held talks with the PM and government officials and discussed the possibility of establishing joint shipping and air lines and joint light industries. (*Shekpendeh*, Jan 30)

(No figures on trade were available.)

TANGANYIKA

Premier Nyerere: Friendly Relations with Arabs States and Israel. On Dec 7 PM Julius Nyerere said, in reply to a press query as to his reaction to any Arab pressure to join in a boycott of Israel, that Tanganyika, emarking on independence, wanted to be friendly with all nations. "We have no intention of letting any friendly country choose our enemies," he said, and the same principle would apply in the cold war. (*East African Standard*, Nairobi, Dec 8)

Israel Ambassador Accredited. Israel's first Ambassador to Tanganyika, Raphael Ruppin, presented his credentials to the Governor-General, Sir Richard Turnbull, on Dec 20. He had been appointed in March. Sir Richard said he hoped the Israel embassy would facilitate technical aid and training and further develop the cordial relations between the two countries. Ruppin replied that Israel would be happy to put at Tanganyika's disposal any knowledge she might have gained. (*Jer. Post*, March 10, Dec 21)

Israel Celebrates Tanganyika's Independence. Moshe Dayan, Minister of Agriculture, represented Israel at Tanganyika's independence celebrations on Dec 9. He presented Tanganyika with 100 grants for study in Israel. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 7, 19)

In Jerusalem the occasion was celebrated at a ceremony addressed by Abba Eban, Minister of Education, and African diplomats. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 10)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation in Agriculture.

[Technical cooperation with Tanganyika had begun many months before independence.] Paul Bomani, the Tanganyikan Minister of Agriculture, visited Israel in June to study possibilities of mutual assistance in agricultural training, water development and joint economic enterprises, and met Moshe Dayan, his Israeli counterpart. It was announced that Israel would grant 24 stipends for advanced agricultural studies to Tanganyikans during the following year and that Israeli experts would leave for Tanganyika to help in farm planning and the setting up of agricultural schools. Nineteen Tanganyikan students were already attending special agricultural courses in Israel. (*Jer. Post*, June 15, 16)

Back home, Bomani said he thought Israel would be the most suitable country for training Tanganyikan farmers. He would like to see Tanganyika undertake "a similar, if less ambitious, agricultural programme." The Tanganyikan trainees he had met in Israel had unanimously praised the courses they were attending. (*Press release, Tanganyika Information Services, Dar es Salaam, June 20*)

Earlier an Israeli agricultural expert conducted a survey of agricultural development and settlement in Tanganyika (*Ha'aretz*, April 11). In Oct. following his report, Ehud Avriel, of the Israel Foreign Ministry, and Aharon Remez, head of its International Cooperation Department, visited Tanganyika and an agreement was reached on the first stages of a scheme based on his findings. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 11)

A Tanganyikan expert in guava growing visited Israel in Sept. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 5)

Technical Assistance and Cooperation in General. Two senior housing officials from Tanganyika studied housing, slum clearance and communal planning in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, March 8)

Joseph Nyerere, MP, the Premier's brother and head of Tanganyika's Federation of Youth Movements, arrived in Israel on Sept 18 for a 12-day visit to study the operations of Gadna, Nahal and the various types of agricultural communities. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 19)

Rashidi Kawawa, Minister without Portfolio, arrived in Sept for a ten-day visit to study the possibilities of cooperation. After his talks with Aharon Becker, the Histadrut SG, the latter declared that the Histadrut would send to Tanganyika advisors and experts on cooperation. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 27, 28; *Ha'aretz*, Sept 28)

Two Israeli eye specialists visited Tanganyika to advise on the organization of public health services, particularly in the treatment of eye diseases. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 11)

In Oct an Israeli economic mission, headed by Pinhas Sapir, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, paid a brief visit to Tanganyika and held talks with PM Nyerere and others on plans for construction, housing and shipping. Projects discussed included a radio and bicycle assembly plant, a cement factory, consumer cooperatives, supermarkets and other services. Ntalo Swai, the Tanganyikan Minister of Commerce and Industry, invited Israeli public and private corporations to submit concrete proposals for joint enterprises. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 22)

Following the visit, a panel of Israeli experts in irrigation, agriculture, commerce, industry, transport and housing, headed by Brig. Yehoshafat Harkaby, was set up in Nov to assist Tanganyika in preparing plans for development projects. The vanguard of an economic mission as well as a four-man mission to set up an agricultural guidance station left for Tanganyika on Nov 17. Harkaby visited Tanganyika early in Dec. Reports alleging

the failure of his mission or unexpected difficulties were denied by the Israel Foreign Ministry. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 19, Dec 11; *Daily Nation, Dar es Salaam*, Dec 9; *Divrei Haknesset*, Jan 8-10, 1962, pp 901-2)

Officials of the Local Government Department of the Israel Ministry of the Interior visited Tanganyika in Dec. in connection with a seminar for local government officials scheduled to take place in Israel in March 1962. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 4)

Other Tanganyikan Visitors to Israel included: Amir Jamal, the Minister of Transport, on a private visit in July (*Jer. Post*, July 16); Edward Barongo, the SG of the TANU (the ruling party), and his deputy as guests of Mapai in Nov. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 6)

Economic Ties, Trade. A contract with an Israeli firm for the construction of a large hotel at Dar es Salaam was signed there on Oct 14. A Tanganyikan paper said in an editorial that the joint project was "an ideal combination of government cooperation with external skill and know-how." (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 16; *Tanganyika Standard*, Oct 16)

A new passenger service between Dar es Salaam and Eilat was inaugurated on Dec 12. A Burmese ship was chartered by Zim, Israel Navigation Co., for this route. (*Lamethan*, Dec 13)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Tanganyika trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$173,000 and imports \$150,000. No figures were available for 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

TOGO

Trade Agreement. A trade agreement between Israel and Togo was signed on July 3 in Jerusalem by Pinhas Sapir, the Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Togo's Minister of Trade, Industry, Economy and Planning, Dr Hospice Coco. Israel was to export to Togo cement, building materials, electrical products, tires and canned food, in exchange for coffee, cocoa, copra, peanuts, castor beans, teak wood and spices. Transit trade was also provided for. The agreement would be in effect until July 1962 and be renewed automatically, subject to three months' notice by one of the parties. Payment was to be made in convertible or other agreed currency. (*Jer. Post*, July 4; *Kitvei Amanah*, 422)

Visits. Dr Coco arrived on June 29 for a fortnight's visit. Earlier, on June 25, the Minister of Labour, Justice, Social Welfare and Public Services, Paulin Aque, arrived for a week's visit to study trade union affairs and the possibility of adapting the Israeli Nahal system to help solve Togo's social and unemployment problems. (*Jer. Post*, June 26, 28, 30)

Technical Cooperation Agreement. An agreement covering cooperation in the economic, technical and scientific fields, with particular stress on agriculture, was signed between Israel and Togo on Aug 14 in Lomé, Togo. Israel was to supply Togo with experts, as well as scholarships for trainees in agricultural development, public health, vocational training, education, transport, youth training and the utilization of natural resources. (*Kitvei Amanah*, 434; *IGPO/WNB No. 22*, Aug)

UGANDA

Apollo Milton Obote, Chairman of the Uganda People's Congress, visited Israel in July and was received by the FM, Mrs Golda Meir. (*Jer. Post*, July 28)

In Oct Lawrence Sebalu, the Uganda Minister of Economic Development, visited Israel and conferred with officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture. (*Jer. Post, Oct 13*)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Uganda trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$27,000 and imports \$493,000. There were no figures for 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

GENERAL

Israel Envoy's Conference. On Feb 20 Israel envoys to Latin-American countries opened a three-day conference at Montevideo designed "to strengthen friendly cultural and economic ties between Israel and Latin-American countries and to coordinate this task through Israel's diplomatic representatives." The Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, Chaim Yehiel, was chairman of the conference. (*Jer. Post, Feb 21, 23*)

Mutual Aid Agreements Sought. On his return from a five-week tour of Latin America, Yehiel reported that in addition to Brazil, which had approached Israel formally, requests were expected from several Latin-American countries, notably Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for technical cooperation agreements on arid zones development, land settlement and agricultural cooperatives.

The traditional friendship between Israel and the Latin-American countries could not be taken for granted, he said. It must be supported by an active policy, particularly in view of recently increased Arab activity. (*Jer. Post, March 23*)

[In 1961 there were five Israeli experts working in Latin America, two in Brazil and one each in Chile, Puerto Rico and Venezuela.]

Cultural Ties. The Central Institute for Cultural Relations Israel-Ibero-America, Spain and Portugal [established in 1956] aimed "to strengthen cultural ties and to increase the friendly relations between Israel and Iberian countries." Its centre was in Jerusalem, and there were 22 sister institutes in most of the Latin-American capitals and New York. The institute had published, or helped to publish, 89 books and pamphlets in Spanish and Portuguese on Israeli subjects, ranging in scope from "The Dead Sea Scrolls" to "Solar Machines" and "Fragments of Hebrew-Spanish Literature" (*Jer. Post, Oct 23*). In June the president of the institute in New York, Prof. Jose-Maria Chavez of Colombia, visited Israel. (*Jer. Post, June 27, 30*)

International Seminar on Rural Planning. In Nov delegates from Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela took part in this seminar, which was organized by the Israel Foreign Ministry. (*IGPO/WNB, No. 33, Nov*)

ARGENTINA

Diplomatic Relations. The first meeting between the Argentine Foreign Minister and a senior Israeli representative since the Eichmann affair took place in Buenos Aires on Feb 18. The FM, Diogenes Taboada, received the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, Chaim Yehiel, for an hour's meeting. Their talk was reported to have been "very friendly." (*Jer. Post, Feb 20*)

Nuclear Research Assistance. Israel was among the 12 countries sending experts to assist in Argentina's pro-

gramme of nuclear research for peaceful purposes. This was provided for in the 1961 technical assistance programme of the International Agency for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. (*Jer. Post, Feb 9*)

Admiral Cuivillal, chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee of Argentina, arrived in Israel on Oct 16. (*Kol Israel, Oct 16 [19]*)

Request to Interrogate Eichmann. On Jan 19, 1962, it was learned that a formal request to interrogate Adolf Eichmann and several Israeli citizens, as to the circumstances of Eichmann's capture, was submitted by the Argentine authorities to the Israel Foreign Ministry. This had been demanded by an Argentine federal judge after Eichmann's wife had charged the Israel embassy in Argentina with kidnapping her husband.

On Feb 27, 1962, it was reported from the Legal Department of the Israel Foreign Ministry that the request was being considered. (For background see *MER* 1960, pp 278 ff.) (*Ha'aretz, Dec 12, 15, 22, 31, 1961, Jan 4, 19, Feb 27, 1962*)

Israel-Argentine Friendship League. On July 9 the establishment of this League was announced by the Argentine Ambassador to Israel, Rogelio Tristany, on the occasion of the Argentine national holiday. The first meeting was held on Oct 12. (*Jer. Post, July 10; Ha'aretz, Oct 13*)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, Israeli exports to Argentina in 1961 totalled \$583,000 and imports \$1,451,000, as against \$295,000 and \$1,157,000 in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

Argentine Visitors to Israel (guests of the government if not otherwise stated) included: Oscar Allende, Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, who lectured on his impressions on his return (Jan) (*Ha'aretz, Jan 18; El Plata, Montevideo, March 25; La Nacion, Buenos Aires, March 26*); Jose Flores Garcia, Chairman of the Communications Committee of the Argentine Congress (Feb) (*Jer. Post, Feb 10, 22*); Juan Antonio Solari, SG of the Argentine Social-Democratic party, as guest of the Histadrut (April) (*Jer. Post, April 14, 21*); an Argentine-Israel Chamber of Commerce delegation (April-May) (*Jer. Post, April 28; Ha'aretz, May 16*); Dr. Risiero Frondizi, rector of Buenos Aires University, brother of the Argentine President, as guest of the Hebrew University (*Jer. Post, May 25, June 1, 2, 5, 6*); César Napoléon Ayraut, Governor of Misiones province (July). (*Jer. Post, July 17*)

BOLIVIA

Legation Rank Raised. On April 19 it was announced that Bolivia and Israel had raised their legations to the rank of embassies. (*Ha'aretz, April 19*)

Agreements on Technical Assistance and Cultural Re-

lations. A technical assistance agreement with Bolivia—the first between Israel and a South American country—was initiated in April in Bolivia and ratified on Aug 6 by the Israeli Cabinet. It was to be implemented shortly. (See also MER 1960, p. 300.)

The agreement called for the exchange of information in science, economics, administration and technology. Israeli experts were to go to Bolivia and Bolivian students were to be trained in Israel. There was to be a separate contract for each project.

At the same time, the Israeli Cabinet ratified a cultural relations treaty with Bolivia, which had been initiated in La Paz on April 27. [Neither treaty had come into force by the end of 1961.] (*Jer. Post*, Aug 7; *Kitvei Amanah* 428, 429)

Visitors to Israel. In Sept Tamayo Caballero, the Bolivian permanent representative to the UN, visited Israel. He was received by the FM, Mrs Golda Meir. (*Jer. Post*, Sept 17)

In Aug Edwin Moller Pacieri, Bolivian National Director of Cooperatives, visited Israel as guest of the Histadrut. On his return he published a series of articles on Israel as a cooperative republic. (*La Nacion*, La Paz, Nov 27, 28, 29)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics, Israeli exports to Bolivia totalled \$81,000 in 1961 and \$19,000 in 1960. There were no imports in either year. (*IFT*, 1961)

BRAZIL

Mutual Aid Pact. In March it was officially revealed in Israel that Brazil had formally proposed a technical cooperation agreement with Israel on arid zone development, hill settlement and agricultural cooperatives. The Mayor of Brasilia had suggested that Israel might assist in establishing new towns and truck farms around Brazil's new capital. (*Jer. Post*, March 23). [The agreement was concluded in March 1962.]

During Oct-Nov the Director-General of the Israel Ministry of Agriculture, Yitzhak Levi, visited Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela at the request of the governments to advise on the development of agriculture. On his return he stated that a cooperative agricultural settlement of the moshav type was to be established in Brazil by a team of Israeli experts. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 22, Nov 22)

Visitors. Santos, the Brazilian soccer team, visited Israel in June. (*Jer. Post*, June 12)

On Oct 21, Senator Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, former President of Brazil, and his family arrived for a five-day visit as guests of the government. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 22, 23, 25, 27; *O Estado De Sao Paulo*, Oct 25)

In Dec the Brazilian Navy's cadet and exhibition ship, *Custodio de Mello*, anchored at Haifa on a four-day courtesy call. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 18, 20, 21)

On Oct 5 a square in Rio de Janeiro was named after PM Ben-Gurion. (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 9)

Trade. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Brazilian trade in 1961 was: exports \$268,000 and imports \$104,000, compared with \$1,157,000 and \$346,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

CHILE, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR BRITISH GUIANA

Chile. On Oct 4 Eugenio Palacios presented his credentials to the President as Ambassador. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 5)

In Feb an evening devoted to the works of the Chilean poetess Gabriela Mistral took place in Jerusalem under the auspices of the Central Institute for Cultural Relations Israel-Ibero-America. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 6)

In April Prof. Julio Plaut of the University of Chile, Santiago, visited Israel and lectured under the auspices of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. (*Jer. Post*, April 16)

Chilean visitors to Israel, all of them guests of the government, included: Luis Guevara Ortuzar, Governor of Valparaiso (July) (*Jer. Post*, July 8); Luis Escobar Cerda, dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Chile (Aug)—during his visit he was appointed Minister of Economics (*Jer. Post*, Aug 29); Juan Martinez Campa, MP (Sept) (*Jer. Post*, Sept 5); Senator Hermes Ahumada Pacheco (*Ha'aretz*, Oct 18); and Senator Angel Favovich (both in Oct-Nov). (*Jer. Post*, Oct 25, 26, 29, Nov 8)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Chilean trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$89,000 and imports \$11,000, compared with \$40,000 and \$46,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

Colombia. German Arciniegas, Ambassador of Colombia in Rome, presented his credentials on May 29 as non-resident Ambassador. (*Jer. Post*, March 9, May 30). [Israel's first Ambassador to Bogota was accredited in 1960—MER 1960, p. 301.]

In May an Israel week was held in Colombia, with lectures, exhibits and films. (*IGYB* 1961/62)

In Oct Arnoldo Tavares, vice-president of the Colombia Trade Union Congress (C.T.C.), and Carlos Nino, secretary of the Cooperation Department of the Alliance of Colombian (Catholic) Workers, spent ten days in Israel as guests of the Histadrut. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 29)

On Oct 29 an exhibition of Israeli children's paintings opened in Bogota. (*El Tiempo*, Bogota, Oct 29)

The volume of Israel-Colombia trade in 1961 was: exports \$14,000 and imports \$87,000, compared with \$544,000 and \$53,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

Ecuador. [There were no further reports on the technical aid agreement signed in 1960—see MER 1960, p. 301.]

The volume of trade between Israel and Ecuador in 1961 was: exports \$48,000 and imports \$19,000, compared with \$81,000 and \$10,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

British Guiana: Visit of PM Jagan. [British Guiana was accorded full internal self-government in Aug 1961; defence and external affairs remained the responsibility of the British government.]

On Dec 2 PM Cheddi Jagan arrived in Israel for a four-day official visit. He was received by the President and met Acting PM Eshkol and several ministers.

Jagan was especially interested in technical cooperation. He said that he was "keen to see what has been achieved in Israel, as British Guiana is also an underdeveloped country and we may be able to learn things from you." He believed that the cooperative movement offered the right solution for many problems of underdeveloped countries. Cooperation with Israel in these fields, he said, was more suitable to his country than that offered by larger states. He also took an interest in Israel's approach to irrigation problems and the Nahal [army agricultural] units, which he discussed with Shimon Peres, the Deputy Defence Minister.

Jagan accepted Eshkol's offer of Israel's aid in the development of British Guiana; specialists would be sent to Israel to discuss technical cooperation.

In Tel Aviv Jagan visited the Histadrut headquarters and the Afro-Asian Institute where he addressed students, and was the guest of the Mapai Central Committee.

Before leaving, he said that British Guiana-Israel relations would be discussed by correspondence. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 4, 5, 7, 8)

On Dec 29 PM Jagan said in Georgetown that he had been impressed with the Israeli army during his recent visit to Israel. There were several lessons British Guiana could learn from Israel, especially in cooperative development and culture. He had discussed with the British Colonial Secretary, Reginald Maudling, the possibilities of British Guiana having an army modelled on Israel's, but Maudling said it was not possible because of Guiana's economic position. (*Reuter, Jer. Post*, Dec 31)

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:

Barbados, Honduras, Trinidad, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama

Barbados, Honduras and Trinidad. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli exports to Barbados, Honduras and Trinidad was: \$7,000 in 1961 and \$75,000 in 1960. There were no imports in either year. (*IFT*, 1961)

Costa Rica. According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Costa Rica trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$324,000 and imports \$13,000. There were no trade statistics for 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

Cuba. In July the Israel Ministry of Agriculture sent an expert to Cuba to help improve goat-breeding. (*Ha'aretz*, July 5, 19)

Francisco Panialvar, a leader of the Revolutionary Youth Movement of Cuba, visited Israel as guest of the local Communist youth movement. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 18)

An exhibition of Israeli children's paintings was shown in Cuba. (*IGYB* 1961/62)

On Dec 31 Cuba and Israel extended for another year the commercial treaty between them (*IGYB*, 1961/62). According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israel-Cuban trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$123,000 and imports \$55,000 compared with \$28,000 and \$224,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

Guatemala. In April the Guatemalan FM, Jesus Unda Murillo, and the Chief of Protocol, Mario Juarez Toledo, with their wives, spent five days in Israel as guests of the government. (*Jer. Post*, April 16, 17)

Other Guatemalan guests were Luis F. Gallich the Mayor of Guatemala City, in Oct, and Dr Ernesto Viteri Bertrand, Chairman of the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee, in Dec. (*Jer. Post*, Oct 29, 30, Nov 2, Dec 4, 5, 7)

In Nov a cultural agreement with Israel was signed in Guatemala City. It was similar to those already signed with other Latin-American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay. (*Jer. Post*, Nov 29; *Kitvei Amanah*, 445)

Children's paintings from Guatemala were exhibited in Israel. (*IGYB*, 1961/62)

In May a memorial meeting for Jorge Garcia Granados, an early and staunch supporter of the Jewish cause in Palestine, and later of Israel, and Guatemala's first Ambassador to Israel, was held by the Institute for Cultural Relations Israel-Ibero-America. (*Jer. Post*, May 29)

According to Israeli statistics, Israel exported \$180,000 worth of goods to Guatemala in 1961. There were no

imports and no separate trade statistics for 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

El Salvador. In Aug Dr Aristides Palacios, president of the Institute for Cultural Relations Israel-El Salvador, visited Israel. (*Jer. Post*, Aug 18)

On Jan 1 an agreement for the abrogation of fees for visas between Israel and El Salvador became effective. (*Kitvei Amanah*, 401)

There were no separate statistics of trade between Israel and El Salvador in 1960, 1961. (*IFT*, 1961)

Haiti. According to Israeli statistics, Israeli exports to Haiti totalled \$5,000 in 1961 and \$1,000 in 1960. There were no imports. (*IFT*, 1961)

Jamaica. In Jan and Feb, Wills O. Isaacs, Jamaican Minister of Trade and Industry, visited Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, Jan 20)

The Financial Secretary of Jamaica, E.R. Richardson, and Ivo De Souza, the West Indies representative to the UK Ministry of Labour, visited Israel for nine days as guests of the government. They toured army installations and arms factories and showed special interest in the possibility of solving Jamaica's unemployment problem by creating units based on the Nahal [army agricultural] corps for development areas. (*IGPO/WNB*, No. 33, Nov)

(There were no separate statistics of trade between Israel and Jamaica.)

Panama. In May the Israeli and Panamanian legations were raised to the rank of embassies. (*IGYB*, 1961/62)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of trade between Israel and Panama in 1961 was: Israel exports \$20,000 and imports \$10,000. There were no separate statistics of trade in 1960. (*IFT*, 1961)

MEXICO, PARAGUAY, PERU

An exhibition of "Four Thousand Years of Mexican Architecture" was opened on Feb 18 in Jerusalem. (*Jer. Post*, Feb 20)

Mexican visitors to Israel included: Fernando Gomez Arrias, the Attorney-General (June); Augustin Salva, of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Oct); and Luis Velasquez, SG of the Mexican Working Youth Organization (Nov)—on his return he published a booklet of impressions. (*Jer. Post*, June 7, 25, Oct 25, Nov 14)

On May 29 the Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, Pinhas Sapir, arrived in Mexico City. He said that Israel was considering the possibility of increasing its trade with Mexico and extending El Al's Lydda-New York route to Mexico. (*Jer. Post*, May 30)

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israel-Mexican trade in 1961 was: Israel exports \$98,000 and imports \$220,000. In 1960 the figures were \$121,000 and \$896,000 respectively. (*IFT*, 1961)

Paraguay. According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israeli-Paraguayan trade in 1961 was: Israel exports \$1,000 and imports \$7,000. In 1960 exports were \$5,000 and imports nil. (*IFT*, 1961)

Peru. Peruvian visitors to Israel included three leaders of APRA [Peru's Social Reform party]: Manuel Seoane, Peruvian Ambassador to the Netherlands, in Nov 1960 (*La Tribuna*, Lima, Feb 2). [Armando Villanueva, Organizing Secretary, (Aug)], and Victor Haya de la Torre, its leader (Dec). (*Jer. Post*, Dec 8, 10, 11; *La Tribuna*, Lima, Dec 20)

In March the Director-General of the Israel Foreign Ministry, Chaim Yahlil, visited Lima as part of his tour of Latin America. (*Jer. Post, March 10*)

According to Israeli statistics the volume of Israeli-Peruvian trade in 1961 was: Israel exports \$201,000 and imports \$747,000, compared with \$151,000 and \$524,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

URUGUAY, VENEZUELA

Uruguay. Urugayan visitors to Israel included: Prof. Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat, Uruguayan Ambassador to the UN (Aug) (*Jer. Post, Aug 6, 8, 9, 11*); [Dr Hector Payase Reyes, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies] and Dr Hector A. Grauert, member of the National Council of Government (Sept) (*Jer. Post, Sept 27*; *El Reporter, Montevideo, Nov 15*); Hector Gros Espeill, deputy Secretary of the National Council of Government and editor of *La Tribuna, Montevideo* (Dec). (*Jer. Post, Dec 18, 21*)

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israeli-Uruguayan trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$337,000 and imports \$548,000, compared with \$399,000 and \$90,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

Venezuela. Venezuelan visitors to Israel included: Gonzalo Barrios, Vice-Chairman and parliamentary chairman of Accion Democratica, the ruling (labour) party (April)—he was received by the President, the PM and the FM (*Jer. Post, April 13, 16, 17*); Pedro Zuloaga, delegate to the UN (*Jer. Post, June 13, 14*); four delegates to the Israeli-organized International Seminar on Rural Planning (Oct-Nov). (*Jer. Post, Nov 22*)

On Sept 10 an exhibition of Israeli painting was opened in Caracas. (*El Nacional, Caracas, Sept 11*)

According to Israeli statistics, the volume of Israeli-Venezuelan trade in 1961 was: Israeli exports \$363,000 and imports \$43,000 compared with \$200,000 and \$9,000 respectively in 1960. (*IFT, 1961*)

THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

(Al-Mamlakah al-Urduniyah al-Hashimiyah)

SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

SYNOPSIS: INTERNAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The internal calm which Jordan enjoyed by the end of 1960 was enhanced in 1961 by both internal and external factors. The government benefited from the truce established by King Hussein with President Abdel Nasser and, in the last quarter of the year, by the breakup of the UAR. This, for the time being, greatly reduced the possibility of establishing an alternative regime in Jordan. At the same time the government was aided by a considerable improvement in the economic situation (on which see below: Economic and Social Survey).

The Baghdad conference of Arab foreign ministers in January, largely an endeavour by the protagonists of "Arab solidarity"—King Hussein among them—to bring the UAR into cooperation with them on their own terms, was followed by Jordanian initiative to improve relations with that country. (See pp 140 ff.) However, though the correspondence which King Hussein started with President Abdel Nasser was couched in friendly terms, it revealed anew their basic differences. As against the President's policies of "cooperative democratic socialism," a comprehensive Arab union, "anti-imperialism," and non-alignment, Hussein insisted on his own: a non-socialist development and reform policy, Arab solidarity rather than union, and an anti-Communist foreign policy. Hussein presented himself in his letters as an Arab leader equal to Abdel Nasser in stature and in status.

Inside Jordan this development was accompanied by the release of pro-Nasser officers and civilians who had been imprisoned for subversive activities. There was an outburst of pro-Nasser—though not anti-government—sentiments in Jordan, and the government intervened to control matters. Foreign observers thought that a rapprochement with Abdel Nasser might endanger the throne as it had in 1956-7, and that on the other hand the King might encounter difficulties with the Bedouin and other supporters of the regime who were suspicious of such a policy.

Facts, however, proved these apprehensions unfounded. There was no sign of any organization among pro-UAR elements. As to the Bedouin, the King took it upon himself personally to extend to them drought-assistance. Within the ruling group he decided a dispute between rival Bedouin clans and personalities in favour of his army chief Habis al-Majali, and against Akil al-Fa'iz of the Bani Sakhr tribe and some senior officers. Fa'iz resigned and the officers were retired.

On May 1 the engagement of King Hussein to Miss Antoinette Gardiner, an English girl, was announced. The wedding took place on May 25; the King's wife was given no title or political position. Strong opposition to the marriage was reported on the part of the King's family, the government and his closest associates, while Gen. Majali and senior officers were said to favour the

match; regarding the Bedouin there were conflicting reports. Foreign observers thought that national feeling had been deeply hurt by the King's marriage to an "imperialist foreigner" and that the King's position had been seriously weakened. The King replied that his marriage was a private affair and advised his "hypocritical" critics "to return to their senses."

During May, between the engagement and the wedding, more political and non-political prisoners were released. During this period also Jordan published the second round of letters between the King and President Abdel Nasser in which the latter accepted in principle a suggestion that they meet. A cabinet reshuffle in June in which three ultra-conservative ministers and the Foreign Minister Mosa Nasir were relieved of their posts seemed to be related to the improved relations with the UAR; similarly, the release from house arrest in August of Sulayman an-Nahuli, who had headed the nationalist pro-Egyptian government in 1956-57.

Jordan's inter-Arab standing further improved with the Kuwait crisis (from June onwards) when Hussein succeeded in maintaining relatively good terms with Iraq while attaching a contingent to the Arab Force in Kuwait and opening a perspective for Kuwaiti financial aid to his country.

Upon the breakup of the UAR King Hussein made a complete *volte face* in his relations with Abdel Nasser. Jordan was the first state to recognize independent Syria on September 29, the day after the coup. King Hussein was the only Arab leader who almost immediately praised the coup as a "blessed upsurge," while vilifying Abdel Nasser (though not by name). Cairo retaliated by severing relations with Jordan. King Hussein said his policy had not been fortuitous and—making clear his estimate that his situation had improved—he said that his self-confidence was growing.

The general elections, which had been postponed from 1960 following the assassination of Majali, took place in October on a personal basis; parties had been dissolved in 1957. Two thirds of the seats were not contested because of what was described as machinations by the government, and even usually sympathetic observers remarked that the elections had been rigged. The majority of the 60 deputies was reported to be right-wing and supporting cooperation with Iraq and Syria. The elections were followed by new appointments to and a reshuffle of the cabinet, but there were no significant changes; Bahjat at-Talhuni retained the premiership.

While Jordan's basic political issue—namely the nature of the regime—obviously could not be raised in parliament, some matters ailing the country could. Deputies complained *inter alia* of inefficiency and corruption in the administration; exploitation by officers of army resources for private benefit; failure of industrial development pro-

jects; unemployment in general and of secondary school graduates in particular; the high cost of living; lack or insufficiency of public and especially social services in certain districts; and last but not least, Jordan's dependence on foreign aid. The deputies demanded an economic development policy aimed at making Jordan economically viable. For his part, King Hussein also laid stress on an economic and social development policy, and the development of an effective administration.

Jordan's foreign policy continued on the established markedly pro-Western and anti-Communist lines. The country continued to be dependent on Western financial aid which covered 57.4% of the total budget expenditure, the bulk coming from the US and the remainder from the UK. The US made it clear that she regarded Jordan's continued political and economic stability as of "key importance," and that consequently large scale assistance would have to continue. At the UN General Assembly, Jordan's voting record was more pro-Western than that of any other Arab country, in spite of her voting approximately twice as much with the Communist countries as with the US.

Jordan showed increased interest in African countries, following King Hussein's tour the previous year. Contacts were established mainly in the Islamic sphere.

The situation on Jordan's long border with Israel continued much as usual. (See also Synopsis on Arab-Israel Conflict, pp 179-80.)

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY

A Favourable Year. 1961 was a favourable year for the economy of Jordan. The national product rose by 23%. The gross national product per capita grew from JD58 in 1960 to JD70 in 1961. The growth was principally due to the increase in the value of net agricultural output, which amounted to 77%; industrial output grew by 24.8%. In 1961 28% of the resources at the disposal of the national economy had to be imported, as against 32% in 1960. Resources apportioned to gross investment and exports stood at 21% in 1961, as against 19% in 1960; the absolute figures were JD33.5m. against JD26.4m. There was a considerable increase in private consumption, while the increase in that of the state was negligible; government expenditure remained nearly frozen. The deficit in the current balance of payments

decreased. The general price index went down from 101 in 1960 to 88 in 1961, according to Jordanian figures.

Population. A general census was held in Jordan in November. The Kingdom's population had reached 1,690,000 as against 1,329,000 in 1952, an increase of 27%. As a consequence of internal movement the population in the East Bank now constituted 52% of the total as against only 44% in 1952, having risen by 51%. The number of nomads (tent-dwellers) was estimated at 96,000.

A 1960 survey estimated the labour force at 400,000 (excluding women working in agriculture). There were, however, only 280,000 gainfully employed, their distribution among branches being: Agriculture—150,000; Public Administration and Defence—75,000; Industry—22,000; Building and Construction—18,000; Commerce and Services—15,000. The number of gainfully employed probably grew in 1961 because of the improved economic situation, but unemployment no doubt remained high.

Education—especially at the secondary level—continued to expand. The overall number of pupils in 1961/2 (in round figures) was 300,000 (including 104,000 girls) as against 284,000 in 1960/1 and 254,000 in 1956/7. The number of students in secondary schools was 20,000 as against 15,000 in 1960/1 and 9,000 in 1956/7. 4,300 students matriculated as against 1,770 in 1956/7. This rapid growth of secondary school graduates constituted a serious political liability as the economy was unable to absorb them at the level they aspired to and as there were no local institutions for higher studies apart from a small university institute of arts. Though the expansion of vocational schools was rapid, absolute figures remained low; there were 3,242 students in 1961/2 as against 2,466 in 1960/1 and 1,770 in 1959/60.

While the relative increase in the number of doctors and hospital beds exceeded that of population growth, absolute figures remained very low. There was one doctor for 5,300 persons (as against 760 in the US and 2,600 in the UAR).

National Accounts. According to Jordanian official figures the gross national product amounted in 1961 to JD118m. an increase of 23.4% over 1960, compared with an increase of 8.7% from 1959 to 1960. The largest increases were in agriculture, industry and trade.

ORIGIN OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

(JD million at current prices)

	1959	1960	% increase 1959/60	1961	% increase 1960/61
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	11.4	13.0	14.0	23.1	77.7
Manufacturing, Mining, Construction and Power	11.8	12.1	2.5	15.1	24.8
Transport	10.8	11.3	4.6	12.8	13.3
Ownership of Dwellings	5.4	6.1	12.9	7.1	16.4
Public Administration and Defence	16.1	17.6	9.3	17.8	1.1
Trade, Banking and Other Services	23.6	26.1	10.6	31.6	21.0
Gross Domestic Product at Factor Costs	79.1	86.2	8.9	107.5	24.8
Net Indirect Taxes and Income from Abroad	8.9	9.2	3.4	10.6	15.2
Gross National Product at Market Prices	88.0	95.7	8.7	118.1	23.4

At the same time domestic output grew in proportion to imported resources:

RESOURCES OF JORDANIAN ECONOMY
(JD million at market prices)

	1959	%	1960	%	1961	%
Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices*	87.0	67.7	94.6	67.5	116.3	71.7
Import of Goods and Services	42.6	32.3	45.7	32.5	45.8	28.3
Total Resources	129.6	100	140.3	100	162.1	100

* Equals gross domestic product at factor cost plus indirect taxes.

In 1961, as in 1960, there was an increase of investments and exports in the use of resources, against a relative decrease of government consumption. Private

consumption remained static in relative figures while increasing considerably in actual figures.

USE OF RESOURCES OF JORDANIAN ECONOMY
(JD million)

	1959	%	1960	%	1961	%
Private Consumption	80.5	62.1	86.2	61.5	99.7	61.5
Government Consumption	27.7	21.4	27.7	19.7	28.9	17.8
Gross Investment	9.9	7.6	13.9	9.9	17.0	10.5
Export of Goods and Services	11.5	8.9	12.5	8.9	16.5	10.2
Total Resources	129.6	100	140.3	100	162.1	100

Gross investment was financed as follows: JD11.4m. by private savings, JD3.8m. by government savings, and JD1.8m. by a deficit in current accounts. Gross investments were apportioned to building (JD9.1m.), equipment (JD5.5m.) and build-up of stocks (JD2.4m.)

Agriculture, 1961 was a good year for Jordanian agriculture, though the late rains of May damaged the crops. The value of the gross agricultural product was JD23.1m., compared with JD13m. in 1960 and JD11.4m. in 1959.

Output in 1961 increased considerably in all branches over that in 1959 and 1960, though the cereal and legumes crops fell below those of the bumper years 1956/7.

AGRICULTURAL CROPS (IN THOUSAND TONS)

	1957	1959	1960	1961
Cereals	311	138	60	206
Legumes	335	146	66	222
Vegetables	240	351	399	533
Fruit	97	112	104	262

The outstanding increase in vegetable and fruit crops was due to several factors: plentiful rains; expansion of

cultivated areas (vegetables from 43,200 hectares in 1957 to 58,300 hectares in 1961; fruit, during the same period, from 9,700 hectares to 26,200 hectares); maturing of young plantations; improved cultivation methods (e.g. the tomato harvest per hectare rose from 5.8 tons in 1957 to 11.2 tons in 1961). On the other hand, the area under legumes decreased from 45,600 hectares in 1957 to 41,400 hectares in 1961.

The East Ghor project made progress. Its purpose was to provide irrigation for about 12,000 hectares in the eastern Jordan Valley by diverting water from the Yarmuk river through a main canal of 69 km length and a system of subsidiary canals. In October 1961 the first stage was completed with the opening of a 22 km stretch of the main canal, intended to irrigate about 3,700 hectares. In January an agreement was signed for U.S. participation in the second stage to the extent of \$2m. out of a total of \$3.1m. In this stage, due for completion in 1962, the main canal was to be extended a further 24 km, thus providing for the irrigation of another 3,300 hectares. The third and last stage of the project was due for completion by 1964. (See also p 219.)

Manufacturing and Mining. Industrial output showed a considerable increase.

INDUSTRIAL CONTRIBUTION TO GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT)
(JD million at current factor costs)

	1959	1960	% 1959/60	1961	% 1960/61
Manufacturing and Mining	7.4	8.3	+12.2	10.7	+28.9
Construction	3.7	3.0	-18.9	3.4	+13.3
Electricity Supply	0.7	0.8	+14.3	1.0	+25.0
Total	11.8	12.1	+2.6	15.1	+24.8

ECONOMIC SURVEY

The main branches in manufacturing and mining were foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco—JD2.88m. (26%); mining and quarrying—JD2.20m. (21%); non-metallic mineral products—JD1.45m. (14%); textiles, clothing and footwear—JD1.12m. (10%); oil refining—JD0.99m. (9%).

The following developments took place in industry and mining: the oil refinery at Khaw, near Zarqa (MER 1960, p 317) was opened in February; it was assumed that it would annually save the country JD1.75m, and increase the national product by JD1.5m. In June the Iraq Petroleum Company announced that it would transfer to Jordan the section of the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline which passed through her territory and which had been unused since 1948; the government intended to utilize the line for piping water from the Azraq springs westwards. In June a tannery was opened at Zarqa. Phosphates production far exceeded the marketing possibilities, as a consequence of the enlargement of the Ruseifa mining plant and the high transport costs hampering exports. Mining of phosphates reached 423,000 tons and exports 383,000 tons compared with 362,000 tons and 319,000 tons respectively in 1960. In September a US firm was commissioned to undertake a preliminary survey for the erection of a potash plant on the southern shore of the Dead Sea—with an annual capacity of 250,000 tons following the completion of trials at the pilot plant on the northern shore (MER 1960, p 317). Geologists of the West German technical aid team discovered copper ore deposits in the Khusseiba region in the Wadi Araba, estimated at 22.5m. tons. In December the Jordan Sulphur Company was licensed to exploit the sulphur deposits in the vicinity of the Dead Sea.

The completion in 1960 of the Amman-Aqaba highway was followed up with further efforts to overcome a major obstacle in the development of the economy, namely the inadequate communication facilities. In October West Germany agreed to participate with JD1.35m. in an expansion project for Aqaba port. The volume of goods passing through the port was 733,000 tons in 1961, compared with 685,000 tons in 1960 and 147,000 tons in 1957. In November the mixed Syrian-Jordanian-Saudi Arabian commission for the reconstruction of the 840 km Ma'an-Medina section of the Hijaz railway (the Damascus-Ma'an section was in use) awarded the contract to a Japanese-Saudi Arabian partnership; the cost, estimated at JD8m., was to be borne by the three countries in equal shares and work was to start at the be-

ginning of 1962. The government published a five-year plan for the development of air communications, mainly the expansion of the airports of Amman and Qalendiya (north of Jerusalem) and the construction of an international airport on the shores of the Dead Sea. In September the concessions of Air Jordan and National Jordanian Airways were cancelled and a new company was formed under the name of Jordania (Jordan Airlines). Its capital of JD1m. was subscribed by the Lebanese Middle East Airlines (35%), the Jordanian government (25%), the dissolved companies, and the public.

Finance. Bank credit continued to expand, but at a slower rate, and reached JD18.6m. as against JD16.6m. in 1960 and JD13.2m. in 1959. This expansion was mainly the result of an increasing demand for instalment purchases, building and real estate investing, and credits to industry; government indebtedness, on the other hand, decreased. The slowing down was caused by declining imports and decreasing stocks.

Means of payment amounted at the end of 1961 to JD28.9m., as against JD26.1m. in 1960 and JD24.2m. in 1959. Private deposits constituted 42% of the total in 1961, as against 40% in 1960 and 37% in 1959, a proof of the public's growing readiness to use banking facilities.

According to provisional figures prices went down considerably in 1961—in agriculture mainly, due to the year's bumper crops.

PRICE INDICES (1953=100)

	General P.I.	P.I. for Grain and Flour
1959	93	98
1960	101	110
1961	88	92

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments. Imports amounted to JD41.9m. with re-exports at JD1m.—a decrease of 2.4% from 1960. The main import items were foodstuffs (JD13.4m.—32%), raw materials and semi-manufactured products (JD8.9m.—21%), machinery and equipment (JD6.2m.—15%), textiles (JD6m.—14%), petroleum products (JD2.4m.—6%).

Exports amounted to JD4.25m. as against JD3.48m. in 1960, an increase of 22%. The main export items were again foodstuffs (54%) and phosphates (37%).

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(in JD million)

Capital Accounts	1958	1959	1960	1961
<i>Exports</i>				
Goods (including Re-export)	3.43	3.35	3.90	5.27
Services (including Tourism)	7.82	5.52	6.18	9.26
<i>Imports</i>				
Goods	33.92	40.20	41.43	40.93
Services	2.71	3.37	4.40	5.15
Deficit in Current Account	25.38	34.70	35.75	31.55
UNRWA	4.75	5.40	5.29	5.15
Foreign Assistance	19.96	20.75	21.34	21.14
Private Remittances and Capital	1.35	6.27	8.05	7.43
Miscellaneous, Including Monetary Movement	+0.68	-2.28	-1.07	+2.17

JORDAN: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Changes in the direction of trade were insignificant. The countries of Western Europe, headed by the UK, the Middle East countries, and the USA, remained chief suppliers. Imports from the USA increased from JD5.1m. in 1960 to JD7m. in 1961 as Jordan agreed to import US goods to the value of half the US aid to Jordan. Imports from Italy, the GFR, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia decreased. The main increases in exports were to Middle East markets, from JD2.1m. in 1960 to JD2.7m. in 1961. (For details, see tables, pp 82-5.)

The percentage of outlay for imports covered by exports grew considerably over 1960 though only insignificantly over 1958. The figures were as follows: 1958: 30.8%; 1959: 20.4%; 1960: 22.0%; 1961: 31.5%.

Foreign Aid continued to be vital to Jordan's economy. While the percentage of foreign aid as part of the gross national product and the budget decreased, it generally remained very high.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN

(in JD million)

	1958	1959	1960	1961
USA	16.3	17.3	18.2	17.1
UK	1.7	2.9	2.5	2.9
UNRWA	4.8	5.4	5.3	5.2
Other Official Sources	1.9	0.5	0.6	1.2
Total Official Sources	24.7	26.1	26.6	26.3
Private Remittances and Capital (+)	1.4	6.3	8.1	7.4
Total Foreign Assistance	26.1	32.4	34.7	33.7
As percentage of Gross National Product	—	36.8%	36.3%	28.6%

(+) Especially emigrants assisting their relations in Jordan.

More aid was granted but not as yet drawn upon: (1) a JD1.35m. loan from the GFR for the development of Aqaba port at 3.75% to be repaid after 15 years; (2) a \$2m. loan from the International Development Agency for the Amman water supply project; (3) the UN Special Fund agreed to contribute \$811,000 to a programme of exploration of subterranean water reserves in the Azraq region.

Jordan endeavoured to mobilize additional sources, in particular from Kuwait. (See pp 136, 139a)

The Budget. The budget resembled that of previous years. Foreign aid continued as the foremost source of revenue, though its percentage decreased slightly, from 60% in 1959/60 to 57% in 1960/61 and 56% in 1961/2. Security constituted 63% of total expenditure, as in 1960/61.

Development Plan. Preparations were announced for the publication of a five-year development plan involving an outlay of JD120m. The development authority was authorized by the government to negotiate in Jordan and abroad for the necessary capital.

BUDGET ESTIMATES

(in JD million)

	1959/60	1960/1	1961/2
Security and Police	17.9	18.4	18.5
Education	2.6	2.6	3.0
Other Current Expenditures	5.5	5.8	6.5
Extraordinary Expenditures (mainly Development)	4.7	6.0	4.9
Total Expenditures	30.7	32.8	32.9
Foreign Assistance	18.4	18.1	18.9
Customs and Excise	5.5	5.6	5.2
Direct Taxes	1.8	2.1	2.5
Other Sources	5.0	6.1	7.0
Total Revenue	30.7	31.9	33.6
Deficit or Surplus	—	-0.9	+0.7

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CURRENT AFFAIRS

SUBVERSION: AFTERMATH OF MAJALI MURDER CASE; RELEASE OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS

(January)

[On Dec 31 four persons who had been found guilty of participation in the assassination of PM Majali on Aug 29, 1960 were executed. Immediately following this, many political prisoners—including army officers—were released. The announcement of the King's engagement to Miss Toni Gardiner was followed by another wave of such releases.]

Executions. On Dec 31, 1960, four Jordanians convicted of complicity in the murder of the late PM Hazza' al-Majali were executed in Amman (*Jihad; Falastin, Jan 1*; for details see MER 1960, p 329-30). This was only the second time King Hussein had confirmed death sentences since he assumed constitutional power in 1953. (In 1958 he sanctioned the execution of three men found guilty of spying for Israel.) No reactions appeared in the Jordanian press.

In Damascus the Palestinian National Union organized a protest march by 5,000 people and, in a statement, condemned Hussein whose very "existence they consider to be a crime and a disgrace to the nation." Demonstrations took place also in Hama and Homs. (*Mid. Mir., Jan 7*)

On Jan 25 it was announced that Zakariya Yusuf at-Tahir's property had been confiscated. Tahir had been condemned to capital punishment in *absentia* for his part in Majali's assassination (See MER 1960, p 327, 329.) (*Jihad, Jan 25; Hayat, Jan 26*). In Feb the property was sold by public auction. (*R. Amman, Feb 11 [14]*)

In Aug Ibrahim Yusuf at-Tahir, Zakariya's brother, was murdered in Amman (in an act of blood vengeance). The murderer, who was reported to be a relative of the former PM, was arrested by the police. (*Jihad, Aug 7*)

On Sept 21 King Hussein visited Karak to hush a tribal truce between the Majali and Masawah clans on the one side and the Dabbas, Tahir, Shamdat, Hindawi and other clans on the other. This truce ended the vendetta which started with the murder of PM Majali. King Hussein was accompanied by PM Talhuni, ministers, diplomatic envoys, army officers, government officials, religious leaders and other notables. In a short speech the King spoke of the need for unity and peace within the "large Jordanian family." (*Jihad, Difa, Falastin, Sept 22*)

Death Penalty for Terrorists. On Jan 7 the government approved a bill to be submitted to Parliament imposing the death penalty on persons using or carrying explosives without prior permission from the authorities. An introductory paragraph to the bill said it was necessary in the public interest to impose severe penalties after it had been proven that explosives entered the country for the sole purpose of undermining its stability. (*Jihad, Jer. Times, Jan 8*)

Amnesties and Releases of Political Prisoners. On Jan 1 it was announced that King Hussein had commuted the

death sentences of Major-Gen. Sadiq ash-Shar' and Rifat Awdah to imprisonment for life. They were condemned to death in 1959, having been found guilty of taking part in a military conspiracy in cooperation with the UAR. (MER 1960, p 325-7) (*Jihad, Jan 1*)

Publication followed of many letters and cables received by the King in which the detainees, their families and others thanked the King for his generosity. (*Jihad, Falastin, Jan 5*)

On Jan 1 the release was announced of Mahmud al-Mu'ayyid, ex-Colonel in the Jordanian army, who had been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 1957 on charges of plotting to assassinate King Hussein. He belonged to the group which included the former Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Ali Abu Nuwar and Ali Hayyari, and former Foreign Minister Abdallah ar-Rimawi, the exiled leader of the Jordanian Ba'ath Party. (*Jihad, Jan 2; ANA, Jan 2 [4]*)

On Jan 2 it was reported that a number of officers sentenced on political charges were to be released "soon." The total number of political detainees in Jordan was reported as 146. The next day it was announced that 31 detainees would be freed according to the decision of the State Security Council. (*Jihad, Jan 2, 4*)

On Feb 14 the release was announced of 15 detainees, most of them from the Nahlus region, who had been arrested a year previously on security grounds. (*Falastin, Feb 15*)

On March 13 it was announced that the King had ordered the release on Id al-Fitr of 44 detainees whose cases had been reviewed. (*R. Amman, March 13 [15]*)

For further releases see below: The King's Marriage.

Trial of Would-be Saboteurs. In Feb the State Security Court tried two men charged with attempting to blow up the Amman radio station in Sept 1960. The defendants, Taysir Darwish Ahmad and Shawqi Ku'aybani, were former employees of the radio station. The prosecutor alleged that they had agreed to destroy the station after a meeting with the acting UAR consul. On Feb 28 they were found guilty and sentenced to terms of six and three years imprisonment respectively, with hard labour. (*Jihad; Falastin, Feb 15, March 1*)

IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH UAR
AND

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT, ARMY

(March-April)

Improved Relations With UAR; Public Expression of Pro-UAR Sentiments. The correspondence between King Hussein and President Abdel Nasser, the first part of which was published on March 31, as well as other signs of improving relations between Jordan and the UAR, brought forth an outburst of pro-UAR sentiments in the Kingdom. There were spontaneous demonstrations in which pictures of Abdel Nasser as well as of Hussein were borne aloft; pictures of the President were reported to have appeared "in every shop window in Jerusalem." The King issued a statement thanking the people for

THE GOVERNMENT

<i>Ministry</i>	<i>Dec 7 1960– June 8 1961</i>	<i>Community Bank**</i>	<i>June 28– October 31</i>	<i>Community Bank**</i>	<i>Rehuffles on Oct 31; Nov 5</i>
<i>PM</i>	Bahjat al-Talhūni	Muslim	E Bahjat al-Talhūni*	Muslim	E
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Mūsa Nāsir	Christian	W Bahjat al-Talhūni*		
<i>Interior</i>	Falāh al-Madād-hah	Muslim	E Hasan al-Kātib*	Muslim	W
<i>Defence</i>	Akif al-Fā'iz ¹ Wasfī Mirza ²	Muslim	E Wasfī Mirza ³	Circassian	E Hasan al-Kātib (Oct 31) Ahmad al-Tarāwnah* (Nov 5) Muslim E
<i>Finance</i>	Hāshim al-Jayūsī	Muslim	W Hāshim al-Jayūsī	Muslim	W
<i>National Economy</i>	Rafīq al-Husseinī	Muslim	W Jalil Harb	Christian	W
<i>Agriculture</i>	Nusūh al-Tāhir*	Muslim	W Nusūh al-Tāhir*	Muslim	W
<i>Development & Reconstruction</i>	Nusūh al-Tāhir*		Nusūh al-Tāhir*		
<i>Justice</i>	Shaykh Muhammad Alī al-Ja'barī	Muslim	W Hasan al-Kātib*		Ya'qūb al-Mu'mar (Oct 31) Ahmad al-Tarāwnah* (Nov 5)
<i>Education & Culture</i>	Shaykh Muhammad Amin ash-Shanqiti*	Muslim	E Rafīq al-Husseinī	Muslim	W Bashir as-Sabbāgh* (Nov 5)
<i>Religious Chief</i>	Shaykh Muhammad Amin ash-Shanqiti*				Hasan al-Kātib* (acting) (Nov 5)
<i>Public Works</i>	Ya'qūb al-Mu'mar	Christian	E Ya'qūb al-Mu'mar	Christian	E Wasfī Mirza (Oct 31)
<i>Communication</i>	Wasfī Mirza*	Circassian	E Abd al-Majīd Murtada	Muslim	E
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Wasfī Mirza*		Bashir as-Sabbāgh	Muslim	E
<i>Health</i>	Dr. Jamīl al-Tutunji	Muslim	E Jamīl al-Tutunji	Muslim	E
<i>Minister of State for Premier's Office Affairs</i>					Ya'qūb al-Mu'mar (Oct 31)
<i>Minister of State for Foreign Affairs</i>					Rafīq al-Husseinī (Nov 5)

¹ Resigned on March 27² Acting Minister from March 27³ Resigned on Sept 6 (acting, Hasan al-Kātib)

** Also holds other Portfolio(s)

** E — East Bank, W — West Bank of the Kingdom.

their loyalty and calling on them to stop the demonstrations.

Some foreign observers thought the move might endanger the throne; on the other hand, it was remarked that many Jordanians were suspicious of a policy of rapprochement and the King might run into difficulties. (For more details see p 145.)

Resignation of Akif al-Fā'iz; Rivalry Between Bani Sakhr and Majāli Tribes Seen. On March 27 it was announced that the King had accepted the resignation of Akif al-Fā'iz, the Minister of Defence. Wasfi al-Mirza, the Minister of Communications and Social Affairs, was appointed Acting Minister of Defence. (R. Amman, March 27 [29]; *Falastin*, March 28)

On the same day the cabinet, in an emergency session, approved the compulsory retirement of five senior army officers, foremost among them being Maj-Gen. Akkash az-Zabin, commander of the armoured corps.

Akif al-Fā'iz refused to comment on his resignation. He affirmed that his loyalty to the King was as great now as it had been before he left the government.

The *New York Times* attributed these changes to the personal rivalry between Hābis al-Majāli, the C-in-C, and Akif al-Fā'iz, as well as to the ancient rivalry between the Majāli clan and the tribe of Akif al-Fā'iz, the Bani Sakhr. Akif was the son of the paramount shaykh of the Bani Sakhr. Thus, while Gen. Majāli had been abroad during the two previous months, Akif al-Fā'iz promoted the cause of Maj-Gen. Akkash az-Zabin, his brother-in-law, then commander of an armoured brigade, whose ambition had been to become Chief of Staff. King Hussein, the paper wrote, was now moving to strengthen the discipline of the army. (*Falastin*, March 28, 29; *NTT*, March 29, April 1)

In Beirut there were also attempts to connect this affair with the improvement of relations with the UAR, to which those involved were said to be opposed (*Hawadith*, March 31; *Mid. Mir.*, April 1). *Al-Hayāt*, however, discounted this interpretation. (*Hayat*, March 30)

Some days later Maj-Gen. fzzat Hasan Qandūr, [Circassian] assistant C-in-C of the Jordanian armed forces, "retired at his own request." He met the King on the occasion of his retirement. (*ANA*, April 3 [6]; *Jihad*, April 3)

Unfounded Reports of Sharif Nāsir's Arrest; Changes in Government. Following the resignation of Akif al-Fā'iz, foreign reports appeared to the effect that King Hussein had ordered the arrest of his uncle, Sharif Nāsir Ibn Jamil, commander of the royal guard, following a dispute between them on the new policy of improving relations with the UAR, which Sharif Nāsir was said to oppose. (R. Moscow, March 29 [SU April 4]; *MENA*, March 31 [April 4]; *Akhbar*, March 29; *Jaridah*, April 2). [The reports seem to have been unfounded; in fact Sharif Nāsir was appointed commander of the armoured corps in addition to his other duties.]

There were more reports from UAR and pro-UAR sources on forthcoming changes in the government on the issue of relations with the UAR. Fawzi al-Mulqi, Sulaymān an-Nābulsi and Abd al-Halim Nimr were mentioned as possible candidates to head a new government. [The last two were leaders of the dissolved National Socialist party.] Nābulsi, head of the pro-UAR government in 1956-7 was still under house arrest. (*Hawadith*, March 31, April 2; *R. Cairo*, March 30 [4])

PM Tāhūni denied all such reports. (*Manar*, April 16)

THE BUDGET DEBATE

(April)

The budget for the financial year 1961/2 which started on April 1 was debated in the House of Representatives and approved on April 23. (For details of the budget, see above: Economic Survey.)

Deputies Demand Policy To Make Jordan Self-sufficient.

The deputies participating in the debate were unanimous in requesting the government to draw up an economic policy aimed at making Jordan self-sufficient, so that she could dispense with foreign aid. They mentioned industrialization, land reclamation, the Dead Sea Potash works, tourism and oil prospecting. Most of them approved a resolution passed by the parliamentary finance committee calling upon the cabinet to encourage local industry, restrict the import of cars and other luxury goods, encourage foreign investment and grant loans to farmers.

A number of deputies praised the improved relations with the UAR, made proposals for strengthening relations with Africa, and expressed support for the cause of the Algerian insurgents.

The government was asked to find work for the unemployed in general and the unemployed among secondary school graduates in particular; one deputy held the civil service commission responsible for unemployment among the latter. (For sources see below)

Army Officers, Civil Servants Blamed For Waste of Public Funds.

Deputy Qāsim al-Hindāwi called on the PM to prevent army officers from using cars for their private purposes and for employing soldiers in their homes. He said he had called attention to this issue at an earlier opportunity but nothing had been done. The army officers, he said, should take as an example the savings made by the King in his expenditures. He complained that the army budget was not being discussed in parliament; he said the deputies were trustworthy and if it was necessary to keep this budget secret they could debate in closed sessions. Deputy Abd al-Bāqī Jamu, who repeated these charges against army officers, maintained high-ranking civil servants were doing the same. He also asked why the roads were in so bad a state of repair, although so much money had been invested in their construction. Speaking of the "failure" of the potash plant and the sugar factory, he claimed that Israel was behind the failure of the first. He also charged that the oil companies had not discovered oil in Jordan because they wished to keep her reserves for the future.

Local issues were also introduced: requests to improve communications, medical services or education facilities in several districts.

In his reply to the deputies, PM Tāhūni promised to continue work on development and the improvement of the social services. (*Difa*, April 24; *Falastin*, April 25)

Final Approval. The Senate unanimously approved the budget on April 30, and on May 1 the budget was published as a royal decree which also dissolved the current sessions of both houses. (*Jihad*, May 1, 2)

THE KING AND THE PEOPLE THE ROYAL MARRIAGE

(May)

[In 1961, as in previous years, King Hussein made many public appearances all over Jordan in order to gain public support. He devoted special attention to Army camps,

refugee centres, Bedouin encampments and towns of the Eastern bank. At the same time, representatives of the public were invited to the palace and expressed their support for the King and his policy. During May the King's visits and invitations were more intensive, a fact which was attributed by some observers to the need for gaining public support in connection with his marriage.

The King gave a series of speeches under the title "Let Us Build This Country And Serve This Nation," in which he emphasized the need for uniting forces for the development and progress of Jordan, and stressed his personal devotion to this task.]

The King's Engagement. On May 1 the royal court announced the engagement of King Hussein to Muna al-Hussein, formerly Miss Antoinette (Toni) Arvil Gardiner, daughter of Colonel W.P. Gardiner, an advisory expert in the Jordanian Royal Engineering Force (*Jordanian newspapers*, May 2). [The King first married in 1955. His first wife was Dinah Abd al-Hamid, a descendant of the Hashimite family living in Egypt by whom he had a daughter—Princess Aiyah. The marriage ended in divorce in 1957.]

The same evening the King spoke over the radio on the anniversary of his inauguration (May 2, 1953). After recounting the struggle and achievements of his nine years as King, his devotion to the country and the improved relations with Iraq and with President Abdel Nasser, he mentioned his engagement. He spoke of his "loneliness and isolation" and said: "Many times have I craved for sympathy and love, for the thrill and comfort of family life... Time has brought into my path a small ordinary family and a friendship has developed between it and me. Although this family are strangers, they are bound by love to this country... It is God's will that I shall have found in this family's daughter the girl of my dreams..." The King said that his fiancée shared his love for the people of Jordan and inspired him to more of it. "She is a faithful Muslim though not an Arab [Miss Gardiner converted to Islam a month before] and I do not believe that anyone is better than anyone else in life except on the basis of piety." The King added: "When God wills it our wedding will take place without fanfare." He concluded by saying "I know the extent of happiness that will prevail upon you as you see me build myself a peaceful happy family and I know it is your right to see me derive from this peace and happiness the strength to continue in my responsibilities..." (*R. Amman*, May 1 [3]; *Jihad*, *Falastin*, May 2; a description of the King's courtship and proposal may be found in his autobiography: *Unearly Lies: the Head*, Heinemann, London, 1962, pp 220 ff.)

In a press conference, Miss Muna disclosed that she had embraced the faith of Islam a month previously, having studied under Shaykh Muhammad Amin ash-Shanqiti, the Minister of Education, and that she had been learning Arabic for two months. She added that she had many plans for the progress and development of the Jordanian people and would cooperate with the King in order to improve the social conditions of the population, especially the refugees. (*Di'a*, May 3)

Festivities in Jordan. [The heavily censored] Jordanian newspapers warmly welcomed the royal engagement. There were reports of public celebrations and enthusiasm: Firework displays were organized, military bands played in the streets and people danced to them. When the King and his fiancée drove through the city, their car was mobbed by delighted onlookers—according to

both Jordanian papers and Western correspondents. Parties and celebrations took place in the towns of both banks. Congratulatory messages were received from many Jordanian ministers, religious scholars and other notables. (*Di'a*, May 3; *Falastin*, May 3, 4; *Daily Herald*; *Glasgow Herald*; *Daily Express*, May 3)

Adverse Reactions; Weakening of King's Position Seen. Both Arab and Western observers reported strong opposition to Hussein's marriage to an English girl on the part of his family, the government and his closest associates. Queen-Mother Zayn, Sharif Násir, the King's brothers, Premier Talhúni, Wasfi at-Tal, one of the King's closest advisers, and others. (*Nahar*, Beirut, May 7; *Hawadith*, Beirut, May 5, 12; *Sunday Times*, May 28)

The Chief of Staff, Hábis al-Majálí, and senior army officers were said to back the King (*Nahar*, May 9). A later report said the army had been "deeply disturbed" and Majálí at the head of a group of officers had tried to convince Hussein to change his mind. Sharif Násir, the Commander of the Royal Guard, however, had convinced his officers of the futility of opposition and the officers corps then pledged support for the King. (*Daily Telegraph*, May 26)

Regarding the Bedouin tribes there were also conflicting reports. The majority of the Shaykhs were said to have opposed the marriage (*Hawadith*, May 5, 12). A Western observer however found that the Bedouin had "loudly approved" the step of their "leader who so long put the demands of State before his personal happiness." (*Sunday Telegraph*, May 7)

The national feeling in Jordan had been deeply affected by the King's marriage to an "imperialist foreigner," according to British sources, and the opposition was particularly strong amongst the refugees and Eastern Bank population. The attempt to "slur over Miss Gardiner's British origin by describing her as a Muslim" was reportedly regarded as particularly futile and clumsy. The only Jordanians feeling happiness, it was said, were the opposition who wanted to destroy the Jordanian monarchy. The marriage was described as "at best politically unwise and at worst downright disastrous." The general view among British observers was that the King had placed himself in a dangerously weakened position, by giving the UAR and the Communists a perfect weapon against himself and the west. *The Observer* summed up: "The ghost of Glubb will be made to walk again the battlements of the citadel at Amman" (*Daily Express*, May 2, 8; *Observer*, May 7; *Daily Telegraph*, May 26; *Scotsman*, May 24; *Sunday Times*, May 28)

Hussein Attacks His Critics. At a press conference, King Hussein said that his marriage was a private matter, having no connection with Jordan's relations with her sister Arab countries. "I expected that some people would exploit my engagement," he added, "and pretend to be anxious about the fate of Hussein and the Hashimites... But I know that the majority of the people are well-mannered and would realize that I have chosen the course of honesty and truth. My country and I have enemies in this world, I expected them to say that the golden opportunity has now arisen to give Hussein a death-blow." In conclusion, the King said: "My final advice to those who hypocritically profess pity and render advice is to return to their senses." (*Jer. Times*, May 13; *Mid. Mir.*, May 13)

King's Campaign for Public Support. [During May, efforts made by the King and the government to gain

public support, were considered by observers a preliminary to the announcement of the marriage.]

On May 10 Jordan made public an exchange of letters between the King and President Abdel Nasser in which the latter accepted the suggestion of the King for a meeting between them. (For details see p 142 b)

On May 7, in celebration of the royal engagement, an amnesty was announced for prisoners sentenced for non-political crimes between Jan 1960 and May 2, 1962. (*Jihad*, May 8)

On May 13 the release of 24 political prisoners was announced: six ex-officers of the armed forces, convicted at different times for plotting against the state, and 18 Communists serving jail terms ranging from three to fifteen years. Among those freed were Brigadier Adib al-Qasim who was sentenced to death on Oct 17, 1959, and Lieutenant-Col. Qasim Nasir (whose citizen's rights were restored in June). (See MER 1960, p 328; *Jihad*, May 14, June 22.) On May 22 another 25 military detainees were released from jail. (*Falastin*, May 23)

Twelve people from Nablus who had been banished were allowed to return to their home town (*Jihad*, May 31). Further releases from enforced exile were announced in June. (*Manar*, June 14; *Jihad*, June 28)

The Royal Wedding. The wedding of King Hussein and Muna al-Hussein took place on May 25, the country's independence day, at Zahrán palace, in the presence of the Crown Prince, the Prime Minister, the bride's father and a number of Jordanian notables.

After the ceremony, the King received the congratulations of ministers and other visitors at his palace. It was announced that he had received a large number of presents, including presents from President Kennedy, Queen Elizabeth, the Shah of Iran, General Chiang Kai-shek. Congratulatory messages were received from President Shehab, of Lebanon, SG Hassanah of the Arab League, President Gursel of Turkey, King Paul of Greece, President Tito of Yugoslavia, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, General Najib ar-Rubayi, the President of the Iraqi State Council, and others. The King officially announced that his wife would have no title, decoration, or official position; he added that she shared his own indifference to positions and titles and the superficial passing show of life (*R. Amman*, May 28, 31; *Jihad*, *Difa*, May 25, 26; *Mid. Mir.*, May 27). The fact that Muna al-Hussein was not proclaimed Queen was attributed by a Lebanese source to the influence of the Queen Mother. (*Hawadith*, June 2)

The King said that he would spend his honeymoon in Jordan, in order to be able to continue supervising the country's affairs for the coming elections. (*Jihad*, May 29)

Hussein: Suffering From Fatigue. In Dec King Hussein went to London for a private visit which, it was announced, would include a medical checkup. The King was accompanied by Sharif Hussein Ibn Nasir and his personal physician.

Crown Prince Muhammad was appointed deputy monarch (*Jihad*; *Falastin*, Dec 18). The King met with PM Macmillan, and lunched with Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace. (See also below: The UK.)

At a press conference in London the King said: "The years of struggle have left some scars on me. The doctors have found me suffering from strain and fatigue and ordered three days a week off work... I am not allowed to do any acrobatics either." The King said that "things are going well in Jordan at the moment but

in the Arab world anything can happen at any time." (*Jihad*, Dec 20)

CABINET RESHUFFLE

(June)

On June 28 PM Bahjat al-Talhuni submitted the resignation of his government, which was accepted by the King. No official reason was given. The cabinet had been formed on Aug 29, 1960, the day of the assassination of PM Hazza' al-Majali. The King asked Talhuni to form a new cabinet at once and on the same day it was named by royal decree.

Four members of the outgoing government were not included in the new one. They were Musa Nasir (Foreign Affairs), Falah al-Madid-hah (Interior), Muhammad Amin ash-Shanqiti (Education) and Muhammad Ali al-Jabari (Justice). (The last three were known as "ultra-conservatives".)

Talhuni himself became Foreign Minister as well as PM. There were four newcomers: Hasan al-Katib (Interior and Justice), Abd al-Majid Murtada (Communication), Jalil Harb (Economy) and Bashir as-Sabbagh (Social Affairs). (*Jihad*, June 29; see also table of government)

Sulayman an-Nabulsi Released from House Arrest. On Aug 13 the former Premier Sulayman an-Nabulsi was released from house arrest "according to the wish of King Hussein" (*Jihad*, Aug 14). Nabulsi visited the King and thanked him for his release. (*R. Amman*, Aug 15 [17])

Sulayman an-Nabulsi, leader of Jordan's National Socialist Party, had been placed under house arrest in April 1957. He had become PM in Oct 1956 (and conducted a pro-Egyptian policy) but was dismissed by the King on April 10 when he insisted on establishing diplomatic relations with Russia and Communist China. Five days later the King announced that an attempt to stage a [pro-Egyptian] military coup had failed. Nabulsi was reported to be under arrest then but was made PM in the government formed the next day. He was again arrested on April 25, 1957. (*Mid. Mir.*, Aug 19)

ELECTIONS TO CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

(September-October)

For background, see MER 1960, pp 223-4

Elections Announced. A royal decree of Aug 27 ordered elections for the Chamber of Deputies, and accordingly the Cabinet appointed Oct 19 as election day (*R. Amman*, Aug 27 [29]). [This was to be the sixth Chamber; the fifth was elected in 1955 for four years but its term was extended for one year following the assassination of PM Majali.]

An electoral law had already been promulgated on June 11, 1960, and administrative preparations for elections had also been made during the summer of 1960. The electoral law increased the number of deputies from 50 to 60, 30 from each Bank: 48 Muslims, 10 Christians as well as 2 Circassians or Chechens in Amman district. Christian deputies were to be elected in the following districts: Amman, Jerusalem, Bethlehem—2 each; Salt, Irbid, Karak, Ramallah—1 each; the Bedouin would be represented by 3 deputies, 1 each for the northern, southern and central regions. (MER 1960, p 324; *Difa*, Aug 28; *Falastin*, Aug 29)

Resignation of Ministers, Officials. Following the appointment of election day the resignations were announced

of Ya'qub Mu'mar, Minister of Public Works, Wasfi Mirza, Minister of Defence, and high-ranking officials in accordance with a provision in the electoral law requiring the resignation of ministers or high officials who put up their candidacy in the elections within ten days of the announcement of the elections. (*Manar*, Aug 28; *Difa*, Sept 4; *Falastin*, Aug 30)

Two Thirds of Candidates Elected Unopposed. The nomination of candidates took place from Sept 24-29. It now became clear that two thirds of the candidates were unopposed. Seats would be contested only in Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah in the West Bank, and Tafilah and Irbid in the East Bank. In Salt only the seat of the Christian community was contested. (*Jihad*, Sept 25, Oct 6; *Falastin*, Sept 29)

The election campaign was very quiet and the elections took place without disturbances (*Falastin*, Oct 20). This was attributed to the fact that no political parties were contesting the seats (as parties had been dissolved in 1957) (*Times*, Oct 21), to the recent Syrian secession from the UAR and to the desire to maintain stability. (*Jer. Times*, Oct 19)

The majority of the deputies elected were reported to be of the right wing and supporting cooperation with Iraq and Syria; 23 of them were members of the previous parliament. (*Jer. Post*; *Jihad*; *Times*, Oct 21)

"Rigged Elections." [The fact that two thirds of the deputies were elected unopposed was criticized not only by the regime's foes (e.g. the pro-UAR Lebanese paper *Hasadith* Oct 21; *V of A*, Oct 20 [23] but also by neutral and friendly observers.) The Beirut *Al-Jaridah* remarked (Oct 21) that this was certainly not democratic procedure. The *Scotman* said that the government had "rigged the election, even by Middle-East standards," by refusing to give the unfavoured candidates the necessary certificates showing that they had not been convicted of any criminal offence. As a result there was no need for bribery at the polls, or to falsify the results. (*Scotman*, Dec 26)

Election Results.

Note: * Christian; * Circassian; * elected in contest; the last known party affiliations are given in brackets.

East Bank

- 1) *Amman*—Dr. Mustafa Khalifah, Abd ar-Rahman Khalifah, Wasfi Mirza*, Salim al-Bakhit*, Ahmad al-Lawzi, Abd al-Baqi Jamu*, Shahadah al-Tawwal*, Musa Hussein ar-Raghib
- 2) *Salt*—Riyad al-Muflih, Nufan as-Sa'ud, Wasif Bisharat*
- 3) *Madba*—Qablân ash-Shahwân
- 4) *Irbid*—Amin abu ash-Shir*, Idris al-Tal*, Amin al-Khasawneh*, Abd al-Majid ash-Shuraydah*. Day-fallah al-Hamud*, Muflih Hasan al-Garayibah
- 5) *Ajlun*—Muhammad al-Amin al-Mummi
- 6) *Jarash*—Khâlid Nawwâf Abu Dalbâh
- 7) *Karak*—Sâlih al-Majâlî, Amrân al-Mu'ayitah, Abd al-Wahhâb al-Tarâwnah, Sâlib Barqân*
- 8) *Tafilah*—Wahid al-Awrân*
- 9) *Ma'an*—Tharwat al-Talbûni, Atallah al-Kabariti
- 10) *Bedouin*—Southern Bedouin: Faisal Ibn Jâzi, Northern Bedouin: Sa'ud al-Qâdi, Central Bedouin—Akif al-Fâ'iz

West Bank

- 1) *Jerusalem*—Kâmil Urayqât, Ali Hijâzi (National Socialist), Isma'il Atiyah, Ayjûr (Igor) Farrâj*, Husni al-Qurrah*

- 2) *Bethlehem*—Muhammad Sâlim adh-Dhuwayb*, Habib Shabahdâh*, Hasan Abd al-Fattâh Darwish*, Nicola Ya'qub Qatân*
- 3) *Hebron*—Isma'il Hijâzi*, Fâtîm Tabbûb*, Muhammad Mahmûd Qarâjah, Ali Sharîf*, Ahmad Mahmûd Hujjah* (National Socialist)
- 4) *Nablus*—Abd ar-Ra'ûf al-Fâris, Abd al-Qâdir as-Sâlih (Communist), Abdallah al-Khatib (Communist), Na'im Tuqân (National Socialist), Abd al-Latif Anbatawi, Rasûd Nimr
- 5) *Jenin*—Najib al-Ahmad (National Socialist), Jamâl Abd al-Hâdi (National Socialist), Abd ar-Rahim Arhid
- 6) *Tulkarm*—Abdallah al-Fayyâd, Hâfiz al-Hamdalâh (National Socialist), Falâh Hanûn
- 7) *Ramallah*—Dr. Qâsim ar-Rimâwî*, Abdallah Jawdah Khalâl*, Shâhir Hussein Zâhir, Isa Aql*, (*Falastin*, Oct 20, 21)

Appointments to Senate. On Oct 22 five new members were appointed to the Senate by royal decree: Ya'qub Mu'mar [Christian, formerly member of Nâbulusi's National Socialist Party, now Minister of Public Works; Fu'ad abd al-Hâdi; Sâlih ad-Din Tuqân (formerly member of the National Socialist Party and member of Nâbulusi's cabinet in 1957); Mahmûd ad-Dajânî; Mahmûd Kurayshân [of Ma'an] (*Difa*; *Jihad*, Oct 23). A sixth member, Ahmad ad-Tarâwnah, was appointed on Nov 5. (*Jihad*, Nov 6)

On Oct 28 Samir ar-Rifâ'i, President of the Senate, submitted his resignation from the Senate. On the same day Sa'id al-Mufti was appointed by royal decree President of the Senate as of Nov 1. (*Jihad*, Oct 30; *R. Amman*, Oct 28 [31])

Speech from the Throne. On Nov 1, at the opening of the sixth session of Parliament, King Hussein delivered the speech from the throne. He stressed that despite international and regional crises the country enjoyed political and economic stability to which the release of [political] prisoners had contributed. Of the armed forces, the King said that they were "the hope for the restoration of the usurped homeland" and contributed to the security of all Arab countries, he mentioned in this respect the Jordanian contingent in Kuwait. He advocated "comprehensive Arab unity based on equality and sincerity" and not on "domination, ambitions and egotism." He expressed support for the Syrian revolution, the "Palestine cause" and the Algerian insurgents. The King reviewed the achievements of the government in economics, communications, health, education, public works and social affairs, with emphasis on development projects. (*R. Amman*, Nov 1 [4]; *Falastin*, Nov 2)

CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT

(October-November)

New Appointments. Following the elections, on Oct 31 Wasfi Mirza was appointed Minister of Public Works; Ya'qub Mu'mar, Minister of Justice and of Premier's Office Affairs, and Hasan al-Kâtib, Minister of Interior and Defence. (Wasfi Mirza had resigned before the elections.) (*R. Amman*, Oct 31 [Nov 2]; *Jihad*, Nov 1)

Cabinet Reshuffle. On Nov 5 the Cabinet was reshuffled as follows: Ahmad ad-Tarâwnah, formerly Chief of the Royal Court, was appointed Minister of Justice and Defence; Ya'qub Mu'mar, formerly Minister of Justice and Premier's Office Affairs, retained the second port-

folio only; Rafiq al-Husseini, formerly Minister of Education and Culture, became Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Hasan al-Katib, Minister of Interior and Defence, was relieved of the Defence portfolio but made acting Religious Chief Justice; Bashir as-Sabbagh, Minister of Social Affairs, received the portfolio of Culture and Education in addition. (ANA, Nov 5 [7]; Jihad, Nov 6)

Chief of Royal Court. Sharif Hussein Ibn Nasir, Ambassador of Jordan to Spain, was appointed Chief of the Royal Court. (Difa; Jihad, Nov 6)

Government Wins Vote of Confidence; Topics in General Debate. On Nov 21 the government won the confidence of the House by a majority of 49 to 2 (Dayfallah al-Hamud and Idris at-Tal (Irbid)) with two abstentions (Riyad al-Muflih (Salt) and Dr Qasim ar-Rimawi (Ramallah)) and seven absent.

In the course of the debate many internal and external questions were raised by the deputies. Some spoke about the religious situation in the country and asked for care for the old, care of the holy places and tombs, the sending of missions for study at Al-Azhar in order to improve Islamic learning and administration in the country, and the banning of immoral films. Foreign affairs were discussed especially in connection with inter-Arab relations and Palestine. Kamil Urayqat (Jerusalem) requested the

government to work for the establishment of a united Arab front at the UN during the discussions of the Palestine problem and to give practical effect to the proclamation of Jerusalem (the Old City) as the country's second capital. (See MER 1960, p 322.) Ahmad al-Lawzi (Amman) praised the government's attitude towards the Palestine issue and the Syrian revolt. Dr Qasim ar-Rimawi (Ramallah) advocated the establishment of an Arab economic union and an Arab common market. Regarding interior issues, some deputies complained of corruption and inefficiency in the administration. Nicola Qattan (Bethlehem) stressed that employment in the government offices must be based on qualifications, not favouritism, and demanded the reorganization of the government machinery. Shakhir az-Zahir and Abdallah Jawdah complained of the high cost of living and the low incomes, and stressed the economic importance of the potash plant. Some deputies complained of unwarranted arrests and asked for the elimination of obstacles encountered by the citizens at the passport and security departments. Deputies from the north of the East Bank complained of the poor economic and social conditions in their districts. In his reply PM Talhuni assured the House that his government would take into consideration the suggestions for the development of the country and the reorganization of the government machinery. Referring to foreign policy, he said that Jordan's policy was founded on a national basis. (Jihad; Difa, Nov 22)

PARTIES, THE BEDOUIN, STATE AND ISLAM

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Arrests and Trials. On Feb 16 a fugitive Communist was arrested in Nablus. (Falastin; Manar, Feb 17)

On March 13 the State Security Court sentenced two persons from Salfit and one from Beit Furik to 15 years' imprisonment for membership in the CP. (Falastin, March 14)

On March 28 it was reported that a military court in Lebanon had sentenced to imprisonment three Jordanians accused of espionage for the Jordanian CP and conspiracy against the regime in Jordan. (Hayat, March 28; Falastin, March 29)

On Oct 18 the State Security Court sentenced a person from Taiyiba (near Ramallah) to 15 years' imprisonment with hard labour for membership in the CP. The defendant refused to denounce Communism and announced that he would not leave the party. (Falastin, Oct 19)

Party Protest Against Persecution. In March the Lebanon [Communist] newspaper *Al-Akhbar* published a statement by the Jordan CP condemning the Jordanian authorities for "persecuting patriots." It called on the Jordanian people to fight for the release of political prisoners and for the realization of democracy and freedom. The statement said that the "black Jordanian clique" was continuing its "barbarous terrorism" against the people, with the help of specialists from the US, Britain and West Germany who controlled Jordan's army and police. They had been greatly shocked, however, by the fact that hundreds of patriots, Communists and democrats, did not submit. (Akhhbar, March 5; NCNA, March 19 [FE 22])

Khrushchov Letter to Jordanian CP Secretary. In Aug

Moscow Radio reported that the Soviet PM had sent a letter to Fu'ad Nasir, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Jordanian CP, in which he thanked the latter for his congratulations on Titov's successful flight in space. [Nasir's address was not mentioned.] (R. Moscow, Aug 30-IMB, Aug 31)

Fu'ad Nasir participated in the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in Oct. In his speech at the Congress he said: "For many years now, the Jordanian nation has lived under a regime of stark terrorism, which has sold the national interest and sovereignty to American, English and West German imperialists. The living standard of the people is very low [and] the economy is in decline. The land is ruled by oppression and terror directed against all our people and especially against the CP..." (Pravda, Oct 28)

Soviet Claims: Party Continues Struggle Despite Terror and Torture. An article in a Soviet journal in Nov said the Jordanian CP was continuing its struggle in spite of rampant "police terror" and the fact that "hundreds of Communists and patriots have been thrown into prison where they are being tortured." The party continued as before to urge the masses "to struggle against reaction and unmask the aggressive plans of US imperialists and their internal agents..." The call of the CP for "national unity against the forces of reaction and obscurantism" finds ever wider support among the broad layers of the workers and the national bourgeoisie who are dissatisfied with the pro-American policy of King Hussein. (Narodny Azii i Afriki, Nov)

Protests by organizations of Jordanian students in Communist countries, charging the Jordanian authorities with "brutal torture" of political detainees, were reported in Nov from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Com-

munist China. (*R. Moscow, Nov 14 [SU 16]; NCNA, Nov 14 [FE 18]; R. Prague, Nov 26 [FE 29]*)

A Moscow Radio broadcast in Nov repeated the charge that "torture is being administered by an expert from Western Germany who undertook to weaken the morale of the detained Jordanian nationalists and force them to renounce their political beliefs." (*R. Moscow in Arabic, Nov 10 [SU 13]*)

THE ISLAMIC LIBERATION PARTY

(*hizb at-tahrir al-islami*)

In March five persons were found guilty by the State Security Court in Amman of being members of the party. Two of them, originating from Ein Karin [Israel] were sentenced to one year's imprisonment; the other three—inhabitants of Qalqilya, Nablus and Hebron respectively—were sentenced to two years' imprisonment. (*Jihad, March 7*)

In Aug Ahmad ad-Da'ir, the leading personality of the party in Jordan, was released from house arrest imposed in 1959 (*Falastin, Aug 17*). Two other party members, Harith Kaitab and Salih Abd as-Salam al-Mubtasib were released from detention. (*Manar, Aug 18*)

THE MUSLIM BRETHERN

[The King and the Muslim Brethren continued to support each other.]

Participation in Islamic Congress. Abd ar-Rahman Khalifah, the Controller General (*al-murāqib al-amm*) of the Muslim Brethren in Jordan, participated in the Conference of the Islamic Congress in [the Old City of] Jerusalem in Jan. In his speech he said that as "Assistant President of the Executive Secretariat of the Muslim Brethren in the Arab Countries" he represented the Muslim Brethren not only in Jordan but in all the Arab countries. Khalifah denounced those Muslims who went on the "evil path" by following the western capitalist bloc or the eastern Communist bloc, and urged the creation of an Islamic bloc. He called on the Congress to assist the Muslims in "Palestine," Algeria, Mauritania, Southern Arabia, Kashmir and in Africa. (*Manar, Jan 16*)

Khalifah was later received by the King. (*R. Amman, Jan 22-IMB, Jan 24*)

Various Activities. The movement held a number of religious gatherings and ceremonies on the occasion of Islamic religious and historical events, especially in Nablus and Hebron. Political issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Algerian question and the boycott of French goods were also raised in speeches at these gatherings. (*Manar, March 8, Aug 5; Falastin, June 22*)

In an assembly of merchants at Zarqa organized by the Muslim Brethren's local branch on July 28, the public was requested to boycott French-made goods as a mark of solidarity with the cause of the Algerian insurgents. (*Falastin, July 29*)

In Dec it was reported that the movement in Jordan had sent PM Dawālibi of Syria a message of congratulation on his formation of a government. (*Falastin, Manar, Dec 27*)

THE BEDOUIN

[The Bedouin of Jordan, some 150 thousand strong and politically the most loyal to the King, were suffering from the third consecutive year of drought. Especially hard-hit was the Ma'an district in the South of the East

Bank. The government had dealt with this matter the previous year, but during 1961 the Bedouin plight grew even worse.]

Starvation. A parliamentary delegation which had visited the district at the beginning of Jan, reported to parliament on poverty, disease and starvation. (*Jihad, Jan 18*)

A Lebanese correspondent who visited the district wrote of thousands of starving and tubercular children. (*Hayat, Feb 15*)

Government Aid. The King visited the district in person and on his return discussed with the government immediate relief measures. The government immediately granted 10,000 dinars and the Army 5,000 dinars for first aid and set up a committee which included the Chief of the Royal Cabinet, several ministers and high army officers to collect donations. The King ordered the collection of 17,000 dinars for immediate relief. Later, the government set up another committee under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, Habis al-Majali, to supervise the distribution of relief. (*Manar, Jan 10, 15; Difa, Jan 11*)

The issue was raised several times in Parliament, where PM Talhuni announced the following decisions taken by the government: (1) The establishment of a special committee to collect donations and contributions and to supervise the relief programme; (2) to put aside JD 100,000 for loans and rehabilitation projects; (3) to construct a highway between Wadi Musa and Petra in order to provide work for the unemployed; (4) to ask the US for immediate help; (5) to allot 5% of a monthly salary (Feb) of all military and security personnel, and government employees as contributions for relief; (6) to draft plans for cultivation projects; (7) to provide the affected with a permanent water supply; (8) to establish mobile clinics in key villages and to build hospitals; (9) to request charitable societies to participate in the relief measures; (10) to distribute clothing to the needy.

Talhuni concluded that most of these decisions had already been implemented. (*Jer. Times; Jihad, Jan 25*)

Amman Radio announced on March 31 that so far 42,000 needy persons in the afflicted area had received food, clothing and money. Donations totalling over JD100,000 were to be invested to aid the destitute. (*R. Amman, March 31, [W April 6]*)

Private companies, businessmen and organizations also made contributions which by the end of April had exceeded JD120,000. [During the first quarter of the year, the newspapers published the names of hundreds of such donors.] (*Difa, April 30*)

Settlement Projects. During the year the Minister of Agriculture several times announced details of a programme for settlement of nomads. In certain locations in the south wells would be dug and villages built which the government would provide with public services, clinics, schools and mosques. The government would give the Bedouin land, and loans for its cultivation. The programme was to be first implemented in the Hasah region. (*Manar, March 15; Hayat, May 15; Falastin, Sept 13, 17; Jihad, Oct 30*)

A model tribal village was also to be built in the Hebron district for the Ramadan tribe who requested help for this purpose. (*Jihad, Feb 6; Falastin, May 4; Difa, May 18*)

In May the American benevolent society Kerr announced its intention to build a model tribal village for

the southern Bedouin at Hasah (*Jihad*, May 9). Later, the society said that work on the village near Jerbah, 300 km south of Amman, would start at the beginning of 1962 in cooperation with the public works office. Work would progress in three stages over three years, at the end of which the village economy would be based on agriculture and village crafts (*Falastin*, Nov 8). The Minister of Health said that a clinic, school and a mosque would be built in this village. The pupils of Amman secondary schools would take part in the work. (*Jihad*, Dec 19; *Falastin*, Dec 29)

The Bedouin and the King. In Jan a letter from the Shaykhs of the Karak district tribes to the King was published, in which the Shaykhs thanked the King for his economic aid and expressed their loyalty to the King and his family. (*Jihad*, Jan 23)

In the course of his journeys round the country, the King devoted special attention to the Bedouin tribes. In the course of a week in May, the King welcomed to his palace the leaders of the Banu Khālid, Ghazāwiyah and Azāmah tribes, visited the Huwaytāt tribe in Rashadiyah district who demonstrated their loyalty to the King and his family, and invited to his palace the Shaykhs of Tarāwnah, Hasawnah, An-Nasr, Banu Hasan, Banu Hamidah and other tribes. (*Falastin*, Difa', May 9; *Jihad*, May 15, 16)

On June 1, it was announced that the King had given money gifts to hundreds of needy Bedouin families on the occasion of his marriage. (*Manar*, June 1)

Exemption From Taxes. In April, a royal decree confirmed the exemption of nomadic tribes who habitually crossed the borders between Jordan and the neighbouring countries in search of grazing grounds from taxes on sheep during the current financial year. (*Falastin*, April 6)

Request for Parliamentary Representation. In Feb it was reported that the Abād qabilah (tribal federation) had sent a delegation to Amman with the request to provide for it a special electoral district so as to afford proper representation of their interests in parliament. At present they were divided between two districts. The PM and Chief of the Royal Cabinet promised to look into their request. The qabilah comprised the tribes of Irah, Yaraqah, Jabrah, Zuyūh, Shuraydah, Ghanānim, Ziyadāt and others. (*Jihad*, Feb 4, 8; *Falastin*, Feb 13)

ISLAM AND THE STATE

King Hussein and Talhūni on Religion. Hussein's speech from the throne, Nov 1: "Our Armed Forces as well as our Jordanian Community keep in heart and spirit the Holy Places in our country as an eternal sign of the faith in God and a lively symbol of the fraternity between believers in the mission of Heaven and a shining picture depicting the firm stand of the religious idealism in the face of misgivings, materialism and immorality as well as the victory of sincere beliefs in God over the power of atheism." (*Jer. Times*, Nov 2)

PM Talhūni, in a statement to a correspondent on Jordan's foreign relations, said: "Jordan defends its idealism and traditions against atheism and is anxious to preserve its heavenly teachings against materialism." (*Jihad*, July 27)

The Islamic Educational Council (*al-hay'ah al-islamiyah al-isalmiyah*). (The council was not a governmental institution but its members were appointed by royal decree from among eminent religious scholars in the country. The council, which held regular sessions, supervised worship and religious education, and in this capacity also advised the public on secular affairs in accordance with official policy. The council's president was Shaykh Abdallah Ghoshah).

In Jan the council issued a statement to the religious functionaries saying that the Muslims had deviated from the true path, had fallen under foreign influences and had become materialists; some had even conspired against the nation and the state, and had planned assassinations and terror. The council called on all preachers in the mosques, and other religious functionaries, to decry these foreign influences. (*Manar*, Jan 8)

In June the council decided to thank the Jordanian government for its "wise decision" banning alcoholic drinks at official parties. (*Difa'*; *Manar*, June 4)

In Aug the council resolved to call on the preachers in the mosques to invite all Muslims to cooperate fully in the general census (conducted in Oct-Nov); and to request them to give truthful declarations. The census was described by the council as most beneficial for the people. (*Jihad*, Aug 6)

In Dec the council called on the preachers to encourage the Muslims to buy local produce and to cooperate in economic projects in order to contribute to the improvement of the general economic situation. (*Falastin*, Dec 10)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NATO AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

THE UNITED STATES

US Policy; Financial Aid; Trade. In a statement to the US Senate Committee on Appropriations, on Aug 5, a representative of the Administration said: "The location of Jordan in the centre of the ME makes its continued political and economic stability of key importance. If Jordan were unable to maintain its independence, conflict among its neighbours over its absorption or parti-

tion would be a serious threat to peace and stability in the area. However, Jordan has never had a viable economy and has very few prospects of eventual self-sufficiency..." Therefore Jordan would continue to require "large-scale supporting assistance" "for the foreseeable future or until an overall political settlement within the area permits its association with some larger economic entity."

[US aid amounted to over 50% of the total Jordanian budget.] According to US official figures US aid appropriations for Jordan were as follows: (in \$000's)

	1960	1961
Military Aid	5,066	3,753
Economic Aid	47,718	47,401
Total Military Security Appropriations	52,784	51,154

(US Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance for 1962, Washington, 1961; pp 287, 297, 299, 318-9; compare also tables of aid, this volume, pp O.)

In Feb it was announced that Jordan had agreed to import from the US goods to the value of half the US aid to Jordan; the government issued a list of goods which could be imported only from the US. (*Jihad*, Feb 4; *ANA*, Feb 5 [W 9])

New US Ambassador. Mr. William B. Macomber, the new US ambassador to Jordan, presented his credentials to King Hussein on April 5. On his arrival in Amman three days earlier he had declared that the King was highly regarded by the people of the US and that his government was aware of the problems facing Jordan and would do its best to help Jordan to develop its economy and to improve the standard of living. (*Jer. Times*, April 3; *Manar*, April 6)

King Hussein-Kennedy Exchange Cables. On Feb 3 the King received a cable from President Kennedy in reply to his congratulatory message on Kennedy's inauguration. The President, it was reported, "applauded His Majesty's stand in all national and international affairs for the welfare and prosperity of the free world." (*Jer. Times*, Feb 4)

Another "friendly message" from Kennedy to King Hussein was delivered by the US ambassador to Jordan on his arrival in the country on April 2. The President, it was reported, reaffirmed the close ties between the two countries and the continuation of American assistance to Jordan. (*Hayat*, April 13)

In May King Hussein, as well as other Arab heads of state, was the recipient of a message from President Kennedy which dealt with US policy in the ME in general and Arab-Israel relations in particular. (For details, see pp 197 b ff.)

Military Relations. US appropriations for military aid to Jordan for fiscal year 1961 were \$3.7m. (See above: Financial Aid.)

General Habis al-Majali, the Jordanian C-in-C, paid an official visit to the US from Feb 12 to March 14; he met with the US defence chiefs and toured military installations. (*Falastin*, Feb 14, 15, March 4, 9; *Jihad*, Feb 27)

Two US military delegations visited Jordan, in April and in Nov. (*Difa*, April 17; *Jihad*, April 27; *Falastin*, Nov 19)

In May it was reported that two Jordanian officers had completed a course in the US. (*Jihad*, May 6)

Various Contacts, Visits. A Jordanian Parliamentary delegation paid a six-week visit to the US in April-May under the auspices of the cultural exchange programme of the Department of State. (*Falastin*, April 12, 15; *Dep. of State Press Release*, April 12)

In Feb King Hussein sent an invitation to former President Dwight D. Eisenhower to visit Jordan (*Hayat*, Feb 15). In Feb, Dr John Badeau, the President of the Near East Foundation in the US, accompanied by a number of educators, paid a three-day visit to Jordan. (*Jihad*, Feb 18)

In Oct Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for ME Affairs, visited Jordan for five days. (*Difa*, Oct 25)

THE UNITED KINGDOM

Financial Aid. UK financial aid to Jordan comprised a grant-in-aid of £2,356,000 to the Jordanian budget for fiscal year 1961-62, and a £0.5m. interest free loan for development. (*Difa*, March 24; *Falastin*, July 4; *MEED*, July 14, Sept 8)

Military Aid; Visits. In Feb it was reported from London that Jordan was to obtain a regiment of Centurion tanks and an additional 14 Hawker Hunter jet fighters. British army officers were in Amman to advise on the operation and maintenance of the tanks (*Sunday Telegraph*, Feb 26). The sale of the tanks, though not the number, was officially confirmed. (*Hayat*, Feb 28)

General Habis al-Majali, the Jordanian C-in-C, visited the UK (among other western countries) in Feb. (*Manar*, Feb 9)

The C-in-C of the Near East Air Force (RAF), Air Marshal W. Macdonald, visited Jordan in Feb and met with the King and officers. (*R. Amman*, Feb 21-IMB, Feb 22)

Hussein Visits London. On Dec 7 King Hussein left Jordan for London on a private visit which included a medical checkup. He was accompanied by the Chief of the Royal Cabinet and his personal physician. He lunched with Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace and met PM Macmillan. He returned to Amman on Dec 20. (*Jihad*, Dec 8-21; see also above: The King and the People, and p 147 a)

Various Visits. George Brown, MP (member of the "shadow cabinet" of the Labour Party) paid a three-day visit to Jordan in Jan. (*Falastin*, Jan 11)

PM Talhuni, accompanied by Sharif Nair Ibn Jamil and Hasan al-Katib, Minister of the Court, visited the UK in March. (*Falastin*, *Hayat*, March 3)

In April-May Lt-Gen. Karim Ohan, Director of General Security, visited various police institutes in the UK to study new security methods. (*Jihad*, April 22; *Hayat*, April 25)

GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Technical and Economic Aid; Trade. During the year, German experts continued to work in Jordan in accordance with the aid agreement of May 1960, especially in geological surveys; survey of the projected Ma'an-Aqaba railway, and the promotion of tourism (*Manar*, Feb 2; *Falastin*, Feb 19; *Jihad*, June 6; *Hayat*, April 12, June 8)

The GFR granted 10 one-year scholarships to Jordanian graduates of vocational schools. (*Falastin*, Jan 14)

In Aug it was announced that the GFR had granted Jordan a loan of 1.35 million dinars for the extension of Aqaba port. (*EFSPA*, No. 44, Aug)

Jordanian imports from the GFR exceeded DM 22m. during 1960 and DM24m. during 1961 (Nov). (*Jihad*, *Manar*, Nov 21)

EUROPEAN, AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Jordanian Workers to GFR. Four thousand Jordanian workers were permitted to work in the GFR under an agreement between the two governments. (*R. Amman, April 4* [6])

Various Contacts, Visits. The Jordanian C-in-C, General Habis al-Majali, paid a one-week visit to the GFR in March; he visited the Ministry of Defence and army camps. (*R. Amman, March 20-IMB, March 21*)

Samir al-Rifai, President of the Jordanian Senate, visited the GFR in April, at the invitation of the government. He met President Lübke, among others. (*R. Amman, April 29-IMB, April 30; Jihad, April 29; Hayat, April 30; Jer. Times, May 1*)

King Hussein donated 5,000 dinars to build a mosque in Munich. (*Falastin, Feb 3; Hayat, Feb 10*)

A ten-man delegation of West German journalists visited Jordan in Feb-March. (*Jihad, Falastin, Feb 26, 28; March 15*)

In Sept the GFR ambassador in Jordan announced his government's decision to establish a cultural institute in Amman—on the pattern of the British Council and the US Information Service—to spread German culture, and especially the study of the German language. (*Falastin, Sept 20*)

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Austria. An Austrian trade delegation arrived in Amman in Jan on a five-day visit. (They also visited other Arab countries.) They held talks with Jordanian officials and businessmen. (*Difa', Jan 27, 31*)

Denmark. A civil aviation agreement between the two countries was signed in April. (*R. Amman, April 26-IMB, April 27; Manar, May 11*)

Greece. In May a Greek military delegation headed by the Deputy C-in-C of the armed forces arrived in Amman on a five-day visit on the invitation of the Jordanian C-in-C. The tour included the holy places and

border villages. (*R. Amman, May 23 [W, June 1]; Manar, May 24; Falastin, May 27*)

Italy. Lt.-Gen. Karim Ohan, the Director of General Security, went to Italy in Nov on a two-week official visit. (*Difa', Nov 24*)

The Italian firm which had constructed the first stage of the East-Ghor irrigation canal was accorded the contract for the second stage also. (*Jihad, Feb 23, March 5*)

Representatives of ENI visited Jordan in March to explore the possibility of an oil concession (*Jihad, March 26*). [In Jan a US company had given up its concession; the contracts with ENI remained inconclusive to the end of the year.]

Norway. A civil aviation agreement between the two countries was signed in April. (*R. Amman, April 26-IMB, April 27*)

Spain. In April PM Talbuni disclosed that King Hussein had received a message from General Franco pointing out the Spanish support for the Arab refugees in the recent debate at the UN General Assembly, and promising continued support for the Arab stand on this problem. (*Falastin, April 28*)

It was announced in March that seven Jordanian teachers were to teach Arabic in Spanish universities. (*Manar, March 16, 26*)

In July a group of Spanish engineers visited Jordan as guests of the government; they were received by the King. (*Falastin, July 14*)

Switzerland. In April the raising of diplomatic representation between the two countries to embassy level was officially announced (*Jihad, April 4*). In July it was announced that the Jordanian ambassador in Italy would also serve as [non-resident] ambassador to Switzerland (*Manar, July 26*). The [non-resident?] ambassador of Switzerland presented his credentials to the King on Sept 27. (*Difa', Sept 26, 28*)

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

AFRICA IN GENERAL

The Islamic Congress in [the Old City of] Jerusalem. [On the Congress see also p 114. The permanent office of the Congress in the Old City of Jerusalem was perhaps the most active Jordanian agency in African affairs, in keeping with the official emphasis on the Islamic aspect of Jordan's relations with Africa. See also below, under individual African countries.]

In the resolutions published at the end of the Conference of the Islamic Congress (Old City of Jerusalem, Jan 15-17) a special chapter dealt with Africa. The Conference called for an Arab-Islamic plan for the strengthening of relations with African nations; it called on Arab and Muslim banks and firms to open branches in Africa; and requested the Congress secretariat to invite African Muslim organizations to future meetings of the Congress. A separate resolution called for self-determination for the inhabitants of Eritrea. The Congress received messages from the President of the Somali Republic, from the PM of Nigeria and from Guinea. (*Difa', Hayat, Jan 19*)

The consultative committee of the Congress prepared

a plan for action in Africa to be forwarded to the Arab and Islamic states, based upon the information brought by the royal Jordanian delegation which had returned from Africa. (See below.) (*Manar, Aug 2*)

On Dec 7 it was reported in Jordan that a number of Islamic societies in East African countries had united in a "General Islamic League." The League had expressed its wish to be considered the East African branch of the Islamic Congress and the Congress had agreed to this. Later it was reported that the League would send an official delegation of representatives from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar to attend the conference of the Islamic Congress in [the Old City of] Jerusalem in Jan 1962 (*Manar, Dec 8, 17*). The SG of the Congress announced that the conference would give special attention to African questions. (*Hayat, Dec 29*)

Royal Mission To Africa. A Jordanian royal mission visited Africa from March 11 to April 10. It was headed by Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin ash-Shanqli, Minister of Education and Culture and Chief Justice of the Shar'ah Court, and included Ahmad at-Tarawnah, Chief of the

Royal Court, Muhammad Ali al-Jabari, Minister of Justice, Deputy Tharwat al-Tahuni, Deputy Isma'il Hijazi, Kamil ash-Sharif, Deputy Secretary-General of the World Islamic Congress and Ibrahim Uthman, Commander of the Jordanian Air Force. (*Jer. Times*, Feb 20; *Difa*, March 15; *ANA*, March 19 [21]; *R. Amman*, April 11-12MB, April 12)

Preliminary reports said the delegation would carry personal messages, including an invitation to visit Jordan, from King Hussein to African Muslim heads of state (*Jihad*, Feb 23). It was to distribute 300 volumes of the Qur'an to counteract the dissemination in Africa of a "forged Israeli Qur'an" (*Difa*, March 7) and to offer scholarships to African students for military and other training. The office of the Islamic Congress asked Islamic institutions in Africa to contact the delegation for the purpose of strengthening Arab-African relations and repulsing "Zionist penetration." (*Hayat*, March 22)

The delegation visited Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone, Cameroun, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Liberia, Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. (For details see below, under individual countries.) On its return, its leader declared that Jordan would probably be called upon to send teachers of Arabic and Islamic culture to Africa and especially to Nigeria, Chad and Somalia. The delegation had discussed the enrolment of African students at the Jordanian military academy and other institutions. Several heads of African states would visit Jordan in response to King Hussein's invitation (*R. Amman*, April 12-13MB, April 13; *Falastin*, April 13). In its report to the cabinet, the delegation recommended setting up two new embassies in Africa and strengthening the embassy in Khartoum, so that it could serve also Somalia, Ethiopia, and Chad. (*ANA*, April 13 [15])

Technical Assistance in General. It was reported in April that seven African students were due to arrive in Jordan for study on Jordanian government scholarships (*Manar*, April 6). [No report on the arrival of the students was encountered.]

The Jordanian Ministry of Education and Culture decided to send 150 teachers to African countries (*Difa*, Aug 3). [By the end of 1964, there was no report of any Jordanian teachers in Africa.]

In Nov King Hussein awarded 20 scholarships to East African students. A committee was set up in Nairobi to select the students. Ten scholarships were to go to Kenya, 5 to Tanganyika, 3 to Uganda and 2 to Zanzibar. (*Difa*, Nov 13; *Manar*, Nov 19)

Attacks on USSR Policy in Africa. In Feb an Amman Radio commentator charged that the visit of the President of the Supreme Soviet to some African countries was designed to further the USSR's "expansionist aims in Africa." He also charged that the Soviet Union's policy in the Congo had contributed to creating the disturbances there. (*R. Amman*, Feb 12-13MB, Feb 13)

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Chad. The Jordanian royal mission, touring African countries (see above: Africa in General) visited Chad from March 25-27. They were welcomed by the acting President (the Defence Minister) who said that the Muslims of Chad wished to strengthen relations between Muslim peoples. Members of the delegation dwelt on the danger of Israeli activity in Africa, and said that Jordan was ready to offer aid within her means. The President of Chad was invited to visit Jordan. (*Manar*, April 4)

In July Jordan recognized the Republic of Chad. (*Manar*, July 18)

Ghana. The Jordanian royal mission touring African countries (see above: Africa in General) visited Ghana on March 30-31. They were received by President Nkrumah who was handed a message from King Hussein and a gift. (*Falastin*, March 31; *Hayat*, April 2)

A member of the delegation said Dr. Nkrumah had "frankly apologized" to the delegation on his pro-Israeli declaration at the UN General Assembly in 1960 (MER 1960, pp 177-8, 184); he reportedly explained that "he had not been aware then of the truth of the Palestine question." (*Manar*, April 13)

In March Musa Nasser, the Jordanian FM, received Joseph Amo Asmah, a senior Ghanaian Foreign Ministry official who was touring the Arab countries. Asmah was reported to have said that in all problems Ghana adhered to the policy of the Afro-Asian bloc "even if this displeases Israel." A main plank in Ghana's policy was support for all African states in their struggle for freedom; consequently she had strong ties at least with the Arab states located in Africa, and there could be no good relations with countries which opposed this policy. (*Manar*, March 31; *ANA*, March 30 [April 5])

Guinea. Sharif Yusuf Nabhani, head of the Guinean Union of Islamic Culture and member of the political bureau of President Sekou Touré, visited Jordan in Jan upon the invitation of the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem (*R. Amman*, Jan 23 [25]; *Jihad*, Jan 24). Nabhani said he had come to strengthen relations between the Arab world and the countries of Africa. He added that the Africans were aware of "the Israeli policy of infiltration in Africa." He called for an end to divisions among the Arab states and requested their help in the dissemination of Islamic culture in Africa (*Falastin*, Jan 26). Nabhani was received by the King. Later he said the King had ordered the despatch of 2,000 copies of the Qur'an to the Islamic association in Guinea and Mali, as well as the recording of Qur'an verses and religious talks to be broadcast by Conakry Radio during Ramadan. The King had told him that Jordan wished to help African countries and establish friendly relations with them without any political motive and without intervention in their political affairs. (*R. Amman*, Jan 28-12MB, Jan 29; *Manar*, Feb 6)

The Jordanian royal mission touring African countries (see above: Africa in General) visited Guinea at the beginning of April. A member of the delegation, the Minister of Justice, stated on his return that he had explained the Palestine question to his Guinean counterpart who had been so much impressed by the tragedy that he had afterwards requested the holding of a cabinet meeting which immediately passed a resolution on the termination of the contracts of the Israeli experts who were immediately expelled from the country (*Manar*, April 13). [This statement received no support from any other source.]

Ivory Coast. Kamil ash-Sharif, deputy SG of the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem, represented King Hussein at the Ivory Coast's independence celebrations. (*Jer. Times*, Aug 20)

Kenya. Yahya Hussein Jammu [Jum'ah], head of the Islamic Association in East Africa, visited Jordan in Nov. He carried back with him an invitation from King Hussein to Jomo Kenyatta, the Kenyan leader, to visit Jor-

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

dan (*Manar*, Nov 13). Some days later it was reported that Kenyatta would arrive on Nov 18 (*Falastin*, Nov 18). [The visit did not take place.] In Dec it was reported from Amman that Kenyatta had accepted the invitation and that the date of the visit would be fixed later. (*Ghana News Agency*, Dec 25)

Following Jammu's visit, the King ordered Jordanian institutions of learning to accept twenty students from East Africa. Later the Minister of Education said that the necessary steps had been taken with emphasis on Arabic language and Islamic religious studies. (*R. Amman*, Nov 12 [W 16]; *Hayat*, Nov 15; *Falastin*, Dec 24)

Mali. Jordan sent 500 copies of the Qur'an to Mali. (*Manar*, March 26)

Nigeria. The first Jordanian Ambassador to Nigeria, Kamil ash-Sharif, left for Lagos in Nov. (*Falastin*, Nov 26)

The Jordanian royal mission touring African countries (see above: Africa in General) visited Nigeria from March 28-30. They were received by the Governor-General, Dr. N. Azikiwe. The delegation offered scholarships for study at Jordan's military and agricultural institutions. The delegation visited also Northern Nigeria. Dr. Azikiwe, as well as the Federal PM and the Northern Region PM, were invited to visit Jordan. (*Manar*, March 28, 29; *Falastin*, March 30; *West African Pilot*, Lagos, March 29)

The Sardauna of Sokoto and PM of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, paid an official visit to Jordan from July 15-20. (He also visited other Arab countries.)

Bello was visited by King Hussein; he returned this visit and was also the King's guest at a banquet; the King bestowed on him a high decoration. During the receptions held in his honour, in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron, Sir Ahmadu's hosts dwelt at length on the Palestine question; he, however, omitted to mention it in his replies. Nor was any mention made of the issue in the joint communiqué by the King and the PM which was issued in Amman on July 20. The communiqué said that the two sides had reviewed their brotherly relations and it was agreed to expand their cultural cooperation. King Hussein "discovered" that Sir Ahmadu shared his opinion concerning Islamic unity and cooperation and that a meeting of heads of Islamic states would serve a good purpose. The communiqué also denounced racial discrimination. (*Jihad*, July 19; *Falastin*, July 16-20; *R. Amman*, July 20 [22]; *Difa'*, July 21)

During Bello's visit and after it, there appeared a number of reports on requests and preparations for technical assistance to Nigeria, such as the despatch of teachers, agricultural experts and engineers (*Falastin*, July 21; *R. Amman*, July 23 [25]; *Manar*, July 24; *Difa'*, Aug 3); and the establishment of a cigarette factory. (*Falastin*, Dec 4)

Haji Ibrahim Imam, described as [Northern] Nigeria's

"leader of the opposition," visited Jordan in Oct. He visited the holy places, the Israel-Jordan frontier and refugee camps. In a reception held in his honour by the office of the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem he attacked Israel and "the powers behind her." (*Falastin*, Oct 14; *Manar*, Oct 13, 16)

On Dec 22 the Federal PM of Nigeria stated in Lagos that preparations were being made to invite King Hussein to visit Nigeria. (*Falastin*, Dec 23)

Senegal. Shaykh Muhammad ash-Shanqlti, Chief Qādi and Minister of Education, and Ahmad at-Tarāwnah, Chief of the Royal Hashimite Court, represented Jordan at the Senegalese independence celebrations. (*Falastin*; *Jihad*, Feb 28)

Shaykh Ibrahim Niyase, "Shaykh al-Islam" of Senegal, visited Jordan in April on a tour of Islamic and Arab countries. He was accompanied, among others, by a representative of the UAR Foreign Ministry. He visited the holy places of Islam. On seeing the "occupied section" of Jerusalem he remarked that "it would undoubtedly revert to its rightful owners." (*Falastin*; *Manar*, April 6)

On May 30 PM Mamadou Dia of Senegal arrived in [the Old City of] Jerusalem on a one-day unofficial visit on his way home from Saudi Arabia. He visited the holy places of Islam and expressed his wish to return for an official visit to Jordan and meet King Hussein. (*Manar*; *Falastin*, May 30-31)

Sharif Makki Haydar, described as "leader of Islam (khafiat al-Islam) in Black Africa," visited Jordan in Oct as guest of the government, on a tour of Arab states. He visited the holy places of Islam and was received by King Hussein who bestowed on him a medal. The Islamic Cultural Union at Amman and the Islamic Congress in [the Old City of] Jerusalem held receptions in his honour. At the latter reception he said he had not known that the Arab-Jewish dispute was actually "a blatant act of aggression which had uprooted hundreds of thousands from their homeland" and swore he would do his best to arouse the conscience of Africa to the issue since, being Muslims, "your problem—is our problem." (*Difa'*, Oct 17; *Falastin*, Oct 26; *Jer. Times*, Oct 21, 26; *Jihad*, Oct 28)

South Africa. In a commentary on apartheid, Ammao Radio quoting *Ad-Difa'* said Afro-Asian peoples "demanded the destruction" of every state based on the principles of apartheid. Israel too was such a state. (*R. Amman*, March 15 [17])

Upper Volta. In Feb it was reported that the office of the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem had received a letter from the Islamic Cultural Association in Upper Volta saying that it wished to establish ties with the Congress, to send a representative to voice the wishes of the local Muslims, and to open a branch of the Congress in the country. (*Manar*, Feb 19)

OTHER COUNTRIES

NON-ARAB ME COUNTRIES

Ethiopia—The Dayr as-Sultao Affair. [During the first half of 1961 the Jordanian government, the Ethiopian Coptic Church and the Egyptian Coptic Church were disputing the ownership of the Dayr as-Sultan monastery on the premises of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre

in the Old City of Jerusalem. The importance of the monastery lay in a stairway that led from it into the courtyard of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The keys to the door of the stairway had for a century been held by the Egyptian Copts, though the Ethiopians had never ceased to press their claims to them, maintaining that

they had previously belonged to them. In Feb, the Jordanian government transferred the keys to the Ethiopian Church. The Coptic Church of Egypt, backed by the UAR government, exerted heavy pressure on Jordan to cancel the transfer, and the decision was reversed. Jordan's changing attitude was presumably influenced at first by the impending visit to Jordan of Ethiopia's Emperor—which eventually did not take place, and later by the improvement in UAR-Jordanian relations.]

The Coptic Patriarchate decided to cancel the pilgrimage to Jerusalem in protest over Jordan's decision to transfer the ownership of Dayr as-Sultan "which belongs to the Copts of the Southern Region of the UAR since the fourth century A.D." to the Ethiopian monks who were "staying there as guests." (*Ahram, March 7*)

The Holy Synod of the Coptic Church, in a meeting in Cairo on March 7, discussed the developments in Jerusalem on the basis of a message received from Basilios, Archbishop of Jerusalem. The message said that the Copts had been forcibly removed by the Jordanian authorities, and had been barred from passage through the monastery to the church. The Ethiopians who had replaced the Copts were taking down all decorations and symbols in the monastery and replacing them with their own for the forthcoming visit of the Emperor of Ethiopia, due on April 9. The UAR Ambassador to Jordan had contacted the Jordanian government regarding the affair (*Ahram, March 8*). The Copts, it was reported, had refused to leave the monastery, and were ultimately ejected by the police (*Mid. Mir., March 23*). The Synod also prepared a memorandum to be forwarded to King Hussein, which included documents said to prove the Coptic ownership of Dayr as-Sultan. (*Akhbar, March 10*)

The Synod thanked Abdel Nasser for his intervention on its behalf with Jordan. Kyrillos VI, the Coptic Pope, cabled the Ethiopian Emperor, asking him to bring about the return of the *status quo ante* at Dayr as-Sultan; he said there was no justification for the Ethiopians taking possession as long as the Coptic Pope was head of both the Ethiopian and the Egyptian churches (*Ahram, March 12*). The Emperor informed Kyrillos it was Ethiopia's intention to retain possession of Dayr as-Sultan. (*Ahram, March 18*)

On March 21 a delegation from Egypt, carrying a message from the Coptic Pope, was received by King Hussein (*Falastin, March 22, 26*). [Meanwhile, on March 31 a correspondence between King Hussein and President Abdel Nasser was published in Cairo, introducing a period of improved relations between the two countries.] Some days later the Jordanian Government revoked the decision of Feb regarding ownership of Dayr as-Sultan. On April 2 the Jordanian authorities handed the keys of the monastery to the Egyptian Coptic delegation (*Jihad, April 4*). [Like the Egyptian Copts in Feb] the Ethiopians now refused to leave the monastery, it was reported, and were forcibly ejected (*Ahram, April 3, 6*). A Coptic delegation was received by the Jordanian PM; they expressed the community's gratitude to King Hussein. The Coptic Church issued instructions to resume the Eastern pilgrimage and festivities which it had earlier cancelled in protest. (*Falastin, April 5*)

The Jordanian *volte-face* was thought to contribute to the improvement of relations with Cairo, though it could scarcely be well-received in Addis Ababa. Emperor Haile Selassie was believed to be taking a close personal interest in the dispute and the new development was considered likely to cause his projected visit to Jordan to be postponed indefinitely (*Times, April 4*). In response to an invitation by King Hussein who had visited

Ethiopia in 1960 (MER 1960, pp 336-7), the Emperor had informed him in Jan that he would shortly set the date for his visit (*Manar, Jan 18*). Following the new development, the Emperor discussed the affair with the Ethiopian Archbishop of Jerusalem who had been urgently called to Addis Ababa. At the same time an Ethiopian goodwill mission was preparing to go to Jordan, carrying a message from the Emperor to King Hussein (*Ethiopian Herald, April 6*). The delegation was received by Hussein on April 10. (*Hayat, April 11*)

Two weeks later the governor of Jerusalem requested the Coptic Church to furnish more proof of its ownership of Dayr as-Sultan. Demonstrations calling for Ethiopian ownership of the monastery took place in Addis Ababa, and the Ethiopian Patriarch wrote to the Coptic Pope in Egypt that the division between the two churches might deepen if the monastery were not returned to the Ethiopian Church. (*Ahram, April 24*)

Following his return to Jerusalem the Ethiopian Archbishop published a detailed statement supporting the Ethiopian claim for custody of the monastery. He stressed the great importance attached by the Ethiopian people and Church to the question and voiced his hope for a just decision by the Jordanian authorities. On May 9 the Coptic Church in Jerusalem published a detailed reply. (*Falastin, May 9, 10*)

On July 28 the Archbishop of Harar in Ethiopia arrived at Jerusalem to inquire into the state of the Ethiopian Church and the Holy Places in Jordan. (*Falastin, July 29, 30*)

Iran. An Iranian military delegation headed by the Iranian C-in-C of the Armed Forces arrived in Jordan on April 29, at the invitation of the Jordanian C-in-C. They met the King and others and visited the holy places of Islam, and the western frontier. (*Manar, May 2; Jihad, April 29, May 3*)

In Dec, a Jordanian military delegation visited Tehran at the invitation of the Iranian army to take part in the celebrations of the Iranian Army Day. (*Manar, Dec 31*)

Somalia. The royal Jordanian delegation touring African countries (see above: Africa in General) visited Somalia from March 21-22. At a reception the Somali Foreign Minister thanked King Hussein for his offer to aid in education and other fields. (*R. Mogadishu, March 22 [24]*)

King Hussein sent a telegram of congratulations to President Adan Abdullah Osman of Somalia on his election as President of the Somali Republic. (*Jihad, July 31*)

The King made a financial donation to aid flood victims in Somalia. (*Falastin, Dec 7, 24*)

Turkey. On Oct 27 it was announced that King Hussein had sent a congratulatory message to General Gursel on the occasion of his election to the Presidency. (*Falastin, Oct 28*)

ASIAN COUNTRIES

(Note: See also: Non-Arab ME Countries)

Nationalist China. In Oct Nationalist China and Jordan signed a cultural agreement in Amman providing for the encouragement of the study of each other's language; literature, science etc. (*Jihad, Oct 28*)

India. In Feb it was reported that the government had decided to allow the import of tea from all exporting

countries provided a half share of the total was reserved for import from India. (*Falastin, Feb 16*)

A commercial agreement was signed in Amman between India and Jordan on April 19. Jordan would export to India potash, phosphate, bromine and olive oil and would import from India tea, jute and clinical equipment (*Jihad, April 20*). India's phosphate purchases in 1960 were to reach 15,000 tons, to the value of JD0.5m. (*Falastin, April 21*)

Pakistan. According to an agreement signed in April, Jordan would export 15% of its total phosphates to Pakistan. (*Manar, April 17*)

A Pakistani journalists' delegation arrived in Amman in April for a three-day visit at the invitation of the government. (*Jihad, April 30*)

On July 4 the Minister of Education was empowered to sign the cultural agreement with Pakistan. (*Jihad, July 5*)

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Hostile Communist Views on Jordan. [Jordan received relatively scanty attention in the press and radio of Communist bloc countries during 1961. Hostile comments continued as before, denouncing the Jordanian government for alleged subservience to imperialism, a reign of terror, and the persecution of patriots and especially Communists. (For details see: Internal Affairs, The Communist Party.)]

Hostile Jordanian Attitude. [The extreme hostility of Jordan to Communism continued as before. Jordan re-

mained without diplomatic relations with Communist countries.]

In an address to the Islamic conference in the Old City of Jerusalem in Jan King Hussein termed international Communism one of the "two dangerous enemies" facing the Arabs, the other being world Zionism. He said "Communism had gained somebody from amongst us [meaning Abdel Nasser] and used him to divide our ranks for its own purposes..." (*Manar, Jan 15*)

Later, in his correspondence with Abdel Nasser, Hussein took exception to the President's statement that there were two camps competing for the domination of the world. The "Communist threat," "red imperialism," Hussein wrote, was the more dangerous, especially to the national movements. Therefore "we here make no peace with Communism... and try to differentiate between real... imperialist danger... and propaganda..." (*R. Amman, May 10 [12]; Jihad, May 11*)

Russian Clergy Denied Entry to Jordan. For the third successive year Jordan refused permission to Russian clergy in Israel to cross into the Old City to celebrate the Russian Orthodox Christmas. (*Jer. Times, Jan 4*)

Phosphate Trade With Czechoslovakia and Poland. An agreement for the sale of 80,000 tons of phosphates to Czechoslovakia during 1962 was concluded in Nov. (*R. Amman, Nov 9 [W 23]*)

A Polish delegation was expected to arrive in Jordan in Dec for negotiations concerning purchases of phosphates for 1962. (*Jihad, Dec 10*)

THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON

(Al-Jumhuriyah al-Lubnaniyah)

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

SYNOPSIS

1961 was the first full year of what might be termed Lebanese routine politics after the 1958 insurrection and the period of reconstruction under President Sbehab, which culminated in the parliamentary elections of June-July 1960 (see MER 1960, p 348 ff).

The main event took place on the last day of the year, namely the attempted coup d'etat by the Nationalist Social Party (formerly PPS) and several junior army officers. The NSP's central aim, according to the indictment, was to further the eventual establishment of a Greater Syrian or Fertile Crescent union, an aim which was anathema to both the Christian and the Muslim pan-Arab sectors of the Lebanese public. The attempt was almost unanimously condemned and at least for a short while national unity seemed to prevail. There was even talk of a new inter-communal settlement on the basis of this new-found unity. Though nothing came of this, it was thought that the reaction to the coup had demonstrated that the public, which had vivid memories of 1958, was inimical to extremism of any kind and that the regime was essentially stable. (For a fuller synopsis, see below: The Attempted NSP Coup)

The 18-man government of PM Sa'ib Slâm, established after the elections in 1960, continued in office until May 15, when Slâm resigned. Opposition moves which preceded the resignation included a charge that Slâm had exploited his official position for financial gain. Two days later Slâm formed a government of 8 ministers only. It was observed that the new cabinet was just a condensed version of its predecessor, and in particular that the two major antagonists, the Phalanges, and the Progressive Socialist Party, respectively represented by Pierre Jumayil and Kamâl Junblât, were again included.

The new cabinet remained in office for six months, and on Oct 23 Slâm resigned. The reduced size and smaller regional representation of the new cabinet weakened it in the Chamber. Opposition to the government began to crystallize in August, when in the wake of a bloody clash between the police and the Najjâdah, in Beirut, Muslim leaders there joined in opposition to Slâm and his Minister of the Interior, Mashnûq. The breakup of the UAR and other issues (on which see more below) aggravated the government's difficulties. The annual elections to the Presidency of the Chamber (October 17) provided an opportunity for the rallying of opposition groups which now commanded a majority in the Chamber. At this juncture the government was weakened from within when Junblât announced his resignation and published a long list of accusations against Slâm. Slâm made a last attempt to broaden his government but, when this failed, he resigned.

On Oct 31 a government was formed by Rashid Ka-

râmî, the Muslim leader of Tripoli who had resigned from the premiership in May 1960 to make way for a caretaker government before the general elections. The 14-minister cabinet had a much broader basis than the outgoing one. It again included Junblât and Jumayil as well as the Constitutional Union (Taqla) but most parliamentary blocs—including the anti-Slâm Beirut front—and geographical regions were also represented this time. The government received an overwhelming vote of confidence of 63 to 18. The opposition now comprised the National Liberals and sympathizers (*al-shirâr*) led by ex-President Camille Sham'un and Albert Mukhaybar (the party had been in opposition since after the 1958 insurrection); the National Bloc (*kutleh*), led by Raymond Eddeb; the Constitutional Union (though Taqla participated in the government); the Ba'albek-Hermil-Bsherri and Akkar blocs and, last but not least, Sa'ib Slâm who endeavoured to form a new party together with Mashnûq his former Minister of Interior and other politicians—mainly Muslims—who had been left out of the government.

As usual, a great many political issues during the year stemmed from the basic division in the Lebanese political community: the Christian sector, determined to preserve an independent "Lebanese Lebanon", and the Muslim-Druze sector with pan-Arab inclinations. The majority of these issues were in some way connected with the UAR.

At the extremes of the political spectrum stood the Muslim Najjâdah and Popular Resistance groups on the one hand, and the Nationalist Social Party comprising mainly Christian (especially Greek-Orthodox) and other minorities on the other. The Najjâdah was represented in the Chamber by its leader but like the other two movements engaged mainly in agitation and politics of violence. An even more extreme Muslim fringe group was the clandestine Islamic Liberation Party which originated on the West Bank of Jordan; its extremism centred on religion and it was not pro-UAR. Another pro-UAR group was the Movement of Arab Nationalists (*harakat al-qawmiyyin al-arab*); its following came mainly from among the intelligentsia and students; (pro-UAR movements also appeared under this name in other Arab countries). The Communist Party, illegal in theory but tolerated in fact, continued its policy of both opposing the UAR and Lebanon's Western ties. The Ba'ath Party, a small group concentrated mostly in the Muslim North, was both pan-Arab and anti-UAR; its influence on Lebanese politics was negligible. Foreign Arabs, mainly Jordanians, Syrians and Arab refugees, constituted a not insignificant element among the extremists: they were especially prominent in the ranks of the NSP, the Islamic Liberation Party and the *qawmiyyin al-arab*.

Inside the Chamber and the government the extremist

attitudes were represented by the Phalanges led by the Maronite Pierre Jumayil, and the Progressive Socialist Party led by the Druze Kamāl Junblāt. Some of the Christian deputies in opposition, especially Camille Shāmūn and Albert Mukhaybar, could also be classified as extremists, and so could Muslim deputies like Ma'rūf Sa'ad.

The majority of deputies, however, belonged to the centre where the Christian-Muslim-pan-Arab division was still alive but where regional, local, family and personal interests predominated. These deputies, mostly of the wealthy class, were in the main content to leave the Muslim-Christian issue alone, and pursued their interests independently or in the framework of inter-communal and mostly regional parliamentary blocs.

The balancing of the opposing forces fell on the President, the Maronite Fu'ād Shēhāb, aided by the Muslim Premiers, Sa'ib Sīlām and later Rashid Karāmi (who had been rebel leaders in 1958). Behind the President was the army. As far as published reports went, the army did not overtly intervene in politics during the year apart from a few junior officers who participated in the NSP coup with the aim, according to their indictment, of reforming the army which they claimed was permeated with favouritism. The army repeatedly restored public order when the police found itself unable to cope with outbreaks of violence. The policy adopted by both President and Premier was the safeguarding of Lebanon's independence and regime combined with a deferential attitude towards the UAR.

There were several major issues which divided Christians and Muslims-pan-Arabists during the year.

In January Jumayil and Junblāt engaged in a dispute over the issue of private versus state education. Independent Christian private institutions provided more education facilities than state schools. The Muslim sector in general was interested in the speedy development of the latter, while the Christians were concerned lest the scope of private education be limited. Junblāt made the point, among others, that national unity could only be achieved through a uniform study of history and geography while Jumayil argued that educational orientation must not be divorced from the continuing "ideological dilemma" of a Lebanese Lebanon versus an Arab Lebanon.

In February, President Abdel Nassar, in speeches made in Syria, attacked the NSP and the Phalanges as enemies of Arab nationalism and servants of Western imperialism. Disputes and violence ensued between partisans of the UAR and their opponents. Junblāt was as usual prominent among the former.

In April, the Beirut Lawyers' Union (mainly Christian) embarked on a strike in protest against the opening of a faculty of law at the new Arab University in Beirut—established in 1960 as a branch of the University of Alexandria—on the grounds that the profession was already overcrowded. The dispute, however, immediately acquired political overtones, though most of those concerned endeavoured to play them down. The Christian opposition, and initially also Jumayil, supported the union while Junblāt, Adnān al-Hakīm and other Muslim leaders opposed it. The government, while making some concessions to the lawyers, approved the establishment of the faculty, with Jumayil's consent (apparently because the closing of the faculty would have been regarded as a slap in the face of the UAR), and the strike continued until after the NSP coup in Jan 1961 when it was terminated "in order to contribute to the relaxation of tension."

At the end of May the Lebanese Communist Party announced that their Secretary General, Farajallah al-Hilu, had been murdered by the UAR authorities after having been abducted in Damascus, two years earlier. Many Christians and also some Muslim opposition leaders demonstrated their solidarity with Hili's family and argued that Lebanon's national honour and the state's duty to protect its citizens were involved. The government, however, refused to be drawn into a conflict with the UAR over the issue.

The break-up of the UAR caused pro-UAR demonstrations on a large scale, the establishment of a pro-UAR front by Kamāl Junblāt and bomb attacks on pro-UAR newspapers. The government delayed recognition of the Syrian Republic but also banned demonstrations of solidarity with any other state. The Christian opposition also supported a cautious and moderate policy. Nevertheless, this issue was thought to have contributed to the fall of the Sīlām government as both anti- and pro-UAR deputies had been dissatisfied with the government's indecisive attitude. In November, the Karāmi government recognized Syria, and this act was again followed by pro- and anti-UAR violence.

Lebanese politics continued to be accompanied by violence of which the following were major instances: in January, the confirmation of a death sentence on a Shi'ī found guilty of murder in pursuit of a blood feud led to large-scale demonstrations and rioting as well as strikes in the Muslim quarter of Beirut, and disturbances in other—mainly Shi'ī—areas. In March and again in August vehicles carrying Lebanese citizens to Damascus to express their support for the UAR were attacked in the village of Kahale; in the first incident ten people were injured. In March an attempt was discovered to assassinate PM Sīlām; a number of Muslims were found guilty of the attempt; both personal motives and the wish to foment strife between Muslims and Christians were ascribed to them. In April and again in July armed clashes occurred between the rival extremist Christian parties, the Phalanges and the NSP. In August, Najjādah members clashed with the police in Beirut and a demonstrator was killed; rioting by the Najjādah followed and the army had to intervene to restore peace. The break-up of the UAR (September 28) evoked violent outbreaks, as already described. In November and December there were additional instances of pro- and anti-UAR violence, e.g. an explosion at the house of a Cabinet Minister who had headed a friendship mission to Damascus, and an attempt to blow up the premises of a pro-UAR newspaper.

There was scant progress as regards the general national interest. Among the achievements of his government, Sīlām claimed the strengthening of internal security, public works, the fostering of education, the establishment of the Permanent National Exhibition in Tripoli, and the improvement of workers' conditions as a result of the wage law (enacted in May) and the social security bill, which however had not been introduced in the Chamber by the end of the year. In the economic sphere, Lebanon continued to enjoy prosperity thanks to a considerable capital inflow, and private industry continued to expand. There was however, little advance towards a solution of Lebanon's fundamental economic problem, namely the lack of a reasonable productive basis; the government appointed a foreign association to advise on planning and education; and the Chamber appointed a committee on development with an independent fund at its disposal. In his policy statement in November, PM Karāmi said the government would further education, making elementary education general; it would also seek,

in the framework of a free economy, to foster social justice by narrowing the gaps in development and growth between the various regions and groups; planning, monetary affairs and taxation should be reorganized to this end. (See also Economic Survey, below)

Criticism of the government in the Chamber concerned such issues as the neglect of the country's backward districts, which lacked fundamental social services and public utilities; the lack of progress towards a more productive economy; poor handling of relations with state concessionaries; high prices; "anarchy" and "stagnation" in the administration; faulty execution of development projects; and the shaky internal security situation.

Labour unrest continued and there were a number of strikes. The workers however, were still too weak to press their claims effectively in regard to the government. Organized labour was still relatively small in numbers and the trade union movement suffered from internal divisions, much as the Lebanese body politic at large.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

1961 was a year of relatively slow expansion for the Lebanese economy, as compared with the quick recovery that characterized the previous two years following the crisis and stagnation of 1958. There was progress in agriculture, trade, tourism and the money market; industrial development and building slowed down somewhat.

Agriculture. Agricultural production increased considerably after the preceding three years of drought; in 1961 its value was estimated at about £1300m. (49% of the population earned their livelihood in agriculture.)

MAIN CROPS (IN THOUSAND TONS)

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Wheat	65	48	58	40	68
Barley	24	18	24	11	12
Citrus	116	131	160	155	190
Potatoes	40	32	36	28	50
Apples	37	42	60	53	85
Olives	13	48	18	30	65
Sugar beet			10	14	25
Tobacco	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.5	4.0

The Ministry of Agriculture claimed that agriculture received insufficient state subsidies, in view of the drought in recent years and the lack of manpower. (80% of farmers were over 50 years old since the young men emigrated to the towns; 300,000 Syrians and Palestinians were employed in Lebanese agriculture.) The government decided in principle to buy up wheat at prices above market level because land under wheat had contracted

as a result of low prices. In Aug, the Ministry of Finance allocated £110m. as credits to farmers to mitigate drought damage and in an attempt to stop the flight from the land. However, no actual payments or purchases of wheat were known to have been made by the end of the year.

Industry. Industry developed steadily, though at a somewhat slower rate than in 1960. The average size of new undertakings was smaller in 1961: £145,500 invested capital and less than 8 workers, as against £115,000 and 9 workers in 1960.

New investments amounted to £131m. in the food industry, £113m. in the chemical industry, £17.5m. in textiles, £15.2m. in wood products and £12m. in clothing and shoes. Reliable statistics on industrial production were not available. Cotton textiles continued to suffer from lack of markets, although the 15% protective tariff remained in force. (See MER 1960, p 342)

Building. Building activity decreased in relation to 1960 but remained much higher than during the preceding years: in 1961 licences were given for 665,000 sq.m. compared to 704,000 sq.m. in 1960 and 590,000 in 1959. Correspondingly there was a small decrease in real estate business, a turnover of £114.4m. in 1960 as against £112.6m. in 1961.

Finance. Expansion in the means of payment slowed down. Total means of payment reached £11,195m. in 1961, an increase of 7.1% over the previous year, as against increases of 11.8% in 1960 and over 20% in 1959. Currency in circulation continued to decrease in relation to total means of payment; from 45.9% in 1955 to 35.7% in 1960 and 33.6% in 1961; bank accounts increased correspondingly. The declining annual rate of increase acted as a brake on the inflationary tendencies of recent years. Credit conditions moved in the same direction. Thus bank credits to the government remained at the 1960 level of about £1104m. The expansion of credit to the private sector declined from 42% in 1960, to 11% in 1961; credits reached £11,108m. The flow of foreign capital into Lebanon continued, though here too the rate decreased; foreign currency accounts in Lebanese banks amounted to £1452m. in 1961, as against £1369m. in 1960 and £1165m. in 1959. This influx helped the Lebanese pound to rise from 318 to 303 piastres to the dollar during 1961. The turnover in shares and debentures on the Beirut stock exchange grew to £177m. in 1961, as against £169m. in 1960 and £139m. in 1959.

Prices. Despite the monetary expansion, the rise in the c.o.i. index ceased. According to IMF figures it remained constant at the 1960 figure of 122, (1952=100). The food price index fell 4 points, thanks to the bumper harvest,

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 1959-1961

Year	Inv. Cap. (£L.m)	Enterprises	Employees	Rate of Increase		
				Inv. Cap. (£L.m)	Enterprises	Employees
1959	434	3,302	38,783	—	—	—
1960	578	4,559	50,403	33.2%	38.0%	30.0%
1961	640	5,901	60,909	10.7%	29.4%	20.8%

ECONOMIC SURVEY

Wages. According to the Ministry of Labour, average annual wages were (excluding agricultural workers):

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Average annual wages (in £L)</i>
Mining and quarrying	1,615
Industry	1,920
Services	2,250
Water, gas, electricity	3,000
Commerce, insurance, banking and real estate	3,355
Construction and public works	4,175
Communications & transport	4,605

There were pronounced regional differences:

<i>Province</i>	
Beirut	2,872
North Lebanon	2,626
Mt. Lebanon	2,183
South Lebanon	2,027
Biq'a	1,523
Country-wide average	2,581

Budget. The fast economic growth in past years produced unbroken budgetary expansion.

The decrease in estimated total revenue by £L3.1 was due to a decline in oil royalties from £L42.5m. in 1960 to £L12.6m. in 1961, since the IPC had by then paid its arrears; otherwise estimated revenue increased by £L26.8m. over 1960, a result of general economic expansion and a more energetic collection of dues and taxes.

The increase in expenditure was comparatively small; there was a considerable increase in expenditure on wages and salaries, due to the general rise in wages (see p 406 a); the share of development expenditure fell somewhat.

Actual expenditure in 1961 was £L282.4m, as against £L227.7m in 1960; the £L31m surplus in the ordinary

BUDGET ESTIMATES — EXPENDITURES

	1960		1961	
	£L m	%	£L m	%
Wages, salaries, severance pay	115	52.0	134	49.2
General expenditure	24	11.0	33	12.0
Aid and public assistance	15	6.5	15	5.5
Equipment and development	48	22.0	53	19.5
Debt service	16	7.0	20	7.5
Miscellaneous	4	1.5	18	6.3
	222	100.0	273	100.0

Estimated expenditure was apportioned as follows (£L million):—

	1960	1961
Presidency, Parliament, PM's Office	4.71	8.86
Defence	47.43	53.02
Foreign Affairs	8.42	8.68
Interior	23.99	28.31
Finance	12.56	15.57
Education	30.83	37.89
Health	10.56	11.58
Public Works	37.84	43.53
Agriculture	4.73	5.84
Total (including other items)	222.23	273.80

budget could thus be transferred to the reserve fund, for development projects.

The Five-Year Development Plan. In July, the Parliamentary Committee for Finance and Public Works passed the bill, establishing a five-year development plan. Total costs were estimated at £L450m.:

BUDGET ESTIMATES — REVENUES

	(Amount in £L million)			in %		
	1959	1960	1961	1959	1960	1961
1. <i>Direct Taxes</i>	42.0	46.2	53.6	16.7	14.5	16.8
of which						
Building Tax	12.6	15.1	17.0			
Income Tax	20.9	23.1	27.5			
2. <i>Fees and Dues</i>	29.2	32.1	35.3	11.6	10.1	11.3
3. <i>Excise Taxes</i>	45.7	55.1	62.6	18.3	17.4	20.0
of which						
Gasoline Tax	18.8	22.9	27.5			
Tobacco Tax	21.5	26.2	29.0			
4. <i>Customs Duties</i>	89.5	112.7	115.8	35.7	35.9	37.0
5. <i>Government Property and Enterprises</i>	6.3	6.6	13.4	2.5	2.0	4.4
6. <i>Other Revenues</i>	38.2	63.9	32.8	15.2	20.1	10.5
of which						
Retirements Funds	3.5	6.0	7.7			
Concessionary Companies	1.3	0.8	0.6			
Petroleum Transit	23.7	42.5	12.6			
Total	250.9	316.6	313.5	100.0	100.0	100.0

LEBANON: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

	£L m		£L m
Irrigation	64	River drainage	9
Drinking water	76	Historic sites	10
Electricity	72	Buildings	20
Roads	124	Reconstruction	75

In its efforts to put the country's economy on a more productive basis, the government appointed IRFED, a private French association, adviser on planning and education for three years. The Chamber of Deputies formed a "Commission des grands travaux" to initiate, coordinate and execute development projects. The commission was to have an autonomous fund at its disposal into which the budgetary development allocation would be paid. In mid-year work on the Litani project was renewed by an Italian and a Yugoslav firm under the supervision of a French firm; Lebanon also asked the World Bank for additional loans as \$13m. of the original \$27m. loan, received in August 1955, had been spent by the end of 1961.

Foreign Trade; Balance of Payments. (For the direction of trade see pp 82-5. In 1961 exports totalled £L159m. and imports £L954m., leaving a trade deficit of £L795m. From 1960, Lebanese trade statistics also included trade in securities and currency. The figures for 1961 show an "export" of money bills, travellers cheques, obligations and miscellaneous securities amounting to £L238.3m., and an "import" of £L107.3m.)

The export of citrus fruit, raw wool, cement and beans decreased; the export of apples, bananas and raw cotton grew.

Transit of goods rose slightly.

The tourist industry continued to expand; the number of tourists (excluding visitors from Syria) reached 296,000, compared with 233,000 in 1960. The income from tourism was estimated at £L110m., as compared with £L94m. in 1960 and 79m. in 1959.

The balance of payments continued to be favourable. There were increases in the gold and foreign currency reserves (\$159.8m. as against \$137.0 in 1960) and the considerable improvement in the external value of the

Lebanese pound. In contrast to 1960 there was only the slightest rise in imports; the tendency towards greater trade deficits was thus halted. Revenues remained static as compared with 1960, in contrast to the large increase in services that took place between 1959 and 1960. Private donations remained at the level of former years; official donations shrank as USA aid, extended after the 1958 disturbances, was being exhausted. The current account deficit showed almost no change from 1960. The balancing item ("other") reflects in the main the favourable net capital movement to Lebanon, which expanded in comparison with 1960.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

(in £L million)

Items	1959	1960	1961
A. Goods and Services			
Exports	152	162	170
Imports	-762	-930	-945
Non-monetary gold	-9	-8	-8
Services (net)	379	466	470
	-240	-310	-313
B. Donations			
Private donations (net)	88	89	92
Official donations	20	16	15
	108	105	107
Total (A + B)	-132	-205	-206
C. Other			
Liabilities of banks	29	204	83
Errors and omissions	161	40	190
	190	244	273
Total (A + B + C)	58	39	67
D. Official Reserves (increase —)			
Foreign assets	-25	14	-6
Monetary gold	-33	-33	-61
	-58	-39	-67

IMPORTS

(in £L million)

Main Items	1963	1961	Main Items	1960	1961
Oil, crude and refined	59.9	52.6	Eggs, dairy produce	17.7	15.8
Iron, steel	53.1	60.5	Timber	15.5	21.8
Cars, spares	33.4	42.6	Raw cotton	11.6	11.6
Wheat, flour	32.0	29.1	Cotton seed	4.9	0.1
Live cattle	31.9	30.1	Hides	4.7	6.0

EXPORTS

(in £L million)

Main Items	1963	1961	Main Items	1960	1961
Citrus	16.1	13.7	Cement	4.5	0.9
Apples	13.3	16.8	Beans	2.0	1.4
Raw wool	5.2	3.1	Raw cotton	0.9	1.2
Bananas	4.8	5.2	Onions	0.8	0.8

ECONOMIC POLICY

THE NATIONAL INCOME OF LEBANON (AT CURRENT FACTOR PRICES)
(in £L million)

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1961	
					Amount	%
Agriculture	223	231	238	219	269	15.8
Industry	175	183	189	181	214	12.6
Construction	60	50	41	38	46	2.7
Transportation and Communication	75	78	80	57	90	5.3
Commerce	407	410	469	365	530	31.2
Banking	70	80	91	93	104	6.1
Real Estate	116	130	139	155	158	9.3
Government	83	95	108	113	122	7.2
Services	165	160	148	104	167	9.8
Total	1,374	1,417	1,503	1,325	1,700	100.0

National Income. The national income in 1961 was unofficially estimated at £L1,700m. Taking the official figure of population, 2,150,326 on December 31, 1961, average income per head came to £L790. (*L'Orient*, April 12, 1961)

The above figures show the preponderance of unproductive branches in the economy, which constituted Lebanon's basic economic problem.

(Sources: For the 1961 figures, *L'Orient*, Oct 26, 1962; *Le Liban en Chiffres*, CDL, Beirut, Sept, 1962);

for the 1955-58 figures see *CDL, mensuel*, May 15, 1961; no figures were available for 1959 and 1960.)

After a period of rapid expansion the Lebanese economy entered a recession in the last quarter of 1961. Symptoms of this reversal were the slow-down in building, a reduced influx of capital from abroad, shrinking credits to the private sector and an increase in bankruptcies. These developments, however, were moderated by a considerable increase in government expenditure.

THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

Ministry	Aug 2, 1960- May 19, 1961	Community/ Party/District	May 20, 1961- Nov 1, 1961	Community/ Party/District	Nov 1, 1961	Community/ Party/District
PM	Sā'ib Slām*	Sunni/ Beirut III	Sā'ib Slām*	Sunni/ Beirut III	Rashid Kārami*	Sunni/ Tripoli (N)
Deputy PM			Philippe Būlus*	Greek Orthodox/ Kura (N)	Philippe Būlus*	Greek Orthodox/ Kura (N)
Justice	Nasim Majdalāni	Greek Catho- lic/PSP Beirut III	Philippe Būlus*		Fu'ād Butrus	Greek Ortho- dox/Ind. Group/ Beirut I
Foreign Affairs and Emigrants	Philippe Taqla	Greek Catho- lic/Constitu- tional Union	Philippe Taqla	Greek Catho- lic/Constitu- tional Union	Philippe Taqla	Greek Catholic
Interior	Sā'ib Slām*		Abdallah* Mashnūq	Sunni/ Beirut III	Kamāl Junblāt	Druze/PSP/ Shuf (Mt.)
Finance	Pierre Jumayil	Maronite/ Phalanges/ Beirut I	Pierre Jumayil*	Maronite/ Phalanges/ Beirut I	Rashid Kārami*	

* Also holds other portfolios.
Mt. = Mount Lebanon

S. = South Lebanon
N. = North Lebanon

(Continued on following page)

LEBANON: INTERNAL AFFAIRS
THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON
(Continued from preceding page)

Ministry	Aug 2, 1960– May 19, 1961	Community/ Party/District	May 20, 1961– Nov 1, 1961	Community/ Party/District	Nov 1, 1961	Community/ Party/District
Defence	Majid Arslān	Druze/ Aley (Mt.)	Sā'ib Slām*		Majid Arslān	Druze/ Aley (Mt.)
Education	Kamāl Junblāt	Druze/PSP/ Shuf (Mt.)	Muhammad Sa'ī ad-Dīn*	Shi'i/Tyre (S)	Kāmil As'ad	Shi'i/ Bint-Jbeil (S)
Health	Alyās Khūri	Maronite/ Ba'abda (Mt.)	Pierre Jumayil*		Ali Bizzi	Shi'i/ Marj Ayun (S)
Labour and Social Affairs	Joseph Skāf	Greek Catholic/ Zahle (Biqā')	Muhammad Sa'ī ad-Dīn*		Jean Aziz ¹ (Edouard Hunayin)	Maronite/ Jezzin (S) (Ba'abda) (Mt.)
Information	Fu'ād Ghun	Greek Orthodox/ Kura (N)	Abdallah Mashnūq*		Philippe Būlus*	
Public Works and Communi- cations	Uthmān Dana	Sunni/ Beirut III	Kamāl Junblāt	Shuf (Mt.)	Pierre Jumayil	Maronite/ Phalanges/ Beirut I
Agriculture	Muhammad Sa'ī ad-Dīn	Shi'i/Tyre (S)	Sulaymān Faranjīyah*	Zghorta (N)	Joseph Skāf	Greek Catholic/ Zahle (Biqā')
Economy	Sulaymān al-Ali	Sunni/ Akkar (N)	Philippe Būlus*	Druze/PSP/	Rafiq Naja	Sunni/ Beirut III
Posts, Telegraph, Telephones	Sulaymān Faranjīyah	Maronite/ Zghorta (N)	Sulaymān Faranjīyah*	Maronite/	René Mu'awwad	Maronite/ Zghorta (N)
Planning	Rafiq Shahrīn	Shi'i/ Nabatiye (S)			Uthmān Dana	Sunni/ Beirut III
Administrative Reform	Khatchik Babikyan	Armenian Orthodox/ Tashnaq/ Beirut I				
Supply	Maurice Jumayil	Maronite/ Phalanges/ Matn (Mt.)				
Municipal and Rural Affairs	Abdallah Mashnūq	Sunni/ Beirut III				
Tourism			Philippe Būlus*		Philippe Būlus*	
Without Portfolio	Hussein Mansūr	Shi'i/ Zahle (Biqā')				
18 Ministers			8 Ministers		14 Ministers	

¹ He was minister for one day.

* Also holds other portfolios.

Mt. = Mount Lebanon

S. = South Lebanon

N. = North Lebanon

COMMUNITIES AND ALIENS

INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN GENERAL

Proposal for Improving Inter-Community Relations. In Feb a number of deputies and the representatives of several communities suggested the formation of delegations representing all communities to tour the country in order to deepen intercommunal understanding and strengthen national unity. Opponents of the proposal argued that so long as the present government, divided against itself, remained in power, there was no sense in approaching the people at large (*Hayat, Feb 15; Revue du Liban, Feb 18*). [Apparently the subject was not raised again during the year.]

Proposal to Sign the National Charter. In March a proposal was put forward that the National Charter of 1943 should be formally signed. [This unwritten charter established the relative representation of the communities in the Chamber and key executive positions, thus in fact becoming the basic constitution of the country.] The aim was to invest the Charter with formal authority and thus put an end to recurring differences over it.

The proposal was made on March 23 by a group of deputies, headed by the Independent Bloc, at a meeting with the President. Raymond Eddé, leader of the National Bloc, expressed his support and so, reportedly, did a "considerable number" of independents. On March 29 the issue was discussed in the Chamber, where [unspecified] opponents of the proposal claimed that the signing was liable to reawaken intercommunal strife. It was assumed that it was in the power of the President to bring the issue to a conclusion either way (*Hayat, Jaridah, March 24, 30*). [It would seem that the issue did not come up again at this level during the year.]

ARMENIANS

Number. In 1961 the number of Armenians holding Lebanese citizenship was estimated at 100,000 (*Al-Yawm, July 20*). According to [unreliable] 1960 Lebanese statistics, over 71,000 Armenians were eligible to vote at the general elections (MER 1960, p 350). A number of Armenians were granted citizenship at the end of Dec 1960. (*Nahar, Dec 17, 1960*)

Communist Activity. A number of Syrian Armenian Communists were arrested in Beirut in July; one was found in possession of documents proving that he had been in contact with Communist states and received aid from them. (*Antwar, July 9*). (See also under The Communists, below.)

The Tashnaq Party. According to a detailed account of a "research" on the Tashnaq party, published in Aug in the [pro-UAR] weekly *Kul-Shay*, the party was led by an international executive of twelve: five in the U.S., two in Egypt, three in Lebanon and two in France. The Lebanese branch was headed by [Deputy] Mosis Dirkahtsyan (leader), Gharo Saouni and Aram Sahakyan. The party had no official head but its most influential member was Khatahtsyan [of whom no further details were given]. The party had also a military organization called Takim Yasi.

The Tashnaq ("Revolution") party was founded in Ottoman days in 1890, three years after the founding of the Hamshaq party, the paper said. It operated in Armenia as a nationalist movement.

In 1908, however, some members joined the Young Turks, the paper continued, and since then the party had always cooperated with whoever was in power or seemed dominant. From 1922 to 1940 it cooperated with the French (the mandatory power in Syria and Lebanon); Dirkahtsyan served as an officer in the French Army and was head of the party branch in Paris.

During World War II the party collaborated with Germany and had its headquarters in Berlin. True to its policy of always collaborating with whoever seemed the most powerful, *Kul-Shay* continued, it had worked hand in hand with the Americans against Soviet Russia and Communism since the end of the war; its members were favoured in the granting of visas, etc., and enormous funds were collected in the U.S. The security services in the Arab countries were concerned as to whether it was not a body of conspirators against Arab interests. (*Kul-Shay, Aug 19*)

Repercussions in Lebanon of Tashnaq Espionage Trial in Syria. At the end of July many Tashnaq members were arrested in Syria, especially in Aleppo, on charges of espionage and sabotage. The Syrian authorities accused the party in Lebanon of collaboration in these acts (*Jaridah, Aug 2*). The arrests created a furore in the Lebanese party. One of its leaders stated that, though the branches of the party in the various countries were unconnected, they nevertheless had a common basis, namely the fight against Communism. (*Amal, July 28*)

The trial began in Damascus in Nov, some of the accused being tried in *absentia* as they had absconded to Lebanon. The Syrian court requested the extradition of Mosis Dirkahtsyan, but the Lebanese government refused to comply. (See also p 397.) (*Jaridah, Nov 9; Kul-Shay, Dec 23*)

DRUZES

Mashyakhat al-Aql Dispute Settled. [Further to the dispute over Druze community affairs (see MER 1960, p 345), an interim settlement was reached in regard to the spiritual leadership (*mashyakhat al-aql*), pending legislation.]

On Jan 31 a meeting of community leaders, with the two [rival] leaders, Kamal Junblat and Majid Arslan, as well as the Druze ministers and deputies present, agreed on Shaykh Abu Yusuf Abd al-Latif as a third *Shaykh lil-aql*. It was further agreed that if a position of a Shaykh fell vacant, the *marhya Khat* would continue with two Shaykhs only, one of the Yazbakliyah and the other of the Junblatiyah. [The two Shaykhs who continued in office were: Muhammad Abu Shaqra, known for pro-UAR tendencies and supported by Junblat; and Rashid Hamadah, of the Yazbakliyah, known for anti-UAR tendencies and supported by Arslan. The sources did not indicate to which faction—if any—the new Shaykh adhered.] The Druze ministers were to inform the President of the agreement [and it would seem that the matter was not again raised in the Chamber]. (*Hayat, Jaridah, Feb 1*)

Amendment of Personal Statute Law Opposed. On Jan 27 the Druze ministers and deputies discussed with the President proposals to amend the Druze law of personal statute (*qanun al-ahwal al-shakhsiyah*), which had met with the disapproval of several religious leaders. [Since

LEBANON: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

LEBANON, PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS,
COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES



International Boundary ————

Province Boundary ————


District Boundary ————

DEPUTIES BY DISTRICTS

▲ Christians ● Druze ■ Muslims

Each symbol represents one deputy

ELEVATION IN METRES



the enactment of the law in May 1948, many amendments had been requested, all of them opposed by the religious leaders. It was reported that Arslan and Junblat, the Druze ministers, displayed mutual understanding on many points during this meeting (*Hayat, Jan 28*). [The report quoted gave no particulars of the points at issue.]

Community Divided on Breakup of U.A.R. In Dec the [pro-Ar] *As-Siyasah* reported that Shaykh Muhammad Abu Shaqra had refused to receive an official Syrian delegation on the grounds that he opposed the isolationist regime in Syria, like any other isolationist trend in the Arab world. The Syrian revolution, he said, had caused the utmost disillusion to millions of Arabs by injuring Arab unity. Though he did not know President Abdel Nasser personally, he had no doubts that he was a hero who had raised the Arabs to eminence and every Arab owed him respect. (The Mufti of Lebanon, the head of the Sunni Muslims, Muhammad Alaya, also refused to receive the delegation.) (*Siyasah, Dec 6*) The delegation, headed by the director-general of the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was, however, received by Rashid Hamdani, the Yazbaki Shaykh al-Aql who had previously visited Syria to congratulate the government on "the new era" (*al-ahd al-jadid*). (*Amal, Nov 30*)

KURDS

Citizenship. In Sept President Shehab, PM Slim and Mashnugh, the Minister of the Interior, agreed on the granting of citizenship to stateless Kurds. As a result thousands of Kurds were expected to receive Lebanese citizenship shortly. (*Kul-Shay', Sept 16*)

Political Activity. [Intensive political activity among the Kurds, mostly Communist-inspired, was reported during the second half of the year, apparently in connection with the Kurdish uprising in Iraq, which started in June (pp 279 ff).]

In July the discovery of a Kurdish party, working under Communist guidance for an independent Kurdish state, was reported; a Communist leader of Kurdish descent had been arrested and an operational plan for this purpose had been found in his house. (*Anwar, July 15*)

During the same period a number of Kurds were arrested who had reportedly infiltrated from Syria and Turkey to set up in Lebanon a Kurdish party to work for the establishment of a Kurdish state on Iraqi territory. (*Kul-Shay', July 5; Amal, July 19, Aug 18*)

At the beginning of Aug, Muhammad Uthman al-Lawli, described as "the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party," was detained in Lebanon for suspicious activities. It was reported that he had arrived from Syria some time previously. The security authorities claimed to have proof of his connections with "a Lebanese party known for its socialist leanings." Following the intervention of an official political personage belonging to this party, he was released, on condition that he leave the country. (*Jaridah, Aug 2*)

In Oct the arrest was reported of about 20 Persian, Turkish and Iraqi Kurds, who had entered the country illegally and admitted participation in the Kurdish revolt in Iraq. The authorities decided to deport those holding Iranian and Turkish citizenship, but to hold the Iraqi Kurds for further investigation. (*Hayat, Oct 25*)

ALIENS

[During the year the problem of aliens, in both political and economic aspects, came ever more to the fore.

The growing concentration of political refugees from the Arab countries gave great concern to the authorities and the activities of some of them led to no little political tension between Lebanon and other Arab states, as well as, in some instances, aggravating internal tension. The steady influx of aliens also aggravated the unemployment problem.] (For the problems of Arab refugees see p 240 b.)

Granting of Citizenship Slowed Down. In a detailed article, *Al-Yawm* said that under the previous regime citizenship had been granted at the request of deputies. Thus, for instance, 11,000 applications had been granted in 1957—1,700 in Aley district alone, in deference to the wishes of Deputy Munir Abu Fadil, so that the villages in the area were now populated by widely differing groups. During 1956-58 citizenship was granted to about 30,000 foreigners, including Syrians, Englishmen, Poles, Hungarians, and persons from the Eastern Mediterranean area.

The granting of citizenship had now been slowed down, however; it now depended on the fulfilment of most difficult conditions and "on something resembling general agreement, to guard against any interference by the communities which might disturb the country." (*Al-Yawm, July 20*)

The government had stopped the issue of citizenship papers, as well as the filing of citizenship applications abroad without special government permission, at the end of 1960. In the past, Lebanese missions abroad had been authorized to grant citizenship. (*Hayat, Dec 17, 1960*)

There was also a stream of applications, it was reported, from Lebanese emigrants, mostly living in African countries, who now wished to return because of economic restrictions there. (*Hayat, Dec 17, 1960*—see also p 413 b.)

Pressure of Aliens on Labour Market. The Minister of Labour stated in Jan that 35,000 aliens, most of them employed in trade and industry, held Lebanese work permits (*Anwar, Jan 8*). A similar figure was given by other sources (*Hayat, May 26; Jaridah, Oct 31*). [The total number of the alien work force was, however, several times larger.] Official sources said that 300,000 Syrians and Palestinians were employed in Lebanese agriculture (*Nahar, March 24*). Another government source estimated the number of Syrian labourers permanently employed in all economic sectors alone as 75,000, rising to 140,000 during agricultural peak seasons (*Siyasah, Oct 24*). According to another source, the number of foreign Arab workers in Lebanon was 160,000. (*Jaridah, Sept 10*)

In Jan Joseph Skaf, the Minister for Work and Social Affairs, announced preparations for a census of all foreign labourers and said he would limit the number of work permits (*Anwar, Jan 8, 20*). On Oct 17 the ministry issued a decree barring the employment of aliens without a special permit, "to enable the control of the work of aliens and to protect the Lebanese working man" (*Jaridah, Oct 18; Hayat, Oct 20*). The decree did not distinguish between citizens of Arab countries and others, but the Ministry of Labour instituted a temporary arrangement under which Syrians and Palestinians would not need permits, since the Palestinians had international status and the Syrians were mainly unskilled agricultural and building labourers, who did not compete with Lebanese. (*Jaridah, Nov 24*)

Political Activity of Aliens, Arrests and Deportations. In Jan the deportation of six political refugees from Arab

countries, suspected of subversive activity for the realization of the Fertile Crescent plan, was reported. (*Kul-Shay', Jan 14*; see also under the National Social Party.)

On March 1 a special meeting was called at the President's palace to discuss the shaky state of internal security. It was decided to deport about a hundred foreign nationals suspected of illegal activity that was undermining Lebanon's relations with other Arab states. The President requested the security authorities strictly to repress unruly foreign elements stirring up unrest. (*Anwar, March 5*)

Over 300 Syrians and Iraqis, described as Communists, were deported in June. (*Nahar, June 27*; *Kul-Shay', July 1*)

In Oct 350 aliens were deported, most of them Kurds

and Khawranis (Syrians from the Khawran district) suspected of subversive activity. (*Hayat, Oct 15*)

News of further impending deportations was published from time to time. In Dec a government source said that over 500 foreigners suspected of illegal political activity had been deported in 1960 (*Anwar, Oct 21, Dec 30*). (On the deportation of Kurds, see p 377a.)

(For the part played by foreigners in the abortive revolution at the end of Dec, see the relevant chapter, below.)

In Dec the Ministry of Social Affairs requested that all the foreign jugglers and magicians who filled the streets of Beirut be expelled. A survey had shown that they came mostly from India and Pakistan, and that their numbers doubled every year. (*Kifak, Dec 24*)

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS

THE BA'ATH PARTY

(*hizb al-ba'ath al-arabi al-ihtiraki*)

[The Ba'ath party in Lebanon, as in other Arab countries, was rent by dissension in 1961, as became especially evident with the breakup of the UAR (for details see p 394 a). It took virtually no part in political activities.]

Dissension on Attitude to UAR. In Feb a pamphlet over the imprint of the "Revolutionary Ba'ath Party" (Rimawi's UAR-sponsored rival Ba'ath party—see MER 1960, pp 497-8) was distributed in Tripoli accusing Michel Aflaq [the Syrian ideological leader of the party] and his supporters, "the Aflaqites," of deviation from the party's principles. (For sources, see below.)

Rivalry with Karāmi's Tripoli Bloc. At the same time Rashid Karāmi's [parliamentary] bloc (also known locally as the Arab Liberation party) accused the Ba'ath of half-hearted participation in the UAR anniversary celebrations, and a pamphlet campaign developed between the two bodies. *An-Nahar* thought Communists were among those behind the campaign against the Ba'ath party. (*Nahar, Feb 28*; *Jaridah, March 1*)

In April Ba'ath pamphlets counter-attacked the Tripoli bloc deputies for not doing their duty to the city; the latter retorted by charging the Ba'ath party with abandoning Abdel Nasser and his policies. The authorities confiscated the pamphlets. (*Jaridah, April 22*)

On July 17 in Tripoli a group of Rimawi supporters opened fire on Ba'ath members; there were no casualties. (*Nahar, July 18*)

THE COMMUNISTS

Activity and Policy. [As in 1960, the propaganda of the illegal Lebanese Communist party—in its pamphlets and its unofficial organ, *An-Nida'*—was directed mainly against the UAR and against American activity in Lebanon, particularly the former. As on former occasions the visits to Beirut of the American Sixth Fleet aroused vigorous opposition by the Communists and Peace Partisans. (See pp 407 a, 409 b.) Armenians and Kurds stood out among its active members, but villagers from the south were also prominent.]

Struggle with UAR. On Dec 31, 1960, shots were fired at the car of Artin Madyan, the Lebanese-Armenian Communist leader; he and his driver were slightly wound-

ed. Madyan blamed the Egyptian and Syrian intelligence, and during the following weeks *An-Nida'* reported many demonstrations of sympathy with Madyan, including articles in Lebanese Armenian papers. Beirut Armenian and other delegations went to the PM, demanding an investigation. (*Nida', Jan 1-14, 22*)

[The outstanding issue between the Lebanese Communists and the UAR during the year broke at the end of May with the reported murder in Damascus of the party's SG, Farajallah al-Hilu, which aroused a certain amount of solidarity in Lebanon, at least on the part of some opposition leaders. (See p 391b.)]

On June 3 the authorities closed down *An-Nida'* because of its attacks on the UAR (*Hayat, June 4*). The paper and its editor, Suhayl Yammūt, were charged with publishing articles damaging to national unity and UAR-Lebanese relations. On June 13 it was closed for ten days and Yammūt fined £L500. (*Hayat, Jaridah, June 9, 14*; *R. Cairo, June 13* [15])

The Syrian revolution was welcomed by *An-Nida'* as "a historic victory of the Syrian people over Egyptian tyranny." (*Nida', Sept 29, 30, Oct 1, 2, 3*)

Participation in International Communist Conferences. Nicolas Shāwī [the Lebanese Communist leader] attended the 22nd Communist Party Congress in Moscow (Oct 17-31). (*BBC in Arabic, Nov 5*; *IMB, Nov 6*)

Two members of the Printers' Union who took part in the Communist Workers' Conference in Leipzig, East Germany, were arrested on their return on charges of leaving Lebanon without exit permits and participation in an undesirable conference. They pleaded guilty. (*Jaridah, Dec 22*; *Siyasah, Dec 23*; *Anwar, Dec 31*)

Communist Activities; Arrests and Deportations. Two persons arrested in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 348) for espionage were sentenced in March 1961 to three years' imprisonment for Communist activity but were found not guilty of espionage. One of them, Dr Jamil Badir, had been detained at Beirut airport on his way from West Germany with \$7,000 in his possession destined for the Jordanian Communist party. (*Jaridah, March 27*)

Over 300 Syrian and Iraqi citizens described as Communists were deported during the last week of June. Most of them preferred to go to non-Arab states. (*Nahar, June 27*; *Kul-Shay', July 1*)

Following reports of Communist meetings in Bint Jbeil

district in the south, many arrests were reported in the area. Searches revealed Communist documents and propaganda material. (*Jaridah*, Aug 29)

In Sept the authorities announced the discovery of several Communist cells in Beirut which had been engaged in propaganda and espionage. Among those arrested were government employees and foreigners. Some of the propaganda material confiscated originated in Eastern Europe. Locally prepared pamphlets against a visit of the American Sixth Fleet were also found. (*Jaridah*, Sept 15, 19, 20; *Siyasah*, Sept 20)

In Oct the discovery of a Communist ring, headed by Michel Badirah, a lecturer at the Lebanese University, was reported. (*Jaridah*, Oct 7, 8)

In Nov it was reported that Lebanon had denied entry to Khālid Bakdāsh. (*Siyasah*, Nov 23)

A Cairo source stated in Dec that Communist party headquarters for the ME would be transferred to Beirut from Bulgaria after Abdel Nasser had revealed their location. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Dec 11)

In Dec it was reported that the security forces would redouble their efforts to repress the Communists (and the NSP) as a result of their increased activity after the dissolution of the UAR. (*Jaridah*, Dec 8)

Later it was reported that the authorities had confiscated propaganda material containing an account of the Communist platform in Lebanon for 1962. (*Anwar*, Dec 31)

ISLAMIC LIBERATION PARTY

(*hizb al-tahrir al-islāmī*)

[This illegal party's underground activity, mainly the publication of pamphlets imbued with Muslim fanaticism, continued during the year despite government efforts to repress it.]

Membership. According to As'ad al-Mālīki, head of the party branch in the Syrian Region, who was arrested in March (*Jaridah*, March 21), it numbered 3,000 in Lebanon, concentrated mostly in Beirut and including many students (*Anwar*, March 28). Among Lebanese members arrested were engineers, doctors and teachers (*Nahar*, Jan 13). There were also Jordanian nationals, Arab refugees (*Nahar*, Jan 5, 12), as well as at least one Saudi Arabian. (See below; see also following item for names of party leaders.)

Arrests and Charges. The 1960 campaign to repress the party continued into 1961. It was disclosed in Feb that 90 members were awaiting trial. (*Jaridah*, Feb 21)

It was first reported that the party leader, Shaykh Muhammad Taqi ad-Din an-Nabbāni, was among the prisoners, and details of his interrogation were published (MER 1960, p 347), but from the beginning of Feb frequent mention was made of efforts to arrest him. (*Anwar*, Feb 15; *Nahar*, April 28, Oct 19; *Jaridah*, Nov 19)

Among the detainees were several of the party's leaders: Ali Fakhr ad-Din, its head in Lebanon, Ibrahim Hussein Yūsuf, head of the Beirut branch, and Muhammad Tawfiq Abu Khalaf, treasurer. (*Nahar*, Jan 13, Feb 12; *Jaridah*, Jan 17)

Most of the detainees denied having played any part in the party's political activities and disclaimed all knowledge of its alleged connections with a foreign power; they said they had joined because they believed that the party was trying to strengthen Islamic consciousness. (*Siyasah*, Jan 18; *Nahar*, Feb 12)

In April, further arrests were reported including two leading members in Beirut: a Saudi Arabian engineer and a Jordanian student. The latter, Khālid Kamāl Zayd, had been arrested previously for party activities in Jordan and Syria. The engineer, Nazār Sa'īd al-Kardālī al-Manlā, was reputedly the son of the head of the Saudi Arabian intelligence [or information?] services (*Istikhbarāt*). (*Jaridah*, April 26)

The indictment against 91 party members, headed by Nabbāni (tried in *absentia*), was published on April 21. [Among the accused were several whose names bore witness to their origin on the West Bank of Jordan.] The charges included the distribution of pamphlets calling for a change in the Lebanese constitution by illegal means, incitement to inter-communal strife, disparagement of religious ritual, and slander of Lebanese leaders (*Amal*, *Jaridah* of April 22 contain a full list of the accused.) There were no charges of espionage, sabotage and contacts with foreign countries, including Israel, which had been mentioned previously in connection with the interrogation of the prisoners. (See, e.g., *Siyasah*, Jan 8; *Nahar*, Feb 13.)

Party Organization; Charges of Anti-Christian Propaganda. The charge sheet included some details of the organization and operation of the party. Activities were coordinated with the help of Muhammad Tawfiq Abu Khalaf, a Beirut bookseller who collected contributions in [unspecified] Arab countries in the course of his commercial activities. Part of this income he distributed to active members and part was used to produce propaganda material. Meetings were held in secret in private houses or in a public library. The mosques were utilized for the dissemination of the party's ideas. The party's pamphlets condemned Muslim-Christian cooperation and denounced the [Muslim] PM and President of the Chamber as infidels for attending Christmas ceremonies.

The Muslim leaders were accused of being traitors to their faith because they were partners in the Lebanese regime, which enabled Christians to rule over Muslims, although a Muslim is forbidden voluntarily to place himself under the rule of infidels. (*Jaridah*, April 22)

At the trial (May 3-15) all the accused denied the charges and pleaded that the pamphlets were meant to restore people to religion and the path of righteousness (*al-sirat al-mustaqīm*) (*Nahar*, *Jaridah*, May 11). Each of the Lebanese members, including Ali Fakhr ad-Din, head of the Lebanese branch, was sent to prison for six months and fined £L50; foreign nationals were imprisoned for eight months and fined £L100. (*Jaridah*, May 16)

Party Activities Continue; Further Arrests. The party's activities continued after the trials. During July and Sept pamphlets were distributed condemning the participation of Muslim states in the Belgrade Conference (*Amal*, July 10; *Kul-Shay*, Sept 29). [The party was opposed on principle to cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim states.]

In Oct party members were arrested in the Beirut suburb of Burj Hammūd (*Nahar*, Oct 19). A new trial, on charges of distributing pamphlets attacking the regime of "one of the Arab countries" began on Nov 8. (*Siyasah*, Nov 9)

On Dec 29, 20 members were arrested in al-Umari Mosque, Beirut, while distributing pamphlets attacking Muslim dignitaries and politicians attending the Christmas celebrations (*Jaridah*, Jan 3, 1962). [In 1960 mem-

bers of the party had been arrested for the same offence (*Siyasah*, Jan 8, 1961.)]

HIZB AN-NAJJADAH

Opposition to Sīām's Government. [In the Chamber this party made its presence felt by the frequent intervention of its leader and only deputy, Adnān al-Hakīm. Its main activity, however, was street demonstrations in its stronghold, the western quarters of Beirut.]

[In Aug., following clashes between Najjādah demonstrators and the police, the Beirut Front was set up in the Chamber, with Hakīm as one of its members, opposed to PM Sīām and Mashnūq, the Minister of Interior, both Beirut Muslim leaders. See pp 392 a-393.]

Sawt al-Urūbah, the party organ, was closed down twice, in March and Aug., on charges of damaging national unity and provocation to inter-community riots. (*Hayat*, March 8, Aug 10)

Partisan of the UAR. [The party persisted in its all-out support of Abdel Nasser and the UAR.] Hakīm was received by President Abdel Nasser in March in Damascus and again, after the breakup of the UAR, in Cairo in Dec. (*R. Cairo*, March 6 [8]; *Hayat*, Dec 29)

THE NATIONAL BLOC

(*al-kutlah al-wataniyah*)

[This party, led by Raymond Eddeh, stood out as one of the most active and dynamic parties in the Chamber, where it was represented by six members, and consistently opposed the Cabinets of both Sīām and Karāmī—except for one day, when Edouard Hunayn, a party member, served as a minister in Karāmī's newly formed cabinet.]

[Its home policy was based on strict adherence to the National Charter; it even advocated the signing of this unwritten agreement. (See under: Inter-Community Relations, above.) Its external policy was based on the safeguarding of Lebanon's independence and determined opposition to any interference in her internal affairs. These principles found expression in the party's attitude to issues involving UAR-Lebanese relations, e.g., President Abdel Nasser's denunciation of Lebanese parties (p 388 a), and the alleged murder in Damascus of Farajallah al-Hilu, the Lebanese Communist leader (p 391 b).]

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE

(*al-hay'ah al-wataniyah*)

[The activity of this small Beirut group was limited to the publication of manifestoes on current affairs, which generally expressed moderate support of pan-Arabism and the UAR. (See, e.g., open letters to King Hussein in *Hayat*, April 4, and to the governments of the UAR and Syria in *Hayat*, Oct 25.) Rafiq Naja, leader of the party, was a deputy and became Minister of the Economy in Karāmī's Cabinet.]

In Nov a bomb exploded in Naja's home. (See p 397 b.)

THE NATIONAL LIBERALS

(*al-wataniyyūn al-ahḥrār*)

[The National Liberal party, headed by Camille Sham'un, continued to pursue its opposition policy on a limited scale. It continued to have close relations with the NSP, while opposing both the Phalanges and the pro-UAR groups. (On its alleged connection with the abortive NSP coup d'état, see the latter.)]

In Feb., explosives planted in the garden of Sham'un's home near Beirut were discovered in time. (*Hayat*, Feb 7)

At the beginning of July, a Syrian youth was arrested on a charge of having planned to assassinate Sham'un on the orders of a foreign intelligence service. (*Nahar*, July 2)

On April 11 members of the National Liberals and the NSP clashed with members of the Phalanges in a village in the Biqa' area. The police detained 15 persons. (*Hayat*, April 12)

At the end of June the party started a daily, *Ash-Shams* (*Nahar*, June 27), which was closed by order of the government for ten days in Sept for an attack on Pierre Jumayil. (*Hayat*, Sept 22)

THE NATIONALIST SOCIAL PARTY (NSP)

(*al-hizb al-qawmi al-ijtimā'i*)

[The NSP was responsible for numerous acts of violence in 1961 against both pro-UAR Muslim bodies and pro-Western Christian organizations, especially the Phalanges, culminating in its abortive coup d'état, in collaboration with army officers, on the last day of the year. (On the coup see p 398; the trial brought to light points of interest concerning the party's organization, general activities and membership.)]

[Before the coup it was active primarily in the Biqa, Mt. Lebanon and Beirut areas, among the refugees and other foreign Arabs.]

Ideology Reformulated. At a press conference on Nov 15 Dr Abdallah Sa'adah, the head of the party, redefined its basic principles "in view of recent developments in the Arab world."

1. Lebanon is an independent and sovereign state tied by deep-rooted (*aril*) ties to her sisters, the Arab countries, and cooperates with them in order to erect a structure that will strengthen them all.

2. Lebanon is tied by bonds of fate and nature to the countries of her natural surroundings (*al-mukhit al-tahḥī*), which call for the coordination of economic, social, defence and cultural relations for the sake of the genuine interests of Lebanon and the neighbouring countries.

3. The Lebanese people is one social unit without distinction of class, religion, rights or duties.

4. Lebanon should strive to implement the principles of social and economic justice through the development of her social and economic system in the direction of "social socialism" (*al-ihtirakiyah al-ijtima'iyyah*), which will secure justice and safeguard the producers' right to enjoy the benefit of their labours without permitting exploitation.

5. Reliance on genuine democracy, in substance rather than in form, and the safeguarding—in practice, not in words—of the general liberties. (*Jaridah*, Nov 16)

Activities, Arrests. In Jan [as reported by a pro-UAR source] six Arab political refugees were deported on suspicion of working for the forcible realization of the Fertile Crescent project in accordance with a British plan. It was stated that they had established liaison with a certain Lebanese party, but its involvement had been prevented by their deportation, and that machineguns and bombs had been found in their possession. (*Kul-Shay*, Jan 14)

In March a man described as an NSP member was arrested for distributing pamphlets liable to injure relations between Lebanon and one of the Arab states (*Jaridah*, March 19). According to another source, the man was George Abd al-Masih [who had left the NSP in 1958]

and set up the rival Nationalist Syrian Party]. (*Nahar*, March 24)

On March 22 a bomb was planted in a branch office of the party in Zghorta, in the North; there was much damage to property. (*Hayat*, March 23)

The annual ceremony marking the 12th anniversary of the execution of Antun Sa'adah, the NSP's (then PPS) founder, at his birthplace, Dhur ash-Shuwer village, on July 9 was attended by 2,000 members.

Dr Abdallah Sa'adah condemned the government for refusing to permit ceremonies on a larger scale. On the same day clashes broke out in several villages between NSP members and supporters of Abd al-Masih. (*Jaridah*, July 11)

In Oct several members were arrested on suspicion of participation in bombing attacks on pro-UAR newspapers. (See p 394 h.)

In Nov two members, one a Palestinian, were arrested when dangerous pamphlets were discovered in their homes. (*Siyasah*, Nov 25)

Struggle With the Phalanges. See under the Phalanges, below.

Party Backs Syrian Federation Plan. On Oct 11, after the break-up of the UAR, the party officially endorsed the Syrian proposal for a decentralized Arab federation and called on the Lebanese people to support it. (*Hayat*, Oct 12)

In Nov Sa'adah said that Syria should assume the leadership of the Arab world. (*Hayat*, Nov 16)

LES PHALANGES LIBANAIS

(*al-katā'ib al-lubnaniyah*)

Political Developments. [The Phalanges, under the leadership of Pierre Jumayil, stood out in 1961 as one of the most stable and active political bodies in the country. It had six members in the Chamber and was supported by an organized Maronite membership, with the main concentrations in the Mt. Lebanon area and Beirut. Jumayil continued to represent it in the Cabinet, where he claimed to be the spokesman of the Maronite community (p 390 a) and often clashed with Kamāl Jumhāt, who represented Arab nationalist, pro-UAR tendencies. At the end of Feb, Abdel Nasser launched a severe attack on the party and its leader (pp 387-9), and violent clashes broke out later between it and the PSP. Another attack on the party was launched by Cairo in Dec (p 150 b).]

It was reported that other predominantly Maronite parties—Raymond Eddhe's National Bloc, Sham'un's National Liberals and the Constitutional Union—had become uneasy about the Phalanges' strength in Mt. Lebanon, fearing that Jumayil intended to capture the presidency at the next elections. These parties, which had never cooperated, were now contemplating joint preventive action, together with Gen. (ret.) Jamil Lahūd. (*Kul-Shay'*, June 3)

Struggle With Nationalist Social Party. [The traditional rivalry between the Phalanges, which strove for the preservation of independence, and the NSP, which advocated Lebanon's inclusion in a Greater Syria, resulted in several armed clashes. There was one in April in the small town of Al-Qa' in the Biqa' (*Jaridah*, *Hayat*, April 12), and another on July 16 in Qartaba village, Mt. Lebanon (see p 392 a). The Phalanges headquarters were one of the targets of the NSP's abortive coup d'état in Dec,

which the Phalanges apparently helped to frustrate. (See chapter on the coup, below.)]

Membership. An [unsympathetic] source estimated party membership in 1961 at 60,000 (*Hanadith*, Nov 17). [In 1959 the figure of 50,000 was given, including 30,000-40,000 active members, organized in 200 branches, in addition to forty branches among emigrants abroad. (*Les Parties Libanaises en 1959—Edition L'Orient, Al-Jaridah, Beirut*)]

Party Platform. The following were the main points of the platform adopted in Sept at the party's fourth annual convention:

In foreign policy: "the unity of the Lebanese" and Lebanese independence; wider cooperation among the Arab states; Lebanon should help smooth out inter-Arab differences, while maintaining strict neutrality; support for the Arab League and measures to assure the neutrality of its administrative staff; support for the UN and the right of every people to self-determination; support for the resolutions of the 1960 Lebanese Emigrants' Congress, especially for the establishment of a League of the Lebanese in the World (*jami'iet al-Lubnaniyin fi al-dalam*) (see MER 1960, pp 365-6).

In the economic field the convention advocated: "a liberal economy and the protection of the national industry on the basis of consumer's interest," cooperation between the government and the unions, the implementation of the social insurance law [which was not passed during 1960] and the amendment of the wage law [see under Labour] to suit the changing conditions.

In the cultural field the party was in favour of: "the principle of free [private] education side by side with official [state] education," free universal primary education at the earliest possible date, and more intensive study of Arabic together with the encouragement of foreign language study. (See also on the Education Dispute pp 384b-386.)

The convention demanded the introduction of agricultural instruction in village primary schools, more agricultural colleges, the setting up of one or more agricultural colleges to train agronomists, encouragement for agricultural cooperatives, and the founding of centres for the study of village arts and crafts. (*Amal*, *Hayat*, Oct 3)

On the 25th anniversary of the founding of the party (on Nov 21, 1936), a great celebration took place in Beirut, with the slogan "Twenty-five Years of Service to Lebanon" as its focal point. (*Revue du Liban*, Nov 25)

THE POPULAR RESISTANCE

(*al-muqāwamah ash-sha'abiyyah*)

[The Popular Resistance organization pursued its pro-UAR policy on a limited scale.]

In Jan, Rashid Shihāb ad-Din, the organization's leader, vehemently denied rumours of a rapprochement with PM Slām [who gained the upper hand in the struggle for power in the Beirut Muslim sector at the end of the 1958 insurrection]. He said it was a conflict of principle that separated him from Slām, a conflict "between an idealist, progressive, uncompromising youth and a traditional, deceitful power-seeker who strives for power regardless of anything and who has exploited the revolution [the 1958 insurrection], which had other aims, to this end." (*Jaridah*, Jan 14)

In June the organization announced that as a result of contacts with the authorities the discharged soldiers who had taken part in the 1958 insurrection would be given

work by the government and the Beirut municipality. (*Hayat*, June 16)

Io Sept Mashnūq, the Minister of Interior, denied persecution of the organization for its attacks on the PM and himself. (*Hayat*, Sept 2)

THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSP) THE ARAB PROGRESSIVE FRONT

(*al-hizb al-taqaddumi al-ishi'raki*)

[This party, despite its relatively small membership (appr. 10,000—see MER 1960, p 346), was in the forefront of political activity thanks to the dynamic leadership of Kamāl Junblāt, who was a member of all the three Cabinets in office during the year. In each of them he played the part of the *enfant terrible*, as the chief advocate of a pan-Arab and pro-UAR attitude, repeatedly clashing with Pierre Jumayil, the Phalangist leader and spokesman for Christian and pro-Western views. The PSP had six representatives in the Chamber.]

Internal Rifts; Resignation of Majdalāni. Rumours of a rift between Junblāt and Nassim Majdalāni, his second-in-command, were first reported in Feb, but categorically denied by party sources. [Majdalāni had been SG of the party since its inception. He had been a member of Sām's government but was left out of his reduced Cabinet of eight in May, as well as Karāmi's Cabinet, which followed.]

Majdalāni resigned in Nov [it was not quite clear whether only from his post or from his membership in the party—probably the latter]. Party members accused him of supporting the *oeu* [opposition] bloc led by Sā'ib Slām in the Chamber.

Later, Majdalāni denied rumours that he had reconsidered his resignation. (*Hayat*, Feb 18, Nov 27, 30; *Orient*, Dec 10)

On Nov 30 it was reported that seven members of the party presidium had resigned in protest against Junblāt's policy. They had demanded new elections to the presidium and threatened to leave the party if their request was not met. Fadla Abu Haydar, the PSP secretary, declared that only Majdalāni had resigned, and that the presidium had authorized Junblāt's policy. (*Hayat*, Nov 30)

In Dec a [pro-UAR] source reported that the number of PSP branches had declined to 15 from 186 during the "peak period" because of personal friction in the leadership owing to Junblāt's egocentric attitude. (*Kul-Shay'*, Dec 9; during this period *Kul-Shay'* repeatedly attacked Junblāt; see e.g., issue of Dec 23.)

Founding of Arab Progressive Front. [In Oct, after the breakup of the UAR, Junblāt founded the pro-UAR Arab Progressive Front (*al-jabha al-arabiyyah al-taqaddumiyyah*), which corresponded to the parliamentary Front for National Struggle (*jabhat an-nidal al-watani*). As a result, Sām Hajjā joined the six PSP deputies—including Majdalāni—in the Chamber.] (See p 393 h.)

The Front's platform, which was completed by the end of Nov, declared that Arab nationalism was a progressive fighting movement of socialist content; the Front strove for the building of a homeland where the nation would be able to realize its full personality and the individual to preserve his self-confidence and faith in his future.

The Front set itself the following aims:

To deepen the national consciousness and to manifest

the connection between the nationalist movement and the socialist progressive struggle;

To work for the development of state and society in a scientific, progressive socialist direction;

To safeguard human rights (*al-hurriyyat al-amnah*), establish a true democracy, and fight reaction and imperialism in Lebanon and the other parts of the Arab homeland;

To emphasize that Palestine constitutes the foremost Arab issue and that Israel is a forgery and an imperialist crime;

To extend material and moral support to the struggle of the Algerian people, the people in the south of the Arabian peninsula, and all Arab liberation movements, and to fight all imperialist pacts and military bases;

To call for world peace and the prohibition of the employment of nuclear weapons;

To foster socialist consciousness among all the Arabs and to work for cooperation among all Arab socialist organizations;

To work for the joining of the Front by all groups and individuals believing in the above principles. (*Sayyad*, Nov 30)

NEW PARTIES

The National Progress Movement (*harakat al-taqaddum al-watani*). In April the constituent assembly of a party to be called by the above name met in Beirut. The founders were Dr Manu'ul [Manuel] Yūnis and Sulaymān az-Zayn. The party platform stated that it would be based on the spiritual and cultural values that gave Lebanon her specific character, and that it was a national organization whose members were the pioneers of the liberation movement, coming from all strata of the population. Its aims included: the defence of democracy; the acceptance of law and science as a working basis for the life of the community and the individual; the fight against communalism; the reorganization of the administration; legislative reforms in accordance with contemporary needs; the formulation of a general plan for all public activity; guarantees for public freedoms; the transfer of political leadership to the politically responsible youth; and cooperation with all Arab states. (*Jaridah*, April 15)

At the end of Aug Yūnis was appointed SG, and committee and branch officers were also appointed. [The majority of the 56 functionaries bore Christian names.] (For the full list, see *Hayat*, Sept 2)

Sā'ib Slām Forms a Party. It was reported at the end of Nov that Sā'ib Slām [who in Oct had resigned the premiership] was formulating the platform for a new party, which would advocate devotion to independence, struggle against communalism, the preservation of national unity and the defence of democracy (*Sayyad*, Nov 30). [This step may have been connected with the formation of the Beirut Front by his opponents. See below, under Parliamentary Blocs.]

In Dec it was reported that Slām had completed his negotiations for the establishment of his party and that he would be joined by 12 deputies. Among the names mentioned were Nassim Majdalāni (who had left the PSP), Muhammad Safi ad-Din, Ma'arūf Sa'ad, Sulaymān Faranjīyah and Abdallah Mashnūq. Another 12 deputies also reportedly intended to join the party. The party would not limit its activity to the Chamber but would also be active among the Beirut youth groups associated with Slām. The official founding of the party was scheduled for the beginning of 1962. (*Anwar*, Dec 19)

MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS

(harakat al-qawmiyyūn al-arab)

This pan-Arab group, known generally as *al-qawmiyyūn al-arab*, formed in the forties. Its centre was a club named *al-urwah al-wuthqa* ("the firm hold") at the American University of Beirut. Similar groups sprang up in other ME Arab and in the North African countries where their activities centred in clubs named the Arab Cultural Club (*an-nadi ath-thaqafi al-arabi*).

The Beirut club intensified its activities after the Arab-Israel war in 1948 when many former Palestinian Arab youths entered the American University. To "inflict revenge for Arab Palestine on international Zionism" became at that time their main theme and their slogan was: "unity, liberty, revenge." Up to 1955 the *qawmiyyūn al-arab* advocated immediate unification of Iraq, Jordan and Syria. But as Iraq joined the Baghdad pact they became partisans of the Egyptian-Syrian camp and, when it was founded, of the UAR which they regarded as the only legitimate centre of Arab nationalism. They adopted the UAR doctrine of Arab union, positive neutralism and Arab socialism and called for the immediate unification of all Arab states with the UAR. While they regarded Lebanon as an indivisible part of "the one Arab community" (or society—*al-mujtama' al-arabi al-wahid*), one of their leaders stated, they recognized Lebanon's special circumstances and instead of calling for immediate union, they endeavoured to spread the principles of Arab nationalism in the country until union could be achieved by democratic process.

The *qawmiyyūn al-arab* were not a party but rather a loosely-organized movement. Their followers mainly came from among the intelligentsia and students. They had a secret leadership but from time to time some of the leaders emerged in public; in 1959, those last known were Dr. Georges Habbas, Dr. Wadi Haddad and Ali Menko (or Renko), all of them Palestinians "and either imprisoned or fugitive after the events in Jordan"; a prominent personality in Lebanon was Muhsin Ibrahim. (*Les Partis Libanais en 1959; Edition L'Orient—Al-Jaridah, Beirut*)

In 1961 the *qawmiyyūn al-arab* denounced the Syrian coup d'état, distributed pamphlets in Beirut and Tripoli expressing their readiness to put volunteers at the disposal of the UAR, and organized a large demonstration in Tripoli. (*Hayat, Sept 29, 30, Oct 3, 4*)

PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS

[In addition to the political parties, there was continued activity by regional pressure groups and by loose group-

ings of deputies who confined themselves to the parliamentary sphere. They lacked any defined political platform and their activities were limited mainly to the protection of local interests and the furtherance of personal political interests. Their influence in the Chamber was often decisive, however, because of the relatively large number of votes they could marshal.] In Oct the blocs were reported to have the following membership: Zahle-Biqā—six members; Ba'albek-Hermil-Basherri—seven; Independent Bloc—nine; Southern Bloc—six; Akkar—six; Beirut Front—three; Tripoli—four. (*Jaridah, Oct 15*)

[Following are particulars of some of these blocs which were active during the year:]

[The *Tripoli Bloc* conducted a consistent opposition policy until its head, Rashid Karāmi, became PM in Oct.]

[The *Southern Bloc* (*kūlat al-janūb*) was made up primarily of Shi'i deputies. It was headed by Kāmil al-As'ad, who in April was elected to the Chamber after the death in March of his father, Ahmad al-As'ad, the veteran traditional leader. It was frequently torn by internal dissensions generally arising out of family quarrels. As'ad became Minister for Education and Fine Arts in Karāmi's Cabinet.]

[The *Ba'albek-Hermil-Basherri Bloc*, also known as the Parliamentary Union Bloc (*kūlat al-ittihād an-niyabi*), was formed on July 19 by seven deputies (*Hayat, July 20*), and headed by the Shi'i deputy Fadlallah Dandash. The three districts represented were all backward, and their deputies often voiced their grievances in the Chamber, demanding aid and development.]

[The *Beirut Front* (*al-jabha al-beirutiyah*) was established at the end of Aug, in the wake of clashes between Najjādah demonstrators and the police in Beirut, by Adnān al-Hakim and Uthmān Dana (Sunis) and Muhsin Slim (Shi'i). It represented the Beirut Muslim opposition to the Beirut Muslim leaders then in power, PM Slim and Mashnūq, the Minister of the Interior. (For details see p 393 a.)]

[The *Independent Bloc* (*al-kutlah al-mustaqillah*), formed in 1960 by representatives from four different communities and regions (MER 1960, p 348), was mostly neutral as between government and opposition, some of its members tending one way and some the other. Fu'ad Butrus, the Bloc's secretary, became Minister of Justice in Karāmi's government.]

[The *Front For National Struggle* (*jabhat an-nidal al-watani*) was established by Kamāl Junblāt's PSP and apparently included only one member in addition to the PSP's deputies. (See also above: The Progressive Socialist Party.)]

CURRENT AFFAIRS

THE BUDGET DEBATE

(January)

Government Self-Criticism: Outdated Taxation System. The 1961 Budget Bill was presented on Jan 3 by Maurice Jumayil, the Minister of Development, who said that owing to shortage of time the government had prepared a "routine" budget, which did not meet Lebanon's real economic and political needs. He promised, however, that the 1962 budget would be based on "dynamic factors." Jumayil criticized the taxation system, which, he said, had remained unchanged since Ottoman days. He claimed, however, that the government had paid

special attention to the development of water resources, transportation and the raising of the workers' living standards. Jumayil warned employers that if they would not agree to the government's demand for a wage increase, there was an imminent danger of a general strike (*Hayat, Jan 4*). (See also: Workers and Labour, below.)

Internal Affairs Raised. During the month the Chamber approved all the items in the budget, which came to £1,273.8 million, compared with £1,222 million in 1960. Increased allocations went to the Ministries of Defence, Education, Foreign Affairs, and Public Works. (*Hayat, Jan 31*)

During the debate many deputies severely criticized the government's policy and the state of the country. The main critics were deputies from peripheral areas, especially the southern region, Ba'albek and Batrun, who complained of poverty, ignorance and disease, the absence of industrial and other development projects, and the lack of water and electricity. (See MER 1960, p 361.)

There was much criticism of economic policy, in particular: the slow pace of development; the failure to attract foreign investment; taxation policy which discouraged investment; the neglect of industry, particularly cement, caused by credit shortage and the pressure of monopolistic groups; and unsound government deals with companies.

Several deputies criticized internal security deficiencies, recalling cases where the army had had to be called in to establish order. Other topics raised were the failure to fight illiteracy and the shortage of agricultural schools and hospitals. [For details of the debate see *Hayat*, Jan 4, 11, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28 31.]

Struggle Over "Emergency Powers" Clause. A major issue was Article 7 of the Budget Bill, also referred to as the "Emergency Powers" clause, which empowered the government to spend £L13 million as it saw fit on the appointment and replacement of civil servants, salary modifications and pension schemes. [For text see *Hayat*, Jan 22; *Jaridah*, Jan 29.] Slim said that its purpose was to effect administrative reforms and raise the standard of living in the civil service (*Jaridah*, Jan 5). Among those who opposed the measure were Raymond Eddeh [leader of the National Bloc], Albert Mukhaybar [National Liberals], Adnan al-Hakim [leader of the Najjidadh], Rashid Karimi, and Muhsin Slim. They argued that these powers would be used by the government to dispose of civil servants at will and would enable it "to distribute the spoils" that the article violated the law on civil service grading, and that it had no connection with the budget.

The government spokesmen denied these arguments, and said the article was essential for the implementation of civil service reforms, which all agreed were vital. President Shehab announced his support of the article for this reason.

Slim announced that after consultations with the President the government was ready to submit to a vote of confidence. According to "authoritative Government sources" quoted in the press, the government was ready to dissolve parliament unless Article 7 was passed.

On Jan 30, Article 7 was approved by the Chamber as part of the Budget Bill. Opposition leaders continued their attacks on the government after the voting. (*Jaridah*, Jan 7, 8, 17, 18, 21, 22, 29, 31, Feb 1)

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST DEATH SENTENCE (January)

On Jan 3, a military Court of Cassation upheld the death sentence on a Shi'i called Hasan ash-Shimayyini, a former policeman, on a charge of murder in pursuit of a blood-feud at the beginning of 1960. (*Hayat*, Jan 4)

The next day there were demonstrations and disturbances in the western [Muslim] section of Beirut (Al-Basta), which later spread to other parts of the country. The demonstrators demanded pardon for the murderer and the abolition of the death penalty. In one Beirut quarter, demonstrators started looting and were dispersed by police fire over their heads. Other demonstrators proceeded to the Chamber, where Shi'i deputies tried to calm them

down and promised to support their demands. Bombs were exploded in several parts of Beirut, streets were barricaded, and several policemen and demonstrators were injured. Violence ceased, however, when the army took up positions in the city.

Commercial activities were suspended in a large part of the city and there were strikes in several industrial plants on that and the following day, which spread also to other regions, including Sidon, Tyre, Ba'albek, Nahatiye and Hermil [all of which had large Shi'i communities]. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Jan 5, 6)

Shaykh Muhammad Alaya, the Mufti of Lebanon, approached Bulus Ma'ushi, the Maronite Patriarch, for joint action to obtain a pardon for the condemned man and keep the issue clear of communal affairs. The two decided to approach President Shehab with this end in view. (*Hayat*, Jan 5)

Seventeen deputies petitioned the President to commute the sentence to life imprisonment. (*Hayat*, Jan 6)

While ministers such as Nasim Majdalani and Pierre Jumayil, as well as Raymond Eddeh, the leader of the National Bloc, ascribed the demonstrations to ignorance and backwardness, opposition leaders like Rashid Karimi and Abdallah al-Yafi regarded them as an expression of the public's lack of confidence in the government. (*Jaridah*, Jan 5)

It was reported that tribesmen in the Hermil area had been firing for two days on a gendarmerie camp until the condemned man's family asked them to desist. The shaykhs of the Hermil and Ba'albek tribes wired President Shehab threatening violence unless the verdict was quashed. (*Hayat*, Jan 8)

[The condemned man was not executed during the year.]

Resignation of Security Chief. It was reported that following the disturbances, Slim had demanded the resignation of the Director of Security Forces, Nur ad-Din ar-Rifa'i, whom he regarded as responsible for the situation, but the demand was opposed by several ministers.

On Jan 10 Slim met Rifa'i and Yusuf Shmayyit, Chief of the General Staff. It was reported that Rifa'i promised his cooperation in trying to avoid the recurrence of such incidents. (*Jaridah*, Jan 8, 10, 11)

[By the end of the year Rifa'i had not resigned.]

JUMAYIL-JUNBLAT DISPUTE ON EDUCATION POLICY (January)

[Education policy was a political issue in Lebanon. Independent Christian foreign and Lebanese private institutions provided more educational facilities than state schools. The Muslim sector in general was interested in the speedy development of state education, and Kamal Junblat made this his policy as Minister of Education. Free primary schooling was introduced in 1960 but was not universally applied. (See also the question of the UAR-sponsored university in Beirut, under: The Lawyers' Strike, below.)]

Junblat's Plan for Free Primary State Education. On Jan 5 Junblat told a press conference that the principal aim of his ministry's newly formulated five-year plan for educational advancement was the "universalization" (*ta'mim*) of primary education within a free state education system.

Of 241,800 children of primary school age (6-10 years old), Junblat said, only 134,000, or 55% were enrolled

in state and private primary schools, while 108,800 (45%) did not receive any formal education. There were some 95,000 pupils in primary schools over the age of ten, bringing total attendance to 229,000, of whom only 105,922 attended the 1,920 state schools.

Junblät pointed out that the state of primary education was steadily deteriorating because of the progressive increase in the number of each new age-group. The five-year plan envisaged free primary state education for 144,000 additional children, which would require 4,813 more teachers at the rate of one per 30 pupils. In the meantime, Junblät said, the shortage of teachers was a grave handicap to the development of education. (*Ha-yai, Jan 6*)

Jumayil Opposes Junblät's Policy in Cabinet. On Jan 18 Junblät and Pierre Jumayil, Minister of Finance and formerly of Education, renewed their dispute over education at a Cabinet meeting. (They had clashed over the same issue in Oct 1960: MER 1960, pp 359-360.)

Junblät asked for an allocation of £L150,000 for the appointment of 300 new teachers in state primary schools, as his ministry was planning a considerable extension of the state school system. Jumayil opposed this demand, although he agreed that additional teachers were needed, on the ground that Junblät had not presented a comprehensive plan but intended to force upon the government an "isolationist" (*isfrādi*) policy. He declared that the government alone had the authority to determine education policy. The other ministers supported Jumayil, and a Cabinet committee, composed of Junblät, Jumayil and Abdallah Mashnūg, was appointed to draft a plan for Cabinet approval. (*Jaridah, Jan 19*)

In the meantime, a new conflict broke out when Junblät announced a plan for the dismissal, transfer and appointment of teachers, mainly in the Kura district [predominantly Christian]. He announced that teachers who had used their position for harmful political propaganda would be dismissed. There was an uproar among Kura teachers, the district's parliamentary deputies, and others; as a result, the plan was shelved after intervention from "supreme quarters." (*Jaridah, Jan 20, 21*)

Dispute over Private Versus State Schools. On Jan 19 the question of state versus private schools was discussed in the Chamber. In the Education Committee Junblät was supported by the Muslim members and opposed by the Christian chairman. In the plenary, during the budget debate (see above), Rashid Karāmi supported the expansion of state education. At the same time he said that private schools were desirable and beneficial, and that the Ministry of Education was entitled to supervise their curricula and teaching. (*Jaridah, Jan 20*)

[The points at issue between Junblät and Jumayil, as expressed in the Chamber and the press, are summarized below.]

State Schools Versus Carte Scolaire System for "Universalization" of Primary Education; Junblät Attacks Private Foreign Schools. While Jumayil said he was not opposed to the expansion and improvement of the state school system, Junblät usually maintained that he was not opposed to the continued existence of private schools, and did not intend to nationalize them.

Junblät argued (as detailed below) that private schools were harmful to the general interest and must be subjected to close government supervision. They must not constitute "a state within a state"; in their education policy they should follow the 1943 National Charter

and teach their pupils civic responsibility and Lebanese patriotism.

He said he was determined that education should become universal through the state schools. Otherwise, he was reported to have stated (in the parliamentary education committee on Jan 19), "a new and ideological revolution (*thawrah jadidah wa-mazhabiyah*) among the communities will be forced upon us." Junblät was especially vehement in his attack on private foreign schools. By allocating £L25 for each pupil at foreign schools, he said, the government was helping to perpetuate the poisoning of the spirit of the young generation. (Later on March 1, during the crisis caused by President Abdel Nasser's attack on Pierre Jumayil and his party [see below], Junblät demanded in a speech in Damascus that his government close down all foreign schools; *Jaridah, March 3*)

In Jumayil's view, Junblät's policy amounted to the nationalization of primary education, to which he strenuously objected. Private education must remain free, he maintained; this was a right specifically safeguarded in the Constitution. [Chapter II, Article 10 of the Constitution provided: "There shall be no interference with public instruction as long as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not affect the dignity of the various creeds. The communities shall be entitled to maintain their own schools, provided that they conform to the general requirements relating to public instruction laid down by the State."]

Jumayil recalled that as Minister of Education in the Karāmi Cabinet, he had proposed a system of students cards, in order to "universalize" free primary education. [The *carte scolaire* system (*al-biḍāqah al-madrasīyah*), proposed in 1959, was aimed at extending primary education by granting each child the opportunity to obtain free education in any school, governmental or private, according to choice.] Faced with the opposition of the Muslim community, which believed that the plan was to their disadvantage, he had not persisted, he said, but tried to convince them that this system benefited them as well as the Christians. Junblät had opposed this plan, saying it was intended to perpetuate communal divisions.

Jumayil said he was prepared to support Junblät's policy of increasing the number of state primary schools, provided he left the private schools alone. (For sources see below.)

Question of National Orientation. Junblät emphasized the importance of state schools as a consolidating factor in a country with such deep community divisions as Lebanon. He thought national unity could be achieved only through a uniform and modernized study of history and geography, and said that his ministry was preparing plans with this end in view. The private schools were lacking in national orientation, he said; they perpetuated existing divisions, he maintained, and this was what his ministry intended to rectify.

Jumayil, on the other hand, argued that the question of educational orientation must not be divorced from the "Lebanese problem" or ideological dilemma, namely that of a Lebanese Lebanon versus an Arab Lebanon. As neither of these attitudes should and could be forcibly imposed, the solution must be left to peaceful discussion, and if that failed it must be hoped that an equilibrium could be ultimately attained by evolution. (For sources see below.)

Place of Religion. Jumayil claimed that, under the pretext of secularizing the state, "God was forgotten" in

the state schools. This must not be allowed in view of the results of immoral secular education in certain European countries.

Junblät replied that the state school curriculum did not separate the study of science and culture from that of religion and morality, but they believed in the separation of religion from the state. He said he even proposed that religious instruction in state schools should be obligatory, but not subject to examination. (For sources see below.)

Question of Quality and Expense. Jumayil claimed that the standards of private schools far exceeded those of state schools, while their maintenance cost the government much less—only £L25 a year per head, compared with £L165 at a government school. Jumayil said that the greater part of the Lebanese cultural heritage was to be found within free private education, which had produced the country's foremost citizens of all communities and fostered the love of independence and freedom. Junblät countered that not only was the level of state schools not lower than that of the private schools but it was the latter that were unfit to provide sound learning. Of these schools, 85-90 per cent were incapable of preparing their pupils for the certificate, he declared. He maintained that those who were trying to perpetuate private education and communal divisions had prevented the publication of school examination results, which proved these claims. (*Hayat*, Jan 6; *Orient*, Jan 12; *Jaridah*, Jan 19, 20, 21, 31)

THE BEIRUT LAWYERS' STRIKE

(1961-1962)

[The Beirut Lawyers' strike, which lasted for nine months (until the beginning of 1962), was one of the issues in inter-community tension and posed difficulties for the government.]

Beirut Lawyers Demand Closing of Law Faculty at Arab (UAR) University. On Jan 6 the Council of the Beirut Lawyers' Union [*majlis niqabat al-muhamin*] (which numbered some 650 members) adopted the following resolutions:

(a) Protesting against the government's endorsement of the opening of a law faculty at the new Arab University in Beirut [established in 1960 as a branch of the University of Alexandria] and demanding the implementation of a 1959 act authorizing the teaching of law only at the Lebanese University. [The oldest Lebanese law faculty was that of the (Jesuit) University of Saint Joseph. Law was not taught at the American University.]

(b) Dissociating itself from the Arab Lawyers' Federation [*ittihad al-muhamin al-arab*] (a pro-UAR organization with headquarters in Cairo). The Union cited various formal points to explain its attitude and alleged that the constitution of the Federation had political connotations. The Union decided, however, to take part in the Federation's forthcoming conference in Cairo, for the discussion of purely professional questions. (*Jaridah*, Jan 7, 8)

Later the Union explained that the profession was overcrowded and had to be safeguarded against an unwarranted increase in membership. In 1959, it stated, the government had forbidden the establishment of new law faculties. (*Jaridah*, Jan 8, 9, 12, March 26)

Jumayil Supports and Junblät Opposes Lawyers' Demand. Pierre Jumayil, the Minister of Finance, backed the

lawyers' demands. He said that the establishment of the new faculty was illegal and it should be closed. There was no need for it, he declared, as owing to the French staff the standard of law instruction in Lebanon was high: in fact, Lebanon's cultural and scientific standards were much higher than Egypt's. He added that if Egypt sincerely wanted to help Lebanon's scientific development, she could do so better by opening faculties of chemistry and engineering there. (*Jaridah*, Jan 15)

Kamal Junblät, the Minister of Education, announced on March 28, in answer to a memorandum from the Lawyers' Union, that the faculty would not be closed.

PM Slâm said he hoped the Union would refrain from steps liable to cause unnecessary conflicts. (*Jaridah*, March 29)

It was reported that many Muslim delegations had called on Junblät to express their satisfaction at his stand on this issue. (*Jaridah*, April 1)

The Lawyers Strike. On April 15, at a general meeting of the Beirut Lawyers' Union, a majority demanded the closing of the new faculty on the ground of the excessive number of lawyers. It was also argued that the faculty was supported and financed by the UAR. Pro-UAR lawyers argued, on the other hand, that the Jesuit University was supported by the French government. By a majority vote the meeting ratified the Council's demand of Jan 6 and resolved to strike until the government accepted it. A proposal to demand the closing of the Jesuit University was defeated. A number of pro-UAR lawyers left the meeting in protest, declaring that they would not strike. According to the chairman, there were some 500 lawyers present, but the opposition said there were only 200, of whom 50 left in protest. (*Jaridah*, *Siyasah*, April 16)

Cabinet Divided. In the Cabinet, Pierre Jumayil reiterated his support for the Union, saying that this was "a purely professional issue in which no political or communal aspects should be involved." Other ministers, Majdalani, Mashnûq and Faranjyiah, condemned the strike and opposed the closing of the faculty. (*Jaridah*, April 18, 21)

The Lawyers' Union of Tripoli [predominantly Muslim] condemned the strike.

The editor of *Al-Jaridah*, Rushdi Ma'alûf, who supported the strike, said it had nothing to do with communal affairs and pointed out that there were many Muslims among the strikers. (*Jaridah*, April 16, 17). On the other hand the editor of *Al-Siyasah*, Abdallah al-Yâsi, who opposed it, said that the real causes were political. (*Siyasah*, April 18)

The issue was raised at a Cabinet meeting on April 19, at which President Shehab called for tolerance. In view of the division in the Cabinet, it was decided to leave the matter in the hands of Shehab and PM Slâm. [Junblät and Slâm were absent.] (*Jaridah*, April 20)

PM Slâm, who declared that the faculty would not be closed, had two abortive meetings with Jumayil in an effort to settle the issue. (*Jaridah*, April 21, 23)

Pierre and Maurice Jumayil went so far as to threaten to resign from the Cabinet if no solution was found soon. President Shehab's efforts to persuade the Chairman of the Union, Philippe Sa'adah, to call off the strike also failed. (*Jaridah*, April 25)

Parliamentary Repercussions. [The strike issue was utilized by the opposition in the Chamber to harass the government during most of the year.]

In May the issue was raised in the Chamber during the debate preceding a vote of confidence (see below). Adnan al-Hakim, the leader of the Najjādah, warned that the closure of the faculty would immediately lead to civil strife (*fitnah*) while Edouard Hunayin (National Bloc) supported the strike on the grounds of the 1959 act; both attacked the government's handling of the matter. Junblat declared that the faculty would not be closed, and PM Slām said that the issue was a delicate one. (*Jaridah*, May 5, 6)

Government Approves Faculty; Union Rejects Decision. At a Cabinet meeting on May 10, a committee consisting of Pierre Jumayil, Mashnūq and Majdalāni was set up, at Jumayil's suggestion, to tackle the crisis. [After the Cabinet reshuffle at the end of May Majdalāni was replaced by Muhammad Safi ad-Din.] (*Jaridah*, May 11)

On July 19, after studying the committee's conclusions, the Cabinet adopted a series of decisions on strict government supervision of higher education, providing that, *inter alia*: (1) The establishment of institutions of higher education would be permitted only with the approval of a special authority and in conformity with detailed preliminary conditions; (2) A supreme council for higher education, headed by the President of the State, would be established; (3) All state legal employees would be required to possess law certificates of the Lebanese University; (4) The government recognized the legality of the new faculty and approved its establishment (*Jaridah*, July 20). [Resolution (3) was obviously intended to balance, at least to some extent, resolution (4).]

Jumayil commented that "there had been no possibility of reaching a better solution." Mashnūq agreed. On the other hand, [Christian] opposition leaders, such as Raymond Eddeh, were critical, and Mukhayyar said that the issue would remain open until the faculty was closed.

The Council of the Lawyers' Union immediately rejected the decisions. (*Jaridah*, July 20, 21)

Strike Continues; the Higher Education Act. A general meeting of the Beirut Lawyers' Union resolved on Aug 10, by 110 votes to 29 and 3 abstentions, to continue the strike. [There were 650 members, as already mentioned.]

It was reported that a proposal by a Phalangist lawyer, [in conformity with the views of Jumayil, the Phalangist leader] to call off the strike temporarily to give the government a few months to reach a better solution, was indignantly rejected. (*Jaridah*, Aug 21)

On Oct 18 the government approved the Higher Education Bill, which was designed to solve the crisis. It stipulated that no law school was to be established in the next 12 years, and that the study of law would be restricted to graduates of Lebanese secondary schools. (*Jaridah*, Oct 19, 21)

A month later, after the change in the government, PM Karāni affirmed his support for the bill. (*Jaridah*, Nov 18)

The Lawyers' Union announced, however, that it did not regard the bill as a solution and would not end the strike. (*Jaridah*, Dec 8, 9)

The Chamber approved the bill on Dec 22, by a majority of 50 to 7. (*Jaridah*, Dec 23)

End of Strike After NSP Coup. The strike was officially called off only on Jan 18, 1962, after the abortive NSP coup d'état, without the lawyers having attained their aims. The Union announced that it had decided to terminate the strike in order to contribute to the relaxation

of tension after the attempted coup. (*Jaridah*, Jan 19, 1962)

During the trial of the insurgents in June 1962, some of the accused mentioned the lawyers' strike as one of the causes of their action. (*Jaridah*, June 17, 1962)

ABDEL NASSER ATTACKS LEBANESE PARTIES

(February-March)

Abdel Nasser Attacks NSP and Phalanges. In a series of speeches in the Syrian Region on Feb 20, 23 and 24, President Abdel Nasser attacked the Lebanese Nationalist Social party and the Phalanges, as opponents of the UAR and enemies of Arab nationalism. [In a similar attack in 1960 the UAR President had denounced only the NSP (MER 1960, p 346).] Abdel Nasser started by denouncing certain Beirut Arab papers for distorted reporting on Syrian affairs, with the aim of destroying the union, in the service of American, British and French imperialism. In his first speech, on Feb 20, he said that these were probably NSP papers (*Ahram*, Feb 21). (A number of Lebanese papers published extensive reports on the mounting internal difficulties in the Syrian Region, q.v.)

On Feb 23 and 24, however, he attacked both parties. He said the NSP were simply a gang that carried out killings [of Arab nationalists] for imperialism, and accused them of collaborating for this purpose with Nūri Sa'īd, late PM of Iraq, and accepting funds from the US. The Phalanges, Abdel Nasser said, cherished "black bitter hatred" against Arab nationalism and the UAR; "they have interfered in our affairs and opposed our unity since its first day," he said. In 1956 he claimed, their paper, *Al-Amal*, had desired the destruction of Egypt and called for the death of Arab nationalism and victory for "the beloved motherland, France." "We are friends to friends and foes to foes; we shall not in the future overlook matters," he said. "Die in your rage!" he exclaimed, addressing "these fronts." The UAR would always remain the bastion of Arab nationalism. The Phalanges, Abdel Nasser added, participated in the Lebanese Cabinet, and "we cannot forget this." (*R. Damascus*, Feb 23 [25]; *Ahram*, Feb 24)

Lebanese Comment. This attack on the Phalanges came as a surprise to Lebanese political observers, since the party had adopted a moderate attitude towards the UAR, for which it had been criticized by extreme anti-UAR opinion.

Lebanese [anti-UAR] papers suggested that the aim of the attack was to cover up internal difficulties in the Syrian sector, that Abdel Nasser had taken offence at the Phalanges' indifference towards the celebration of the UAR's third anniversary in Lebanon, and that it was intended to "bring Abdel Nasser back into the headlines," since Arab attention now centred on the efforts of President Bourguiba of Tunisia to mediate between the Algerian Provisional Government and France. (*Nahar*, Feb 24, 26; *Jaridah*, March 3, 4)

Lebanese Parties Clash. The speech had an unsettling effect in Lebanon and led to a flare-up of inter-party friction.

The NSP and the Phalanges immediately launched counter-charges. Pierre Jumayil, the leader of the latter, stated that his party had striven for good relations with the UAR, but she was interested in satellites, not in allies. He attacked Abdel Nasser for subversion in the Arab states and aiming to dominate them; Lebanon would never consent to become a satellite of the UAR, he declared.

The reaction of the NSP was much more vehement. Its leader, Abdallah Sa'adah, violently attacked the UAR regime as a dictatorship. He emphasized that the UAR President's attack was an open intervention in Lebanese internal affairs and an encouragement to sedition. He demanded that the government protest officially to the UAR and that the matter be taken up by the Arab League.

The National Bloc demanded immediate government action to put a stop to the UAR propaganda broadcasts. It stigmatized Abdel Nasser's attacks on the Phalanges members of the Cabinet as overt pressure on the government and intervention in Lebanon's parliamentary processes. The party's deputies in the Chamber asked the government what steps it contemplated taking. (*Orient, Hayat, Jaridah, Feb 25*)

The UAR's supporters, on the other hand, followed up Abdel Nasser's attack and demanded the cessation of anti-UAR propaganda.

Kamal Junblat demanded on Feb 26 restrictions on the activities of the NSP, the Phalanges, and Camille Sham'un's National Liberals (who had not been attacked), on the ground that they were working for foreign interests. Junblat denied that the speech had injured relations between the two countries and said that Abdel Nasser was referring only to the elements actually mentioned in his speech.

Three other ministers, Abdallah Maashuq, Nassim Majdalaani and Uthman ad-Dana, supported Junblat. (*R. Cairo, Feb 26 [28]; Jaridah, Feb 26, 27; Siyash, Feb 27*)

UAR supporters also included the Najjadah and Popular Resistance parties, who issued statements condemning the parties in question, particularly the Phalanges. (*Hayat, Jaridah, Feb 25, 26; Siyash, Feb 26*)

Riots broke out at the American University in Beirut between supporters and antagonists of the UAR. (*Hayat, Jaridah, Feb 24, 25*)

In Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon unsigned pamphlets were distributed, violently attacking the UAR and Abdel Nasser. The security authorities immediately stopped distribution of these pamphlets and some of the distributors were arrested. (*Jaridah, Feb 25*)

UAR Attacks Continue. On Feb 24 Abdel Nasser reiterated his attack on the two parties, especially the Phalanges, in a speech in Damascus in answer to Pierre Jumayil. (*Ahram, Feb 25*)

During the next few days the UAR radio stations continuously attacked the two Lebanese parties. The leader of the Phalanges was accused of collaborating with Israel and the party was attacked for its attitude to the Arab boycott against Israel. [In 1960 its newspaper, *Al-Amal*, had attacked the UAR's conduct of the Arab boycott, which, it thought, was injuring Lebanese economic interests. (See MER 1960, p 188).]

The NSP was accused of having aided the Israel Defence Forces in taking Galilee in 1948, in exchange for an Israeli undertaking to help it seize power in Lebanon. (*R. Cairo, V of A, R. Damascus, Feb 24-March 3 [Feb 25-March 4]. Akhbar Sa'ah, Cairo, March 1*)

In reaction, Jumayil threatened to resign from the Cabinet if the government did not take immediate action to put an end to this propaganda, which, he claimed, injured the country's prestige. On March 1 he met President Shalhah and PM Slâm, who prevailed upon him neither to resign nor to react to the UAR's attacks. (*Jaridah, March 1, 3; Amal, March 2, 4*)

Slâm Praises Abdel Nasser and Criticizes Anti-UAR Press. At first it was reported that PM Slâm was trying to

smooth matters over by avoiding a definite stand. Cairo Radio therefore accused him of conciliating the Phalanges, while Phalanges circles criticized him for surrendering to UAR policy. (*R. Cairo, Feb 26 [28]; Jaridah, Amal, Nahar, Feb 26, 28*)

However, in a press conference on Feb 28 Slâm adopted an attitude that Ahmad Sa'id, chief commentator of the Voice of the Arabs, Cairo, immediately termed "encouraging, extremely encouraging." (*V of A, Feb 28 [March 2]*)

Slâm opened by stating that "Lebanon was established on love, and love will continue to be her way of life in her relationship with her Arab sisters, particularly with the UAR, her elder sister and closest neighbour." He declared that President Abdel Nasser "held only love for Lebanon" and was anxious to "preserve national unity." The UAR was a "protecting shield for a free and independent Arab Lebanon." Lebanon must also be "anxious to preserve the national unity of our great sister, the UAR." The present crisis had come about, he said, when the Lebanese press had abused its freedom and made some "dangerous slips," and some journalists had injured fraternal unity. He had been lenient until the [anti-UAR] conspiracies of Shishakli and Muhammad al-Fadi were discovered (see MER, 1960, pp 504-6); "then we struck with an iron fist," he declared. Slâm added that he preferred the conflicting trends and currents to be represented in the government at his expense, rather than abroad at Lebanon's expense. (*R. Beirut, Feb 28 [March 2]; Hayat, March 1*)

Slâm's attack on the press was received with indignation by anti-UAR and independent papers. *An-Nahar* (Christian, anti-UAR) published a cartoon representing Slâm as the servant of the UAR; the paper was closed down for 20 days and its editor fined. (*Jaridah, March 4, 6; Nahar, March 5*)

It was reported that the government was trying through diplomatic channels to put an end to the UAR radio attacks, and that Abd al-Hamid Ghâlib, the UAR Ambassador in Lebanon, undertook that they would stop (*Jaridah, March 2*), but they continued up to March 4. (BBCM)

Junblat Criticizes Lebanese Regime and NSP. On March 1, while in Damascus, Kamal Junblat congratulated Abdel Nasser on the anniversary of the UAR and issued a list of demands on his government. These included the immediate prohibition of the NSP, which he described as an espionage agency, the closing down of the British Middle East Centre for Arab Studies (see p 409 a) and of all foreign schools, and the reorganization of political life to prevent the formation of political parties on a community basis.

Junblat's speech caused a renewed outbreak of political feeling in Lebanon. The NSP violently attacked him and his party, while Jumayil described him as a man in need of medical care. (*Hayat, Jaridah, Amal, March 2, 4*)

Controversy Over Parliamentary Delegation to Damascus. At the same time a controversy arose over a Lebanese parliamentary delegation to congratulate Abdel Nasser on the UAR anniversary. A number of deputies nominated, including Fu'ad Butrus, head of the independent group, refused on the ground that the UAR President's attack on the parties was actually an attack on Lebanon as a whole. Finally, a delegation headed by Sabri Hamâdah, President of the Chamber, went to Damascus. Abdel Nasser told them (on Feb 28) that he advocated the union

of all the Arabs, provided that this should be accomplished by mutual desire and general agreement. (*Hayat, Feb 28, March 1*)

Slām Meets Abdel Nasser. PM Slām met President Abdel Nasser in Damascus on March 4. Before leaving Beirut he said his purpose was to clear up any difficulties in the relations between the two countries; President Shehab and Pierre Jumayl wished him success in his mission.

On his return, Slām stated that his meeting with Abdel Nasser had convinced him that the latter was sincerely friendly to Lebanon and her President, and that there was absolutely no danger that the UAR would intervene in Lebanese internal affairs. (*Hayat, Jaridah, March 5, 6; ANA, March 5 [7]*)

DISTURBANCES AND VIOLENCE

(March)

Anti-UAR Demonstration. On March 5 a convoy of trucks was attacked near Kahale village (about 10 kms. east of Beirut), while carrying Lebanese to Damascus to celebrate the UAR anniversary.

Inhabitants of the village opened fire on a truck bearing a picture of Abdel Nasser, injuring ten people, while trucks bearing pictures of President Shehab passed unmolested. Thirty people were arrested. (*R. Beirut, ANA March 5 [7]; Hayat, March 6, 7; Jaridah, March 7*)

(Similar incidents occurred in Lebanon in Feb 1960 on the occasion of the UAR's second anniversary; see MER 1960 pp 155-6. Another such incident occurred in the same village in Aug; see below.)

At the Cabinet meeting of March 7, Kamāl Junhlāt condemned those involved, who, he claimed, had been incited by "an important political personage," and accused the security forces of collusion with the villagers. Jumayl retorted that, although the incident should of course be condemned, recent provocations by the UAR had to be taken into account. The Cabinet resolved to refer the matter to the Judicial Council for early consideration and, "in principle," to compensate those injured, "materially and morally." (*Hayat, March 8*)

[The pro-UAR press reacted sharply to the incident.] *Sa'at al-Urubbah*, the Najjādah organ, which wrote of "the dogs of Kahale," was closed for ten days and its owner fined for "damaging national unity." (*Jaridah, March 13; Times, March 15*)

The detainees were gradually released, until on May 16 the last six were let out on bail. (By the end of the year none had as yet stood trial.) (*Hayat, Jaridah, May 17*)

Attempt on Life of PM Slām. On March 7 an attempt was made on the life of PM Sā'ih Slām, when 12 kg of explosives were placed at a petrol station, 25-30m. from his Beirut home. The charge was discovered by a passer-by who, it was reported, removed the fuse "15 seconds before explosion." Severe security measures were adopted throughout Beirut and there were many arrests. The authorities decided to cancel all civilian permits for possession of firearms. [It would seem that this decision was not implemented, because later on the problem recurred in connection with similar incidents.] (*R. Beirut, March 7 [9]; Hayat, Jaridah, March 8, 9*)

All parties immediately condemned the attempt and congratulated the PM on his escape. The press placed special emphasis on the condemnation issued by Abdallah Sa'adah, leader of the NSP, who said that the outrage

was intended to stir up communal friction. (*Hayat, March 8, 10*)

British and NSP Blamed: Muslim Sources Charge of Fake. UAR sources and pro-UAR Lebanese newspapers claimed that British circles, in collaboration with the NSP, were responsible for the attempted assassination. (*R. Damascus, March 10-11B, March 10; Kifāh, March 10; Mutaawwar, Cairo, March 17*)

In view of the many rumours, the press was forbidden to publish any unauthorized news about the investigation. (*Hayat, March 17*)

A week later Slām announced that the investigations had shown that no foreign element had been involved (*Jaridah, March 25*). Foreign pressure or intervention in the investigation was also officially denied.

Lebanese Muslim opposition sources claimed that the explosives had not been armed and alleged that the incident had been purposely staged to increase Slām's popularity and strengthen the position of his Cabinet in the light of recent difficulties. (*Hawadith, March 17; Siyārah, Anwar, April 1*)

Assassins not Connected with any Political Group. A group led by 78-year old Darwish Baydūn, a former supporter of Sāmi as-Sulh (PM under then President Shām'ūn) and the old order, was charged with the attempt. The group consisted of members of his family and some "ruffians," including a former army sergeant who had deserted during the 1958 rising and joined the revolutionaries. [All those arrested were Muslims.] (*Jaridah, March 11, 17, 24*)

On March 30 eight of the group were charged with complicity in the attempted assassination. It was stated that Baydūn had personal motives, stemming from a financial disagreement. The former sergeant, Mahmūd Ayāsh, was accused of having intended to foment clashes between Christians and Muslims. The prosecution said that the assassination had been planned to appear as if carried out by Christians and the NSP. (*Hayat, Jaridah, March 31*)

The trial began on June 28, after several postponements caused by the lawyers' strike (see above). Ayāsh alone admitted his guilt. Five of the accused, including Ayāsh and Baydūn, received 7-year sentences; three were acquitted (*Hayat, June 29, 30, July 1*). Baydūn died in prison two weeks later. (*Jaridah, July 15*)

CABINET DIFFICULTIES AND A GENERAL DEBATE

(March-May)

During the second half of March the Cabinet was repeatedly shaken by dissension.

On March 16 Sulaymān al-ʿAlī, Minister of National Economic Affairs, tendered his resignation because the Cabinet decided, over his opposition, to import flour from the US instead of grinding the wheat in Lebanon. Slām persuaded al-ʿAlī to remain in the Cabinet, however.

At the same time the PM and Fuād Ghusn, the Minister of Information, disagreed on policy towards press law violations; Slām [who two weeks earlier had sharply criticized the anti-UAR press] advocated harsh measures. Finally, a Cabinet meeting attended by President Shehab adopted a compromise. (*Hayat, March 16*)

Disagreement Between Slām and Junhlāt. At the end of March there was a more serious rift between Slām and Junhlāt, the Minister of Education. It had started,

it was reported, with the trips to Damascus of Junblât and Nassim Majdalâni, the Minister of Justice, and a member of his party. Junblât also made it known that unless intervention in the affairs of the Ministry was stopped, he would not hesitate to resign; especially as he had already carried out most of his plans for the development of state education [as against private schools]. (*Hayat*, March 28)

Opposition Moves to Overthrow the Government. During the second half of March, Raymond Eddeh, leader of the National Bloc, and Albert Mukhayyar of the National Liberals, started a campaign to overthrow the government. Apart from general criticism of Cabinet efficiency, Eddeh also demanded an official statement by PM Sîm in the Chamber on the government's attitude to possible union of Lebanon with another Arab state.

The PM and Cabinet members, including Jumayil and Junblât, said they had no intention to resign and there was no need to change the composition of the Cabinet, which had many achievements to its credit. The opposition had no plans, Jumayil charged, beyond overthrowing the government.

The opposition demanded a general debate at an early date. The government made it known that it was prepared for such a debate and a vote of confidence at any time. (*Jaridah*, March 19, 21, 23; *Hayat*, April 2)

Cabinet Debate on Civil Service Appointments on Communal Basis. It was reported that on April 5, in the presence of President Shehab, the Cabinet debated the question of appointments to the civil service on a communal basis. Shehab opened by saying that in all appointments the ministers must observe the communal equilibrium on a "6 to 6 basis." [The seats in the Chamber of Deputies, however, were apportioned on the basis of 6 Christians to 5 Muslims and Druzes.] It was understood that the President referred to certain appointments in the Ministry of Public Works [headed by Uthmân Dana, a Sunni Muslim].

PM Sîm said that he supported the equilibrium, but the Muslims were discriminated against. Majid Arslân and Kamâl Junblât [the rival Druze leaders] said that this was especially true in regard to the Druzes.

Jumayil also supported the principle of equilibrium, but declared that administrative efficiency should also be respected. In reply to a remark by Sîm on Christian predominance in the administration, Jumayil said that not only rights but duties should be taken into account; the Christians were the source of 83% of the country's revenue. PM Sîm took exception to this statement. (For source see below.)

"Too Much Talk on National Unity Impedes Cabinet's Work." Jumayil went on to declare: "We defend and reinforce the entity (*kiyân*) of Lebanon." PM Sîm interrupted: "We defend the entity [of Lebanon] with our blood," adding that the talk on the "entity" at every Cabinet session was unnecessary. When Jumayil retorted: "We sacrifice ourselves for the sake of the entity," Sulaymân Faranjijah [Maronite] interrupted him and asked: "Who said you are the defender of the entity and is the entity really in need of your defence?" Faranjijah also demanded an end to talk of the "entity" and said it was in no danger. Jumayil, in reply, claimed to represent the opinion of the largest community [the Maronites]. (*Jaridah*, April 7)

Sîm Accused of Unlawfully Exploiting His Status. On April 5 Muhsin Sîm [Muslim deputy from Beirut, opposed

to PM Sîm] wrote to the President of the Chamber accusing PM Sîm of exploiting his status for financial gain. He charged that the government had paid an exorbitant price for lands belonging to the Sîm family appropriated for the development of Beirut airport, though there was no need to acquire these lands in particular. (*Siyasah*, April 6)

On April 11 Sîm claimed in the Chamber that the transaction had been necessary for the airport. Besides, the lands belonged not to him but to his family, which numbered 84. He added that far from making profits in his post, he had entered it wealthy and was now a poor man who depended on his wife to pay his debts.

The issue was shelved after a short discussion. (*Jaridah*, April 12)

General Debate on Internal Affairs: Vote of Confidence.

The general debate in the Chamber, for which the opposition had asked a month earlier, opened on April 27 and ended on May 5 with a vote of confidence in the government by 56 to 26. It was concerned mainly with internal affairs. [The issues raised were essentially the same as those in the last quarter of 1960—see MER 1960, p 361—and in the budget debate in Jan—see above.] Many representatives severely criticized "anarchy" and "stagnation" in the administration. They claimed that the government's poor handling of relations with state concessionaries, such as the Beirut Harbour Company, and La Régie des Tabacs, had caused losses to the state economy. Adil Usayrân, former President of the Chamber of Deputies (Shi'i), criticized the work of the French experts in the administration (IRFED, see p 408 b) and asked why no American, Russian or British experts had been invited; Raymond Eddeh took up their defence. There was also criticism of faulty execution of development projects, particularly the Litani scheme.

A central topic was the lawyers' strike (see above). The shaky internal security position came also in for special criticism and it was claimed that no progress had been made in collecting the arms in private hands (since the 1958 rising).

The hardships of the population in the undeveloped district of Ba'albeck and Hermil, "where humans drink water fit only for animal consumption and famine is rife," were also raised again. Other topics were: complaints about high prices, especially of basic articles such as sugar, rice and cement; the import of apples, which Lebanon produces [and exports]; and the alleged exploitation of the radio for government purposes.

Rashid Karâmi directed attention to rifts in the Cabinet, which interfered with its work, and urged a vote of non-confidence.

Only one deputy, Raymond Eddeh, raised a question about foreign affairs, when he asked about the deterioration of relations with the UAR.

The debate was stormy. PM Sîm retorted to vehement attacks by Muhsin Sîm [a Muslim deputy from Beirut, who later in the year became co-founder of an anti-Sîm Beirut Muslim group]: "Shut up; you asked me for £125,000 and I did not give it to you. You have soiled your position as deputy." Sîm retorted: "Lies, lies, you are the thieves."

Sîm, in a major speech, accused the opposition of deliberately resorting to distortion and defamation. He said that to deride the government was to deride the Chamber and parliamentary rule in general. "And if there is one person who has sacrificed his blood for this rule—it is I," he declared. Sîm claimed that internal security had recently been strengthened, and promised

that workers' conditions would be improved as a result of projected laws on social insurance and wage increases (see p. 406). He also claimed that his government had fostered education, instituted public works, and set up the Permanent National Exhibition in Tripoli. On relations with the UAR he said: "I offer thanks to God that I was in power and could avoid a holocaust." Siām concluded: "I promise to myself, to God and to my people, that I will shed my last drop of blood for the cause of national unity."

In the reports on the voting in the papers of May 6 (see below) the names of deputies appear without party affiliations. According to known affiliations the following appears to have been the result: The government was supported by the Phalanges, the PSP, the Southern Group and the Constitutional Union. The National Bloc, the National Liberals, the Tripoli Group and the Najjādhāh voted non-confidence. The Independent Group was divided. (*Hayat*, April 28, May 3, 6; *Amal*, *Siyasah*, May 6)

CABINET RESHUFFLE AND NEW DIFFICULTIES

(May-July)

The defeat of the non-confidence motion was closely followed by the resignation of six ministers and, on May 15, of PM Siām himself. On May 17 Siām accepted an invitation to form a new government.

Resignations from Cabinet. Majid Arslān, Minister of Defence, announced his resignation on May 9. He said that he wanted to serve the people and had been unable to do so as a Cabinet minister; furthermore, his resignation would enable Siām to make certain changes in his government. (*Hayat*, May 10; *Jaridah*, *Mid. Mir.*, May 11)

On May 10 five additional ministers tendered their resignations: Nassim Majdalāni, Deputy PM and Minister of Justice; Muhammad Safi ad-Din, Agriculture; Abdallah Mashnūq, Municipal Affairs; Rafiq Shahin, Planning; and Sulaymān al-Alī, Economy. (*Hayat*, May 11)

Shahin and Mashnūq said that their resignations were provoked by internal dissension, which had to be stopped at any cost. The resignations were received with no particular surprise. Raymond Eddeh described them as a political manoeuvre aimed at confusing the people and strengthening the position of the government. (*Hayat*, May 12)

Siām Resigns, Forms New Government. On May 15 Siām tendered the resignation of his government to the President, who asked him to continue in office until the formation of a new Cabinet.

On May 17 the President, following consultation with the parties and blocs, asked Siām to form a new government, which he did within three days. There were eight ministers:

Sa'ib Siām (PM, Defence); Philippe Bölus (Vice-PM, Justice, Economy and Tourism); Philippe Taqla (Foreign Affairs, remaining also Ambassador to Brazil); Kamāl Junblāt (Public Works and Communications); Muhammad Safi ad-Din (Education, Social Affairs and Labour); Pierre Jumayil (Finance, Health); Sulaymān Faranjīyah (Posts, Agriculture); Abdallah Mashnūq (Interior, Information). (*Hayat*, May 17, 18, 21; *Mid. Mir.*, May 20, 27; *Jaridah*, May 21; see also table pp. 373-4)

Same Differences Inside Smaller Cabinet; Policy Unchanged. [The outstanding feature of the new Cabinet was the reduction in its size from 18 members to eight.

However, the same three parties were represented: the PSP (Junblāt), the Phalanges (Jumayil) and the Constitutional Union (Taqla). The only new member was Philippe Bölus. Four ministers retained the same portfolios: Mashnūq, Faranjīyah, Taqla and Jumayil. Beirut was represented by three ministers, Siām, Jumayil and Mashnūq, the north by two, Bölus and Faranjīyah, the south by Safi ad-Din, and Ash-Shuf by Junblāt; the Biqā' and certain mountain regions were unrepresented.]

Commenting on the chances for stability, observers pointed out that the new Cabinet was only a condensed version of its predecessor and, in particular, that the two major antagonists, the PSP and the Phalanges, were still represented. The drastic reduction in size would appreciably weaken the Cabinet's position in the Chamber. (*Jaridah*, *Hayat*, May 21)

On May 20 Siām stated: "It will be the duty of the new government to continue the policies of its predecessors, with no change whatsoever." (*Jaridah*, May 21; *Mid. Mir.*, May 27)

At their first meeting, on May 22, the ministers solemnly undertook to strive through mutual understanding to serve the best interests of the state and, it was reported, the President and the PM appealed to Junblāt and Jumayil to surmount their differences. (*Jaridah*, May 23)

The weakness of the new government was apparent on its first appearance in parliament, on May 30, when it won a vote of confidence by only two votes; 46 to 44, with one abstention. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, May 31)

Reported Murder in Damascus of Lebanese Communist Leader Becomes National Issue. In mid-May the Lebanese Communists renewed their campaign for the release by the UAR authorities of Farajallah al-Hilu, the SG of the Lebanese Communist party (*Nida'*, May 18, 21, 28). For two years Communist sources had been claiming that Hilu had been imprisoned and tortured in Damascus, which the UAR authorities denied. (*World Marxist Review*, July; *MER* 1960, pp. 81, 348) (On non-Lebanese aspects of this issue, see p. 654 b.)

On May 29, Hasan Qraytim and Nicolas Shāwī, the two Lebanese Communist leaders, declared that Hilu had been murdered by the UAR authorities (no date was given). Their statement included an extremely sharp attack on the "Nasserist dictatorship" and an appeal in the "Lebanese people and all the Arab peoples" to demand an inquiry into the circumstances of Hilu's death and the delivery of the body to the family. (*Nida'*, May 30)

Cairo Radio again denied that Hilu had been abducted in Damascus. (*R. Cairo*, May 31 [June 2])

Demonstrations took place in front of the UAR embassy in Beirut. The demonstrators were described as Communists. The police confiscated leaflets attacking the UAR and made a number of arrests. (*Nida'*, May 31; *Jaridah*, *Amal*, June 1)

Beirut Radio broadcast a warning against illegal demonstrations and the publication of statements by prohibited parties. The Communist paper *An-Nida'* was closed for 10 days for attacking the UAR. (*ANA*, June 3 [6, 7]; *Hayat*, June 6, 14)

It was reported that the Hilu family had received many cables of condolence, from Patriarch Ma'āshi, Maurice Jumayil of the Phalanges, Raymond Eddeh, the leader of the National Bloc, and all its deputies, Albert Mukhayyar of the National Liberals, Fu'ād Butrus, deputies of the Constitutional Union, and many others. Nassim Majdalāni [of Junblāt's pro-UAR PSP, who had been left out

of the new Cabinet a month before and later broke with his party) came to express his condolences in person. *An-Nida'* claimed that 100 delegations, comprising 3,000 persons, had visited the family. (*Nida'*, June 2, 17)

One argument often voiced by opposition deputies and the anti-UAR papers was that the Hilu affair was primarily a Lebanese national issue, as it was the state's duty to ensure the safety of its citizens; it was also a question of Lebanon's honour. (*Nahar*, June 1; *Nida'*, June 2, 17)

The Chamber dealt with the question both in the Foreign Affairs Committee (on June 6) and in the plenary session (on June 15). In the committee Taqla stated that the government had twice inquired about Hilu of the UAR authorities, who had denied any knowledge of him (*Jaridah*, June 7). In the plenary the question was raised by Ya'qub as-Sarrāf [Greek-Orthodox, same as Hilu] and Sulaymān al-Alī [Independent, who had been left out of the new Cabinet], who accused the government of ignoring a national issue and described Taqla's statement as "criminal." In reply, PM Sīlām reiterated Taqla's statement and said that the government would drop the question; it would "not permit relations between the Lebanon and the UAR to be tainted because of an affair which I consider to be wholly imaginary." (*Hayat*, June 16)

In Oct, after the breakup of the UAR, Lebanese Communist circles requested the Syrian government to determine the cause of Hilu's death and punish those responsible. Damascus did not reply [and the matter did not reappear in the press up to the end of the year]. (*Hayat*, Nov 8)

Armed Clash between Phalanges and NSP. In July the strained relations between these two parties, which had caused several violent clashes between them during the year (see section on parties), reached a new height with an armed clash in Qartaba village, Mt. Lebanon. Both sides employed firearms and suffered casualties. Several persons were arrested.

The NSP alleged that the clash resulted from an attempt on the life of Abdallah Sa'adah, the party's leader, who was visiting the village. (*Hayat*, July 18). The Phalanges claimed that it started with NSP members shouting "anti-Lebanese" slogans, such as "Long live Syria," and that the NSP members opened fire when people "reacted with Lebanese slogans." (*Amal*, July 18)

Second Anti-UAR Incident in Kahale. On Aug 21 a convoy of vehicles on its way from Beirut to Damascus was attacked in Kahale village (see above, p 389). The travellers had intended to "congratulate Abd al-Hakim Amer, the UAR Vice-President, on the occasion of his stay in Damascus." The security forces acted quickly and there were no casualties. (*Hayat*, Aug 22)

Compensation to Sīmi as-Sulh Causes Temporary Resignation of the PM. In July the question of compensation to Sīmi as-Sulh, PM during the 1958 insurrection, for damage sustained to his home at the time, was brought up in the Chamber. Rashid Karāmi asked PM Sīlām [both were leaders of the insurrection] about the accuracy of reports that £1300,000 (\$=£12.19 official rate) had been paid to As-Sulh. Sīlām denied the allegation. (*Hayat*, July 18)

Two months later, when the Cabinet was dealing with the question in the presence of the President, Sīlām announced his resignation in protest against the payment of

£1,500,000 compensation to As-Sulh. [The sources do not specify the date of this payment.]

Jumayl [who in 1958 fought the insurgents at the head of the Phalanges] explained that the compensation had been paid on the decision of the government of 1958, which had been held up repeatedly by legal institutions. Sīlām answered that this decision was not legally binding, since As-Sulh himself was the head of the government at the time. Jumayl pointed out that the decision had never been annulled and declared that he would resign if the payment order already issued was cancelled. The President persuaded Sīlām, as well as Abdallah Mashnūq, who wanted to join him, not to resign.

L'Orient thought that Sīlām's resignation was a manoeuvre to spike the guns of his fellow-insurgents—now his political opponents, in particular Abdallah al-Yāfi [of Beirut], editor of *As-Siyāḥ*, who had often attacked him on this issue. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, *Amal*, *Orient*, Sept 14)

POLARIZATION INSIDE THE MUSLIM SECTOR (August–September)

The Najjādah Incident in Beirut. On Aug 23 during the celebrations of Muhammad's birthday (*al-mawlid an-nabawi*), there was an armed clash in Beirut between police and some 400 demonstrators headed by the Najjādah leader, Deputy Adnān al-Hakim. (*Hayat*, *Siyasah*, Aug 24)

It was officially stated that after prayers at the Great Mosque an unlawful demonstration, headed by Hakim, disobeyed repeated police orders to disperse. A demonstrator opened fire on the police, and in the exchange of fire that followed one demonstrator was killed and another injured. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, *Beirut al-Masa'*, Aug 24)

According to *As-Siyāḥ* [pro-UAR and Najjādah, owned by Abdallah al-Yāfi, Beirut Muslim leader, PM Sīlām's political opponent], however, the disturbances started during prayers, when supporters of Sīlām, who was present, incessantly provoked Najjādah supporters and religious functionaries. After the ceremony Hakim was carried home in triumph by his supporters, whereupon, by orders of Sīlām and Abdallah Mashnūq, the Minister of Interior, the police attempted to forcibly disperse this peaceful demonstration by opening fire, killing one demonstrator and injuring ten. The paper alleged that the police deliberately aimed at Hakim, whose car was hit by bullets. (*Siyasah*, Aug 24)

After the clash, tension mounted in Beirut, especially in the western part, where barricades were erected; in the Basta quarter [a Najjādah bastion] several buses were set on fire. The demonstrators called for a general strike and the closing of shops, and clashed with the police, who tried to clear the barricades. Army units took up positions to prevent further disturbances. (*Hayat*, *Siyasah*, Aug 24)

As-Siyāḥ claimed that the police, who were aided by armed groups of "Sīlām's partisans," failed to clear the barricades and prevent the strike. (*Siyasah*, Aug 24, 25)

Beirut al-Masa' [the Minister of Interior's paper] reported, however, that the strike had failed and that the majority of the population supported the government. Nine people were arrested. A government announcement denied rumours that the number of injured exceeded the official reports. (*Beirut al-Masa'*, Aug 24, 25, 26)

After a meeting with the President, PM Sīlām said that Shehab approved of the government's handling of the affair. At an urgent Cabinet meeting, Sīlām and Mashnūq stated that those responsible for the disturbances and anyone attempting to undermine national

unity would be severely punished. (*Hayat, Beirut al-Masa', Aug 25*)

Campaign for Popular Support in the Muslim Sector. [The Najjādah incident marked the beginning of the consolidation of the conflicting Muslim camps: (a) that of Sīām and Mashnūq, and (b) various groups, mainly Beirut Muslims, united by opposition to Sīām. The two camps competed for popular support in Beirut.]

Soon after the incidents, Muhsin Sīām and Uthmān ad-Dana, two Beirut opposition Muslims, denounced the government for the "criminal conduct" of the police in attacking a peaceful demonstration on the occasion of a religious event. Similar statements were also made by Rashid Karāmi, the Popular Resistance Organization, the Supreme Islamic Council, and, reportedly, Kamāl Junblāt. (*Hayat, Siyash, Aug 25, 26; Siyash, Aug 24, 27*)

As-Siyāsh claimed that Sīām had sent armed groups of his supporters to Tripoli to prevent clashes among Muslims there. (*Siyash, Aug 25*)

There was great tension on Aug 25 at the funeral of the demonstrator who had been killed. *As-Siyāsh* reported that thousands shouted anti-Sīām slogans. (*Hayat, Siyash, Aug 26, 27*)

On Aug 25 Sīām said at a press conference that the demonstration and the events following it had been designed to create inter-communal hostility. He called for the preservation of Lebanese unity and asked the Muslims not to be led astray by "satans and evil spirits." He said that he was a devout Muslim, but believed that his religion enjoined him to befriend the Christians. Mashnūq said that the government had started an investigation of the Kahale incident (p 392 a). Both expressed regret that a former judge [Dana] and a lawyer [Sīām] had issued a statement (see above) containing misrepresentation and biased opinions. (*Beirut al-Masa', Aug 26*)

As-Siyāsh claimed that in his efforts to create a counter-front among Beirut Muslims, Sīām had asked for the support of Rafiq Naja, head of the National Committee, an insubstantial Beirut party, lacking any support in the community, but that Naja had refused, for fear of losing prestige in western Beirut. Sīām was also reported to have made an unsuccessful bid for the support of the Beirut League of Families and Quarters (*rābiāt al-a'ilāt wa-al-ahyā*). (*Siyash, Aug 28*)

By invitation of Sulaymān Faranjīyah, Sīām toured the north and, according to *Beirut al-Masa'*, received support in the villages he passed through. In his speeches he emphasized his closeness to the people and their support for him.

It was also reported that three ministers, Jumayl, Faranjīyah and Safi ad-Din, as well as Sabri Hamādah, the President of the Chamber, held a reception for Sīām to express their support. (*Beirut al-Masa', Aug 28*)

In reply to Sīām, Adnān al-Hakīm retorted that the incidents had nothing to do with communal strife but were mainly an effort by Sīām to liquidate the Najjādah. He accused him of impiety for violating a religious occasion; the people despised him, Hakīm declared, and his memory would "be held in abomination in the history of Lebanon." (*Siyash, Aug 29*)

Anti-Sīām "Beirut Front" Established. At the end of Aug a "Beirut Front," aimed against Sīām and Mashnūq, was established by five Beirut Muslims: Adnān al-Hakīm, Uthmān ad-Dana and Muhsin Sīām, (all deputies) Abdallah al-Yafi (a former PM), and Rashid as-Sulh. They said they would include in the group members from

other communities and other parts of the country. (*Hayat, Siyash, Aug 30*)

Two Beirut Muslim leaders, Hussein al-Awayni and Ahmad Da'ūq, denied that they had joined the Front. Sīām claimed Rashid Karāmi as a supporter. (*Jaridah, Aug 27*)

Other Muslim leaders, Rafiq Naja of Beirut and Deputy Ma'arūf Sa'ad from Sidon, also dissociated themselves from the Front, and denounced it as likely to arouse inter-communal strife (*Jaridah, Aug 28, Sept 2*). Mashnūq said he regarded the Front as just "empty and meaningless talk." (*Hayat, Beirut al-Masa', Aug 30*)

On Sept 1, representatives of the Front met President Shehab and demanded the resignation of Sīām and Mashnūq for what they termed their recent manifestations of tyranny and persecution, which had lost them the faith of the public. The President said that he never intervened in disputes between government and opposition, and that the representatives should keep to the rules of the game and accept the decisions of the parliamentary majority (*Hayat, Jaridah, Sept 2*). After the meeting, members announced that the Front constituted a nucleus for a wider parliamentary association, which would develop into a national front to achieve national unity and oppose the rule of tyranny and injustice exercised by Sīām and Mashnūq (*Siyash, Jaridah, Sept 2*). [Up to the end of the year, however, the Front had not succeeded in enlarging its membership.]

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BREAK-UP OF THE UAR

(September-October)

Demonstrations and Violence. Immediately on the outbreak of the revolution in Syria on the morning of Sept 28, the atmosphere throughout Lebanon became highly charged. Tumultuous demonstrations by thousands of people took place in Tripoli, Tyre, Beirut and Ba'albek on the following days, protesting against the Syrian coup and isolationism in the Arab world. [No anti-UAR demonstrations were reported.] (*Hayat, Jaridah, Orient, Anwar, Siyash, Sept 29-30-Oct 3*)

Junblāt Organizes Pro-UAR Front. Kamāl Junblāt was most active in organizing mass meetings, together with others who supported President Abdel Nasser and the unity of the UAR. On Oct 2 he called for the creation of a national front to protect the UAR, support Abdel Nasser and defend national unity, and on Oct 3 such a body, called "The Arab Progressive Front," was established. (*R. Cairo, Oct 1 [3]; Jaridah, Oct 3, 5, 6; Hayat, Oct 4*)

The Front included the PSP, one additional [pro-UAR] deputy Ismā'īl Hajjār, and the Movement of Arab Nationalists (see below). It deplored isolationism in Syria, expressed its support of the UAR under Abdel Nasser's leadership and praised the achievements of socialism in Syria during the union. (*R. Cairo, Oct 4 [6]; Orient, Siyash, Hayat, Oct 6*)

Other Support for Abdel Nasser. Statements in support of the UAR and Abdel Nasser were also published by the Najjādah and the Popular Resistance.

The Movement of Arab Nationalists [*harakat al-qawmiyyūn al-ʿarab*, an organization of Abdel Nasser's supporters, mainly among the students] repeatedly denounced the coup. It distributed pamphlets in Beirut and Tripoli expressing readiness to put volunteers at the disposal of the UAR and on Oct 2 organized a large demonstration in Tripoli. (*Hayat, Sept 29, 30, Oct 3, 4*)

The Mufti of Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Alāya, sent a cable of support to Abdel Nasser. (*Hayat, Oct 3*)

Of the independent deputies, Ma'rūf Sa'ad [Sunni Muslim from Sidon] and Adil Usayrān [Shi'i Muslim from the south] expressed their support for the UAR. (*Hayat, Oct 6*)

Ba'ath in a Quandary. [The various statements of the Ba'ath party reflected differing attitudes.] On Sept 29 a press statement in the name of the regional [Lebanese] headquarters (*al-qiyyādh al-qutriyah*) of the Ba'ath party vehemently denounced the coup.

On the same day, however, a spokesman of the national [inter-Arab] headquarters (*al-qiyyādh al-qawmiyah*) [also located in Lebanon] said the party had not yet announced its attitude but would soon do so. The following day Sāmī Rifā'i, Secretary of the regional [Lebanese] headquarters, issued a new statement saying only: "In the light of present circumstances we request that the Arab public in Lebanon and all the Arab countries augment and deepen its faith in Arab Nationalism." (*Hayat, Sept 29, 30, Oct 1*)

NSP Supports Syria's Independence, Phalanges Cautious. The NSP [was the only party that] openly announced its support of the Syrian revolution, which, it said, expressed the will of the Syrian people, to whom it had restored their freedom. It welcomed the coup as a victory of "true Arabism over false Arabism." (*Hayat, Jaridah, Sept 30*)

[The Phalanges refrained from openly adopting a definite attitude, but their paper, *Al-Amal*, made it clear that it welcomed recent developments in Syria.]

It wrote: "The Syrians alone can determine the fate of their nation." (*Amal, Oct 1*)

United Government Attitude; Jumayil's Moderation. It was reported on Oct 2 that following a meeting between President Shehab and Pierre Jumayil, full agreement had been reached in the Cabinet to delay recognition of Syria (*Jaridah, Oct 1, 3*). An official announcement denied Lebanese press reports that Slām had said he was anxiously following the Syrian revolution. On Oct 2 it was officially denied that there were differences in the Cabinet regarding events in Syria. (*R. Beirut, Oct 1, 2 [3, 4]*)

It was thought that, by not demanding the immediate recognition of Syria, the opposition, especially the National Bloc (whose leader Raymond Eddeh was one of the first to call for a moderate and cautious policy), had incidentally foiled a political manoeuvre contemplated by PM Slām. It was believed that Slām hoped to gain renewed support among the Beirut Muslims if he had been given the opportunity to refuse an opposition demand to recognize Syria. (*Jaridah, Oct 6*)

On the other hand, it was reported that the widespread pro-UAR demonstrations might lead to a Cabinet crisis. Jumayil had been asked by many delegations to stop them or to organize counter-demonstrations. While he prevailed upon them to desist, he warned Slām and Mashūq, the Minister of the Interior, that the demonstrations were harmful to Lebanon's neutrality and must be stopped. (*Jaridah, Oct 3-5*)

On Oct 5 the Cabinet reaffirmed its moderate policy and, on Jumayil's proposal, decided to ban demonstrations of solidarity with any other state. On the same day a Presidential announcement forbade demonstrations and the display of pictures or pamphlets of any kind, as well as the carrying of firearms, until further notice. (*Jaridah, Oct 6*)

Premises of Pro-UAR Papers Blown Up. On Oct 1 an explosion occurred in the building of *Al-Hawddith*, [a pro-UAR paper]. On Oct 6 [on the morrow of the President's announcement], there were explosions in buildings of the [pro-UAR] papers: *Beirut al-Masā; Sawt al-Urūbah, Al-Sayyād and Kul-Shay'*, as well as in the Najjādh building, and another the next day in the building of *Al-Siyāh*. An investigation was launched (*Hayat, Oct 3, 7, 8; Jaridah, Orient, Oct 7, 9*), [but up to the end of the month the guilty parties were not found and all suspects were released].

Country Quiets Down, Abdel Nasser's Attitude Praised. Meanwhile, however, the country had begun to quiet down, in the wake of the ban on demonstrations and President Abdel Nasser's speech on Oct 5, in which he recognized the breakup of the UAR as a *fait accompli* for the time being (see p 162).

[Abdel Nasser's speech was warmly welcomed in Lebanon by friends and opponents alike.] Among those who publicly praised him for a statesmanlike attitude were Raymond Eddeh, Pierre Jumayil, Slām and Adnān al-Hakim. (*Jaridah, Oct 7*)

Recognition of Syria Delayed. [Lebanon granted recognition to the government of independent Syria only on Nov 8, after the downfall of Slām's government and the formation of Karāmi's Cabinet—see pp 166-7.]

OPPOSITION UNITES—GOVERNMENT RESIGNS (October)

Manoeuvring for Elections to Presidency of Chamber. [The annual elections for the presidency of the Chamber, reserved for a Shi'i Muslim and known as "The Second Presidency," were held on Oct 17. Even more than usual, they served as a focus for increased party and parliamentary activity. The rallying of opposition groups for these elections led directly to the downfall of the Slām government.] (On the 1960 elections see MER 1960, pp 356-7.)

The first moves took place as early as July. Fu'ād Butrus, of the Independent Group, announced that his group would support Ali Bizzi, a member of the Bloc [who represented Marj Ayun in the south and was Minister of Information in the Karāmi Cabinet, which resigned in May 1960].

The remaining groups had not yet taken a definite stand, but it was known that the National Bloc would oppose Sabri Hamādāh, the incumbent, whose relations with Eddeh, leader of the Bloc, had been rather strained for an extended period (*Hayat, July 22*). [This bloc had voted for Adil Usayrān in 1960.]

Later a third candidate emerged: Muhammad Safi ad-Din, the Minister of Interior, of the Southern Bloc, which supported him.

In mid-Oct, however, Safi ad-Din withdrew, and the Southern Bloc shifted its support to Hamādāh [brother-in-law of Kāmil al-As'ad, leader of the Bloc] after he had undertaken to support Safi ad-Din for the post in the coming year. Hamādāh was supported by the Constitutional Union and by the Front for National Struggle (identical with the Arab Progressive Front, the seven-member Parliamentary Bloc headed by Kamāl Junblāt) because he had helped to have its candidates elected to the parliamentary committees.

Ali Bizzi, the Independent Group candidate, also enjoyed the support of two major opposition groups, the Tripoli Bloc and the National Bloc. The new Ba'albek-Hermil Group (see p 383 b) had not as yet decided on

its attitude. (*Hayat*, Oct 1, 4, 12, 14, 15; *Jaridah*, Oct 12)

At this stage observers assumed that the elections would be decided between Hamadah as the government candidate and Bazzi as the candidate of the opposition. (*Hayat*, Oct 14)

Opposition Unites Against Government and Elects Hamadah. However, things started to take a turn against the government. On Oct 14 it was reported that the Southern Bloc, which had generally supported the government, would now vote against it [for reasons not explained by our sources]. The other opposition parties now joined it in support of Hamadah, who promised to maintain neutrality as President of the Chamber. (*Hayat*; *Jaridah*, Oct 15)

The newly united opposition issued a manifesto announcing support for Hamadah on the basis of this promise, but stating that their main objective was to concentrate their efforts to overthrow the government. The document was signed by representatives of: the Zahle, Biqa', Independent, Ba'albek-Hermil-Beherri, Akkar, Tripoli, National and Southern Blocs, the Constitutional Union, the National Liberals, and the Beirut Front. [Safi ad-Din who represented the Southern Bloc in the Cabinet, did not sign, however.]

Out of the 99 deputies in the Chamber, these groups comprised 58 according to *Al-Jaridah*, and 51 according to *Al-Hayat*. (*Jaridah*, Oct 15)

On Oct 17 Hamadah was elected President of the Chamber by 71 votes to five and two abstentions. Munir Abu Fadil was elected Vice-President (a post reserved for the Greek Orthodox community) and Hashim Husseini (Sunni) became Secretary.

Immediately after the elections Rashid Karami asked, in the name of 48 deputies, for a vote of non-confidence in the government and said he would marshal 60 votes. (*Orient*, *Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Oct 18)

Government Counter-moves Unsuccessful. PM Slâm and other ministers said, however, they were sure to win the vote and denied any intention of resigning. (*Hayat*, Oct 15, 17, 18)

The fate of the government was now seen to depend on the attitude of the Southern Bloc and the Constitutional Union. Slâm tried to win over the Southern Bloc with the aid of two of its members, Safi ad-Din, the Minister of Agriculture, and Deputy Sa'id Fawaz, but failed to overcome the opposition of Kamil al-As'ad and other members of the Bloc, who also demanded Safi ad-Din's resignation.

There was a rift in the Constitutional Union, represented in the government by Philippe Taqla, the Foreign Minister, over the signing of the opposition manifesto by its representative. Deputy Fu'ad Nafâ also openly opposed his party's new policy.

Government and opposition also competed for the vote of the Independents. (*Jaridah*, Oct 17)

Junblât Breaks With Slâm. On Oct 20 the position of the government further deteriorated when Junblât announced his resignation. He said he had had differences with the PM since the end of 1960 over, *inter alia*, the government's leniency towards opium smugglers, the non-recognition of Communist China which impaired Lebanon's policy of neutrality, Slâm's groundless attacks on Rashid Karami, the setting up and dissolution of municipalities for party reasons, the waste of public funds to enhance

the PM's prestige, unpunished waste and corruption in the administration, and the lack of efficiency and discipline in the internal security forces owing to unwarranted interference by the PM and the Minister of the Interior. Junblât denied accusations that he had given employment in his ministry to many of his supporters. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Oct 21)

On Oct 20 Slâm met President Shehab, who left him free to choose between resignation or facing the Chamber. On the same day it was officially stated that the ministers were prepared to continue to bear collective responsibility for the government's fate; Pierre Jumayil and Safi ad-Din made separate statements to this effect. (*Hayat*, Oct 21)

Slâm now endeavoured to strengthen his coalition with new partners, on the assumption that Junblât's departure had made this possible. It was reported that he contacted, among others, the [conservative anti-Junblât] Biqa' deputies and Majid Arslan [the Druze leader, Junblât's rival].

The opposition issued a statement, signed by 54 deputies, opposing any attempt to widen the basis of the government. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Oct 21, 22, 24)

On Oct 24 it was revealed that Junblât had not actually resigned. The President refused to act on Slâm's request to accept Junblât's resignation as he had received no written notice of it. On Oct 23 Junblât asked the President to "freeze" his resignation. He told the press that he had intended it to trigger that of Slâm, but it now appeared that he had underestimated Slâm's attachment to his post, and as the Cabinet had decided to face a vote of confidence he had resolved to stand by it. *Al-Jaridah* attributed Junblât's volte-face to fears that Slâm might succeed in broadening the government and gaining a vote of confidence.

Further efforts by Slâm to persuade the President to regard Junblât as having resigned were fruitless. Slâm declared: "Junblât is not just a problem of the present government, he constitutes a chronic Lebanese problem." (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Oct 24)

Resignation of Government; Reasons for Fall. On the evening of Oct 23, however, the government's resignation was announced; it would continue in office, at the President's request, until the formation of a new government. (*Hayat*, Oct 24, 25; *Jaridah*, Oct 25; *Mid. Mir.*, Oct 26)

One explanation given for the resignation was the government's hesitant attitude towards the Syrian revolution: it had lost popularity by failing to recognize Syria, while Abdel Nasser's supporters were critical of Slâm because he was unpopular with the UAR authorities owing to his evasive attitude in earlier instances. (*Times*, Oct 27; *Guardian*, Oct 28)

Al-Jaridah cited both the government's non-recognition of Syria and its handling of the lawyers' strike [also an issue connected with the UAR, see pp 386-7] as reasons why many independent deputies joined the opposition. *Al-Siyasah* [the anti-Slâm Beirut Muslim paper] ascribed the Government's fall to inefficiency in the administration and corruption involving Slâm himself. (*Siyasah*, Oct 24; *Jaridah*, Oct 25)

Jumayil's Criticism of Lebanese Regime. Pierre Jumayil declared that Lebanon was in the throes of a "crisis of government" (*armat al-hukm*) due to: "the corruption (*fasad*) of the parliamentary regime; the ministerial fever (*humma al-istidar*); and the unsuitable way in which Cabinets were formed." Participants in the "parliamentary game," he said, were mostly representatives of private

or regional interests and not parties with principles and programmes; the Phalanges, in fact, had been the first such party in the Chamber. Consequently, the formation of the Cabinet was an opportunistic process, under the influence of unprincipled deputies greedy for power.

To rectify this situation, Jumayil proposed that as long as there was no change for the better in the formation of genuine parties, deputies should not become ministers, so as to overcome the "ministerial fever." (*Jaridah, Oct 25*)

THE KARAMI GOVERNMENT

(October–December)

Rashid Karāmi Prime Minister. [On Oct 25 President Shehab asked Rashid Karāmi to form a government and on Oct 31 Karāmi announced its formation.

Karāmi (b. 1921), a Sunni Muslim of Tripoli, formed his first government in 1955 at the age of 34. In 1958 he was the leader of the insurgents in the north and became after the insurrection the first PM under Shehab's presidency. He resigned in May 1960 to make place for a caretaker Cabinet before the general elections (MER 1960, p 344, 352). His late father, Abd al-Hamid Karāmi, was also a PM.]

Political Line-up Before Karāmi's Nomination; Slām, Sulh, Naja Considered. In the President's prior consultations the following line-up had emerged.

Supporters of Karāmi: National Bloc, Beirut Front, Constitutional Union (except Sabri Hamādah), Tripoli Bloc and Southern Bloc.

Supporters of Sa'ib Slām: Adil and Samih Usayrān; independents from the south; Zghorta Bloc and three independents of similar outlook—Majid Arslān, Qabalān Qabalān and Munir Abu Fādil.

Rafiq Naja was supported by the ten Independent Bloc deputies.

The following made no proposals to the President: The Ba'albek-Hermil, Baherri and Akkar Blocs; the Armenians; the Front for National Struggle (Junblāt); several independents; and the National Liberals, except for their leader, former President Sham'un.

Sham'un proposed Kazim as-Sulh, as did the Biqa' Bloc, to which as-Sulh belonged.

The attitude of the Phalanges was not disclosed. Karāmi received the largest support, followed by Slām, as-Sulh and Naja, in that order. The majority of deputies proposed a Cabinet of 14. (*Hayat, Jaridah, Oct 26*)

Manoeuvring for Formation of Cabinet. Karāmi's first step, on Oct 26, was a declaration saying that he would try to form a Cabinet of 14, that his government would strive to further national unity, and that Lebanon's foreign policy would remain unchanged.

The same day, the opposition deputies assembled and resolved that the new Cabinet must be composed of their representatives only, that no member of the outgoing Cabinet must be included, that all ministers must be deputies except for Philippe Taqla, the Foreign Minister (compare with Jumayil's opposition proposal above), and that there must be no Cabinet of [opposite] poles (*wa'idat aqtāb*).

Karāmi opened negotiations the same day and all opposition groups demanded representation in the Cabinet. The united front of the opposition crumbled, however, the next day when some groups agreed to join the new Cabinet with Jumayil and Junblāt.

Still Karāmi found himself unable to complete his task

and he now announced that he intended to form his Cabinet of non-members of the Chamber; as such a Cabinet would cooperate better and function with greater efficiency. This was immediately and bitterly opposed by many deputies.

On Oct 30 the Cabinet was almost wholly formed, but Jumayil and Junblāt refused to accept the ministries offered them. Jumayil demanded Finance instead of Interior, while Junblāt, it was reported, had accepted the Planning portfolio but, when he heard of Jumayil's stand, demanded the Ministry of Public Works. [For the compromise achieved, see the list of ministers below.] (*Jaridah, Oct 27, 28, 29, 31*)

The Karāmi Cabinet. On Oct 31 Karāmi announced the formation of his Cabinet. He said that since it comprised the various parliamentary factions he hoped that it would succeed in fulfilling its duties and enhance the security of the state. (*Hayat, Nov 2*)

The new Cabinet was composed as follows: Rashid Karāmi, PM and Minister of Finance; Philippe Būlus, Deputy PM, Information and Tourism; Kamāl Junblāt, Minister of State, in charge of the Interior Ministry and the coordination of the activities of IRFED (see p 408 b); Pierre Jumayil, Minister of State, in charge of Public Works and Communications and aiding in studies of the organization of financial affairs; Joseph Skāf, Agriculture; Rafiq Naja, Economy; Ali Bizzi, Health; Fu'ad Butrus, Justice; Uthmān Dana, Planning; Edouard Hunayin, Labour and Social Affairs; René Mu'awwad, Posts; Majid Arslān, Defence; Philippe Taqla, Foreign Affairs; Kāmil As'ad, Education and Fine Arts. (*Hayat, Jaridah, Nov 2; Mid. Mir., Nov 4*)

The Cabinet contained four members of Slām's Cabinet: Būlus Jumayil, Junblāt and Taqla As'ad. Mu'awwad and Hunayin were ministers for the first time. The Independent Bloc was represented by two ministers, Butrus and Bizzi, and the following by one each: Phalanges (Jumayil), PSP (Junblāt), Southern Bloc (Kāmil As'ad), National Bloc (Hunayin), Constitutional Union (Taqla), Tripoli Bloc (Karāmi), Beirut Front (Dana). [Not included, and constituting the opposition, were: the National Liberals (Sham'un), and the Ba'albek-Hermil-Baherri and Akkar Blocs. The latter were the only geographical regions not represented.] (Compare also table, pp 373-4.) Political commentators observed that the special positions of Minister of State accorded to Jumayil and Junblāt were intended to forestall open friction between the two. (*Mid. Mir., Nov 4*)

National Bloc Joins Opposition. On the morrow of its formation, on Nov 2, the Cabinet was faced with an internal crisis when the National Bloc, led by Raymond Eddeh, said that Hunayin, its representative in the Cabinet, would resign if the government did not meet its demands: the closing of the Faculty of Law at the UAR-founded Arab University of Beirut [see Lawyers' Strike pp 386-7] and the abolition of the posts of Minister of State held by Jumayil and Junblāt. (*Hayat, Nov 3; Mid. Mir., Nov 4*)

Hunayin resigned on Nov 3; and the National Bloc thus joined the opposition.

The same day Hunayin's portfolio, Labour and Social Affairs, was given to Jean Aziz, an independent Maronite deputy from the Jezzin area. Earlier, Karāmi had proposed the ministry to the National Liberals and the Ba'albek-Hermil Bloc, the two major opposition groups, but both declined. (*Jaridah, Nov 4*)

The next day Uthmān Dana announced that he would resign if he was not given responsibility for IRFED.

This was followed by a joint letter from Junblāt and Jumayil to President Shehab, resigning from their posts as Ministers of State, as they now realized that their retention of these posts was not for the good of the country.

The President accepted their resignations and announced the appointment of Junblāt and Jumayil as Ministers of the Interior and of Public Works and Communications respectively. While Jumayil retained the additional assignment of aiding in studies for the reorganization of financial affairs, the responsibility for IRFED was transferred from Junblāt to Uthmān Dana. (*Jaridah*, Nov 5)

Recognition of Syria; Junblāt to Reassure Syria. The first major act of the new Cabinet was the recognition of Syria on Nov 8. The Cabinet discussed press reports that Lebanon was being utilized as a base for the subversion of Syria and asked Junblāt to inform his Syrian opposite number that Lebanon would not allow any anti-Syrian activity on her soil and was anxious to co-operate with the Syrian government for the settlement of any dispute that might arise.

The next day Junblāt stated that Lebanon would not be a centre for inter-Arab strife and the Cabinet decided to send a delegation to congratulate the Syrian government. [It left on Nov 26.] (On relations with Syria, see also pp 166-7.) (*Jaridah*, Nov 9, 10)

Policy Statement: Adherence to Arab League; Good Relations with Syria; Non-Alignment; Social Justice. On Nov 16 the government presented itself in the Chamber and PM Karāmi made a statement of policy, which contained the following major points:

The government's policy would be based on the unity and the independence of Lebanon. In Arab affairs Lebanon wished for friendship with all Arab states and cooperation through the Arab League on the basis of its charter, with special emphasis on good relations with Syria. In international affairs, the policy would be neutrality and non-alignment.

In internal affairs the general aim would be to foster social justice by narrowing the gaps in development and growth between the various areas and groups. To achieve this in the framework of a free economy, the Ministry of Planning should be reorganized and the Ministry of Finance should reorganize monetary affairs and taxation. In security affairs, the rule of law would be strengthened. A new press law would be introduced. Elementary education would be made general, and vocational and higher education would be furthered. The government also hoped to find a solution to the question of the teaching of law (see Lawyers' Strike). (*R. Beirut*, Nov 16 [18]; *Hayat*, Nov 17)

Opposition Says New Cabinet Like Old. Relations with Syria a Critical Issue. The main theme of the opposition was the question: How could the new Cabinet properly function if the old one, with largely the same composition, had failed. Karāmi was criticized for deserting his allies in the opposition. While the National Bloc, the National Liberals and Independents demanded better relations with Syria, Ma'arūf Sa'ad [Muslim from Sidon, a supporter of Abdel Nasser] and other [Muslim] Independents criticized the government's favourable attitude towards that country. Sa'ad denied that he had smuggled arms to

Syria. Many deputies demanded the ending of the lawyers' strike.

Junblāt pointed to the understanding among the members of the new Cabinet, including himself and Pierre Jumayil, declaring: "Today the two barricades have become one."

In his defence Karāmi stated that opposition groups had rejected his offer to include their representatives in the Cabinet. He promised vigorous action in settling the lawyer's strike and stated that it would be senseless to ignore the existence of the new order in Syria: "We extend one hand to Damascus and the other to Cairo, for Lebanon strives for the strengthening of ties between all the Arab states." (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Nov 12, 18)

Large Vote of Confidence. The government received a vote of confidence by 63 to 18. The National Bloc, the Constitutional Union and the National Liberals voted against, and the Ba'albek-Hermil bloc in favour of the government [though it was not represented in the Cabinet].

The Najjādah representative abstained. Conspicuous by their absence were ex-PM Sīām, Mashnūq, his Minister of the Interior, and Ma'arūf Sa'ad. (*Jaridah*, Nov 18)

Renewed Pro- and Anti-UAR Violence. On Nov 26 an explosion occurred in the garden of the house of Rafiq Naja, the Minister of Economy, shortly after his return from Damascus, where he headed the government's delegation of friendship (see above). There were no casualties.

Naja's party, the National Committee (*al-hay'ah al-wastaniyah*), in a statement denouncing the attempt, said that the many delegations that had congratulated Naja on his escape had expressed their support for his policy in general and for the aims of the delegation to Damascus in particular. (*Hayat*, Nov 28, 30)

On Dec 2 it was reported that a number of politicians had received threatening letters signed by the "Arab Revolutionary Committee" (*al-hay'ah al-arabiyyah athawriyyah*). About 35 suspects were arrested, and several Arab refugees and foreigners were placed under surveillance. The authorities thought the senders of the letters were in league with the Islamic Liberation Party. (*Nahar*; *Anwar*, Dec 2)

On Dec 24 an unsuccessful attempt by one man to blow up the building of the [pro-UAR] weekly *Al-Hawadith* was reported. He was not caught. (*Jaridah*, Dec 24)

Candidates for Political Assassination? In Dec Kamāl Junblāt, the Minister of the Interior, issued a decree specifying the number of policemen and gendarmes responsible for guarding the lives of: Camille Sham'ūn, Sāmi as-Sulh [President and PM respectively during the 1958 insurrection] — two guards each; Sulaymān Faranjīyah [pro-UAR Maronite]; Abdallah Mashnūq [Interior Minister in Sīām's Cabinet who had lately clashed with the Najjādah—see above]; and Ma'arūf Sa'ad [prominent UAR supporter from Sidon]—one guard each. (*Hayat*, Dec 20)

Cabinet Disagreement on Economic Policy. On Dec 9 PM Karāmi announced a programme for strengthening the economy by lowering the cost of living, encouraging production and lowering imports and restrictions on imports. On Dec 13 the Cabinet resolved on a month's concentrated campaign under Karāmi's supervision from Dec 15, 1961, to Jan 15, 1962, to lower the cost of living.

Karāmi's initiative led to a rift with Rafiq Najja, the Minister of the Economy, who criticized the new programme as unrealistic (*Hayat*, Dec 10, 14, 19). On Dec 21 Najja left suddenly for Europe—officially for medical treatment, but according to some sources, on the advice

of his colleagues in order to prevent an open clash with the PM. It was stated that he had intended to resign and had stayed away from the meetings of the special council set up by the PM to supervise his programme. (*Nahar*, Dec 22; *Kul Shay*, Dec 30)

THE ATTEMPTED NSP COUP

(December 30, 1961–March 1962)

SYNOPSIS

On the night of Dec 30/31 the Nationalist Social Party (formerly the Parti Populaire Syrien—PPS—or Syrian Nationalist Party) attempted a coup d'état with the central aim of furthering the eventual establishment of a Greater Syria, or Fertile Crescent union. The active participants in the coup were several junior army officers, an armoured company of 90 men, some of whom were misled by their commander as to the nature of the operation, and the NSP's own armed squads, which included Arab refugees, Syrians and Jordanians, besides Lebanese. In the early morning of Jan 1, 1962 it was already apparent that the coup had failed. The soldiers surrendered to loyal forces, who had them surrounded, and the NSP rebels fled to their village strongholds in the mountain area to the north-east of Beirut, which was occupied by the army during the next few days.

The attempted coup was almost unanimously condemned by politicians and press, and for a short while at least national unity seemed to prevail.

For two and a half months, however, the country was in a state of emergency. There were several thousand arrests, especially in Jan, and considerable quantities of arms were confiscated. The majority of the detainees were soon released, however, and in March only some 500 remained in custody. Owing to the large-scale participation of alien Arabs in the coup, the authorities took steps to ensure increased control over aliens and Arab refugees.

These and other security measures were conducive to a wave of rumours which started to flood the country on the day of the coup, causing serious concern, and were ascribed by the authorities to an NSP campaign to destroy national unity and morale in the army.

The rumour which was most widely circulated, especially by the UAR mass-media and pro-UAR elements in Lebanon, was that the coup was backed by the British, but there was no mention in the indictment of any British connection with the plot.

The charge sheet did not allege actual knowledge of the coup on the part of any Lebanese politician or political body save the NSP, though Camille Sham'un—whom the NSP had strongly backed in 1958 and who had licensed it at the time—and his party had been strongly suspected.

The indictment charged the NSP with having received financial aid from official Jordanian sources, though Jordan was not accused of having had foreknowledge of the coup. According to Lebanese sources, Jordan also harboured NSP fugitives.

The NSP in Lebanon suffered an extreme setback—if it was not actually destroyed (and there was even a rumour that the authorities had known of the plot but had let it ripen with the intention of destroying the party). Abroad, however, among the large communities of Lebanese emigrants, who were also influential in Lebanon itself, the NSP apparently increased its activities.

The indictment was published on May 9, 1962; the trial will be surveyed in MER 1962.

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUP

The following is a reconstruction of the conspiracy and the coup as set out in the indictment, published on May 9, 1962.

Extent of Conspiracy. The conspirators consisted of leaders of the NSP and "a tiny group of disgruntled army officers." [Note: The indictment referred to the NSP as the Syrian Nationalist Party.]

Named in the bill of indictment were: 4 officers, 2 retired officers, 90 soldiers, 12 policemen, 323 civilians including 20 Palestinians and 54 Syrians.

Of these, 38 military men and 262 civilians were charged and indicted. Of the rest, eleven had been killed and the others were granted a stay of trial.

They were charged with: organizing a plot and carrying out an aggression with intent to change the constitution by illegal means; instituting an armed mutiny against the established government; seizing civil and military powers; incitement to civil war and armed strife by arming Lebanese to fight other Lebanese; exhortation to murder and sabotage; kidnapping certain officers; the attempted kidnapping of certain statesmen and politicians; the carrying and transportation of arms without permit; and the forming of armed gangs with the above and related purposes.

Organization and Leaders of the NSP. According to the indictment, the following leaders of the NSP were responsible for the conspiracy [Lebanese where no other nationality is indicated]:

Party Leader: Abdallah Sa'adah.

Members of the Higher Council (al-majlis al-a'la): Muhammad al-Ba'albaki, Chairman, Emile Ra'd, "Confidant (aami) of the Council", Asad al-Ashqar, Kamil Abu Kamil, Munir Khuri, As'ad Rihail, Nadhir al-Azmah (Syrian), Abdallah al-Qubrusi, and Umar Abu Zlam (Syrian).

The Directors (or Chiefs al-umud): Bashir Ubayd (Defence), Ramiz al-Yaziji (Interior, Syria), Yusuf al-Ashqar (Culture), In'am Ra'd (Propaganda), Yusuf al-Mu'allim (Finance), Philippe Musallim (Bureau for Affairs Abroad (Overseas)—*maktab abra al-hudud*), Raja al-Yaziji (Confidant—*namus*—of the Party Leader, Syrian), Mustafa Izz ad-Din, Subhi Abu Ubayd (without portfolios), Mustafa Abd as-Satir (Legal Department), and Nicolas Trid (Deputy Director of Work—*amal*).

The Political Bureau (al-maktab al-siyasi): George Salibi (Chairman) Mubammad al-Ba'albaki, Nasri Abu Sulayman, Isa Salamah (Syrian) and Ali Ghandur.

Military Experts: Abdallah al-Jubayli and Mahmud Ni'mah (both Syrians).

NSP Aim: Fertile Crescent Union; Officers' Aim: to Abolish Favouritism in the Army. The NSP had a negative motive for the coup, namely the hostile attitude of the authorities towards it, and a positive one, based on its ideology. It believed that: (1) Social justice and reform in Lebanon could be achieved only by breaking sectarianism and establishing a lay regime; (2) Lebanon should become the active agent for the gradual union of countries of the Fertile Crescent or "Natural Syria" (*surīyah al-tabi'iyah*): Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria — which constituted her "natural surroundings" (*muhitah al-tabi'i*); she should also become the model for this future state, which should be nationalist, populist and lay, modern and progressive. [The above is a résumé of slightly differing versions by various party leaders quoted in the indictment.]

The army officers, Capt. Fu'ad Awad, Capt. Shawqi Khayrallah and Capt. Badi' Ghāzi, on the other hand, justified the conspiracy by alleging that the army command, especially the Deuxième Bureau, had adopted a policy of favouritism. They found no other way to realize their objective, which they termed "reform" in the army, than to stage a coup. A fourth officer, Lt. Ali al-Hajj Hasan, was a member of the NSP. The officers and the NSP used each other to further their respective aims.

How the Plan was Born. The idea of the coup was raised at a meeting between Khayrallah and Nahīb Nimah, confidant of Abdallah Sa'adah, the NSP leader. Subsequently, in Aug, the idea was discussed between Khayrallah and Sa'adah, without any specific agreement.

Following the breakup of the UAR [Sept 28], contacts were renewed between Khayrallah, Awad (a friend of his) and Sa'adah, and the idea of the coup began to take definite shape.

In mid-Oct Sa'adah brought the issue before the party's Council of Chiefs and Higher Council at a meeting held at Asad al-Ashqar's house. There was some opposition, but the Higher Council agreed to invest Sa'adah with extraordinary powers to resume the discussions with the officers.

Sa'adah's meetings with the officers continued, and they were now joined by Capt. Ghāzi and Abdallah al-Jubayli; Bashir Ubayd, Emile Ra'd and Mahmūd Nimah joined in later. On Dec 5, however, Khayrallah was detained by the authorities as an administrative measure. [No reason for his detention was mentioned in the indictment.]

A final meeting was held on Dec 29 at Sa'adah's residence; Awad, Ghāzi, Sa'adah, Ra'd, Ubayd and Nimah were present. Zero hour was fixed at 02.15 on Sunday, Dec 31, and Sa'adah immediately communicated the plan to the Higher Council, which approved it.

NSP Mobilizes Men, Arms and Funds; Jordanian Financial Aid. Bashir Ubayd, the Defence Chief, was charged with recruiting the armed squads, with the aid of 30 of the party's district executive officers (*musaḥḥidh ammi*) and training inspectors (*nāẓir al-tadrīb*).

The NSP had some 2,000 weapons stored in depots in Dik al-Mahdi, Asad al-Ashqar's village [on the outskirts of Beirut; it later served as the rebels' stronghold during the operations], and other villages. Shortly before zero hour, all the arms were moved to Dik al-Mahdi and deposited in caches under the supervision of Ashqar. They were then transported to houses in Beirut and its suburbs from which the insurgents were to act.

Funds were raised as follows: £1,100,000 were received as contributions from party members; £1,160,000 were

personally secured by the party leader; £150,000 were given by Asad al-Ashqar, and £140,000 were given by an expatriate, Butrus Abu Shadid. In addition, Jordan granted JD20,000, which were delivered in two instalments through Ashqar and Muhammad al-Ba'alhaki, chairman of the Higher Council.

Contacts with Other Parties. The NSP contacted several politicians to sound them out on the possibility of cooperation and to win their support for the coup.

Sa'adah contacted Raymond Eddeh through an intermediary and made serious efforts to create an atmosphere of understanding, but no definite result was achieved.

About a month before the coup Sa'adah had been informed by a party member [the indictment does not clarify on what authority] that Sham'un would be prepared to support a coup with funds and his army connections. Sa'adah intended to follow up by a meeting with Sham'un but the latter was abroad and no contact was established.

Also approached were Fawzi al-Qawuqji, [a retired officer and commander of the Army of Salvation (*jaysh al-inqādh*) in the 1948 war against Israel], Jawād Būlus [an historian and a minister in 1941], and Sulaymān al-Ali, [deputy from Akkar and Minister of the Economy in Sām's last Cabinet]. This led party members to think, the indictment stated, that Būlus was the party's candidate for the presidency and al-Ali for the premiership.

The party expected the major centres of opposition to the coup to be Tripoli, Sidon, Ash-Shuf, the western areas of Beirut, and certain pro-Phalangist areas. It considered the appointment to its Cabinet of elements assumed to be capable of winning over western Beirut and intended to foment confusion in the other areas by kidnapping its leaders, such as Rashid Karāmi, Kamāl Junblāt, Pierre Jumayil and Ma'arūf Sa'd. The party also tried to win over the trade unions.

External Relations: Jordanian Aid, Iraq's Response Negative. Some party leaders visited Baghdad, "but their endeavours do not seem to have found any response."

On the other hand, a letter from Asad al-Ashqar to King Hussein of Jordan, and other contacts, brought Jordanian financial aid, as detailed above. After the breakup of the UAR, the party had also been counting on Jordanian intervention with the Syrian authorities to release the detained NSP members and to open the border to fugitive party members in general, but the Syrians did not agree. [The indictment did not allege direct Jordanian involvement in the coup.]

Towards the end of Dec the party sent some of its members abroad to make efforts, if the conspiracy succeeded, to persuade certain governments to recognize the new regime. George Salibi went to Amman on the understanding that Jordan would undertake to secure recognition from the British and their allies; Iaa Salāmah went to Washington to request Charles Malik to intercede with the U.S. government; Nicolas Trād went to Paris, and Ali Ghandūr had earlier left for Rome.

Preparations by Officers; Attempts to Widen Participation Fail. Captains Awad and Khayrallah informed Brig. Ghattās Labakī of their intention to take part in the coup and invited him to head the movement and assume command of the army if it succeeded, but he asked them to abandon the whole idea. Former Col. Fu'ad Lahūd, who was also approached, was against the participation

of the NSP, and recommended that the army should stage the coup alone.

At Awad's suggestion, the night of Dec 30-31 was fixed for the coup, since half of the officers would be on leave.

On the eve of the coup Awad alerted his unit, the Second Independent Armoured Company (*al-katibah al-musaffahah al-mustaqillah ath-thaniyah*), stationed at Tyre, on the pretext that it had to quell a coup staged by Kamal Junblat and some officers. Some soldiers, however, collaborated knowingly.

Allocation of Operational Tasks. The following tasks were allocated to the NSP: to kidnap Brig. Shmayyit, Chief of Staff of the army, Col. Abd al-Qadir Shehab, Beirut Region Commander, Col. Antun Sa'ad, Chief of the Deuxième Bureau, and other officers in key positions, as well as the President of the Chamber and the PM, Pierre Jumayil and Kamal Junblat, Lt.-Col. Ahdab, the Chief of the Security Services, and Ma'ruf Sa'ad, the [pro-UAR] deputy from Sidon. In addition the party was to support Awad in occupying the Defence Ministry, to facilitate the escape of Khayrallah, who had been detained since Dec 5, and to secure the admission of the wounded to the American University Hospital.

The military were to occupy the Defence Ministry and kidnap Brig. Michel Nawfal and Lt.-Col. Louis Shehab.

The party and the military jointly were to kidnap President Shehab and to occupy the broadcasting station, the barracks of the 16th Emergency Police Squad (located at the government palace) and the Phalangist premises.

In the Event of Success. The President of the Republic was to be deported to France, the Cabinet dismissed and the Chamber dissolved. A new army command was to be formed. Four communiqués were prepared by Muhammad al-Ba'abaki and In'am Ra'd for immediate issue. They summarized the reasons for the coup as a rectification of military and political conditions, announced a curfew and the closing of the borders, accused the state of failing to deal with social and economic problems, and demanded the support of the military and the people.

The NSP was to have three members in the new Cabinet: Sa'adah, Ba'albaki and Nasri Abu Sulayman. It had also reviewed the names of Lebanese personalities with the view to asking them to participate in the regime if the coup succeeded.

The new regime was intended to declare the following policies: To abolish the sectarian political base and to establish a lay regime; to draw up social security legislation in cooperation with the trade unions; to introduce new election laws; to coordinate the commercial and industrial sections of the economy; to follow a policy of "genuine non-alignment" and to work for the cooperation of the countries of the Fertile Crescent in all fields with the view to a future union.


The Operation and Its Collapse. Zero hour was fixed for 02.15 hours, Sunday, Dec 31.

Twenty-two party members, nine of them Syrians, carried out the allotted task of occupying the post and telegraph buildings, sometime after 02.00.

Two party members cut the telephone lines between Tyre and Sidon.

Fu'ad Awad alerted his company at Tyre at 21.00 on Dec 30 to occupy the Defence Ministry. His force numbered 90 men in 13 armoured cars and nine jeeps. Together with 20 armed party members led by Bashir Ubayd (including five Palestinians and one Syrian),

SCENE OF THE NSP COUP



they took up positions in the square facing the Ministry. Meanwhile, with the aid of NSP members, Khayrallah had escaped from detention and at 02.45 joined Awad.

Awad and Khayrallah entered the building, where they sent out a forged order in a [vain] attempt to bring Khayrallah's unit to Beirut from Marj-Ayun, in the south. In the building they encountered a number of loyal officers, headed by Col. Iskandar Ghanim, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Col. Antun Sa'ad, head of the Deuxième Bureau (some of the officers had gathered there on hearing of the rebel's moves before they arrived at the ministry). The loyal officers were in the upper storey and the rebels on the ground floor. When the loyal officers refused to surrender, the rebels opened fire, which was returned. The rebels retreated from the building and found that a loyal infantry force had arrived on the scene. They tried, without success, to persuade its commander to come over to their side; meanwhile, small loyal armoured detachments had arrived. Awad's men refused to open fire, on his orders, and having also been informed that the attempt to kidnap the President had failed, the rebel officers fled [some time after 04.00].

Earlier, the rebels had kidnapped a number of officers who had gone to the Defence Ministry, and transferred them to Dik al-Mahdi.

The attempt to kidnap the President was abandoned; a detachment of 25 armed party members under the command of Subhi Abu Ubayd, together with Lt. Ali al-Hajj Hasan, dispersed after their scout found army units on the road to the presidential palace.

A group of 17 NSP members succeeded, however, in kidnapping Brig. Shmayyit, the Chief of Staff, and Col. Abd al-Qadir Shehab from their Beirut residence, killing three soldiers and wounding two during the operation.

The PM and other politicians were to be kidnapped with the aid of party members in the police, but this

had not been done by the time it became clear that the coup had failed.

In the course of the operation the barracks of the 16th Emergency Police Squad were temporarily occupied by two armoured cars of Awad's regiment.

The seizure of the broadcasting station was not attempted.

Last Stand of Rebels at Dik al-Mahdi. When the party leaders realized that the coup had failed, they conferred at Mar Sam'an Monastery but failed to agree on any particular plan. Sa'adah and Jubayli left for Dik al-Mahdi, leading a convoy of cars, taking Brig. Shmayyit and Col. Shehab with them.

While Sa'adah tried to contact the authorities, Jubayli organized armed resistance with the help of Jarjura Zuraqy. There were 55 men, including eight Syrians and six Palestinians, armed with automatic weapons and rifles.

At 14.00 army troops took up positions along the road opposite Asad al-Ashqar's house, began to cordon off the village, and called on the rebels to surrender. Sa'adah, Jubayli and some others left again, taking with them Brig. Shmayyit and Col. Shehab whom they eventually abandoned on the road. The rest of the armed men opened fire after they had left. Fire was exchanged for two hours, until 16.30; three soldiers and several rebels were killed and an officer wounded. The rebels then began to flee, but several remained in the house and surrendered only the next day, after it had been shelled. (*R. Beirut, May 9 [1]; Hayat, Jaridah, May 10, 1962*)

SECURITY MEASURES

Occupation of NSP Strongholds. Dik al-Mahdi and Bayt ash-Sha'ar, the two NSP strongholds near Beirut, were occupied by the army on Jan 1, 1962. There was armed resistance, and the villages were shelled by tank guns. In Dik al-Mahdi, Asad al-Ashqar's house and others were destroyed and two truck-loads of documents were seized; 120 armed men in all were taken prisoner.

Military operations against the NSP in the mountains to the east and north-east of Beirut continued on Jan 2 and 3, 1962 (*R. Beirut, Jan 2 [4]; Hayat, Jan 3, 1962*) and several non-Lebanese NSP members were killed. (See below: Casualties.)

Security Measures. Throughout Jan 1962 the army, air force and police rounded up NSP members and other suspects, and searched for arms.

The security forces were placed on a full emergency footing. Road blocks were set up all over the country and all persons were required to carry identity cards. Key points in the towns and elsewhere were heavily guarded and there were frequent armed patrols.

The security forces were authorized to fire at anybody disobeying orders. There were frequent exhortations to citizens to help the authorities to apprehend wanted persons, and warnings of the consequences of sheltering fugitives.

Security measures were even intensified with time. On Jan 11 all ministers were given bodyguards, and on Jan 13 all permits for private radio transmitters were cancelled. (*Hayat, Jaridah, BBCM, Jan 1962*)

Only at the beginning of Feb 1962, when the mass arrests had ceased, were some of the security measures cancelled. In the middle of the month army units were withdrawn from the approaches of Beirut, but road blocks, now manned by police, continued. The state of

emergency was partially lifted only at the end of Feb, and was not cancelled in the security forces until March 26, 1962. (*Jaridah, Feb 6, 14, 20, 23, March 27, 1962*)

Mass Arrests. Immediately after the coup the number of arrests was especially heavy in the [predominantly Maronite] Matn district and the Nahr al-Kalb valley, Mt. Lebanon, to the east and north-east of Beirut, but large-scale arrests were reported later in all provinces. There were many arrests in the north, especially in Kura district [predominantly Greek-Orthodox].

On Jan 1, 1962, the number of detainees was reported as 400, and the next day as 1,195. Until the end of Jan there were almost daily announcements of up to 300 arrests, but during the last week of the month the number fell gradually from some fifty to twenty. [Sporadic arrests continued into Feb and even March 1962.] (*Hayat, Jaridah, BBCM, Jan, Feb, 1962*)

On Feb 6 the Minister of Justice announced that up to Feb 4, 6,435 persons had been interrogated and 2,437 of them detained. On March 10 he stated that only 525 remained under detention. (*Hayat, Feb 7, March 11, 1962*)

Sa'adah Arrested; Majority of NSP Leaders Still at Large. Of the leaders, Sa'adah was arrested on the day of the coup, Khayrallah on Jan 11, Awad on Jan 20, Asad al-Ashqar on Feb 2 and Ubayd on Feb 15. The latter was captured after a comb-out of an area east of Beirut by some thousand soldiers.

When the bill of indictment was published on May 5, 14 out of the 25 party leaders named in it were still at large. They were Emile Ra'd, Nadhir Azmah, Abdallah al-Qubrusi, Umar Abu Zlam, Rami al-Yaziji, Yusuf al-Ashqar, Yusuf al-Mu'allim, Philippe Musallim, Raja al-Yaziji, Narsi Abu Sulayman, George Salibi, Iza Salimiah, Nicolas Trad and Ali Ghandor. The last four had gone abroad before the coup to establish political contacts for the future NSP regime. (Compare with the full list of party leadership in the indictment above; see also below: The NSP after the coup.)

Of the two Syrian military experts, Al-Jubayli absconded and Nimah was killed while attempting to escape. (*Hayat, Jaridah, BBCM, Jan-Feb 16, 1962*; Bill of Indictment—see above.)

Casualties: 27 Killed. According to a statement by the Minister of Justice on Feb 6, 1962, casualties during and after the coup were as follows:

Six of the security forces were killed, in Beirut, and more than 20 wounded, most of them at Dik al-Mahdi.

The security forces killed 19 non-Lebanese NSP members, and two Lebanese were killed on the night of the coup. (*Jaridah, Feb 7, 1962*)

[The 19 non-Lebanese were killed during the mopping-up operations, e.g.:] It was announced on Jan 2, 1962, that six persons had been killed while attempting to escape during arrests and searches, and on Jan 5, 1962, three other deaths were reported. (*Hayat, Jan 3, 6, 1962*)

Arms Seizures. Together with the arrests, the seizure of considerable quantities of light arms, including Hotchkiss medium machine guns (formerly used by the Lebanese Army), ammunition and explosives were reported daily throughout Jan 1962. A number of wireless transmitters were also found. Other large caches were discovered; one contained seven Hotchkiss guns and other weapons. (*Hayat, Jaridah, BBCM, Jan 1962*)

Sporadic seizures continued in Feb 1962. On Feb 20 it was announced that an additional large cache of arms, including ten 12.7mm dual purpose antitank-antiaircraft machine guns, had been found in Dik al-Mahdi, following the interrogation of Bashir Ubayd (*Hayat*, Feb 20; *Jaridah*, Feb 21, 1962). Later, three bazookas, three anti-aircraft machineguns and ten Hotchkiss guns were found near a village in the northern Biqa'. (*Hayat*, Feb 25, 1962)

In the next few days, about ten wireless transmitters were found in Bayt ash-Sha'ar village (Matn) (*Jaridah*, Feb 25, 1962) and a complete wireless station, including a 1,000 kw. transmitter, was found in al-Ashqar's house in Dik al-Mahdi. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, March 7, 8, 1962)

Widespread Rumours; Arrests. Immediately after the coup the authorities warned the press against the publication of incorrect information. On Jan 3, 1962, the Newspaper Association set up, with the agreement of the government, a committee to censor news and comment (*Hayat*, Jan 3, 4; *Jaridah*, Jan 4, 5, 1962). *Ash-Sham* [organ of Sham'un's party] was closed in Jan 1962 and its editor later arrested. On Feb 3, 1962, he was sentenced to two months' imprisonment for publishing incorrect information (*Jaridah*, Jan 5, 21; *Amal*, Jan 23; *Hayat*, Feb 4, 1962). [There were frequent measures against other papers.]

With time the authorities became more and more concerned about the spread of rumours ascribing unlawful motives, favoritism, etc., to the security forces in carrying out arrests, releases and other measures. On Jan 16, 1962, the Defence Ministry spokesman warned that the rumours were part of an NSP campaign, which had been planned for the eventuality of the coup's failure and was intended to break up national unity, especially in the communal sphere, and to undermine the morale of the army. (*Hayat*, Jan 17, 1962; in Feb and March 1962 there were further statements and reports to the same effect. *Jaridah*, Feb 16, March 7, 1962.)

There were frequent denials of various rumours, such as that the state of emergency had damaged the tourist industry and the transit trade, or that a military government was to take over. (*Hayat*, Jan 25; *Jihad*, Jordan, Feb 25 1962)

In mid-March the spreading of rumours was apparently even intensified, and it was reported that the security authorities were to establish a special unit to combat them. The Phalanges also resolved on an anti-rumour campaign. On March 11 it was reported that 90 members of what was called the "fifth column" had been arrested for spreading rumours. The Liberation Party (*hizb al-tahrir*) was said to be collaborating with the NSP in this campaign. (*Anwar*, March 9, 11, 13; *Jaridah*, March 14, 1962)

Measures Against Arab Refugees and Alien Arabs. [As will be seen from the indictment above, many Arab refugees were involved in the coup. The authorities instituted closer surveillance of the refugees. According to UNRWA statistics there were 140,000 refugees in Lebanon.]

On Jan 7, 1962 the refugees were strictly confined to their camps and all those living outside were instructed to register. Later, arrests of refugees who had disobeyed these orders were reported. (*ANA*, Jan 7, 9 [11]; *Jaridah*, Jan 19, 25, 1962)

On Jan 19, 1962 all refugees were ordered to obtain special permits, and former refugees who had become citizens were obliged to register. (*Jihad*, Jordan, Jan 20; *Hayat*, Feb 4, 1962)

The Lebanese Refugee Administration conducted a

census of refugees to assist the security measures. (*Amal*, March 18; *Jaridah*, March 31, 1962)

The government prepared a bill for the regulation of political asylum. (Text in *Hayat*, Jan 10, 1962)

Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi nationals and Arab refugees were subjected to special restrictions when entering or leaving the country, which were lifted in March in regard to Syrians and Iraqis. (*Jaridah*, Jan 10, March 7, 10, 1962)

In Jan-March there were frequent reports of the deportation of aliens for security reasons. (See e.g., *Jaridah*, Jan 6, Feb 28, March 3, 28, 1962)

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Cabinet and Parliament Unanimous; Army Rewarded. During the first days after the coup, the Cabinet, sitting together with the President, occupied itself mainly with security measures, such as supervision of party funds and activities, regulation of entry and sojourn of aliens, regulation of Arab refugee affairs, organization of mass media, and control of the source of newspaper funds. Najib al-Kfuri was appointed to investigate the affair. The NSP was outlawed and the illegality of the Liberation Party (*hizb al-tahrir*) was reaffirmed. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Jan 3, 4, 5, 1962)

Premier Karami reported on the coup at a special session of the Chamber on Jan 2, 1962, stressing the serious damage the coup might have done to Lebanon's security and her reputation abroad, had it not been crushed in a matter of hours. Karami and deputies of all parties praised the army for its prompt action and dwelt on the unity, brotherly love and democratic spirit which, they said, characterized the people of Lebanon. A unanimous decision expressed these sentiments and urged "the responsible authorities to strike speedily and firmly at the hands of criminals, whoever they may be." The Chamber also announced its complete support for "all measures that have been or will be adopted by the authorities in this regard."

The atmosphere of unity was disrupted, however, when Albert Mukhaybar of Sham'un's National Liberals compared the attempted coup with the 1958 rising. Sa'ib Slim demanded a retraction, and Sulayman Farajiyah slapped Mukhaybar twice in the face. Disorder broke out in the Chamber, but the deputies soon calmed down. (*Jaridah*, Jan 3; *R. Beirut*, Jan 2, 3 [4], 1962)

[The apparent unanimity of politicians and public in condemning the coup aroused some speculation on the possibility of a new intercommunal settlement.] It was reported that President Shehab was discussing the possibility of a "New Charter" as the political basis of a "New Lebanon." There was also talk of a people's convention to seek a solution for Lebanese problems. The reports stressed that the atmosphere created by the unanimous reaction to the plot was conducive to such attempts (*Jaridah*, Jan 10; *Hayat*, Jan 12, 1962). [Nothing came of these beginnings, however.]

On Jan 10 the Cabinet decided, in accordance with a law on compensation in cases of rebellion, to grant an extra month's salary to all members of the security forces in appreciation of their special efforts. (*ANA*, Jan 10 [12], 1962)

Allegations that Authorities Deliberately Allowed Plot to Ripen to Destroy NSP. According to *The New York Times* correspondent in Beirut, informants close to the government said on Dec 31 that "security forces had received advance notice of the attempted coup and had

permitted the insurgents to strike in the hope of wiping out the movement." (NYT, Jan 1, 1962)

[The report does not specify whether this advance notice was received on the night of the coup, after the plotters had started to move but before their forces reached Beirut—for which verification is cited below—or at some previous time, as it seems to imply. The following items may have some relevance to the latter case: (1) It was reported that after the breakup of the UAR the security authorities had intensified their surveillance of the NSP (*Jaridah*, Dec 8). (2) Capt. Shawqi Khayrallah was detained some time before the coup (*MENA*, Jan 1 [2], 1962). (3) According to *Telegraph*, the Phalanges had prior knowledge of the coup and had warned a number of politicians not to remain at home during the night in question (*Amal*, Jan 3, 1962). (4) About two weeks before the coup a decree was published obliging all persons to carry identity cards, reportedly because information had been received, two weeks previously, of large-scale infiltration into Lebanon by persons who contacted the NSP. However, though the security authorities were on the alert, the coup came as a surprise. (*Jaridah*, Jan 4, 1962)

Phalanges Countermeasures. *Al-Amal*, the Phalanges paper which quoted the above item from *Telegraph*, did not confirm it, but said that it had been informed at 01.30 on Jan 31, 1962 and had in turn informed Pierre Jumayil, who "resolved on the necessary measures." These were [according to a pro-UAR source] the placing of armed squads at road intersections in eastern Beirut, while Jumayil himself went immediately to the President's residence at Sarbah. PM Karāmi was reported to have praised Jumayil warmly. (*Amal*, Jan 3; *Hawadith*, Jan 5, 1962)

Allegation of British, Jordanian Participation. [The UAR mass media and the pro-UAR Lebanese press alleged that the UK was behind the coup. In the extensive UAR reporting on the subject this was practically the main theme. British military moves in Dec, which were otherwise understood to be connected with the Kuwait affair (see p 138), were interpreted as moves in a British plot. Pro-UAR Lebanese politicians like Kamāl Junblāt and Ma'arūf Sa'ad joined in these allegations during the first days after the coup, though they did not persist later on. The indictment made no mention of any British connection with the NSP.

[On the other hand, the fact of Jordanian aid to the NSP was quickly established, though the Jordanians denied any knowledge of the coup. According to Lebanese sources, Jordan harboured a number of absconding NSP leaders, (see below).]

Camille Sham'un and Other Suspected Politicians. [Camille Sham'un, the former President, and members of the party, the National Liberals, were widely suspected of collaboration with the NSP. Immediately after the coup it was rumoured that Sham'un had been the candidate for the Presidency and Sāmi as-Sulh (PM under Sham'un) for the premiership in case of success. But *Al-Hawadith* [anti-Sham'un and pro-UAR], which claimed that the UK was behind the plot, thought this an unlikely choice, since Sham'un and as-Sulh were too unpopular. (*Hawadith*, Jan 5)

Edgar Lyān, secretary of the National Liberals, and some ten members of the party were arrested (*Jaridah*, Jan 6, 1962). It was reported that Lyān denied any knowledge of the coup but admitted having had contacts

with the NSP with a view to uniting the two parties, Fu'ād Lahūd serving as middleman.

On Jan 14, 1962, it was reported that Sham'un, among some other politicians, was forbidden to leave the country.

Kāzīm Khalil, a former minister and Deputy President of the National Liberals, and his brother, Abd ar-Rahmān, were also arrested. They were said to have met Capt. Awad often, in Tyre and Beirut. [They were released on Jan 31, 1962.]

On Jan 18 Sham'un denied any knowledge of the coup. He said the Fertile Crescent plan had been buried long ago and that he himself had never believed in it. He reacted to further press reports purporting to show that the authorities suspected him by filing defamation charges against several papers. (*Jaridah*, Jan 6, 10, 14, 19, 31, Feb 6, 21; *Anwar*, Jan 7; *Nahar*, Feb 11, 1962)

Other politicians who were reportedly forbidden to leave the country were: Jawād Būlus, Sulaymān al-ʿAlī and Fawzi al-Qawūqji (who were mentioned in the indictment, see above). (*Jaridah*, *Nahar*, Jan 4; *Hawadith*, Jan 19; *BBCM*, Jan 16, 1962)

Western Comment Blames "Lunatic Fringe." Western comment in general attributed scant significance to the coup.

The Economist described the NSP as "a rightwing movement of a slightly dotty kind" and thought that "the lunatic fringe aspect was strongly in evidence." "The suppression of the NSP can hardly be anything but salutary for Lebanon," the paper summed up; "memories of 1958 are still vivid, and the public at large is nervous of extremism of any kind. The farcical nature of the coup has thoroughly discredited the movement." (*Economist*, Jan 6, 1962; for a similar judgement see *Sunday Times*, Jan 7, 1962.)

The New York Times commented that the uprising was such a fiasco that it went to show the essential stability of the regime. However, since the two religious communities could only coexist, not really merge, and in view of the country's history of instability, Lebanese internal strife should never be dismissed too lightly, the paper added. (NYT, Jan 2, 1962)

THE NSP AFTER THE COUP

On Jan 1, 1962 the government outlawed the NSP in Lebanon. (*Hayat*, Jan 3, 1962)

On Feb 6, 1962 all former members were instructed to register with the police, who would issue special identity cards. The order met with scant response. (*Jaridah*, Feb 7; *Amal*, Feb 14, 1962)

The NSP faction led by George Abd al-Masīh was found to have been unconnected with the plot, but the authorities resolved not to permit them to conduct any political activity. (*Hawadith*, Feb 9; *Kul Shay'*, Feb 10, 1962)

NSP Intensifies Activities Abroad. [The authorities and the press showed much concern about the continuing activities of the NSP abroad, among the Lebanese communities in Africa, Europe and Latin America, and in Jordan.]

An NSP letter from London to the Lebanese press restated the party's Greater Syria concept (*Jaridah*, Jan 25, 28, 1962). Nicolas Trād was reported to be writing against the Lebanese regime in the French press (*Kul Shay'*, Feb 3, 1962). A meeting of Lebanese diplomats in Paris at the beginning of Feb was reported to be concerned, among other things, with devising measures

against the NSP campaign abroad (*Hawadith, Feb 2, 1962*). NSP propaganda against the Lebanese regime was reported from the Ivory Coast, Brazil and other Latin American countries (*Hawadith, Feb 6; Answer, Feb 7; Sayyad, Feb 8, March 22; Jaridah, Feb 24, 1962*). The government reportedly contemplated sending a mission, headed by Pierre Jumayil, to the Lebanese communities abroad to counter the NSP activities. (*Kul Shay', Feb 10, 1962*)

Abseeding NSP Members in Jordan. A number of NSP members who took part in the plot absconded to Jordan. In mid-March 1962 it was reported that shortly after

the coup Lebanon had requested the Jordanian government to extradite a number of NSP members who had taken part in it; Jordan had not yet replied. The Jordanian Ambassador in Beirut denied that there had been such a request, but Lebanese papers said at the end of the month that four requests had been sent.

Among the NSP leaders who reportedly stayed in Amman under the Jordanian government's protection or active support were: George Salibi, Salim Abu Zayd, Nadhir al-Azmah, Rami al-Yaziji, Raja al-Yaziji, Isa Salim and Umar Abu Zlam. Salibi was said to have been elected leader of the group. (*Answer, March 14, 16, 27, 29, 30; Jaridah, March 14, 16, 17, 21, 24, 1962*)

WORKERS AND LABOUR

Labour unrest, which acquired serious proportions in 1960 (MER 1960, pp 362 ff), continued throughout 1961, in the form of strikes and demonstrations for higher wages and improved social benefits. Political repercussions included government-sponsored legislation on wages and social insurance.

Cabinet members stressed the importance of the problem. In March for instance, Maurice Jumayil, the Minister of Supply, said in the Chamber: "If we do not succeed in persuading employers to pay realistic wages, riots will certainly break out throughout the country." (*Hayat, April 1*)

LABOUR STATISTICS

Various figures on the size of the labour force were published during the year. In May PM Slim told the Chamber that there were 150,000 workers—together with their families more than one-third of the population. (*Hayat, May 6*)

In Nov a publication of the Ministry of Labour's Statistics Office gave the number of clerks and workers as 120,000, including 60,000 in Beirut. This figure covered industry, trade and services, but not "agricultural institutions," the building trade and the civil service. (*Answer, Oct 21*)

Figures on the industrial working force were given as follows: in 1960—30,400 employees in 4,559 enterprises (*Hayat, July 16*); in 1961—60,909 employees in 5,901 enterprises. (*Hayat, Nov 11, 1962*)

THE TRADE UNIONS

It was reported in March that according to a "responsible" statistical publication, 45,000 workers were organized in five major trade union federations (*Answer, March 24*). At the end of 1961 a sixth was added as a result of a rift in the Federation of United Trade Unions (see below). There were also a number of independent unions.

The Federation of United Trade Unions (*ittihad an-niqabat al-mustahidah*), headed by Gabriel Khuri, was the largest. It was reported to comprise eighteen unions in: railways, Beirut harbour, La Régie des Tabacs, banks, Mohiloil, Shell clerks, Shell workers, Esso workers, Lebanese Petroleum Company (LEPCO), Total (company), hotels and entertainments, electricity in the south, textile workers, the Tripoli refinery, IPC and the American University (employees). (*Answer, Nov 25*)

The total membership was given as 21,000. (*Jaridah, Dec 2*)

According to government statistics, 87,630 work-days were lost by strikes in 1960. Of these, 8,000 workers organized in the United Trade Unions were on strike for 75,270 work-days, while in all the other unions put together, 1,350 workers struck for a total of 12,100 work-days (*Hayat, Jaridah, March 1*). [Compare also the list of unions above with the list of strikes in 1960; MER 1960, pp 262-3.]

Rift in the Federation of United Trade Unions: On Dec 1 Gabriel Khuri, chairman of the Executive Council, announced that, in obedience to a majority decision, he had officially applied on behalf of the Federation for membership in the ICFU.

The unions of the tobacco monopoly (*regie*), the railways and Beirut port, which had shown leftist leanings in the past, opposed the decision on the grounds that the ICFU was anti-Communist and, together with a fourth union, that of electricity employees which had earlier broken away, formed a new federation, as described below. (For details of the dispute see *Jaridah, Dec 2*.)

Following the rift only twelve unions were represented at an executive meeting of the Federation on Dec 6 [see below]. (*Answer, Dec 7*)

The Federation of Labour Unions in Lebanon (*ittihad an-niqabat al-ummadiyah fi lubnan*). On Dec 6 representatives of the four unions referred to above met and appointed a constituent committee to establish a new federation. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the IPC and Tripoli refinery unions [making up the six unions whose representatives apparently stayed away from the meeting of the United Trade Unions on the same day—see above]. (*Jaridah, Dec 2; Jaridah, Dec 3; Answer, Dec 7*)

The League of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees (*jam'iyat niqabat al-umm al-mustahidah*), founded in 1947, was Lebanon's first trade union federation, according to *As-Siyasah*. In 1961 it consisted of 17 unions and was a member of the ICFU. It was headed by Hussein Ali Hussein and reportedly comprised unions of: bakers, upholsterers, pharmacists' assistants, cinema projector operators, taxi drivers, theatre and cinema actors, barbers and employees in groceries, commerce, cinemas, film studios, Shell, Mobilil [the two latter belonged, according to another version, to the Federation of United Unions—see above], printing, sewing, tourist agencies and greengroceries. (*Siyasah, Dec 5*)

Another source said the federation comprised 22 unions, but gave no details. (*Answer*, Nov 25)

The Federation of Independent Trade Unions (*ittihād an-niqabāt al-mustaqillah*), headed by Na'im Kraydi, was established in 1954. In 1961, it reportedly comprised 13 unions in: mechanical trades, kerosene retailing, tanning, tile manufacturing, port workers (the Beirut port employees belong to the United Trade Unions, see above and under Strikes), pharmaceuticals (clerks and shop assistants), dyeing, goldsmiths, groomers, clerks on ships, and customs clerks. (*Siyasah*, Dec 5)

The federation was said to be neutralist and a member of the [UAR-sponsored] International Federation of Arab Trade Unions (IFATU). (*Answer*, Nov 25)

The Federation of Unaffiliated Trade Union (*ittihād an-niqabāt al-munfaridah*), a small federation with pronounced leftist leanings, was a member of the IFATU (*Answer*, Nov 25). [Its activities were quite thoroughly covered in the unofficial organ of the Lebanese Communist party, *An-Nida'*.]

The Federation of Trade Unions in the North (*ittihād niqabāt as-shimāl*), headed by Mustafa Hamzah, included 13 unions in the Tripoli area. It was also a member of the IFATU. (*Siyasah*, Dec 5)

STRIKES

The wave of strikes in 1960 continued into 1961. Strikes against private companies were partially successful, but government employees proved powerless, because of a law that empowered the government to dismiss strikers.

Abortive Strikes of Government Employees. At the end of Dec 1960 the Physicians Union (*niqabāt al-atibbā*) demanded a salary rise and protection against the influx of Arab physicians, now numbering 125, who had come as political refugees. The union denied that its members had gone on strike, while the Minister of Health insisted that they had, but that the strike had failed. Fearing that the minister intended to have its council dissolved, the union went to Sabri Hamādah, the President of the Chamber, to explain their position. The minister stated, however, that the council could not be legally dissolved, and said he regarded the affair as closed. (*Jaridah*, Jan 1, 4, 7; *Hayat*, Jan 4, 6)

On Jan 23 about 500 court employees went on strike for higher wages, despite a government warning that any striker would be dismissed. On Jan 31 the government dismissed 54 ringleaders. Students of the Jesuit University and the University of Lebanon held a one-hour solidarity strike; a number of deputies and Patriarch Ma'ūshi asked that the dismissed employees be reinstated. The government, however, only reduced the number of those dismissed to 31 (*Hayat*, Jan 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, Feb 1, 2, 3, 4). Later it was reported that the dismissed clerks had declared their readiness to undergo a special examination in order to be allowed to return to work. (*Hayat*, Feb 12)

A strike of temporary employees in the government-owned telephone service broke out on Aug 29, after the failure of negotiations. The employees had demanded permanency after a year's work, sick pay, family allowances, paid annual vacations, paid maternity leave, reimbursement for travel to work, payment of cost-of-living allowances as from the beginning of 1961, and insurance against traffic accidents during working hours. The strikers

numbered 800 according to the workers, but the government said they numbered only 120. Many of the temporary workers did not take part.

Sulaymān Faranjīyah, the Minister of Posts, said that all the strikers would be dismissed (*Hayat*, Aug 30). [After a similar warning in 1960 the strikers immediately returned to work—MER 1960, p. 363.] The strikers issued a pamphlet defending the right to strike. The unions tried to mediate, but the government refused to negotiate while the strike was in progress, and on Sept 5 the minister announced that he now considered all strikers as dismissed. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Sept 6)

On Oct 13 the strikers and their families demonstrated and called on the government to allow them to return to work. On Oct 25 all except ten, who were considered the ringleaders, were reinstated. (*Hayat*, Oct 14, 26)

Strikes Against Private Employees Partly Successful. On May 19 workers in the Aridah Textile Plant in Tripoli struck for a 10% wage increase. When negotiations failed, all the textile workers in the United Trade Unions joined the strike on May 25; the number in Beirut and Tripoli was estimated at 3,300, out of 7,000 in the whole country. The workers demonstrated in Tripoli and several were arrested. The employees at the Aridah factory staged a sit-down strike and were removed by the police. (*Hayat*, May 20, 21, 23, 27; *Orient*, May 25, 26)

The strike ended on June 3 after a compromise on wages had been reached. There was agreement on the fixing of a minimum wage as provided in the wage law; payment of strike pay; and increases of 15% on monthly wages up to £L150, 8% from £L151 to £L300, and 5% for wages over £L300. [For details see *Hayat*, June 4.]

On Aug 14 a new strike broke out in the Aridah factory in protest against the discharge of three hundred workers owing to lack of work. The strike ended on Aug 16 after the Union of Textile Workers had undertaken to find employment for the discharged men. (*Hayat*, Aug 15, 18)

The United Trade Unions announced on May 26 that after June 2 it would call a strike in any factory that would not act upon the new wage—for which see below (*Hayat*, *Orient*, May 27). Accordingly, 1,200 workers in Beirut harbour [which belongs to the government, but is run by a private concern], struck on June 2, and the United Trade Unions announced a one-hour solidarity strike of all its members. On June 6 the strike ended with a temporary arrangement, but was renewed on Aug 4 when no permanent agreement was reached. It came to an end on Aug 11 after an agreement raising the monthly minimum wage from £L 125 to £L132.5 and providing for a general increase of 6%, strike pay, and improved conditions for temporary workers. (*Hayat*, June 3, 7, Aug 12; *Orient*, Aug 5, 12)

On Aug 11 employees of the Qadisha Electric Company in Tripoli struck in protest against the discharge of four workers. They were supported by the Federation of Trade Unions of the North, to which their union belonged. The strike ended the following day after the management had agreed to re-engage the discharged workmen. (*Hayat*, Aug 12, 13)

In Aug the independent Union of Hotel and Restaurant Employees, reportedly comprising 8,000 permanent and 6,000 seasonal workers, threatened to strike if their demands for wage increases and better working conditions were not met. The Union of Hotel Clerks and Workers, belonging to the United Trade Unions, announced its readiness to staff the hotels if the strike took

place (*Hayat*, Aug 15). The threat to strike was quickly settled, owing to pressure and mediation by the government which feared injury to the tourist trade. The agreement provided for family allowances, the exclusion of aliens from the trade, payment for holidays, and supply of working clothes. (*Hayat*, Aug 17)

LABOUR LEGISLATION

The Wage Law (*qanūn al-ujūr*). The various labour unions disagreed on the recommendations of a Cabinet committee on wages, which had recommended on Dec 9, 1960 that from Jan 1, 1961, the minimum monthly wage should be raised from £L94 to £L125, and wages in general by 15% in view of the increase in the cost of living since 1955. (See MER 1960, pp 363-4.) [The index, however, had risen more; see MER 1960, p 362.] (See also Economic Survey, above, for actual wages.) At the beginning of Jan, several unions announced that they would strike if the Chamber would not approve the bill unamended. (*Hayat*, Jan 4)

The Cabinet approved a bill giving effect to the recommendations on Feb 1. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Feb 2)

The Chamber passed the bill as detailed above on April 14, and the law was officially published on May 19. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, April 15, May 21; for complete text see CDL, June 1961.)

The Social Security Bill (*qanūn ad-damūn al-ijtimā'ī*). At the beginning of the year the government discussed a social security bill, the first of its kind to be introduced in Lebanon. It provided for: (1) health insurance (including maternity benefits); (2) work accident insurance; (3) family allowances for dependent children up to a maximum of five; (4) retirement pensions.

In the first stage, the scheme was to apply to all wage-earners, with the following exceptions: agricultural workers would enjoy work accident insurance only and only if the accident was caused by a machine powered by

other than man or animal energy; domestic servants would enjoy health insurance only; state employees would enjoy work accident and health insurance only. In the second stage agricultural workers would be subject to all provisions of the law. According to *Al-Hayat*, the second stage was to comprise "the fellahin and the other popular classes." (*Hayat*, Feb 22; *Mid. East Forum*, April)

On Feb 21 the Cabinet decided that the scheme would be largely financed by the employers. The government would contribute in proportion to the number of civil servants, and only a very small contribution would be made by the employees. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Feb 22)

On March 15 the Cabinet approved the bill in principle and set up a committee, composed of the Ministers of Finance, Planning and Labour, to consider its implementation. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, *Orient*, March 16)

The labour unions, particularly the Federation of United Trade Unions, seriously objected to the scheme, which the latter said was hastily drawn up and disregarded the absence of reliable labour statistics. They also argued that there were no guarantees that the bill would be implemented by the employers and demanded a government subsidy to assure implementation. Some unions maintained that the social benefits they had already gained were far superior to those proposed in the bill.

Objections also came from the employers, on the ground that the financial hazards involved were unforeseeable; they too demanded a government subsidy. (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, Feb 22; *Mid. East Forum*, April; CDL, Jan, April; *Orient*, April 15)

Answering these criticisms, Pierre Jumayil [who throughout the year enthusiastically supported the plan] said that the government had already allocated £L1 million for the implementation of the scheme (*Orient*, Aug 1). On Aug 9, the government finally adopted the bill with several amendments. (*Hayat*; *Jaridah*, Aug 10)

[The bill had not been introduced in the Chamber by the end of the year.]

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYNOPSIS

Lebanon's foreign policy continued unchanged from the previous year; (see MER 1960, p 366). It was designed primarily to preserve the country's independence and internal unity in face of the division between the Muslim pan-Arab sector and the Christian sector which advocated a "Lebanese Lebanon" and was pro-Western. The government therefore sought to pursue a neutral course both in Arab affairs and the world at large.

In spite of its quest for neutrality, however, the government was repeatedly involved in inter-Arab conflicts by both internal and external political elements. (For details see above: Synopsis of Internal Affairs.) According to Syrian accusations, Lebanese territory was repeatedly utilized as a base for subversive activities against Syria: by Jordan before Syria's secession from the UAR, by Cairo after the union had broken up. When conflicts occurred, Lebanon sometimes sought to mediate between the parties.

Lebanon participated in the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned Countries. She had, however, not been invited to the preparatory conference in Cairo; a Cairo paper explained that though she had declared herself non-aligned, she had in practice followed Western policies. The Lebanese Foreign Minister thereupon explained Lebanon's neutralism: she did not prefer one country to another, no foreign bases would be allowed on her territory and she regarded herself bound only by the Arab League Charter. In the end Lebanon was invited to the conference after the basis for participation had been widened. At the conference, PM Sīlām reiterated that Lebanon's non-alignment was "linked to its people's unity and to its independence"; he was non-committal on the world issues that occupied the conference.

At the UN General Assembly Lebanon's voting record, like that of all other Arab countries, showed a much higher rate of coincidence with that of Communist than

with that of Western countries. Nevertheless, she was placed among those Arab countries which voted relatively more often with the West. At both the 15th and 16th sessions only Tunisia's, Jordan's and Libya's votes coincided more frequently with those of the US, while at the 15th session Lebanon's vote coincided less often with the Communist countries than that of any other Arab country.

Official relations with the Western countries continued to be friendly, whilst the Muslim pan-Arab sector often attacked them. A courtesy call of the 6th Fleet to Beirut provoked some internal opposition and attacks by the Communist press. USOM wound up its activities in Lebanon, after having spent some \$64m. since the Point Four programme was inaugurated in 1951; on the other hand an agreement was signed for the supply of US surplus grain. The US also supplied ammunition, and arms were also reportedly shipped.

The UK was accused by Pan-Arab spokesmen of plotting against the country, especially in connection with the attempted NSP coup. The British Middle East Centre of Arab Studies in Shamlan was denounced as a spy training centre and its closure was demanded; this the government did not agree to. The opposition similarly complained about IRFED, a French private association, which had been appointed by the government to advise on development. A technical agreement was signed with Western Germany.

The USSR approved Lebanon's policy of neutrality but protested indirectly against the US 6th Fleet visit and

directly against a clause in the Lebanese-West German agreement which, it said, illegally treated West Berlin as part of the GFR and thus violated Lebanon's neutrality. It was reported that Lebanon had rejected an offer of Soviet aid. Routine trade and other relations continued with the USSR and East European countries.

In Africa, Lebanon's policy was to strengthen her relations on the continent and "combat Israel activity"; her special concern, however, was the Lebanese emigrants, estimated at close to 130,000 (see MER 1960, p 364). Complaints mounted by emigrants, who claimed that their interests, which were mostly financial and mercantile, were being seriously endangered by the policy of the newly independent African states. The Lebanese government concerned itself more and more with their affairs, and intervened on their behalf. Towards the end of the year it was reported that large sums were reaching Lebanese banks from West African countries and that Lebanese merchants there intended to return to their home country. Many projects for the strengthening of relations with African countries in the political, economic and cultural spheres were given publicity but only a few were put into effect. The extension of diplomatic relations was apparently affected by the reluctance of Lebanese diplomats to assume African posts.

Lebanon's position as a *laissez-faire* Arab mercantile and financial centre also played a part in her foreign relations: a number of countries sought to establish marketing centres for the Arab and African markets in the free port of Beirut: Argentina for frozen meat, Brazil for coffee and Japan for general goods.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

THE UNITED STATES

Eisenhower Doctrine "Dead and Buried." The Eisenhower Doctrine (see MER 1960, p 367) came up for discussion again in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies at the beginning of 1961. On Jan 25, replying to Emile Bustani, PM Slâm stated that "as far as Lebanon is concerned the Eisenhower Doctrine is dead and buried and no power in the world can restore it to life." Raymond Eddé demanded that the government should officially announce its attitude and not confine itself to declarations in the Chamber. (*Hayat*, Jan 26, 27)

Question of Visits by US Sixth Fleet. On March 21 eight ships of the American Sixth Fleet called at Beirut harbour for a visit. Kamâl Junblât objected to the visit on the ground that it was of a political propaganda character. (*Hayat*, March 22)

PM Slâm stated, when the commander of the Fleet and the US Ambassador came to visit him, that there was a basic difference between the present call and that in 1958. Then, the Fleet had come to intervene in favour of certain elements, while now the visit was a courtesy call authorized by the government (*Hayat*; *Jaridah*; *Anwar*, March 23). (See MER 1960, p 367.)

On March 23, a time bomb was discovered near the American embassy in Beirut. (*Orient*, March 24)

In Sept, news of an additional impending visit of the Sixth Fleet provoked a wave of Communist press attacks. An official spokesman replied that Lebanon's harbours were not closed to ships of friendly nations.

The visit was postponed however [and had not taken

place by the end of the year]. (*Hayat*, Oct 11; *Amal*, Oct 19)

Lebanon's Reply to Kennedy's Note on Arab-Israel Question. See p 200 a.

Economic Aid, Trade. For items of aid see table, p 75.

At the beginning of Feb PM Slâm announced that agreement had been reached in principle with the US for the supply to Lebanon under Public Law 480, of 225,000 tons of American surplus grain over the next three years. Payment would be made in local currency, most of which would be loaned to Lebanon to finance development projects (*MEED*, Feb 17). The loan was to be repayable within fifteen years at 3½%. (*Jaridah*, Feb 9)

It was reported that the Lebanese Planning Council (*majlis al-tasimim*) and the Economic Department of the Foreign Office objected that the terms of the loan did not suit Lebanese economic interests, and that PM Slâm and the Foreign Office had conducted secret negotiations with the US Ambassador to amend the terms. This was denied by Slâm and the director of the department concerned. (*Anwar*, March 2; *Jaridah*, March 5, April 2)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

USOM Activities. After official Lebanese statements that the Point Four agency [this term continued to be used in the Lebanese press though it had officially ceased to exist] would discontinue its activities in the country, which were followed by counter-statements, it was agreed

at the beginning of May that the agency would continue the projects it had started. These included the laying of about eight hundred kilometres of roads and the development of Beirut airport. (*Jaridah*, Feb 1, 8, May 4)

An American source in Lebanon stated in Sept that \$64 million had been spent on the Point Four Program in Lebanon since 1951. He said the Agency was about to wind up its activities because African states were more in need of them than Lebanon, which had already achieved excellent economic conditions. (*Jaridah*, Sept 22)

Later it was reported that the director of the agency had formally announced to the government that its activities in Lebanon would be wound up on June 8, 1962. (*Jaridah*, Nov 8)

Military Aid. A shipment of American ammunition arrived in Beirut on Feb 15 in accordance with an agreement signed in June 1960. It comprised two hundred tons of light and heavy ammunition and spare parts for vehicles, tanks and cannon. (*Hayat*, Feb 16)

In June an Egyptian paper reported that the US had sent Lebanon a gift of jet planes, armoured cars, large quantities of arms and wireless equipment. (*Akhbar*, Cairo, June 28)

Aid in Atomic Research. In Feb the government authorized the US government to set up an atomic exhibition in Beirut. (*Hayat*; *Amal*, Feb 4)

It was announced on Sept 2 that a first shipment of American atomic equipment had reached Beirut. It would be used in a joint Lebanese-American research project, and also for the training of Lebanese scientists in the utilization of atomic energy. (See MER 1960, p 367.) (*R. Beirut*, Sept 2-IMB, Sept 3)

Mutual Facilities. In April it was reported that an ordinance had been prepared exempting US citizens from taxes imposed on foreign citizens holding local work permits. Lebanese citizens were to be similarly treated in the US. (*Anwar*, April 5)

In July it was reported that the US government had agreed to waive dues on Lebanese merchant ships in American harbours. American ships had enjoyed a similar exemption in Beirut harbour since 1959. (*Jaridah*, July 26)

An agreement was signed at the beginning of Jan for the Voice of America to broadcast the Lebanese program aimed at Lebanese emigrants all over the world. (*Nahar*, Jan 11)

American Missions. A US medical mission arrived in Lebanon in March to study the nutrition of the poor and the middle classes. (*MENA*, March 17 [W 23])

A mission including the American Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and Department of Justice officials arrived in Beirut on Nov 10. One of its aims was to coordinate the fight against the smuggling of drugs to the US through Lebanon. (*Jaridah*, Nov 11)

On Nov 25 a six-man American Congress mission arrived in Lebanon for an official visit. After meeting with the mission, PM Karāmi said they had discussed current questions, particularly "the Palestine problem." (*Hayat*, Nov 26, 27)

WESTERN EUROPE, YUGOSLAVIA, BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Australia. In Jan an Australian commercial representative came to Beirut to discuss the extension of trade ties. (*Hayat*, Jan 11)

The first and only Australian diplomatic representative in Lebanon, a commercial attaché, took up his duties in Aug. (*Amal*, July 20; *Hayat*, Aug 6)

Austria. An Austrian economic mission arrived for an official visit on Feb 2. [It had also visited Jordan and Syria.] (*Hayat*, Feb 4; *R. Amman*, Feb 6-IMB, Feb 7)

In Oct negotiations were reported on a comprehensive aviation agreement. [No agreement had been signed by the end of the year.] (*Jaridah*, Oct 11)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

Canada. In July it was reported that the Lebanese authorities had been asked to permit the extension of the plans for the Canadian grain silos to be built in Lebanon as a centre of Canada's wheat trade in the ME. (*Jaridah*, July 13)

On Nov 25 PM Karāmi discussed with Canadian experts, in the presence of the Canadian Ambassador, a project for an aerial survey of Lebanon. (*Jaridah*, Nov 26)

Denmark. The Lebanese and Danish legations were raised to the rank of embassy. (*Jaridah*, Nov 15)

France. There were several complaints about French experts operating in Lebanon. In the Chamber a deputy claimed that they were using obsolete methods of management, and they were accused of killing all personal initiative on the part of Lebanese workers. IRFED was even blamed for the closing down of Point Four activities (see under US). (*Hayat*, March 3, May 6)

IRFED—Institut international de recherche et de formation en vue de développement—was a private, independent association established in Paris and directed by Père Louis-Joseph Lebert. On the invitation of the Lebanese government in 1958, the association sent a mission of experts to prepare a report on the social and economic situation. (*CDL*, Nov 1960, April 1961)

On Jan 11 the Lebanese government signed a contract with the Electricité de France company for the building of a dam as part of the Litani project. (*Hayat*, Jan 12)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

German Federal Republic. In Oct the GFR and Lebanon concluded an agreement on technical assistance.

Talks on economic and technical assistance from the GFR had already been held in 1960 (see MER 1960, pp 367-8). Lebanon had announced her intention of requesting technical aid from West Germany at the beginning of Jan, and talks began in Beirut later in the month. It was reported that the agreement was supported by the US, who had requested her allies to ease her financial burdens by assisting friendly nations. (*Hayat*, Jan 27, April 29; *Nahar*, Feb 8)

In June government sources denied rumours that German aid involved military or political obligations on Lebanon's part. (*Hayat*, June 8)

Agreement was reached on Oct 20. The GFR was to supply technical aid in the form of know-how and equipment; German experts would conduct surveys of agriculture and industry and help to set up institutions for scientific training. Scholarships would be granted to Lebanese students for study in German factories and scientific institutions. (For full text, see *CDL*, Dec 1961; see also: The USSR on Soviet protest.) (*Hayat*, Oct 21)

On March 20 an aviation agreement between Lebanon and the GFR was signed in Beirut (*Hayat*, March 21). In Dec the Lebanese Middle East Airlines and Lufthansa

concluded an agreement for cooperation and division of passengers. (MEED, Dec 8)

On April 12 the GFR and Lebanon signed a criminal extradition treaty. (Hayat, April 13)

A four-man mission from the German Social Democrat party arrived in Beirut on April 21, as guests of the government, to study labour problems, culture and tourism (Anwar, April 22). In May Sulaymān Faranjīyah, the Lebanese Minister of Posts, and Uthmān Dana, the Minister of Public Works, visited the GFR. Faranjīyah discussed postal cooperation with his opposite number. (Hayat, May 14)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

Italy. An Italian trade delegation arrived in Lebanon in May to explore investment opportunities in development projects, including the enlarging of Beirut harbour, road construction and land amelioration. (Hayat, May 17; R. Beirut, May 17 [W, 25])

In July the government announced that Italians working in Lebanon would be exempted from the tax on foreign workers. A similar concession had been granted to Lebanese workers in Italy. (Anwar, July 29)

An Italian firm was awarded a roadmaking contract. (Anwar, Oct 29)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

Switzerland. In April an ordinance was issued exempting Swiss nationals in Lebanon from taxes on bolders of work permits, in recognition of reciprocity on the part of Switzerland. (Anwar, April 5)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

United Kingdom. The UK was accused by the opposition and Kamāl Junblāt, the Minister of Education, of subversive activities.

In Feb Junblāt announced that he had information about a British Intelligence plot to assassinate various Lebanese and Arab statesmen. He declared that Camille Sham'un was implicated, and warned the government to keep a close watch on British agents in Lebanon. (Anwar, Feb 9; Hawadith, Feb 10)

Several (pro-UAR) papers attacked the British Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies (MECAS) in the village of Shamlan, near Beirut. They claimed that the Centre was training British spies and meddling in Lebanon's internal affairs. (Hawadith, Feb 1; Siyasa, Feb 11)

[The Centre was established in 1944 in Jerusalem by the British Foreign Office to train personnel for ME assignments. It was transferred to Jordan in 1947, and moved to Lebanon in 1948. (Times, April 14)]

Following these reports Junblāt demanded the closing of MECAS. (Jaridah, March 3, June 7; Anwar, April 12, May 6)

A British source said that the Centre's activities were limited to Arabic and Islamic studies. There were many Arab teachers on its staff and its students included Commonwealth citizens from Ghana and the Asian countries, as well as British Foreign Office personnel. (Times, April 14)

At the end of May it was reported that the Lebanese government had decided to close MECAS, but at the end of July the Foreign Minister announced that to the best of his knowledge it was not engaged in espionage. On July 31, in answer to a question in the Chamber, the government announced that MECAS was operating legally and would not be closed. (Anwar, May 28; Jaridah, June 7, July 25; Hayat, Times, Aug 1)

[Pro-UAR] papers alleged that the British embassy

had had a hand in the attempt on Sā'ib Slam's life at the beginning of March. (See p 389.)

A British parliamentary delegation arrived on May 18 for an unofficial visit. (Hayat, May 19)

UAR sources as well as some Lebanese politicians and (pro-UAR) newspapers accused the UK of having supported the abortive coup d'état of the Nationalist Social party at the end of Dec. (See p 403 a.)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

Yugoslavia. On Jan 20 it was reported that diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Yugoslavia would be raised to embassy rank (Hayat, Jan 21), but in a list of diplomatic missions carried by Al-Jaridah at the beginning of Nov the Lebanese mission in Belgrade still appeared as a legation. (Jaridah, Nov 2)

Negotiations on a cultural agreement were also reported in Jan (Jaridah, Jan 15; Hayat, Jan 20). [No reports were found on the conclusion of such an agreement during the year.]

It was reported in May that a Yugoslavian concern had won a contract for work in the Litani river development project. (Kul-Shay, May 6)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES THE USSR

Keeping Lebanon Neutral; Protest Against US Sixth Fleet Visit. On Lebanon's Independence Day, as in the previous year (see MER 1960, p 78), Pravda expressed approval of the country's policy of neutrality: "The Lebanese people strives for the continuation of the policy of neutralism and non-participation in military alliances." It recalled the USSR's role in bringing about the evacuation of foreign troops from Lebanon in 1946 and 1958. "The Soviet Union is the loyal friend of the Arabs," the paper declared. (Pravda, Nov 22)

At a reception at Friendship House, Moscow, the Lebanese Ambassador emphasized Lebanese-Soviet friendship and Lebanese neutrality. (Tass, Nov 22 [SU 24])

The Soviet press quoted Lebanese protests against the visit of the US Sixth Fleet in March, including an allegation that it was intended to exert pressure during the election campaign [in 1960?—there were no elections in 1961]. (Atiya 1 Afrika Segodnya, Nos. 5, 6, 1961, quoted in Misan, Dec 1961; this article also contains an appreciation of Lebanese politics. See also Trud, March 3; Krasnaya Zvezda, March 10, 21, 24, 26; Pravda, March 14.) In Oct, a Lebanese spokesman replied to Lebanese Communist press attacks that Lebanon's harbours were not closed to ships of foreign nations. (Amal, Oct 19)

Cultural Relations; Soviet Cultural Aid Offer? On Jan 19 a Soviet cultural mission, headed by M. Prokofiev, Deputy Minister of Education, arrived in Beirut to discuss student exchanges and expansion of cultural ties. The Education Ministry accepted an offer to arrange a study tour in the USSR for Lebanese technology lecturers. (Hayat, Jan 20, 21; Jaridah, Jan 21)

It was reported, but denied by a Soviet embassy spokesman, that the USSR had offered Lebanon cultural aid (Nahar, Feb 15; Hayat, Feb 22). On March 9 Kamāl Junblāt, the Minister of Education, spoke of talks on a Soviet loan to the Ministry (ANA, March 9 [11]). [No such loan had been reported by the end of the year.]

In Feb a reception on the 75th birthday of the Lebanese writer Marūn Abbūd was held at Friendship House, Moscow, organized by the Soviet Society for Friendship

and Cultural Relations with countries of the Arab East, the Soviet Writers' Union and the Asian Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It was attended by the Lebanese Ambassador, Soviet writers and scholars, and Arab students in the USSR. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Feb 9 [SU 11])

In May Dr Georges Hanna, president of the Society for Cultural Relations between Lebanon and the USSR, held a reception in Beirut in honour of the visit of Aram Khachaturian, the Soviet composer. (*Tass in English*, May 19 [SU 24])

Trade Relations. A protocol, extending the Soviet-Lebanese trade agreement of 1954 for another three years and increasing trade in each direction from £1.15m. to £1.20m. (\$6.8m.—\$9.1m.) annually, was signed in Beirut on Jan 23. The USSR undertook to buy Lebanese fruit to the value of one-third of Soviet exports to Lebanon (*Tass*, Jan 23 [W Feb 9]; *Hayat*, Jan 24; for full text see *CDL*, March 1961) (See also MER 1960, pp 57-8). During the negotiations the chairman of the Lebanese Manufacturers' Association publicly expressed the hope that the USSR would stop dumping on the Lebanese market industrial products, such as finished cotton goods, which injured local industry and labour. (*Hayat*, Jan 17) It was reported that Lebanon had rejected a Soviet offer for fuel oil on easier terms than those obtained from the West. (*Kul Shay*, Jan 14)

The Lebanese government ratified the agreement on June 21. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, June 23 [SU 27])

[There were many reports in the Lebanese press on trade with the USSR, especially on fruit exports, which met with difficulties in Western markets.]

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

Soviet Loan Offer Rejected. It was reported in Feb and March—and repeatedly denied by Lebanese government sources—that the USSR had offered a loan to Lebanon (*Anwar*, Feb 16; *Jaridah*, March 23). According to another source, the Lebanese Foreign Minister expressed readiness to accept a loan, but not Soviet experts (*Haqadith*, March 3). A similar report appeared in August (*Kul Shay*, Aug 5), but according to *Al-Hayat* a minister had stated that a USSR offer for a loan or technical aid had been refused and would not be repeated. (*Hayat*, Aug 15)

Soviet Armenian Ambassador-designate Rejected. The replacement of USSR Ambassador S.P. Kiktev set off extended negotiations. Lebanon objected to the candidate proposed because of his Armenian extraction. Finally, at the beginning of July, the USSR announced the appointment of Vasilii Korniev, USSR Consul-General in Damascus, to the post. (*Anwar*, March 15; *Al-Yaum*, June 4; *Nahar*, July 1; *Hayat*, July 11; *Izvestia*, Sept 17)

Political Propaganda Issues. At the end of May Lebanese Communist newspapers attacked the government for censoring a film of the space-flight of Yuri Gagarin, the Soviet cosmonaut, claiming that an American film on a similar topic had not been censored. The censorship authorities answered that only sequences containing Communist propaganda had been censored, since the law prohibited political propaganda in films. The USSR embassy refused to show the censored film. (*Nida*, *Anwar*, May 24; *Pravda*, May 25; *Hayat*, June 4)

An American record was removed from the Lebanese market following a protest by the Soviet embassy on the ground that it praised the Russian pre-revolutionary era,

thus injuring the friendly relations between the two countries. (*Nahar*, Sept 2)

Contacts with the Greek Orthodox Church. On July 15 the Metropolitan of Antakya (Antioch), Ilya Salibi, head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Lebanon and Syria, gave a farewell reception for Kiktev, the outgoing Soviet Ambassador. He praised the traditional relations between the local community and the Russian Church and people, and thanked the Ambassador for his efforts to further these relations and his aid to the Greek Orthodox community in Beirut (*Nahar*, July 16). (The Russian Church donated the equipment for the Greek-Orthodox hospital in Beirut. See MER 1960, p 78.)

Soviet Protests Against Lebanese GFR Relations. On July 14 the Soviet Ambassador drew the attention of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry to the "misconduct" of the West German embassy in Beirut, which used the title "The German Embassy" in its correspondence. (*Izvestia*, July 16)

On Dec 12 the USSR embassy demanded the cancellation of the clause in the Lebanese-West German technical cooperation agreement of Oct 20, which made the agreement applicable to West Berlin (see p 408 b; for full text see *CDL*, Dec 1961), and which, it said, illegally treated Berlin as part of the GFR. The embassy statement added that public opinion might regard this as encouragement of West German aggressive intentions against Democratic Germany. Moscow Radio commented that this was a direct blow at Lebanon's official policy of positive neutralism. (*ANA*, Dec 12 [14]; *R. Moscow in Arabic*, Dec 14 [SU 16]; *Hayat*, Dec 13)

In reply, Foreign Minister Taqia declared that the agreement was absolutely valid, but said he wished to avoid a verbal battle with the USSR (*Hayat*, Dec 16). *Kul Shay* wrote that the real reason behind the Soviet protest was Lebanon's unyielding attitude to local Communist activity. (*Kul Shay*, Dec 16)

Lenin Peace Prize Awarded to a Lebanese. The Lenin Peace Prize for 1961 was awarded on May 1 to Anton Thabit, a Lebanese engineer (a leader of the Lebanese Peace Partisans). In June he was presented with the prize by a Soviet academician in Beirut. (*Pravda*, May 1, June 27; *Tass*, May 2 [SU 4]; *Nida*, June 7)

OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Bulgaria. A Bulgarian delegation which arrived in Beirut on Nov 1 proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations and closer trade ties (*ANA*, Nov 2 [W 9]). [By the end of the year no diplomatic representatives had been exchanged and no trade agreement signed.]

Czechoslovakia. On Feb 20 an aviation agreement was signed between Czechoslovakia and Lebanon, providing for two direct weekly return flights—one from each country. (*Hayat*, Feb 21; see also MER 1960, p 78.)

In April the Federation of Independent Trade Unions in Lebanon accepted an invitation from the Czech Workers' Organization for representatives to visit their country. (*Amal*, April 22)

A protocol was signed in Beirut on Nov 7 increasing the value of trade between the two countries from £1.9 million (\$4.1 million) to £12 million (\$5.5 million). Czechoslovakia would buy 7,500 tons of Lebanese citrus fruits annually and use 55% of the income from its exports to Lebanon for the purchase of Lebanese products. (*CDL*, Dec 1961)

For volume of trade see table: ME Foreign Trade.

During the year Czechoslovakia granted ten scholarships to Lebanese students. (*Jaridah*, April 2, Dec 9)

In the middle of Dec an official Lebanese cultural mission left for Czechoslovakia. (*Hayat*, Dec 12)

German Democratic Republic. A trade protocol, signed on May 22, raised the annual value of trade between Lebanon and East Germany from £17.5 million to £21.5 million. East Germany undertook to buy 8,000 tons of citrus fruits annually and allocate 65% of the income from its exports to Lebanon for the purchase of Lebanese products and transit goods. (*ANA*, May 22 [25]; *Jaridah*, May 23)

For volume of trade, see table: ME Foreign Trade.

Poland. Diplomatic representation was raised to embassy rank. On March 14 the Polish minister presented his credentials as ambassador to the Lebanese Foreign Minister. (*Anwar*, March 15)

A Lebanese-Polish trade agreement, signed on Oct 5, replacing the 1956 agreement, which expired at the end of the year, provided for trade of up to £19 million each way, and undertook to import 5,000 tons of citrus, among other agricultural products, yearly. (*Hayat*, Oct 6). (For full text see *CDE*, Nov 1961.)

NON-ARAB MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

Cyprus. On Jan 5 the Cypriot Vice-President, Dr Fazil Küçük, arrived in Beirut "for a special visit." He met the Maronite Patriarch, Bulus Ma'ushi, and the Minister of Economy, and announced that Cyprus would open an embassy in Beirut during the year to foster political and economic relations. (*Hayat*, Jan 6, 10, 18)

At the end of April a Cypriot parliamentary and government delegation held talks in Beirut on the improvement of political and economic relations. (*R. Beirut*, April 29 [May 2])

A Cypriot economic delegation conducted talks in Beirut on trade and aviation agreements in Nov and it was reported that the talks would be resumed "shortly" in Nicosia. Lebanon had reportedly refused a request that Cyprus Airways should be allowed to pick up passengers in Beirut on flights to the Persian Gulf. (*R. Beirut*, Nov 13 [15]; *ANA*, Nov 20 [W, 30])

In Nov the Lebanese authorities decided to set up a permanent exhibition of industrial and agricultural products in Cyprus. It was reported that Cyprus was willing to facilitate the sale of Lebanese goods by reducing tariffs. (*Jaridah*, Nov 14)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

Ethiopia. In June it was reported that Lebanon would establish an embassy in Ethiopia. (*Anwar*, June 20). [This had not been done by the end of 1961. The Lebanese Ambassador to Sudan remained accredited to Ethiopia as well. The Emperor of Ethiopia's visit to Lebanon, forecast in 1960, did not take place in 1961 (see MER 1960, p 369).]

Iran. At the beginning of April it was agreed to extend the aviation agreement between Iran and Lebanon. (*Hayat*, Feb 24, April 6)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

Israel. See the Arab-Israel Conflict.

Somalia. In July three students left Hargeisa for Beirut to study agronomy. (*R. Mogadishu*, July 27 [W Aug 3])

Turkey. In Feb it was reported that opium was being smuggled from Turkey to Lebanon by boat. (*Anwar*, Feb 5)

On May 27 the Lebanese customs authorities uncovered a large gang engaged in smuggling into Lebanon, from Turkey, arms bearing Turkish army marks. Machineguns, rifles, pistols, hand-grenades and ammunition were found in Beirut. [No mention was made of the consignee of these arms.] (*Jaridah*, *Anwar*, May 28)

At the end of the same month a [pro-UAR] paper reported that a Turkish spy net working in the interests of Israel had been discovered in Lebanon. (*Siyassah*, May 25)

In July the Lebanese authorities rejected a Turkish demand to extradite a Kurdish leader with Turkish citizenship, on the grounds that he was a political refugee. (*Nahar*, July 27)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina. It was reported in Nov that the Argentine government had asked for permission to erect cold storage facilities in the free port of Beirut harbour to store Argentine meat destined for Middle Eastern and African markets. *Al-Jaridah*, reporting this, remarked that all requests for facilities in the free port were readily accepted by the Lebanese authorities. (*Jaridah*, Nov 26)

Brazil. At the end of March an agreement was signed permitting the Brazilian Centre for Coffee Marketing to erect storehouses in the free area of Beirut harbour. (*Jaridah*, March 23). See MER 1960, p 368.

On July 16 a Brazilian delegation arrived in Lebanon to supervise the setting up of a coffee marketing centre and discussed the development of trade. (*Hayat*, July 18; *ANA*, July 16 [W, 20]). When local coffee merchants protested that the centre would damage their business, the government replied that it would be of benefit to the country. (*Hayat*, Aug 11, 13)

It was agreed that Brazilian ships bringing coffee would carry back to Brazil apples, grapes and pears from Lebanon; the talks touched on the formation of a combined company to foster trade. (*Hayat*, Aug 11, 13)

In Aug Pierre Eddeh, chairman of the Lebanese Bank Union, left for Brazil for talks on economic relations. (*Hayat*, Aug 15)

Colombia. On June 21 a cultural agreement was signed in Bogota between Lebanon and Colombia. One of the aims of the agreement, valid for three years, was to encourage reciprocal tourism. (*Jaridah*, June 22)

Cuba. In Jan the Lebanese government informed Cuba, through the latter's chargé d'affaires in Beirut, of its interest in the situation of Lebanese emigrants in Cuba. (*Hayat*, Jan 13)

Peru. At the beginning of Dec a commercial delegation from Peru discussed with the Lebanese authorities the expansion of trade between the two nations. (*Jaridah*, Dec 1; *Amal*, Dec 2)

ASIA

India. At the end of Jan the president of the Indian Chamber of Commerce visited Lebanon to discuss the marketing of Indian products and the use of Beirut as a transit port for Syrian cotton on its way to India. (*Jaridah*, Jan 26)

In Feb an Indian trade delegation made preparations to establish a permanent exhibition of Indian industrial goods in Beirut. (*Hayat*, Feb 22)

An Indian warship arrived in Beirut harbour on April 17 on a goodwill visit. (*Hayat*, April 18)

Pakistan. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan stopped off in Lebanon on Jan 12 on his way to Europe. He was welcomed by PM Sām and dined with President Shehab. (*Hayat*, Jan 13)

The government of Pakistan granted two scholarships for Lebanese students for the year 1961-2. (*Nahar*, May 13)

Indonesia. In April it was revealed that the Lebanese Foreign Office had informed Indonesia, in reply to an inquiry, that its budget did not permit the opening of a legation in Jakarta (*Jaridah*, April 6). [There is an Indonesian legation in Lebanon.]

Later it was reported that the Lebanese minister in India was to be accredited to Indonesia as well. (*Jaridah*, Sept 30)

Japan. A Japanese government plan to set up a commercial centre in Lebanon for the sale of Japanese goods in the Middle East and Africa was first discussed by a Japanese representative in Beirut in April. After meeting President Shehab, he announced that the latter had welcomed the suggestion.

Under the plan, it was reported, a special area would be set aside for Japanese use in the free port of Beirut harbour. Assembly plants, to be exempted from income tax, would be set up for Japanese goods, which would be distributed throughout the Middle East and Africa with the help of Lebanese emigrants. Japan offered technical and cultural aid in return.

During the following months the plan was discussed in detail. The Japanese representative met Lebanese emigrants in Africa. Pierre Eddeh, chairman of the Lebanese Bank Union, left at the beginning of Nov to discuss the plan in Japan.

At the beginning of Dec it was reported that the general outline of the proposed project, but not the details, had been agreed on. In the meantime it was decided to set up a Japan-Lebanon Bank, with its main office in Beirut and branches in Middle Eastern and African countries. (*Hayat*, April 11, Nov 24; *Jaridah*, April 13, June 22, Nov 5, 14, Dec 7)

During the year Japanese industrialists tested the possibilities of establishing various plants in Lebanon. Plans were reported in April for the erection of electrical appliances, canning, textile and machinery plants (in July) and a tractor plant (in Sept). Local manufacturers expressed misgivings lest some of these projects might injure local industry. (*Hayat*, April 21; *Jaridah*, July 2, Sept 6, Nov 14, Dec 2)

For trade figures see table: ME Foreign Trade.

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

GENERAL

Policy: To Strengthen Relations and Combat Israel Activities with the Aid of the Lebanese Emigrants. In Jan the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs discussed a memorandum by the Foreign Minister on Lebanon's policy in Africa, which was aimed at "strengthening the relations between Lebanon and Africa in particular and the Arabs and Africa in general, and combating Israeli activity in this continent."

The most important points, it was reported, were: (1) "Extension of diplomatic representation throughout the continent on embassy level"; (2) "Appointment of the maximum number of cultural attachés"; (3) "The Lebanese emigrants must fulfil their propagandist duty in coordination with the diplomatic missions"; (4) "A census of emigrants and their trade activities in each African country so that the economic agreements with each country could be based on this census" (*Jaridah*, Jan 18); (5) Sending Arabic teachers and awarding scholarships to students interested in Arabic. (*Hayat*, Jan 24)

In Feb it was reported that the Lebanese Foreign Ministry had hastily prepared [general] draft agreements for conclusion with African countries offering, *inter alia*, to open schools for the teaching of Arabic by Lebanese teachers. These were then sent to the diplomatic representatives in Africa for submission to the authorities, and copies were sent through the Arab League secretariat to the Arab governments to enable them to take similar steps. The urgency was due, it was reported, to "secret information" to the effect that some African countries had expressed a desire to replace their agreements with Israel by similar agreements with the Arab states (*Hayat*, Feb 14). [No further reports were available on this matter

and no such agreements were apparently concluded during the year.]

It was reported in June that the Lebanese government intended to invite African heads of state to visit Lebanon in the summer, and that the heads of state of Ghana and Freetown (sic) had accepted the invitation. The PM of [Northern] Nigeria was due to visit Lebanon on July 4. [For his visit, see under Nigeria.] (*Hayat*, June 7)

Later it was reported that the Foreign Ministry had been asked by the Lebanese emigrants in Africa to persuade the visiting African leaders to allow them to withdraw their money for investment in Lebanon (*Sayyad*, Nov 9). [No African head of state visited Lebanon in 1961.]

Extension of Lebanese Representation in Africa; Diplomats Shirk African Service. [Throughout 1961, the Lebanese press reported on the government's plans to extend Lebanon's diplomatic representation in Africa. Some of the missions that had been decided upon the year before were actually set up and their heads of mission were nominated. (See under individual countries.)]

In March it was reported that the Foreign Ministry had decided to set up five embassies with resident Ambassadors in all Africa. Each Ambassador would be accredited to several countries, with a resident consul or chargé d'affaires in each.

Al-Hayāt criticized this policy and called for additional representation in view of the interests of the Lebanese emigrants in Africa as well as the general Arab interests in combating Israeli influence there. (*Hayat*, March 20, 30)

[By the end of 1961 there were, however, only three resident Lebanese Ambassadors in non-Arab Africa (in

Abidjan, Accra and Dakar). The post of resident Ambassador in Liberia, which was vacated in Sept, was not filled again during the remainder of the year. For a possible reason for this situation, see below.]

As in 1960 [see MER 1960, p 369], reports continued that Lebanese diplomats were shirking service in Africa. In Feb it was reported that the Foreign Ministry had failed to persuade a number of diplomats to accept nomination for African posts, in spite of promises to raise their representation allowance. The reasons given were the climate and the political situation in Africa. The Ministry had succeeded only in forcing the diplomats under ambassadorial level to accept nominations, under the threat of dismissal from the service. (*Nahar*, Feb 15)

Economic Relations. During the year there were several reports on possibilities and government efforts to develop trade with the African countries (e.g. *Hayat*, Jan 1; *Nahar*, Dec 8; *Jaridah*, Dec 10). However, in the Lebanese trade statistics as published in *Le Commerce du Liban* for the years 1959-61, African countries did not appear (though they might be included under the heading of "other countries"). (*CDL*, May 15, 1961, Sept 15, 1962)

There were also reports that commercial missions of the government and of commercial and industrial institutions would go to Africa (*Jaridah*, Feb 18; *Hayat*, Aug 13), [but no reports on such missions were received].

Henri Jumayil, Liberian Minister in Lebanon, and Anis Bibi, vice-president of the Bankers' Association of Lebanon, went to West Africa in the spring. They reportedly reached agreements with the authorities in Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Senegal to set up Lebanese banks in these countries (*Amal*, March 23). Foreign Ministry efforts to encourage and facilitate the opening in Africa of branches of Lebanese economic and financial institutions were also reported (*Jaridah*, June 22). [No reports were received that such banks or institutions had been opened.]

A Lebanese economic counsellor was appointed for West and Equatorial Africa where he was to try to conclude trade agreements. (*Jaridah*, Dec 13; *Hayat*, Dec 16)

Cultural Relations: The Lebanese Ministry of Information sent propaganda films on Lebanon to African countries. The films reportedly met with great success, especially in Lebanese emigrants circles. (*R. Beirut*, March 22 [24]; *Amal*, March 23; see also *Siyasah*, Nov 9; *Jaridah*, Nov 11.)

The Lebanese government planned to set up four cultural centres in Africa, the main one in Senegal. Their purpose would be "to make propaganda for Lebanon and the Arab questions" (*Anwar*, Aug 8). [It was not clear whether there was any connection between these centres and the "Lebanese House" or clubs which were also to be set up. See below under Emigrants; Senegal.]

In March it was reported that a plan had been prepared for the award of scholarships to African countries (*Hayat*, March 11), and in July the government asked the Chamber for the appropriation of an additional \$22,831 from the Education Budget, in favour of foreign students in Lebanon, mainly from Africa (*Anwar*, July 29). (See also below under individual countries for requests for Lebanese teachers and for the award of scholarships.)

THE LEBANESE EMIGRANTS IN AFRICA

(See also above—Policy—and under individual countries.)

Emigrants Claim Interests Jeopardized; Lebanese Govern-

ment Intervenes. [Mounting complaints by Lebanese emigrants that their interests—mostly mercantile—were being seriously endangered by the policies of the newly independent African states continued in 1961. The Lebanese government concerned itself more and more with their affairs, and intervened on their behalf.]

Fu'ad Buraydi, Director of the Emigrants' Department in the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, went to West Africa in Jan to examine the state of the Lebanese communities there. (*Anwar*, Jan 8)

In Dakar Buraydi discussed the setting up of a "Lebanese House" to serve as a meeting place for Lebanese and Africans. Similar clubs were to be established in other African capitals with large Lebanese communities (*Hayat*, Feb 11). [For further developments see under Senegal, below.]

On his return to Lebanon Buraydi said there were 35,000-40,000 Lebanese in West Africa. [According to Lebanese 1960 statistics there were 35,000 emigrants in Africa excluding Egypt, North and South Africa. See MER 1960, p 364.] They were prosperous, though some had misgivings because of recent laws, and had requested Lebanon to intercede on their behalf. Buraydi added that the governments concerned had assured him that there was no ground for anxiety. (*Hayat*, Feb 3)

Al-Haydi criticized the government for inactivity in the face of bad news from the emigrants in Africa. It was not only the number of embassies to be opened in Africa that was important, but the quality of the representatives, who would have to face a wave of nationalism and xenophobia, the curtailing of "financial freedom," and the "Israeli demon," whose penetration was aimed especially against the emigrants. (*Hayat*, Jan 24)

In March a Lebanese Foreign Ministry source confirmed that the condition of the emigrants in Africa had deteriorated, though he said that the reports were exaggerated, and gave the following reasons: (1) economic and administrative changes; (2) new laws in some countries hampering trade and commerce, while the emigrants were not allowed to take their money out; (3) refusal of the African banks to grant loans to the emigrants on the grounds that they were not nationals of the country and did not possess real estate; (4) preference by the law in many countries to local nationals in commerce and finance. (*Hayat*, April 1)

Emigrants Return to Lebanon? [Towards the end of the year, there were reports of a further deterioration in the situation of the emigrants.] According to information reportedly reaching merchants in Lebanon from their Lebanese trading partners in Africa, most of them had started to close down their businesses, with the intention of returning to Lebanon, because of their mounting difficulties. As a result, Beirut commercial circles feared curtailment of economic activity in Lebanon and asked the government to approach the African authorities on behalf of the Lebanese merchants there. The government promised to act accordingly. (*Jaridah*, Oct 31)

In Nov bank managers in Lebanon said that large sums were reaching their banks from some countries in Asia and West Africa. (*Anwar*, Nov 11)

UAR Paper Attacks Lebanese Emigrants. In July the editor of *Rizq al-Yasuf*, Ihsan Abd al-Qudus, wrote that the Lebanese emigrants in Africa had cooperated with imperialism for economic reasons, turning their backs on the nationalist movement and keeping aloof from the people, thinking only of Lebanon. They were divided among themselves, as in their own country, he declared.

It was true that the emigrants had helped the economy of their host countries, but, in spite of a common religion—Islam [?—it may be assumed that many, if not the majority of the emigrants, were Christians]—the emigrants were very distinct from the inhabitants. They had built no mosques or hospitals and all their profits were sent to Lebanon.

With the advent of independence the issue had come to a head: the authorities had put a stop to Lebanese immigration, and some governments had acted against the emigrants by taxation, restrictions on commerce, and heavy penalties for smuggling. Consequently, many Lebanese had decided to leave. The article ended by saying that it was not too late to make amends; the emigrants should regard their host countries as their own, invest money in them and take part in their public life. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, July 10)

Al-Haydt's Dakar correspondent declared that the accusations contained in the article were groundless. It had caused great dismay among the emigrants, he said, and had aroused suspicion of them among the Africans, especially in Senegal. (*Hayat*, Aug 3)

Emigrants' Ties with Lebanon. The Lebanese government awarded 150 scholarships for children of Lebanese emigrants in Africa. (*Hayat*, Jan 10)

In July it was reported that 7,500 Lebanese emigrants from Africa were spending their summer vacation in Lebanon, while a similar number were on their way, according to emigrant sources. The report emphasized the large income Lebanon derived from such visits. (*Jaridah*, July 11)

ENTENTE COUNTRIES

Lebanese Emigrants in Ivory Coast. In Aug it was reported that President Houphouët-Boigny had assured a delegation of Lebanese emigrants that there would be no change in their conditions and that they could consider the country their second home.

There were said to be some 2,500 emigrants in the Ivory Coast (according to 1960 Lebanese official statistics—1,854, MER 1960, p 364). A third of them lived in the capital, Abidjan, where they were the wealthiest of the foreign communities. (*Hayat*, Aug 16)

Diplomatic Relations. In Oct Jân Hâjji Tûma, first Lebanese Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, presented his credentials. (*Manar*, Oct 6)

He had also been appointed Minister to Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta (*Jaridah*, July 16), [but was not accredited to these countries until later].

It was reported that the Lebanese community in the Ivory Coast had grave misgivings about his qualifications. (*Hayat*, Aug 20)

Upper Volta. On Dec 7 Camille Sham'un, former President of Lebanon, attended Upper Volta's Independence Day celebrations on the invitation of its President. (*Hayat*, Dec 8)

CAMEROUN, GHANA, GUINEA

Cameroun. The SG of the Cameroun Foreign Ministry visited Lebanon in Aug. He said he had discussed the exchange of diplomatic representation. (*Hayat*, Aug 20)

Ghana. Lebanon's new resident Ambassador to Ghana was also accredited to Guinea and Mali. [There was no

Ghanaian representative in Lebanon.] (*Revue du Liban*, Oct 21)

On Jan 29 Uthmân ad-Dana, Lebanese Minister of Public Works, left for Ghana at its government's invitation. He brought a message from President Shéhab to President Nkrumah expressing Lebanon's wish to conclude agreements with Ghana to strengthen their ties. (*Hayat*, Jan 29, 30, Feb 3; *R. Damasius*, Jan 30-IMB, Jan 31)

On his return, on Feb 6, Dana said Nkrumah had accepted an invitation to visit Lebanon in the spring (*Hayat*, Feb 7). [The visit did not materialize during the year.]

In Feb Krobô Edusei, Ghanaian Minister of Transport and Communications, came to Beirut for the inauguration of an air service to Accra (*R. Beirut*, Feb 5 [W, 9], *Revue du Liban*, Feb 11). [On the signature of the air agreement, see MER 1960, p 369.]

Following this visit, it was decided to send an official Lebanese mission to Ghana to discuss the conclusion of cultural and economic agreements [but no such delegation went during the year]. (*Ansat*, Feb 9)

Guinea. [The Lebanese Ambassador to Ghana presented his credentials as non-resident Ambassador to Guinea on Oct 18. This post had previously been filled by the Lebanese Ambassador to Liberia, who had meanwhile vacated this post.]

On Oct 28 Seydou Diallo [Guinean Ambassador to Cairo] presented his credentials as Guinea's [first, non-resident] Ambassador to Lebanon. (*Hayat*, Oct 29)

The Lebanese government welcomed a Guinean request to set up a warehouse in the free port of Beirut for Guinean timber to be exported to the Middle East. (*Hayat*, Nov 14; *Jaridah*, Nov 26)

LIBERIA, MALI

Reported Friction with Lebanese Emigrants in Liberia. At a dinner on Jan 5 given by the Lebanese community in Liberia, President Tubman requested the community to take Liberians into business and teach them the principles of trading. (*Liberian Age*, Jan 9)

The Monrovia port authorities accused Lebanese merchants of "unscrupulous business procedures" for having ordered large quantities of merchandise while being unable to clear it on arrival at Monrovia for lack of funds. A Monrovia paper, reporting this, said that there was a "mad rush" of merchants from Arab countries into Liberia, which was explained by Lebanese emigrants as due to Liberia's liberal business policy. (*Liberian Age*, Feb 24)

In July it was reported that the Lebanese government intended to take up with the Liberian government the question of an alleged campaign against Lebanese emigrants. Several Lebanese trading houses had been damaged by attacks and others robbed. The Liberians had also forced several Lebanese commercial agents to give up their agencies in favour of Liberian nationals. The Lebanese Minister in Monrovia had discussed the matter with the authorities there, but without result. (*Nahar*, July 20)

The Liberian Minister of Communications, who was in Beirut at the time, vehemently denied these reports. He mentioned that the Lebanese were the largest foreign community in Liberia, controlling 65% of the country's trade [the same figure was also given in 1960—see MER 1960, p 370] and enjoying the same rights as Liberian nationals. (*Jaridah*, July 20)

Lebanese Investment Proposals Fail to Materialize. Deputy Emile Bustani [the well-known entrepreneur] said on a visit to Liberia that he intended to open a "Liberia Company" for construction and building. (*Liberian Age*, Feb 27)

[A Lebanese proposal to establish a joint Lebanese-Libyan development company was also made in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 370). Neither of these proposals, apparently, materialized during 1961.]

A delegation representing the Lebanese Al-Ahali Bank was to leave for Liberia to set up a branch there (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Cairo, April 12). [No report was received on the establishment of such a bank.]

A civil aviation agreement between Lebanon and Liberia was concluded in Beirut on July 28. Air Liban was accorded the same privileges as other international airlines operating in Liberia. (*Liberian Age*, July 31)

Diplomatic Representation Raised. The governments of Liberia and Lebanon decided to raise the status of their diplomatic missions to embassy as from Sept 10. (*Hayat*, Sept 19; *Liberian Age*, Sept 29)

Mali. The Lebanese Ministry of Education said that the government of Mali was interested in employing teachers from Lebanon for the forthcoming school year. (*Anwar*, July 9)

On Oct 9 Dr Karim Anzûl [resident Lebanese Ambassador to Ghana] presented his credentials to President Modibo Keita as his country's first [non-resident] Ambassador to Mali. In their speeches on the occasion both mentioned the role of the Lebanese emigrants in the country. (*Esur*, Bamako, Oct 11)

NIGERIA

Diplomatic Representation. In Jan the Lebanese consulate in Lagos was raised to embassy level. (*Hayat*, Jan 8)

In July it was reported that Nigeria had decided to open an embassy in Beirut [but this had not been done by the end of the year]. (*Anwar*, July 22)

Lebanese Emigrants Meet with Difficulties. During April and May considerable attention was paid by the Nigerian press to the question of the Lebanese emigrants.

Commenting on complaints against the activities of Syrian and Lebanese emigrants in Nigeria, one daily said it was not the first time that these traders were attacked, as they engaged in all fields of retail trade at the expense of the indigenous population. The paper demanded that the government should exclude all foreigners from the retail business or restrict their permits. (*West African Pilot*, Lagos, April 24)

Another paper maintained that Syrian and Lebanese immigrants had no right to call themselves Nigerians. It was unfair to make Nigerians suffer at the hands of those aliens, "who seem to have no sympathy whatsoever for the indigenous petty traders and craftsmen of this country," the article concluded. (*Daily Express*, Lagos, May 1)

Special attention was aroused by the accusation that Syrian and Lebanese emigrants were engaging in various trades without permits. On April 20 after a complaint by a member of the Federal Parliament, the Nigerian Federal Minister of Information said he would order an investigation. (*Daily Express*, Lagos, April 24)

Later a Lebanese printer was sentenced to a fine of £40 or four months' imprisonment with hard labour for contravening the printing press regulations. (*Daily Times*, Lagos, May 4)

On May 23 a Syrian delegation, in a meeting with the Nigerian Federal Minister of Information, denied that members of their community were engaged in "pools and printing trades." They said there were 101 Syrians and about 4,000 Lebanese in Lagos, and only one Syrian was engaged in the transport trade. [There were said to be 6,150 Lebanese emigrants in Nigeria—see MER 1960, p 364.] The minister assured them of the government's cooperation so long as they did not deprive the indigenous population of their living. (*West Africa Pilot*, Lagos, May 24)

Visit of PM of Northern Nigeria. On July 4 Sir Ahmadu Bello, PM of Northern Nigeria, arrived in Lebanon for a four-day visit. It had been originally set for March 20 and was twice postponed (*Hayat*, March 2, 22, April 11, July 5). Sir Ahmadu, and the Lebanese President and the PM, held talks on the strengthening of economic ties, and toured the country. (*Hayat*, July 5; *Daily Times*, Lagos, July 6)

He told a press conference that he had reached agreement on cooperation in economic affairs, culture and education. He welcomed the suggestion of President Ayub Khan of Pakistan for a union of Islamic states [?] and suggested that Arab policy should be based on Islamic nationalism and not on Arab nationalism. Sir Ahmadu said that his country's relations with Israel were limited to a few missions of engineers and experts. On Kuwait he said that Iraq had no right to annex this independent country. (*Hayat*, July 9)

Before leaving, on July 9, Sir Ahmadu said that he welcomed the cooperation of Lebanese businessmen in the economic development of Northern Nigeria. (*R. Beirut*, July 9 [W, 20])

Technical and Economic Cooperation. Throughout 1961, Lebanese newspapers repeatedly referred to a forthcoming visit by a Nigerian economic delegation (*Hayat*, Jan 12, Sept 6; *Jaridah*, March 14, Oct 25) [but it had not materialized by the end of the year].

Four Northern Nigerians were offered scholarships at the American University in Beirut, following Sir Ahmadu Bello's visit (*Daily Times*, Lagos, Aug 24). Lebanon was requested by the government of Northern Nigeria to send three judges and four lawyers to work as advisers in the Ministry of Justice. (*Anwar*, Sept 12)

According to Lebanese reports, the Nigerian [Federal?] government had agreed to employ doctors, agricultural experts and engineers from Lebanon, and a number of Lebanese had applied for such posts (*Hayat*, Nov 23). In Dec it was reported that a delegation of Lebanese economists would visit Nigeria to examine the country's economic needs and the possibility of setting up joint companies. (*Siyasah*, Dec 20)

RHODESIA

Rhodesian Delegation Requests Support for Independence. In Aug a two-member delegation [of Africans] representing the United National Independence party of Rhodesia came to Lebanon to request the government's support for their country's independence. They had talks with PM Slâm and Foreign Ministry officials. (*Hayat*, Aug 8, 9)

SENEGAL

Diplomatic Relations, Visits. The first Consul General of Senegal in Lebanon, Issa Kane, arrived in Beirut at the beginning of May. In Aug he became his country's first

Ambassador in Lebanon, and the consulate general was abolished. (*Hayat*, May 4, Aug 3)

In April the Lebanese consulate general in Senegal was replaced by an embassy (*Hayat*, April 22). The first Lebanese Ambassador to Senegal, Muhammad Ali Hamadah, presenting his credentials on April 24, said that the Lebanese emigrants wanted to cooperate in the execution of Senegal's economic and agricultural plans. In his reply, President Senghor said there were 10,000 Lebanese in Senegal [compare MER 1960, pp 364, 370], most of whom felt they were part of the country. (*Hayat*, April 26)

A Lebanese mission headed by the SG of the Foreign Ministry, Dr Fu'ad Amoun, attended Senegal's independence celebrations in April. (*Jaridah*, *Anwar*, April 13)

Shaykh Ibrahim Inas (Niyasse), a Senegalese Muslim leader, visited Lebanon in April on a tour of Arab and Muslim states. (*Hayat*, April 7, 8)

On May 15 Mamadou Dia, the Senegalese PM, stopped in Beirut for a day on his way to Mecca for the pilgrimage, and met PM Sliam. (*Hayat*, May 16; *R. Amman*, May 17-IMB, May 17)

In Oct Sharif Makki Haydar, from Senegal, described as the "Khalif of Islam in Black Africa," visited Lebanon on a tour of the Arab countries. He said that he would seek help for African states engaged in combating illiteracy and try to strengthen cultural relations with the Arab countries. (*Hayat*, *Hawadith*, Oct 31)

Among the Emigrants. In April it was reported that, on the initiative of the Lebanese Consul General, the Lebanese emigrants had decided to present Senegal with an independence gift. It seemed, however, that the community could not agree on the present. *Al-Hayat's* Dakar correspondent declared: "We have become a subject for jokes." (*Hayat*, April 6, 15)

In Aug it was reported that the Lebanese Ambassador in Dakar had obtained the agreement of the Lebanese and Syrian emigrants to the dissolution of their various associations, thus putting an end to internecine division and strife. The embassy was to see to the completion of a large club, which would be owned by the government of Lebanon and would serve the community and the Arab diplomatic missions. (*Hayat*, Aug 9)

Economic Difficulties of Emigrants; Policy of Senegal. In July, following complaints by emigrants in Senegal of restrictions on trading, the Lebanese government in-

structed its Ambassador to intercede with the Senegalese authorities. (*Anwar*, July 19)

In Nov, in a press interview, the Senegalese Ambassador in Beirut, asked why his government had taken measures against Lebanese emigrants, explained that it had no intention of acting against anyone; it only aspired to raise the standard of living, especially that of the agricultural population. Colonial policy had favoured the merchant, and the government now wished to destroy this system and reorganize commerce for the good of the peasant. Previously, many peasants had sold their groundnut crops before the harvest to Lebanese money-lenders in order to repay loans for seeds and provisions. The government had now fixed minimum quotas and minimum prices for crop purchases. This had forced the small traders and middlemen to regroup in order to be able to reach the set quota. The Lebanese had therefore to adapt themselves to the new conditions. (*Revue du Liban*, Nov 11)

Lebanese in Senegal Boycott Israel? It was reported from Dakar that in support of the Arab boycott no Lebanese emigrant had applied for foreign currency appropriated by the Senegalese government for imports from Israel. (*Hayat*, Feb 8)

SIERRA LEONE

Lebanese Emigrants and Independence of Sierra Leone. [Sierra Leone attained its independence on April 27.] The Lebanese community in Sierra Leone presented the government with a £24,000 hospital as an independence gift. (*Daily Mail*, *Freetown*, March 16)

Commenting on the status of Lebanese emigrants after independence, a Sierra Leone journalist wrote in Aug that this rich community of 6,000 [numbers were given variously in 1960 as 2,900 and 5,000—see MER 1960, p 371] need not have any apprehensions regarding their fate as they were part of the country and contributed much to its economy. Although the Lebanese had engaged in "sharp practices" in business and many envied their business qualities, their withdrawal could cause chaos in the country's economy. Rumours that they would be discriminated against and their enterprises taken over were nonsense; they could be assured of the government's continued protection. (*Shekpende*, *Freetown*, Aug 9)

[Lebanon was represented in Freetown by a chargé d'affaires.]

THE SAUDI ARABIAN KINGDOM

(Al-Mamlakah as-Sa'udiyah al-Arabiyyah)

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SYNOPSIS; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY

SYNOPSIS

The struggle for power inside the royal family continued as the main feature in Saudi Arabia politics throughout 1961, and whereas the end of 1960 witnessed King Saud wresting control of government from Crown Prince Faisal, the end of 1961 saw the latter's return to power.

The formation of a government by King Saud in December had become possible because he made common cause against Faisal with the group of reform-minded or "free" princes, led by his younger brother Talal. Very soon, however, it transpired that Saud had no intention of introducing constitutional reforms. Still, an uneasy coalition lasted until September, for Talal's seat in the government was dependent on Saud, and Saud was reluctant to part with Talal without whom his position might be weakened in his struggle with the Faisal camp.

The King made an earnest effort to win over public opinion through conveying an image of a benevolent and industrious monarch working for the welfare of his subjects and the progress and international standing of his country. Talal, too, strove to build up public support for himself. Faisal continued to enjoy strong backing among the princes and the public. All this time the struggle for power continued, involving changing of sides and intricate manoeuvring on the part of the princes as well as members of the court. Consequently relations between the King and Talal deteriorated, and though attempts to appease Faisal without restoring him to power failed, the King dismissed Talal at the beginning of September. The place of Talal as Minister of Finance and National Economy was taken by Amir Nawwaf, who occupied a neutral position between the opposing camps, and whose influence was growing. Though it was assumed that Talal aroused the King's anger by expressing some of his opinions to the Beirut press, his dismissal was also interpreted as a move by the King to appease Faisal. A month later Faisal returned to Riyadh, while Talal, and two of his brothers who resigned from the government when Talal was dismissed, left the city. Talal soon resumed his public call for the basic reform of the regime in the political, social and economic spheres, within the framework of the *Shar'iah*.

The wheel turned almost full circle in November when the King's illness necessitated his departure for the USA. After some hesitation, and on the princes' recommendation, he appointed Faisal as his deputy, retaining the premiership for himself. The King stayed for the rest of the year in the USA, where he underwent a series of operations.

While the royal family was torn by the power struggle, it faced no serious outside challenge. The young educated generation, still a small group, but comparatively strong

in the oil region of the east coast as well as in Jeddah, the country's main gateway, was reported to be divided into numerous factions, from Communists to "Nasserists" and "Ba'athists." Their known activities were restricted to occasional dissemination of leaflets and letters to foreign papers. Still, observers noticed, modern educational methods which were being introduced (as well as the growing influence of the outside world on the traditional way of life in general) were bound to bring about a change.

Meanwhile, the men of religion and tradition-minded tribal shaykhs continued to exercise a powerful influence. It was reported, for instance, that it was because of their pressure that Saud did not attend the Belgrade Conference in person, Yugoslavia being an "officially Communist and atheist country." Also, such innovations as schools for girls and female nurses in hospitals were introduced only after the approval and under the supervision of the Grand Mufti.

The institutional innovations during the year included a Supreme Planning Council and a Supreme Defence Council.

NOTE: *The reports on the power struggle have been taken partly from the Cairo Al-Haqd'iq. It should be remembered that at the time the articles in question were published, the UAR was conducting a propaganda campaign against King Saud and his regime.*

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY

In spite of the resignation from government in Dec 1960 of Amir Faisal, who had been responsible for a policy of retrenchment, 1961 saw no radical change of direction. At the end of the year, the financial position was still described as tight; the development budget for 1380/81 AH (1961) was not wholly spent (see also below: Talal's policy); the currency remained fully backed by gold and foreign exchange. On the other hand, the downward trend of imports was reversed. The output of crude petroleum rose by slightly more than 10%.

Unemployment remained an unsolved problem which seriously exercised public opinion. No reliable figures were available.

The 1380/81 AH (1961) budget balanced at 1,786m. riyals (4.5 riyals=\$1) as against 1,637m. riyals in 1379/80 (re-assessed after the devaluation of the riyal on Jan 8, 1960). Expenditure on the royal house remained at 248m. riyals; defence went down to 180m. riyals (1960: 197m. riyals); education increased to 137m. riyals (1960: 122m. riyals); health 58m. riyals (1960:

55m. riyals); development figured originally at 291m. riyals and was allotted in Jan a further 35m. riyals (1960: 215m. riyals).

Revenues were expected mainly from oil.

1961 and 1962 Budget Estimates

- NOTES: 1. Sources: Bilād, Dec 25, 1960, Dec 9, 1961; R. Mecca, Dec 8 [13], 1961; for subheadings of Development Projects see R. Mecca, Dec 31, 1960 [Jan 3, 1961].
2. The Saudi Arabian fiscal year begins on the first of Rajab of the Hijrah year. In 1960 this fell on Dec 20; in 1961, on Dec 9.

Revenues
(in thousand riyals)

	1380/81 [1961]	1381/82 [1962]
Oil royalties	540,319	564,291
Oil companies' income tax	835,609	1,117,471
Other income tax	34,500	
Other revenues	375,571	484,239
Total revenue	1,786,000	2,166,000

Expenditure

	1380/81	1381/82
Privy Purse	248,206	248,206
Royal Guard	15,858	17,660
Other items connected with the royal house	6,343	10,084
Premier's Office	77,392	82,003
incl. National Guard		55,244
Foreign Office	34,000	43,410
Defence and Aviation Ministry	223,581	366,229
incl. General Bureau and Army		180,462
Labour, Works and Social Affairs Ministry	6,324	21,480
incl. Social Affairs Dept. (old age, children's homes, orphanages)		4,374
Ministry of the Interior	103,929	129,438
incl. public security		65,845
Ministry of Education	164,225	171,171
incl. girl's schools		4,400
Ministry of Communications	86,838	93,226
Ministry of Agriculture	21,348	33,840
Ministry of Finance and National Economy	36,365	44,867
Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources	10,500	11,000
Ministry of Health	58,372	68,447
Ministry of Trade	3,686	4,683
Office of the Chief Justice	20,118	20,930
Religious institutions	25,384	29,298
incl. "Do Good and Shun Evil" Societies (<i>hay'at al-amr bil-ma'ruf wa an-nahi an al-munkar</i>)		10,698
Provincial administrations (six amirates)	19,608	21,728
incl. Eastern Amirate		7,221
Supreme Planning Council	3,000	10,249
"Bases" (<i>qaw'id</i>) and general allocations	52,172	52,000
Riyadh electricity project	14,000	12,000
Various development projects	291,146	400,000
incl.: "Enlargement of holy mosques"		30,000
"Mecca projects"		20,000
Hijaz railway		9,840
Road construction		52,604
Health projects		10,994
School building		15,183
New broadcasting station		10,036
Subsidies to municipalities	9,000	9,448
Subsidies to vital commodities	25,000	25,000
Contribution to pension funds	10,000	15,000
Debt service	225,000	225,000
Subsidy o/a of devaluation		10,000
Total	1,786,000	2,166,000

ECONOMIC SURVEY

In July new paper currency was put into circulation. In autumn a gold purchase valued at \$25m. brought the gold cover to 30%. At the end of the year, gold, silver and foreign exchange holdings totalled 1,072m. riyals. The riyal was freely convertible, and Saudi Arabia formally agreed to keep it so.

Crude oil production achieved another record of 69m. metric tons (1960: 62m.). Oil exports, crude and refined, totalled 540.7m. barrels valued at \$941.3m. (1960: 493.6m. bbls at \$873.4m.). Oil revenues by source were (1960 figures in brackets): Aramco, \$352.2m. (\$312.8m.); Getty Oil, \$22.9m. (\$18.4m.); Arabian Oil, \$2.5m. (\$2.5m.). The two last-mentioned companies were active in the Neutral Zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, on-shore and off-shore respectively. Apart from royalties, Aramco claimed to have channelled about \$72m. into the Saudi Arabian economy. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia reiterated her claim against Aramco for \$180m. on account of profits due from the operation of Tapline; Aramco, as previously, denied the validity of the claim.

In Sept Aramco's liquefied petroleum gas plant at Ras Tanura, with a capacity of 4,000 b/d, went on stream; it was the first plant in the ME to make refrigerated propane and butane gas available in liquefied form for export. At the same time the company signed its first contract for the sale of natural gas for local industrial use. Development drilling continued on the Abu Hadriyah, Safaniyah and Abqai'q fields. Tapline throughput to Sidon rose to an average of 309,000 b/d (1960: 240,000 b/d). In April the (Japanese) Arabian Oil Company started exports from its Khafji field off-shore the Neutral Zone, with royalties going to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in equal parts.

In Jan 1961 a Supreme Planning Council was set up consisting of the Ministers of National Economy and Finance, Communications, Oil and Agriculture, to deal with problems of long-term economic policy. The main projects completed or under progress in 1961, apart from oil activities, were extensive municipal development in the five chief cities (Riyadh, Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, Ta'if), mainly water supply and canalization, grain silos at Jeddah and Dammam, drainage of the Qatif swamps, expansion of the ports of Dammam (completed) and Yanbu, highways joining Riyadh with Ta'if and Medina with the Jordanian frontier, and additional railways in the

eastern province. The Hijaz railway from Damascus to Medina was to be completely restored and opened for the 1963 pilgrimage season; Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia agreed to share the cost, estimated at £8m. The line was expected to bring an increase in the number of pilgrims but not to be economically profitable. 30m. riyals were earmarked for the improvement of the Holy Places. A West German firm contracted to prepare an overall industrial survey.

Imports rose from a total of 978m. riyals in 1379 AH (mid-1959-mid-1960) to 1,198m. riyals in 1380 AH.

Saudi Arabian official sources reported considerable progress in the various fields of education. (No figures were available on the number of school-age children in Saudi Arabia. A 1956 estimate of the country's total population was 6m.) The number of pupils receiving primary education rose from 85,847 in 1960 to 104,203 in 1961; those receiving various types of intermediate and secondary education from 6,807 to 10,049; and the number of students in teachers' colleges from 2,687 to 3,497. There was a corresponding rise in the number of teachers and classes. The King Saud University of Riyadh increased its academic staff from 28 to 56, and its student body from 213 (34 external) to 563 (200 external). 4.4m. riyals were spent on primary schools.

There were 87 centres for the elimination of illiteracy, with 9,220 students. An Islamic University was inaugurated at Medina.

The first government primary school for girls was opened in Medina in January; a department for girls' schools had been established in 1960 under the auspices of the Grand Mufti. (Private girls' schools had been opened earlier, mainly in Jeddah, among others by the daughter of Amir Faisal and the wife of Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud.)

The "latest foreign teaching methods and most advanced foreign scientific ideas" were taught for the first time in Saudi Arabia, in the new "School of Port" in Jeddah, it was reported in *The New York Times* (April 9). This, it was reported, often meant breaking some of the old rules. Boys at the school went to films and acted in plays, they were encouraged to draw or paint likenesses of animals and humans. They learned to sing and listen to music. They learned the Qur'an as well, but it was a far more moderate form of Islam they were absorbing.

THE GOVERNMENT

Ministry	Dec 21, 1960	Sept 11, 1961
Prime Minister	King Saud Ibn Abd al-Aziz	King Saud Ibn Abd al-Aziz
Foreign Affairs	Shaykh Ibrahim as-Suwayl	Shaykh Ibrahim as-Suwayl
Finance and National Economy	Amir Talal Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Amir Nawwaf Ibn Abd al-Aziz (Sept 16)
Defence and Civil Aviation	Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud	Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud
Interior	Amir Abd al-Muhsin Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Amir Faisal Ibn Turki
Communications	Amir Badr Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Atallah as-Sa'ad
Education	Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Hasan	Abd al-Aziz ash-Shaykh
Health	Dr. Hasan Nasif	Dr. Hasan Nasif
Agriculture	Abdallah ad-Dabbagh	Abdallah ad-Dabbagh
Oil and Mineral Resources	Abdallah al-Hammud at-Tariqi	Abdallah al-Hammud at-Tariqi
Trade and Supply	Ahmad Shata	Ahmad Shata
Labour, Workers and Social Affairs	Amir Faisal Ibn Turki (June 8)	Nasir al-Manqur
Broadcasting, Press and Publications		Shaykh Abdallah Balkhayr (Oct 5)

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER INSIDE THE ROYAL FAMILY

THE THREE CONTESTING CAMPS

The Three Contesting Camps. As recorded in MER 1960, when Faisal was removed from power in Dec 1960, King Saud formed a government in collaboration with Amir Talāl, the protagonist of constitutional reform, and his supporters. Before the changeover, Saud intimated support for the reforms but afterwards he gave no sign of intending to implement them and it was thought that by his earlier attitude he had only wished to gain the support of the reformers in his struggle for power against Faisal. Consequently, at the beginning of the year, three rival groups were seen to be emerging in the royal family, headed by three brothers:

1. The King [supported by a number of princes, his sons and others, called by the Cairo *Al-Haqā'iq* "the little kings"—see below]. (It was thought Saud had also the backing of "powerful tribal leaders and many of the young men of the capital, who were getting government jobs"; NYT, April 14.)

2. Faisal with his royal supporters and the reactionary elements, particularly the religious groups who looked to him for leadership. (He was, however, also thought to have "considerable support among the powerful merchants of Jeddah" and other cities of Hijaz, who remembered that as a former viceroy of Hijaz he usually had a receptive ear for their petitions; see NYT, April 14.)

3. Talāl who advocated a programme of constitutional reform, supported by another group of amirs and by the young intelligentsia, graduates of foreign universities and the professional middle class. (MER 1960, pp 366-7)

In his struggle with Faisal in 1960, the King had had the support of his uncle Amir Abdallah Ibn Abd al-Rahmān and of the so-called "free princes" who included his brothers Talāl, Nawwāf Badr, Abd al-Muhsin, Fawwāz and Majid. After Faisal's removal and the recapture of power by Saud, which came to be called the "white revolution" (*al-inqilāb al-abyad*), the six princes remained loyal to the King. During the first four months of 1961, the situation was reported to have developed as follows:

Abdallah, together with some other princes from among the King's brothers and uncles, went over to Faisal—as did Majid, one of the "free princes." In April it was reported that the King had cut the allowance of Amir Abdallah to the amount received by his other uncles; hitherto he had received a larger allowance in consideration of his high standing with the tribes. (*Hayat*, April 29)

Four of the six "free princes" continued to cooperate with the King: Talāl, Badr and Abd al-Muhsin entered the government, and Fawwāz became the governor of Riyadh.

Nawwāf declined the Ministry of the Interior and remained neutral. (*Hayat*, May 7)

During this period, it was further reported, the struggle became mainly one between the Faisal and the Talāl groups. The Talāl group and the King had a common interest in their struggle with the Faisal group. Faisal's return to power would have meant the end of Saud as ruler; moreover, Saud was determined not to give his opponents an opportunity to allege that the regime was unstable and impotent. Talāl and his group, on the other hand, were said to be willing to cooperate with the King and, for tactical reasons, to accept royal acts with which they basically disagreed. (*Hayat*, May 7)

Significance of Royal Rift. The rift in the royal family was regarded as significant, in that the King, as head of a state unified less than thirty years ago, counted upon his brothers as a device to hold the country together. "The late King Ibn Saud took many wives from different tribal strains in order to link each with the crown. So the King's brothers are like the string in a necklace in the tribal politics of Saudi Arabia." (NYT, April 14)

Activities of King Saud. [The take-over of the government by King Saud was followed by a spate of reports conveying a picture of intensive activity on the part of the King in his role as Prime Minister. Following are some Radio Mecca reports of Jan and April.]

On Jan 2 a directive was published, issued by the King to the ministers. He ordered: (1) the establishment of a "Sherī'ah system of appeal" in "view of the great importance of justice and our keen desire to safeguard the rights of our subjects"; (2) customs protection of local industry in fulfilment of the "policy of industrial development which we seek to pursue..."; (3) "closest observation in the application of the budget" as "we regard state funds as a trust in our hands."

On Jan 3 the King told journalists: "I am determined to work with all the strength I have to ensure comfort, prestige and dignity for the people."

On Jan 7 the Planning Council (see above: Economic and Social Survey) held its first meeting, presided over by the King. The meeting studied certain of the new projects which had been made public in detail on Dec 31, 1960. (For some of these projects, see: The Budget, in the Economic Survey, above.)

On the same day the King inaugurated a dam, built at his own expense, in Wadi Namar.

At a cabinet meeting on Jan 11, the King ordered that foreign experts be engaged to study the civil service and pensions systems and to amend them "so as to safeguard the interest of civil servants" [on this issue, see also below, under: Labour, Civil Service, Aliens] and to carry out a project for a dam at Abha "to bring economic revival to the people of Abha."

A cabinet meeting on Jan 15, presided over by the King, decided, among other issues, to abolish the real estate tax collected by the municipalities. The Health Minister communicated to the King the Grand Mufti's approval of courses for female nurses and the King explained that this measure would improve the standard of hospital nursing.

Mecca Radio later commented that after the abolition of the real estate tax had become known, the towns and villages of the western region had all been praising the King for his munificence. Other taxes also were to be rescinded, and the King had already abrogated the taxes on foodstuffs, building materials, and industrial tools. King Saud's activities, the comment went on, were not restricted to the fiscal field, but included the building of hospitals, roads and schools, and other projects.

The Finance Ministry building in Mecca, it was announced on Jan 18, would be converted into a hospital to replace another hospital, which would be demolished to widen a road. The Finance and Health Ministries were to study the establishment of a benevolent relief association, with branches throughout the country, to serve all citizens and visitors.

On April 17 the King left Riyadh on an inspection

tour of the eastern province, where he was warmly welcomed. On this occasion he told the press that the government was diligently working to promote every aspect of life in the country in order that it might become a very active member in the Arab and Muslim community. He elaborated on development activities in education, industry and agriculture. Among other details, he said he had ordered the import of agricultural machinery, to be sold to farmers in instalments.

On April 21 the King inaugurated the Saudi Arabian Gas and Industrialization Company.

On April 24 he opened the Qatif irrigation project. (*R. Mecca, Dec 31, 1960 [Jan 3, 1961], Jan 2 [4], 3 [5], 7 [10], 7 [W 12], 12 [14], 15 [17], 18 [21], 18 [W 26], April 17 [19], 20 [22], 21 [W 27], 24 [W 27].*)

King Saud's need to cultivate public opinion was thought to have been one of the motives behind the termination by Saudi Arabia of the Dhahran agreement with the U.S. (*Economist, March 25*)

On May 24, in a speech at the Officers' Club in Ta'if, the King told the army of the forthcoming establishment of a Supreme Defence Council. (*Blad, May 25*)

A supporter of the King told a foreign correspondent in April: "I am sure the King is trying now to win his place in history as a great monarch; he is trying to be somebody. As a human being, he had everything he could have wanted. Now he wants to prove to the world that he can run this country better than everybody else." (*NYT, April 14*)

Talāl's Policy. The practical division of authority in the government was such, it was reported, that the King determined the international and Arab policy while leaving internal affairs to the government, led by Talāl. Talāl, it was further reported, had not opened the Treasury to pump money into circulation and get business moving in spite of the severe economic crisis. Talāl was a great believer in planning and refused to spend money except in accordance with a comprehensive plan. For this reason, he had even stopped the execution of projects which had already been approved. The government had agreed to call on foreign experts from the UN and the World Bank but, the writer remarked, to work out a comprehensive plan took a long time (*Hayat, May 7*). At the same time it was noted that the government of Crown Prince Faisal had been undermined to a large extent by "progressive elements" who criticized what they considered exceedingly stringent economy measures which hurt the tribes and business community alike. (*The Statesman, March 6*)

In the political sphere, Talāl, who was lacking in popular support because he had been abroad for a long time, was now striving to build it up quickly by cultivating "some of the youth" and journalists, "knowing that time was short." (*Hayat, May 7*)

Faisal's Supporters Push His Claims. Early in the year it was reported that relations between Saud and Faisal had improved. In Feb, however, it became known that Faisal's supporters, especially his brothers, had renewed their efforts for his return to power. It was reported that at a meeting in Riyadh, which Faisal did not attend, they signed a memorandum which was submitted to the King by Amir Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Aziz. The memorandum requested: (1) that Faisal be reinstated; (2) that certain princes be removed from the government; (3) that the King's counsellors, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Mu'ammār and Abdallah Ibn Huiaylān, be removed;

and (4) that Shaykh Muhammad Surūr [as-Sabān] (on whom see immediately below) be induced to leave Riyadh and return to Hijaz. Saud replied: (1) it had been Faisal who had resigned, and he, Saud, could not be blamed for Faisal's failure to organize a new government; the fact that Faisal was not in the government did not lessen his importance as the King's brother and crown prince; (2) reconstitution of the government was not now possible, since it had settled down to work; (3) the counsellors mentioned were about to go abroad; (4) Muhammad Surūr had come to Riyadh on a visit only, and would soon return to Hijaz. (*Hayat, Feb 22*)

The princes supporting Faisal urged him to renew his political activity, but he refused. He pleaded with them to avoid an open struggle, maintaining that the issue was a matter of time and that the King could not continue to rule for long. His mistakes, shortcomings and weaknesses would bring about his downfall. In the end power would return to Faisal's hands. Thus the Faisal group embarked on a policy of concentrating on the Talāl group and of "ignoring the King."

When on March 15 Saud travelled from Riyadh to Mecca for a religious function, neither Faisal nor his supporters among the princes greeted the King upon his arrival. In view of the elaborate protocol of palace life, this was seen as a serious snub. The same thing happened when Saud returned to Riyadh from a visit to Kuwait. (*Hayat, March 23, May 7; NYT, April 14, May 19; Time, May 19*)

Muhammad Surūr as-Sabān Fails to Make a Comeback. Muhammad Surūr [as-Sabān] had been Minister of Finance and was dismissed when Faisal came to power early in 1959. Since then he had lived in Cairo where, it was reported, he had cultivated Saudi Arabian visitors with the aim of staging a comeback. When Saud took over from Faisal, Sabān returned to Saudi Arabia. His name was "so indissolubly linked with the inflationary policies that brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy in 1958 that his return aroused lively alarm among the business community." It had also angered Talāl who did not "relish a shadow finance minister at the King's elbow." Impressed by the volume of opposition, the King had declined Sabān's offer of service. In March Sabān was reported in Jeddah and, it was thought, on his way to Cairo. (*Economist, March 18*)

Struggle Over Appointment of Chief of the Royal Cabinet. According to *Al-Haqā'iq*, Sabān had been a candidate for the post of the Chief of the Royal Diwān; he was supported by "those anxious for the government." While the King favoured his candidacy, Talāl opposed it. Sabān, for his part, had made his acceptance conditional on the dismissal of Id Ibn Sālim, the Chief of the Royal Household (*al-khāss al-malakiyyah*).

Al-Haqā'iq claimed that Sālim, who had started his career as a car-washer in the royal garages, had acquired enormous influence over the King. He received the intelligence reports, and ministers as well as members of the royal family came to him for advice. Sālim, the paper said, was hated by the people.

As Sabān's candidacy fell through, *Al-Haqā'iq* continued, "the little kings" suggested the appointment of Prince Faisal Ibn Turki Ibn Abd al-Aziz. Knowing him to be an amiable man and well regarded by the King, they thought that they could utilize him in bringing the government under their influence. Talāl, however, vetoed his appointment. (He later became a minister; see below.)

The candidacy of the [neutral] Amir Nawwāf was then

proposed by "those anxious for the government" accepted by the King and supported by many ministers as well as the people. The "little kings," however, opposed Nawwāf as an influential personality. (*Haqā'iq, Nov 16*)

Nawwāf's appointment was announced on May 5 (*Ahram, May 6*). Nawwāf, *Al-Haqā'iq* continued, declared that he would keep away from the King the "courtiers hated by the people"—he did so in regard to Ibn Salīm—and that all audiences with the King would require his approval. (*Haqā'iq, Nov 16*)

The King's Advisers Mu'ammār and Hujaylān. When King Saud formed his cabinet, he appointed Abd al-Aziz Ibn Mu'ammār and Faisal Ibn Hujaylān to the posts of royal advisers. Both were termed progressives. In March it was reported that they had apparently been appointed ambassadors to Switzerland and Spain respectively, but there were many who considered that "their responsibility for the formation of the new government was so great" that they should be kept in Riyadh. A difficult situation had arisen between the King's advisers and the ministers, because the King was also Prime Minister.

Hujaylān and Mu'ammār were men of about forty. The first had served in the embassy in Washington and was "an ardent nationalist," but no "Naserist." Mu'ammār, the son of an old friend of the King, had been imprisoned for a year after the Aramco strike in 1935, having been accused of association with the defunct "National Liberation Front." His opponents who brought about his removal had accused him of leftist tendencies and even of being "planted" by Moscow. (*Daily Telegraph, Feb 7; Ecnamit, March 18; Hayat, March 23*)

THE ELIMINATION OF TALĀL

Moves To Conciliate the King and Faisal. In April reports circulated that the Lebanese politician Hussein al-Uwayni had been mediating between Saud and Faisal, but an official denial of this insisted that the relations between the brothers were unimpaired. (*Jihād, April 26, 27; Falastin, April 28*)

At the same time, it was reported that members of the royal family had been unsuccessfully trying to reconcile the brothers by proposing that Saud become a constitutional monarch, and Faisal PM as well as Crown Prince. (*Hawadith, April 28*)

Al-Haqā'iq claimed that "the little kings" had "brandished the [sword] of conciliation" in order to reduce Talāl's influence and his "extremism." (*Haqā'iq, Nov 9*)

Al-Hayāt reported that many moves at conciliation, made with the encouragement of the King, had failed. Amir Nawwāf tried vigorously to mediate between the two sides, and he almost succeeded. He proposed the formation of a new government headed by Amir Khālīd Ibn Abd al-Aziz of the Faisal camp, on condition that two ministers in the present government be dropped and three new ministers from the opposition be added in their place. The proposal fell through because Faisal insisted that Talāl be dropped (*Hayat, May 7*). The King was also said to have offered to take Faisal back as acting PM, but without the power to make foreign policy: Faisal had remained aloof. (*NYT, May 19*)

The "Little Kings" Against Talāl. According to *Al-Haqā'iq*, a prominent role in undermining Talāl's position was played by the "little kings" (i.e. the group of princes, sons of Saud and others, who made up the third group—apart from those of Talāl and Faisal—struggling for power), as will be recorded below.

Appointment of Faisal Ibn Turki as Minister of Labour Causes Tension Between Talāl and King. Talāl and Nawwāf. At the beginning of June, the King appointed [his nephew] Amir Faisal Ibn Turki Ibn Abd al-Aziz to the newly-created Ministry of Labour and Workers. The suggestion for such a ministry had originally come from Nāsir al-Manqūr, whose candidacy for the office had met with the opposition of the princes.

According to *Al-Haqā'iq*, the "little kings" were effective in persuading the King to appoint Faisal Ibn Turki (having previously failed to secure his appointment as Chief of the Royal Household; see above) so as to strengthen the hands of his son Muhammad against Talāl in the government. Faisal Ibn Turki's appointment was said to mean: (1) the strengthening of the anti-Talāl front inside the government, which now included Faisal Ibn Turki, Muhammad Ibn Saud, the Defence Minister, Ibrahim as-Suwayl, the Foreign Minister, and Abd al-Aziz Ibn Hasan, the Minister of Education; (2) the driving of a wedge between Talāl and Nawwāf, as Talāl was said to have been deeply offended by Saud's appointment of Faisal Ibn Turki and by Nawwāf's announcement of the appointment without bothering to inform the government and without a budget having been provided for such a ministry. Talāl absented himself from his ministry but was persuaded to return to his duties. (*Hayat, June 10; Haqā'iq, Nov 16*)

Nawwāf Resigns From Diwān; Estrangement Between Talāl and Nawwāf. By royal decree published on July 20, King Saud ordered "in accordance with the suggestion of the head of the Council of Ministers" [i.e. Saud himself] that the Directorate of Broadcasting, Press and Publications be attached to the Royal Diwān, and Nawwāf, in his capacity of Chief of the Diwān, be responsible to the King for the department.

The same evening, however, Nawwāf resigned his post as Chief of the Royal Diwān (*Bilad, July 20, 21*). What had happened, according to *Al-Haqā'iq*, was that the "little kings" had instigated the King to make this appointment, and Nawwāf to accept it, with a view to establishing the paramountcy of the court over the government in executive matters, without informing Nawwāf of their real motives (*Hayat, Nov 16*). Talāl protested vehemently against this infringement of the executive authority. Talāl—or the government as a whole—informed the King that they were determined to resign if the decree remained in force. Consequently, Nawwāf tendered his resignation to save the King from a humiliating impasse, and Saud accepted it.

A letter to *Al-Hayāt* from a Saudi Arabian said that the crisis had originated in the insufficient demarcation of authority between the government and the Diwān. Nawwāf had been turning the Diwān into a means of by-passing the government, so much so that even ministers had started to use it to solve their problems. The Nawwāf crisis had not been the first one to arise from this state of affairs. (*Hayat, Aug 18; Haqā'iq, Nov 16*)

The "little kings," *Al-Haqā'iq* continued, celebrated a victory, having caused a rift between Talāl and Nawwāf and regained domination over the court; Ibn Salīm again became the King's confidant. (*Haqā'iq, Nov 16*)

Towards Reconciliation Between Saud and Faisal. In June there were reports of reconciliation meetings at Ta'if between the King and Faisal, on the former's initiative (*Hayat, June 7, 13; Falastin, June 6, 17*). One report was explicitly denied by official circles in Jeddah (*Hayat, June 9*). The King was also said to have

consulted Faisal at the outbreak of the Kuwaiti crisis [end of June] at a meeting arranged by the "neutral" Amir Nawwaf.

At any rate, on Aug 8, the King called on Faisal at his house in Ta'if, at the entreaties, it was said, of Amir Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Aziz and other "neutrals." According to *Al-Haqā'iq*, their motive was to shake the position of Amir Talāl. The talk was inconclusive, since Faisal insisted that the government should resign prior to his reconciliation with the King. The King demurred, it was reported, because he did not wish to abandon those who had stood by him against Faisal, and because a new government would be loyal to Faisal. The following day, when the King left for Riyadh, Faisal was not among the persons taking leave of him. (*Hayat*, Aug 16, 17; *Haqā'iq*, Nov 16)

Talāl's Press Conference at Beirut Offends the King. On Aug 14 Amir Talāl gave a press conference in Beirut, where he had arrived on Aug 12 on a private visit. He said that the King had formed his government in order to carry out the changes which the country needed. Talāl emphasized the harmony which existed among the members of the government, and between the government and the King. When asked about the proposed constitution and the representative council (*al-majlis al-tamthili*) which, according to rumour, the King had rejected, Talāl replied that the Qur'an was Saudi Arabia's constitution and the Shari'ah her guide to action. However, a "set of basic principles for government" (*usūl asāsī lil-hukm*) was being considered, to define the rights and duties of citizens. A "national council" (*majlis watani*) was also envisaged to give the people a share in the government. Talāl referred to his alleged quarrel with Faisal as "only a difference of opinion over the ruling system." As regards foreign policy, Talāl declared that the lease of Dhahran had practically expired and that Saudi Arabia stood to lose in consequence about \$10 million per annum. He also spoke in praise of Arab union (*Hayat*, Aug 15; *NYT*, Aug 16; *Times*, Sept 14). (On the issue of the Dhahran agreement, see below: International Relations; United States.)

This press conference, it was reported, aroused the King's anger. Observers in Beirut were reported to believe that it was the reference to the Dhahran base which had given offence to the King; others that it had been caused by the mention of a national assembly; and there were also suggestions that he was upset by the admission that a dispute existed between the royal brothers. (*Times*, Sept 14)

Al-Hayāt reported that the King upbraided Talāl by cable for interfering in matters outside his competence; Talāl countered that he had expressed opinions shared by the government at large. The King then ordered Talāl, who was at that time in Europe, to hasten his return. On Aug 29 Talāl reached Jeddah where he stayed for some time, since he felt offended by the King. It was only when his brothers Badr and Abd al-Muhsin remonstrated with him that he went to Riyadh. In the meantime the King had repeated his demand in another cable; he stressed in particular that only the Foreign Minister had the right to make statements on foreign affairs. (*Hayat*, Sept 10, 16)

The affair came up at the government meeting in the beginning of Sept. It was decided that Talāl should explain his conduct in a letter to the King, in order to close the matter, but no such letter was ever written. (*Hayat*, Sept 10, 16; *Haqā'iq*, Nov 30)

Talāl and Followers Leave Government; Faisal Returns to Riyadh. On Sept 11 the King published a decree announcing changes in the government. The new government did not include Talāl (hitherto Minister of Finance and National Economy), Badr (Communications) and Abd al-Muhsin (Interior). (*Bilad*, Sept 12; for details see table: The Government.)

Al-Haqā'iq held that the die had been cast at the government meeting mentioned above, when Saud and his supporters had told Talāl, in answer to his question, that the time was not appropriate for introducing constitutional reform. Talāl refused to take part in government business until the King redeemed his promises on this score, and the King dismissed him in consequence. Badr and Abd al-Muhsin resigned in solidarity with Talāl. (*Haqā'iq*, Nov 30)

Al-Hayāt, on the other hand, believed that the crisis had been brought to a head by Talāl's refusal, as Minister of Finance, to ratify the gift by the King of a tract of land to Amir Saud Ibn Jalawi, governor of the eastern provinces. (*Hayat*, Sept 16)

Observers generally regarded the rebuff as an attempt by the King to conciliate Faisal and his group. (*Times*, Sept 12; *Hayat*, Sept 12, 13, 15)

On Sept 16 [the "neutral"] Amir Nawwaf Ibn Abd al-Aziz was appointed Minister of Finance and National Economy. On Oct 5 the appointment was announced of Shaykh Abdallah Balkhayr, Director of the Department of Broadcasting, Press and Publications as Minister of State for Broadcasting, Press and Publications. (*Bilad*, Sept 17, Oct 6)

On Oct 10 Faisal returned to Riyadh. Prominent among those who greeted him was Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud, the Minister of Defence and Aviation. *Kul-Shay'* thought that the King and Faisal would be reconciled since there were so few personalities left to shoulder affairs of state. *Al-Hayāt* reported that the King consulted Faisal on the question of recognition of the new regime in Syria and found himself in agreement with him on inter-Arab questions in general.

As soon as Faisal arrived in Riyadh, Talāl left the city with his brothers Badr and Abd al-Muhsin and took up residence in Jeddah. (*Kul-Shay'*, Oct 14; *Hayat*, Oct 17)

FAISAL'S RETURN TO POWER

The King's Illness. On Nov 16 the King suddenly fainted and was taken to the American hospital in Dhahran. It was reported that the 59-year-old King had been complaining for some time of fatigue caused by over-exertion since the ouster of Faisal in Dec 1960. In Dhahran, the King was seen by a number of specialists, including Dr. F.D. Moore of Boston. On Dr Moore's recommendation, the King went to Boston where he entered the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital. The nature of the monarch's illness was not disclosed. He was understood to be suffering from an ulcer condition. Official bulletins from Riyadh, however, denied this and claimed that his digestive system was in "very good order"; the physicians had advised the King to stay in hospital for a rest. On Dec 3 the King left hospital. On Dec 10 and 17 the King was operated for cataract on both his eyes; on Dec 27 his condition was reported to be good; on Dec 30 he underwent a "minor" stomach operation. (*NYT*, Nov 23; *Bilad*, Nov 23-Dec 10, Jan 1, 1962; *R. Mecca*, Nov 21 [23]; *Hayat*, Nov 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, Dec 1; *Falastin*, Dec 11, 28; *Manar*, Jordan, Dec 18)

Faisal Appointed King's Deputy. When the King was hospitalized in Dhahran, Faisal was among those who immediately called upon him; thereafter Faisal returned to Riyadh (*Bilad*, Nov 19). Meanwhile, Amir Nawwaf, the Minister of Finance and Economy, assumed the functions of acting PM. (*Hayat*, Nov 19)

On Nov 21, upon the King's departure for Boston, a royal decree appointed Faisal as the King's deputy in his absence (*R. Mecca*, Nov 21 [23]). Foreign reports said that originally the King had intended to appoint a regency council composed of five ministers: Nawwaf, Muhammad Ibn Saud, Faisal Ibn Turki, Dr. Hasan Nasif and Shaykh Abdallah Balkhayr. However, Nawwaf himself suggested Faisal's appointment as deputy; Faisal arrived in Dhahran accompanied by his brothers Abdal-lab, Mut'ib and Khalid; even Talal was said to support Faisal's candidacy. The King agreed. (*Hayat*, Nov 23, Dec 3; *Haq'iq*, Dec 1)

Rumours spread that Faisal would use the King's absence to undermine his brother's position. However, Faisal announced that he would honour the trust placed in him, and introduce no changes in government until the King's return. The King, for his part, was said to have promised before his departure that on his return he would re-form the government on a broad basis. The general public received Faisal's return with satisfaction and as an indication that the rift within the royal family had been healed (*Hayat*, Nov 23, Dec 3). Later, *Al-Hayat* repeated reports that Faisal would become PM after the King's return, or else the King would remain PM with Faisal as deputy PM. According to these rumours, Nawwaf, Muhammad Ibn Saud, Faisal Ibn Turki and Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Hasan would stay in the government. (*Hayat*, Dec 8)

TALAL RENEWS CALL FOR REFORM OF REGIME
In Dec the Cairo *Al-Haq'iq* published articles which, it said, had been written by Amir Talal and had originally appeared in the Saudi Arabian *Al-Qasim* [date not specified by *Al-Haq'iq*] and in which Talal called for a basic reform of the regime. (Only one article was available to the editor.)

From time to time, Talal wrote, articles appeared in the press on topics such as socialism from the Islamic point of view, Arab nationalism and Islam, "there is no nationalization in Islam," systems opposed by Islam, etc. [This was a reference to articles against the UAR regime which became frequent in the last quarter of the year.]

It was indeed a duty, Talal continued, to discuss such questions and to clarify what was the right system for the country, in the political, economic and social spheres. "Everybody knows," the article continued, "that the *Shar'iah* is the [our] present and continuing system, and also knows that the gates of *ijtihād* are closed to the people save a small minority which does nothing but copy Islamic laws written hundreds of years ago." This state of affairs must not continue, the gates of *ijtihād* must be opened to all; "because we firmly believe in our true religion we must have a say in its affairs." It was imperative now to know the road the country was to take in the future and to study "scientifically, logically and realistically" axioms such as: "Arab nationalism is opposed to Islam... Islam is the basis of Arab nationalism... socialism is clearly stipulated in Islam..."

Times had changed and were changing ever more rapidly and it was no longer possible to deal with the country's problems "on the village level." A basic system for the state (*niẓām asāsī lil-dawlah*) must be found; this was inescapable under present conditions in the country and for its development.

"I know," Talal continued, "that if the above-mentioned system was found it might conflict with the teachings of Islam and its spirit, and to allay such fears I call for the formation of a high-level commission. It would comprise men of religion from our and other Islamic countries as well as experts in the economic and social sciences and others." This commission was to study the system and lay down new concepts for the political and social order.

The call for Islam and the call for Arab nationalism, Talal continued, was nothing new in this country but the call must be based on clear concepts. In this era it was not enough to make the call without fully believing in it, nor was it enough to criticize the principles and systems of others without having something better to show.

"The present era is an era of principles and reform (*tanẓīm*), and a nation that neither believes in certain principles nor reforms its affairs will not enjoy progress and prosperity. We have such principles, praise be to God, and they only want smoothing-out, concentration and reform (*as-saql, at-tarkiz wa-at-tanẓīm*) in order that we might face with them the people of the earth."

Talal concluded with a request that those in power concern themselves with these basic demands. (*Haq'iq*, Dec 7)

VARIOUS INTERNAL AFFAIRS

OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME

The "National Liberation Front." In Feb it was reported that leaflets had been distributed in Riyadh and Hijaz attacking the King and the Crown Prince. Official sources put the blame on leftist elements among the youth. (*Hayat*, Feb 22)

Another source said during the same period that the [leftist] National Liberation Front (*jabhat al-tahrur al-awatani*) had distributed leaflets against the "tribal despotism" which ruled the country. It attacked the "increasingly reactionary" policy of the King and his failure to fulfil his promises for constitutional reform. The front identified itself with the anti-imperialist struggle in the Arab states, Asia, Africa and America, and put forward a programme of four points: (1) abolition of autocracy

and introduction of a parliamentary regime; (2) formulation of a national economic policy; (3) revision of all oil agreements; (4) adoption of "positive neutralism" and repeal of the Dhahran lease. (*Afrique Action*, Tunis, Feb 27)

Law on Trial of Ministers. On March 11 Mecca Radio published a law on the trial of ministers and officials of ministerial rank. The following crimes would make their perpetrators liable to a death sentence or 25 years imprisonment: (1) attempting to change the monarchy; (2) high treason; (3) endangering the state's internal security, safety and unity; (4) undermining the loyalty of the armed forces.

The law listed a series of crimes of subversive cha-

raeter as well as the exploiting of official position for private benefit, disclosure of cabinet secrets, interference in affairs relating to the judiciary, or to government departments etc., and fixed the respective punishments.

The court to try offenders under this law would consist of three ministers selected by the cabinet. (For full text, see *R. Mecca, May 11 [14]*).

Al-Hayat attributed this legislation to information received by the authorities concerning the activity of a number of anti-monarchist organizations of an extreme leftist and nationalist character, and the leaflets distributed in the previous month, [though the connection between the law and these activities was not quite clear]. (*Hayat, March 14*)

More Opposition Activities. In May *Al-Hayat* reported growing resentment against the King, the Crown Prince and the royal house in general, which was taking shape in secret societies. The younger generation from which these societies had emerged, was split into numerous factions, from Communists and leftists to Ba'athists and Nasserists. The Communists and leftists and some of the nationalists were of the opinion that no situation after the elimination of the royal house could be worse than the present one.

Al-Hayat (June 1) published a statement which it had received from Riyadh, attacking the squandering of the oil income on the royal family instead of its allocation to development. Disatisfaction was said to be especially strong in the eastern provinces—in Dhahran and Dammam—which complained that they did not receive their share of development, although they contributed 90% of the country's revenue.

Opposition leaflets attacking the King and Faisal were distributed also in Jeddah. (*Hayat, May 7, 26, June 1*)

Press Asks For Reforms; King Courts the Press. In July Saud was reported to have summoned to Ta'if the leading members of the press after some of them had begun to campaign in Hijaz and in Riyadh but more particularly in the US oil company's concession areas, for larger representation of the educated élite on the Royal Advisory Council, and for the conversion of this assembly into a legislative body. It was commented that some surprise may have been expressed and an air of hopeful expectancy created when the King, instead of imposing fresh restrictions on the press, merely admonished it. (*Hindustan Times, Aug 18*)

In Sept the King ordered that the newspapers be despatched free by air inside the country and abroad, following a request by the press for royal encouragement (*Bilad, Sept 24*). Foreign sources also reported that the King had abolished press censorship. (*R. Beirut, Sept 25-IMB, Sept 26*)

Opposition Abroad. In Dec it was reported in Lebanon that a Saudi Arabian cell had been uncovered in Beirut, which had distributed leaflets attacking the King and his regime. The cell was said to have had ten members, who had been aided by Lebanese citizens and financed by an unidentified Arab organization. One Saudi Arabian had been arrested while distributing leaflets. Similar cells were believed to have remained active in Lebanon. (*Amal, Beirut, Dec 10*)

LABOUR, CIVIL SERVICE, ALIENS

Unemployment. [The problem of unemployment assumed ever larger dimensions during the year.]

In March Amir Talal, the Minister of Finance and

Economy, announced that the government would carry out public works at an increased rate in order to create employment. (*Hayat, March 14*)

In April the government, having been requested by the King to attend to the labour situation, put the Labour and Workers' Authority (*maslahat al-amal wal-ummal*) under Násir al-Manqúr, the Minister of State, and decided to invite foreign experts to the country to look into the state of the Authority. (*Umm al-Qura, April 21*)

At the beginning of May a conference was reported between Manqúr, Abdallah ad-Dahib, the Director of the Labour and Workers Authority, and its senior staff. The minister promised the Authority every aid to enable it to fulfil its functions. Dahib was said to have enlarged upon the difficulties with which the Authority had to cope, its lack of suitable officials and the neglect it had suffered so far at the hand of the government. (*Al-Qasim, Buraydah, May 2*)

At about the same time readers' letters and an article in the weekly *Al-Khalij al-Arabi* attacked the helplessness of the Authority on the one hand, and the uncooperative attitude of employers on the other. "Irresponsible" dismissals by Aramco and other firms had recently further aggravated unemployment and led to a lowering of wages. Help could only come from a far-reaching works programme, such as that carried out in Europe in the 'thirties, and not from any legal steps. (*Al-Khalij al-Arabi, Khubar, May 4*)

On June 8 a Ministry of Labour, Workers and Social Affairs was formed, with Amir Faisal Ibn Turki at its head. (See above—The Royal House.) (*Hayat, May 9*). On Sept 11 Násir al-Manqúr was appointed in his stead. (*Bilad, Sept 12*)

In order to ease unemployment, the new ministry instructed employers not to permit overtime work. (*Bilad, Aug 31*)

However, reports of mass unemployment continued. According to the Riyadh newspaper *Al-Yamamah*, as quoted by *Al-Haqiq*, thousands of unemployed applied daily to labour exchanges in vain, while the government was warned of the consequences of its failure to cope with the problem. (*Haqqiq, Dec 14*)

Improved Conditions for Civil Service. Improvements in the terms of employment for the civil service were under consideration during the year. On Aug 3 new pension regulations were published. Family allowances and more favourable gradings were among other improvements considered. (*Bilad, Feb 23, March 23, Aug 3, 4, 28*)

Aramco. The Aramco report for 1960 gave 14,384 registered employees, of whom over 75% were Saudi Arabians. During the year 722 employees purchased homes under a company project, making a total of 2,800 within ten years. Twenty nine Saudi Arabians were sent to foreign universities at the expense of Aramco—12 to Lebanon and the remainder to the USA. At the firm's technical training centres in Saudi Arabia, an average of 4,531 studied during working hours and 4,212 after working hours. Another elementary school for the staff was opened (the eleventh established by the company) and the building of two intermediate schools was begun. A hundred and thirty two staff members were superannuated (*Hayat, May 17*). In July another 30 Saudi Arabian employees were sent abroad for study, 21 of them to Lebanon for general secondary education, and nine to various colleges and universities in the USA. (*Bilad, July 18*)

From Sept 1, the working week was shortened from 42 to 40 hours, without a reduction in wages. (*Bilad, Aug 24*)

A local newspaper attacked the company for arbitrary dismissals and failure to train an appreciable number of local graduate staff and any local petroleum engineers. (*Khaliq al-Arabi, Khubar, May 4*)

Aliens. Various measures were taken to prevent aliens from competing with Saudi Arabians on the labour market, and in the country's economy in general.

At the beginning of the pilgrimage season, it was reported that foreign pilgrims had been forbidden to trade whilst inside Saudi Arabia. (*Falastin, Jordan, March 15*)

The employment of aliens, especially Lebanese, in office work while qualified Saudi Arabians went unemployed, was the subject of complaint. (*Bilad, March 5*)

In Nov it was reported that the authorities were taking steps to ensure the employment of local labour. 75% of the employees in the banks, companies and stores were to be Saudi Arabians. Foreign employees were being registered as a first step to their being replaced by local staff. (*Bilad, Nov 20, 30*)

In Dec it was reported that the newly-organized Aliens Control Department had started to function (*Bilad, Dec 4*) and that a census would be conducted of aliens resident in the country. (*Bilad, Dec 11*)

Arab Refugees. [Arab refugees had a special status.] In Aug the King declared at a reception given by the refugees at Riyadh that they were not strangers in the Kingdom, and that they shared the rights and duties of Saudi Arabians. (*Bilad, Aug 14*)

In Sept "various passport departments received a circular explaining that all Palestinians residing in the Kingdom, including those who hold passports other than those issued by the All-Palestine Government," had the right to enjoy the special facilities detailed in a previous royal announcement. (*Saudi Weekly Newsletter, Jeddah, Sept 25*)

In Nov it was reported that the Saudi Arabian embassy in Beirut issued entry visas to Palestinians only on recommendation from the Arab Higher Committee. (*Ha-nadith, Nov 17*)

ISLAM AND THE STATE

Injunctions to Observe Relations. In May the King issued a message to "the princes, the qadis and the religious institutions in the Kingdom" calling on all his subjects, "whether small or big," strictly to observe the *shari'ah*. He said that this was especially necessary at the present time when propaganda was directed at Islam in order to replace it by principles unacceptable to God. *Al-Hayat* noted that the princes thought this to be another move in the struggle between the King and the princes in opposition. (*Bilad, Hayat, May 14*)

In Nov the authorities published a warning against "non-Islamic principles," such as socialism and Communism. In particular the press was exhorted not to deviate from the precepts of religion. *Al-Hayat* saw this warning against the background of Egyptian socialist measures and the mutual recriminations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. (See Relations Between the UAR and Saudi Arabia.) (*Hayat, Nov 14*)

Opposition to Belgrade Conference. Prior to the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, tribal heads and

religious leaders were said to have advised the King, as "Keeper of the Holy Places," not to visit a country which had officially adopted the Communist-atheist creed; they also asked him to cease cooperating with leaders of such countries and issue a declaration denying "neutrality" in regard to Islamic principles. Leaflets on this issue were distributed in mosques at that time. The Conference was also attacked on similar grounds in the Mecca newspaper *An-Nadwah*. (*Hayat Aug 16, 17; Haq'iq, Nov 23*)

Improving the Holy Cities; Record Pilgrimage. At the beginning of Jan an executive body, headed by the King, was set up for the improvement of facilities for pilgrims in Mecca. 30m. riyal were set aside in the 1961 budget for "enlargement of the holy mosques and 20m. riyal for Mecca projects." (*Bilad, Jan 19; Falastin, Feb 17*; see also above: Economic Survey; the Budget.)

Record Pilgrimage. It was reported that pilgrimage to the Holy Places in 1380 AH (1961) had reached the record figure of 1,185,000 as against 750,000 in 1379 AH (1960). Health conditions had been very satisfactory, partly owing to the weather, and deaths had numbered 360, compared to 665 in the preceding year. (*Jidah, Jordan, June 19*)

A report by three Muslim doctors of the World Health Organization was reported to have noted that the lot of the pilgrims had been "completely transformed" by the improvements and "health control measures" introduced by the government. (*Newsweek, Aug 21*)

Islamic University Inaugurated. On Oct 24 an Islamic University for religious studies was inaugurated in Medina. The foundation expenditure to the amount of 3m. riyal came out of the royal household budget. Three hundred and twenty students were to enrol in the first year, 80% of them Saudi Arabians. (*Umm al-Qura, Sept 8; Bilad, Oct 12, 25*; see also below: Foreign Relations in General: Call for Establishment of "Islamic League.")

Islamic Programme on Mecca Radio. In Nov the Information Department announced that Mecca Radio was about to introduce a new programme named "The Call of Islam" (*al-daw' al-ilah*), to be broadcast daily for an hour and a half. The programme would include the transmission of prayers from the *Ka'bah* and various religious features by Muslim men of learning from all over the world (*Bilad, Nov 15*). [No monitoring record of this programme was available.]

THE ARMED FORCES

Supreme Defence Council Formed. On July 25 the King decreed the establishment of a Supreme Defence Council consisting of himself as chairman, the Minister of Defence and Civil Aviation as deputy chairman, the Inspector-General of the Army, the Chief of Staff and the Ministers of the Interior, Finance and Economy, Communications, and Foreign Affairs as members. The Council's task was to draw up "a long-term defence policy for the Saudi Arabian army," to provide it with equipment and men and raise its standard. The same evening, the Council held its first session. (*R. Mecca, July 25 [27]; Bilad, July 26*)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYNOPSIS

Saudi Arabia continued to profess a policy of neutralism and she was represented at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. As in previous years, she had no diplomatic relations with any Communist country, and, of the three Western powers, only with the United States.

Saudi Arabia informed the US that she would not renew the agreement by which the US Air Force enjoyed access to the US-constructed Dhahran airfield. The agreement was to expire on April 1, 1962. On the other hand, the US, which under the agreement was supplying military assistance and constructing civil aviation facilities at Dhahran at her expense, made it known that she would continue these activities. Relations remained friendly. At the end of the year King Saud went to the US for medical treatment. Relations with Aramco continued normal.

The Buraimi dispute continued to dominate relations with Britain; negotiations went on but were still inconclusive by the end of the year. In the dispute over Iraq's claim to sovereignty over Kuwait, the UK and Saudi Arabia found themselves for a time on the same side of the fence.

Saudi Arabia endeavoured to keep on friendly terms with all Arab countries but her relations with Iraq and the UAR greatly worsened. Her opposition to Iraqi claims over Kuwait was sharper than that of any other Arab country. Cairo, which after the break-up of Syria had embarked on a policy of "battling imperialism in the palaces of reaction, in Riyadh, Amman" and elsewhere, started to attack the Saudi Arabian regime in October. King Saud was charged with having conspired with King Hussein (who had visited Riyadh in August) and with "Syrian plotters" to destroy the UAR. Riyadh's relations with Sudan, on the other hand, improved. Saudi Arabia continued to sponsor all the usual Arab causes, from Algeria to the struggle against Zionism. (See Inter-Arab Relations.) Activities in the Islamic spheres developed conspicuously during the year. During the pilgrimage, in which a number of African and Asian Muslim political leaders participated, King Saud called for the establishment of an Islamic League to fight imperialism and to face the world blocs. The Islamic University, patterned after the Cairo Al-Azhar, which was opened during the year in Medina and which was to be attended also by Muslim students from abroad, may also be seen in this context. Of the 30 countries in which Saudi Arabia had diplomatic representatives, 17 were Arab and or predominantly Muslim; of the four African countries with which she established diplomatic relations during the year—Guinea, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria—the first two were predominantly Muslim, and the President of Guinea as well as the Prime Ministers of Senegal and Northern Nigeria came on pilgrimage to Mecca. Close contacts continued also with Pakistan following President Ayub's visit to Saudi Arabia in the previous year.

FOREIGN RELATIONS IN GENERAL

Call for Establishment of "Islamic League." "Islamic Conference" at Jedda. At a reception which he gave for the leaders of the pilgrim delegations on May 20, King Saud (in a speech read by Amir Nawwaf) called for the establishment of a "strong Islamic League" (*rabitah islamiyah qawriyah*) to overcome the divisions in the

Islamic world brought about by imperialism and in order to face the two competing world blocs. He also spoke of the Islamic University which was being established in Medina and said he would strive to have a considerable number of African and Asian students enrolled there. He elaborated on the Arab causes from Algeria to the Palestine question and Buraimi. PM Mamadou Dia of Senegal, who attended the reception, thanked King Saud in the name of all Muslims for his services as Keeper of the Holy Places. (*Al-Bilad*, May 21, *Hayat*, May 23)

On May 27 a number of Saudi Arabian and foreign Muslim notables, who had come on pilgrimage, met King Saud in Jedda and issued a number of resolutions. The foreign participants were: Sir Ahmadu Bello, the PM of Northern Nigeria; Shaykh Ibrahim Inas, the Mufti of Senegal; Sekou Kaba, Guinea Minister of the Interior; the Minister of Religion of Indonesia; the leader of the Cameroun delegation and the Malayan Consul in Jedda. The following resolutions were adopted: (1) affirmation of spiritual and material cooperation in accordance with the precepts of Islam; (2) affirmation of cooperation in the struggle against imperialism, especially on behalf of Algeria; (3) every Muslim to be active in the struggle against Zionism, which constitutes a danger to Islam; (4) support for the Islamic University of Medina; (5) recommendation of close high-level political cooperation. (*Al-Bilad*, May 29)

Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. Saudi Arabia participated in the preparatory conference in Cairo as well as in the Belgrade Conference itself (see: The Belgrade Conference). King Saud did not go to Belgrade himself; it was reported that tribal heads and religious leaders had opposed his going to a country which had officially adopted the Communist-atheist creed (*Hayat*, Aug 16, 17; *Haq'iq*, Nov 2). Shaykh Ibrahim as-Suwayl, the Foreign Minister, appeared at the Conference as the King's personal representative. In his speech he stressed Saudi Arabia's policy of non-alignment, her desire for international justice and security, participation in the fight against imperialism and cooperation within the UN. [He took no stand on the controversial issues which occupied the conference.] (*Doc. Belg.* p 133 ff; see also: The Belgrade Conference)

The King on Foreign Policy. On Nov 12, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of his accession, the King, in a speech read by his son Muhammad, the Minister of Defence, said: "Our foreign policy as regards Arabs... is based on the Arab League Charter... We sincerely work for the achievement of greater Arab unity despite unforeseen incidents and circumstances... Our policy as regards the Arab states is based on the spirit of Islam and free cooperation in all foreign, cultural, economic and military affairs against the common enemy... We regret, as does every Arab, what has occurred and what sometimes occurs among Arab states, matters which only benefit the enemies of the Arab nation. I seize this opportunity to call sincerely and truly for the closing of ranks... we should work concertedly on matters which need our attention most, namely the protection of the rights of our Palestinian brethren..."

"As regards the outside world we shall continue to pursue our frank and clear policy of befriending whoever seeks our friendship and opposing whoever is hostile to us. We proclaim to all our policy of neutrality, which

endeavours to reduce international tension..." (*R. Mecca, Nov 12 14*; *Bilad, Nov 13*)

UNITED STATES THE DHAHRAN BASE

A central issue in Saudi Arabian-US relations in 1961 was the question of the Dhahran agreement which, Saudi Arabia declared, early in the year, it did not intend to renew.

Background. The airfield and installations at Dhahran had originally been built by the US during World War II. The mutual rights of the countries were determined by agreements of June 23, 1949, June 18, 1951 and April 2, 1957. The United States Air Force was permitted to use the base, which remained under "the complete authority and sovereignty" of Saudi Arabia. All fixed installations and other properties on the airfield established by the US became by virtue of the agreement the property of the Saudi Arabian government. The US also constructed civil aviation facilities at Dhahran. The US agreed to help Saudi Arabia procure US military supplies against payment as well as train and organize the Saudi Arabian army, air force and navy. The agreement was to expire on April 1, 1962. (For an official Saudi Arabian view on the status of the airfield, said to have US approval and made public in 1960, see MER 1960, p 381.)

Dhahran Agreement Not to Be Renewed. On March 16 the State Department announced that Saudi Arabia had asked the US to "withdraw its military operations from the Dhahran airfield." Saudi Arabia had notified Washington that she would not renew the 1957 agreement, which provided for US military access to the airfield. (*NYT, March 17*)

Saudi Arabian Motives. A commentary broadcast by Mecca Radio said that the Dhahran agreement was allowed to lapse because its object—helping Saudi Arabia to become independent in defence matters—had been attained. Relations with the US remained good. (*R. Mecca, March 17 20*)

In April Amir Talāh [the Minister of Finance and Economy] said in Cairo that his government would not renew the agreement because the US intended to continue its aid to Israel (*Times, April 3*). King Saud said in an interview in the same connection that he considered all aid to Israel as anti-Arab activity. (*Bilad, April 23*; *ANA, April 23 25*)

Foreign sources attributed the move to nationalist pressure, family considerations and anti-Zionism.

The Times attributed the Saudi Arabian step mainly to nationalist pressure within the Arab world. It added that "the Saudi Arabians may also feel that they have squeezed all they wanted out of the Americans," baving got a modern civil aviation centre. (*Times, March 18*)

Unofficial views reported from Washington were that "US use of the base had been a domestic political issue and Saudi Arabia had been a favourite target of attack for Arab nationalists and neutralists." King Saud had wished to continue the agreement but was opposed by [Crown Prince] Faisal and other members of his family (*NYT, May 17*). A "powerful clique of royal princes", another source said, had been "ceaselessly nagging the King to toss the US Air Force out of Dhahran. The princes were eager to appease Abdel Nasser and other Arab nationalists, who had used the King's suzerainty of a US base on Arab soil as an excuse for attacks on

the Saudi Arabian royal family" (*Time, May 14*). It was remarked that it was impossible to say whether King Saud had yielded to pressure from the UAR. In any event, his action was consistent with the earlier request by Morocco for evacuation of American bases there. (*Washington Post, March 20*)

The hurry, said *The Economist*, was explained by King Saud's pressing need to wring the maximum advantage from a popular political decision at a time when his new government still governed uneasily. (*Economist, March 25*)

Another view expressed by officials in Washington was that the Saudi Arabian action had apparently been prompted by political controversy within the Arab nation over US friendliness towards Israel (*NYT, March 17*), but, according to *Al-Hayāt*, a State Department spokesman gave as his opinion that the "friendly relations between the US and Israel" had not been responsible for the above-mentioned action. (*Hayat, March 18*)

US Official Reaction. It was reported from Washington that the State Department would not attempt to reverse the Saudi Arabian decision. It had agreed to withdraw US military operations in the airfield. These included a military air transport service unit used for cargo and passenger aircraft and an air-sea rescue unit. The State Department said that it had no plans to cancel general aid to Saudi Arabia. "The US Government expects that its close and friendly operations with Saudi Arabia in various fields will continue." It promised that, before leaving, the US would finish the air terminal it had been building. It was now about 70 per cent complete and had so far cost \$5m. (*NYT, March 17, 18*; *Dept. of State Bul., April 3*)

[Views differed as to the degree to which the US had been prepared for the development, and as to the feelings aroused. The official American view was that the Saudi Arabian announcement came as no surprise since] "discussions had been proceeding for some time with [Saudi Arabia] looking toward the non-renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement" (*Dept. of State Bul., April 3*). *Time* said that the State Department "swallowed its surprise," and *The Economist* wrote that the Saudi Arabian step "surprised the US government by its timing rather than its text." "Whereas the talks about the base were leisurely, the Saudi Arabian decision was abrupt." (*Time, March 24*; *Economist, March 25*)

Value of Dhahran Base. [US opinion generally held that no major harm had been done to US global strategy.]

The airfield was mainly a staging post for the US Military Air Transport Services when supplying military missions in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the Far East. It was maintained by some 800 US airmen, with Saudi Arabian participation. (*Economist, March 25*)

From a strategic standpoint, the base had long been of only limited utility. There had been an understanding that no combat aircraft would be stationed there except in time of war when it would be of greatest value. The development of new missile systems, including the sea-launched Polaris, made bases like Dhahran far less important than they once had been. (*Washington Post, March 20*; *Time, March 24*)

According to *The Times*, it was probable that the US Strategic Air Command would have deployed some of their bombers at Dhahran in a grave emergency. Its main value would disappear when it ceased to be a base where repairs and maintenance could be carried out and stocks of equipment held. "Dhahran was certainly not on Pre-

sident Kennedy's list of overseas bases that are expendable, for the US had asked for the renewal of the agreement." The Americans could not be feeling happy about the Saudi Arabian move. By April 1962 the only air base available to the US in the Arab world would be Wheelus Field in Libya, more than 2,000 miles away. "The British answer to the kind of political pressures that have rendered Dhahran untenable has been to keep clear of neutral countries so far as possible and move to isolated places like Gan Island. This policy may have disadvantages in peacetime, but it would offer greater security in limited war situations where the attitudes of neutral countries may be unpredictable. The Americans are at present wholly dependent on mainland routes between the Near and Far East." (*Times*, March 18)

The *Washington Post* remarked that the lapse of the agreement would "also end the American acquiescence in some quite unpleasant personnel practices dictated by the Saudi Arabian government" [obviously a reference to Saudi Arabia's barring of American Jews from serving at the Dhahran base]. In Feb a State Department official had said Saudi Arabia was within "its sovereign right" in doing so. (*NYT*, March 17; *Washington Post*, March 20; also *Time*, March 24)

Further Developments. Immediately after the Saudi Arabian decision not to renew the agreement had become known, *The Times* correspondent in Washington reported "it is believed that a new arrangement will be found." (*Times*, March 18)

At the beginning of June the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Baghdad was reported as saying that negotiations were going on between his country and the USA, since Saudi Arabia had decided not to renew the Dhahran agreement. He added that there were no military aircraft at Dhahran, and that the base served commercial purposes only. (*Mustaqbal*, Baghdad; *Manar*, Jordan, June 7)

In Aug Talal repeated at a press conference in Beirut, that US installations at Dhahran would be liquidated within eight months. Saudi Arabia was giving up an income of \$10m. yearly by asking the Americans to leave the base. (*NYT*, Aug 16)

In Dec UAR and [pro-UAR] Lebanese newspapers alleged that King Saud's stay in the USA, where he had gone for medical treatment, served for secret negotiations concerning a renewal of the agreement. (*Haqaiq*, Dec 14; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, Dec 25; *Hawadith*, Dec 15)

US Military Assistance. According to evidence given on Aug 25 in the US Senate, the US military training mission in Saudi Arabia had been reduced from 376 to 250 persons. The US was continuing to sell Saudi Arabia military equipment. (*US Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1962, Washington 1961*)

Aramco. Arab sources at the UN stated that the termination of the Dhahran agreement would not affect American oil concessions in Saudi Arabia. (*Ha'aretz*, March 17; *Hayat*, March 18)

In Nov, when the King went to Boston for medical treatment, he addressed a short message to his people which included a passage thanking Aramco for his treatment in the company's hospital. (*Hayat*, Nov 23)

King Saud in the USA. In Nov King Saud went to the USA for medical treatment which continued into 1962.

(See Internal Affairs: Faisal's Return to Power.) At the end of Dec a State Department official called upon the King and handed him a message from the President, the contents of which were not disclosed (*Hayat*, Dec 29). On Jan 27, 1962 President Kennedy paid the King a courtesy visit at Palm Beach, Fla., where the King was recuperating. (*NYHT*, Jan 28, 1962)

UNITED KINGDOM

Buraïmi Dispute Continues Unsolved. [The Saudi Arabian position remained basically unaltered.] At the beginning of Feb Shaykh Ibrahim as-Suwai, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in a press interview: "Our rights are clear... Buraïmi is an inseparable part of our country" (*Iraq Times*, Feb 7). In Jan and again in March, Suwai announced that diplomatic relations with the UK would not be resumed until the Buraïmi dispute had been settled to his country's satisfaction. (*Hayat*, Jan 27; *R. Mecca*, March 24 [27])

In Jan it was reported that the UN Sec.-Gen. had forwarded to the UK and Saudi Arabia a report prepared by Herbert de Ribbing, Hammarskjöld's personal representative in regard to the Buraïmi dispute (see MER 1960, p 380), which included "constructive proposals" for the renewal of talks between the sides. Britain was reported to have reacted favourably to the report; however, her final attitude depended on further consultations with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman [who claimed part of the disputed area]. Earlier, a Foreign Office spokesman was reported to have declared that the UK would welcome the renewal of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. (*Akram*, Jan 13; *Ha'aretz*, Jan 29; *Manar*, Feb 17; *Hayat*, Feb 24)

Al-Haydt reported that in mid-Feb talks had taken place at UN headquarters between Abd ar-Rahmān Azzām [political counsellor to King Saud] and Harold Beeley [British Deputy Representative at the UN] on the basis of de Ribbing's report. At the same time UN efforts were expected to implement the agreement which Azzām and Beeley were said to have reached in Dec 1960 concerning the repatriation of 2,500 refugees who had fled from the Buraïmi area to Saudi Arabia during earlier stages of the dispute. (*Hayat*, Feb 24)

In April an Egyptian newspaper reported that during his recent visit to Kuwait King Saud had discussed with the Ruler and the British representative the resumption of diplomatic relations with the UK. (*Akhbar Sa'ad*, Cairo, April 12)

In Aug de Ribbing again visited Saudi Arabia (*Falastin*, Aug 9; *Jer. Times*, Aug 23). On Oct 15 King Saud discussed the Buraïmi problem at length with de Ribbing and a British Foreign Office representative. The King expressed his hope for a speedy and peaceful solution. (*Bilad*, Oct 16; *Hayat*, Oct 17)

In Dec de Ribbing handed to the Foreign Office lists of refugees who wished to return to Buraïmi, for transmission to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Shaykh of Abu Dhabi. (*Times*, Dec 6; *Hayat*, Dec 8)

At the end of the year *The Times* wrote: "A new stage in the long-drawn out dispute was reached on Dec 5 at a meeting [in London] between Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, and Azzām..." The talks covered the problems of the refugees and their bearing on the restoration of Anglo-Saudi relations. "The talks... seem to have gone reasonably well, but there have been so many setbacks and disappointments since the dispute began in 1952, that Foreign Office representatives were understandably cautious." (*Times*, Dec 6).

The Kuwait Crisis. On July 1, following Iraq's claim to sovereignty over Kuwait, both British and Saudi Arabian troops entered the country at Kuwait's request. Saudi Arabia denied that there was any liaison between the two forces and that the measures taken signified a rapprochement between Riyadh and London. (*MENA*, July 6 [7]; *R. Mecca*, July 8 [11])

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

African Representation at Islamic Meetings. (See above: Foreign Relations in General; below: Senegal.)

Scholarships. In Sept Saudi Arabia informed the Arab League Secretariat that it had decided to donate 16 scholarships to African students. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, Cairo, Sept 30)

Guinea. On May 15, during his stay in the UAR on an official visit, Sekou Touré, the President of Guinea, paid an unscheduled 13-hours visit to Saudi Arabia. Previously the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the UAR had handed him a message. At Jeddah airport, Touré was received by King Saud. They later met twice for talks. According to a Guinean statement, Touré was to discuss diplomatic relations between the two countries and questions connected with the Guinean pilgrims. The two heads of state decided to exchange diplomatic representatives. Touré invited his host to visit Guinea. Touré flew to Mecca and prayed with the pilgrims there.

A Mecca Radio commentary said that Touré's visit, although brief, had strengthened relations between Guinea and Saudi Arabia. The president had also affirmed Saudi Arabia's service to the cause of peoples longing for independence and freedom (*Ahram*, May 16, 17; *R. Mecca*, May 16 [18]; *Bilad*, May 17, 18). During his visit Sekou Touré gave his consent to the Saudi Arabian nominee for the post of ambassador to Guinea. (*Ahram*, May 17)

On June 14, the Guinean ambassador to Saudi Arabia presented his credentials to King Saud. The Guinean Foreign Minister was present at the ceremony. (*Bilad*, June 15)

Nigeria. In May King Saud accepted an invitation to pay an official visit to Nigeria later in 1961. The invitation was tendered by Sir Ahunadu Bello, PM of Northern Nigeria, who had come on pilgrimage (*Jihad*, May 31; *West African Pilot*, May 31). (The visit did not materialize.)

In June King Saud received members of a Nigerian mission headed by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs. (*R. Mecca*, June 15 [17])

Saudi Arabia's first ambassador to Nigeria (and Ghana) left to take up his post in Aug (*Ayyam*, Damascus, Aug 21). [There was a Nigerian Ambassador in Jeddah.]

A Nigerian daily quoted a report by the Anti-Slavery Society that there was a "continuing slave traffic in children from Nigeria to Arabia." The article pointed out that Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Arabian Peninsula still recognized the status of slavery. The article quoted reports that slave-dealers were sent from Arabia under the guise of Muslim missionaries who guided poor, unsuspecting pilgrims to ports on the Saudi Arabian coast. These "pilgrims" were then imprisoned for illegal entry into the country and later sold into slavery. (*Morning Post*, Lagos, Nov 4)

Senegal. In Jan a representative of Senegal conducted negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government on the

establishment of diplomatic relations. He met King Saud who gave him agreement to the appointment of a Senegalese diplomatic representative in Jeddah. (*Bilad*; *Hayat*, Jan 22)

On Oct 5 the first Saudi Arabian ambassador to Senegal presented his credentials to President Senghor. (*Hayat*, Oct 8)

In May Mamadou Dia, PM of Senegal, accompanied by his Director of Information and Radio and the Mufti of Senegal, paid a fortnight's visit to Saudi Arabia where he carried out the Muslim pilgrimage rites. (*Dakar Matin*, May 18; *R. Amman*, May 30 [June 1])

Dia attended a reception given by King Saud in Mecca on May 21 for the Muslim leaders. Dia spoke after Amir Nawwaf who read the King's speech and expressed the thanks of the Muslims of Senegal and in general to King Saud for his services as Keeper of the Holy Places of Islam and the help extended to the pilgrims (*Hayat*, May 23). The Mufti of Senegal—but not the PM—also participated in an "Islamic Conference" held in Jeddah on May 27, which adopted a number of resolutions. (See above: Foreign Relations in General.)

Commenting later on the talks held between King Saud and Muslim leaders on inter-Islamic collaboration, Mamadou Dia said such a project should contain guarantees for non-intervention in the policies of the governments concerned under the guise of an Islamic union, and it should not serve as a cover for the expansion of a foreign power. Nothing precise had been decided upon. It was understood that King Saud, when he thought the time was favourable, would propose the means for the implementation of such inter-Islamic collaboration. (*Dakar Matin*, June 3)

On June 7 the Senegalese Minister of Information said at a press conference in Dakar that Dia had gone to Mecca as a private person, but had been considered an official guest of the government there. Dia was glad that his contacts with the King and others had furthered mutual understanding. Senegal favoured the convocation of a Muslim congress which would open the door for cooperation between Arab and African Muslims, provided it eschewed all conflict with other religions. (*Dakar Matin*, June 8; *R. Paris for Africa*, June 7 [9])

Sierra Leone. Shaykh Gibril Sesay, the secretary of the Sierra Leone Muslim Congress and founder-president of the Sierra Leone Muslim Pilgrims Association in Freetown, was to head the first group of pilgrims to Mecca. He was expected to hold discussions with the "Arab authorities" concerning the welfare of Sierra Leone pilgrims. It was through Shaykh Sesay in 1957 that Sierra Leoneans going on pilgrimage to Mecca were recognized as a unit. (*Daily Mail*, Freetown, May 5)

Somalia. Ten out of 55 Saudi Arabian government scholarships, for students from Arab and friendly countries for studies in the King Saud University, were intended for Somalia. (*Manar*, March 8)

In Dec, on learning of the floods in Somalia, King Saud telegraphed to the Somali President from his Boston hospital, expressing his sympathy for the victims. He also donated £10,000 for their relief. (*R. Mecca*, Dec 1 [5]; *Jihad*, Dec 3)

Upper Volta. The Saudi Arabian ambassador to Ghana and Nigeria attended the Upper Volta independence anniversary celebrations. (*R. Mecca*, Dec 5 [9])

OTHER COUNTRIES

France. There were no official relations between the two countries throughout the year. Saudi Arabian spokesmen and the King himself denounced "French aggression" and proclaimed that independence for Algeria was a condition for the resumption of diplomatic relations. (e.g. *Hayat*, Jan 27; *R. Mecca*, March 24 [27]; *Falastin*, June 17; *Umm al-Qura*, Aug 4, Sept 8)

Pakistan. In March the Pakistani Health Minister paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia; he carried a message from President Ayub to King Saud. (*R. Damascus*, March 24-*IMB*, March 24)

Another such message was delivered by the Pakistani Minister of Finance who came to the country on pilgrimage in May. (*Hayat*, May 23)

In Dec a Saudi Arabian military delegation, headed by Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud, the Minister of Defence,

paid an official ten-day visit to Pakistan and toured military installations. (*Hayat*, Dec 19, 30)

Spain. On Jan 12 a treaty of friendship was signed at Madrid between the two countries. (*Bilad*, Jan 13)

USSR. In early summer, during the period of propaganda warfare between the UAR and the USSR, Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud, the Minister of Defence, told a Cairo radio correspondent that "the campaign directed against the UAR was in fact directed against all the Arabs." He expressed the hope that the USSR would stop the campaign "to preserve Arab-Soviet friendship." (*R. Cairo*, June 10 [13])

Yugoslavia. On April 5 a Yugoslav delegation left Saudi Arabia after ten days of commercial talks at Riyadh and Jeddah; it had been received by King Saud. (*R. Baghdad*, April 5-*IMB*, April 6)

SOUTHERN ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

ADEN COLONY AND PROTECTORATES

SYNOPSIS

The major political developments during the year were the talks on the British-sponsored federation of Aden Colony and the Federation of the Arab Emirates of the South. In April the Colonial Secretary visited Aden in connection with this project, and talks were held with federal and Colony ministers in London (in June-July) as well as in Aden.

The leaders of the Federation of the Amirates, i.e. the various local rulers who had become ministers in the federal government, strongly supported merger with the Colony, as did the ministers of the Colony government. The nationalists, on the other hand, led by the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), opposed the project on the ground that it was designed to perpetuate imperialist domination over the territory; they demanded independence, to be followed by a unification of all Southern Arabia in a Greater Yemen, which in turn would be incorporated in an all-embracing Arab union.

Opposition also came from circles usually described as "moderate," including members of the Legislative Council which was regarded by the nationalists as an instrument of British policy. These "moderates," who originally would have been content with self-government, took exception to the secrecy of the talks in which only ministers participated, and perhaps also took cognizance of nationalist strength in the Colony. At any rate, they demanded that a national government be elected prior to negotiations for a federation and by the end of the year they demanded "freedom for Aden before 1963." There could be no doubt that the majority of political opinion in the Colony opposed the projected merger.

Political parties of various trends proliferated (their establishment had been called for by the Governor in 1960 in preparation for self-government) but no major party emerged. On the eve of the Colonial Secretary's visit, the nationalists, with the ATUC in the forefront, established an *ad hoc* coordinating body to fight the federation plan, but no permanent nationalist political organization had been formed by the end of the year.

In Aden Colony, where Aden-born Arabs were in a minority, the question of how the term "Adeni" would be defined became even more of a political issue than before because of the imminent change in Aden's status. The "Aden for the Adenis" circles, including nationalist-inclined "moderates," continued to advocate that franchise be given only to Aden-born persons, while the nationalist ATUC, with its large Yemeni membership, also wished to enfranchise the Yemeni immigrants. Both were opposed to granting rights to non-Arabs, whether for economic or nationalist reasons or both. The Indian, the largest foreign community, was at the centre of the controversy, as the Indian Association which represented mainly Hindu elements (as distinct from Indian Mus-

lims) sought guarantees from the British in case of independence.

The Aden Trade Union Congress, in addition to its nationalist activities, continued its struggle against the Industrial Ordinance of 1960, which was being strictly enforced by the authorities; the leader of the only strike during the year (as compared with the tens of strikes before the ordinance came into force) was sentenced to prison.

The Federation of the Amirates was joined by its eleventh member, the Wāhidi sultanate of Balhaf and Bir Ali, the westernmost state of the Eastern Protectorate. The Hadhramaut states, on the other hand, showed no inclination to do likewise. The Federation acquired an army in the form of the Aden Protectorate levies which were handed over to it by the British; the force retained British command. Hostilities in Yafi and Awlaqi continued. In May-June a government offensive in Lower Yafi, with the help of the RAF, compelled the rebel leader Muhammad Ibn Aydarus to seek refuge in Yemen, where he endeavoured to establish a joint rebel command; he later left Yemen. In the reports on hostilities in Upper Yafi, the Musalli clan was conspicuous, while in those in Upper Awlaqi, pride of place was taken by the Shams.

In the Hadhramaut, a central event was the rebellion of the Saibāni tribes in the Wadi Du'an region of the Qu'aiti sultanate. It would seem that the rebellion was caused by local issues with no apparent nationalist overtones such as those in the Western Protectorate rebellions. The rebellion was put down by the government forces aided by the RAF towards the end of August. Both sides sustained a considerable number of casualties.

In Nov the Qu'aiti and Kathiri governments granted an oil concession to an American company, having already agreed between themselves in 1959 to share the anticipated oil income (see MER 1960, p. 392). The Thamud concession area was claimed also by the neighbouring Mahri state of the Eastern Protectorate while Yemen, which claimed all the Aden territories, announced that the agreement was "null and void."

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Yemen continued to make public its claims to sovereignty over Aden and announced that it would not recognize Aden's independence (if such were granted by Britain.)

The UAR continued its support of the nationalist movement in Aden, hospitality to Adeni nationalists and propaganda against the British presence in the region, (as will be seen from many references below). In May a UAR spokesman stated that Britain had refused the UAR permission to open a consulate in Aden. (*Times*, May 19)

ISSUE OF MERGER OF ADEN COLONY AND PROTECTORATES

[The major political issue throughout the year was the British-sponsored union between Aden Colony and the protectorates (compare MER 1960, p 388). Related questions were the constitutional development in Aden Colony, the widening of the Federation of the Amirates of the South to include all states of the Western Protectorate, and the proposed union of the sultanates of the Hadhramaut, Eastern Protectorate.]

BRITISH POLICY

Addressing the third session of the Aden Colony Legislative Council (Legco) on Jan 16, Sir Charles Johnston, Governor of Aden, said that he was pursuing the question of further constitutional development but "at the same time I must ask you to be patient." (The council had requested in Aug 1960 that a new constitution be brought into effect not later than the end of 1962.) The governor said it would be some time before the government would be in a position to announce firm proposals. There were many complex problems, including the possibility of "closer association" with the Western Aden Protectorate and in particular with the Federation of the Arab Amirates of the South. "We want it firmly rooted and must avoid hasty or premature action," he said. (*Times*, Jan 17)

Members in Charge Become Ministers. At the same time the governor announced that the Colonial Secretary had approved a ministerial system for Aden Colony. Accordingly, members-in-charge would soon assume ministerial status "more faithfully to represent their actual powers and responsibilities." *The Times* commented that this was a change in name but not in function, for the members-in-charge already fulfilled the role of ministers (*Times*, Jan 17). *Aden Chronicle* commented that the governor would continue to nominate his ministers, who would still be lacking any popular association (*Aden Chr.*, Feb 2). *The Voice of the Arabs* was of a similar opinion and added that this was another step to link Aden with the federation and thus tie the whole region to British imperialism and isolate it from the Arab world. (*V of A*, Jan 18, 25, 26 [20, 27, 28])

MACLEOD VISITS ADEN

On April 4, Mr Iain Macleod, the British Colonial Secretary, arrived in Aden for an informal three-day visit to ascertain local views concerning Aden's future. On April 5 and 6 he visited the Eastern and Western Protectorates respectively. He met representatives of the Protectorates' governments and Aden executive and legislative councils members, and received representatives of the Indian Association, the National Union, the Ummah and the Sha'ab parties.

Colony: National Organizations Boycott Visit; Demonstrations. Public reactions to Macleod's visit represented the pro-government and nationalist trends.

The ATUC, which called for a hostile reception, succeeded, after weeks of futile contacts and attempts (*Ayyam*, Feb 18, March 6, 18, 23), in uniting the nationalist organizations on this issue. Before Macleod's arrival the ATUC called for a meeting of all "national organizations" to adopt a national stand toward the visit. Only the National Union Party was not invited, it being considered by the ATUC "a semi-governmental political party" as long as it was headed by a minister "in the

present Aden government" [Hussein Ali Bayūmī] (*Ayyam*, March 29). Nineteen organizations participated in the meeting, including the ATUC, the South Arabian League, the Istiqlāl Party, the Yemeni Association, the Islamic Association, the Committee for the Boycott of Israel, the Committee for the Support of Algeria and several social and sport organizations. It was decided not to meet the Colonial Secretary, but to stage a popular peaceful demonstration (in spite of the ban on any kind of demonstration), and to hold a general popular rally on April 3. (*Ayyam*, April 5; *V of A*, April 2 [5])

The demonstrations were staged on April 3, according to plan, in Crater, Ma'alla and Tawahi, with thousands participating, according to nationalist sources. Crowds then gathered in the ATUC grounds for the popular rally. In another demonstration on April 6 in Shaykh Uthmān, coffins inscribed "The Federation" and "The Legislative Council" were carried to the Jewish cemetery and burned there. The demonstrations were peaceful. (*Ayyam*, April 5, 11; *V of A*, April 5 [8]; *Aden Chr.*, May 4)

According to Cairo reports, the "popular organizations" participating in the rally signed a "national document" denouncing the "British imperialist" plan to establish a political entity of Aden and the Amirates. The organizations declared their non-recognition of the "British federation of sultans," and their rejection of the "governmental Legislative Council" and of treaties concluded by "self-styled" sultans, amirs, and ministers. The document denounced imperialist designs aimed at "defacing the Arabhood of the area," granting foreigners in Aden political rights, whilst denying them to "legitimate citizens from the Yemeni north." The rally declared the "national wealth" [natural resources] to be solely the property of the people and announced its opposition to the conversion of the area into a military base. It denounced the British "policy of suppression and extermination" in the amirates, the restrictions on the press and the anti-strike law. The only solution was complete and unconditional liberation of the area from British imperialism and reaction (*V of A*, April 5, 6 [7, 8]). The 19 organizations later formed a Congress of Popular Organizations (*mu'tamar al-hay'at ash-sha'abiyah*) with Abdallah al-Asnag as Chairman. (*Ayyam*, June 25; *Aden Chr.*, July 6)

A number of the organizations' leaders, including Abdallah al-Asnag, were tried on April 29 and fined for organizing the demonstrations. On the eve of the trial, the "popular organizations" held a rally in the ATUC grounds, reportedly attended by some 10,000 people. (*MENA*, April 16 [18]; *Aden Chr.*, April 27, May 4; *Haga'iq*, May 4; *V of A*, May 7 [9])

The "Arab South" youth organization in Cairo and "the Sons of the Arab South" in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, were reported to have denounced "imperialist schemes" regarding Aden. (*V of A*, April 4, 9 [6, 11])

"Moderate" vs "Phased Independence." The "moderate" point of view was represented by the National Union Party, the Ummah Party and the Sha'ab Party and members of the Legco [the term "moderates" was employed by both *Aden Chronicle* and *The Times*]. The pro-government *Aden Chronicle* commented that both the people of Aden and the British government were inclined to support self-government and gradual progress towards full independence with an eventual merger with the Fede-

ration and the Eastern Protectorate rather than immediate independence (*Aden Chr.*, April 6). In more detail, M.A. Luqman listed demands for the creation of a constituent assembly to formulate a constitution, for the exclusion of non-Adenis from the electoral lists and for equal political status for Aden and the Protectorates. (*Fat. Jaz.*, April 10, 13, 14)

Legco member Sa'id Muhammad Hasan Hason published a report on the Legco meeting with Macleod. He said he had demanded immediate and unconditional independence. Mr Macleod had answered that he expected a request for constitutional amendments within self-government before the request for complete independence. The other Legco members, including the ministers A. S. Ali, H.A. Bayumi and A.S. Basendwah, as well as M.A. Maqtari, A.A. as-Safi and H.I. Khodabux had stated that neither they nor 85% of the people supported the request for complete independence. (*Ayyam*, April 9)

[Later in the year it appeared that these differences among the "inoderates" became more pronounced. See further below.]

In the ensuing press debate on the issue, V.K. Joshi, Minister of Works, [a Hindu, president of the Indian Association], pointed out the problems which would be posed by independence and which would take time to solve: the need to form an independent army, the political differences between the Colony and the Protectorates, the economic impact of the withdrawal of British forces before other sources of revenues were secured. In reply, Muhammad Salim Ali, head of the ATUC National Bureau, wrote that Aden would not be abandoned since it was part of the great Arab nation; Aden Port's advantages were not due to British enterprise; and the people were the army which would defend freedom. (*Ayyam*, April 16, 23; *V of A*, April 30, May 3 [2, 5])

Leaders of Federation Welcome Union. In a speech of welcome to Macleod on April 6, the Sultan of Lahaj, Fadl Ibn Ali, Chairman of the Federal Supreme Council of the Arab Amirates of the South, called for "independence in full union with the colony of Aden and other south Arabian states." In reply, Macleod told the Council that the federated states had entered the Federation voluntarily; "if Aden and other states are to unite with the Federation, I am sure you will agree it must be with their consent." (*Times*, April 7)

Sultan Ibn Ali had also earlier taken the opportunity to express his support for such a union; so did Sultan Salih Ibn Hussein [al-Awdhali], and later Sharif Hussein of Beihan, Federal Minister of the Interior. (*Aden Chr.*, Jan 19, Feb 16, Aug 10)

Hadhramaut Opposed to Union Schemes. When visiting Mukalla on April 5, Macleod received a four-point memorandum from a group of dignitaries in Mukalla, demanding revision of the Protectorate's treaty with Britain, unification of Hadhramaut, creation of elected legislative and municipal councils and increased economic aid. Macleod said later that the demands should follow, and not precede, a wider association between Hadhramaut and other protectorate states. (*Times*, April 6; *Hayat*, *Ayyam*, April 7)

Following the visit, reports said that both the Kaihri and the Qu'aiti states were unwilling to join a federal union with the Western Protectorate (*Aden Chr.*, April 13; *Fat. Jaz.*, April 14). (The Wihidi state, however, joined the WAP in Nov; see below.)

Earlier, rumours had been reported from Mukalla of discussions of a federal union between the Qu'aiti and

Kathiri states, which would then merge in the WAP federation. It was remarked that it could not be expected that the two states would agree to pool their resources and incomes, since one was better off than the other. (*Aden Chr.*, Feb 9)

Britain Continues Policy of "Phased Independence" and Federation. Summing up the impressions he gained in his talks, Macleod was reported to have said that the demand was more for self-government and phased independence than for immediate independence. He said the British government thought it likely that, within the next 12 months, some kind of constitutional conference would be held with leaders from the Colony and the Protectorates. This did not mean that major constitutional changes were envisaged, but he felt there was a general demand for a closer association between Aden and the states. (*Fat. Jaz.*, April 6; *Aden Chr.*, April 6, 13; *Times*, April 7)

Colony and Federation Governments Work Towards Union. Union talks between the Aden government and Federation dignitaries had been reported already before the Macleod visit (*V of A*, March 23 [25]). In May, economic talks were reported which, "it was hoped," would be followed by closer political ties. (*Aden Chr.*, May 11)

During the same month, Governor Johnston completed a series of talks at the Colonial Office on constitutional issues in the Colony, including its relationship with the Federation. (*Aden Chr.*, June 15)

TALKS ON MERGER; WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION
Talks in London. In June, at the invitation of the Colonial Secretary, a delegation from the Supreme Council of the Federation arrived in London to discuss questions of the Federation, and union with the Colony. On July 1 they were joined by Governor Johnston and the five Aden Colony ministers. (*Times*, June 13, 30, July 3; *Aden Chr.*, June 15, 29; *Hayat*, July 2)

On their return home, Shaykh Muhammad Farid, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Federation, said all three sides had agreed that Aden should join the Federation. V.K. Joshi, Minister of Works of Aden Colony, stated that there had been evidence of a keen desire on the part of both the Federation and the Colony to come much closer. (*Aden Chr.*, July 20, 27)

A statement issued at the conclusion of the talks referred to valuable progress made in discussion of matters of joint concern between the Federation and the Colony. (*Times*, Aug 9)

Talks Continued in Aden. Talks were resumed on Aug 8 in Aden with the participation of the Federal and Colony ministers. An official statement said the talks were likely to lead to much closer links between the Colony and the Federation; members of the Legislative and Federal Councils and "others" would in due course be given an opportunity to express their opinions in the matter.

In Sept a delegation consisting of Adeni and Federal ministers went to the Amirates to canvass support for the merger.

The participants set up working parties to deal with questions in detail and there were further meetings of the ministers in Sept and Oct. Johnston went to London in Sept and Nov to report on the talks which, he said, had got off to a good start. (*Times*, Aug 8, 9, Nov 11; *Aden Chr.*, Aug 10, 24, Sept 7, Oct 19, Nov 9; *Hayat*, Aug 9, Sept 7; *Fat. Jaz.*, Sept 23)

Nationalist Stand: Total Opposition. Nationalist rejection of the talks was based on arguments that the Adeni ministers lacked popular authority and that the union plans were designed to perpetuate imperialist rule in the region; the only solution for Aden was immediate and unconditional independence.

In June, on the arrival in London of the Federal delegation, the ATUC, in a communiqué from its London Office, said that the Federation was forced on the people, the RAF had been told to attack villagers who opposed the Federation, press freedom was denied in Aden, union rights disregarded and demonstrations prohibited (*Aden Chr.*, June 22). There were many subsequent statements in this vein by the ATUC. SG Asmag said the ATUC was sending a delegation to the permanent secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference and would appeal for support to the UN and friendly countries (*Mid. Mir.*, July 8, Aug 12; *Aden Chr.*, July 6). In Oct, in a note to the representatives of foreign states in Aden, the ATUC called on them not to recognize any political entity set up by the British supposedly in the name of the people of Aden (*MENA*, Oct 28 [31]). During the same period, the ATUC published an appeal for support to "all free people and international organizations," demanding self-determination for all Aden territories by means of plebiscite under UN supervision. (*V of A*, Oct 31 [Nov 2])

In Sept, it was reported that the "national organizations" in Aden had submitted a memorandum to the British Governor demanding the suspension of the talks. The only solution was for Britain to recognize the freedom and sovereignty of the people and leave it to them to decide what sort of federation they wanted. (*MENA*, Sept 12 [14])

Opposition to the talks and to the federation plan was also reported from the South Arabian League, Muhammad Ibn Aydarus, the rebel Sultan of Yafi and Ali Abd al-Karim, [the exiled ex-Sultan of Lahej]. (*Mid. Mir.*, July 5, Aug 12; *Aden Chr.*, July 6; *Haq'iq*, Nov 9; *V of A*, Aug 19 [22]; Nov 13 [15], Nov 20 [22])

On Sept 22 "leading nationalist elements," at a conference of all political parties and organizations in Aden, proposed civil disobedience throughout the Colony but a resolution in these terms was not passed, due largely, according to *Aden Chronicle*, to the lukewarm support of the "two most powerful" political organizations in Aden—the [nationalist] ATUC and the [moderate] People's Constitutional Congress (on the attitude of which, see below). (*Aden Chr.*, Sept 28)

[The UAR fully backed the nationalists.]

"Moderates" Demand National Government Before Union. [From the sources available, it would seem that the "moderates" polarized into two camps: on the one hand, those who collaborated more closely with the British government, notably Legco members who were also ministers, and other Legco members on the other. The latter took exception to the secrecy of the talks from which they were excluded and demanded that before a merger with the Federation, the Colony must be placed politically on

a par with the Federation and have a national government elected by Adenis only, i.e. to the exclusion of members of foreign communities. It would seem that their attitude hardened as time went on. It should be noted that *Aden Chronicle* and *Fatā al-Jazirah*, the main sources for this chapter, were both owned by members of the Luqman family who belonged to the latter group of moderates. The editor-in-chief of both papers was Muhammad Ali Luqman; Ali Muhammad Luqman, managing editor of *Fatā al-Jazirah*, was a Legco member and founded the People's Constitutional Congress, with a programme couched in nationalist and even socialist terms. See: Political Parties.]

In June, when the London talks started, *Aden Chronicle* suggested that the Federation rulers should have informed their peoples and their "brethren in Aden" of the objects of the talks. (*Aden Chr.*, June 29)

Legco members I.K. Khan, A.M. Luqman, M.A. Maqtari, S.M. Hassan, M.S. Hussein, A.A. as-Sāfi, J.A. Saleh and M. Abdallah cabled to the Colonial Secretary in protest against "calling ministers to discuss the future of Aden and ignoring our opinion," and declared they would not be bound by the decisions of the meeting.

The newly-formed People's Constitutional Congress (PCC; A.M. Luqman, Secretary-General) demanded a national government for Aden Colony before any other decisions were taken to determine its future.

Aden Chronicle added that there were too many disparities, in administration, economy and outlook, to permit an immediate union between Aden and her hinterland. At the same time, the paper said that public opposition was not to talks between the Federation and Aden but to the authority granted to the hereditary autocracy and the nominated and elected members of the Legco to decide the future of "about a million people." (*Aden Chr.*, July 6; see also July 27)

In Aug, when the talks were resumed in Aden, the Democratic Party of South Arabia and the PCC submitted memoranda to the Aden government demanding elections for a national government in which only Adeni (or "Aden-born"—the PCC version) nationals would have the franchise; only such a government was qualified to negotiate for union with the Federation (*Aden Chr.*, Aug 10, 24, 31; *Fat. Jaz.*, Aug 12, Sept 23). At the same time, Legco members U.A. Shihāb, A.A. Sāfi, A.Q. Mak-kawī, S.M. Hassan, and A.M. Alwān, in a memorandum to the government, demanded the suspension of the talks and "drastic constitutional changes" which would grant the Aden Arab element in Aden the final decision in regard to self-determination. (*Aden Chr.*, Sept 7; *Fat. Jaz.*, Aug 25)

In Nov Ali Muhammad Luqman informed the Colonial Secretary of the additional PCC demand for "freedom for Aden before 1963" and the right to self-determination after the election of a national government. (*Times*, Nov 15; *Aden Chr.*, Nov 16; *Mid. Mir.*, Nov 18)

In Dec a PCC member told the press that Legco did not represent the nation, since its members were not party nominees and were therefore responsible only to themselves. (*Aden Chr.*, Dec 28)

ADEN COLONY

THE GOVERNMENT

Members in Charge Become Ministers (see p 433 a).

Change in Government. For members of the Legislative Council and the Executive Council, see MER 1960, p 384.

On Oct 24 A.S. Ali, Minister of Posts and Information, tendered his resignation for personal reasons, but retained his membership in Legco. He was replaced by M.S. Hussein, Legco opposition member and Secretary of the Sha'ab Party. (*Aden Chr.*, Oct 26, Nov 2; *Mid. Mir.*, Nov 4)

Attempt on Life of V.K. Joshi. On Aug 13 V.K. Joshi, Minister of Public Works and Civil Aviation [and President of the Indian Association, narrowly escaped death when explosives were hurled at his house (*Fat. Jaz.*, Aug 15, 18; *Aden Chr.*, Aug 17). [No motives were mentioned in the sources available. For Joshi's involvement in a political controversy, see below: Immigration, Status of Indian Community.]

Ban on Political Activities of Civil Servants. In Feb it was reported that the government had banned the participation of civil servants in any form of political activity. (*V of A*, Feb 9 [11])

In July, the newly-formed Democratic Party asked that the ban be relaxed. (*Aden Chr.*, July 20)

BRITISH FORCES

On March 1, 1961, Headquarters British Forces, Arabian Peninsula, at Aden was redesignated Middle East Command. The Command area included the Araoian coast and up to the Persian Gulf as far as Kuwait, as well as Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and the western half of the Indian Ocean. (*Army Quarterly*, July; *NYT*, July 7; for details of the Command's forces see p 90 b.)

Baghdad and Cairo alleged that the British were constructing an atomic base in Aden. (See e.g. *Akhir Sa'ah*, Cairo, Nov 8; *R. Baghdad*, Nov 14 [16])

THE ADEN TRADE UNION CONGRESS

Organization. In Feb a large labour rally, presided over by Abdallah al-Asnag, SG of the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), heard the latest plans and organizational programme.

On the political plane, the ATUC would resist the forces of imperialism and reaction all over the "Yemeni State," comprising Yemen and Aden. Internally the cultural committee of the ATUC would endeavour to keep members informed by means of news bulletins, broadcasting services, lectures, etc. The Committee had obtained the services of legal, economic and medical advisers. (*Aden Chr.*, Feb 16)

In a press interview Asnag gave the following information on ATUC organization:

General Organization. The ATUC embraced eight separate federations, "each decentralized and administered by a secretary": petroleum workers, transport, teachers, government and local government employees, civilian employees of the armed forces, commercial workers, technical workers, banks and insurance. Each federation elected an executive, which sent a minimum of two and a maximum of four members to the Council of Representatives. The council held annual elections for the executive board which consisted of nine members: president,

vice-president, SG, deputy SG, an assistant secretary [each] for national affairs, industrial relations and cultural affairs, treasurer and assistant treasurer.

The National Bureau: See below: Political Activities.

Source of Finance: Membership fees and local donations.

Affiliation: the ATUC was affiliated to the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU) and to labour organizations in the UAR, Libya, Lebanon and Iraq. [The ATUC was also affiliated to the ICFTU.]

Activities: In addition to policy-making and arbitration, the ATUC conducted "a vigorous weekly programme of lectures, debates and internal broadcasts."

Membership: The ATUC had 15,000 paying members (*Aden Chr.*, June 1). In Nov Asnag said it was estimated that some 40% of all workers employed in the oil installations, as well as in the port of Aden, were members of the Congress (*Tanyug*, Nov 28 [EE Dec 1]). Fifty per cent of the union members were said to be temporary immigrants from Yemen and the Protectorates. (*Aden Chr.*, Jan 5)

Abdallah al-Asnag. A biographical sketch of the ATUC leader contained the following details: He was born in Grater, Aden, in 1934. His father (d. 1960), a municipal clerk, was a renowned Arabic poet and as such enjoyed the patronage of the Imam of Yemen. His father had imbued him with a love of Arabic literature, and with the ideals of freedom and Arab unity. Two incidents especially had a formative influence on the boy when he was at secondary school: the Palestine war in 1948, when his father published a "polemic" on Arab unity, and, when he was 16, the authorities' refusal to allow pupils to celebrate the formation of the Arab League. Asnag and other students hired buses and toured Aden denouncing the Education Department. Asnag continued his feud with this department on national issues, while studying at the Shaykh Uthman College, and later at the Teachers' Training College, both of which he left without completing his studies because of his nationalist "frustrations." Meanwhile, he had started to write on nationalist issues for the *Al-Ba'ath* newspaper.

In 1953 Asnag was employed as a clerk by Aden Airways where he organized a union and became its president; the only other union in Aden at that time was the Technical Workers' Union. The Aden Airways' management gave way to a series of demands by the union, and in the wake of this success, other unions soon came into being. Later, Asnag formed the ATUC.

Asnag was described as a "short, chubby little man" with a "cautious smile and mild manner"; he was a voracious reader and a witty man. He was a Muslim "but claims he is not over-religious." He said his outlook was one of a "liberal socialist" and he strongly refuted any suggestion of Communist tendencies. (*Aden Chr.*, June 22)

A Purge. In Feb Asnag told the press that the ATUC would weed out certain corrupt and inefficient elements from the leadership of the unions (*Aden Chr.*, Feb 16). In March the ATUC published its decision to expel Abd al-Qadir Fariawi and Mustafa Ri'at, on the grounds of "misbehaviour and open association with the British authorities in Aden." (*MENA*, March 31 [April 5])

Opposition to Industrial Ordinance; "Work Stoppages." (Compare MER 1960, pp 385-6.)

In April it was reported that the ATUC had asked the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) for an expert to set up machinery for the settlement of disputes by negotiation. Asnag said the trade unions refused to deal with the industrial court and would not register with it any agreements they made with employers. (*Aden Chr.*, April 27)

In Aug it was reported that, to express their grievances, unions had been resorting to work stoppages at the airport, the harbour, BP (Aden) Ltd., the RAF hospital and the National Bottling Company. The ATUC conference had now formed a special committee to intensify the struggle against the Industrial Ordinance. (*Aden Chr.*, Aug 24)

The ATUC enlisted the aid of the British TUC and international labour organizations in its struggle against the ordinance. (See below: International Labour Relations.)

Labour Disputes: Technical Workers Strike. On Feb 24 the technical workers at the Lebanese "Mathercat" company staged a peaceful demonstration led by Abdallah Ali Murshid, SG of the Technical Workers' Union, to demand limited hours of work during Ramadan (*Ayyam*, March 1; *NCNA*, March 3 [FE 6]). Later Cairo reported that Murshid and two others had been sentenced to a week's imprisonment and to a fine for staging the demonstration. (*V of A*, March 28 [30])

On Oct 20, 5,000 technical workers went on a six-day strike—the first to take place since strikes were outlawed by the Industrial Ordinance in 1960—after a dispute with the Civil Contractors' Association over increased wages, sick, annual and holiday leaves, overtime pay and severance pay. A compromise offer by the CCA was rejected. Asnag said that the Union had made every effort to reach a settlement by negotiation. (*V of A*, Oct 29 [Nov 2]). Later, an agreement was concluded, which partly met the workers' demands.

In Nov, Abdallah Ali Murshid, the Union secretary, was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment with hard labour on charges of sedition and encouraging strikes contrary to the Industrial Ordinance (*Aden Chr.*, Oct 26, Nov 16, 23; *Times*, Nov 25). The government also deported 17 Yemeni workers, fined ten strikers and charged four members of the union executive with participation in the strike.

The ICFTU protested against these measures (*ICFTU Press and Radio Service*, No. 19, Nov 3); so did the WFTU in a telegram from Prague to the Governor of Aden. (*NCNA*, Oct 28 [FE, Nov 1])

New ATUC Paper. In Oct it was reported that the ATUC would issue a new paper, *Al-Ummal*; [its former organ *Al-Amal* had been closed down in 1960]. (*Fot. Jaz.*, Oct 28)

Political Objectives and Activities. [The ATUC was the major local political force in Aden Colony and the focus of nationalist activity. For ATUC activities in the political sphere, see under: Issue of Merger of Aden Colony and Protectorates; Political Parties.]

The main political objective of the ATUC was the merger of all Aden territories ("southern Yemen") and Yemen under a democratic regime and the adherence of this state to an all-encompassing Arab union; this entailed the elimination of British colonialism from Aden and the curtailment of the sway of the sultans in the Protectorates. Asnag said the ATUC's creed was socialism; they did not believe in Communism. The ATUC opposed immigration [of non-Arabs] and demanded the

enfranchisement of the Yemenis in Aden. (*Aden Chr.*, Feb 16, May 18, June 1, 29)

In 1960 the ATUC requested that Aden be put under UN trusteeship. (*R. Moscow*, Jan 26 [SU 28]; *Aden Chr.*, Jan 26)

ATUC political activities were coordinated by a national bureau (*maktab qaumi*). In March the formation was reported of new national bureau committees: Aden town national branch committee, the northern [i.e. Yemeni] branch committee, Arab relations committee headed by Muhsin al-Ayni, Afro-Asian relations committee, planning committee, international committee. The heads and secretaries of these committees would be considered assistants to the SG of the national bureau, Muhammad Salim Ali. (*Ayyam*, March 16)

Ayni, a Yemeni political exile, was expelled from Aden in Jan; he also later appeared under the title of Permanent Representative of the ATUC in Cairo and the Arab Countries (see p 702 b).

The ATUC in Aug resolved to expand the national bureau, in order to separate political activities from purely labour affairs. (A proposal for an organizational separation of political activities from trade union activities was made in 1960 by an Egyptian expert; *MER* 1960, p 385.) (*Aden Chr.*, Aug 24)

International Labour Relations. *International Labour Organizations:* The British TUC, the ICFTU and the ILO all intervened with the British government on behalf of the ATUC.

The ICFTU executive board, at its meeting in Brussels, Nov 28-Dec 2, 1960, adopted a resolution calling on the British government to ensure repeal of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, reinstate the workers dismissed in connection with the general strike of Aug 1960 and license a new ATUC journal.

The ICFTU also submitted a complaint to the ILO in this matter. The ILO governing body did not accept the ICFTU "allegation" that the 1960 Ordinance ran counter to ILO conventions but called the attention of the British government to the importance it attached to the principle that where the right to strike was subject to restriction, conciliation and arbitration should be "adequate, impartial and speedy, which was not the case where the employer was the Aden government"; it also called for trade union and press freedom and asked for information on dismissals. (*ICFTU, Free Labour World*, No. 127, Jan 1961, p 39; *ICFTU Information Bulletin*, No. 15-16, Aug 1-15, 1961, p 97; *ICFTU Press and Radio Service*, No. 6, Aug 10, 1961)

On July 27 representatives of the ATUC, the British TUC and the ICFTU met in London to discuss industrial relations in Aden—the industrial ordinance, the dismissal of workers who had struck in 1960 and the banning of the ATUC newspaper, and agreed that the TUC should present the case to the Colonial Office. (*ICFTU Press and Radio Service*, No. 6, Aug 10, 1961; *ICFTU 7th World Congress Report*, 5-13, July 1962)

Somalia. At the beginning of Jan, following a visit by Asnag to Hargeisa, a joint statement by Asnag for the ATUC and Abdi Hussein Esa for the Somali Confederation of Labour, said: (1) the two "national centres" would establish closer contacts and "harmonize international labour policy," (2) the newly formed AATUF should be supported by all African trade unions as a step towards the immediate emancipation of Africa's political, social and economic life, (3) the SCL fully supported the ATUC struggle against British anti-trade-union policy in Aden. (*Aden Chr.*, Jan 12)

Italy: Following a meeting in Aden between a member of the Italian Labour Federation [?] and leaders of the ATUC, a joint statement was issued expressing the wish for closer relations, denouncing imperialism, expressing support for a people's right to self-determination, declaring the Italian federation's sympathy with the ATUC struggle for labour rights, and denouncing the plans to divide the "natural Yemen." (*Ayyam, March 29*)

Yugoslavia: ATUC delegations visited Yugoslavia in June (Assistant SG Muhammad Sâlim Ali and Muhiin al-Ayni). (*Tanyug, June 15 [EE 19]; R. Belgrade, June 15 [EE 22]*) and in Nov (headed by Asnag). (*Tanyug, Nov 25 [EE 29]*)

A joint statement issued after the talks in Nov expressed the support of the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation for Aden's national liberation aspirations, especially a plebiscite in exercise of self-determination, and the struggle of the ATUC for the "fundamental interests of the Aden people." The two organizations condemned colonialism and neo-colonialism, and pledged support to the anti-colonialist struggle. (*Tanyug, Nov 30 [EE, Dec 2]*)

UAR: In Aug it was reported that the UAR had presented 2,000 textbooks to the ATUC Cultural Bureau. The UAR and Iraq had also promised a number of scholarships. (*Aden Chr., Aug 24; Akhbar, Egypt, Sept 5*)

On Nov 13 a joint statement was issued by the UAR Trade Union Federation and the ATUC "in view of the grave events... [in] the Arab world." The two parties, being "members of the Arab union" (*ittihâd al-arab*) believed in their important role in the Arab movement and pledged themselves to consolidate the union. The UAR Federation supported the ATUC in its just struggle against the imperialist designs and restriction of trade unions in Aden and in its efforts to promote the cause of the "Southern Yemen, which is known as Aden and the Protectorates." The ATUC congratulated the UAR workers on the revolutionary socialist laws and on their participation in profits and management. The Arab workers in the Yemen and the UAR denounced the "secessionist movement" in Syria. (*MENA, Nov 13 [15]*)

POLITICAL PARTIES

Proliferation of Parties. [The Governor's call for the formation of political parties made in Jan 1960 was taken up mainly by moderate circles. While there had been only little progress in 1960, seven new parties were formed in the first half of 1961, bringing the sum total by July to ten. As the population of the Colony was only some 200,000 and the nationalists were organized mainly in the ATUC, these parties—mostly based on one of the town quarters—could not have a large membership.]

It was remarked that popular support for some of the parties was doubtful and that their programmes were almost identical (*Ayyam, March 14; Aden Chr., June 1*). A typical report (in Feb) on the formation of a new party in Shaykh Uthmân said that M. S. Hussein, Legco member, had called for a meeting of several leading personalities to "discuss the need for a political party." (*Aden Chr., Feb 9*)

The Nation Party (*hizb al-ummah*). The party was founded in Shaykh Uthmân at the beginning of the year, with Ali Ahmad Isma'il as president and Makram Antar as secretary. On May 12 it held a "thousands strong" popular rally, which passed resolutions calling for (a) complete independence for Aden and the Protectorates

after an interim period, during which the people must be trained for eventual political, administrative and military responsibility; (b) formation of a committee "to undertake military training" (ex-officers of the Aden Protectorate Levies were said to have volunteered assistance); (c) formation of committees to alleviate unemployment and fight illiteracy; (d) foreign communities in Aden to keep aloof from political activities; (e) tours to the Protectorate to be organized in order to propagate the ideal of federation and unity; and (f) the granting of political rights to women. (*Fat. Jaz., May 16; Aden Chr., May 18, June 22*)

On Nov 1 the party held a popular rally on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Algerian rebellion and cabled the UN denouncing French policy in Algeria. There were two splits from this party; see below. (*Fat. Jaz., Nov 6*)

Democratic Liberals Party (*hizb al-ahdâr ad-dimuqrâtî*). This party was established as a merger of two groups which split off from the Ummah party.

In May a group of defectors from the Ummah party formed the Free Arab Progressive Party (*hizb al-ahdâr al-arabi al-taqaddumi*) which held that Aden Colony, the Protectorates and Yemen constituted one entity and part of the Arab world, called for independence for all South Arabia, objected to immigration into Aden and to "capitalistic exploitation", called for nationalization of public services, supported the labour movement, and advocated development of heavy industry. (*Aden Chr., June 29*)

In July another rift in the Ummah Party was reported, resulting in the formation of the Democratic Party. The party was reported to intend to ask the government to relax restrictions on the political activities of civil servants. The party also protested against the proposed amendments to the Shaykh Uthmân constitution, giving greater authority to the Governor in local government. (*Aden Chr., July 12, 20, 27*)

In Oct, after the break-up of the UAR, it was reported that the two parties had organized licensed demonstrations by over 250 schoolboys, aged 8-17, in Shaykh Uthmân and Ma'alla against the Syrian government and in support of Abdel Nasser. (*Aden Chr., Oct 12*)

At the end of the year the two parties merged and formed the Democratic Liberals Party. (*Fat. Jaz., Dec 2*)
The People's Party (*hizb ash-sha'ab*). Its formation in Shaykh Uthmân was announced in Feb, with Legco member M.A. Maqatari as president and Legco member Muhammad Sa'id al-Husseini as secretary. (*Fat. Jaz., Feb 13, April 10*)

The People's Constitutional Congress (*hay'at al-mu'tamar ad-dustûri ash-sha'abi*) was formed on May 23, with Legco member Ali Muhammad Luqman [managing editor of *Fatât al-Ja'itrah*] as secretary (*Aden Chronicle, June 1*). The party was thought to include members of the Colony's intelligentsia (*Mid. Mir., May 25*). Its objectives were announced as independence for Aden and the Amirates and their merger, a constitutional, democratic socialist form of government, cooperation with nationalist, democratic and socialist movements in the Arab world to eliminate colonialism, social discrimination and tribalism, and promotion of international peace and Arab unity (*Aden Chr., Aug 10; Fat. Jaz., Aug 5*). In July the PCC expressed support for Tunisia in her dispute with France over the Bizerta base, and Luqman announced its readiness to recruit volunteers "for the defence of Arab freedom." (*Aden Chr., July 27*)

(For PCC opposition to the talks on union with the Federation, see p 435).

Merchants' Party. On July 11 the formation was announced of a new party out of the ranks of the Muslim Association (see MER 1960, p 386), sponsored and supported by Arab merchants in Aden. (*Aden Chr.*, July 13)

National Union Party (*al-hizb al-ittihādī al-watānī*). This party, successor to the Aden Association, was established in 1960, with Hussein Ali al-Bayūmi, Minister of Labour and Welfare, as its president (MER 1960, pp 386-7). The party's political objectives were listed by the *Aden Chronicle* as follows: Aden and southern Arabia were inseparable; anyone who considered Aden and southern Arabia his permanent and only home was a citizen of Aden; complete union with Protectorate states; recognition of government in these states only if it sprang from popular choice; establishment of party branches in these states; the party would seek to realize the idea of a Greater Yemen when conditions in Yemen changed; it recognized the trade union movement, had "no vested interests in it," and would "discourage any interference with it." (*Aden Chr.*, June 22)

In Jan Abd ar-Rahmān Jarjūrah, Secretary of the Party, said that there was no noticeable difference between his party, the Independence Party and the South Arabian League, but a proposal by his party for a merger had not been taken up. These two parties, however, denied that they had been contacted. (*Ayyam*, Jan 3, 7, 9)

In March the party announced that it would commence cultural activities in April. (*Fat. Jaz.*, March 24)

The ATUC opposed the party as a "semi-governmental party" as long as it was led by a minister in the Aden government [Bayūmi]. (*Ayyam*, March 29)

The Independence (Istiqlāl) Party was founded, it was reported, largely by residents of Crater South to represent their quarter "as a counterbalance to the National Union Party." Membership was open to any Arab, defined as anyone who was born or lived in southern Arabia, having severed all connections with his mother country, and who can write or speak Arabic. The party's principal objectives were independence for Aden and southern Arabia, a sovereign Arab republic, a cooperative socialist form of government, compulsory education, a national economic structure and a national army. (*Aden Chr.*, June 22)

The South Arabian League (SAL). The SAL was active both in Aden and abroad. Its leader, Muhammad Ali al-Jifri, remained in exile, in Cairo.

At the end of Dec 1960 an attempt was made on the life of Rashid al-Hariri, acting chairman of the SAL in Aden. In Jan Abdallah Abd al-Majid as-Salafi, SG of the Committee for the Boycott of Israel, was attacked by unknown assailants.

Cairo and the SAL described these incidents as political terrorism by "British agents." The attempt on Hariri followed a speech in which he attacked supporters of imperialism in the Federation. The SAL alleged that the attempt was made by Yaḥyā Awad al-Fadli, an officer in the government national guard, who had been incited to this act by [Sultān] Ahmad [Ibn] Abdallah al-Fadli, Minister [of Agriculture] in the federal government. The authorities had also searched the house of Muhammad Salīm Ba-Wazīr, acting SG of the League,

but had only found an issue of *As-Nidāl* [published by the League office in Cairo]; he had been tried and fined 500 shillings. The League and the ATUC protested to the government against these attacks which they described as "political terrorism," as did Cairo Radio. (*Akhar, Cairo*, Dec 21, 1960; *V of A*, Dec 31, 1960 [Jan 3, 1961]; *Ayyam*, Jan 3, 9, 11; *R. Cairo*, Jan 14, 17 [17, 19])

At a convention in Feb the SAL established executive offices (*makātib tanfidhiyah*) for labour, culture, national guidance, the Eastern and Western Amirates and the north [i.e. Yemen]. (*Ayyam*, March 4)

On Feb 22 the League celebrated the UAR's 3rd anniversary (*Ayyam*, Feb 25), despite—according to a Cairo source—a ban by the Aden authorities. (*MENA*, March 14 [16])

In Feb Muhammad Ali al-Jifri, the [exiled] head of the League, and Subhānallah al-Habashi, its SG, attended the Arab lawyers' convention in Cairo, which adopted a resolution supporting the struggle of the people of southern Arabia (*Ayyam*, Feb 27). In June the SAL asked for the support of the forthcoming Belgrade conference of non-aligned states. (*Ayyam*, June 16)

In Nov it was reported that SAL leaders in exile in Cairo would be allowed to return to Aden. Contact had been made in Cairo by a British officer. SAL leaders wished to return provided there were no conditions attached to the permit. An official [Aden] spokesman denied these reports. (*Mid. Mir.*, Nov 25)

ATUC-SAL Relations. In Feb the ATUC accused the League of destroying the homes of poor people by arson in the village of Aydarus on the Shaykh Uthmān road, under the false pretence that the village was hiding weapons belonging to the British army. This was denied by the League. The ATUC, however, repeated the accusations and intimated that this act was intended to demonstrate the nationalist zeal of the League and to facilitate the collection of contributions. The ATUC alleged that the SAL had embezzled £10,000 contributed in 1958 by the UAR to Aden worked for the national cause, as well as £1,000 of the BP workers' money. (*Ayyam*, Feb 28, March 3, 4; compare also MER 1960 p 388.)

In Feb and March contacts were reported between SAL and ATUC leaders in an unsuccessful attempt at a merger. The discussions reportedly broke down because of differences in nationalist attitudes, personal differences and opposition in the SAL to Asnaq; the ATUC also accused the SAL of anti-labour connections. (*Ayyam*, Feb 18, March 6, 18, 23)

Congress of Nationalist Organizations. A plan by the ATUC to revive the Arab National Congress had been reported in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 388).

In April, on the eve of the Macleod visit to Aden, 19 "nationalist organizations," on ATUC initiative, jointly protested against British plans for Aden's political future and demanded independence for southern Arabia (see p 433 a). In May it was noted that unity did not last for long after Macleod's departure (*Ayyam*, May 16); the Congress, however, was mentioned again later, as when in June representatives of its affiliated organizations met in order to adopt a united stand on the question of the status of the Indian community. (*Ayyam*, June 25; see also under relevant heading below.)

Various Organizations. In Jan a Committee for Support of Algeria was formed in Shaykh Uthmān; it also de-

manded independence for Aden. By May the committee had ceased to exist. (*Ayyam*, Jan 26, April 5, May 16)

In Feb the President of the Aden Women's Club announced that the name of the Club had been changed to the Arah Women's Club. Branches had been opened in Little Aden and Shaykh Uthman. (*Aden Chr.*, Feb 16)

In April the formation was reported of an Arah Youth Organization in Tawahi. Its objectives were liberation of "Yemen, north and south," from imperialism and reaction, the attachment of the liberated parts to the UAR, and support of the people's right to self-determination. (*Ayyam*, April 7)

IMMIGRATION, FOREIGN COMMUNITIES AND ADENIZATION

[In 1961, because of the imminent change in the status of Aden, questions related to aliens became even more of a political issue than in previous years. Aliens, especially Indians, dominated Aden business life, and this aroused the opposition of both the nationalists, who also claimed that the government intended to destroy Aden's Arab character, and of native Aden businessmen who were otherwise regarded as "moderates" in politics. The latter also insisted that in an elective system, the introduction of which they demanded, franchise should be accorded only to "Aden-born" citizens, a qualification which would have excluded the many thousands of Yemeni immigrants, mainly workers. The ATUC, on the other hand, which regarded Aden as the "Southern Yemen," demanded the enfranchisement of the Yemenis. See also *Parties; Issue of Merger of Aden Colony and Protectorates.*]

[The population of Aden Colony in 1960 was estimated at 200,000.] According to the census held in Feb 1955, the population was 138,441 including: Arabs—55,791; Yemenis—48,088; Indians—15,817; Somalis—10,611; Europeans—4,484; Jews—831; others—2,819 (*The Statesman's Year-Book 1962; Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1962, pp 140-1*). In 1961 the number of Indians was given as some 20,000 (see below).

In Jan M.A. Abdu said in the Legco that before independence alien immigration must be prevented and foreigners deprived of franchise. (*Aden Chr.*, Jan 5)

In Feb Cairo Radio, and following it Moscow Radio, claimed that the British authorities had devised a "new plot" to destroy Arabism in Aden by bringing in a large number of foreigners and granting them Aden citizenship. (*V of A*, Feb 16 [18]; *R. Moscow*, Feb 16 [SU 21])

Status of Indian Community. In April a public debate opened concerning the status of the Indian community in Aden which, it was reported, comprised some 15,000 Muslims and 5,000 Hindus. The Muslims were mostly Aden-born and largely integrated with the Arah natives through intermarriage as well as culturally and politically. The Hindus were immigrants who had retained their Indian citizenship and close ties with India, their language and separate institutions. Most of them were organized in the Indian Association which was represented in the government by V.K. Joshi.

When Macleod visited Aden in April, Joshi submitted to him a memorandum in the name of the Indian Association asking for guarantees for the interests of the Indians in the Colony in case of independence.

The Indian Muslims, in a letter to the Colonial Secretary, sharply dissociated themselves from this step, declaring that they were not one community with the Hindus and Joshi did not represent them. They claimed

they were Adenis, and though they had not succeeded in electing an Indian Muslim to the Legco they were satisfied with various statements in the Legco "by our Adeni Arab brethren that we, the Indian Muslims, and the Adeni Arabs are one..."

N.R. Nair, hon. secretary of the Indian Association, published a letter in the press in which he said the memorandum stressed Indian identification with the interests of Aden and asked that in return they should be treated as equals and be allowed to participate in the constitutional talks. Nair noted that they were perturbed by the inclination to differentiate between parts of the community on a religious basis.

Letters and articles in the press, including several by Indians, criticized the claim of a foreign community to political equality and the reference to their citizenship in the Commonwealth as a basis for claiming Aden citizenship (*Aden Chr.*, April 20, 27, May 4, 11, 18, June 8; *Ayyam*, May 10, 11, 12, 28)

The ATUC attitude was expressed in a letter to the editor by Abdallah al-Asmag in which he said that all the Indians had done in Aden was "to hoard money [and] monopolize business." They had not severed their ties with their homeland, looked down upon and kept aloof from the natives and did not, as a minority and as foreigners, deserve equal shares in the citizenship of the country. (*Aden Chr.*, June 1)

On June 11 representatives of the 19 organizations belonging to the Congress of Popular Organizations met to discuss developments caused by the memorandum and to adopt a united stand on the issue. (*Ayyam*, June 25)

A.I. Sa'di, Minister of Education and Emigration, stated that both Arabs and non-Arabs not born in Aden, who had families and property in Aden and had severed their relations with other countries, should be considered Adenis. Those, however, who had come to Aden to earn a living only should keep out of politics and would receive Aden's hospitality in return. Sa'di assured the foreign residents that they had nothing to fear from a national government but they "should not delude themselves into thinking that they are the uncontrollable rulers of Aden." As to the Aden-born [non-Arabs] "they are as good Arabs as ourselves." H.A. Bayumi, Minister in the Aden government (and President of the National Union Party, the former Aden Association), stated upon his return from the London talks in July that only "Aden-born" should have active and passive franchise in the next elections to Legco. (*Aden Chr.*, May 18, July 27, Aug 10)

[Apparently, not all the Hindus were of one opinion.] In May it was reported that in a recent meeting of the Indian Association a rift occurred between the executive and a number of members who strongly opposed the memorandum. In June there were reports of meetings between the leaders of the Indian Association and leaders of the National Union Party, the People's Constitutional Congress and the ATUC following strong opposition inside the Indian [Hindu] community to the memorandum. Asmag denied that any formal talks had taken place and reiterated his opposition to the Indian stand (*Ayyam*, May 28, June 14, 17, 21). In July, at a meeting of Indian merchants, mostly Hindus, it was resolved to help Aden achieve constitutional progress and to refrain from seeking any special rights and from interfering in politics. (*V of A*, July 29 [Aug 1])

In Aug [?] the Aden Boycott of Israel Committee warned all foreign communities against interfering in Aden national affairs and taking a stand against the will of "this Arah people." (*V of A*, Aug 2 [4])

Demands for Revision of Laws Concerning Immigrants. In Feb. A.M. Luqman demanded a revision in the clause in the immigration law, which provided for "exemption permits" and facilitated large-scale immigration, thus depriving the Adenis of work, medical care and education and threatening to turn them into a minority. An exempted immigrant had all the rights and opportunities possessed by an Aden-born citizen. A person attained exempted status if one of his forefathers had attained such status—even if he himself was a new immigrant—or if he was accorded exemption himself. The immigration officer accorded exemption freely, Luqman said. (*Fat. Jaz., Feb 17*)

In March, A.M. Luqman suggested the amendment of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Law, in particular the provision which allowed late birth registration and thus enabled new immigrants to obtain Aden birth certificates and identity cards. Registration should be no later than three days after birth. The suggestion was endorsed by Ministers As-Sa'idi and Basendwah and a committee to consider the issue was formed by Legco in April. It invited parties and individuals to express their views before it and heard much opposition to a change in existing procedures. (*Fat. Jaz., March 23, April 18, May 2, 5; Aden Chr., June 22*)

In Aug the People's Constitutional Congress demanded that the Governor cancel the announcement allowing persons registered in the 1955 electoral lists to apply for registration in case their names did not appear in the current lists, as this measure was contrary to the demands for the limiting of franchise to Aden-born persons only. The government replied that the law did not allow postponement of the procedure. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 22, Sept 14*)

In Nov it was suggested that a way be found to register as Adenis children born to Adenis abroad. (*Fat. Jaz., Nov 27*)

THE ADEN PROTECTORATES

THE FEDERATION OF THE ARAB AMIRATES OF THE SOUTH

Projected Merger Between Federation and Colony: See separate heading above.

Wahidi Sultanate Joins Federation. In the autumn it was reported that the two Wahidi sultanates of Balhaf and Bir Ali had merged and joined the Federation. (The Wahidi sultanates were the westernmost states of the Eastern Protectorate, bordering on the Western Protectorate.) In Nov it was reported that Sultan Nasir [Ibn] Abdallah Muhain al-Wahidi [of Balhaf, the senior Wahidi state], had become a minister in the federal government (see below). Wahidi was the eleventh state to join the Federation.

Cairo and Baghdad commented that this was a new plot of British imperialism. (*Fat. Jaz., Sept 23, Oct 29; Haqa'ig, Cairo, Nov 23; R. Baghdad, Oct 30 [Nov 1]; V of A, Dec 7 [9]*)

New Ministries. At the beginning of Nov the formation was reported of three new ministries in the federal government: (1) Information—Sultan Nasir Ibn Abdallah, Wahidi; (2) State Affairs—Sultan Nasir Ibn Aydarus, Lower Awlaqi; (3) Justice—Shaykh Abdallah al-Hamid, Dathina. This brought the number of ministers in the

Adenization. There were some reports on individual cases of Adenization in the civil service (*Aden Chr., July 20, Oct 26*) but there was scant progress. In Jan A.A. as-Safi, Legco member, said in the Council that most of the government departments had not yet been Adenized and demanded that the government accomplish this as soon as possible (*Fat. Jaz., Jan 26*). In Dec *Fatid al-Jazirah* wrote that Adenization existed only on paper and amounted to only 1%. (*Fat. Jaz., Dec 21*)

Articles in and letters to the press, as well as various organizations, dealt with this question and also accused foreign companies and firms of disregarding Adenization and giving priority to foreign workers. (*Ayyem, Jan 19-21; Aden Chr., Jan 26, April 20, July 20; Fat. Jaz., Nov 19*)

In March it was reported that K.W. Simmons, Chief Secretary to the Government of Aden, had told Legco that recipients of government scholarships would be required to sign an undertaking to serve in the civil service for not less than five years after completing their studies. If the Overseas Studies Board had reasons for doubting whether the candidate would honour the undertaking, the Board might require him to produce sureties. (The issue had been raised in 1960, MER 1960, p 389.)

The *Aden Chronicle*, welcoming this measure, mentioned that the relaxation as to Arabic language standards allowed in 1959 for scholarship candidates had been cancelled. The paper demanded that awards for overseas training for serving officers should also be made subject to the Arabic language conditions and that discretion be exercised in favour of Adeni candidates (*Aden Chr., March 2*)

Military Training Introduced. On Oct 17 a first group of students at the Aden College, aged 17-19, started a two-year military training course under the supervision of a British officer and NCOs. (*Aden Chr., Oct 19*)

Supreme Council to ten, every state except Aqrabi being represented by a minister. (*Aden Chr., Nov 2*; for six formerly existing ministries, see MER 1960, p 390; no report was available on a tenth ministry.)

Aden Protectorate Levies Become Federal Army. On Nov 29 the Aden Protectorate Levies (see MER 1960, p 390) were handed over to the Federation. Henceforth, they were to constitute the federal army, thus coming under the control of the Sultan of Lahaj, federal Minister of Defence.

The force now included five infantry battalions, an armoured car squadron, a signals unit and administrative units. It was basically an Arab force trained and commanded by some 90 British officers and NCOs. Command would continue to be British and, for some time to come, the federal army "would have to rely on [the British] Middle East headquarters" [located in Aden]. Britain would make funds available to increase the pay of both the federal army and the federal guards. (*Times, Nov 30; Daily Telegraph, Nov 30*)

Baghdad Radio described the handover as a "new farce" enacted by the British imperialist authorities in the Arab home. (*R. Baghdad, Nov 29 [Dec 1]*)

In Dec an agreement was reported between the federal government and London to raise the salaries of

all members of the federal guards [formerly the Western Protectorate government guards] and the federal army beginning July 1960. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Dec 2)

In June a delegation went to Jordan to arrange for the training of federal guards officers in Jordan. (*Ayam, June 15*)

Budget, British Financial Aid. [The federal budget—excluding the budgets of the individual states—for 1961/2 totalled £1,473,729 of which £1,276,324 was covered by a British grant-in-aid. On the expenditure side, £969,000 was allocated to internal security, £189,000 to public works and development, £96,000 each to interior and health, £43,000 to education.]

In July Shaykh Muhammad Farid, Minister of Finance, on returning from talks in London, said that Britain had agreed to increase its annual development and welfare aid to the WAP (in the framework of the Colonial Development scheme) from £250,000 to £400,000.

In Nov Shaykh Farid went to London to negotiate further British aid, in particular the financing of a three-year development plan. Shaykh Farid intended to ask for £7½m. for the plan; Britain had already agreed to a block grant instead of the annual subsidy paid hitherto. (*Times*, April 7; *Aden Chr.*, July 27, Oct 19, Nov 2)

Border Relations with Yemen, see p 706.

"Constitution for Dathina." In May it was reported that the Dathina Confederacy (30,000–40,000 inhabitants) had promulgated its first constitution. Dathina was ruled by a council, each member of which was responsible for a government department, with an annually rotating chairmanship. The constitution provided for a Na'ib, Hussein Mansur, said that local councils and justices of the peace had now been established throughout Dathina, which had also set up its own customs system. The occasion was celebrated with public festivities.

Dathina was one of the best cotton-growing areas in the Federation and had now 37 privately-owned tractors. A secondary school building was being completed in Mudiya, the capital. (*Aden Chr.*, June 1)

Towards Municipal Elections in Lahej. Opening the 11th session of the Lahej Legislative Council in Oct, Sultan Fadl Ibn Ali said his government was discussing the possibility of allowing the people to elect their own representatives to the municipal councils. (*Aden Chr.*, Nov 2)

UPRISING IN YAFI

Rebel activities in Upper and Lower Yafi continued; government counter-action came to a head in June.

Enlisting International Aid? In May the Jordanian press reported on the activities in Amman of one Abdallah Ahmad al-Mud'iq (or al-Fud'iq), "SG of the Yafi Federation." He intended to tour Arab, African and Asian countries to enlist support for the rebellion in the Arab South. (*Jihad*, May 14; *Manar*, May 29)

Hostilities in Upper Yafi. In Jan an uprising was reported in "Hilin" against Sultan Muhammad [Ibn] Salih Ibn Umar of Upper Yafi. Among the rebels was Shaykh al-Musalli. The Sultan asked the Aden government for help and several RAF airplanes bombed the rebels. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Jan 21)

CORRENDUM: The reports on fighting in Upper Yafi in MER 1960, p 391, based on BBC sources (12 Jan, 3 Feb) relate to Jan 1961 and not to Jan 1960, and should be read here.

A Yemeni report in May said the "villages of Musalli," among others, had been severely attacked by aircraft [no date given]. (*Saba*, May 11)

On June 8, according to Muhammad Ibn Aydarus, British aircraft raided localities in Upper Yafi, including the village of Musalli. (*Saba*, July 13)

In Aug Cairo published the text of a leaflet which, it said, had been dropped by the RAF (no time specified) bearing an ultimatum to the inhabitants of Nisara'a (?) and al-Musalli (?) to leave the villages because they were giving asylum to members of the Musalli family and others (names specified) who had launched an unprovoked attack on Hilan (?)—[Hilan?—see above]. (*V of A*, Aug 16 [18])

Offensive Against Rebels; Aydarus Seeks Refuge in Yemen. In June Arab sources reported an offensive by government forces against the Lower Yafi stronghold of Muhammad Aydarus, forcing him to seek refuge in Yemen.

The reports spoke of heavy air raids. Aydarus, in a statement issued later in Ta'izz, said the air raids started on May 29 on Al-Qara and continued for 12 days on towns and villages (which he named) in Lower Yafi, especially in the areas of Wadi Rasid and As-Sa'ad. On June 8 the raids were extended to Upper Yafi; among places raided there, Aydarus mentioned Al-Musalli. The inhabitants had been warned by leaflets to evacuate the whole area. (*Saba*, July 13)

San'a reported on June 5 that many refugees from Yafi had arrived in Beida, Yemen, after six days of air raids on their area. Cairo reports said the aircraft had attacked towns and villages with incendiary bombs, rockets and machineguns and had destroyed a large number of houses. A cable to President Abdel Nasser from the "Yafi people" was quoted, stating that many lives had been lost and over 200 families had been rendered homeless.

The Jeddah paper *Al-Bilad* said that the British had imposed a "starvation blockade" on rebels in the mountains of Upper Yafi but tribesmen were smuggling supplies into the area. An earlier report, at the end of April, said that government forces had been concentrating around the rebel area. (*R. San'a*, June 5 [8]; *V of A*, June 7, 10, 11, 26 [9, 13, 28]; *MENA*, June 11, 12, 13 [13, 14, 15]; *Akhbar Sa'ah*, Cairo, June 21)

Aden Chronicle wrote that Muhammad Ibn Aydarus, a "brave and popular chieftain," had crossed into Yemen after the RAF, which had been called upon to subdue the rebellion, had accomplished this task; his men had been decimated and his ammunition dumps—supplied by Yemen—had been lost. (*Aden Chr.*, Aug 10)

From Ta'izz, where he was received as a guest of the Yemeni government, Aydarus issued an appeal to Muslims and Arabs everywhere, as well as to world opinion, for support in the "war of extermination" which imperialist forces were waging against the people of Yafi. (*Aden Chr.*, July 10; *Saba*, Ta'izz, June 29, July 13)

Efforts to Unify Rebel Command. On June 16 an agreement was concluded [in Yemen] between Muhammad Ibn Aydarus, Sultan of Lower Yafi, and Sultan Muhammad Ibn Umar Abd al-Taqq "and all the citizens of Harharah," Upper Yafi, providing for joint defence

of Upper and Lower Yafi against imperialism and its agents, and traitors. (*Saba*, July 13; also reported in *V of A*, Aug 30 [Sept 1])

At the beginning of Aug Aydarus published an appeal to all nationalist forces in Aden to join hands in the struggle against imperialism. He said he was prepared "to make all efforts possible to unify the forces of the armed movement under a joint command representing all the areas of the revolutionary south." (*Nasr*, Aug 3; *V of A*, Sept 7 [9])

In Aug it was reported from Cairo that Aydarus had met in Beida all the rebel commanders in the various parts of the "Arab South." They had unanimously decided to form a joint general command of all the forces fighting colonialism in the "Arab South" under Sultan Muhammad Ibn Aydarus (*V of A*, Aug 10 [12]; *Jihad*, Aug 10). [There was no confirmation of this report.]

Alleged Yemeni Aid; Imam Opposed to United Rebel Army? The presence of Aydarus in Yemen was one of the matters reportedly discussed between Naqib Salih Ruwayshan, the Yemeni governor of Beida, and the Deputy British Agent, Mr R. R. Johnson, at their meeting in Mukeris on Aug 14. Aydarus was understood to be organizing a "South Arabian Legion" with Yemeni help, but the Imam Ahmad was believed to be against this move. (*Mid. Mir.*, Aug 19)

A report in Sept said that by "a Sharifian decree" Aydarus had been supplied with some 30 Russian-made rifles and five machine-guns, ammunition, 5,000 "French riyals," a quantity of millet and five mules. These supplies had been sent from San'a to "Salah" in 16 trucks. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Sept 6)

In Oct Aydarus left Yemen for Jeddah. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 14 [17])

UPRISING IN AWLAQI

Activities of ash-Shams Rebels. A federal communiqué in Feb said that a party of Ahl ash-Shams (tribes) had attacked a position of the federal guards in Upper Awlaqi. After a prolonged exchange of fire, the defenders had succeeded in warding off the attack. After tracking the attackers for 48 hours, a patrol of the guards managed to engage them in battle. Two of the rebels were wounded and taken to hospital in Aden: Shaykh Hamid Ibn Hussein Ibn Sarib, "one of the foremost leaders of the Shams rebels," and "the shrewd and famous commander" Shaykh Ali Am'ur. (*Ayyam*, Feb 27)

Cairo reported in April that the combatants in Upper Awlaqi had blown up roads. (*V of A*, April 11 [13])

On April 8 Awlaqi rebels successfully ambushed federal guards on the road from Al-Mahfid to al-Ahmar —Mudiya in either Awlaqi or Dathina territory. An officer and a soldier, both Awlaqi, and a local deputy political officer were injured. The rebels were thought to belong to the Shams tribes (*Ayyam*, April 11) and said to be known as "Shuyu'iyah"—Communists. (*Aden Chr.*, April 13)

Air Raids Reported. On May 13 the "Arab South" office in Cairo reported that the RAF had repeatedly raided "the villages and dwellings of the Awlaqi tribe" and completely destroyed them because "members of the tribe had refused to join the British forces." A British officer and two soldiers had been killed while on their way to Nisab in Upper Awlaqi.

Several British officers and soldiers were killed in an ambush laid by the warriors in Dhala. (*MENA*, May 13 [16])

EASTERN PROTECTORATE

Wahidi States of Balhaf and Bir Ali Join Federation of Amirates. See above: Western Protectorate.

The Hadhramaut and the British-sponsored Scheme for Union of the Aden Territory. See above: Issue of Merger of Aden Colony and Protectorates.

Political Life in the Hadhramaut. In Jan it was alleged that the "Hadhramaut government" did not allow the formation of cultural clubs and associations for fear they might engage in politics (*Fat. Jaz.*, Jan 17) and that Amir Hussein Ibn Salih al-Kathiri, the deputy Secretary of State, had closed down the only Arabic monthly in the state, *Al-Ash'ah*. (*Ayyam*, Jan 19)

In April it was reported that Abu Bakr Ibn Shaykh al-Kaf (the famous benefactor of Hadhramaut) had resigned from the Kathiri State Council. No reason was given, but the paper suggested that he resented the fact that the Council members held on to their seats in the Council while the Kathiri people demanded from the Sultan the establishment of a legislative council, which Abu Bakr considered a fair demand. (*Fat. Jaz.*, April 4)

In May the *Voice of the Arabs* reported that a request had been submitted to the authorities in Mukalla (Qu'aiti) for permission to form a new political party called "The Islamic Cooperative Party of Hadhramaut" (*al-hizb al-islami at-ta'awuni al-hadhrami*). (*V of A*, May 4 [6])

In Aug it was reported that a number of citizens of "Sayem" (Sayyun, capital of Kathiri?) were endeavouring to form a new party to be called "The Popular Party" (*hizb ar-rabi'ah ash-sha'abiyyah*) to defend the rights of citizens there. (*V of A*, Aug 29 [31])

In Oct clamorous demonstrations in support of President Abdel Nasser, and work and transport dislocations, were reported from Mukalla. Apparently, this was all sparked off by two guests in a coffee house expressing grief over the breakup of the UAR and starting a round of cheers for the UAR. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Oct 9)

Tribal Rebellion in Qu'aiti. At the beginning of the year, a tribal rebellion broke out in the Wadi Du'an province in the Qu'aiti Sultanate. It appeared that in 1960 (?) the government had banned the indiscriminate firing of rifles in certain settled areas in and around Wadi Du'an (including the wadis of Du'an al-Ayyar (or Laisar) and Duan al-Ayman, Wadi al-Ayn and Wadi Amd).

The tribes in this area, the *Marāshidhah*, the *Hālīkah* (Halka), part of the *Khāmī'ah* (Khām'ah) and others, all belonging to the Saibān tribal federation, held a meeting on Jan 14 at which they resolved to reject the ban on shooting and not to recognize the State Council and the Sultan's Council.

In March it was reported that the *muqōdimoh* [official heads?] of the Saibān tribes, the *Hālīkah*, the *Marāshidhah* and others, had submitted their resignation from their positions to the Na'ib [government representative] of Du'an province, Shaykh Hasan Muhammad Bā-Surrah [of the Khāmī'ah tribe], on the ground that they were unable to cope with Bedouin opposition to the ban as well as to the treaty of Shuhūrah (?). The Bedouin, they said, were enraged and bent on commencing hostilities. The Bedouin claimed that the sound of shots drove off the monkeys which would otherwise damage the fields and that they also used the weapons to defend themselves against wild beasts and robbers. The Bedouin reportedly also accused those who wished to overthrow customs and traditions of "deviation from nationality (*jinsiyyah*), nationalism (*qawmiyyah*) and Bedouin Ara-

him." They were also said to claim that the "Shu-hrah treaty" between the Bedouin and the government was signed by townsmen who did not belong to the Bedouin at all and who should now keep away from them. The Bedouin were angry with all their *muqaddimah* for accepting the treaty.

The tribes had also been requested to submit hostages to the Qu'aiti government in Mukalla. Several tribes complied, but the Khāmi'ah and the Hālikah refused to comply.

The Nā'ih and the Sultan rejected the resignation of the *muqaddimah* and told them that they would be held responsible for any breach of the peace in the Wadi. (*Fat. Jaz.*, March 25, 28, Aug 29; *Ayyam*, May 12)

The rebellious tribes destroyed the "eastern road" connecting the seaboard with the interior of Hadhramaut, and ambushed traffic. As the alternative al-Kāf road was in bad shape, the interior became exposed to danger of hunger and Bedouin raids.

A government force which left Mukalla for the rebel area, equipped with "heavy armoured cars and tanks," found the road impassable. The people in the interior were said to have taken refuge in the houses of the *sādah* [or Sayyids, the privileged descendants of the Prophet] and the *mandūs* (mansab—head of a family of Sayyids and recognized spiritual leader) who were traditionally honoured by the Bedouin. (*Fat. Jaz.*, March 28)

In April it was reported that armoured detachments had taken up positions outside certain towns in the affected area, and that reconnaissance planes had been sighted over the Wadi. The Bedouin, instructed by their leaders to keep away from the valleys and highways, withdrew to the mountains. (*Fat. Jaz.*, April 4)

In May, in a press interview, Nā'ih Bā-Surrah said that on April 31 (sic) he had met the tribes at a place called Bayn al-Jibāl ("between the mountains"), at the invitation of the Muqaddam Sa'id Bā-Nuḥaym (Bā-Naḥim?), the "leader (*sa'im*) of the Saibāni tribes." He said he had asked the tribes to cancel the resolutions of their Jan meeting or alternatively to submit in writing their agreement to the shooting ban. The Marāshidah tribe was also requested to deliver to the authorities a certain person named Bā-Ahūth, who was charged with robbery. Bā-Nuḥaym agreed to this request in the name of his tribe, the Marāshidah.

However, the elders (*uqalā*) of the other tribes withdrew their support from Bā-Nuḥaym, as he had agreed with them not to acknowledge the guilt of Bā-Ahūth, and this he had now done. Among the disaffected tribes were the Sūmuhi (also spelled: Sumūhi), the Hālikah, the Bā-Qadim and Bā-Sallūm clans of the Khāmi'ah tribe, and others. Some people were asking themselves, it was reported, whether it was not the noise of the aircraft over Kor Saiban which had changed the Muqaddam's mind. The break between him and the tribes was thought to be the harbinger of more troubles in the area. (*Ayyam*, May 12; also *Fat. Jaz.*, May 2)

An official Qu'aiti announcement on July 30 said that government forces had suffered 16 killed and 25 wounded in a recent clash with the Khāmi'ah rebels. At the same time, the Qu'aiti government thanked the RAF for help in repelling the Khāmi'ah who had been looting and pillaging in the area. An official Aden statement said RAF aircraft had completely destroyed two Khāmi'ah settlements and intensive ground and air action was keeping the tribesmen on the move and might force them to surrender. An RAF spokesman said that only one Shackleton aircraft had been used "on each occa-

sion" and no casualties had been reported because the population had been warned to leave before the attacks. (*Times*, July 31)

Another report added that government forces had been ambushed by some 200 Khāmi'ah tribesmen, who themselves suffered eleven fatalities. (*Fat. Jaz.*, July 30; see also *Hayat*, Aug 5)

A report on developments (without dates) before the July battle said that the Khāmi'ah had attacked and robbed some ten vehicles carrying provisions and passengers on the road from Mukalla to Du'an. A force sent to punish the rebels had not found them. The government then sent workers to repair the road and soldiers to guard them. These were the soldiers who were ambushed. One of the places destroyed by the aircraft was Sharj Halh (?) near Du'an al-Aysar. The Bedouin had reacted by attacking a position of government forces in Wadi Al-Aysar; there were no casualties. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Aug 29)

Mecca reported that King Saud had received cables from "sons of the Arah South" residing in Saudi Arabia and from the "Tayirah tribes" in Hadhramaut, denouncing the air attacks on the tribes. (*R. Mecca*, Aug 3, 5 [5, 8])

Cairo reports in Aug said the government forces had lost 200 men. Other reports purporting to quote official announcements said aircraft reinforcements and an aircraft carrier had arrived in Mukalla and aircraft were seeking out the rebels in the mountains; the government forces were encountering difficulties because of the terrain and because the rebel armament was superior. (*MENA*, Aug 9 [11]; *V of A*, Aug 15, 16 [17, 18])

On Aug 18 the tribesmen attacked government officers at Sharq al-Hurairah and Aūra—the residence of the Nā'ih—in Wadi Du'an. A woman was killed (*Fat. Jaz.*, Aug 29). According to Cairo, purporting to quote "London radio," seven government officials had been killed. (*V of A*, Aug 22 [24])

At the same time it was reported that the head of the Marāshidah tribe had tried to mediate but the government had stipulated unconditional surrender and this the rebellious tribes refused to accept.

Shortly afterwards, however, it was reported that the Khāmi'ah and the Hālikah had surrendered hostages to the government. The reason for the surrender was not known. It was thought that the tribes might have exhausted their ammunition, suffered from hunger caused by the government blockade, feared the jet planes or became torn with internal strife. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Aug 29, Sept 4)

In Oct the government withdrew the ban on shooting, realizing the great damage it had caused to tribal security and to agriculture. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Oct 17)

Trial of Rebels. The trial of 50 (according to Baghdad 76) captured tribesmen opened in Mukalla on Oct 7. The defendants were the Khāmi'ah, Hālikah, Hāmidīyān, Asīrīnāh and Awābīḥāh tribes as well as individuals of these tribes. They were charged with intention to weaken the position of the government, spreading havoc in the country, robbery with violence, high treason through conspiracy with foreign elements (which were not detailed in the reports) and damage to the "reform movements" of the government and the people. The prosecution demanded the imposition of penalties customary under Islamic law—death sentences, cutting off hands and feet and deportation for life. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Oct 13; *Mid. Mir.*, Oct 14)

In Dec the court sentenced six men to death, in

absentia, and 11 to prison terms ranging from three to six years, and ordered the destruction of 20 rifles. (*R. Baghdad, Dec 21 [22]; Aden Chr., Dec 28*)

Oil Agreement. On Nov 5 the Qu'aiti and Kathiri governments signed an agreement granting the Pan-American International Corporation a 45,000 square mile concession providing for a ten-year exploration period with a possible five-year extension and a 30-year exploitation period for each oil field discovered. The two governments would receive 55% of the company's net profits and would have an option to participate in up

to 20% of the company's rights and obligations under the agreement; if this option were exercised, the profits would be divided on a 50:50 basis. The company agreed to build a small refinery once commercial exports began.

Negotiations had started in Aden in May and continued in Thamud in Aug. The Thamud concession area was also claimed by the neighbouring Mahri state, to the east of it. Yemen, which claimed the whole of Hadhramaut, announced that any agreements between international organizations and local shaykhs were "null and void." (*Aden Chr., May 18, Aug 3, Nov 9, 23, Dec 28; Petroleum Times, Dec 1*)

KUWAIT, MUSCAT AND OMAN, PERSIAN GULF PRINCIPALITIES

BRITAIN AND THE PERSIAN GULF IN GENERAL

New British Resident. In May it was reported that Sir William Luce had been appointed H.M. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. [The post had been vacant for some time. The Resident's headquarters were in Bahrain and he had Political Agents in Kuwait (until after independence, when the Agent was appointed Consul-General, later Ambassador), Bahrain, Doha (Qatar) and Dubai (Trucial States).] Luce's former post was Governor of Aden [where he played a leading part in establishing the Federation of the Amirates] and he was a former officer of the Sudan Political Service. He was spoken of as a "Colonial Office man" and Cairo commentators among others alleged that Britain was trying to put the clock back in the Persian Gulf. (*Times, May 12, 19*)

British Oil Interests. "A threat to the oil in the Middle East," *The Times* remarked editorially during the Kuwait crisis, "is one of the main occupations of British strategy" (*Times, July 11*). The way to protect the oil interests, it was observed, just as it had been formerly the way to protect the route to India, was "to protect the weak coastal powers and the minorities against outward pressure of the powers and peoples of the interior." This was what the newly-established ME Command (HQ in Aden) was doing from the Aden-Yemen border through Oman and Buraimi to Kuwait. (*NYT, July 7*; see also D.C. Watt: *The Arabian Peninsula in British Strategy, Military Review, Feb 1961*)

Britain's Position and Policy in the Gulf. [The advent of Kuwait's independence and later the Kuwait crisis prompted questions on the future of the Gulf principalities and especially Britain's position and policies in the area. Disatisfaction with the present state of affairs was expressed as well as the need for new departures; in the material available to the editor, however, there was no suggestion that Britain should withdraw completely from the area in the near future.]

A pamphlet, *Middle East Issues*, published in Feb by the Fabian International Bureau on the basis of a report by a working party of the Labour Party, as reported by *The Times*, suggested that "any British financial contribution to capital investment in the ME should take the form of a diversion from London of Kuwait's funds."

Britain would never be able to assist the ME countries with more than Kuwait's annual investment in London. The diversion of these funds might be difficult in a period of economic expansion in Britain "but it would have the real advantage for Britain of associating the maintenance of Kuwait's oil industry with the investments of the Arab world as a whole."

In an examination of Britain's commitments in the Persian Gulf, the pamphlet argued that the area's immunity from "the liberating, modernizing tides that lap the rest of the Arab world" had provided the British government with a breathing space which should be used to start the process of decolonization. "Unfortunately, Whitehall shows all the signs of regarding it as an unconditional extension of empire." The Gulf states and Aden deserved the promise of eventual self-determination and, if possible, a definite date for British political withdrawal. "But the key to the situation in the Gulf is to react sensibly rather than to initiate positive policies. For a start the rulers should be allowed to have relations with other countries. The date palm curtain cutting off the Gulf from the rest of the Arab world will be torn down sooner or later. We could make a start by lowering it a few inches now."

The Times commented editorially that any hints of what a future Labour government's policy in the ME would be were always valuable. In those fields of the ME "where Britain can be said to hold real initiative—the Persian Gulf, southern Arabia, and perhaps relations between the Arabs and oil"—there was a question whether the British government should "in the old imperial manner, compel, or should they try to persuade?" The Fabian answer was not always clear. As to the suggestion to react rather than initiate positive policies, what if there was no clear political goal toward which the Gulf Arabs as yet wished to work, the paper asked. *The Times* termed the suggestion that Kuwait's funds should be "diverted" from London to ME countries, "the fatal temptation to let good intentions lead to high-handed interference." (*Times, Feb 3*)

In May the ME correspondent of *The Times* asked "whether Britain is making sufficient use of her special... position on the Gulf to try to change present systems [of the shaykhdoms] or whether she is merely letting events take their course." In the face of the in-

ternal problems of the region and the influence on it of Saudi Arabia, the UAR and Iraq, should Britain "step forward a little or should she in time withdraw from her role of adviser and protector and rely on commercial treaties to bring her the oil she needs? Few people in Britain are likely to agree in favour of the second course..." (*Times*, May 19)

"The British silver cord has been loosed; all the Queen's gunboats and men cannot perfectly restore the peace of mind of the... Gulf sheikhs..." *The Economist* commented in July during the Kuwait crisis. Whether rich or poor, the problem of the sheikhdoms was that they were both "so small and so emphatically outmoded." Relations among the rulers themselves were also bad. "With their uncertain frontiers, dispiriting feudal structures, and young generations growing up with a yearning for wider horizons, these sheikhdoms are natural targets for territorial claims" and they were coveted by their large neighbours: Iraq, which now claimed Kuwait; Saudi Arabia, "subtler, swifter of action and not so sharp of word," which was in dispute with Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Oman over Buraimi, and with Qatar over the frontiers (though with the latter in a friendly fashion, since Qatar was a Wahhabi enclave); and Iran, which in 1957 enacted a law making Bahrain an Iranian province. (For sources, see below.)

Suggestions for Sharing Oil Wealth; Progressive British Disengagement; Sheikhdoms Seen Viable. What to do about it? "Sharing their... oil wealth with the Arab East" would make the sheikhs "more honoured, more responsible—and far less vulnerable," *The Economist* suggested. The sheikhs also "had little choice but to revise the pattern of their political life to meet the needs of mid-century."

A later article by *The Economist's* ME correspondent suggested that the crux of the argument for not disturbing existing British arrangements in the Gulf had been that the situation in Kuwait must not be upset. But as Kuwait had now been given independence, there was no reason why Britain should not embark on progressive disengagement throughout the Gulf.

Most of the sheikhdoms would probably continue to exist if British protection were withdrawn. Iran's claim to Bahrain would be resisted by the Arabs as well as discouraged by Iran's Western allies. Qatar and Saudi Arabia were "on the best of terms." The Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat might lose Buraimi to

Saudi Arabia] and the Sultan might see his "shadow" sovereignty over the interior of Oman challenged again by the "Saudi-supported Imam Ghālib..." but they too were unlikely to be challenged in their homelands. (*Economist*, July 15, Aug 19)

British Project to Establish Gulf Federation Claimed by Baghdad and Cairo. [Baghdad and Cairo repeatedly claimed that Britain was working towards the establishment of a federation of the Persian Gulf principalities from Kuwait to Muscat and Oman.] At the end of May Kuwait officially denied that such a federation under Kuwait's leadership was or had been under consideration by the government. (*MENA*, May 31 [June 2])

On June 25, when Premier Qassim first publicly stated Iraq's claim to Kuwait, he also alleged that "imperialism wanted to establish itself" by setting up an "Arab Eastern Federation" just as it was establishing the Aden federation to the West. Such a federation would dominate the "Arab [Persian] Gulf" and in particular threaten Iraq and block her approaches to the Indian Ocean. (*R. Baghdad*, June 25 [27])

[In July, following the outbreak of the Kuwait crisis, the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Qatar and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman visited London.] Baghdad Radio later tied these visits to the alleged federation plan. (*R. Baghdad*, Sept 20 [22])

In Oct Baghdad Radio asserted that Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Dubai were to establish a secret organization to combat liberal propaganda. At a meeting in Qatar, attended by the British Resident, agreement was reached on the formation of a committee for this purpose. (*R. Baghdad*, Oct 9 [11])

In Nov a Cairo paper claimed that Sir William Luce, the new British Resident in the Gulf, who as Governor of Aden had been successful in setting up the Federation of the Amirates in the Aden Protectorate, was now endeavouring to establish the federation of the Gulf sheikhdoms which would have economic and defence treaties with Britain. In addition to protecting the Rulers from their neighbours (e.g. Bahrain from Iran; Qatar from Saudi Arabia), the projected federation was designed to enhance British influence in the area in face of American influence in Iran and Saudi Arabia. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, Nov 8)

"Terrorist Campaign in the Gulf." See below: Muscat and Oman: Reports on Hostilities.

THE STATE OF KUWAIT

(Dawlat al-Kuwait)

SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

Independence and the Kuwait Crisis. Kuwait became an independent and sovereign state with an exchange of notes, on June 19, between the Ruler of Kuwait and the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, terminating the 1899 agreement which provided for British protection for the sheikhdom. The new agreement also provided for British assistance upon request by the Ruler.

Kuwait's newly-found independence was immediately challenged by Iraq, which claimed sovereignty over it. The Ruler asked for British and Saudi Arabian assistance, and troops of these two countries arrived in Kuwait on July 1. The British troops were withdrawn by Oct 10, having been relieved by an Arab force, the first con-

tingents of which arrived on Sept 10 (see: The Kuwait Crisis).

Even before 1961, Kuwait had gradually taken over the management of its foreign relations and had been admitted to UN agencies. By the end of the year, she had exchanged diplomatic representation with the UK, the US and a number of other countries. She also sought to enlist international support by sending goodwill missions to a large number of countries all over the world. The admittance of Kuwait to the UN was vetoed by the USSR on the ground—among others—that the new state continued to constitute a British colony.

In her dispute with Iraq, Kuwait sought and obtained the aid of the great majority of Arab countries, both of

the UAR and of her antagonists and especially Saudi Arabia. In July she was admitted to the Arab League. In other ways, Kuwait continued her traditional policy of keeping aloof from inter-Arab disputes and of maintaining good relations with all. In seeking support, Kuwait promised financial assistance to the Arab countries, for which purpose she arranged to set up a special fund.

Internally, the ruling Sabah family continued to monopolize power completely. The Ruler continued to be assisted by a Supreme Council comprising family members only, each with a defined departmental responsibility. In April the deputy Ruler resigned, reportedly because of rivalry for the succession. The institution of British Political Agent was abolished as of July 1.

In Aug there was a new departure when eleven notables were summoned to form a joint committee with the Supreme Council to prepare a bill for the election of a Constituent Assembly. At the end of the year, in the first elections ever to be held in Kuwait, 20 members were elected to a Constituent Assembly on an individual basis; the Supreme Council members became Assembly members *ex-officio*. A provisional constitution was promulgated by the Ruler in Jan 1962 (not recorded in this volume) and the Supreme Council was redesignated the Council of Ministers.

A Kuwait currency was introduced on April 1 when the Kuwait dinar was fixed at par with sterling. A new flag was also introduced and steps were taken to reorganize the government in keeping with the needs of a sovereign state.

Population. According to a 1961 census, the population was 321,621, of whom some 210,000 lived in the town of Kuwait. Over half the population were foreign nationals engaged in the oil industry and services. There were some 120,000 Kuwaiti nationals, 45,000 Iraqis, 35,000 Palestinians (mostly Jordanian nationals), 10,000 Lebanese, 3,000 Egyptians, and several thousand Saudi Arabians. According to an Iranian estimate, there were also about 70,000 Iranians.

Oil. Kuwait was in 1961 by far the largest producer of oil in the ME, estimated crude oil production amounting to 82,482,000 metric tons and an additional 9.8m. tons in the Kuwait Neutral Zone. Direct payments to Kuwait by the oil companies (excluding payments for oil from the Neutral Zone) amounted in 1961 to \$454m. This was the generally accepted figure; there was, however, a view that revenue might have been nearer to £200m, i.e. \$560m.

The oil concessions were as follows: the greater part of Kuwait territory was covered by a concession of the Kuwait Oil Co., the major producer, owned jointly and equally by BP and Gulf Oil Corp. of America, with 50% of the company's profits accruing to the Ruler. Kuwait's interest in the Neutral Zone was granted to the American Independent Oil Co., which operated jointly with the (American) Getty Oil Co. In 1958 the (Japanese) Arabian Oil Co. was granted the concession for the Ruler's half-share in the offshore area of the Neutral Zone, guaranteeing the ruler a minimum share of 57% in the profits; in March 1961, the company made its first commercial shipment of oil to Japan. In Jan 1961 the Royal Dutch Shell group was granted a concession in the Kuwait offshore area, on a 50:50 profit-sharing basis. The first two groups set up refineries.

The Economy and Social Services. The land being desert, there was no agriculture except for experimental farms. Drinking water was distilled from sea water and the

brackish water available was also utilized; a sweet water source was lately discovered. The economy, originally built around the natural harbour and the resultant trades, was transformed in the 'fifties by the huge oil revenues which accrued to the Ruler who gradually built up a welfare state. Originally, the income was allocated in roughly three equal parts to current expenditure, investment abroad—mainly in Britain—and development, but in the latter years there was a retrenchment in development spending (which included land purchase) and a rise in current expenditure, due, *inter alia*, to the financing of social services. There was a free health service and free education which also included free meals, books, clothes, etc. There were over 45,000 pupils and 2,000 teachers. Kuwait town was turned into a modern city with many public amenities.

Kuwait port was developed into a deep-water harbour; power plants and an extensive road system were constructed. Local, private and government investment resulted in the establishment of a number of industries, especially building materials. In 1961 plans were in hand for a petro-chemical plant, an aluminium smelter and a steel mill, based on imported ore. An asbestos-cement company was set up and two joint state-private enterprises were established on a 51:49 basis: a flour-milling company and a national manufacturing company to which existing state plants were to be sold. In June the Kuwait National Oil Co. (60% government-owned) took over local distribution of oil products for the Kuwait Oil Co. There was a locally-owned tanker company and two national airlines as well as a locally-owned bank and insurance companies.

Government land purchases, large-scale building, local purchases and contracting by the oil companies and their employment of local labour produced great prosperity among merchants and contractors while workers' living standards were relatively high. Still, large-scale immigration produced a measure of unemployment.

A budget law was issued in 1960, providing for proper budgeting, but no budget was published for 1960/61.

VIEWS ON KUWAIT

"Feudal and Welfare State." *The Times* ME correspondent, writing in May before the Kuwait crisis, remarked that Kuwait was "both a feudal and a welfare state." Kuwait was ruled by a family accountable only to itself. No one was "both able and willing" to state how the annual oil revenue of perhaps close to £200m. was allocated between the ruling shaykhs and the state nor was there a clear separation between the two as to holding-ings abroad.

One of the chief methods of distributing wealth was the purchase of land by the government from the Shaykha and others. Between £200m. and £300m. was thought to have been spent on these purchases during the last five years. Up to a third of the land was resold at lower prices; most of it was used for development, public buildings, streets, parks, etc.

Nor had the general public been forgotten; in fact, some of their neighbours said they were being spoiled. There were free education and health services, cars were seen everywhere, even outside tents in the desert "in which some workers, by their own choice, continue to live. No matter how much cream is skimmed off the top in Kuwait, there has been enough over for others." (For source, see below.)

Political Atmosphere. The above article continued: It was the "secrecy and reticence" maintained by the ruling fa-

mily and resulting in "rumour, guesses, and more rumour" that harmed Kuwait. But on the whole "the Kuwait community" was "proud and contented." There was no sign of the formation of trade unions. A Kuwait Oil Co. official, discussing "labour and race relations" in the company, "spoke rather like a gardener surveying his blooms." If any cause for tension lay ahead, it was to be found in the foreigners who constituted the majority of the population. Their labour was indispensable, but they were not Kuwait citizens. A decision on their future would soon have to be made. (*Times*, May 18)

A View of the Ruler. An article in *The New York Times* on Shaykh Abdallah as-Sālim as-Sabāh, the Ruler of Kuwait, characterized him as a "conservative Arab gentleman and a tradition-minded Muslim" whose "dream of a good life would be to retire to a garden somewhere with four wives and a copy of the Qur'ān." He was about 64 years old. The fortune held in his name was reckoned at as much as \$1,000m., but he was a man of simple tastes, not a lavish spender (he had only one car), and regarded his wealth as a trust fund for his subjects.

Before becoming the Ruler he was well-known as a financial expert, conciliator and negotiator and perhaps because of these traits was chosen by the family council as the new Ruler in 1950, after the death of his predecessor.

When oil royalties began to flow in large amounts, the Ruler embarked on a programme to turn Kuwait into a welfare state. At home he jealously guarded the family's power, rejecting any effort to give outsiders a real voice in government and especially trying to hold at arm's length the educated young men who demanded reforms. He also had to deal with the rivalry for the succession and, were it not for this, he quite possibly would have retired several years ago.

In Arab affairs, the Ruler's policy had always been to remain aloof from quarrels and keep Kuwait uncommitted and independent.

The Ruler had only one wife; neither of his two sons was regarded as likely to succeed him. (*NYT*, July 4)

THE GOVERNMENT

The Government, Dec 1961.

Ruler: Shaykh Abdallah as-Sālim as-Sabāh

The Supreme Council

Department

Foreign Affairs: Sabāh Sālim as-Sabāh

Finance, Economy, Oil: Jābir al-Ahmad as-Sabāh

Defence: Muhammad Ahmad al-Jābir as-Sabāh

Police and Public Security: Sa'ad al-Abdallah as-Sālim as-Sabāh

Social Affairs, Printing and Publishing: Sabāh al-Ahmad as-Sabāh

Health: Khālid al-Abdallah as-Sālim as-Sabāh

Water, Electricity and Gas: Jābir al-Ali as-Sabāh

Public Works: Sālim al-Ali as-Sabāh

Port and Customs: Khālid al-Abdallah as-Sabāh

PTT: Mubārak al-Abdallah as-Sabāh

Awqaf: Mubārak al-Hamid as-Sabāh

Justice and Public Instruction [Education]: Abdallah al-Jābir as-Sabāh.

(Compare MER 1960, p 405; for details on changes during the year, see below.)

Intention to Establish Hereditary Monarchy Denied. In May Egyptian sources reported that a monarchy would

be declared in Kuwait following independence and that the Supreme Council was discussing the question of hereditary succession (*Akhir Sa'ah*, May 24, 31). However, it was officially denied that the government intended to change the present system. [Traditionally, the Ruler was chosen by the Sabāh family from among its members.] (*MENA*, May 31 [June 2])

Resignation of Deputy Ruler. In April, following a dispute with the family council, Shaykh Abdallah al-Mubārak as-Sabāh resigned from his posts of Deputy Ruler, Chief of the Armed Forces [?] and Chief of Police and Public Security and left the country. The dispute reportedly concerned the question of succession. After abortive attempts at reconciliation, in which King Saud participated, the family council decided on June 15 to accept Shaykh Abdallah's resignation from the post of Chief of Police and appointed to this post Shaykh Sa'ad Abdallah as-Sālim as-Sabāh, the Ruler's eldest son and former Deputy Chief of Police and Public Security. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, May 2; *Hayat*, May 3, June 20; *Falastin*, June 21; *MENA*, June 19 [W 22])

On June 27 Shaykh Abdallah returned to Kuwait, reportedly on the invitation of the Ruler. *The Times* interpreted this as a closing of the ranks in the face of the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis. (*Falastin*, *Times*, June 28)

Rumours Denied of Ruler's Intention to Resign. In Sept reports were denied that the Ruler, Shaykh Abdallah as-Sālim, intended to resign and that authority would be transferred to his son, Sa'ad Abdallah. (*Kul Shay'*, Sept 2, 9)

New Appointments. In Oct it was reported that Shaykh Sabāh Sālim as-Sabāh had been appointed head of the newly established Foreign Affairs Department, in addition to his position as head of the Health Department (*Falastin*, Oct 4). The department was established by a decree of the Ruler, dated Sept 3. (*Kuwait al-Yaum*, Sept 3)

In Nov it was reported that Ashraf Lutfi had been appointed Chief of the Ruler's bureau (*Falastin*, Nov 7); Khālid al-Ahmad al-Jābir as-Sabāh—Chief of the Diwan; Sālim al-Hamid al-Jābir as-Sabāh—chief military ADC; Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad al-Jābir—Minister of [President of Department of] Defence; and Shaykh Khālid al-Abdallah as-Sālim—Minister [President of Department] of Health. (*R. Kuwait*, Nov 30 [Dec 2]; *Haqā'iq*, Dec 14; *Akhbar al-Yaum*, Dec 16)

Kuwait obtained the assistance of UAR experts in various administrative fields (see p 140 b).

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

On Aug 26 the Ruler issued a decree providing for the election of a Constituent Assembly "preparatory to the issue of a constitution for the country... based on democratic foundations..." It stipulated:

- 1) An organization committee would be formed consisting of 11 persons (names given in *Siyasah*, Beirut, Sept 6).
- 2) A joint council would be formed from the members of the Supreme Council [all of whom were members of the ruling Sabāh family] and the members of the organization committee. "In addition to its present duties," [?] the joint council would prepare a bill for the election of the Constituent Assembly, which would prepare the constitution.
- 3) Elections to the Constituent Assembly would take place on Nov 1, 1961. (*R. Kuwait*, Aug 27 [29])

The Assembly was to consist of elected members and the members of the Supreme Council (who later were re-designated ministers). Candidates had to be over 30 and literate.

The right to vote was given to all Kuwaiti males over 21, except for policemen, soldiers and naturalized Kuwaitis. The country was divided into ten districts, each electing two candidates. No provision was made for parties in the election. The elections were to be secret. Election committees would consist of one officer each from the departments of justice (chairman) and police, as well as one representative of each of the candidates in a given district.

The elections were postponed to Dec 2 and again to Dec 30. The number of eligible voters was estimated at 40,000. There were 74 candidates, one of whom, Dr Ahmad al-Khatib, was reported to be a nationalist. The government allowed election propaganda meetings. In Sept all Kuwaiti citizens abroad were instructed by the Ruler to return home (*Kuwait al-Yaum*, Sept 10; *Manar*, Hayat, Sept 12; *Kul Shay*, Sept 23; *Jihad*, Oct 10; *Haqiq*, Nov 23, Dec 14; *Kifah*, Beirut, Dec 22; *Times*, Dec 30). The elections were said to have aroused very little interest. (*Figaro*, Dec 29)

The elections took place on Dec 30. Of the 20 candidates returned, the largest number of votes went to Mansur Musa al-Majid (848) and Ya'qub Yusuf al-Humaydi (678). Dr Khatib [the reputed nationalist] received 360 votes. The lowest number of votes received by a successful candidate was 272. (For full results, see: *R. Kuwait*, Dec 31 [Jan 3, 1962])

VARIOUS INTERNAL AFFAIRS

National Currency Introduced. A Kuwaiti dinar was put into circulation on April 1. The current Indian rupee was to be withdrawn as of May 15. The two governments had reached an agreement on the terms governing the conversion of the Indian currency into local dinars. (*MENA*, March 2 [W 6]; *R. Delhi*, March 23 [W 30])

The new dinar was set at par with sterling and its weight was 2.48828 grams gold. It was divided into 1,000 fils, 100 fils being equivalent to one dirham. (*Falastin*, March 30)

According to the Kuwait currency law of Oct 19, 1960, the new dinar was to be covered by 50% gold and 50% commercial securities and foreign currency easily convertible into gold. (*Falastin*, March 30; *Hayat*, April 1)

Immigration, Unemployment; Iranian. In April it was reported that residence of aliens in Kuwait had been restricted to one year, whereas previously the British Agent used to grant permanent residence. (*Masa*, Jordan, April 24)

In June the Kuwaiti security authorities announced that steps would be taken to deport unemployed workers who stayed illegally in the country. The number of unemployed was reported as 20,000, including Jordanians, Lebanese, Syrians, Iraqis and Iranians, and they constituted a disruptive element. (*Hayat*, June 21; *Falastin*, June 22)

In Nov it was reported that Kuwait had asked the oil companies to employ as many Kuwaitis as possible, to employ Arabs in posts which could not be filled by Kuwaitis, to make purchases locally through Kuwaiti merchants and also to reduce working hours and institute a pension scheme. (*V of A*, Nov 26 [29])

In Jan it was reported that 88 Iranians had drowned

in the Gulf while attempting to enter Kuwait illegally. (*Iraq Times*, Jan 9).

Press. In March, ten licences were granted for newspapers (names listed in *Siyaah*, Beirut, April 1). The appearance of new papers, including an organ of the armed forces, was reported in Aug, Sept and Nov. (*Musawwar*, Cairo, Aug 25; *Siyaah*, Sept 7; *Jaridah*, Nov 19)

The Army; Establishment of Air Force. In the summer of 1961, the Kuwait army was reported to consist of 3,000 troops armed with British weapons, some armour and 12 [light] aircraft including four helicopters. It was commanded by Brigadier Mubarak Abdallah, a Sandhurst graduate and the son of Abdallah al-Jabir as-Sabih, President of the [Justice and] Education departments. (*NYT*, June 27; *Times*, July 8)

In July it was reported that the government intended to introduce military training in schools at the beginning of the next academic year. (*Falastin*, July 11)

On Aug 4 a £500,000 contract was announced for British jet aircraft (Provosts) to form the nucleus of Kuwait's air force (*Times*, Aug 5). An earlier report said that six planes would be ordered, Kuwait would send civil pilots to Britain for military training and the air force would be supervised by an RAF officer. (*Manar*, Feb 20)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Establishment of Foreign Affairs Department and Diplomatic Service. In Jan the Kuwait government announced the forthcoming establishment of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a diplomatic service, members of which were to be trained in London. As of Jan 23, it was reported, Kuwait had assumed control of its foreign affairs, hitherto managed by the British government. (*Hayat*, Jan 27, 28)

[However, not until Sept did Kuwait assume full management of her foreign affairs.] In May *The Times* remarked that Kuwait still dealt with some countries or foreign nationals through Britain (*Times*, May 5). In Sept, on the announcement of the establishment of ambassadorial relationship between Britain and Kuwait (see below), *The Times* commented that this change formalized the assumption of full responsibility by Kuwait for her own foreign relations. The transition had been taking place progressively for the last two or three years but had been hampered by a shortage of trained staff. The paper said that eleven Kuwaiti foreign service officers had been receiving training in the UK since Aug. (*Times*, Sept 23)

On Aug 30 a decree by the Ruler announced the formation of a Foreign Affairs Department. (*Difa*, Aug 31)

Goodwill Missions. Five Kuwaiti friendship missions left Kuwait at the end of Aug for tours of UN member-states in order to explain the Kuwaiti problem. In Nov the return was reported of the mission to Asia, which had visited Burma, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey, and the mission to Latin America, which had visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. (*R. Kuwait*, Aug 27 [29], Nov 4 [7])

Recognition. In Nov it was reported that 60 countries had extended recognition to Kuwait. (*Manar*, Nov 20)

Diplomatic Relations. [Kuwait was admitted as a member of the Arab League on July 20. In Sept she established

diplomatic representation with the UK and the US. She also established such relations with Iran, Japan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAR. Kuwait's admission to the UN was vetoed by the USSR, but for some time she had been a member of specialized agencies and international organizations and during the year joined others. For details see below]

Arab Countries. See pp 139-40.

United Kingdom. On May 2 Kuwait denied reports that it intended to join the British Commonwealth. (*MENA*, May 3 [4]; *Hayat*, May 3)

[The British protection over Kuwait was terminated by an agreement dated June 19. Subsequently, British forces landed in Kuwait in accordance with the new agreement and in response to a request by the Ruler for assistance in face of the Iraqi threat to her independence. By Oct 10 all British troops had been withdrawn, having been relieved by an Arab force.]

At first, after the conclusion of the agreement, the British Political Agent in Kuwait remained there with the same function and the Lord Privy Seal stated in the House that there had been no request by the Ruler for a change in the Agent's title; but ten days later [Iraq had meanwhile claimed sovereignty over Kuwait] be stated that as a result of consultations with the Ruler, the title would shortly be changed (*Hansard C*, Vol. 642, Col 954-8, June 19, Vol. 643, Col. 448, June 28). As of July 1, according to a Kuwaiti announcement, the British Political Agent (J.C.B. Richmond) was re-designated British Consul-General. (*Falastin*, July 2)

On Sept 22 the appointment was announced of Mr J.C.B. Richmond as Ambassador to the State of Kuwait. *The Times* said that the Consul-General, which now became the British embassy, would no longer be under the supervision of the Political Residency in Bahrain.

Khalid Khālid al-Ghunaym was appointed Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UK. (*MENA*, Aug 16 [18]; *Times*, Sept 23, Oct 19, Nov 9; *Hayat*, Sept 23)

The USA. On Sept 22 Kuwait announced the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with the USA (*Hayat*, Sept 23). On Dec 14 the appointment was announced in Washington of Parker T. Hart as first American [non-resident] ambassador to Kuwait. Hart was the American [resident] ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen. (*Ha'aretz*, Dec 15)

Brazil. In May it was reported that Brazil was inviting the Kuwait Minister [President of the Department] of Finance to visit Brazil. (*Jaridah*, May 9)

GFR. In Jan the Kuwait Minister [President of the Department] of Justice and Education arrived in West

Germany for a tour of educational and cultural institutions. (*Iraq Times*, Jan 16)

Greece. In June it was reported that the Ruler had accepted an official invitation to visit Greece. (*MENA*, June 11 [13])

India. The Ruler visited India in March. (*MENA*, March 22 [24])

Kenya. The Ruler contributed £E10,000 to raise the standard of living of the Muslims in Kenya. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, Cairo, Oct 14)

Philippines. In Oct a Kuwaiti delegation conferred with Philippine officials on the possibility of opening up trade relations between the two countries. (*Times*, Oct 5)

Somalia. On Aug 10 the Ruler received the Somali Consul-General in Aden, who was visiting Kuwait. (*MENA*, Aug 11 [12, 14])

Communist Countries. For first reaction of Communist countries to Kuwait's attainment of independence, see p 125 b. In Nov, in the Security Council the USSR vetoed Kuwait's admission to the UN on the ground, *inter alia*, that Kuwait remained in fact a British colony. (*S/PV 984*, Nov 30; see also: the Kuwait Crisis)

Poland. In July a delegation of Kuwaiti merchants paid a ten-day visit to Poland. They placed trial orders for food products, wireless sets and tyres and also discussed a project for the construction of a freezing plant in Kuwait. (*PAP*, Aug 2 [EE 4])

Diplomatic Relations. In Nov a Kuwaiti official denied reports that Kuwait would not establish diplomatic relations with Communist countries. (*Falastin*, Nov 9)

In Dec it was reported that Kuwait had removed the ban on visits by its citizens to Communist countries and intended to send goodwill missions to some of them. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Dec 11)

The United Nations and International Organizations. Kuwait's application for UN membership was vetoed by the USSR in the Security Council in Nov (*S/PV 984*, Nov 30). Kuwait adhered to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies and became a member of ILO (June 13) and FAO (Nov 9). It was also a member of UNESCO and WHO as well as of ICAO, IMCO, ITU and UPU. (*UN Year Book 1961*, pp 528, 598, 603, 613, 650, 620, 671, 655, 660)

In March a development advisory mission of the IBRD went to Kuwait at the request of the government. It included experts on public administration and budgetary procedures, education and public health. (*Times*, March 21; *UN Year Book*, 1961, p 624)

MUSCAT AND OMAN

SYNOPSIS

The year opened with the British-Omani talks held in Lebanon which failed when the rebel leaders demanded sovereign status for Oman and immediate withdrawal of British forces. A rebel spokesman said that they would now intensify their military activities (see MER 1960, pp 402-3, and below).

The reports available did not allow for a clear picture

of Omani rebel activities during the year. Arab sources reported mining activities as well as armed clashes with British forces; British sources confirmed part of the former which they attributed to "infiltrators" but denied the latter. There was, however, a British press report on coordinated terrorist activities in the Persian Gulf area, including the sinking of a British liner. The Arab countries declared openly, at the UN and elsewhere, that they

were aiding the rebels. Iraq claimed that she was providing the greater part of this aid.

Meanwhile, the British were considerably increasing their aid, both military and economic, to the Sultan.

The main feature of the year was the debate on the Omani question in the UN General Assembly. In Oct 1960 the 15th session accepted a request for the inclusion of the question in its agenda. The Special Political Committee debated it in April and decided to defer it to the 16th session. A draft resolution, supported by the Arab, the Communist and a number of Afro-Asian countries called for the independence of Oman. Britain, which opposed the inclusion of the item in the agenda, argued that the Sultan enjoyed complete sovereignty over the country as a whole. The resolution was debated in the 16th session in Dec and was not adopted.

The Omanis also failed in their endeavours to secure admission to the Arab League.

BRITAIN AND THE SULTAN OF MUSCAT

Sultan in London; Issue of Gulf Federation. In July Sa'id Ibn Taymūr, Sultan of Muscat, went to England and was received by Edward Heath, the Lord Privy Seal (*Mid. Mir.*, July 29; *Times*, July 25). In Sept Baghdad Radio reported another meeting between the two and claimed that the Sultan's visit was connected with the visits to London in July of other rulers of the Gulf principalities and with a British plan to establish a federation in the Gulf. (*R. Baghdad*, Sept 20 [22]; see also p 446 b)

Increased British Aid. Civil estimates published in Britain on March 24 predicted an increase in the grant to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman from £947,000 to £1,058,750, and an increase in assistance to the Sultan's armed forces from £5,250 to £447,175. (*Times*, March 25)

A British source said that both economic development and the strengthening of the Sultan's armed forces had been speeded up as a result of an agreement of Aug 1960 for an increase in British financial assistance. Health centres, dispensaries and agricultural stations were being built, anti-malaria spraying carried out and new roads and schools planned. (*Army Quarterly*, July 1961)

Military Cooperation. A British source, reviewing the situation in 1960 and the first half of 1961, said the Sultan's armed forces frequently cooperated in exercises in the country with sub-units of British Forces Arabian Peninsula units. These were mostly joint exercises supported by the Navy and the RAF. (*Army Quarterly*, Jan, July 1961)

Masira Island Said to Serve as British Base. A statement by the Omani office in Damascus attacked Britain for having turned Masira Island [in the Arabian Sea, off the coast of southern Oman] into a British military base "threatening the Middle East area." The statement added that the British military authorities now attached increasing importance to Masira Island as a result of growing troubles in the Aden Protectorates. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, Jan 31)

ACTIVITIES OF THE OMANI EXILES

Replacement of Omani Office Heads. On Jan 3 the Omani Imamate office in Cairo announced that Imam Ghālib Ibn Ali had appointed Mustafa Ghazāl temporary head of the Omani Imamate office in Cairo and Faisal Ibn Ali head of the Imamate office in Damascus instead of Shaykh Salih Ibn Isa al-Hārithi and Shaykh Muhammad

al-Hārithi, who had been relieved of their posts on Nov 24, 1960. (*MENA*, Jan 3 [5]; *Gumhuriyah*, Cairo, Jan 5; see also MER 1960, p 403)

In June an Omani delegation headed by Shaykh Yahya Ibn Abdallah, head of the Imamate office in Dammam (Saudi Arabia), arrived in Damascus to publicize the Omani question in preparation for the forthcoming UN debate; it was also to visit Iraq and Kuwait. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, June 14)

Imam Sets up "Consultative Council." A "Consultative Council (*majlis istishāri*) of the Amirate of Oman" was set up in Sept by "decree" of the Imam. It was to be composed of the leaders of the Omani revolt and to have its seat wherever the Imam took up residence (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Sept 6). [The Imam's permanent residence was apparently still in Dammam but he spent two months in Cairo, from Aug 7.]

The Council held its first meeting in Cairo on Sept 12. It decided on the composition of the Omani delegation to the UN—Shaykh Sulaymān Ibn Hīmār, Tālib Ibn Ali, and Muhammad al-Amin Abdallah—and the Omani delegation to the Arab League Council—Shaykh Sulaymān Ibn Hīmār, Shaykh Tālib Ibn Ali, Shaykh Hīmār Ibn Sulaymān, and Shaykh Faisal Ibn Ali, head of the Omani office in Damascus. (*MENA*, Sept 11 [14])

THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND OMAN

[The Arab countries continued to sponsor the case of the deposed Imam of Oman, both by bringing up the issue at international Afro-Asian and neutral forums and at the UN as a case of anti-colonialist struggle (see index) and by extending material aid.]

Arab League Refers Omani Application for Membership. [Imam Ghālib had applied for Omani membership in the Arab League in 1954 but the League Council, at its 23rd session in March 1955, decided to defer the issue. At its 24th session, in Oct 1955, the Council resolved to recognize the independence of Oman over Iraq's objections but again deferred the question of membership.]

At the conference of Arab foreign ministers, held in Baghdad on Jan 30-Feb 4, 1961, plans for advancing the Omani cause at the UN were approved. The Imam's brother attended the conference as an observer. (*Zaman*, Jan 31, Feb 5)

On Aug 17 the Imam, who had come to Cairo for this purpose, applied officially for membership of the League. (*Times of India*, Aug 9)

In Mecca it was announced on Aug 30 that Saudi Arabia supported the Imam's application. (*Manar*, Jordan, Sept 1)

The 36th session of the League Council decided on Sept 16 to place the application on the agenda for the Arab foreign ministers scheduled to convene at Casablanca in Oct (*Hayat*, Sept 20). [The Casablanca meeting of Arab foreign ministers never took place.] At its meeting in Riyadh in April 1962, the Council decided to defer the question of Oman's membership to a subsequent session. (*Hayat*, April 4, 1962)

Iraq Claims Omanis Depend Primarily on Iraqi Aid. In Jan Maj-Gen. Ahmad Salih al-Abdi, Iraqi Chief of Staff, said that Iraq had provided great quantities of arms, supplies and equipment to the Omani fighters. (*Times*, Jan 7)

On Aug 22 Baghdad Radio, quoting an article from a Lebanese paper, said that a certain Arab state [the UAR] had filled the Omanis with words of support, while Qas-

sim had filled them with money and weapons. The "Omani revolution depends primarily on Iraq's material and military aid." Iraq had also asked the Arab states to make financial contributions in support of the Omani revolt, but some of them had been content to extend radio support. (*R. Baghdad, Aug 22 [24]*)

AFTERMATH OF FAILURE OF BRITISH-OMANI TALKS; SULTAN'S OFFER OF AMNESTY

British Statement on Talks, Offer of Amnesty to Rebels. On March 15, in answer to a question, the Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath said "the former rebel leaders," who fled from the Sultanate in 1959, had later taken the initiative in seeking terms for their return. After consulting the Sultan, the British representatives took part in informal and exploratory contacts with some of these leaders. The Sultan was willing to grant an amnesty to the rebels and permit them to return in safety subject to satisfactory guarantees that they would keep the peace. A statement made by the rebel leaders at a meeting in Jan afforded hope that a settlement could be achieved, but at a further meeting in Feb, the rebel leaders completely reversed their attitude and demanded the recognition of sovereign status for a part of the Sultan's territory, Oman. This went even beyond the interpretation previously placed by the rebel leaders upon the Sib Agreement of 1920. Moreover, it went beyond the interpretation placed on the agreement by Muhammad Ibn Abdallah al-Khalili and the other shaykhs who signed it. The Sultan, however, only the previous week had confirmed his offer of an amnesty. (For further details on the negotiations, see below: the accounts of the British and the Saudi Arabian delegates at the UN.) (*Harvard C, Vol. 515, Col 123-4, March 15*)

Further Talks? On May 2 a British spokesman denied any knowledge of an intention to renew the talks between British and Omani representatives. He was commenting on a statement attributed by Cairo Radio to Shaykh Tālib Ibn Ali to the effect that contacts for the resumption of negotiations had been initiated in mid-April in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, where the Imam was residing (*Mid. Mir., May 6; Jihad, Jordan, May 3*). The Imam, for his part, told newsmen on arrival in Cairo from Dammam on Aug 7 that talks had been held with the British during the past three months, but no progress had been made. "The door for negotiations is still open," he added, "if the British show signs of being reasonable." (*Times of India, Aug 9*)

Question of Publication of Sib Agreement. In answer to a question in the House of Commons on June 12 as to whether it would publish the text of the Sib agreement [which had never been officially issued], the government replied that Britain was not responsible for the negotiation of the agreement: "In fact, the British Political Agent was responsible for bringing the parties together but, thereafter, they carried on their own discussions and they reached agreement between themselves." The question of publicity for that document was a matter for the Sultan, as the British government had never been responsible for his external relations. (*Harvard C, Vol. 526, Col. 23-24, June 12*)

Issue of Amnesty. It was reported in Dec that the Sultan had written to the shaykhs of the principal Omani tribes expressing his readiness to allow any of his subjects to return peacefully to their homes and families, provided

they gave assurances of good behaviour. The offer was directed to those Omanis who supported the former Imam, Ghālib Ibn Ali, in his revolt and fled the country in Jan 1959. Since then they had been living in exile in Dammam and elsewhere and many were known to be anxious to return but feared arrest if they did so. (*Mid. Mir., Dec 23*)

REPORTS ON HOSTILITIES IN OMAN

Arab Reports on Renewed Hostilities—British Counter-activities. In Jan an Iraqi source reported the resumption of hostilities after a quiet period. The Omanis were attacking the "British and mercenary forces," employing modern weapons which were arriving regularly from abroad. The British were carrying out extensive arrests. The Omanis had twice attacked British patrols in the vicinity of Nazwah (Nizwa), killing one British soldier and wounding three. A mine exploded under a British vehicle, wounding 7 (*Fajr al-Jadid, Baghdad, Jan 24*). Earlier Cairo, reporting similar incidents, also mentioned an attack on the British force in Nazwah.

Counteractivities of the British forces reportedly covered the whole of Oman and they imposed a day and night curfew (*V of A, Jan 1 [3]*). The Oman Imamate office in Cairo said a warrior arrested by the British had died under "beastly torture." (*Zaman, Baghdad, Jan 12*)

In Feb, it was reported that two British vehicles were blown up in the Sib al-Malih region near the Oman Petroleum Development Company's installations. Another dispatch said "the British authorities at Ibbi" had executed the Omani fighter Khalaf Ibn Hamid al-Ibbi, who had been arrested on Nov 15, 1960. (*V of A, Feb 18 [21]*)

On March 1 the Omani office in Damascus reported that resistance in Oman had entered a new phase, in accordance with the strategy of the "revolutionary command." The insurgents had planted a mine on the route of "Brigadier Waterfield, Minister of Defence in the Muscat government," and other British officers, but a private car, which preceded the officer's vehicle, was blown up; two passengers were killed and five injured. (*Mid. Mir., March 4*)

On March 21, the same source reported the death of two British officers as a result of a mine explosion in the Rastaq region. The British authorities had announced a state of emergency and imposed heavy fines on villages in the area. (*Manar, March 23*)

British Source Confirms Mining Activities. A British army journal surveying activities in 1960 and 1961 up to May said that in the second half of 1960 the security situation in Muscat and Oman had been "most satisfactory." The majority of arms shipped into the country "in the shape of Egyptian plastic mines as well as hand grenades and other equipment" had fallen into the hands of the security forces, due to an "inspired intelligence effort" and growing cooperation on the part of the local population.

The activities of the Imam and his followers in Dammam were confined to paying terrorists to infiltrate and lay mines. In 1960 six out of every seven mines were recovered unexploded, including 40 handed in by the people ordered to lay them. There were slight increases in mining activities in Dec 1960 and April 1961 assumedly in order to coincide with the UN debates on the Oman question. One British soldier was killed by a mine in 1961 (up to May) but none in 1960. In Feb a civilian car was blown up (as related above). (*Army Quarterly, June, July 1961; Note: After the July 1961 issue, The*

Army Quarterly discontinued its biannual review of events in the Arabian Peninsula.)

More Arab Reports on Mine Incidents. The Omani Imamate office in Cairo announced on May 21 that eight British soldiers had been killed and others wounded when mines laid by Omani nationalists exploded in Nazwah and Bahla, destroying two military vehicles. Other mines in the Rastaq area had caused further enemy losses. Another report, apparently referring to the same incidents, added that the British had retaliated with widespread arrests of unarmed civilians, whom they accused of aiding an attack on a British post when an officer was killed and a number of other ranks were wounded. They had also imposed heavy fines on the inhabitants in the affected area. The nationalists had seized a quantity of arms. (*V of A, May 20, 21* [23])

The British reportedly distributed leaflets promising money rewards for information on arms smuggling to the Trucial Coast amirates, Muscat and Oman. (*V of A, May 30* [June 1])

Loss of British Liner in Gulf Attributed to Terrorism. In April a British liner, the *Dara*, sank in the Persian Gulf in the vicinity of the Amirate of Abu Dhabi as a result of a fire, resulting in the loss of 212 lives. The *Voice of the Arabs* claimed that the fire resulted from an explosion of ammunition and explosives intended for the British forces in Muscat. An official spokesman in London was quoted as saying on May 2 that this was "entirely untrue and completely without foundation." A British source later ascribed the sinking to an Arab terrorist attack. (*V of A, April 30* [May 2]; *Mid. Mir., May 6*; *Daily Telegraph, July 16*)

British Source Confirms Far-Reaching Terrorist Campaign in Persian Gulf. The *Daily Telegraph* reported on July 16 that a growing terrorist campaign was under way in Oman and the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms. It said the campaign was financed by the UAR and was directed against Britain and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Bombs had exploded in a British bank, two British ships, a Dutch ship, an aviation office, an oil pipeline, and a British-chartered aircraft. A terrorist attack was responsible for the sinking of the *Dara* in April (see above).

Although the terrorists had been operating for 18 months it was only in recent weeks that British intelligence sources had confirmed that there was a political pattern behind their attacks. (*Daily Telegraph, July 16*)

Inter-Tribal Fighting. In Aug the Imam's office in Cairo alleged that the British policy of "divide and rule" was responsible for bloodshed between Omani tribes. The tribes of Bani Ghafir and al-Hawasinah were reported to have engaged in fighting, which resulted in the destruction of a village. Another clash was said to have taken place between the Bani Hashim and Bani Rashed tribes. (*Jihad, Jordan, Aug 9*)

Further Arab Reports and a British Denial. On Aug 7 the Imam said in Cairo that the revolt against the colonialist forces had flared up in Bani Rawahah, and the enemy had lost eight men. (*V of A, Aug 8* [10])

On Oct 15 the Omani office in Cairo reported that two British soldiers had been killed and five seriously wounded in clashes with Omani fighters in an Omani ambush in the Wadi Bani Kharus. Another British car had been damaged by an Omani mine which killed the driver and wounded three others. A spokesman for the British War

Office said he had no information of such clashes. On Oct 18 the report was denied. The *Times* said it could now be stated that no British troops had been involved in shooting incidents in the area since Jan 1959. The last mine incident was in March 1961 and there were no casualties. (*Times, Oct 16, 18*)

Incidents Listed in UN Debate; British Denial. On Nov 27, in the course of the UN Special Political Committee's debate on the Oman question, the Saudi Arabian representative, Ahmad Shukairy, cited the following incidents reported by Imamate sources: on Oct 14, armed clashes broke out at various points throughout Oman, including Wadi Bani Kharus and the town of Bahlah; in Oct a sunset-to-sunrise curfew was imposed by the British in most Omani towns; according to a report of Nov 6, a British armoured car had been ambushed in Jabal Akhdar and a number of British and local soldiers had been killed; on Nov 13 it was reported that "enemy forces" had attacked Falaj and arrested a number of "nationalists," several engagements had taken place in the Wadi Samaj area, British reinforcements had continued to arrive by air from Bahrain, and air attacks had taken place near Nazwah, Bahlah and Jabal Akhdar; on Nov 14 it was reported that Omanis had attacked British posts at Awali; in retaliation the British had bombed Nazwah, and in a number of "nationalist" counterattacks, several British soldiers had been killed and wounded. (*UN Doc, A/SPC/SR. 299*)

The British representative denied that there had been recent armed clashes with British troops and declared that there was no more fighting except for occasional mine-laying incidents by "infiltrators." The only British personnel in Oman, he said, consisted of a topographical unit of 30 men and small parties, never exceeding a dozen men, which had been engaged in exercises in Oman from time to time, "without firing a shot." (*A/SPC/SR. 301*)

In Dec the Imamate office in Cairo announced that a British patrol had been ambushed, 2 soldiers had been killed and others wounded. (*Akhbar, Cairo, Dec 20*)

THE OMAN QUESTION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 15th SESSION

Background to UN Discussion. Already on Aug 13, 1957 the representatives of 11 Arab countries requested in a letter to the UN Security Council that an urgent meeting be convened to consider "the armed aggression of the UK against the independence, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Imamate of Oman." The letter stated that Britain's aggression had during the preceding few weeks taken the form of a full-scale war against the people of Oman. The matter came up at the Security Council's meeting on Aug 20, 1957, and the representative of Iraq — as the sole Arab member of the Council — pressed for the inclusion of the item in the agenda. The British representative opposed the request, terming the Arab complaint "inconsistent, incoherent and improper." The USSR representative strongly supported the Arab request, while the US delegate stated that in view of the insufficiency of information his country would not commit itself; he made it clear, however, that the US did not accept the interpretation of the situation in Oman as set forth in the Arab letter. The request was rejected by 5 (Australia, Colombia, Cuba, France and the UK) to 4 (Iraq, the Philippines, Sweden and the USSR), with the US abstaining and China not participating in the vote. (*UN Docs., S/3863, S/PV. 783-4*)

The Arab Case for the Independence and Sovereignty of Oman. A formal request for the inclusion of the "Question of Oman" in the agenda of the 15th session of the General Assembly was made on Sept 29, 1960 by ten Arab countries (MER 1960, p 402). In the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, it was stated that the Imamate of Oman formed the greater part of "what is erroneously called" the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman; that for the past 1,200 years the people of Oman used to be ruled by their own elected Imams; and that Oman's independence and sovereignty was consolidated by the expulsion of the Portuguese from Muscat in 1650 by Oman troops. Since the latter part of the 18th century, it was further stated, Britain had sought to extend its influence over Oman by attempting to impose on it the rule of anglophile Sultans of Muscat, but the people of Oman had stubbornly resisted those attempts. The conflict between Muscat and Oman had come to a head at the end of World War I, and when Muscat was about to surrender, the British intervened to settle the dispute. The outcome had been the conclusion of the Treaty of Sib between Muscat and Oman on Sept 25, 1920, which "confirms without ambiguity the independence of Oman."

CORRENDUM: MER 1960, p 400: "In 1921... the treaty of Sib was concluded," correct to: "In 1920..."

The memorandum went on to say that, "as is well known, the present conflict arose as a result of the constant refusal of the Imams of Oman to grant oil concessions to British companies in their territory." Oman was invaded by British forces and the capital, Nazwah, was occupied on Dec 17, 1955. Since then the people of Oman "continued their resistance to the military aggression directed against their independence." (UN Doc. A/4521)

Communist Bloc Supports Arabs; Western Powers Object To Placing Item on Agenda. An opening skirmish over the question of Oman took place on Oct 25, 1960 in the General Committee [the body which examines requests for placing items on the agenda]. The Arab and Communist Bloc delegates pressed for the inclusion of the item, while Britain and France objected. The US representative stated that, considering that the facts with regard to the region were exceedingly complex and that it was "not even certain who were the real parties in the dispute," his delegation would abstain on the procedural question of the inclusion of the item, as it had done in the Security Council in 1957. In the end, the Committee recommended the placing of the item on the agenda by a vote of 14 to 2, with four abstentions. (A/BUR/SR. 131)

On Oct 31, 1960 the GA approved the recommendation and allocated the item to the Special Political Committee for consideration. (A/PV. 909)

Discussion at the 15th UN Session. The Special Political Committee took up the question as the last on its agenda at the end of the second part of the 15th UN session, between April 19 and 22, 1961.

Shukairy Spearheads Attack on Britain. Opening the debate, Ahmad Shukairy, the Saudi Arabian representative, said that although Britain claimed that she was not a party to the conflict, her forces were blockading Oman by land and sea and attacking the people of Oman with machineguns, heavy mortars and jet aircraft. The argument was advanced, Shukairy said, that Oman was a dominion of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, and that Britain was intervening at the Sultan's request.

Against this "absurd argument" Shukairy restated the Arab case for the sovereignty of Oman (see above). Muscat was merely the principal port of Oman. The Sultan was no more than "a cat's-paw of the British," he added, while Oman was "perhaps the oldest democracy surviving as a state."

The British, "on the pretext of combating slavery and piracy," had broken up the territory of Oman into nine separate units [i.e., Oman and Muscat and the seven Trucial States]. Even so, the Treaty of Sib was evidence of the formal recognition of Oman's sovereignty by the Sultan of Muscat. Hostilities were renewed in recent years because of the discovery of oil in Oman. "It was a fact" that following the occupation in 1955 of Nazwah, Oman's capital, the British had immediately started drilling operations in the area.

Shukairy further stated that in the secret meetings in Lebanon in 1960 and early 1961, the British had jounded out the Omani delegation on the possibility of withdrawing the complaint to the UN; this had been refused by the Omanis, and the negotiations had collapsed. (On these talks, see MER 1960, pp 402-3, and above.) Shukairy concluded by calling upon the UK to withdraw the troops from Oman and "dismantle all military bases" there. (A/SPC/SR. 255-6)

The British Case for the Sovereignty of the Sultan of Muscat. The British representative, C.T. Crowe, denounced Shukairy's statement as "a series of distortions, omissions and half-truths," and declared that there had never been a separate state under the Imam of Oman, independent of, and separate from, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Theoretically, the office of Imam had not been necessary to the Ibadhi tribes which inhabited Muscat, and actually, apart from a brief interlude, there had been no Imam from 1821 until 1913. At that time, however, the religious leaders in the interior had become incensed by the Sultan's modern outlook "and particularly by his efforts, at the instigation of the UK government, to suppress the slave trade and the traffic in arms." The main factions had combined in 1914 to revive the Imamate, but troubles had continued between the tribes and, following the murder of the Imam and the election of a new one, his supporters had asked the British Political Agent in Muscat to mediate. As a result, the Sib agreement had been concluded in 1920 with a number of shaykhs of the interior. Although that agreement had accorded the tribes a large measure of autonomy, they had contracted to remain in peace and amity with the Sultan's government, "thus in effect acknowledging his sovereignty."

Referring to the assertion that Britain intervened in Oman because of oil interests, the British representative pointed out that the oil concession had been granted by the Sultan, Sa'id Ibn Taymr, as long ago as 1937, "but it was only when the increasing riches of Saudi Arabia had demonstrated what oil wealth could mean for an absolute ruler, that certain shaykhs in Oman had seen the death of Imam Muhammad in 1954 as an opportunity to secure for themselves any benefit that might come from the discovery of oil in Oman." The election of the new Imam, Ghālib Ibn Ali, "had taken place in a marked atmosphere of intrigue," and upon his election he had claimed to be an independent ruler and purported to annul the oil concession. It was significant, Crowe observed, that Imam Ghālib's application for membership in the Arab League had not been accepted at that time. After the suppression of the revolt in 1954, the Sultan had allowed Ghālib to retire to a village in the interior,

and the only persons still not reconciled were his brother, Tālib, and a few followers. They had left Oman only to come back after some time at the head of an "Oman Liberation Army," which had been trained and equipped in Saudi Arabia. Britain had responded to the Sultan's request for support only because of Saudi Arabia's interference. The main revolt had come to an end in Jan 1959, with the occupation of Jabal Akhdar by the Sultan's forces, which had been aided by "less than 300 British troops." Since then, there had been no rebellion except for the occasional infiltration of "individual terrorists" from Saudi Arabia to mine roads in an attempt to justify stories of continued fighting. There were now no British combatant units permanently stationed in the Sultanate, although a small number of British personnel were seconded to the Sultan's army and air force, and small UK units sometimes went to Oman for training exercises of short duration.

As to the contacts in Lebanon, Crowe reiterated the account given in March by the Lord Privy Seal (see above: Aftermath of Failure of British-Omani talks). He attributed the reversal of the attitude of the rebel leaders to outside pressure from those governments which, for reasons of their own, had encouraged the original rebellion. (*A/SPC/SR. 257*)

UAR: Will Help Omanis in Their Struggle. Other Arab representatives joined in accusing Britain of illegal intervention. The UAR representative wished to make it clear that his country "would do all it could to help its Arab brothers in Oman in their struggle against colonialism." Referring to the British representative's statement that the Arab League had not accepted Oman as a member, he said this was incorrect: "The application of Oman had, rather, been reviewed in the special circumstances of Oman's military occupation" (*A/SPC/SR. 256-7*). The representative of Iraq asked the UN to dispatch an impartial commission to investigate the situation (*A/SPC/SR. 257*). The representative of Lebanon said that if Saudi Arabia had supported the Omanis, it had done so "because it was a tradition among Arabs to help their brothers to defend their rights and freedom," but the UK had no right to intervene in conflicts arising between Arab brothers. (*A/SPC/SR. 258*)

USSR and Neutralists Support Arab Position. Supporting the Arab thesis, the representative of the USSR, Platon Morozov, pointed out that "many delegations had given evidence to show that Oman had been an independent state for many centuries," thus contradicting "the aggressors' pseudo-historical analysis" (*A/SPC/SR. 259*). The delegations of Afghanistan, Cuba, Guinea, Indonesia and Yugoslavia also supported the Arab stand. (*A/SPC/SR. 257-9*)

Western Representatives Passive. No representative of Western countries, except for the UK, participated in the debate.

Draft Resolution; Discussion Deferred to the 16th UN Session. Towards the end of the debate, on April 21, a draft resolution was introduced by Afghanistan, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the UAR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. By the draft resolution, the General Assembly, recalling its declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, would: (1) recognize the right of the people of Oman to self-determination and independence; (2) call for the withdrawal of foreign

forces from Oman; and (3) invite the parties concerned to settle their differences peacefully with a view to restoring normal conditions in Oman (*UN Doc. A/SPC/L. 67*)

This draft resolution was not voted on during the 15th UN session. On April 22 the British and Saudi Arabian representatives agreed to an Indian suggestion to postpone further consideration to the 16th session, and it was so decided. (*A/SPC/SR. 259*)

DISCUSSION AT THE 16TH UN SESSION

NOTE: For the detailed voting record on the Oman question, see pp 31-2, Nos. 60-64.

During the 16th session, the Oman question was discussed in the Special Political Committee between Nov 27 and Dec 4.

Arab Draft Resolution Presented. The Committee had before it a draft resolution on Oman identical to that submitted during the 15th session. The list of sponsors had increased by now to 16 [from the original 14] as a result of Syria's secession from UAR and the addition of Mali. (*UN Doc. A/SPC/L. 78 and Add. 1*)

Omani Delegation Granted Hearing. On Nov 23 the Arab delegations submitted a formal request that the Committee grant a hearing to an Omani delegation consisting of Tālib Ibn Ali (brother of Imam Ghālib), Shaykh Sulaymān Ibn Hīmār al-Nabḥānī and Muḥammad al-Amin Abdallah (Secretary of the Omani office in Cairo). (*Bilat. Oct 23; UN Doc. A/SPC/59*)

On Nov 27, when the Committee began the debate on Oman, the British representative opposed this request on the grounds that the Committee was now being asked to hear a delegation which claimed to represent a territory forming part of an independent state. The Arab representatives countered that the British contention prejudged the issue, as it was for the Committee to decide whether the question was, or was not, an internal one. The request was then put to a vote and accepted by 40 votes to 26, with 23 abstentions. (*A/SPC/SR. 299*)

The following day, Muḥammad al-Amin Abdallah was invited to address the Committee as spokesman of the Omani delegation, and he repeated in general terms the Arab charges of British aggression. (*A/SPC/SR. 300*)

The Sultan Protests. The Sultan of Muscat and Oman, for his part, sent a cable to the President of the General Assembly, protesting at both the hearing given to "the so-called Omani delegation" and the holding of the debate itself, since "the matters involved fell exclusively under the internal jurisdiction of the Sultanate." (*UN Doc. A/SPC/62*)

Arab Speakers. Almad Shukairy, the representative of Saudi Arabia, again opened the debate with a speech against Britain's intervention in Oman. While in general repeating the arguments he had advanced at the 15th session, he placed special emphasis on the claim that the struggle of "Omani nationalists" against "British aggression" was continuing even while the Committee was discussing the issue; (see above: Reports on Hostilities). The outside world knew little of all these happenings, he said, because of the curfew which had been imposed over most of the country and the embargo placed on all informational media. Referring to the Sultan's alleged subservience to imperialism, he stated that, during World War II, the Sultan had given Britain and the US permission, for a cash payment, to build an airport on Masira Island;

"perhaps the existence of that airfield explained the US position on the question of Oman." In answer to British charges of Saudi Arabian intervention in Oman, he stated that his country "considered itself entitled to give the population of Oman every kind of help it needed to recover its liberty and independence." (*A/SPC/SR. 299, 301*)

All the other Arab delegations participated in the debate, and advanced arguments to uphold Oman's right to independence and in denunciation of the British position. [However, a note of divergence was discernible in some of the Arab representatives' references to the relationship between Oman and Muscat.] Whereas the Saudi Arabian representative maintained that, historically, "Greater Oman" had included Muscat as well as other areas, and that its "dismemberment" was the fault of the imperialists (*A/SPC/SR. 301*), the representative of Iraq claimed that the two countries "showed strongly marked differences of geography, history, economy, politics and religion." [Thus, the implication of the Saudi Arabian position was that Muscat and Oman should be considered as one country, but that the Imam should be recognized as the legitimate ruler instead of the Sultan; the Iraqi representative, in contrast, implicitly advocated the separation of Oman from Muscat.] The Iraqi delegate further declared that his country "would continue to support the people of Oman in its struggle for independence" (*A/SPC/SR. 301*). The UAR representative, also referring to British charges of Arab intervention, stated that his country was "proud" of having aided the Omani nationalists. (*A/SPC/SR. 303*)

The UK Representative. C.T. Crowe again declared that in his government's view the situation was not one which the UN was entitled to discuss. Whatever interpretations were placed on the agreement of Sir, he said, the matter was now of "purely historical interest," since the agreement had been unilaterally terminated by the Imam's rebellion of 1954-55. There was no indication of any desire in the country to revive the religious office of Imam, still less an Imamate with secular powers, for the vast majority of Omanis regarded the Imamate as "an archaic

institution." Crowe denied the reports of recent clashes. (*A/SPC/SR. 301*; see also above: Reports on Hostilities.)

Other Delegations. The representative of France supported the British position, observing that "an unfortunate situation seemed to be developing in the UN: that of dramatizing, for private ends, situations which were no concern of the Organization." (*A/SPC/SR. 305*)

The Arab point of view was supported by the Communist bloc delegates, as well as by Ghana, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Cuba, and Mali. The representatives of India, Ceylon, Iran, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast and Brazil stated that while they were in sympathy with other parts of the draft resolution before the Committee, they could not support para. 1, which purported to recognize Oman's independence of Muscat. Representatives of some Latin American countries (Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Paraguay) announced that they intended to abstain on the draft resolution because the issue in their view had not been clarified sufficiently (*A/SPC/SR. 302-306*). The US delegation did not participate in the debate.

Resolution Not Adopted by Assembly. The 16-Power draft resolution was voted on by the Special Political Committee on Dec. 4. After separate votes on paras. 1 and 2, the resolution as a whole was adopted by the Committee by a roll-call vote of 38 to 21, with 29 abstentions. It was opposed by the W. European and "white Commonwealth" countries, the US, Israel, Panama and the Dominican Republic. Most of the abstainers were Latin American and the U.A.M. group of countries, also Pakistan and Malaysia. India and Iran, after abstaining on para. 1, voted in favour of the resolution as a whole. (*A/SPC/SR. 306*)

The General Assembly's vote on the draft resolution, on Dec 14, resulted in 33 in favour, 21 against, and 37 abstentions. (Some of those who voted for the resolution in the Committee—like Mauritania, Nepal and Ghana—either switched to abstention or were absent.) Since it failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, the draft resolution was not adopted. (*A/PV. 1078*)

PERSIAN GULF PRINCIPALITIES

BAHRAIN

Corrigendum: See MER 1960, p. 403, Background Note. Read: The total population in 1959 was 142,213.

Oil; and the Economy. [Estimated crude oil production in Bahrain in 1961 was 2,250,000 tons as compared with 2,257,000 tons in 1960. Oil receipts in 1961 were \$2.1m. riyal (\$11m. as compared with \$13m. in 1960).]

Death of Ruler; Isa Ibn Salṣān New Ruler. Shaykh Salṣān Ibn Ḥamad Al Khalīfah, Ruler of Bahrain, died on Nov 2 at the age of 67. His eldest son, Shaykh Isa, succeeded him "in view of his appointment as heir apparent during his father's lifetime." In a statement broadcast on Nov 2, the new ruler promised to observe all the obligations and agreements concluded with the state's friends and allies. (*Times*; *Hayat*, Nov 3; *R. Kuwait*, Nov 2 [4]; *Mid Mir*, Nov 4)

The Ruler of Kuwait ordered the observance of three days' mourning in Kuwait and went to Bahrain in person to express his condolences. (*R. Kuwait*, Nov 2 [4]; *R.*

Amman, Nov 4-IMB, Nov 5). A Saudi Arabian condolence mission left for Bahrain on Nov 3 (*Hayat*, Nov 4). President Abdel Nasser cabled his condolences (*R. Cairo*, Nov 4-IMB, Nov 5). Gen. Ḥāḥis al-Majālī, the Jordanian Chief of Staff, visited Bahrain and delivered Ḥusein's congratulations to the new Ruler. (*Fat. Jaz.*, *Aden*, Nov 20)

A commentator pointed to what he described as Shaykh Isa's precarious position in the face of local pro-Nasser trends, his inexperience and his relatively meagre budget. "Isa is as pro-British as his father... but if he is to maintain the connection he must learn to win his people's respect by being a wise leader—fast." (*Topic*, Nov 25; see also below: Anti-British Trends.)

The royal princes were reported to be demanding from the new Ruler an increase in their monthly salaries (the late Ruler had turned down this demand). (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, *Cairo*, Nov 22)

Other Changes in Government. (For composition of government, see MER 1960, p. 403.)

In March Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Muhammad Al Khalifah, Director of Police and Public Security, died at the age of 59. He was replaced by Shaykh Muhammad, son of the Ruler, who left three months later for the UK for training in military affairs. (*Times*, March 29; *Hayat*, June 9)

Nationalist Activities, Anti-British Trends; Attacks on British Forces. Visiting Bahrain at the beginning of the year, a *New York Times* correspondent remarked that the Ruler was certainly not being difficult with his British protectors but "British protection exacerbates the insistent demands for further independence, arising from the growing class of younger Bahraini who have been educated abroad." There were British military bases in the islands (see also p 90 a) as well as British merchants and civil servants and "they create a British colonial atmosphere." There were minor signs of the demand for change, as when some months ago the colonial Indian type of head-dress of the Arab police was changed because of Bahraini objections. The Bahrainis also took over the immigration department from the British (see below). The British were protecting the Ruler from his old rivals, the Rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as from Iranian claims. They were also protecting him from his own young men, but at the same time pressing him to train the same young men to replace his British civil servants. (*NYT*, March, 4)

Anti-British Trends; Attacks on British Forces. A report from Bahrain in March said that, every morning before dawn, patrols in Manama and Muharraq had to erase subversive slogans which had been put on the walls during the night. Illegal leaflets were circulated, some bearing the "ominous name" of the Committee of National Union which, "inspired by Communists and Arab nationalists," caused the disturbances of 1956. [The St. Helena prisoners, on whom see below, belonged to this Committee.] Since the autumn of 1960 there had been threatening developments. "Nasser-inspired forces" in Muharraq alone were estimated at 10,000. This "subversive movement" was sustained by broadcasts from Cairo and Baghdad, and also from Moscow and Peking, with the Ruler now their main target whereas in 1956 they had concentrated on the British. There was some tension between the Ruler and the British over the questions of the St. Helena prisoners and the Indian community (on both issues see below). Some observers believed that all the makings of a new outburst in Bahrain were visible. (*Intelligence Digest*, England, March 1961; also quoted by *Sawt al-Arab*, May 10 [13])

In Oct Baghdad Radio reported that a British aircraft had been blown up at Bahrain airport on arrival from Kuwait. Strict security measures had been introduced and Arab airport workers had been replaced. (*R. Baghdad*, Oct 9 [11])

A British statement on Oct 30 said a small explosion in the stores area of the Muharraq RAF station in Bahrain had occurred the previous night, causing minor damage but no casualties. This was the third of what were unofficially believed to be bomb incidents, all involving the RAF in the Persian Gulf. (*Times*, Oct 31)

In Nov Baghdad Radio reported that three British soldiers repairing their armoured car near Manama were overwhelmed by masked nationalists and forced to surrender their arms and equipment. A group of Bahrain youths were detained for questioning. (*R. Baghdad*, Nov 27 [29])

In Nov it was reported that after the death of the Ruler the struggle conducted by Bahraini youths against

transforming the islands into major British bases, had gained new momentum. The movement was reported to be led by a younger brother of the late Ruler, Ahmad Al Khalifah, who had studied in Cairo and Europe. The British adviser in Bahrain had threatened to exile him from the island. A big fire had been started in one of the British bases in Muharraq, resulting in damage to several military vehicles. The Bahraini youths had distributed leaflets and the authorities had failed to discover the printing press. (*Jihad*, Jordan, Nov 9)

Immigration: Iranians, Indians. On Jan 27 the Bahrain Immigration Department was taken over by the government and became responsible for entry visas. British subjects and officials of the British government and of other foreign governments were exempted from this procedure (*V. of A*, Feb 20 [22]). This was interpreted as one of the signs of the Shaykh's inclination to assert his independence. (*NYT*, March 4)

The department was requested to "check the overpowering number of foreigners, particularly Iranians," who were "jeopardizing the welfare of Bahrain." (*Gulf Daily Times*, Feb 9)

The Indian community, especially in Manama, was reported to be "heavily Communist-infiltrated." There was a "well-established courier service between Indians in Bahrain and the Communist Party of India. The chief suspects are prosperous Indian merchants." The Bahrainis contended that the British were preventing the elimination of these "centres of subversion" for fear of difficulties with the Indian government. (*Intelligence Digest*, England, March)

Bahrain Political Prisoners in St. Helena (see MER pp 403-4). In a letter to the editor of *The Times*, dated Dec 30, 1960, the British Judicial Adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain protested against the suggestions made in the British press and by "some ill-informed members" in the House that if the prisoners were transferred to Bahrain, they would be treated cruelly there. The letter said the penal code in force in Bahrain since 1955 was based on English law, the courts were among the least harsh in the ME and elsewhere, and the prisoners there were treated fairly. The two prisoners in Bahrain convicted together with the three in St. Helena were given even more favourable treatment, and the ruler was incapable of any form of cruelty to those people. (*Times*, Jan 5)

In Jan the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, and George Brown, deputy leader of the Labour Party, visited Bahrain and paid a visit to the Jidda penal island where these two prisoners were staying. They said they found them living in good conditions. (*Times*, Jan, 19)

On Jan 26 Mr Stonehouse, MP apologized in the House for his statement on Dec 20, 1960, in which he "adopted without consideration an intimation that [the prisoners] would have their heads chopped off" [if they were to be returned to Bahrain] (*Times*, Jan 27). Another apology for using this expression came from William Yates, MP, who on a tour of the ME went especially to Bahrain to see the Ruler. He said in future he would not criticize decisions of the Ruler but only those of "government advisers which I consider half-baked." He asked the Ruler to show clemency to the prisoners. He said he had no doubt that the exiles "would not be injured in any way here, and could apply for mercy through the Ruler, the only way for clemency." (*Times*, Feb 23)

There were further questions and answers in the House on Jan 30 (*Times*, Jan 31) and on Feb 8. On the latter date, the Lord Privy Seal said that the three prisoners

had communicated their wish to be returned to Bahrain if they were not to be released. (*Hansard, C, Vol 510, Col. 399-400, Feb 8*)

In June the three men were freed after successful habeas corpus applications. On June 13, the acting Chief Justice of St. Helena ruled that the three prisoners, Abd al-Aziz Shamlan, Abd ar-Rahman al-Bakir and Abd al-Ali Alaywat, had been unlawfully detained in St. Helena and ordered that they be discharged and awarded costs (*Times, June 14; Hayat, June 20*). On June 19 the Lord Privy Seal said in the House that the court judgement had been based not on the ground that there was any defect in the men's original trial, but that the warrant under which they were transferred from the custody of the Ruler in 1956 was invalid. (*Hansard, C, Vol 527, Col. 939-43, June 19*)

The ex-prisoners arrived in England on July 14. They were reported to intend remaining in England for an indefinite period but in the certain hope that a government statement would be made about the payment of compensation to them. They had been issued with St. Helena passports, in which each was described as a "British-protected person of Bahrain, without consultation with Bahrain authorities." They were met by John Stonehouse, MP, who expressed his satisfaction at seeing them at liberty but protected from being returned to Bahrain "where they would have been imprisoned again."

Abd ar-Rahman al-Bakir told the press that it was the British government which really ruled Bahrain. He described the court that judged him in 1956 as "no court at all but a creation of the Political Resident." He said that Bahrain was in a state of feudalism which was supported by the British government. (*Times, July 3, 15*)

QATAR

Oil and Royalties. [Estimated crude oil production in Qatar amounted to 8.2m. metric tons in 1960 and 8.4m. metric tons in 1961. Royalties accruing to the ruler in 1960 came to \$54m. (or \$1,350 per head of the estimated 40,000 inhabitants).]

British Influence Reported Curtailed. [UAR sources reported throughout the year on a policy on the part of Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Hamad Al Thani, the heir apparent, of curtailing British influence.]

In Jan it was reported that Shaykh Khalifah had issued a decree terminating the services of the British adviser. (For similar information, see MER 1960, pp 406.) He had also changed the name of the "British adviser's residence" (*ddr al-istishariyah al-britaniyah*) to Government House, and had ordered that Qatar was henceforth to make its purchases in Arab countries instead of in Britain. He was considering inviting Arab economic advisers to replace the British. He had, for the first time, sent a delegation to represent Qatar at the Arab League cultural meeting. (*Ayyam, Damascus, Jan 11; Akhbar Sa'ah, Jan 25*)

In June it was reported that Qatar intended to demand the abolition of British inspection over its consular affairs. It also intended to abolish entry visas for nationals of Arab countries. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, June 26*)

At the end of the year, UAR sources reported that Shaykh Khalifah had been appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and intended to reorganize the government with the aid of UAR experts. At his invitation, a UAR judge left for Qatar to take up a position as legal adviser. (*V of A, Nov 9 [11]; Akhbar Sa'ah, Dec 6*)

Reported Federation Plans. See above: British Policy in the Gulf and Reported Federation Plans.

Ruler Visits London. On July 4 Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Ali Al Thani, the Ruler of Qatar, arrived in London on an official visit. He was received by Queen Elizabeth and by Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary. (*Times, July 5, 7; R. Baghdad, July 5 [7]*)

First Prince to Pursue Higher Studies. Prince Suhaym Ibn Hamad Al Thani, brother of Shaykh Khalifah, the Deputy Ruler, left Qatar to pursue higher studies at Cambridge. He was the first Qatar prince to do so and had been encouraged by his brother among others. (*Akhbar Sa'ah, June 21*)

Friendly Relations with the UAR. [See also above: the sympathetic UAR reporting on Shaykh Khalifah's alleged anti-British policies.]

Education; Cultural Relations. At the beginning of the year, the UAR university authorities agreed to accept unconditionally holders of Qatar secondary school certificates. The enrolment of Qatar graduates at UAR universities, and cultural cooperation in general, were discussed by the UAR Education Minister and Shaykh Qasim Ibn Hamad Al Thani, Qatar Education Minister, on July 19 in Cairo. (*R. Cairo, Jan 28 [W, Feb 21]; MENA, July 19 [21]*)

A UAR education and press delegation attended a festival in Qatar on April 13. (*Haqqiq, April 20*)

Miscellaneous. In June Qatar Arabs were allowed to enter the UAR without visas. (*MENA, June 26 [27]*)

A large delegation from Qatar attended the Egyptian revolution anniversary on July 23 in Cairo. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, June 26*)

Ruler Visits Cairo. On July 25 Shaykh Ahmad Al Thani, the Ruler of Qatar, arrived in Alexandria on a six days' official visit to the UAR [on his way from London—see above]. He was received by Zakariya Mubhy al-Din, the Minister of the Interior. He was expected to discuss the promotion of Arab solidarity between the two countries. On July 27 he was visited by President Nasser at As-Safar Palace, Alexandria. The President decorated the Shaykh and his son. The Ruler attended various ceremonies and toured industrial establishments. (*Ahram, July 26, 28, 30, 31*)

It was commented that the Ruler's visit (as well as the visit of the Ruler of Dubai during the same period) was apparently designed to find out whether the UAR would support their independence at a future date in case Britain released them from their treaty obligations. (*Times of India, Aug 9*)

Saudi Arabia: Ruler and King Saud Exchange Visits. On Jan 24 the Ruler of Qatar arrived in Riyadh on a three days' official visit. He was received at the airport by King Saud and the two rulers were "understood to have discussed... the strengthening of brotherly ties between the two Arab countries." (*R. Mecca, Jan 24 [26]; Iraq Times, Jan 30*)

On Feb 6 King Saud arrived in Qatar on a three days' return visit and was given a hearty welcome. (*Falastin, Feb 7; R. Mecca, Feb 6 [8]; Hayat, Feb 11*)

On March 25 [ex-ruler] Shaykh Ali Al Thani arrived in Riyadh as a guest of King Saud. (*R. Mecca, March 25, 27 [28, 29]*)

In Dec authoritative sources in Riyadh said that contacts were taking place between Saudi Arabia and Qatar on the demarcation of the land and sea borders between the two countries. (*ANA, Dec 22 [W, 28]*)

Loan to Lebanon? In Feb it was reported in Beirut that Qatar had agreed to grant Lebanon a loan for municipal projects in Tripoli, Sidon and Zahle. Lebanon aimed at raising a loan of L.E.5m (*Hayat*, Feb 24, March 1). [No report was received that the loan had been contracted.]

Ruler Visits Kuwait. On May 21 the Ruler arrived in Kuwait on a two-day visit to the Ruler of Kuwait. (*MENA*, May 22 [23])

Ruler Visits Jordan. On Aug 2 the Ruler arrived in Jordan for a four-day visit at the King's invitation. The Ruler contributed JD100,000 to the Jordanian armed forces, and JD3,000 to the charity associations in the Kingdom. (*Falastin*, Aug 2, 4; *Jihad*, Aug 3-5, 7)

TRUCIAL STATES

(See also above: British Policy in General)

The Government: Rulers and British Political Agent, as in MER 1960, p. 407. Political Officer in Abu Dhabi: R.D. Oliphant.

Trucial Council. The seven ruling Shaykhs were "loosely federated" through a Trucial Council [established in 1952, the same period as the Oman Scouts, under British advice] but, it was reported, each Shaykh "remains proudly independent and jealous of his neighbours" (*NYT*, Feb 23). Amman Radio referred to the Council which held semi-annual meetings under British supervision as an outcome of "secret attempts since 1945" to establish a kind of federation among the shaykhdoms. (*R. Amman*, June 18 [20])

Social and Political Change Seen. Richard P. Hunt, a *New York Times* correspondent who toured Trucial Oman at the beginning of 1961, remarked that for generations the people there had lived "on dates, fish and trade." Now there was oil (in Abu Dhabi), the beginning of farming (in Ras al-Khaimah) and trading (in Dubai—see heading below). Life was beginning to change rapidly and the territory was stirring with new ideas. Political change was brewing along with social change and those who knew the territory believed it inevitable that the stirrings of change would put the power of the shaykhs—who were still governing like patriarchs over their tribes—against some form of nationalism. (*NYT*, Feb 23)

British Policy; The Oman Scouts. The correspondent mentioned above described British policy in the territory and the role of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The British Political Agent, with residence in Dubai, acted as "a combination schoolmaster, referee, counsellor and foreign minister" for the seven shaykhs. The shaykhs were free to govern their countries and trade as they liked but they were not free to war against each other "as some would like to do," or to raid shipping, permit slavery and make treaties with other powers. "The Agent's job is to leave the shaykhs free to be good, but not to be bad. Under his paternal eye, they are encouraged to educate their people and to develop their countries. They are prevented from abusing their civil and religious power."

When rival shaykhs threatened each other, the Oman Scouts intervened. This force, which consisted of some 1,200 Arab soldiers commanded by British officers, had succeeded in pacifying the territory. In regard to tribal disputes, they mostly used traditional Arab peace-making methods accompanied by a show of force.

The scouts patrolled the desolate, roadless interior of the shaykhdoms to stop gun-running and contraband,

pursue criminals and protect oil properties. They also continued to hold Buraimi oasis (see p. 429 b) and control the passes to Muscat and Oman in order to block the traffic in fighting men and weapons to the Omani rebels (*NYT*, Feb 24, 25 [2]). According to another source, the scouts also combated slave traffic. (*Sunday Pictorial*, June 18, 25)

Abu Dhabi, Dubai Rulers Visit London After Kuwait Crisis. In July the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai visited London. Commenting on the arrival of Shakhbūt Ibn Sultān, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, for a six-day official visit, *The Times* said the Shaykh would be interested to hear British views on the future of the British-protected Shaykhdoms after the Iraqi claim to Kuwait (*Times*, July 18). In Nov the Ruler of Abu Dhabi conducted talks in New York with American oil companies concerning oil explorations in the amirate. (*Hayat*, Dec 13)

Contemplated Change in Political Status Reported. In Oct it was reported in Cairo that Sir William Luce, British Political Resident in the Gulf, was touring the Trucial States in order to convince the shaykhs to accept a new arrangement for relations with Britain. The proposed arrangement involved the signing of a series of agreements acknowledging the termination of British protection over the seven states, to be followed by new agreements which would tie their economies and defence to Britain, while internal affairs and government would be left to the shaykhs. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Oct 18)

Issue of Iranian Immigration. Arab sources continued to complain of a flow of Iranian immigrants into the shaykhdoms. It was alleged that there was a design to turn the Arabs in the area into a minority. Iran would then claim these regions, on the basis of an Iranian majority. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, Cairo, Oct 28; *Beirut al-Masa'*, Nov 1)

Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah sent delegations to the Arab educational congress which opened in Cairo on June 25. (*Hayat*, June 26)

"Egyptian Cultural Mission in the Oman Coast." Its "inspector," Kāmil Abu Ghāli, was mentioned as visiting Qatar in April. (*Haq'a'iq*, Cairo, April 20; see also under: Sharjah)

Dubai Ruler Visits Cairo. On Aug 5 the Ruler of Dubai, Shaykh Rashid Ibn Sa'īd al-Maktūm, as well as his son and heir (on their way from London), arrived in Cairo on a two-week visit. They were received by President Abdel Nasser and visited various establishments and industrial plants. (*R. Cairo*, Aug 6 [8]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 6, 10, 13)

Oil in Abu Dhabi. [Drilling and building of oil installations in Abu Dhabi were continued by the IFC group (Petroleum Development, Trucial Coast) and, offshore, by Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (BP and CFP).] Exploitation was to start in 1962. (*Petroleum Press Service*, March, April)

"Officials in the Gulf" were reported to "express consternation at the prospect of Shaykh Shakhbūt getting oil money on a large scale..." He had "made a start by insisting on payment in hard cash." (*Economist*, Aug 19)

In July a representative of the Abu Dhabi government arrived in Jordan to recruit civil servants for the amirate. (*Jihad*, July 5)

Sharjah. The Deputy Ruler of Sharjah stated in April that there were 21 Egyptian teachers, male and female, in the shaykhdom. There were 500 boy and 300 girl students. (*Haqaiq, Cairo, April 20*)

Prosperity in Dubai. A *New York Times* correspondent described Dubai, a seaport city of 30,000, as one of the boom towns of the Gulf. The prosperity was the work of the ruler, Rashid Ibn Sa'id al-Maktûm, "a shrewd trader," in cooperation with his British advisers as well as "imaginative and flexible" Iranian, Pakistani and Arab merchants. Dubai had a \$17m. yearly export-import trade, due to a considerable extent to dhow smuggling of merchandise to Iran, which had high import duties, and of gold to Bombay, which could earn the trader 40% of his investment within four weeks. The ruler was aiding the sea trade by keeping the harbour free of silt. He had revenues of about \$700,000 a year and was building the largest city in Trucial Oman. Municipal services, land registration and schools were progressing rapidly and the town was patrolled by a smartly-uniformed police force. (*NYT, Feb 24*)

In Jan it was reported that the ruler of Dubai had announced the enactment of legislation giving the municipal council wider authority. (*Gulf Daily Times, Jan 14*)

Slavery. A report in a British paper alleged that an estimated 8,000 young men and girls were annually sold into slavery in the Trucial Coast. One of the sources was the Iranian littoral where children were captured by slave raiders from Trucial Oman who crossed the Gulf in dhows. The slaves were mostly sold into Saudi Arabia. Most rulers and notables in the territory had slaves whom they made no effort to conceal from the British representatives. The Trucial Oman Scouts fought the slave traffic and so did British gunboats on the Gulf; they had succeeded in raising the price of slaves but not in stopping the traffic. (*Sunday Pictorial, June 18, 25*)

R. P. Hunt in the *New York Times* wrote that "technically" slaves had been free for many years in the territory "but a few, usually, old family servants, are still discovering their freedom." About 30 slaves a year reached the British Agency and were manumitted. (*NYT, Feb 24*)

THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN

(Jumhuriyat As-Sudan)

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

SYNOPSIS

During 1961, while the military government—which comprised the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces—continued its previous policies, and while at least outward calm prevailed in the armed forces, civilian opposition to the military regime, which had come to the fore in the second half of 1960, became even more intense.

The independence of Sudan continued to figure as the main political idea advocated by the government; in its name, the government exhorted the people to national effort, unity and support of the regime. The Sudanese nation was depicted as Islamic in religion and cultural base, Arabic in language, and black African in nationalist identification; as previously there was no identification with Arab nationalism.

The reorganization of local government, begun in 1960, was completed in July. The government presented the scheme to the public as the basis of Sudanese indigenous democracy; the establishment of local and province councils was eventually to be followed by the constitution of a "central council." The scheme, government spokesmen declared, also aimed at involving the citizens in the affairs of government and at the decentralization of administration. The councils were established in March, all members being appointed by the government. All provincial "government representatives" who under the new scheme succeeded the governors and also presided over the province councils, were army officers. As already recorded in MER 1960 (p. 414), the opposition criticized the new set-up as regressive on the grounds that local elections which had worked well for 20 years, up to 1958, were now being abolished in favour of government appointments.

The reorganization of local government was followed by the appointment of a committee to study constitutional advancement, headed by Chief Justice Abu Rannat, who had also served as chairman of the commission which recommended the new local government scheme. It was directed to study the introduction of an electoral system for the local government councils and the formation of a legislative, the "central council"; both the provincial and the central councils were to be partly elected and partly appointed by the government.

Efforts to canvass public support included tours of the country by Gen. Abbud and other members of the government. Foreign policy events such as General Abbud's visits to both Moscow and Washington and President Brezhnev's visit to Sudan were also utilized to bolster the regime's prestige. In the economic sphere, stress was laid on the efforts in economic and social development (see Economic Survey, below).

The opposition to the regime comprised all sections of the public, traditional religious sects as well as trade unions, the party leaders of the former regime as well

as the intelligentsia, students, manual and white-collar workers. Among the workers, especially in the railway and industrial centre of Athara, Communists were also active. In so far as the sources available indicated, the opposition was to the military regime itself, not to any specific policy of the government, except in the case of trade unions.

In February, the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the first PM of Congo (L), occasioned protest demonstrations by workers, lawyers, students, clerks and also by women during which anti-government slogans were shouted.

On June 17, in the course of a dispute over wages and social benefits which had started in February, the railways and Nile steamer workers, organized in Sudan's strongest unions, went on strike in defiance of the Labour Disputes Act of 1960 (see MER 1960, p. 411). Thereupon the government dissolved the Railway Workers' Union. The strike, which was reported to have been fairly effective, ended after a week. It was renewed on July 25, but under the threat of dismissal the strike crumbled after two days. Throughout this affair, the government employed a stick and carrot policy but ultimately acted moderately and most of the measures taken against the workers were withdrawn.

It was reported that the Ansār and Khatmiyah sects and the politicians of the former regime had become active among the unions, and especially the railway workers. Demonstrations took place in Umdurman on June 14 and 15, after the dissolution of the unions (though the reports available did not indicate a direct connection with this event); a Sudanese report at that time gave a picture of intense opposition activity in Khartoum. On July 11, twelve politicians of the former regime were arrested, and deported to the South; prominent among them were leaders of both the Ansār sect—Ummah party and the Khatmiyah sect and National Unionist Party. General Abbud charged them with "dark conspiracies," including the incitement of students, to reinstate the former regime. The arrests gave rise to another spate of demonstrations in the northern towns, though these had been banned, and many arrests were made. A serious clash between the police and demonstrators took place on Aug 21 in Umdurman when at least 12 Ansār youth and three policemen were killed. Siddiq al-Mahdi, the Imam of the Ansār, who had not been arrested together with the other leaders in July, was now placed under house arrest. Six weeks later the Imam died and was succeeded by his brother, al-Hadi. It was reported that the late Imam, who had repeatedly declared his opposition to the continuation of military government, had made a death-bed will in which he requested his successor to keep the Ansār organization intact and to work for democratic government; al-Hadi

had vowed to continue where Siddiq left off "in the religious and nationalist fields."

Demonstrations of students of Khartoum university, ostensibly in support of the Algerian cause but in fact against the government, took place in November. When members of the students-council, said to have been members of the dissolved parties, were arrested, a students strike was declared which was also joined by high school students. Thereupon the authorities closed the university which was reopened only in January 1962.

In South Sudan the government continued its policy of Sudanization through the spreading of Islam and Arabic, while the activities of Christian missionaries were further curtailed. The government also took various measures to win the support of the South and provide public evidence of such support. Meanwhile Southern opposition took a new turn when a number of persons, described as intellectuals trained in missionary schools, sought political asylum in Kenya with the reported aim of establishing an exile-government that would strive either to achieve the South's complete independence or its autonomy in a Sudanese federal framework.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

NOTE: This survey follows mainly the *Economic Survey 1961* published by the Sudanese Ministry of Finance and Economics, Khartoum, May 1962, and the *Report of the Bank of Sudan for 1951*.

The Sudanese economy in 1961 was marked by continuing development, and a sizable deficit in the current account of the balance of payments as a consequence of increased imports and stagnation in exports.

Population, Labour Force. The population of Sudan in 1961 was estimated at 11.9m.; the economically active population at 5.6m. Population growth was estimated at 2.8% per annum. According to the 1955/6 census, some 86% of the labour force was engaged in farming, animal husbandry, hunting, fishing and forestry, whilst 5.5% were employed in manufacturing and construction; up to 1961 only fractional changes were assumed to have taken place.

Gross Domestic Product. Gross domestic product in 1960/1 was estimated at £S357.2m.; £S187.2m. from the traditional section of the economy and £S170m. from the modern; it totalled £S347.8m. in 1959/60 and £S284.2 in 1955/6. The gross domestic product per head, however, was outstripped by population growth: it was estimated at £S29.95 in comparison with £S30.02 in 1959/60. Overall annual growth in the economy from 1955/6 was estimated at 4.7%, 6.5% in the modern sector and 3% in the traditional sector. During the same period, gross domestic product per head only rose by 2% annually because the population grew by some 2.8% annually.

The gross domestic product by economic sectors was composed as follows:

Composition of Gross Domestic Product by Economic Sector
(In percentages of total G.D.P.)

Sector	(*)	
	1955/6	1960/1
a) Agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishing	61	57
b) Transport & distribution, banking	14	15
c) Mining, manufacture, public utilities	1	2
d) Building and construction	6	7
e) Crafts, domestic and miscellaneous, services, ownership of buildings	12	11
f) Administration and social services	6	8
	100	100

* Provisional

Production. The production of cotton, the most important crop, fell 8%, from 2.95m. kantar in 1959/60 to 2.4m. kantar in 1960/1; the area planted remained about the same but the yield in the Jezirah was damaged by insects and dropped from 4.1 kantar per feddan in 1959/60 to 2.7 kantar. However, a large increase was expected in the 1961/2 season because yields were above average and further stages of the Managil extension were completed. Other figures for agricultural production in 1960/61 were incomplete.

As can be seen from the above table, manufacturing, mining and public utilities (mainly electricity) amounted to only 2% of the gross domestic product. Consumer goods formed some 80% of manufacturing output.

Foreign Trade. Sudanese exports stagnated, and were lower in value than in 1960 (£S62.2m. in 1961 as against £S63.4m. in 1960). This was due largely to the difficulties in disposing of the cotton crop; cotton exports declined and the value per ton of ginned Sald cotton fell 6% in comparison with 1960. There was also a fall in exports of gum arabic, the second most important product exported; groundnuts and American-type cotton and cottonseed exports rose.

Imports, on the other hand, increased £S17.8m. to the unprecedented level of £S81.5m. Thus the trade deficit amounted to £S19.3m. as against only £S0.3m. in 1960 and a surplus of £S9.7m. in 1959. The increase in imports resulted from the effects of high investment, an increased demand for raw materials and a higher demand for imported consumer goods caused by a rise in the means of payment.

Balance of Payments, Foreign Aid, Foreign Exchange Reserves and Debts. The adverse balance of trade mainly accounted for an unfavourable balance of payments, in contrast to the military regime's first two years in power.

ECONOMIC SURVEY
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (£S Million)

	1958	1959	1960	1961 (<i>Proe</i>)
Exports	+44.9	+68.2	+64.0	+61.3
Imports	-54.0	-49.2	-61.9	-77.6
Balance Visibles	-9.1	+19.0	+2.1	-16.3
Balance Invisibles	-3.7	-5.0	-3.1	-5.0
Balance Current Account	-12.8	+14.0	-1.0	-21.3
Official Loans and Grants	+1.8	+12.6	+10.4	+6.1
High Dam Compensations [from UAR, Egypt]	—	—	+3.0	+4.0
Movements in Working Balance (net)	+1.9	+3.6	—	-0.1
Other (net)	+4.3	-4.4	-0.3	+6.3
Total Capital Account	+8.0	+11.8	+13.1	+16.3
Errors and Omissions	+0.4	-0.1	-0.1	+0.2
Increase (+) Decrease (—) in Foreign Exchange Reserves	-4.4	+25.7	+12.2	-4.8

The deficit in "Invisibles" accrued mainly from transport and travel, while the balance of interest payments was favourable to Sudan. The net income of £S6.1m. from official loans and grants resulted from drawings of £S8.1m. and repayments of £S2m., as follows:

*Drawings and Repayments of Official Loans and Grants
(in £S Million)*

	Drawings in 1961	Still Avail- able End of 1961
1) <i>Long Term Loans</i>		
IBRD for Railways	1.8	2.3
IBRD for Managil	1.1	4.3
IBRD for Roseires	0.2	6.6
IDA for Roseires	0.2	4.3
West Germany for Roseires	0.2	6.4
2) <i>Medium Term Loans</i>		
Yugoslavia	0.7	4.6
3) <i>Grants (US Aid)</i>		
Project Aid	2.0	*
Non-Project Aid	1.9	*
4) <i>IMF</i>	—	—
Total Drawings	8.1	—
5) <i>Repayments:</i>		
IBRD for Railways	0.2	—
British Credit	0.8	—
IMF	1.0	—
Total repayments	2.0	—

* Allocations fixed annually

The Soviet project-tied credit of £S8m. agreed on in Nov was not drawn upon.

At the end of 1961 the foreign debt was £S26m. The foreign exchange reserves decreased from £S58m. at the end of 1960 to £S32m. at the end of 1961, as they were used to cover the deficit in the balance of payments.

The Budget. The following are budget figures for 1960/1 and 1961/2:

THE BUDGET (in £Sm.)

	1961/2		1960/1
	Estimates	Actual	Estimates
<i>Ordinary Budget</i>			
Revenue	56.2	63.1	57.0
Expenditure	47.9	48.2	50.3
Surplus	8.3	15.9	6.7
Development Budget	25.4	17.3	38.1
Overall Deficit	-17.1	-1.4	-31.4

The increase of close to \$8m. in revenue over the estimate derived mostly from import duties (imports having risen more than foreseen), the sugar monopoly (world prices fell), and cotton profits (due to favourable prices obtained for most of the 1959/60 crop).

60% of revenues in 1960/1 were derived from indirect taxation and the sugar monopoly, as against only 2% from direct taxation; 15% of the remainder from the income of agricultural undertakings, interest, and dividends.

Expenditure in the 1960/1 budget of £S48.19m. was divided as follows: economic services—32%; social services—25%; general administration and other items—43%.

It was proposed to meet the overall deficit in the 1961/2 budget, deriving from the development budget, by foreign aid, the third instalment of the Aswan Dam compensations from Egypt—(together £S12m.), and drawings from government reserves. It was also expected that actual expenditure on development would fall below estimates, while ordinary revenue might again exceed them.

Monetary Development, Prices. Means of payment rose from £S40.8m. at the end of 1960 to £S48.3m. at the end of 1961; of this increase, £S4.2m. were bank advances to the private sector, of which £S2.4m. were

advanced for financing exports. Means of payment were equally divided between currency on the one hand and deposit and quasi-money on the other.

In spite of this increase in means of payment, credit and money both remained tight. The rise was absorbed mainly by importers overstocking and delays in transport, chiefly between Port Sudan and Khartoum.

The tight money situation somewhat curbed the rise in prices. The cost-of-living index rose by nearly 6% in the first half of the year. This was attributed to the large inflow of foreign capital, spending by foreign technicians and the poor agricultural crop in 1960. Prices, however, fell again during the latter part of the year.

Investment and Development. Gross fixed investment in 1960/1 was estimated at £\$43.1m. or 11% of the total

DEVELOPMENT BUDGET (in £\$ 000)

	60/61 Actual	61/62 Estimate
General Development		
Accounts	1946/51	—
	1951/56	16
	1957/62	6,829
Sugar Factory Geneid		1,078
Sennar H.E.P.		1,536
Managil Extension		7,828
Khashm al-Girba		—
Roseires Project	—(••)	3,805
Total	17,287	38,106

* £\$1,035,623 included in 1957/62 Account.

national means of £\$401.9m. in contrast to £\$21.2m. or 7% of the total means of £\$288.9m. in 1955/6.

The table in the left-hand column shows actual expenditure under the development budget in 1960/1 and estimated expenditure in 1961/2, the first year of the new 7-year economic and social development plan.

£\$4.2m. of US development aid should be added to the figure for 1961/2, as this amount was not included in the budget.

The £\$17.3m. actually spent in 1960/1 fell short of estimates by £\$7m. and it was assumed that a similar pattern might occur in 1961/2.

While further stages were being completed of the Managil extension, work was to start on two new dams, Khashm al-Girba and Roseires; for the latter Sudan obtained \$50m. credits on easy terms (see p 76).

Newly opened industrial establishments included an integrated textile mill, (Sudan American Textile Industry), said to be the largest of its kind in the ME, and a state-owned tannery, built by Yugoslavia, with a capacity to supply local needs and leave nearly 50% of the output for export. A training and development centre in leather trades, to be established by the UN Special Fund, was to assist in the development of a leather industry.

Projects under construction included the cardboard factory at Aroma. New projects approved by the government included plants for production of building materials, aluminium sheets, air conditioners, razor blades, drugs, perfumes and cosmetics, cardboard and paper, and tomato sauce. The Soviet credit was to be used to finance the construction of two grain elevators, plants for asbestos and cement, milk powder, dried fruits and onions, fish canning, and a cotton experimental station.

An industrial bank was inaugurated in Nov with an initial capital of £\$3m.

VIEWS AND POLICIES

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

NOTE: The views and policies recorded here are supplementary to those quoted in MER 1960 (p 409); none of the latter was superseded.

NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

[The words nationalism (*qawmiyah*) and patriotism (*watanīyah*) were rarely used by Sudanese leaders nor were attempts made to define Sudanese nationalism. Basically, the Sudanese leaders advocated complete independence, and they gave the word "independence" meanings usually associated with "nationalism." At the same time there was a pronounced identification with African nationalism and practically none with Arab nationalism.]

These identifications were not made as specific declarations but as matter-of-fact statements in discussions of other topics. The attitude of the Sudanese to Africa as contrasted with their attitude to the Arab world was also brought out in President Abbud's joint communiqué with President Kennedy and PM Khrushchov, where African affairs were dealt with extensively and Arab affairs were not even mentioned.]

"Independence" in the Sense of "Nationalism." President Abbud, Jan 1: "The independence of the Sudan

has been, and still is, the noble legacy for whose preservation we care now and which we shall guard for coming generations... The meaning of independence must be before our eyes in internal and external affairs, and it should leave a characteristic impress on all the work we do... In this way, the meaning of independence may become synonymous with the dignity of the citizens and the honour of all of us..."

"It was inevitable that the word independence should touch the souls of the citizens, doing away with envy and animosity, and making its imprint on their lives with the consequent release of their potentialities, and that all this should be reflected in the lives of the people, developing their economy and spreading progress, and causing the spirit of participation in public responsibility to grow in them." (R. Umdurman, Jan 1 [3])

Fostering Sudanese Nationalism. Anonymous author in *Sudan*, a government English language monthly, in an article on the Nubia monuments: "Excavation and survey will add to world history and will help instill confidence and cohesion to Sudanese nationality." (*Sudan*, Feb)

"Sudan's African Destiny." Ziyādah Arbāb, Minister of Education, on laying the cornerstone of Abbud Cultural Hall, Umdurman, Nov 17: [The building] "will be a

confluence of three cultural streams, one emanating from Europe, the second... from the Middle East and the third... from Africa, the continent which has awakened to retrieve its old glory.

"...the destiny ordained by the fate for our country from the dawn of life... [in] merging the different cultures which come from other countries with the genuine African cultural legacy." (*S. Daily*, Nov 21)

Identification with the "Black Man." President Abbad in answer to a question by an American correspondent, Nov 1960: "I think that we [italics supplied] still need the help of the white men here in Africa, because they are more educated and advanced in technical and economic matters... The help of the white man is most important to the underdeveloped countries." Q. "You are following that policy here yourself?" A. "Yes..." (*S. Daily*, Jan 31)

National Integration—Through Development and Settlement of Nomads. President Abbad, Nov 17: "This overall development and economic programme should aim at safeguarding the integrity of the national structure... attention should be given to our... underdeveloped regions until the residues of the past are completely removed... For this reason we shall not rest so long as a great part of our citizens continue to lead a nomadic life away from... education and... medical care. We shall do all we can for their settlement..." (*S. Daily*, Nov 20)
(See also below: Goals of Education.)

THE POLITICAL REGIME

"The Revolution Originates With the People." President Abbad at Shendi, April 3 [?]: "In the name of the Revolution, the principles of which you cherish deeply in your souls and the aims of which originated in your souls... I affectionately greet you..."

"...what we have achieved, has been inspired by you..." (*Sudan*, May; the English text has been corrected here.)

The Failure of "Imported Democracy"; Indigenous Democracy Through Representative Local Government. President Abbad inaugurating the province councils, July 1: "Democracy is a philosophy of government which... has been practised by different countries according to their environment and requirements. It is no use to import a democratic system... without pruning it to our circumstances... The revolution came to save the country from the old regimes... [whose] imported parliamentary partisan system was about to drive the country into a deep chasm of instability..."

"...the absence of democratic institutions on provincial levels was the chief reason for the failure of

democracy in the Sudan... In the middle sector between the local councils and the central government, public representation was lacking..."

"The present system [i.e. the new local government system] is surely [truly] Sudanese."

"We gave the base of the democratic rule, namely the local government councils, every care and attention."

"Today the first constitutional institutions on provincial level came into being."

"The broad line of the constitutional development which I will introduce involves the creation of a Central Council to be established with the present institutions in a pyramid, with the local councils as a base after introducing the local councils elections by a reasonable percentage system." (*S. Daily*, July 2)

The Tasks of Good Government. President Abbad, July 1: "... a good government is that which can realize the aspirations of [the] citizens for social justice, economic revival, internal stability, complete union of all national sectors and maintaining good relations with all countries of the world. When we came to power nothing of that existed... Then we started to build from the base..." (*S. Daily*, July 2)

Regime Bids for Public Support Through Development. Editor of *Sudan*, government English language monthly: The people "know that the revolution[ary] government intends to gain the support of the people through nothing but development programmes." (*Sudan*, May)

EDUCATION, RELIGION

The Goals of Education. Ziyāhah Arbāb, Minister of Education, Jan 1: "The aim of education in Sudan is to create a strong generation from both sexes to preserve their national legacy, religious culture and pride in their country and not to refrain from manual labour and handicraft." (*S. Daily*, Jan 4)

Religious Tolerance, but Guarding Against the Missionaries. The governor of Equatoria province, Feb 11: The policy of the new regime is based on the concept that "religion is for God and the fatherland is for all" (*ad-din lillāh wa al-waṭan liljāmī*), that religion is only a force which drives the people to become righteous citizens, who love each other and help each other justly and fear God. The government will not permit religion to become a cause for hate, disturbing the peace, and non-enforcement of the laws.

The government is on guard against those who might want to fish in muddy waters; it is aware of the actions of a fanatic religious group [the Christian missionaries], which respect neither any other's religion nor the law of the land. (*Sudan al-Jadīd*, Feb 15)

THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

THE GOVERNMENT

Reshuffle. On Feb 2 President Abbad reshuffled his cabinet: Makki al-Muna, the Deputy-Director of the Agricultural Bank, was appointed Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation; Brig. Maqbūl al-Amin al-Hājī, the Min-

ister of Communications and of Agriculture and Irrigation, was named Minister of the Interior and Local Government replacing Maj.-Gen. Ahmad Majdhūb al-Bahārī, who was named Minister of Communications. (*R. Khar-toum*, Feb 2 [4]; *Ra'y al-Amm*, Hayat, Feb 3)

THE GOVERNMENT

Ministry	January 1	Changes on Feb 2
President, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence	Ibrahim Abbud	
Interior and Local Government	Ahmad Majdhūb al-Bahārī	Maqbūl al-Amin al-Hājī
Information and Labour	Muhammad Ta'at Farid	
State, Communications	Maqbūl al-Amin al-Hājī	Ahmad Majdhūb al-Bahārī
Agriculture and Irrigation	Maqbūl al-Amin al-Hājī	Makki al-Muna
Public Works and Mineral Resources	Ahmad Rida Farid	
Commerce, Industry and Supply	Muhammad Ahmad Irwah	
Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and Deputy-Commander of the Army	Hasan Bashir Nasr	
Foreign Affairs	Ahmad Khayr	
Education and Justice	Ziyādah Uthmān Arbāb	
Finance and Economy	Abd al-Majid Ahmad	
Health	Dr Muhammad Ahmad Ali	
Animal Resources	Santino Deng Teng	

EFFORTS TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT

[Tours of the country by the PM and cabinet members constituted one of the regime's principal efforts to win popular support.]

Touring the Provinces. President Abbud, accompanied by the entire High Command of the army, visited the Northern province from April 1-7, stopping at all the major towns. At Atbara, the main centre of railway and other organized workers in Sudan, he was received by the workers and told them: "We are ready to examine all complaints with justice and sincerity." In every place he was welcomed by the citizens; he conferred with leading local personalities.

In his speeches President Abbud stressed that the enthusiastic receptions tendered him were the most eloquent testimony to the popular approval of the revolution. He stressed the role of the revolution in the progress of Sudan and in the liquidation of its backwardness. He emphasized the decentralization policy which, he said, meant leaving the affairs of each province in the hands of the local people best qualified to understand their local needs. A recurring theme in his speeches was the need to develop the country, and he exhorted his audience to work hard and to combine efforts to this end. (*R. Umdurman, April 3, 6, 7 [5, 8, 10]; Ra'y al-Amm, April 1, 6, 7, 8; S. News, April 15; Sudan, May*)

Government officials said that the tour was in a large measure the result of local invitations to "come and see us." According to *The Daily Telegraph* the aim was to learn the workers' state of mind and that of the union men in Atbara and meet with tribal chiefs who still held a good deal of influence. Although the government was encouraging the movement away from tribalism, it appreciated the benefits emerging from maintaining good relations with tribal heads. Another unofficial aim, it was thought, was to remind the Northern Sudanese that there were in existence forms of political life other than those emanating from Cairo. (*Daily Telegraph, April 4*)

Maj.-Gen. Hasan Bashir Nasr, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and Deputy-Commander of the army, toured the Darfur province at the end of April. He met with members of the local councils and with the tribal chieftains and discussed with them the needs of their localities. He inspected the government services and promised to fulfil the various requests. (*Ra'y al-Amm, May 4*)

THE NEW PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

[During the year the new provincial administration was set up, in accordance with the Act passed in Nov 1960 (MER 1960, pp 413-4). The new administration in each province was composed of (1) a Government Representative, (replacing the governor) appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces; (2) the Province Council, a legislative body, partly appointed by the central government and partly elected by the local government council from among their members; (3) the Province Authority, the executive, composed of departmental officers of the various ministries in the province.]

Aims: Establishing a Democratic Base, Civic Training, Decentralization. The aims of the new local administration system were set out by President Abbud and Brig. Maqbūl al-Amin al-Hājī, the Minister of Interior and Local Government.

President Abbud said on July 1 that "the absence of sound democratic institutions on [the] provincial level was the chief reason for the failure of the parliamentary system in Sudan." The "imported" democratic system of the previous regime had driven the country into chaos, as it was unsuited to local conditions. The revolutionary government was now inaugurating a Sudanese system of democracy, building from the base of democratic rule, namely local government. The next step in constitutional development, after the establishment of the local and province councils, would be the creation of a central council. However, this new system was dependent on the active participation of faithful and responsible citizens. (*Sudan, July*)

The active participation of the citizens in the responsibilities of government was also presented as an independent aim of the province councils. Brig. Maqbūl said: "It would be sufficient if these [provincial] councils achieve nothing except for involving the citizens in the affairs of government; it would be enough if they achieved not even one of the stated goals but awakened the provincial society and supplied the social and health services and the cultural needs of the citizens." (*Ra'y al-Amm, June 13*)

Another aim was decentralization. "Centralization," Brig. Maqbūl said, was "no longer a suitable pattern of government for this age, particularly in a wide and extensive country like the Sudan." (*Sudan, July*)

Ar-Ra'y al-Amm commented that it was hoped that "local inclinations" which had for a long time wished for a free hand to work for the progress of their regions would now no longer "feel a sense of bitterness and disappointment at being barred from the management of the affairs of their regions." (Quot. in *S. Daily*, July 3)

Santino Deng Teng, the Minister from the south, commented that the decentralization introduced by the new system had "finished" the demand of Southerners, for changing Sudan into a federation. (*S. Daily*, July 4)

Powers and Tasks of the Province Councils. The Minister of the Interior outlined the powers and tasks of the province councils, in accordance with "the Schedule of the Provincial Administration Act" [which was not available to the editor of MER] as follows: The councils were empowered to initiate and promote activities, to establish and maintain institutions in the fields of education, culture, social welfare, agriculture (including land reclamation, irrigation and drainage projects), public health and public works and to advise the central government on these fields. The province councils were also to approve the budgets of the local councils. The province council would constitute a body corporate and have financial independence. The council's revenue would come from appropriations in the general budget as well as from taxes and imposts payable directly to the council.

The province council and authority would be established by warrant of the central government which would also supervise their work and approve the provincial budget. Each minister would have the power to confirm, suspend or cancel province council by-laws and to supervise and inspect the council's activities in the fields pertaining to his ministerial responsibility.

Though the province councils were to be generally responsible for the promotion of local government, the local councils were to be autonomous. The provincial council would take over when a local council failed to perform its duties. (*Sudan*, July)

The councils were to convene three or four times a year. (*S. Daily*, July 19).

Composition of Provincial Authorities. On Jan 12 the Council of Ministers approved an act establishing the composition of the province authorities in the nine provinces. Each authority would be headed by the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, and the authority's secretary, and would comprise officials of the different ministries stationed in the provinces. For example, the following province officials would be members of the authority of the Northern Province: the health officer, the chief surveyor, the education officer, the supervisors of the private and government irrigation works, the veterinary officer, the engineer, the information and labour officer, and the financial supervisor. In other provinces other functionaries would participate, all in accordance with the special conditions of each province. (*S. Daily*, Jan 13)

Local Councils. On March 4 and 5 the Minister of the Interior made public the names of the 2,300 members of local councils. One hundred and seventy of them were appointed to the province councils. The appointment was for the year 1961; but at the end of the year the term was extended until June 30, 1962. (*S. Daily*, March 5, 6, July 2, Dec 19)

[In theory] the local councils were to elect their own

chairmen and their representatives in the province councils [but in fact they were appointed; see above]. The chairmen were to be *ex-officio* members in the province councils. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, March 27)

Provincial Councils. On June 12 were made public the names of 129 civilians who were appointed members of the province councils by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (full list in *Ra'y al-Amm*, June 13). The Minister of the Interior stated that the appointees represented all the different elements in the country (*R. Umdurman*, June 12 [15]). Two additional categories of council members were listed: The representatives of the local government councils who constituted 50% of the province council membership, and the *ex-officio* members of the province authorities. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Dec 19; see also MER 1960, p 414)

The next day the province governors were appointed Government Representatives in the provinces, in which capacity they were to head the province authorities as well as the province councils. Their former deputies were appointed chairmen of the authorities as well as secretaries of the councils.

All Government Representatives were army officers: (1) Northern Province—Brig. Muhammad Mahdi Hämüd; (2) Khartoum—Brig. Awad Abd ar-Rahmân; (3) Blue Nile—Col. Hussein Ali Karrâr; (4) Kassala—Maj.-Gen. Al-Khawwâd Muhammad Ahmad; (5) Kordofân—Brig. Az-Zayn Hasan at-Tayyib; (6) Darfur—Brig. Hamad an-Nil Dayfallah; (7) Upper Nile—Col. Abdul Hussein Makhhrûs; (8) Equatoria Province—Brig. At-Tâhir Abd ar-Rahmân; (9) Bahr al-Ghazâl—Col. Ahmad Hasan Sâlim. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 13, 14; *R. Umdurman*, June 13 [15])

Activation of the New Administration. The province councils held their inaugural meetings on July 1. They elected by secret ballot their vice-chairmen—the chairmen being the Government Representatives—and had the inaugural speeches of the President and the Minister of the Interior read to them. The meetings adjourned the same day until an unspecified date. (*S. Daily*, July 2, 13). [Until the end of 1961 no additional meetings were reported.]

On Sept 1 the officers of the former provincial administrations took up their new duties: The governors (*mudîr*) became Government Representatives; the district commissioners and their deputies (*mufattiḥ al-markaz*, *ma'mûr*) became local government inspectors or executive officers. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Sept 1, 2)

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

"Central Council" Promised. On July 1 and again in a speech to the nation on Nov 17, third anniversary of the military revolution, President Abdud announced a plan which, he said, was intended ultimately to lead to a permanent constitution. He said that he had appointed a committee to study and recommend the establishment of a central national council, which would be partly selected by the province councils and partly appointed by the government. The next step would be partial elections for the at present appointed province councils. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, July 2; *Sudan al-Jadid*, Times, Nov 18)

Public Enthusiasm at Prospects of Democracy. The Sudanese press, in commenting on the President's anniversary speech, concentrated on his promise to introduce the central council. *Ar-Ra'y al-Amm* wrote that the in-

roduction of a parliamentary system based on general elections was the aspiration of every loyal citizen. *As-Sudan al-Jadid* stated that "ours is by nature a democratic nation"; the people were full of joy when they heard that democracy "shall be restored to them in the purest and noblest manner"; they sang and danced and congratulated each other. (Quot. in *S. Daily*, Nov 20)

A foreign source said the majority of the Sudanese saw in Abbud's announcement the first step towards the termination of military rule. Observers in Khartoum pointed out that while the government was aware of its success, it knew that the regime could not continue indefinitely. (*Sayyad, Beirut, Dec 7*)

Al-Hadi al-Mahdi, who had succeeded Siddiq al-Mahdi as head of the Ansar sect, stated on Nov 28 that "the establishment of a national committee to study the question of a constitution is in line with our national aims. We hope that the committee will be organized on a representative basis." (*Ahram*, Nov 29; *S. Daily*, Dec 2)

The Constitution Committee. The composition of the committee and its directive were announced on Dec 27. It was headed by Muhammad Ahmad Abu Rannat, Chief Justice. The committee, the directive said, was to study the introduction of an electoral system for local government councils and to draft legislation for the formation of a legislative body. This body, the "central council," was to be partly elected through the province councils and partly "selected." (*R. Umdurman*, Dec 27 [29]; *S. Daily*, Dec 27)

SUDANIZATION

Protection of Sudanese Workers. The Department of Labour made arrangements for the opening of a section which would supervise the entry and exit of foreigners and their work in Sudan in an effort to protect the Sudanese officials; a number of ministries participated in these arrangements. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, March 1)

Promotion of Arabic. All foreign schools were informed that they must include the Arabic language in their

curriculum; beginning from 1964 all foreign students studying in Sudan would have to pass the Arabic language examination in order to receive their diplomas. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, March 12)

The European languages section of Sudan radio introduced a series of broadcasts on the Qur'an for those who do not understand Arabic. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, March 12)

(See also under: The Southern Sudan.)

THE WADI HALFA ISSUE

[In contrast to 1960 when the Nubians of Wadi Halfa were protesting against their intended transfer from their region (MER 1960, pp 416-7), the year 1961 was comparatively quiet. Nubian delegations visited the Khashm al-Girba development area which was designated by the government for their resettlement. When they returned they indicated a positive attitude towards the proposed area.]

Government Attitude Toward Wadi Halfa Inhabitants. On Jan 4 Maj.-Gen. Tal'at Farid, Minister of Information, told a delegation of Wadi Halfa citizens that the government did not bear them any malice but appreciated their position and their sacrifice and would do everything to help them. He was ready to assist anyone who wanted to go to Khashm al-Girba to see for himself the splendid prospects there. (*R. Umdurman*, Jan 5 [6])

In Feb a Wadi Halfa delegation which had visited Khashm al-Girba reportedly said that they considered it to be "the best home" they could have. (*R. Umdurman*, Feb 9 [10])

Another delegation from Wadi Halfa met President Abbud on April 20, after having toured Khashm al-Girba. Their spokesman said that they now had confidence in the government's desire to help them find new homes. He said that the delegation would honestly tell the people what they had seen and especially about the fertility of the Khashm al-Girba region. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, April 22)

[The government proceeded with the development of Khashm al-Girba area all through the year.]

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION

Liquidation of Sudanese Party Assets. On Jan 7 an amendment to the 1959 law on the liquidation of party assets was announced; it provided that any balance of assets over liabilities of political parties in the provinces were to be transferred to the Minister of the Interior on demand. (*R. Cairo*, Jan 7 [10])

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

[During 1961 the police continued to arrest Communists for distributing circulars or for other forbidden activities. They were brought to trial together with those arrested in 1960, and some were sentenced to long prison terms.

During the railway workers' strike the police uncovered an important Communist cell in Athara, the centre of the railway workers and of trade unions. Further investigations led to the arrest of members high in the hierarchy of the Communist party.]

In an interview with an American correspondent in Nov 1960, President Abbud said he did not feel there was any Communist threat in Sudan, particularly since

the economic conditions had improved. He said there were about 30 to 35 Communists under detention. (*Sudan*, Jan 1961)

Trials and Arrests. On April 20 a military court in Wad-Madani sentenced Al-Badri Hasanayn to five years imprisonment for having been caught with Communist circulars in his possession in Aug 1960. On the same day Muhammad Salih al-Tarzi was brought to court at Athara on a similar charge. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, April 21)

Athara police uncovered Communist circulars on Sept 9 in a house in the Al-Faki Madani section. The police investigation resulted in the arrest of Yis Sharafi Hasan. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Sept 12)

Two Communist Cells. On June 21 the police discovered a Communist cell in the Qubba quarters of Obeid and arrested Munsafa Abu Hasanayn and Sulayman Hamid al-Hajj, who had two Arabic typewriters, a printing press, and printed circulars in their possession. They were

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brought to trial on July 11. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 22, July 12)

On June 22 the police uncovered an important Communist cell at Aibara. In a bunker a typewriter, two mimeograph machines, paper and many circulars were found; the circulars were similar to those which were distributed during the railway workers' strike. Hundreds of copies of the Sudanese Communist clandestine magazine *At-Tal'ah* and other Communist literature were also uncovered. Uthman al-Hasan Muhammad Uthman, who was caught in the bunker, confessed, according to *Ra'y al-Amm*, that he was a member of the Communist party and that he had printed the circulars. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 23; *Akhir Sa'ah*, Cairo, July 19)

As a result of extensive investigations the police brought another 15 men before a high military court at Athara. Among those arrested were: Al-Hajj Abd ar-Rahman, a member of the central committee of the Communist party, and Muhammad Muhammad al-Hamad Salim, a member of the provincial committee and in charge of the financial affairs of the party in Athara. Among the other party functionaries were members of the Aibara city committee and members in charge of neighbourhood and professional cells.

Uthman was sentenced on Nov 6 to ten years imprisonment, reduced by the C-in-C of the armed forces to five years; Abd ar-Rahman and Salim to three years, and others to shorter terms, while two were acquitted. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Oct 8, 11, 13; *Sudan al-Jadid*, Nov 7)

GROWING OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT

Lumumba Murder Demonstrations. A number of demonstrations protesting against the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the first PM of Congo (L), were held on Feb 14-16 in Khartoum by University students, lawyers, clerks, workers, secondary school students and women.

On Feb 15 *The Sudan Daily* reported a "terrific wave" of demonstrations had swept Khartoum. Several demonstrations proceeded to the Ministry of Information where the Minister, Tal'at Farid, exhorted the demonstrators to keep discipline and order as "soldiers of the Revolution." [According to the text published he did not mention the Lumumba issue.] There was also a demonstration in Umdurman.

Anti-government slogans were shouted during all except the women's demonstrations. (On the government policy regarding the Congo question, see p 152 h.) At the lawyers' demonstration in Khartoum on Feb 15 one of the lawyers attacked the Foreign Minister for siding with President Kasavubu against Lumumba's representative at the UN Assembly and criticized the government for granting permission to the UN to land on Sudanese airfields one day before Lumumba was murdered. The speaker was arrested and sentenced to six months imprisonment.

The police dispersed the demonstrators and arrested 19 persons, mostly workers and students; some were given four months jail terms, some suspended sentences, and one was given ten lashes. (*S. Daily*, Feb 16; *Sudan al-Jadid*, Feb 18, 20, 25, March 7)

Siddiq al-Mahdi Calls for End To Military Regime. On April 11 Siddiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Ansar sect, told a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in Khartoum, while disclosing the terms of a note which he had sent to the government the previous month, that the military regime "has performed a useful purpose but has now outlived it." (In Nov 1960 Siddiq al-Mahdi was the principal

signatory to a memorandum calling on the military to hand over power to an elected civilian authority. See MER 1960 p 417.) Al-Mahdi added that he had not lost hope that the government would respond favourably to his approaches. He suggested that representatives of the army and the people should jointly prepare rules for elections. These could be administered during a transitional period by a caretaker government, appointed by the army and civilians. Al-Mahdi thought that after the end of the military regime "new political parties would emerge naturally." He threatened that if his note were ignored the possibility of "passive resistance" or of strikes might be considered. Nevertheless he said that he did not advocate violence. "I am the only man in this country who could raise a war or a rebellion," he added, "but I would not do it." He ended the interview by emphasizing that he was not against individuals in the government but against the regime itself. "I supported the regime with reservation from the start but on the understanding that it was temporary. My attitude has now changed because with my own eyes I see many wrong things happening. The army is seeking to retain power." (*Daily Telegraph*, April 12)

[The government did not react to this statement; its contents were not reported in the Sudanese press.]

Anti-Government Circulars and Demonstrations. Anti-government demonstrations took place in Umdurman on June 14 and 15; thirteen of the organizers were arrested, among them two workers, two clerks and a student. They were charged with harming national security. Eleven of them were given jail terms of three weeks to four months, two were freed. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 18, 23, 29)

Arrest of 12 Politicians and Aftermath. On July 11 in accordance with a resolution of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of July 9, 12 politicians of the old regime were arrested. They were flown to Juba in the Southern Sudan and lodged in officer hostels in a military camp. The arrested men were denied communication with the external world. They were: (1) members of the Ummah party: Abdallah Khalil, (former PM); Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub, (FM); Amin al-Tawm, and Abdallah Abd ar-Rahman Naqdalh, (both Ministers of State); (2) members of the National Unionist party: Isma'il al-Azhari, (PM); Muharak Zarq, (FM); Muhammad Ahmad al-Mardi, (Minister of Local Government), (3) others: Shaykh Abdallah al-Mirghani, [a prominent member of the Khartoum sect] (MP); Abd al-Khalil Mahjoub (leader of the dissolved Communist Anti-Imperialist Front); Abd ar-Rahman Ibrahim Jibril; Ahmad Sulayman; Abd ar-Rahman Shakhur. (*Ra'y al-Amm*; *Ahram*; *Hayat*, July 12)

In a speech on the same day Gen. Abbud charged those arrested with placing their personal interests above those of the nation; he maintained that they had engaged in opposition activities which were not in the common interest; they had spread rumours to mislead the ordinary people and incite the students. Their only aim had been to realize their personal ambitions through bringing back the old regime. In spite of warnings they had persisted in their destructive activities, and had continued preparing their "dark conspiracies." They had interpreted the government's patience as weakness. It was therefore decided to arrest them. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, July 12)

"1958 Coup Completed." *Al-Hayat* commented that the arrest of the politicians had completed the bloodless

1958 military coup d'état. *The Times* commented in similar vein.

For the last two years there had been growing political unrest fostered by the officially banned parties who based their claim to power on their past achievements: The Ummah party pointed to the part it had played in securing Sudan's independence as well as to its active opposition to the military government; the National Unionist party based its aspirations on its victory in the 1956 plebiscite and its achievements in the Sudanization of the government.

During the last nine months, since the party leaders had petitioned the military to return to the barracks, the situation had grown even more serious. The railway workers' strike [for which see below], as well as opposition activities by the Ansār during the preceding weeks, had caused the government great concern. The Ansār and Khatmiyah sects had also become active in the trade unions, especially among the railway workers.

The government reacted by putting pressure on the Ansār men who had not paid taxes and confiscated some of their land. There were also disturbances between the government and the Communist Anti-Imperialist Front. (No details were given.) The arrests came as no surprise to observers, who had remarked on the dilemma which the Abbad government faced in reconciling its professed liberal intentions with the challenge posed by the resurgence of political activities. However neither Siddiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Ansār, nor any of his closest associates had been arrested, perhaps, according to *The Times*, because an "earlier attempt" by the authorities to arrest Siddiq's son and brother had been thwarted by some of the Ansār. (*Times*; *Hayat*, July 12)

Demonstrations Forbidden. On July 11 following the arrests, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces banned all forms of gathering in the name of youth organizations, the wearing of special costumes, marching in columns, the carrying or hoisting of flags other than the national flag, and the reciting of holy verses in a manner contrary to religion (*Ra'y al-Amm*, July 12). It was understood that this ban was directed against the young followers of the Ansār and Khatmiyah sects. (*Akram*, July 12)

Demonstrations Against the Arrests. Demonstrations started however immediately after the arrests. On July 11 demonstrators in Umdurman demanded the release of the "independence hero" [Ismā'il al-Azhari]. They numbered, according to a Sudanese newspaper, about 130. They were dispersed by force and ten of them were arrested and brought before a military court. Eight of the ten objected to being tried by a military court and refused to recognize its authority. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, July 23)

Other demonstrations took place in Umdurman on July 12 and 15 and on Aug 14; one of them was organized by a clerk and a student. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, July 26, 30, Aug 30)

In Obeid, a centre of the Ansār sect, a demonstration took place on July 28. The demonstrators came out of the mosque after the Friday prayers and shouted anti-government slogans. Many of them were arrested and brought to trial. Eight were sentenced to terms ranging from one to five years imprisonment. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Aug 4, 13, 15, 18; *ANA*, Aug 8 [10])

Bloody Clash With Ansār Youth. The most serious clash

between demonstrators and the police took place in Umdurman on Aug 21 on the eve of the Prophet's birthday celebration (*ma'lid an-nabi*), when a group of youths of the Ansār sect marched from the tomb of Al-Mahdi to the Prophet's Birthday Square. According to an official statement they were marching "in an illegal semi-military procession under a religious guise." The police asked them to disperse but they refused; the police then used tear-gas. The demonstrators then attacked the policemen with clubs and knives and the police opened fire. 12 of the demonstrators were killed and 19 wounded [the number was apparently much greater]; three policemen were killed and five wounded. (*S. Daily*, Aug 23; *Ra'y al-Amm*, Aug 22, 23, 29; *Akram*; *Hayat*, Aug 23, 30)

[The immediate reaction of the government authorities was rather moderate.] Representatives of the province government attended the funerals of the demonstrators killed and expressed their sympathy to the bereaved families. The police began an immediate investigation but made no arrests. Only after the wounded recovered did the police arrest 34, but they were released on bail on Dec 18. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Aug 23, Dec 19)

In contrast, the police placed Siddiq al-Mahdi, the head of the Ansār, under house arrest, and arrested 100 leaders of the sect. The government spokesman explained this step as a means of preventing Siddiq from inciting his followers to new riots. (*Hayat*, Aug 23)

Government sources reported that after the demonstration, Umdurman and the rest of the country were quiet; even the funeral of those killed had created no incidents. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Aug 23)

At Khartoum University on the other hand, attempts were made to organize a protest strike. Two students were dismissed from the university for their attempt to organize the strike (*Hayat*, Aug 30). [No further details about the strike were reported, and it apparently did not take place.]

The head of the Khatmiyah sect, Ali al-Mirghāni, issued a public statement in which he expressed his regret for the "bloody events." He offered his condolences to the bereaved families and called on all to work for the good of the country; he declared that one of the most sacred duties of every citizen was to work for the security, peace and prosperity of the country. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Aug 30)

Ansār Leader Dies, His Will Commands and His Successor Vows Continued Opposition to Present Regime. Sayyid Siddiq al-Mahdi, the Imām of the Ansār religious sect, died on Oct 2, from a heart attack. Born in 1911 to Abd ar-Rahmān al-Mahdi, he was the grandson of the founder of the sect, Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad, who led the Dervish revolt in 1882. He succeeded his father, who died in 1959, as head of the Ansār. He was president of the Ummah party that was in power before the coup d'état in 1958 after which political parties were dissolved.

President Abbad and all his ministers as well as Sayyid Ali al-Mirghāni, the head of the Khatmiyah sect, were among those who came to pay their condolences.

Students headed the funeral procession in which army officers carried the Imām's body, draped in the Sudanese flag. Many of the mourners fainted. (*Mid. Mir.*, Oct 7; *S. News*, Oct 11)

Siddiq was succeeded as Imām of the Ansār by his brother, al-Hadi. From Cairo were reported the following details of the last will of Imām Siddiq, which had been received from the Secretariat of the Imām al-

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Hadi: "During the last moments of his life Imām Siddiq confided the following to his elder son, Sayyid as-Sādiq al-Mahdi:

1. Our demand is the demand of the whole country: (a) General freedom, democracy and a representative system of government; (h) the Mahdi family have no specific demands for enmity with anybody; (c) you should uphold these demands whatever the cost may be; (d) the Ansār organization should continue intact; (e) you should be careful to maintain your relations with its followers and friends.

2. A five-man council should be formed to consist of Sayyids Abdallah al-Fadl, al-Hādi al-Mahdi, Yahya al-Mahdi, Ahmad al-Mahdi and as-Sādiq al-Mahdi. They should be united in looking after its religious and nationalist affairs. When you meet to select a successor, the selection must be endorsed by the Ansār.

When the council met before the interment of Imām Siddiq it was decided that in view of what were considered critical circumstances and to ensure the unity of the Ansār sect it was necessary to choose a successor forthwith. When Sayyid al-Hādi was chosen unanimously, he declared: "The great principles willed by my brother, the late Imām Siddiq al-Mahdi, and which the people agreed to support, will be my guidance. I will begin in the religious and nationalist fields (from) where Siddiq ended. I will raise the flag in the field and carry it forward. May God help me!" (*Mid. Mirror, Oct 21*)

Later in the month, Imām al-Hādi paid a visit to President Abbud. An official statement published some days later said that al-Hādi had expressed his thanks to the President for the government's participation in the mourning for and the funeral of the late Imām. The interpretation of this visit by some citizens, the statement continued, was "far from the truth." The meeting was cordial but no subjects were discussed which could give rise to such "misunderstandings" [on which the statement gave no details]. (*S. Daily, Oct 30*)

Students Demonstration; University Closed. On Oct 4 a student demonstration at Khartoum University expressed support for the struggle of the Algerian people. A number of students shouted anti-government slogans. The police dispersed the demonstrators; some were arrested and brought to trial. (*Sudan al-Jadid, Nov 9*)

The student's council requested the release of the detained students; instead the government arrested some of the members of the council. The number of the arrested reached 19; Akhīr Sā'ah reported that they had been members of the dissolved political parties.

On Nov 8 the students reacted by declaring a strike and on Nov 12 the authorities closed the university and the students were ordered to return to their homes. (*Ra'y al-Amm, Nov 9, 10; Akhīr, Sudan al-Jadid, Nov 13; Akhīr Sā'ah, Cairo, Nov 22*)

[By the end of the year the university was still closed.]

High School Students Join Strike. The students of the Technical Institute in Khartoum proclaimed a [solidarity?] strike on Nov 8. They were joined during the following days by students from more high schools. (*Ra'y al-Amm, Nov 10; Sudan al-Jadid, Nov 13, 14, 15*)

The Ministry of Education warned the students that unless they returned to their classes by Nov 16, they would not be able to return until Jan 1, 1962, and the authorities would consider their suspension from school; they would not be allowed to take their final examinations. (*Sudan al-Jadid, Nov 13, 15*)

In Nov the authorities decided to reopen the university on Jan 2, 1962. (*S. Daily, Nov 23*)

Other Opposition Trials. A military tribunal was set up to try the accused, Hamid Muhammad Uthmān and Abdallah Mustafa Hamad an-Nil, under article 4a of the Sudanese Defence Regulations of 1952, for offences against the State. The trial began on Jan 25. (*R. Urduman, Jan 25 [25], Jan 25 [28]*)

On June 13 the High Court of Khartoum sentenced an engraver by trade to a year's imprisonment, for distributing anti-regime circulars, under article 4a of the Sudanese Defence Regulations. He was caught on July 27, 1960. (*Ra'y al-Amm, June 14*)

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS

[Unlike 1960 which saw the press play an important role in the political struggle (see MER 1960, p 412), the year 1961 was comparatively calm.]

Al-Ayyām Closed Down. On Jan 16 the government closed the Sudanese paper *Al-Ayyām*, which had the highest circulation. The official reason given was that it had published an article which had harmed the good name of Sudan and insulted the diplomatic corps; this was a violation of the press law. [Bashir Muhammad Sa'id, its editor and author of the article, was one of the signatories of the petition presented to President Abbud at the end of Nov 1960 which requested that he terminate military rule. (For the petition see MER 1960, p 417).] (*S. Daily, Jan 17; Times, Monde, Jan 18*)

[Another factor may have contributed to the closing of the paper.] Muhammad Ali Bashir, chairman of the dissolved Railway Workers Union, and Muhammad al-Hasan Bashir, an *Al-Ayyām* correspondent reporting from Atbara, were charged in Aug with disseminating harmful lies. The correspondent published an interview with Muhammad Ali Bashir in which the latter charged the Railway Administration with interfering on behalf of a number of candidates in the election of the Workers' Union which was held on Jan 7. (*Ra'y al-Amm, Aug 3*)

Al-Ayyām was closed previously by the government in Dec 1959, but resumed publication in April 1960. (*Times, Jan 18*)

THE GOVERNMENT AND LABOUR

THE GOVERNMENT AND LABOUR

Registration of TUs. (See MER 1960, pp 410-3.) Three new trade unions—the Ministry of Education Workers, the Khartoum University Workers, and the Khartoum Municipality Workers—were registered in Jan, bringing

the total number of unions registered so far to 26. (*R. Cairo, Jan 22 [W 26]*)

Elections to Railway Workers Union. Elections for members of the council, secretary and president of the Rail-

way Workers' Union were held on Jan 6-8. Later, Ali Muhammad Bashir, who was elected chairman, accused the Railway Administration of intervening on behalf of certain candidates. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Jan 7-9, Aug 3)

Workers' Pro-Government Demonstrations. According to official information, in May labour unions twice demonstrated in favour of the government. On May 4 workers of the Central Electricity and Water Administration in Umdurman and Khartoum marched in a peaceful demonstration to the Ministry of Information and Labour, thanking the Minister for his efforts to find a solution to the conflict which had arisen between the Administration and the workers (*R. Umdurman*, May 5 [10]; *Ra'y al-Amm*, May 5). On May 11 the Khartoum Province [government] Workers' Union demonstrated in appreciation of the authorities' efforts to satisfy the workers' demands. The chairman of the union pointed out the loyalty of the members of his organization to the revolution. In reply Maj.-Gen. Ta'at Farid, Minister of Information and Labour, stated that his office was established to serve the workers, and he emphasized that the labour laws aimed at protecting the workers' interests, so long as the workers abided by the laws. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, May 12)

RAILWAY WORKERS' STRIKE

Workers' Demands. On Feb 7 the Railway Workers' Union raised a number of demands, and the Railway Administration began to examine them. (The demands were jointly worked out with the workers of the Department of Steamers in Khartoum.) (*Sudan al-Jadid*, Feb 8)

When by April 10 the Railway Administration had not responded, the union presented a memorandum to Muhammad al-Fadi, the director general of the Railways. It reiterated the workers' basic demands: (1) a wage increase of 45%; (2) a new evaluation of the workers' grading system; (3) retirement pension at the age of 60 for workers belonging to the insurance fund and retirement pension at the age of 65 for all other workers. The memorandum gave a detailed explanation of the reasons and causes which prompted the demands. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, April 12)

Fruitless Negotiations; Union Declares Strike to Start on June 17. The director general of Railways met with the representatives of the union on May 6 and 7. He rejected their request that he reply to their demands within a set time limit. A week later he failed to respond to a request by the union representatives to meet with them. Thereafter, on May 18 the workers informed him that they could not wait any longer and that they would have to take appropriate measures to achieve their demands; the responsibility for the consequences would rest with him. A few days later the union published notices calling for a strike. The director general turned on May 31 to the director of the Labour Department and requested him to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the Labour Disputes Law of 1960 (see MER 1960, p 411).

On June 1 the Union notified the director general that on June 17 a seven-day strike would be declared. (*R. Umdurman*, June 7 [9]; *Ra'y al-Amm*, June 7)

Government Intervention. The director of the Labour Department responded to the request for arbitration and invited representatives of both sides to meet with him on June 3. He called the attention of the Union to para 16 of the Labour Disputes Law which forbids the

proclamation of a strike after one of the parties had asked the director of the Labour Department to arbitrate. However, the union representatives did not come to the meeting. Three days later (June 6) Maj.-Gen. Ahmad Majdhub al-Bahari, Minister of Communications, entered the picture. He publicly warned the workers against declaring an unlawful strike (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 7). On the following day he spoke of the harm a strike would do to the economy. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 8)

Following these developments the central committee of the Railway Workers went from Athara to Khartoum to meet with the director of the Labour Department. They were joined by the representatives of workers of the Department of Steamers. At the meeting of June 8, they maintained that the direct negotiations between them and the employer were not terminated, in accordance with art. 5 of the Labour Disputes Law [hence their failure to respond to the director's invitation]. The director of the Labour Department replied that the law forbids any strike threats. The meeting ended inconclusively. On June 9 the committee returned to Athara. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 8, 10)

In two statements issued on June 10 and 11, the Minister of Communications rejected the arguments of the union and advised the workers not to proceed with an illegal strike; he warned them of the legal consequences should they stop working. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 11, 13)

Attempts at Settlement. On June 11 an attempt was made at Athara to form a committee composed of public figures to attempt to arbitrate the dispute. But the Minister of Communications in his sixth public statement on the subject, issued on June 12, rejected the proposed arbitration; he maintained that as the matter had been brought before the Department of Labour, it alone was authorized to settle the dispute. He again warned the union not to declare the strike. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 13)

Dissolution of the Railway Workers' Union. On June 13 the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces decided to dissolve the Railway Workers' Union with immediate effect because of its "blatant defiance of the law" by declaring an illegal strike and because of the possibly adverse effects of such a strike on the economy. The Minister of Communications warned that legal proceedings would be taken against every worker who would strike. He assured the workers that the dissolution of the union would not affect the normal relations between the Railway Administration and the workers, that their rights would be protected and their grievances heard. (*R. Umdurman*, June 13 [15])

An Umdurman Radio commentary said the previous appeals and warnings issued to the workers by the government were not a consequence of panic but emanated from the government's responsibility, kindness and justice. The workers should have realized that the revolutionary government was capable of enforcing the law. The Supreme Council had acted as the surgeon who amputates the diseased member to prevent the spread of infection. The country would now proceed "in calm and tranquil conditions" to build its future.

The radio also reported that a number of trade unions had called on the railway workers to desist from the strike. (*R. Umdurman*, June 13 [16])

Politicians, Sects Said to Be Involved in Strike. An article in *Ath-Thawrah* quoted by Umdurman Radio on

the day of the dissolution of the union gave a picture of widespread unrest, and connected the politicians of the former regime with the strike. It was no coincidence, the article said, that the streets of the capital should be filled with leaflets and the tea shops with politicians of the former regime. These men had attempted to use the workers to achieve their interests. The article referred to some incidents for which these men had been responsible, including the shedding of the "blood of farmers in Amber-Korti," and concluded that it was a pity that the workers should choose their friends among such men. (*R. Umdurman, June 13 [15]*)

The *Times* later reported that the Ansār and Khat-miyah sects had become active in the trade unions and especially among the railway workers. (*Times, July 12*)

Official Denial of Communist Influence. At a later date, on Oct 10, the Minister of Communications denied, in answer to a question, any Communist connection with the railway workers' strikes and said: "The Sudanese are far from being Communists owing to the nature of their religion, their morals and the absence of class differences between them. If a few of them have deviated, I do not think that they would affect the activities of the State. The recent strikes occurred through misunderstanding, ignorance and chaos." (*R. Umdurman, Oct 10 [12]*) [No comments on this strike were found in the Communist sources under survey for MER.]

The Strike. In spite of the government's warnings, the strike began on the day it was set: June 17. According to the Minister of Communications, "the number of strikers in Khartoum, Port Sudan and Obeid did not amount to more than 10%." (It should be remembered that the centre of the Railway Union and its greatest strength was at Athbara.) (*Ra'y al-Amm, June 18*) [The steamers employees also went on strike.]

On June 19 and 20 the Railway Administration recalled the veteran workers who had left the railway, for a six-month period. The Minister of Communications reported a great response to this call, he also maintained that the number of strikers who were returning to work in Khartoum, Madani, Sennar and Kaveina was constantly increasing, 1000 engineering workers at "railway headquarters" were continuing work as usual.

The authorities announced the departure of individual trains and steamers and said on June 21 that trains were moving on proper schedule and that it was now possible to supply the public in all areas with all the necessities. (*R. Umdurman, June 19, 20, 21 [21, 22, 23]; Ra'y al-Amm, June 20, 21, 23*)

Minister of Communications at Centre of Strike. On June 22 the Minister of Communications arrived at Athbara where he discussed operational arrangements and methods to "deny saboteurs the opportunity to impede the programme of work or to create dissension in the ranks of the workers." A member of the Northern Province council addressed a public reception in the city square and stated that the workers had used the strike weapon many times as a means for obtaining their demands; the strike was not aimed against the revolutionary government. He asked the Minister to treat the workers' requests with consideration.

In his response the Minister recalled the development of events which culminated in the illegal strike, and assured his audience that the government would continue to care for the welfare of the workers. From there the Minister went to the railway workshops and met with

the non-striking workers and praised their patriotism. (*Ra'y al-Amm, June 23*)

End of Strike. On June 24 the Minister of Communications announced that as of 10 a.m. all railway workers had returned to work, and that train operations were back to normal. [*A-Ra'y al-Amm* stressed particularly the return of the workers at Athbara.] (*Ra'y al-Amm, June 25*)

[No report has been found on the causes for the termination of the strike.]

The strike was reported to have been fairly effective. The trade unions were said to have threatened to continue their struggle. (*Times, July 12*)

Post-Strike Government Policy: "Stick and Carrot." [The government now took punitive as well as conciliatory measures. It imposed financial penalties on strikers on the one hand and promised improvements in working conditions on the other; it used moderate language in treating the strikers and the strike.]

On June 27 the government announced that for each day of strike, the workers would lose two days' pay. (*Ra'y al-Amm, June 28*)

On July 6 the Minister of Communications announced, at a press conference, that the government had decided to introduce many improvements for the workers, but he did not spell them out. He praised the conduct of the workers and pointed out that except for a small number of workers, the strikers did no harm either to public order or to security. The dissolution of the union was "the direct result of its error of declaring an illegal strike." But it was not to be ruled out that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces would in future reconsider the issue. (*Ra'y al-Amm, July 7*)

The Strike Renewed. On July 25 a number of workers, especially those at Athbara, renewed the strike. The number of strikers was reported as 1,354. On the same day the strikers at Athbara demonstrated and shouted anti-government slogans. Sixteen persons were arrested and brought to trial. Four were acquitted on Aug 9, and the other 12 were given suspended sentences on condition of guarantees for good behaviour for one year (*Ra'y al-Amm, July 27, 30 Aug 1, 10*). On July 26 the Minister of Communications announced that any worker who had not returned to work on July 27 would be considered dismissed and that strong measures would be taken against him.

The threat proved effective, and on that day the majority of the strikers returned. The Minister of Communications announced that those who had not returned would be dismissed and punished. (*Ra'y al-Amm, July 27, 28; R. Umdurman, July 27 [29]*)

Government Measures After Termination of Strike. [Even now the government continued to operate along the same lines as before; it promised improvements and punished strikers; ultimately however, it acted moderately and most of the measures taken against the workers were cancelled.]

On Aug 3 it was reported that many additional railway workers would be included in the pension scheme, in addition to the cost of living increase which was instituted by the Railway Administration.

The workers who struck were dismissed and ordered to appear before discipline committees. Most of them were reinstated, but they were denied the pay increases

which had been recently granted the others. Among those dismissed was Ali Muhammad Bashir, chairman of the dissolved union, who was released from jail together with Mahjûb Uthmân, the secretary general of the union. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, July 29, Aug 1, 3, 4, 6)

In the end all the dismissals save the latter two were cancelled. On Aug 10 the Minister of Communications met at Atbara with representatives of the workers and the railway administration. He declared all dismissals as cancelled and assured the workers that the government was striving to improve their conditions. He also announced that Abu Bakr Ali Rida was named general

manager of the railway administration, as the "service period of the former manager had ended" and he "was pensioned off." (*R. Umdurman*, Aug 11 [14]; *Ra'y al-Amm*, Aug 11, 25)

In Oct. in fulfillment of a promise made by President Abbud during his visit to Atbara to grant financial assistance for the schooling of workers' children, the authorities ordered the payment of £53,200 [recipients not reported] for scholarship grants for 788 children, at the rate of £5 2, 6, 10 and 15 respectively for each student in elementary, intermediate, secondary and higher institutions. (*S. Daily*, Oct 18)

THE SOUTHERN SUDAN

Synopsis. [The government continued to apply its policy of Sudanization in Southern Sudan through the spreading of Islam and the Arab language. At the same time the government further curtailed the activities of foreign Christian missionaries who were deemed an adverse force to the national integration of Sudan on the Islamic-Arabic basis.]

There was some evidence of continued political unrest; a number of political refugees fled the country and a Minister made a statement which implied that there was agitation for autonomy of the South in a federal framework. The government continued to take various measures to win the support of the South for its policies and to provide evidence of such support.]

POLITICAL UNREST, PACIFICATION EFFORTS, ADMINISTRATION

Southern Political Refugees. [Compared with previous years there were no reports of serious unrest in Southern Sudan.]

A Cairo source reported in March that since the beginning of the year eight persons had fled the Southern Sudan to Kenya. The last one was an important official by the name of William Ding who had asked for political asylum. The refugees were intellectuals who had received their training in the missionary schools. Their flight, the weekly claimed, was part of an imperialist plot carried out by the missionaries and the staff of their mobile hospitals in the south. Their aim was to establish a government of exiles whose task would be to separate the Southern Sudan from the North or to achieve autonomy for the South in a Sudanese federal framework. (*Rux al-Yusuf*, March 6)

An official Sudanese source said that complete security and stability reigned in Southern Sudan and that the flight of some Southerners to Kenya was caused by personal differences which had nothing to do with politics. (*MENA*, March 15 [17])

New Decentralized Provincial Administration. Claimed "to Finish" Federation Aspirations. In July Santino Deng Teng, the Minister for Animal Resources and a Southerner, said that with the introduction of the province councils (see above: The New Provincial Administration) "the call for federation is finished." Though the advocates of federation in the South really wished to tear the country apart, they clamoured for an opportunity to administer their affairs by themselves. This latter aspiration had now been realized throughout the country. (*S. Daily*, July 4)

Support Shown for the Government. [The Sudanese press often published reports to show the support of the Southerners for the government. Following is an example.]

In Oct it was reported that many delegations of citizens from Upper Nile province came to the Government Representative to convey their congratulations on the safe return of President Abbud from the Belgrade conference. "Each delegation expressed their appreciation of the President's activities at the conference, absolute support for the Revolution Government... had a letter addressed to Gen. Abbud and the leader of each delegation read his letter [to the Government Representative]." (*S. Daily*, Oct 5)

Local Government Activities. From time to time reports appeared on the work of the focal councils in the South. A meeting of the Yambio rural council, Equatoria province, was reported in Oct. In addition to routine procedure, this meeting adopted a proposal from the central government to set up a "fishing industry"; it heard a report from the inspector of village schools, was informed of the appointment of two representatives to the province council and confirmed the allotment of land for cotton cultivation. "All items... were discussed in an amicable atmosphere." (*S. Daily*, Oct 12)

A Visit to An Outlying District By the Military Ruler. Following is a detailed description of a one-day visit of the Military Ruler and Governor of Upper Nile province to Fangak, Zeraf district. Fangak, he pointed out on one occasion, was "not much heard [of] in the province headquarters" but now he had seen it and found it well organized.

He arrived early in the morning by steamer and he was received by the local officials, notables and the Nuer Umdahs who gave him a "bull name" in accordance with local custom and presented him with a bull; the governor in return gave them two bulls.

Making his round of local offices and institutions, he asked the district commissioner to present the patients of the local dispensary with gifts of grain.

At the market place the merchants complained of transport difficulties during the rainy season; the governor in reply urged them to form a "sort of a co-operative" to concentrate their buying and stocking of commodities.

Visiting an elementary school he urged that the [resident] pupils be provided with good food and clothing in order to attract more pupils from the villages. He asked that the pupils be given gifts of sweets. At another school he discussed transport problems, and suggested

that local Christian priests would be preferable to foreigners.

At a meeting with officials and members of local councils including tribal chiefs, the governor expounded the advantages of the new provincial administration, especially the participation of the people in conducting their affairs.

In the afternoon there were three hours of tribal dances and in the evening films were shown by a mobile cinema unit which had accompanied the governor.

This was just one of a series of tours which the governor had planned, the report concluded. (*S. Daily*, July 19)

CURTAILING CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES

Abbud: Missionaries Oppose National Independence. On Sept 1 in his speech at the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade, President Abbud said Colonialism "may also take the form of improper direction to the internal affairs of a certain country by means of conditioned aid or trade or imposed culture or religion. The resistance of missionaries to national independence is still fresh in many minds." (*Doc. Belg.*, p 57)

Missionary Hospitals Taken Over and Medical Activities Curtailed. In July it was announced that the Ministry of Health had taken over missionary hospitals in Upper Nile and Kordofan provinces and in the Nuba mountains. The Ministry intended to terminate all missionary medical work everywhere in Sudan, except at Umdurman missionary hospital. (*R. Umdurman*, July 24 [*W. Aug 10*])

Missionary Activities Curtailed. In Oct a Dutch priest, an Italian nun and an American Protestant missionary were expelled from Sudan. In Nov two Verona missionaries were expelled after 24 hours' notice. Missionary schools, *The Catholic Times* reported, had been confiscated in Southern Sudan as far back as 1957 and no new missionaries were allowed into the country. No religious buildings were permitted to be erected and parents had to apply in writing to the police for permission to have children baptized. The application form had to be obtained from the district commissioner and the application itself had to be sponsored by the village chief, who was often not a Christian. Since Aug, it was reported, no missionary was allowed to leave the grounds of his mission without the permission of a district commissioner "who often lives hundreds of miles away." Permission to visit people who were gravely ill was granted only rarely. (*Catholic Times*, Oct 20; *Univette*, Nov 24)

SUDANIZATION; SPREADING OF ISLAM AND ARABIC

The Grand Qādi's Visits, Islamization. Mahjūh Ishāq, the Grand Qādi of Sudan, began on Jan 15 a 15-day tour of the Southern provinces. The Shaykh, it was reported, was received everywhere with great enthusiasm by the governors, the army, government officials, Qādis

and other religious functionaries and local notables. Special prayers were offered for him; and he in turn distributed clothing and other gifts to the people. [A campaign against nudity was part of the Islamization effort; compare MER 1960, p 418.] He dedicated new religious buildings and expressed the belief that "the word of God would grow among the Dinka." At one place the Qādi was met by "a large number of Eastern Nuer chiefs" who had been "embracing Islam since [last] Sept."

Speakers on various occasions stressed such themes as the "importance of Islam as the national religion of Sudan." (*S. Daily*, Jan 15, 16, 24, 29, Feb 9)

When he returned to Khartoum Shaykh Mahjūh stated that Islam was spreading rapidly in the South and that encouraging the study of Arabic was an important means for spreading Islam. During his tour he had Islamized some 2,000 people. (*R. Cairo*, Feb 9 [11])

When the Shaykh met President Abbud he expressed the gratefulness of the population for the government's efforts on behalf of Islam. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, Feb 13)

The Qādi of Wau said that visits like that of Shaykh Mahjūh encouraged those working for Islam. He stated that in the Awil district alone more than 400 persons had been Islamized during the Shaykh's visit. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, Feb 20)

Establishment of Religious Institutions. In May Ali Baldu, the Governor of Equatoria province, announced that some 30 new *khalwas* (school and prayer centres) and 14 mosques would be erected in his province in addition to the 43 *khalwas* and 13 mosques already in existence. He added that an institute for religious studies would be established in each district. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, May 13)

In June it was reported that the government had decided to open a faculty of Islamic studies at Juba (*Musawwar*, Cairo, June 16). In Aug plans were announced for opening an additional nine institutes for Islamic studies. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Aug 15)

Promotion and Supervision of Cultural Activities. In Sept the Government Representative in Upper Nile province appointed a committee for the promotion of culture with the aim to advance "the social mission" by the following means:

1. The unification of language to spread national consciousness;
2. Consolidation of national integrity;
3. Encouraging virtuous and good conduct.

For these ends the committee was to promote sport, public recreation facilities, music and art shows, and folklore. The committee was empowered to supervise all cultural activities in the province, to coordinate societies promoting "public culture" and to report on them to the authorities; committee members would become *ex-officio* honorary members of any such society. (*S. Daily*, Sept 28)

The Department of Religious Affairs selected a number of high school students from the South studying in Umdurman to serve as teachers of Arabic and religion in the elementary schools in Equatoria province. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Oct 18)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYNOPSIS, VIEWS AND POLICIES

SYNOPSIS

Sudan continued to pursue a policy of "positive neutralism" or "non-alignment" while keeping out of international entanglements as far as she could. She utilized her non-aligned position for getting aid from both East and West as well as to bolster her international prestige, not least for internal political considerations. President Abbud participated in the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries where he took a moderate stand.

Sudan strove to develop cordial relations with both Communist countries and the West. President Abbud visited the Soviet Union in July and the US in October, while President Brezhnev of the USSR paid a return visit in Nov. While in his public utterances in the US Gen. Abbud spoke in praise of US economic assistance, US-Sudanese friendship and Sudan's confidence in the US's support for freedom, Sudan was nevertheless closer to the East in her attitude to international issues. This was made clear in the joint communiques of Gen Abbud with President Kennedy on the one hand and President Brezhnev on the other. Abbud and Brezhnev stated that their community of views on fundamental international questions provided opportunities for Soviet-Sudanese co-operation in the world arena. The Soviet government also endorsed Sudan's non-alignment policy. No such outright endorsement was included in the Abbud-Kennedy communique and a divergence of views was also discernible in regard to African affairs. On the German and Berlin questions, Abbud's attitude was non-committal in both documents. Like all Arab countries at the UN General Assembly, Sudan voted much more often with the USSR than with the US (64.1% against 24.8% of all votes at the 15th session; 56.8% to 18.4% at the 16th session). In this respect she was placed about halfway between Arab countries such as Iraq, the UAR and Morocco which had the highest voting coincidence with the Communist countries and those with the lowest, namely Tunisia, Libya and Jordan.

While US economic and technical assistance continued—some \$13m. were programmed for US fiscal year 1961, and about \$12. for 1962—Abbud obtained a \$22m. credit in Moscow for development projects. A major achievement in the aid field was the \$50m. agreement for the financing of the Roseires dam project through long-term loans on easy terms by the World Bank, the International Development Association and West Germany. The latter also continued to extend other important development and technical assistance.

More contacts were also established with the East European countries and the People's Republic of China. Close cooperation continued with non-aligned Yugoslavia which played an important role in Sudan's economic development efforts; the two countries established a joint-shipping line.

Sudan continued to be on good terms with the UK; the British-trained-and-equipped Sudanese army received a British gift of arms, and Sudanese army officers trained in Britain. The UK continued to be Sudan's most important trading partner.

Sudan continued to identify herself with Africa more

than with the Arab world. No pronunciation on Arab nationalism was apparently made by the Sudanese leaders while they often emphasized Sudan's Africanness. Significantly, in Gen. Abbud's joint communiques with the Soviet and US Presidents, no mention was made of Arab questions—save for Algeria—nor of the Arab-Israel conflict while African questions figured prominently and in detail. At the Belgrade conference Gen. Abbud spoke of Sudan as an African, not as an Arab, country.

In practice Sudan kept out of inter-African as much as of inter-Arab affairs. She declined invitations to attend both the Casablanca and the rival Monrovia conferences. At the same time she promoted her relations with individual countries and especially with the UAR, her powerful neighbour, though neither on the Congo question nor in regard to the Casablanca group did she follow the UAR's lead. Sudan was the only Arab country, besides the UAR itself, which by the end of the year had not yet recognized the Syrian Republic which had seceded from the UAR.

As for other ME and African countries, relations continued to be closest with Ethiopia. Various contacts were established also with other African countries.

VIEWS AND POLICIES

[Note: The views and policies recorded here are supplementary to those quoted in MER 1960 (p 421); no change in declared policies was discernible. For Sudanese views and attitudes on world issues see under The Belgrade Conference, and also President Abbud's joint communiques with President Kennedy and PM Khrushchov, below. On Sudanese identification with African nationalism, see above: Internal Affairs, Views and Policies. It may be noted that along with other neutralist leaders, President Abbud discontinued the use of the term "positive neutralism," resorting exclusively to "non-alignment."]

Sudan Respected By Neutrals and East and West. President Abbud, Nov 17: "The Sudan is no longer a mere space on the map of the world but has become a powerful state whose friendship is sought by world nations."

"The Sudan appeared to the world in its true face. It was trusted in Moscow, appreciated by the leaders who met in Belgrade and supported in Washington, and so the true worth of the Sudan has been well established all over the world. When I toured the East and the West I wished that you were with me to share the pride I felt, the appreciation I received and the praise I heard on your behalf." (*Sudan News*, Nov 27)

The Policy of Non-Alignment and Anti-Colonialism. President Abbud, addressing President Brezhnev of the USSR, Khartoum, Nov 16: "We in the Sudan... keep the doors of our markets open to all. We stretch a hand of friendship to all countries irrespective of their political and social systems, and support the liberation movements and independence of nations, because we strongly believe that by so doing we shall contribute to the alleviation of world tension and strengthen the foundations of peace." (*S. Daily*, Nov 17)

African Union—A Project for Future Generations. President Abbud in an interview with an American correspondent, Nov 1960: "At present every country in Africa must make itself economically and industrially sound.

And after that we may think of a United States of Africa." But he said in answer to further questions that he did not think union would come about during his lifetime. (*Sudan, Jan 1961*)

RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Views and Policies on Africa. See above: Synopsis; Views and Policies.

Sudan in African Affairs in General. See: Congo (L); Afro-Asian and African Conferences.

"Duty of Spreading Islam in Africa." In an article on *al-ma'had al-ilmī* (institute of Islamic and Arabic studies) of Umdurman, Sudan, the government monthly, said that it was the "historic duty" of Sudan to spread Islamic culture among the peoples of Africa. Sudan claimed that *al-ma'had* was the "largest institute of Islamic culture in Africa south of the Tropic of Cancer" and ranked second only to Al-Azhar of Cairo. It was established in 1912 and in 1943 it engaged teachers from Al-Azhar in order to raise the standard of teaching. In 1955 a Religious Affairs Department was formed which enabled *al-ma'had* "to meet its developing responsibility in spreading the Islamic culture amongst Sudanese and other African people." *Al-ma'had's* certificates qualified their holders to enrol for shari'ah studies at the Faculty of Law, Khartoum University, while graduates of its "higher section" were also accepted at Al-Azhar. During the current year Al-Azhar had made available to Sudan 30 scholarships, ten of them to *al-ma'had* graduates. *Al-ma'had* had foreign students from Nigeria, Somalia, Morocco and Southern Arabia. (*Sudan, Oct*)

Chad. On June 20 Chad's [first] Ambassador to Sudan presented his credentials to Gen. Abbud. (*Sudan al-Jadid, June 21*)

Chad visitors to Sudan included the FM (Feh) and the Ministers of the Interior (May), Finance and Information (Dec). (*Sudan, Feb; R. Umdurman, May 15 [17], Dec 7 [9]*)

Congo (L). (On Sudan's attitude to the Congo conflict, see p 152 h.)

A Congolese trade delegation arrived in Khartoum in Dec. Preliminary trade talks had been held during the visit to Sudan [time not specified] of the Congolese Ministers of Economy and Trade. (*SNA, Dec 14, 29, 30, 31*)

Ethiopia. An Ethiopian source said in Feb that since the signing of the Ethiopian Sudanese trade agreement in 1958 the value of Ethiopian exports to Sudan had risen from \$Eh2 million to over \$Eh9 million and Ethiopian imports from Sudan—from \$Eh5 million to over \$Eh10 million. (*R. Addis Ababa, Feb 10 [W. 16]; Compare table: ME Foreign Trade.*)

On May 30 Ethiopian and Sudanese experts discussed in Addis Ababa joint measures to control epidemics in the border areas. The director of the Ethiopian department concerned said that such joint efforts by "the two sister neighbours" would serve as a good example for neighbouring countries. (*R. Addis Ababa, May 30 [W. June 8], June 6 [W. 15]*)

On Aug 5 Emperor Haile Selassie inaugurated in Addis Ababa a social club, Sudan House, which he said would further strengthen Sudanese-Ethiopian ties of friendship. He also expressed his gratitude to the Sudanese people for their help in the liberation of Ethiopia 20 years ago. *The Ethiopian Herald* commented that "the pattern set by the Sudan and Ethiopia [in] regarding boundaries as points of friendship is worthy of imitation . . . particularly [by] African [nations]." (*Ethiopian Herald, Aug 6, 8*)

A group of Sudanese artists and singers, sent by the Sudanese Ministry of Information, toured Ethiopia for a month. Members of the group were received by Emperor Haile Selassie. (*R. Addis Ababa, Sept 22 [25]; Sudan News, Oct 11*)

Ghana. The Ghanaian FM visited Khartoum in Jan. (*Hayat, Jan 21*)

In April Ghana Airways Ltd. opened an Accra-Khartoum air link. The Ghanaian Minister of Communications arrived in Khartoum aboard the first plane, accompanied by a musical troupe which performed for the Sudanese soldiers returning from Congo. (*R. Umdurman, April 26 [28]; S. News, April 30*)

Guinea. On May 17 on his way home from the UAR, President Sekou Touré stayed overnight in Khartoum because of engine trouble in his aircraft. President Abbud met him at the airport and the two Presidents used the opportunity to hold talks. (*Morning News, May 18*)

The two Presidents met again in Khartoum on June 23, following Sekou Touré's state visit to Ethiopia. A communiqué said the two Presidents supported the idea of an early meeting of African heads of state. (*R. Cairo, June 24, BBC in Arabic, June 26—IMB, June 25, 27*)

In Aug Seydou Diallo, Guinean Ambassador to the UAR, presented his credentials to President Abbud as his country's [first?] Ambassador to Sudan. (*Ahram, Aug 24*)

Kenya. On the release of Jomo Kenyatta, the Kenyan leader, a Sudanese spokesman said that the news had overwhelmed the whole of Africa with joy. Sudan, he continued, linked with Kenya by common aims, struggle and frontier, had been first to declare her support for the Kenyan leader and his people. This had been done in a message from President Abbud to Kenyatta. (*R. Umdurman, Aug 17 [19]*)

Nigeria. On May 30, Sir Ahmadu Bello, PM of Northern Nigeria, arrived in Khartoum for a four-day official visit.

Bello announced that his government would award two scholarships to Sudanese to study at the Institute of Administration in Zaria. He revealed that the Sudanese government had promised to provide Northern Nigeria with experienced magistrates and had also awarded additional scholarships to Northern Nigerians for study in the republic. He thanked Sudan for its help.

(Daily Express, Lagos, June 2; Daily Times, Lagos, May 31, June 5, 7)

The governments of Sudan and Nigeria agreed on the repatriation of 750 jobless Nigerians from Sudan. Five hundred and forty-five had already been returned. (MENA, May 8 [10])

On Aug 28 six Nigerian students arrived in Khartoum for study. (R. Umdurman, Aug 29 [30])

A North Nigerian paper said that there were no more than 30 Sudanese nationals in Nigeria, but over a million Nigerians in Sudan. They suffered from no discrimination and many of them were prosperous. Over 10,000 Nigerians were crossing Sudan every year on their way to perform the Holy Pilgrimage. The paper concluded that the governments of Nigeria, especially that of the North, held the Sudanese government and leaders in the highest esteem. (Daily Mail, Kano, Aug 30)

Rhodesia. On Sept 12 Kenneth Kaunda, the North-Rhodesian African leader, arrived in Khartoum. He was received by President Abbud. (R. Umdurman, Sept 13 [15])

Somalia. Sudan decided to send medical aid and food to Somalia for the flood victims there. (Sahafah, Khartoum, Nov 25)

ASIAN COUNTRIES

India. In a joint Indian-Sudanese communiqué issued on July 20 it was announced that President Abbud had accepted an invitation to visit India at an unspecified date. (S. Daily, July 21)

Japan. In Feb it was reported that Sudan had warned Japan that it would curtail its imports from that country if the latter would not increase its purchase of Sudanese cotton. (Bilad, Jeddah, Feb 8)

In Aug the director of the Sudanese railways visited Japan on a study tour. (Akhbar al-Yaum, Cairo, Aug 9)

Pakistan. A Pakistani businessmen delegation visited Sudan in Jan. (Sudan News, Jan 3)

Philippines. A two member goodwill mission representing the Islamic League of the Philippines visited Sudan in Dec. They reportedly carried a written message from the President of the Philippines to President Abbud. (SNA, Dec 14, 15)

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

USSR

[The two main events of the year in the relations between the USSR and Sudan were the visit of President Abbud to the USSR in July and that of President Brezhnev to the Sudan in Nov. The visits were accorded wide publicity by both Sudanese and Soviet news media as symbols of the growing friendship between the two countries.]

Trade Protocol. A Sudanese trade delegation visited the Soviet Union in Jan, and on Jan 9 a trade protocol was signed in Moscow extending for another year the trade agreement of March 16, 1959. The protocol provided for an increase in trade for 1961 to twice the value of the trade in 1960. [The 1960 trade protocol had also envisaged a 50% increase over the preceding year from £S2 million to £S3 million—see MER 1960, p 79.] The USSR was to supply equipment and machinery, railway rails, timber, textiles, wheat, sugar,

cement and other goods, in return for Sudanese cotton, oil seeds, raw hides and other traditional Sudanese exports. (R. Moscow in Arabic and Tass in English, Jan 9 [SU 11])

Following this announcement press reports appeared that the Russians would export arms to Sudan. This was denied on Jan 11 by the Sudanese Minister of Commerce and Industry. An editorial note of the BBC monitoring service said that Moscow Radio in its Arabic broadcasts on the protocol had used the word *iād* [atād] which means equipment but has also the secondary meaning of "munitions"; Tass in English on the same day however said "equipment." (BBCM, Jan 12)

On Nov 1 a trade agreement covering the period 1962-64 was signed at Khartoum, stipulating a further increase in Soviet-Sudanese trade. The signing took place during a prolonged tour of Sudan by a Soviet trade delegation. (R. Umdurman, Oct 9 [W, 12], Nov 1 [3]; R. Moscow, Nov 2 [W, 9])

A Soviet Visit. Vladimir Semenov, the Soviet Deputy-FM, held talks in Khartoum in Feb, while on his way to a conference in Addis Ababa. (ANA, Feb 5 [7])

Congratulation on the First Space Orbit. by Maj. Gagarin (April 12), were sent to PM Khruushchov by President Abbud. Commenting on the flight, Brig. Maqūl al-Amin al-Hājj, the Minister of the Interior, said: "The Russians, in their forty-year old resurrection, have won the space race; would it not be possible that the Sudan in a shorter period may win a race that humanity never conceived before." The Russians, he said in another statement, would "no doubt direct the knowledge thus obtained to the good of humanity, because they are advocates of peace and love." (Sudan, May)

A Sudanese Visitor. Muhammad Uthmān al-Yasin, the Sudanese Deputy-FM, visited Moscow in April on an inspection tour of Sudanese missions abroad. He was received by Soviet FM Gromyko among others. (R. Moscow, April 4 [SU, 6]; Tass, April 7 [SU, 10])

President Abbud's Visit to the USSR. The announcement of the Soviet invitation to President Abbud to visit the Soviet Union was made in Dec 1960 (see MER 1960, p 79) and the visit took place between July 17 and 27. President Abbud was accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Works and Mineral Resources, Finance and Economy and Agriculture, Irrigation and Hydro-electric Energy. Beginning July 19 talks were held with Soviet government leaders headed by President Brezhnev and including First Deputy-FM Mikoyan, FM Gromyko, Marshals Rokossovsky and Grechko and senior officials in the economic and cultural fields.

The Sudanese party toured Tashkent where they met with Muslim functionaries and attended the Friday prayers at a mosque together with "5,000 Muslims."

They then went to Sochi where on July 22 President Abbud met PM Khruushchov who was vacationing there. The Sudanese party also toured Leningrad before returning to Moscow on July 25. (Pravda, Sudanese Press, July 18-27)

A joint communiqué by Presidents Abbud and Brezhnev on July 26 expressed mutual agreement on "such questions" as "general and complete disarmament" [compare with Abbud-Kennedy communiqué below] and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to the African continent. As to the German question, the Soviet side set forth its views regarding a peace treaty while both

sides agreed on the urgent need for a peaceful settlement of the problem. The communiqué sharply condemned colonialism "in all its forms and manifestations" with special reference to Angola, "imperialist intervention" in the Congo, the "intrigues of French ruling circles" regarding Algeria and French military action in Bizerta; it also denounced racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa, South West Africa and Mozambique, Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Both sides affirmed their "historic duty" to continue their support of the movement for independence in Africa. The Soviet government declared that it "fully understood the national policy of Sudan" and appreciated its policy of neutrality and non-alignment with military blocs. Both sides considered that their community of views on fundamental international questions provided opportunities for Soviet-Sudanese cooperation in the world arena. Finally, the communiqué declared that in response to a Sudanese request the USSR had agreed to extend economic and technical assistance in the construction of a number of industrial projects and in organizing the training of workers and technicians. (*Pravda*, July 28)

[The communiqué made no mention of Arab questions other than Algeria, nor of the Arab-Israel conflict.]

President Brezhnev's Visit to the Sudan. The Soviet President paid a return visit to Sudan from Nov 15 to 22. President Brezhnev's entourage included Deputy-PM Malik, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade Semichastnov, Deputy-Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, I.V. Arkhipov, and the Head of the Near East Dept. in the Foreign Ministry, V.I. Kiselev.

In addition to meetings with Sudanese government leaders and attending the usual state functions, the Soviet visitors were present at the celebrations marking the third anniversary of the Sudanese revolution and toured the country. On a number of occasions President Brezhnev made brief speeches which usually compared Sudan's current efforts and tasks to those of the Soviet Union in its early pioneering days and extolled Soviet accomplishments in spheres of economic construction which the Sudan had just begun to tackle. On Nov 20 Umdurman Radio broadcast a translation of an address by Brezhnev to the Sudanese people in which he described Soviet achievements since the Revolution and outlined the programme for the construction of Communist society as adopted at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. He also dealt with the Soviet viewpoints on peaceful co-existence, world disarmament, a German peace treaty, colonialism, apartheid and finally with relations between the USSR and young states in Africa. Soviet-Sudanese relations, he declared, could serve as an example for Soviet-African cooperation. (*R. Umdurman*, Nov 14, 15, 20 [15, 16, 22]; *Tass in English*, Nov 15, 17, 18 [17, 20, 21]; *Pravda*, Nov 15-18, 20-21, 23; *Sudanese Press*, Nov 14-23)

On Nov 21 Presidents Abud and Brezhnev signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement (see below for details), and issued a communiqué which reaffirmed their positions as set forth in the Moscow communiqué of July 26 (see above). They noted with "great satisfaction" the further development of friendly relations and the strengthening of economic links between Sudan and the USSR. (*Tass in English*, Nov 22 [24]; *Izvestia*, *Sudan News*, Nov 24)

Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement. Following President Abud's visit it was reported that the USSR would make available to Sudan a \$22 million

credit for various development projects (see also table: International Economic Assistance to ME countries). Umdurman Radio commented that this provided further evidence of the correctness of the Sudanese government's policy in accepting unconditional assistance from any country regardless of its social system; Soviet-Sudanese economic cooperation was "undoubtedly based on mutually honest intentions" (*R. Umdurman*, Aug 1 [3]). The agreement was signed in Khartoum on Nov 21 on the occasion of the Brezhnev state visit to the Sudan. (*Tass in English*, Nov 22 [24])

In Nov it was reported that Soviet experts had left Khartoum for the Northern province to study the technical aspects of constructing a fruit-canning plant. (*R. Umdurman*, Nov 28 [30])

According to an unconfirmed Egyptian report Sudan had made a request for the supply of Soviet aircraft and rockets under the economic aid agreement. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Nov 22)

OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Albania. The Albanian Minister to Sudan presented his credentials to President Abud on April 17. (*R. Tirana*, April 18 [EE 21]; *R. Amman*, April 17-18B, April 18)

Bulgaria. A Bulgarian government delegation led by Deputy-PM Z. Zhivkov paid a four-day goodwill visit to the Sudan in Oct. A communiqué stated that in the discussions possibilities for the strengthening of friendly relations between the two countries had been explored and that it had been agreed to open negotiations for a trade agreement. (*BTA in English*, Nov 1 [EE, 3]; *R. Umdurman*, Nov 1 [3])

Czechoslovakia. The inaugural meeting of the Sudanese-Czechoslovak Friendship Society was held in Khartoum in March. (*R. Prague*, March 28 [EE 30])

Czechoslovakia was to supply machinery for a footwear factory in Khartoum. (*R. Moscow*, March 11 [W 16])

A Czechoslovak photographic exhibition in Umdurman was opened by the Sudanese Minister of Education on May 8. (*Sudan*, June)

The opening of a permanent exhibition of Czechoslovak industrial goods in Khartoum was reported in Oct. (*R. Umdurman*, Oct 25 [W, Nov 2])

German Democratic Republic. An East German archaeological expedition was working in Sudan. (*Morning News*, March 27)

It was reported in East Berlin in April that Sudanese were among the students of a course for junior officials at the Wilhelm Pieck Youth College. (*DPA*, April 25)

Hungary. A Hungarian delegation visited Sudan in Oct and held talks on the strengthening of relations between the two countries. (*R. Amman*, Oct 29-18B, Oct 30)

Poland. Poland granted Sudan five university scholarships. (*S. Daily*, April 17)

The Polish Deputy-PM visited Sudan in Feb. (*R. Umdurman*, Feb 20 [W, 23])

Rumania. On Feb 1 at the end of a visit of a Rumanian trade delegation, a trade agreement was signed between Rumania and Sudan in Khartoum. (*Sudan News*, Jan 15, Feb 15)

People's Republic of China. On Jan 26 a Sudanese technical mission went for a month's visit to the CPR. (*MENA*, Jan 27 [W, Feb 2])

In Feb Sudan accepted a Chinese invitation to send three physicians on a short visit to the CPR. (*S. Daily*, Feb 2)

A Sudanese groupe of stage artists—variously referred to as a "cultural delegation," "Sudanese National Theatre troupe" and folklore artists—toured the CPR at the beginning of the year. Their *première* was attended by the Deputy-PM. (*NCNA*, Jan 29, Feb 4 [*FE*, Jan 31, Feb 7]; *Sudan*, May)

On March 10 a Chinese Economic Construction Achievements Exhibition was inaugurated in Khartoum. Sudan noted that the exhibition showed "the will and strength of the Chinese people who have achieved an industrial revolution in this short period" (*Sudan*, March). It was reported that this was the biggest exhibition held so far in Sudan. (*MENA*, March 8, [W 16])

On the occasion of Id al-Fitr President Abbud received a telegram of congratulations from Burhan ad-Din Shahidi, President of the Islamic League of People's China. (*R. Umdurman*, March 17 [W 23])

In April, the Sudanese government decided in principle to conclude a trade agreement with the CPR. (*R. Umdurman*, April 26 [W May 4])

Shaykh Ima'il Abu al-Qasim, Inspector General of Religious Education at the Sudanese Education Ministry, arrived in Peking on June 4 at the invitation of the Chinese Islamic Society. (*R. Peking in Arabic*, June 5 [*FE* 10])

The CPR proposed a visit to Sudan of a Chinese theatrical company and the establishment of a public gymnasium in Sudan. (*R. Umdurman*, June 2 [W 8])

THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Military Relations. On his way home from the UK Maj.-Gen. Hasan Bashir Nasr visited the GFR from March 22-28. On arriving in Khartoum he said he had "discussed various matters, the results of which will be seen shortly." (*Ra'y al-Amm*, March 23; *R. Umdurman*, March 28 [29])

In July-Aug a Sudanese military mission headed by Col. (*qā'imāqām*) Ibrahim Ahmad paid a goodwill visit to the armed forces of the GFR. (*Hayat*, Aug 10; *MENA*, Aug 9 [W 17])

A German firm was training Sudanese officers and soldiers in the manufacture of ammunition. (*Ritalah*, Nov 18; *GFR official publication*, Bonn, Nov 18)

Economic Aid, Technical Cooperation, Trade. In May Muhammad Ahmad Irwah, the Sudanese Minister of Commerce and Industry, visited the GFR and West Berlin (*R. Baghdad*, May 4-1MB, May 5). In June the GFR joined with the World Bank and the International Development Corp. to provide a \$30 million loan for the construction of the Roseires dam. The GFR's part was \$19.5 million. (See table: International Economic Assistance to ME Countries.)

In July it was reported that the GFR was considering the granting of a £57.5 million loan for railway development. (*S. Daily*, July 25)

On Aug 31 Sudan signed a contract with a German firm for the planning of the development of the Khashm al-Girba area where the Nubians from Wadi Halfa were to be settled. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Sept 1)

The GFR was assisting in the establishment of an agricultural experimental station in Northern Sudan. (*Ritalah*, Nov 15; *GFR official publication*, Nov 18)

On Nov 25 a GFR industrial exhibition was opened in Khartoum in the presence of President Abbud and

Dr Hans von Merkatz, the GFR Minister of Federal Council Affairs (*S. Daily*, Nov 26). President Abbud accepted an invitation conveyed to him by Dr von Merkatz to visit the GFR sometime in 1962. In Dec, the exhibition buildings were handed over to the Sudanese government as a gift. (*SNA*, Dec 12)

Otto Bach, the President of the West Berlin parliament, visited Sudan in Dec. He announced an offer of 15 scholarships for technical studies in West Berlin. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, Nov 25, 27, 29, Dec 4)

In Nov Brig. Irwah, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, in an interview over German television, expressed appreciation of West German cooperation in such Sudanese projects as the sugar refinery, the Sennar dam electricity project and the building of irrigation canals in Managil. (*R. Umdurman*, Nov 28 [30])

The Sennar hydro-electric project, to provide 25,000 kwh., was being financed and executed by a consortium of three firms, two German and one British. The first stage was inaugurated in April. (*Sudan*, May)

An agreement between Sudan and German contractors for the construction of a sugar refinery had been signed on March 2, 1960. The refinery, to cost £55 million, was being constructed at Genaid, 130 km south of Khartoum. (*Sudan*, Jan)

In Dec it was reported that Sudan was negotiating for the accommodation of one thousand Sudanese secondary school graduates, who had not been admitted to universities, in German technical institutes for practical mechanical training. (*SNA*, Dec 7)

Sudan accepted a GFR offer to establish a television station in Sudan at its expense. (*S. News*, Dec 10)

In Dec Sudanese government representatives started discussions with German financiers on the building of an international standard-type hotel. (*R. Umdurman*, Dec 17 [W 21])

THE UNITED KINGDOM

On Jan 16 Sudan and the UK signed an aviation agreement. (*S. Daily*, Jan 17)

Deputy-Army Chief Visits Britain; Military Aid. Maj.-Gen. Hasan Bashir Nasr, Deputy-C-in-C and CGS of the Sudanese Army, paid an official visit to the UK from March 12 to 22 at the invitation of Field Marshal Sir Francis Festing, CIGS. (*Times*, March 13, 14, 17; *Sudan News*, March 15, 30)

It was reported that Bashir Nasr made the following requests, that: Britain grant Sudan a £20 m. loan, the British government use its influence on British capital to increase its investments in Sudan, the West display a greater interest in the financing of the Roseires dam and Britain arm a new mechanized unit and form an air force and a military transport service. (*MENA*, April 20 [22])

Following the visit Sudan received a British gift of military equipment. It included four Provost jet training aircraft, six Saladin armoured cars and twelve Ferret scout cars; these arrived in Khartoum in Oct. (*Times*, April 6; *Sudan News*, April 15; *S. Daily*, Oct 8; *R. Umdurman*, Oct 25 [W Nov 2])

A British correspondent in Sudan reported earlier that the Sudanese army was equipped with British arms. During the Congo crisis Sudan had accepted armoured carriers from the UAR as well as from the USSR (compare MER 1960, pp 156 and 79); Gen. Abbud however had said: "We know and like British arms and do not particularly want to change." (*Daily Telegraph*, April 4)

On Nov 7 at the ceremony of officially handing over the arms, Maj.-Gen. Bashir Nasr said: "We consider this gift a symbol of the traditional friendship between our two countries which we are both doing our best to consolidate and promote." (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Nov 8; *S. Daily*, Nov 8)

In March it was reported that ten Sudanese officers were training in the UK. They were the last of 50 officers who had been training there during the last two years. (*S. Daily*, March 22)

President Abdudd said in a speech in Nov that Sudanese pilots had been trained in the UK (and in Yugoslavia). (*Sudan News*, Nov 27)

A Minor Diplomatic Incident occurred in Nov, when the Sudan Progress Report, which was to be issued on Nov 17, the third anniversary of the revolution, contained a passage expressing disappointment at "Kuwait's call for help from the colonizers, our number one enemy"; a reference to Kuwait's call for British military assistance in face of Iraq's claims on the country. It was reported that the British Chargé d'Affaires had expressed a strong unofficial objection to this passage. It was understood however that the passage had crept into the report without the knowledge of senior officers and steps were being considered to remedy the situation. (*Daily Telegraph*, Nov 15)

Visitors, Miscellaneous. A British firm participated with two German firms in the financing and construction of the Sennar hydro-electric project designed to provide 25,000 kw. The first stage of the project was inaugurated in April. (*Sudan*, May)

Maj.-Gen. Majdhub al-Bahari, Minister of Communications, visited the UK in Sept as guest of the British government. (*S. Daily*, Sept 3)

Ziyadah Uthman Arab, the Sudanese Minister of Education, visited the UK [in Oct-Nov] where he met Sudanese students. (*R. Umdurman*, Nov 3 [6])

The Duke of Edinburgh made a stopover in Sudan on Dec 14-15 (on his way home from Tanganyika) to visit the Wadi Halfa antiquities. He had a short meeting with President Abdudd and the members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. (*SNA*, Dec 15)

THE UNITED STATES

Military Relations. In May two Sudanese officers, commanders of military schools, toured US army installations. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, May 2)

President Abdudd's Visit to the US. On Oct 4 President Abdudd arrived in Washington, accompanied by five ministers (a sixth had preceded him), on an 11-day state visit to the US. He had received the invitation on April 20. [Abdudd had been invited to the USSR in Dec 1960 and the visit took place in July.] He flew in President Kennedy's aircraft which had been sent especially to Sudan. At the airport he was received by President Kennedy and was given full military honours.

The two presidents conferred twice, and on Oct 6 they issued a joint communiqué. The document said the two presidents had a most cordial exchange of views; they shared a common concern for the preservation of world peace, and a common reliance on the UN; they agreed on the importance of reaching, through negotiations, solutions to existing disputes especially when the right of self-determination was involved.

President Abdudd stressed the importance of rapidly

implementing the right of self-determination throughout Africa. President Kennedy expressed satisfaction with the African peoples' political gains and stated his hopes for further progress.

President Abdudd explained that Sudan's policy of non-alignment was designed to strengthen her independence and to enable her to play a constructive role in resolving tensions. President Kennedy confirmed that the US endorsed the determination of the newly independent countries of Africa to maintain their independence.

President Kennedy drew attention to the struggle of the people of West Berlin to preserve their independence and to the US's determination to support them. President Abdudd confirmed that Sudan attached great importance to a peaceful solution of the question consistent with the legitimate expectations of the people of Berlin and of Germany.

The two presidents were in complete agreement as to the importance of the early conclusion of a nuclear test ban agreement based on an effective system of inspection and control. They also agreed that efforts should be continued in the field of general disarmament.

President Abdudd explained the steps Sudan had been taking to promote economic development and social justice in accordance with an integrated national plan. The two presidents agreed that talks should continue between their advisers with a view to expand their co-operation in key areas in which the US could most effectively assist in Sudan's self-help efforts. President Kennedy accepted an invitation to visit Sudan "whenever his presidential duties permit." [Arab questions and the Arab-Israel conflict were not mentioned. Compare this communiqué with that of Gen. Abdudd and President Brezhnev, for which see above.] (*S. News*, Oct 11)

It was reported that Abdudd desired US economic support for the following projects: a Khartoum-Port Sudan highway, a Sudanese international airline, a sugar refinery and a plant to manufacture sacking.

Although expressing his gratitude for some \$53 million in US economic aid in the five years since Sudan's independence, Abdudd told the press that he would also continue to accept Soviet assistance, in fact any assistance public or private, as long as this did not interfere with "our principles and policies."

In his public utterances President Abdudd spoke of the "deep affection and close friendship" between Sudan and the US and expressed the Sudanese people's confidence in the US tradition of fighting for and supporting the independence and freedom of peoples everywhere.

Washington observers were quoted to the effect that Abdudd's visit was unusual in that "there are no conflicts" between his country and the US. *The New York Times* commented: "Arriving apparently with neither hat nor complaints in hand, he appeared to be a man free of pressure."

On Oct 6 Abdudd left Washington for California, Chicago and New York, and after participating in the UN General Assembly session he left the US on Oct 16, again making the journey in President Kennedy's plane. (*NYT*, Oct 5, 6, 7; *Ra'y al-Amm*, Oct 3-17; *Sudan News*, Oct 11, 16; *Dept. of State Bull.*, Oct 30)

US Economic and Technical Assistance. In an interview with an American correspondent in Nov 1960 President Abdudd said: "The help that we have received [from the US] has been very useful... But... American routine... needs to be hurried... It is too slow. There is too much routine... We should like to have quicker

and... more aid." In answer to a further question the President said he could give no example of aid from another country received any faster. (*S. Daily, Jan 31*)

[According to figures available to the editor new agreements on US aid in calendar year 1961 totalled \$46.6 million. (For details see table on Foreign Assistance, p 76.) This sum does not include the \$0.9 million for the Khartoum-Port Sudan road project (mentioned below), as this sum might have been made available from funds previously approved. A sum of \$8 million listed in the afore-mentioned table was approved in the calendar year 1960 and has therefore also been excluded here.]

US aid programmed for the US fiscal year 1960 amounted to \$13.0m. and for 1961 to \$11.0m. of which \$3.4 m. was to be surplus food under PL 480. (*US Senate, Committee on Appropriations; Foreign Assistance for 1962, Washington 1961, pp 298, 300*)

According to Sudanese statistics, drawings from US grants in 1961 amounted to £53.9 m. (\$11.2 m.) (*Economic Survey 1961, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Khartoum, May 1962*)

Total US aid to Sudan up to Oct 1961 was said to have amounted to some \$53 million (see above: the Abbad visit).

According to a [US?] review, US dollar grants totalling \$22 million—£57.68 million—had been made available to Sudan through USOM from 1958 to Oct 1, 1960. These grants were especially designed to alleviate the foreign currency shortage which was acute at the time the programme started. Sudanese importers were enabled to draw upon the dollar fund for government-approved imports, by depositing Sudanese pounds into a special government-controlled fund; these monies in turn were used to finance development projects. The total of approved import applications had reached £56.9 million and some £50.8 million had remained available for future development schemes. (*Sudan, Feb*)

Among the many USOM activities special attention was given in Sudan to the survey by an American team of the projected Khartoum-Port Sudan road on a budget of \$900,000. This project was started shortly after President Abbad's visit to the US. (See e.g. *S. Daily, Nov 15*)

OTHER NATO AND WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Austria. An Austrian trade delegation visited Sudan in Jan. (*Sudan, Feb*)

Belgium. The murder of Patrice Lumumba, the first PM of Congo (L), occasioned a number of large-scale demonstrations against "Belgian imperialism" and for the freedom of Congo; the government's Congo policy was also attacked (see p 469 a).

It was reported that because of the Lumumba murder Sudan would not take part in the Brussels International Exhibition [it opened in April]. (*Sudan al-Jadid, Feb 27*)

In Aug Maj-Gen. Ahmad M. al-Bahāri, the Minister of Communications, paid an official visit to Belgium. He visited industries, including an ammunition factory, as well as dock-yards. (*S. Daily, Aug 27*)

France. On Dec 31, 1960 Sudan recalled her Ambassador from Paris in protest against France's atomic tests in the Sahara. Diplomatic relations continued, however. (*S. Daily, Jan 1; Monde, Jan 3*)

On Nov 1, the seventh anniversary of the Algerian rising, anti-French student demonstrations took place in Khartoum and Umdurman. (*Sudan al-Jadid, Nov 2*)

On Nov 15 the Sudanese government informed the French Ambassador of its concern about the hunger strike of Ben Bella and the other imprisoned Algerian leaders. (*Sudan al-Jadid, Nov 16*)

Italy. The Italian company Torno won the international bid to build the Khashm al-Girba dam, which was to be completed by July 1963. (*Ra'y al-Amm, April 29; S. Daily, Nov 17*)

The Italian African Mining Syndicate was granted the exploration rights of the "Hafrat al-Nihās" copper mines. (*S. News, Dec 11*)

Netherlands. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands visited Sudan in Feb. (*Sudan, March*)

Maj-Gen. Ahmad Majdhūb al-Bahāri, Minister of Communications, visited the Netherlands in Aug. (*Reuter, Aug 28*)

In Feb it was learned that the Netherlands and Sudan had decided to raise their [non-resident] diplomatic missions to ambassadorial level. (*Reuter, Feb 7*)

Switzerland. The Minister of Communications, Maj-Gen. Ahmad M. al-Bahāri, visited Switzerland in Aug at the invitation of Swissair. (*S. Daily, Aug 27*)

On Sept 27 an aviation agreement between Switzerland and Sudan was signed in Khartoum. (*Ra'y al-Amm, Sept 28*)

YUGOSLAVIA

Economic Aid, Technical Cooperation, Trade. In Jan a Yugoslav economic delegation headed by Sery Kragjer, the Minister of Foreign Trade, conducted talks in Khartoum (*Tanyug, Jan 7 [EE 9]*). Sudan and Yugoslavia signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement and a payments agreement; they exchanged notes on an understanding regarding the credit agreement and the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation signed in 1959. (*S. Daily, Jan 4, 16; Tanyug, Jan 7, 18 [EE 9, 19]*)

Yugoslavia supplied the plans, machinery and experts for the establishment of a cardboard factory at Aroma in the Gash area. The agreement was signed in 1959. The factory, with an annual capacity of 4,000 tons, was to start production in 1961. The Sudanese personnel would be trained in Yugoslavia. (*Sudan, Feb*)

Yugoslavia assisted in the preliminary work for establishing a tannery envisaged by the Sudanese government and designed to enable Sudan to dispense with leather imports. (*R. Umdurman, March 27 [W 30]*)

A first shipment of 2,000 tons of Sudanese iron ore left for Yugoslavia in March. [This was Sudan's first commercial export of iron ore.] (*R. Umdurman, March 3 [W 9]*)

Yugoslavia played a major part in establishing a Sudanese shipping line. The Sudanese authorities consulted Yugoslav experts on shipping questions, maritime laws to be enacted, the building of harbours, etc. The two countries established a joint shipping line, the Sudan Maritime Lines, with a capital of £280,000 equally shared by the two countries. Two ships were built in Yugoslavia at a cost of £51.5 million; the money was provided by the Yugoslav government as a loan repayable over eight years. The first ship, *Sennar*, was launched in Sept. The Sudanese crews were to be trained in Yugos-

YUGOSLAVIA

lavia. (*Sudan News*, June 1, Oct 11; *S. Daily*, June 5; *Sudan*, Oct)

In June three Sudanese officials left for Yugoslavia for a course in farming techniques. (*R. Umdurman*, June 13 [16])

During Sept Maj.-Gen. Ahmad Majdhûb al-Bahâri, Minister of Communications, visited Yugoslavia "to discuss further expansion of economic cooperation." Two Sudanese officials went to Yugoslavia to discuss shipping interests (*R. Umdurman*, Sept 14 [16]), and another as a guest of the Permanent Conference of Towns. (*Tanyug*, Sept 16, 30 [EE, Sept 20, Oct 4])

Cultural Relations. A "Yugoslavia in Pictures" exhibition was held in Umdurman and was to be shown in other towns. (*Tanyug*, March 14 [EE 18])

A "cultural agreement" [yearly working plan?] was signed in Khartoum on June 19. Yugoslavia enlarged the number of scholarships offered to 20, while Sudan offered two for studies in Arabic and the history of

Sudan at Khartoum University. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, June 20)

Four Yugoslav students arrived in Khartoum in Oct. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Oct 20)

On Nov 17 the corner-stone was laid of the Abbud Cultural Hall [centre] in Umdurman; it was planned with the assistance of the Yugoslav Ministry of Education and was to be built under the supervision of a Yugoslav architect. (*S. Daily*, Nov 21)

Military Aid: In Nov Admiral Mate Jerkovic, Commander of the Yugoslav Navy, attended the inauguration ceremonies of the Sudanese navy at Port-Sudan. Four patrol vessels were delivered. One of these vessels was donated by Yugoslavia and the rest were built with the help of Yugoslav experts. Their crews were trained in Yugoslavia. (*S. Daily*, Nov 16, 22)

President Abbud said in a speech in Nov that Sudanese pilots had been trained in Yugoslavia (and in the UK). (*S. News*, Nov 27)

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF SYRIA

(Al-Jumhuriyah al-Arabiyyah as-Suriyah)

SYNOPSIS

INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

On Sept 28 Syria was reestablished as an independent state by a military coup d'état which effected Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic, three years and eight months after Syria and Egypt had established the union. (On the coup d'état and its background, see synopses, pp 605 ff.)

Syrian politics during the following period were influenced by three principal factors:

1) The real power remained in the hands of the military who had reestablished Syria's independence and appointed its first government. The army conceived it their political task to act as the guiding spirit of the nation and arbitrator behind the scenes, and did not participate in the government. They opposed the revival of political parties, and advocated national unity. The officers were, however, divided among themselves; less than 2 months after the coup, one of its leaders, Lieut.-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari, was arrested by his fellow officers.

2) A potentially explosive division developed between the left and the right. The coup d'état was a reaction to both what the Syrians called "Egyptian domination" and to the policy of "Arab socialism." Though the left too had opposed the perpetuation of the union in the form that it had taken, the coup was essentially a reaction by the right. On the other hand, the left had been considerably strengthened under the union. Indeed, among the workers, the peasants and the lower middle classes pro-Nasser sentiments were thought to have remained strong after the secession, primarily because they had begun to enjoy or had been given hope of enjoying new benefits through such measures as the agrarian reform and the July decrees (see p 601). The left intended to safeguard these benefits, and to expand them; the right wished to rescind or amend some of these measures and reestablish a free economy. The only hope for a stable government thus lay in an accommodation between the left and the right, which was insisted upon by the army. The transitional government endeavoured to steer such a course, significantly calling it "Arab socialism," for, it declared, it recognized socialism as the dominant trend. But the general elections in December, which were conducted on the pre-union system, returned to Parliament a large rightist majority which thereafter showed much less inclination to compromise with the left.

3) The question of Arab unity continued to occupy the Syrians. The Syrians had long prided themselves as the vanguard in the struggle for Arab union. Under the UAR local Syrian nationalism had grown, but Arab nationalism had remained strong. Now that Syria had broken up the union, many Syrians clearly had a bad conscience. Also, as already mentioned, many Syrians retained strong sympathy for Abdel Nasser who in spite of the setback he had suffered remained the foremost Arab leader, and who manifested the utmost hostility to the Syrian "seces-

sionist" regime. Thus, as before the union, Syria's internal politics were liable to be strongly affected by questions of Arab nationalism, and Syria's orientation within the framework of inter-Arab relations.

No dominant personality emerged on the Syrian scene. The affairs of state were in the hands of the politicians of the former republic, and the army junta, composed of officers ranking from major to brigadier, who remained for the most part anonymous.

Chronologically, events unfolded as follows:

By noon of September 28 the majority of the military and civilian authorities in Syria had expressed their adherence to the insurgent officers (who called themselves the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces). Aleppo Command and Latakia garrison remained loyal to the UAR throughout the day, but before midnight they too joined the insurgents. In Damascus there were apparently anti-UAR demonstrations in the morning, and pro-UAR demonstrations in the afternoon, when communique No. 9 of the insurgents conveyed the impression that the revolt was being ended and unity preserved. Palestinian refugees were reportedly conspicuous among the pro-UAR demonstrators.

On the morning of September 29 the Revolutionary Command announced that it had charged Dr Ma'mun al-Kuzbari to form a government that would restore constitutional conditions. Kuzbari was regarded as a moderate rightist; he had family connections with a partner in the "Company of Five," Syria's foremost industrial concern which had been recently nationalized. Prominent among the ministers were conservatives—former members of the Watani and Sha'ab parties as well as bankers.

The government quickly restored the symbols of independence, giving the republic its name and restoring its former flag and anthem. On Oct 1, three days after the coup, the Revolutionary Command announced the appointment of Maj.-Gen. Zahr ad-Din, a Druze, as C-in-C of the Armed Forces. At that time and during the next few days new chiefs were appointed to the security services and police.

On September 29, immediately after the establishment of the provisional government, the Syrian Republic was recognized by two of its neighbours, Jordan and Turkey. President Abdel Nasser reacted by breaking off diplomatic relations with these two countries, thereby instituting a diplomatic blockade of the new Republic. In a speech on October 5, however, Abdel Nasser lifted the blockade, and soon recognition followed by the world powers—Soviet Russia preceding the US—and Arab as well as other countries. On October 13 Syria was readmitted to the United Nations and on October 28 to the Arab League.

Some unrest continued for a few days after the coup. There were apparently pro- and anti-UAR demonstrations, and clashes with armed terror bands. Peasants in

the Hauran were also reported to have resorted to fighting in defence of the UAR; in all other pro-UAR manifestations "foreign mercenaries"—probably a reference to the Palestinian refugees—were again said to have been prominent. The government closed the schools and the universities, among other security precautions. A week after the coup, however, the country had calmed down, and on October 4 the night curfew, imposed on September 28, was lifted. (The schools stayed closed for several weeks, the universities until mid-December.) Summing up the situation some days later, a foreign observer described the atmosphere as one of "relief rather than rejoicing."

The support of the parties for the revolution was practically unanimous. While the parties were not allowed to reestablish themselves, their leaders could now envisage their return to power from which they had been barred under the UAR. On October 2, 16 prominent politicians signed a statement in support of the revolution. They included all the Syrian ministers present in the country who had signed the union document in 1958, and represented all the parties except for the Communists and the Nationalist Social Party (PPS), who, however, also vigorously supported the secession from the UAR. Only inside the Ba'ath party was opposition to the secession reported, though the document was signed by two of its most prominent leaders, Bitar and Hurani. Expressions of support were also heard from the Alawi and Druze communities, Kurds, religious functionaries and various organizations. The attitude of organized labour to the new regime, on the other hand, was rather lukewarm.

The policies of the new regime were outlined in statements by the government (September 29 and October 17) and the Revolutionary Command (October 2): The statement of October 17 sought to establish a doctrine of "Arab Socialism." There was to be "true socialism," "true democracy" and "true and comprehensive Arab unity," in contrast to the allegedly falsified concepts propagated under the UAR; elections to a constituent assembly were to be held in four months; the rights and benefits enjoyed by workers, peasants and the lower income groups in general would be protected and extended; agrarian reform would be continued but the owners compensated fairly and injustices redressed; a system of "controlled economic freedom" would be established; private enterprise would be encouraged for the benefit of the economy, and free currency convertibility introduced. In the face of the general opinion that the government was rightist, and Cairo's violent attacks on Syrian "reaction", both the government and the army took care to reassure the workers and peasants that they meant to protect their rights. They also took practical steps to demonstrate their concern. Ownership certificates in the framework of the agrarian reform were distributed in Now, and various means of assistance were extended to the peasantry which had been severely hit by three consecutive years of drought. Decrees were issued providing for a representative each of workers and employees on the boards of directors of joint stock companies (similar to the UAR July decrees), and granting workers various benefits. At the same time the government took various steps towards a liberalization of the economy, notably the lifting of import restrictions. The nationalizations effected under the UAR, were not, however, rescinded. The confidence of the economic circles in the new regime was apparent in a pronounced rise in bank deposits, attributed to the return of Syrian capital, and in a marked appreciation in the Syrian pound.

In the sphere of Arab nationalism, the government

presented a project for a loose Arab federation, two weeks after the coup. The plan was generally thought to have been prompted by considerations of internal politics. Cairo's reaction was hostile, other Arab countries were non-committal, and soon the issue faded out.

On November 9 the government's middle of the road approach was formally endorsed by some 60 leading politicians—representing all parties save for the Communists and the Nationalist Social Party—who, under the prodding of the army, signed a "National Charter." The charter was to serve as the basis for both an agreed election programme and a temporary constitution. It endorsed the project for an Arab federation, but otherwise concentrated upon economic and social questions, thus reflecting the main issue in Syrian politics, namely, the conflict between the left and the right. The charter detailed policies which would protect and enhance the rights and benefits of the workers and peasants, and at the same time reestablish a liberal economy, encourage private enterprise and protect and compensate landowners. The question of nationalization was not mentioned.

The signing of the charter set the stage for the promulgation of the temporary constitution (November 15). The constitution provided for a Constituent and Parliamentary Assembly to be established by general elections, and for a President of the Republic with executive powers, to be elected by the Assembly, and to be assisted by a cabinet. The provisional constitution was to be submitted to a referendum.

The elections and referendum took place on December 1. Ten days earlier a caretaker government for the election period had been formed under Dr. Izzat an-Nus, the former Minister of Education. The elections were conducted according to the law of 1949, with some amendments. The constituencies remained identical with the administrative districts. Christians and Bedouin tribes were again accorded reserved seats. The election campaign was severely restricted in time and scope; propaganda on radio and television was banned and "sincere criticism" only was allowed. The army reaffirmed its neutrality and warned that it would strike with a mailed fist at opportunists using its name in the campaign. The political parties were still banned, but lists combining individual candidates were allowed; in many, if not in most cases, these lists had party undertones. The voting procedure, however, provided for the choice of individual candidates only.

The election campaign and the elections themselves took place for the most part in a calm atmosphere. Two bombs were thrown in Damascus on the eve of the elections; the Syrian authorities attributed the deed to the UAR, which had been conducting an active propaganda campaign against the elections, calling on the Syrian people to boycott them.

The vote in the referendum was public. The temporary constitution was approved by 97.6% of the workers, with 50 to 60 per cent of the electorate having voted, a large percentage for Syria. Western observers thought that in spite of the absence of secrecy these results showed wide support for an independent Syria.

In the general elections, close to 1,900 candidates contested 172 seats. In all opinions the results were an overwhelming victory for the right, though estimates varied in regard to the numerical strength of the various parties, factions and tendencies. A subdivision was thought to exist in the right wing, between the "extremists" who would, if possible, cancel the agrarian reform and the nationalizations, and the "centre" or "moderate conservatives" who would accept the established socialist mea-

tures, but no more, and carry on with a limited amount of economic planning. From the party point of view the composition of the Assembly resembled the pre-union one, elected in 1954; the Sha'ab party remained the strongest faction, followed by the Watani party; after these two conservative parties came the nationalist and leftist Ba'ath. A new feature was the success of the Muslim Brethren, who were usually defined as "extreme right" and anti-Nasser. The Bedouin representatives were also classified with the "extreme right."

On the eve of the inauguration of the Assembly, the army again issued a warning: it wished to retire from politics, but could not do so if the politicians tried to exploit it for their own purposes; the politicians should eschew quarrels.

Power now passed exclusively into the hands of the right. Dr. Nāzim al-Qudsi, a leader of the Sha'ab party, was elected President of the Republic by 153 out of 172 members of the Assembly, after his opponent and candidate of the left, Khālid al-Azm, withdrew his candidacy. Dr. Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari was elected President of the Assembly, by 114 votes; the 47 votes cast for Jalāl as-Sayyid, a former member of the Ba'ath, were thought to represent the strength of the left. The new government was formed on December 23 by Dr. Ma'rūf al-Dawālībī of Aleppo, a former leader of the Sha'ab party, who only some days before had made clear his anti-socialist outlook. The government was a right-wing coalition, comprising members of the former Sha'ab and Watani parties, independents and the Constitutional and Islamic Parliamentary blocs. The left was not represented.

Foreign affairs, apart from the question of securing recognition and Arab relations, did not figure predominantly during these months, when Syria was occupied with establishing the regime. The UAR remained extremely hostile and did not extend recognition even after the elections; the clearly did not accept the "separatist regime" as there to stay. Syria charged Cairo with launching a subversive campaign against her from Lebanese territory. This also caused a strain in Syria's relations with Lebanon; by the end of the year, however, relations improved after Lebanon had extended her recognition which she had delayed out of consideration for the susceptibilities of the UAR and internal difficulties. Relations with Jordan were good. Syria concluded an economic agreement with Iraq at the beginning of November, which the two countries proclaimed as the initiation of "real Arab solidarity." As to Syria's non-Arab neighbours, Turkey, as already mentioned, was the second country (after Jordan) to recognise Syria; incidents on the border which traditionally marred relations between the two countries subsided after Syria became independent (though not necessarily for that reason.) On the Israel border sporadic incidents continued much as usual.

The Syrian Communists' praise for the "historic victory" of the secession was widely reported in the Communist countries, including the USSR; otherwise the Soviet attitude to the new regime was non-committal.

With the US Syria negotiated for the purchase of wheat, and a loan; and with West Germany for large-scale assistance in building the Euphrates dam which had already been agreed upon with the UAR, in July.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

THE FIRST TEN DAYS

INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

Dr Kuzbari Appointed Premier; Cabinet Formed. At about 7.30 a.m. (local time) on Sept 29 the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces announced in communiqué No. 17 that "in fulfilment of the pledge which it has made to the people it will place political and administrative affairs in the charge of competent sons of the people." It had charged Dr Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari with the formation of a cabinet which "will run the affairs of the country so as to restore constitutional conditions." Kuzbari had accepted. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [30].)

At 11 a.m., communiqué No. 18 announced that the Revolutionary Command had invested the premier with the power of naming his ministers.

Shortly afterwards *Premier's decree No. 1* gave the composition of the cabinet as follows:

Dr Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari: PM, FM and Minister of Defence. (Muslim; born in Damascus, 1914; studied law at Beirut and Lyons and lectured at Damascus University. He was a member of Shishakli's Arab Liberation Movement (*harakat al-tahrir al-arabi*) and was elected deputy for Damascus in 1953, speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Minister of Justice, of Education, of Labour and Social Affairs; "moderate rightist"; son-in-law of Adil

al-Khoja, prominent partner in the "Company of Five," and cousin of Lieut-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari.)

Dr Leon Zamariya: Finance and Supplies (Christian from Aleppo; prominent member of the Watani Party; Minister of Finance in pre-union cabinets.)

Dr Farhān al-Jandālī: Health (Muslim from Hama; former deputy and minister on behalf of the Sha'ab Party).

Dr Izzat an-Nus: Education and National Guidance (Muslim from Damascus; lecturer in History and Geography at Damascus University; independent).

Dr Adnān al-Quwatli: Interior (Muslim from Damascus; former secretary of Lawyers' Union; independent). (*An-Nahar* of Dec 5 classified him as a Watani Party member.)

Dr Awad Barakāt: Economy and Industry (Christian from Damascus; former deputy-governor of Central Bank, lately chairman of United Banks Co.—*sharikat al-masdirif al-muttahidah*; independent).

Eng. Amin Nazif: Agriculture and acting Agrarian Reform (Muslim from Damascus; former secretary of Ministry of Agriculture; independent).

Adv. Ahmad Sulṭān: Justice and Waqf (Muslim from Hama; independent).

Eng. Abd ar-Rahmān Hurriyah: Works and Communi-

cations (Muslim from Latakia and mayor of this town under Shishakli; independent).

Dr Mu'amin Ashari: Planning, Municipal and Rural Affairs (Muslim from Latakia; former bank manager; independent).

Fu'ad al-Adil: Social Affairs and Labour (Muslim from Aleppo; former city treasurer there; independent).

Dr Mustafa al-Barudi: Minister of State for Propaganda, Broadcasting and Television. (Born 1924; former lecturer of law at Damascus University.) (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29, 30 [Oct 1, 2]; *Jaridah*, Sept 30, Oct 1; *Anwar*, Sept 30; *Mid. Mir.*, Sept 30, Dec 16; *Jihad*, Oct 1; *Akhbar*, Egypt, Nov 22)

Powers of the Cabinet, PM—Acting President. On Sept 29, communiqué No. 19 announced that the Revolutionary Command had "empowered the cabinet to issue laws in the transitional period with the proviso that these laws will be submitted to the legislative authority, which will emerge from the people after free elections, at its first meeting." (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [30])

Since there was no provision, so far, for a formal head of state, Legislative Decree No. 19 of Oct 26 laid down that, for the term of office of the transitional government, the Prime Minister should exercise the prerogatives of the President of the Republic. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 26 [28])

C-in-C Appointed. [Three days had passed since the revolution when] on the morning of Oct 1, the Revolutionary Command announced that it had appointed Maj-Gen. Abd al-Karim Zahr ad-Din C-in-C of the Armed Forces as from Sept 28. Zahr ad-Din, a Druze born in 1915, had previously been Director of Equipment and Supply of the 1st [Syrian] Army. (*R. Damascus-IMB*, Oct 1; *Jaridah*, Oct 3; *Mid. Mir.*, Oct 1, *Kul Shay*, Oct 7)

Senior Appointments Made. At that time, four other senior appointments were made which were of prime significance during the period of consolidation of the new regime:

Maj-Gen. Fathi Baqir, as Asst. SG for Security and Police in the Ministry of Interior in place of Maj-Gen. Muhammad al-Jarrâh who was dismissed on Sept 30 (*R. Damascus*, Sept 30 [Oct 3]; *Jaridah*, Oct 1);

Dr Atif al-Barqawi, as Director-General of Propaganda and Information in place of Mutasim Sayfi, on Oct 2 (*Jaridah*, Oct 3);

Col. Muhammad Hishâm as-Samân (formerly Director-General of the Grain Office) as Director of General Security, in place of Brig. Ahmad al-Bayluni, who was appointed Chief of Police in Aleppo, on Oct 7. (*ANA*, Oct 7 [10]; *Jaridah*, Oct 8);

Brig. Izz ad-Din Karamân's appointment as Inspector-General of Police was confirmed. (*INA*, Oct 4)

Symbols of Sovereignty Restored or Emphasized. [One of the first concerns of the government was to underline Syrian independence by restoring the attributes of sovereignty.] On Sept 30 Dr Kuzbari as FM informed the UN and the Arab League of the establishment of the sovereign and independent "Syrian Arab Republic" (*al-jumhuriyah al-arabiyyah as-suriyyah*). This name had appeared first on Sept 29 in the announcement of the formation of the Cabinet. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [Oct 1]; *Hayat*, Oct 1)

On Sept 30 Legislative Decree No. 2 restored Syria's former flag, emblem and anthem. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 30 [Oct 3])

The Minister of the Interior ordered the designation "Syrian-Arab" to be included in forms and registers under the heading "nationality," thus reverting to pre-Union practice according to the *Syrian News Agency*. (*SNA*, Oct 2)

On Oct 9 Abu al-Yusuf al-Abidin, former mufti of Syria, followed up his personal declaration of support (see below) by broadcasting a legal opinion (*fatwa*) releasing Syrians from their allegiance to Abdel Nasser (*Manar*, Jordan, Oct 2). (Abidin was subsequently reinstated in his former post.) (*ANA*, Oct 29 [31])

PROGRAMMES AND TRENDS

The Government Programme. On Sept 29, the day of its constitution, the Kuzbari government issued a policy statement. It declared the following aims: "stable constitutional conditions to be established within four months"; restoration of "all the individual and general freedoms," in particular freedom of press and opinion; strengthening the army to enable it to protect the borders and "carry out its anticipated role in the realization of the aims of Arab nationalism"; [cf. the Revolutionary Command statement below, according to which the army should confine itself to the protection of the country]; protecting the workers, guarding and further expanding their acquired rights and supporting the trade union movement; applying the agrarian reform laws "in such a manner as to achieve prosperity and ease (*idihâr wa-rakhâ*) for the peasant and the agricultural worker; also guaranteeing agricultural workers' organizations"; promoting economic activity by "encouraging savings, investment, industrialization, legal profit making and restoring normality"; inviting foreign, especially Arab, capital; the government to "confine itself to implementing economic projects connected with public utilities, projects which individuals cannot or do not wish to implement, and to projects required by the national defence; a balanced budget, free currency convertibility, 'safeguarding Syria's reputation abroad by fulfilling its obligations'; 'a true and comprehensive Arab unity (*wahdah arabiyah haqiqiyah shâmilah*) based on freedom and equality," participation in the Arab struggle in Palestine and Algeria; observing international agreements and the UN charter.

The statement concluded as follows: "the government... emanates from the desires of the people with all its groups; and, while thanking its brave army... for their blessed revolution, affirms that it will always be at war with imperialism... It will march words with deeds." (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [Oct 2]; *Narr*, Oct 1)

Revolutionary Command: "The Principles of the People"; "True Socialism." In addition to the government programme the Revolutionary Command formulated the "principles and aims of the people" on Oct 2 as follows: 1. the protection of the sanctities of Arab nationalism; 2. the realization of a true socialism; 3. the establishment of a true democracy; 4. "full discipline and respect for the sanctity of regulations in a strong army, an army which clings to its fundamental duties—namely, to protect the neutrality of the country." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 2 [4]; *Hayat*, Oct 3)

Social and Economic Policy. The social and economic aims of the government were further elaborated by Dr Awad Barakât, the Minister of Economy, as follows: to restore public confidence and to safeguard civil rights; to encourage individual savings and productive investments; to set up development projects in order to increase production and national income; to work for a better dis-

THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT

President of the Republic: Dr Nazim al-Qudsi (Muslim from Aleppo, Sha'ab Party; elected by National Assembly on Dec 14).

Ministry	Provisional Government Sept 29-Nov 20	Community Party District	Caretaker Government Nov 20-Dec 22	Community Party District	Post Election Government Dec 22	Community Party District
PM	Ma'mūn al-Kurbani*	Muslim Damascus	Izzat an-Nus*	Muslim/Independent/ Damascus	Ma'rūf ad-Dawālībī	Muslim/Sh'a'ab Aleppo
Deputy PM					Jalāl al-Sayyid*	Muslim/ex-Ba'ath Deir ez-Zor
Foreign Affairs	Ma'mūn al-Kurbani*		Izzat an-Nus*		Ma'rūf ad-Dawālībī*	
Defence	Ma'mūn al-Kurbani*		Izzat an-Nus*		Rashād Barmaḍa*	Muslim/Sh'a'ab Aleppo
Interior	Adnān al-Quwatli	Muslim/Watani/ Damascus	Abd al-Salīm al-Tarmānī*	Muslim/Independent/ Damascus	Ahmad Qanbar	Muslim/Sh'a'ab Aleppo
Justice	Ahmad Sulṭān*	Muslim/Independent/ Hama	Ahmad Sulṭān*	Muslim/Independent/ Hama	Mustaḥf az-Zarqā*	Muslim Brethren/ Aleppo
National Guidance	Izzat an-Nus*	Muslim/Independent/ Damascus	Ahmad al-Sammān*	Muslim/Independent/ Damascus	Fu'ād al-Adil*	Muslim/Indepen- dent/Damascus
Information (Propaganda)	Mustaḥf al-Barūdī	Muslim/Independent/ Hama	Mustaḥf al-Barūdī	Muslim/Independent/ Hama	Fu'ād al-Adil*	
Finance	Leon Zamariya*	Christian/Watani/ Aleppo	Nu'mān Aḥari*	Muslim/Independent/ Latakia	Rashīd ad-Duqr*	Muslim/Indepen- dent/Damascus
Economy	Awad Barakāt*	Christian/Indepen- dent/Damascus	Awad Barakāt (from Nov 23— Nu'mān al-Aḥari*)	Adnān al-Quwatli	Adnān al-Quwatli	Muslim/Indepen- dent/Damascus
Planning	Nu'mān Aḥari*	Muslim/Independent/ Damascus	Abd al-Rahmān Hurriyāh*	Muslim/Independent/ Latakia	Na'ūm al-Suyūfī	Muslim/Watani (?) Indep. (?) Aleppo
Industry	Awad Barakāt*		Awad Barakāt (from Nov 23— Fathallah Ayyūn*)		Abd al-Rahmān al-Humaydi	Muslim/Sh'a'ab Tahīr (?)/ Deir ez-Zor

THE GOVERNMENT

Public Works	Abd as-Rahmān Hurriyah*	Muslim/Independent/ Latakia	Abd as-Rahmān Hurriyah*	Muslim/Independent/ Latakia	Muhammad ash-Shawwaf	Muslim/Shahab (?) Independent (?)/ Latakia
Communica- tions	Abd as-Rahmān Hurriyah*		Abd as-Rahmān Hurriyah*		Ahmad Ali Kāmil	Muslim/Independent (?) Wātani (?) Latakia
Agriculture	Amin Nazif*	Muslim/Independent/ Damascus	Sa'īd as-Sayyid*	Sa'īd as-Sayyid*	Jalāl as-Sayyid*	
Agarian Reform	Amin Nazif (acting) Sa'īd as-Sayyid (from Nov 1)		Sa'īd as-Sayyid*	Muslim/Independent/ Deir ez-Zor	Bakri al-Qabbāni	Muslim/Shahab (?) Independent (?)/ Aleppo
Supply	Leon Zamariya*		Nu'mān Azhari*		Rashid ad-Duqr*	
Wages	Ahmad Sulān*		Ahmad Sulān*		Mustafa az-Zarqā*	
Education	Izzat an-Nus*		Ahmad as-Sammān*		Rashid Barnada*	
Labour	Fu'ād al-Adil*	Muslim/Independent/ Aleppo	Fathallah Ayyūn*	Christian/Wātani/ Aleppo	Muhammad Abdin*	Muslim/Independent/ Damascus
Health	Farhān al-Jandali	Muslim/Shahab/ Homs	Abd as-Salām al-Tarmanini*		Mahmūd al-Azm*	Muslim/Wātani (?) Independent (?)/ Damascus
Social Affairs	Fu'ād al-Adil*		Fathallah Ayyūn*		Muhammad Abdin*	
Municipal and Rural Affairs	Nu'mān Azhari*		Mustafa al-Barūdī*		Suhayl al-Khūrī	Christian/Wātani/ Damascus
Public Relief			Abd as-Salām al-Tarmanini*			

16 Ministers

10 Ministers
(from Nov 23—9 Ministers)

12 Ministers
(from Nov 1—13 Ministers)

* Held additional portfolios.

tribution of the national income amongst all producers, especially workers and peasants.

Dr Barakat added that the government had adopted the principles of "true socialism" as suited to Syrian reality, and not a "false theoretical" socialism which took away as much as it gave, and gave an assurance that whatever advantages small earners had derived from the former regime would be preserved. (*Jaridah*, Oct 6)

Elections Envisaged Within Four Months. The government made it clear from the outset that the "constitutional conditions" envisaged in its programme of Sept 29 presupposed the holding of elections. On Sept 30 Adnan al-Quwatli, the Minister of Interior, announced that the "essential objective" of his ministry was "to secure free and honest elections" as soon as possible. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 30 [Oct 2])

On Oct 3 and 5 the PM said that general elections for a constituent assembly would take place after four months, that the elections would be held on a personal basis, without party lists, and that the new constitution would be "based on past experience." (*Nasir*, Oct 4; *Hayat*, Oct 6)

Government "Conservative." The western press was virtually unanimous in labelling the Kuzbari government conservative; it was widely felt that this orientation might mean "trouble in traditionally volatile Syria." (e.g. *Scotsman*, Oct 3; *New Statesman*, Oct 6; *Die Welt*, Oct 7; *Observer*; *NYT*, Oct 8; *Financial Times*, Oct 10)

[Egyptian sources took their clue from Abdel Nasser in describing the new government as a gathering of traitors serving reaction, whether from greed or weakness—see: *The Dissolution of the UAR*.]

[The Lebanese press did not publish any opinions on the character and significance of Dr Kuzbari's cabinet; it appears that the subject was banned by the censor, as the newspapers of those days were conspicuous for their blank spaces.]

Workers and Peasants Reassured. [In view of the proclaimed socialism of the former regime, and its own reputation for conservatism, the new regime took care from the first to reassure the working classes.] On Oct 2 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour requested employers not to discharge workers and to cooperate with trade unions; it also asked the Ministry of Health to appoint doctors to workers' clinics in the provinces according to need. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 2 [6].) On Oct 7 Maj.-Gen. Zahr ad-Din received representatives of the Federation of Trade Unions (*itihād nīqabī al-ummāl*) and promised that they would receive their rights—"more than the 25% of profits promised them by Abdel Nasser." He called on them to ignore misleading rumours and not to let "exploiters and opportunists" infiltrate into their ranks. (*Jaridah*, Oct 8)

On Oct 5, Amin Nazif, Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, said that the Agrarian Reform Law was still effective and all arrangements were being made to carry out its provisions "within the framework of justice and equality." (*Mid. Mir.*, Oct 7)

THE SECURITY SITUATION; STABILIZING THE REGIME

[While the Syrian authorities desired to present a picture of order and calm throughout the country as soon as possible after the revolution, pro-UAR elements produced some tension, especially during the first week after the coup.

At the same time the authorities aimed at eliminating the traces of Egyptian rule and solving personal problems created by the dissolution.]

Symptoms of Unrest, Security Precautions. On Oct 1 the C-in-C of the armed forces announced that the situation had returned to normal throughout Syria. (*Damascus*, Oct 1—*JMB*, Oct 1)

However, on the same day, communiqué No. 21 of the Revolutionary Command warned "subversive elements—non-Syrian mercenaries, foreigners and refugees who were 'penetrating into the demonstrations of jubilation with the purpose of changing [their] character,' that they would be arrested and deported. The same day it was forbidden to carry firearms, which were to be handed in immediately to the nearest police stations. (The deadline was later extended to Oct 10)

The universities of Damascus and Aleppo, and all schools were closed, "in order that opportunistic elements might not be given the opportunity to distort the demonstrations of support..." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 1, 8 [3, 10]). At night a bomb was reported thrown at the embassy of Turkey [which had been the second state to recognize independent Syria]. (*Guardian*, Oct 4)

Cairo Radio quoted reports on clashes "in most of the towns" between the military and the police on the one hand, and "the people," faithful to the UAR, on the other. Such broadcasts continued until Oct 5, [when Abdel Nasser's shift of policy (see p 162) induced restraint]. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 2, 3, 4, 5 [4, 5, 6])

There was some corroborating evidence for these reports. A Lebanese source spoke of armed terror bands on whom the Egyptians relied for incitement and unrest. They were composed of foreign mercenaries with residence permits in Syria (probably a reference to the Palestinian refugees). The Syrian public had tried to lynch members of these bands when discovered and some had to be rescued by the police in a Damascus market on Oct 1. A number of these groups had been expelled into Jordan. (*Jaridah*, Oct 3)

At Der'a, near the Jordanian border, it was reported that for five days, "the peasants resisted the deposition of Abdel Nasser as their leader and idol." There was sporadic fighting between civilians and the army. (*Times*, Oct 6)

On Oct 3, it was reported, Damascus appeared quiet though tanks remained parked at street corners. (*Guardian*, Oct 6)

On Oct 4 the Revolutionary Command announced the arrest of "saboteurs" who had crossed the frontiers into Syria (*R. Damascus*, Oct 4 [6]). Also arrested were adherents of Abdallah Rimawi (the Jordanian, dissident, pro-UAR Ba'ath leader who had fled to the UAR) among political refugees in Syria after Rimawi attacked the new Syrian regime over Cairo Radio. (*Akhbar al-Ushb'*, Jordan, Oct 6)

Country Calming Down; Emergency Measures Relaxed. A week after the coup, an *Al-Jaridah* correspondent in Syria noted after a tour of the country, that recovery from the shock of dissolution had been quick, and absolute quiet reigned everywhere. There had been violence in Damascus and Aleppo, but much less than might have been expected after three-and-a-half years of Egyptian rule, and an even longer period of terror organized by Sarraj. (*Jaridah*, Lebanon, Oct 5)

[Whilst arrests were still being made, some emergency regulations were relaxed or abolished.] On Oct 1, for-

eigners were allowed to leave Syria. (*R. Damascus, Oct 1 [3]*)

On Oct 4 it was announced that contrary to certain reports foreign journalists were free to enter Syria and see for themselves the people's support for the government (*R. Damascus, Oct 4 [3]*). Civilian airports were opened as from Oct 5.

On Oct 4 night curfew was lifted throughout Syria. [The curfew had already been gradually shortened before.]

The same day communiqué No. 25 of the Revolutionary Command announced that the officers of the revolutionary movement, "having carried out their mission," were returning to the posts they had occupied before the uprising (*R. Damascus, Oct 4 [6]*; *Jaridah, Oct 5*). On Oct 9 the C-in-C declared that this step had been carried out (*R. Damascus, Oct 9 [11]*)

[The schools, however, remained closed.]

Sarrāj Arrested. Col Abd al-Hamid Sarrāj, Vice-President of the UAR, was put under house arrest at Damascus on Sept 28. He escaped—according to one source by opening fire on the revolutionary forces surrounding his house—and was arrested in a "hide-out" on Oct 1. On Oct 7 Maj.-Gen. Zahr ad-Din denied that Sarrāj had taken any part whatsoever in the revolution. (*Jaridah, Sept 30, Oct 8*; *Jihad, Oct 2*; *R. Damascus, Oct 2 [3, 4]*)

Liquidation of UAR Positions: National Union, MENA, Intelligence Cells. The Government liquidated former UAR strongholds.

On Oct 1 all offices and branches of the National Union were closed and their activities suspended. The same measures were applied to the [UAR directed] Middle East News Agency (*SNA, Oct 2*). Two months later the property of the National Union was transferred to social institutions, such as schools and health centres. (*Jaridah, Dec 1*)

On Sept 30 Dr Adnān al-Quwatli, the Minister of the Interior, announced the closing-down of "tens of offices out of hundreds, the purpose of which was to spy and corrupt." (*Jaridah, Oct 1*)

On Oct 8 the Minister of the Interior said that committees "to liquidate intelligence nests" had begun work. Their task was expected to take a long time "because of the great number of these nests throughout Syria." Dr Quwatli had said earlier that about 6,500 persons were working for intelligence during the previous regime (*Mid. Mir., Oct 14*). School text-books and curricula were purged, by order of the Minister of Education, of "all praise for the individual," as a condition for the reopening of schools. (*ANA, Oct 7 [10]*)

Repatriation of Egyptians. The repatriation of Egyptian army personnel and civilians in Syria started on Oct 1 and was reported completed on Nov 20 (see p 163.)

Financial Stability. [The revolution caused no financial convulsions, largely because of the confidence inspired in business circles in Syria and abroad by the character of the new government.] Within a day of the revolution the exchange rate of the £S rose by 14 piasters on the Beirut money market, and it was traded at only 23 piasters below the £L. (*Hayat, Sept 30*). [Officially the two currencies were at par.]

Later, Dr Awad Barkāt, Minister of Economy and Industry, said that the Central Bank's gold and foreign currency cover was safe and would not be spent except

"to meet the needs of the . . . Republic." (*R. Damascus, Oct 3 [5]*)

Summing Up. In summing up the general situation ten days after the revolution, *The New York Times* reported that Syrian independence seemed to be winning general acceptance. People were talking in public with a freedom unknown under the UAR. The atmosphere was one of "relief rather than rejoicing." On the other hand, the workers and lower middle classes were believed still to be pro-Nasser in sentiment (*NYT, Oct 8*). *The Financial Times* (Oct 10) assessed the situation as "not immediately explosive," though certainly "highly fluid."

DECLARATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE NEW REGIME

The General Public. From Oct 29 Damascus Radio broadcast declarations of support for the revolution and the new regime from a variety of civilian bodies and personalities. A selection of these, as broadcast day by day, is given below:

Sept 29: the executive of the National Union in Damascus; "girl students" at Damascus University; the Patriarch of Antioch; the Imam of Al-Muhajjirin Mosque in Damascus; the inhabitants of the Kurdish quarter of Damascus; the Metal Workers Union and other trade unions; the Lawyers' Association in Damascus. Sept 30: the State Control Council (*Majlis taftish ad-dawlah*) represented by its head, Dr Mazhar Ahmad al-Azmah. Oct 1: the former Mufti of Syria, Abu al-Yus Abdin; the chambers of commerce, agriculture and industry; the Engineers' Union; a delegation representing the judges; "members of the Trade Unions Federation" (*R. Damascus, Sept 29, 30 [Oct 2], Oct 1 [2]*). On Oct 2 the support of Aleppo and Damascus University students' unions was announced (*Nasr, Oct 2, 4*). It was later reported that "the people" had destroyed a statue of Abdel Nasser in Aleppo. (*SNA, Oct 8*)

No Outright Support by Organized Labour. [The trade union federations expressed no support for the revolution as such and in their public statements adopted a lukewarm attitude towards the new regime.]

The chairman of the Aleppo Trade Union Federation called for support for the government, taking cognizance of the cabinet's "absolute pledge (see above, p 487 b) to safeguard the rights of workers..." (*R. Damascus, Sept 30 [Oct 3]*)

A statement by Tal'at at-Taghlili, president of the Syrian Federation of Trade Unions, stressed that Syrian workers had always believed in "the true unity of the Arab states." Having become aware of "errors and deviations," they had tried to rouse Abdel Nasser's attention, but "these explanations had been wrongly received." They were now presenting Dr Kuzbari with a memorandum (*R. Damascus, Oct 2 [4]*; *Nasr, Oct 3*). The Cairo *Sawt al-Arab* commented: "From your sad tone . . . we understand the situation: guns and tanks. Workers, be patient, stubborn, and unite so that you will triumph." (*R. Cairo, Oct 3 [4]*)

Politicians, Parties' Support. On Oct 2 a statement signed by 16 prominent Syrian politicians hailed the revolution, which had freed Syria from a "regime which aimed at distorting the ideals of Arab nationalism and Arab unity (and) at oppressing political and democratic life" and called on the Egyptian people, now "fettered with chains, to free themselves from the dictatorial rule." The state-

ment demanded early "free and neutral" elections and thanked the army for delivering the country. Following are the signatories (with their party affiliation as given by *Al-Jaridah* except where in square brackets): Ahmad Kanbar (Sha'ab), Ahmad ash-Sharabati (Watani), As'ad Harun (Watani), Akram al-Hurani (Ba'ath), Bashir al-Armah (indep.), Hani al-Khoja (Watani), Hasan Murad (indep.), Khalid al-Azm (indep., formerly leftist), Rashid Jabri (Sha'ab), Suhayl Khuri (Watani), Sabri al-Asali (Watani), Salah al-Bitar (Ba'ath), Fu'ad Qadri (Sha'ab), Muhammad al-Ayish (indep.), Najib al-Armazi (Watani) and Hani as-Siba'i (Sha'ab).

Al-Jaridah pointed out that the Communist and the Nationalist-Social (PPS) parties alone did not figure in the statement, though their organs in Lebanon had welcomed the revolution. Damascus Radio commented that amongst the signatories were all the Syrian ministers who had signed the union document of Feb 1958, "except those who have died or are away from the country." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 2 [4]; *IMB*, Oct 3; *Nasr*; *Jaridah*; *Hayat*, Oct 3)

Shukri al-Quwatly, Syria's last President before the Union and "first citizen" of the UAR) congratulated PM Kuzbari and the army in a phone call from his hospital in Zurich. (*Jaridah*, Oct 11)

On Oct 3 a meeting of the Sha'ab Party took place at Aleppo, with the participation of Rushdi Kikhya, Abd ar-Rahman al-Kayyali, Muhammad Sa'id az-Za'im, Munir Ghanam, Ali' ad-Din al-Jahiri, Wajih al-Hallaj, Ahmad Abu Salih and Dr Nazim al-Qudsi, supporting the revolution and expressing confidence that the Revolutionary Command would work for Arab unity (*wahdah*) and restore democratic life. (*Jaridah*, Oct 4)

On the other hand, Ba'ath support for the revolution was reportedly not unanimous. A pro-Egyptian Lebanese source reported a split in the Syrian Ba'ath leadership over the dissolution of the UAR: Kamal Nasir, a former Ba'ath deputy, had attacked Salah ad-Din al-Bitar and Akram Hurani for their support of the revolution as a deviation from the party's principles and averred that the only way to save the situation in Damascus was to fight for the reconstitution of the union (*Hawadith*, Oct 6). [Ba'ath criticism of the government was not long in coming. See p 496 h.]

[Communist support was unequivocal.] A statement by the Syrian Communist Party published in Lebanon hailed the revolution as a "historic victory by the Syrian people and army . . . an expression of its hate for Pharaonic tyranny." At the same time the party asked for "a na-

tional democratic rule based on free elections," for punishment of "criminals" and the liberation of "detained nationalists." (*Nida' Beirut*, Oct 4)

[The support of two prominent Syrian exiles was not desired by the new regime.] It was officially denied that [the deposed dictator] Col. Adib ash-Shishakli and [the Communist leader] Khalid Bakdash had returned, or would return, to Syria. If they did so, the gallows awaited them. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 4, 5 [6])

Minorities: Druzes, Alawis. Damascus Radio mentioned Sultan al-Atrash, [the veteran Druze leader of Jabal Druze] among the first supporters of the Revolutionary Command (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [Oct 2]). Thereupon Kamal Junblat [the Lebanese Druze leader and Minister of Public Works who had expressed his disapproval of the Syrian revolutionaries—see Lebanon] was reported to have sent secret messengers to Atrash to inquire into the latter's attitude to the revolution, and to inform him of his own (*Neher, Lebanon*, Oct 4). At a press conference at Kraya in the presence of other Druze notables, at which he stressed his support for the Syrian government, Sultan expressly branded all rumours to the contrary as false (*SNA*, Oct 5). A pro-UAR source alleged that the government had accepted three demands which Atrash had made as a condition for this declaration: Adib ash-Shishakli would not be permitted to return to Syria; the army Chief-of-Staff was to be a Druze; Atrash was not to be expected to attack Abdel Nasser and the UAR. (*Kul Shay'*, Oct 7)

Representatives of another ethnic-religious minority, the Alawis, announced their support for the new regime through Badi' Isma'il from Tartus. (*Nasr*, Oct 5)

Refugees. On Sept 28 Palestinian refugees in Damascus and Aleppo demonstrated in favour of Abdel Nasser and the union (see p 612 a) and as late as Oct 1 the Revolutionary Command issued a severe warning to "subversive elements penetrating into the demonstrations" who were "foreigners and refugees" (see p 490 h). As the same time, refugee spokesmen and business circles expressed their support for the new regime in guarded terms. Some thirty named notables assured their fellow refugees of the new government's zeal in regard to Palestine, and called upon them "to support the authorities in all matters promoting calm and security" (*R. Damascus*, Oct 1 [3]). A group of "Palestinian businessmen in Damascus" supported the government, arguing that "what pleased Syria pleased them." (*SNA*, Oct 4)

THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

SECURITY AND INVESTIGATIONS

(October-December)

Further Steps Towards Normalcy. Certain security regulations were eased in mid-Oct. Syrians were again permitted to go abroad upon receiving an exit visa and many availed themselves of this facility. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 11 [12]; *Hayat*, Oct 20)

On Oct 21 elementary schools were reopened (*Jaridah*, Oct 22), followed on Nov 4 by secondary and vocational schools, as well as teachers' colleges. (*R. Beirut*, Nov 4 [7])

The universities (Damascus and Aleppo) were reopened [only] on Dec 16 [after the elections]. (*Jaridah*, Dec 17)

Transfers and Appointments. During the first half of Oct there were large-scale dismissals, transfers and appointments of provincial governors and senior police and security officers. (For a list of new governors, see *R. Damascus*, Oct 14 [16]; for a list of officers—*SNA*, Oct 11.)

Judicial Council and Investigation Committee. On Oct 16 a legislative decree provided for the establishment of a Judicial Council (*majlis adli*) for the trial of "everybody who harmed the homeland and the people in the extinct regime . . . particularly those who were in control of power and security affairs and enjoyed the full powers to expend state funds"; an Investigation Committee (*lajnat tahqiq*) would refer cases to the Judicial Coun-

cil. Both council and committee would be governed by the existing law and their members would be qualified law officers. There would be no appeal against the verdicts and the sentences of the Judicial Council; death sentences would have to be confirmed by the head of state. Decisions concerning damages would be left to the civil courts. (*R. Damascus, Oct 16 [18]; Jaridah, Oct 17*)

The establishment of the two institutions was announced on Oct 6. The Judicial Council was headed by Majid al-Ghazi, president of the court of appeal; the Investigation Committee was composed of Tawfiq Abu Ayyash (chairman) with a civilian and a military judge (*Jaridah, Oct 27*). The first case due to open on Nov 1, before the Investigation Committee, was to be that of Sarraj. (*R. Damascus, Oct 30 [Nov 1]*) [but in fact the case was referred to the military prosecutor, see below].

By the beginning of Nov 1,500 complaints had been referred to the Investigation Committee by persons who claimed to have suffered at the hands of the intelligence services during the union (*Jaridah, Nov 3*). [No case was known to have been brought before the Judicial Council by the end of the year.]

Release of Persons Detained Under the UAR. On Oct 18 it was announced that more than 400 people arrested under the former regime "without legal justification" had already been released; "some 71 people" were still detained pending an investigation into their cases (*Nasr, Oct 19; Mid. Mir., Oct 21*). For this purpose the government formed a committee, which was to conclude its work within four months. (*Jaridah, Oct 17*)

On Dec 26 the Chairman said that 45 additional detainees had been released and that his committee would complete its work within three days. A week later the number of releases was given as 55. (*Jihad, Jordan, Dec 27, 1961, Jan 4, 1962*)

Syria Reports Egyptian-Directed Attempts at Sabotage. [On Oct 27 and again on Nov 1 Syrian official sources reported attempts which were repulsed at infiltration into Syria for purposes of sabotage; it was alleged that these attempts were Egyptian-directed. For details see pp 163-4.]

Armenians on Trial for Espionage. (See p 597).

Afil al-Bizri Returns. At the beginning of Feb Afil al-Bizri [Chief of Staff of the Syrian army at the time of the formation of the UAR and a pro-Communist] returned to Syria from Rumania. He was detained for 48 hours for questioning, and requested not to engage in any political activity. He was then placed under house arrest. At the end of Dec he was reported free. (*Jihad, Jordan, Dec 3; R. Tunis, Dec 13 [15]; Akhbar al-Ustun, Jordan, Dec 29*)

Sarraj Investigation Opens. The investigation of Abd al-Hamid as-Sarraj and his assistants commenced on Oct 9 (*Jaridah, Oct 10*). A few days later the arrest was reported from Damascus of Lieut. Abd al-Wahhab Khatib, another of Sarraj's subordinates. (*Jaridah, Oct 18*)

On Nov 1 secret service funds amounting to approximately £52 million, deposited at the Central Syrian Bank and at Miar Bank by Sarraj, were returned to the Syrian treasury. (*Ayyam, Oct 31, Nov 2*)

The questioning of Sarraj by the investigation committee (see above) began at Damascus on Dec 21 before the Military Prosecutor Lieut.-Col. Nur ad-Din Dasqi, who announced that 240 charges had already been filed against Sarraj. Investigation into his activities and those of his accomplices—20 of whom were still at large

—was expected to be completed within a fortnight (*Mid. Mir., Dec 23, 30*). A pro-Egyptian source reported that Sarraj and Lieut.-Col. Burhan Adham were refusing to give information to their investigators and demanded a public trial. Sarraj, according to this source, had declared his intention to withdraw from politics, if released, and settle abroad or at Aleppo. (*Kul Shay', Beirut, Dec 23*)

Internal Security Reorganization. On Dec 15 Col. Muhammad Hisham as-Sammam was appointed Commander of Internal Security Forces; this post replaced the post of Assistant SG of Police and Public Security. The Higher Police Council was also replaced by a committee under the chairmanship of Col. as-Sammam, which included the directors-general of police and public security, the control organization, and six police superintendents from the provinces. (*Mid. Mir., Dec 16*)

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

[As Oct advanced, economic and social questions received increasing attention. The new regime definitely tended towards liberalism.]

Tasks and Priorities. The *New York Times* saw the main problems confronting the new government as social and economic—the decline of exports and the shortage of foreign currency, the difficulty in gaining the confidence of the workers and lower middle classes "among whom pro-Nasser sentiment apparently remained strong." (*NYT, Oct 8*)

According to *Al-Haydt*, the "urgent affairs" occupying the attention of the Syrian government at the moment were largely economic. They were: (a) a speedy termination of the transitional period; (b) preparations for general elections; (c) a survey of the administration; (d) an enquiry into the economic legislation of the former regime, and the possibility of revising it at once; (e) a survey of the economic situation in general; (f) the speeding-up of development projects; (g) foreign relations; (h) diplomatic appointments. (*Hayat, Oct 17*)

Economic and Social Policies. On Oct 17 the government issued a comprehensive statement on social and economic policy under the heading "The Revolution of the New Era and Arab Socialism."

The government declared that it was "imperative to adopt a sound socialist system." It professed to recognize two prominent facts, namely (1) that the socialist trend was steadily spreading to all countries and (2) that the adoption of socialism in different forms in accordance with the particularities of different societies saves it from the pitfalls of dictatorship. The "new era" in Syria strove to establish "Arab socialism" which was a means to attain the aims of Arab nationalism, namely the realization of a free Arab society and the creation of a great Arab civilization. To achieve these aims, socialism must be combined with democracy: the individual could not realize his potential except under socialism, and society could not prosper until the individual enjoyed freedom.

Ar. Economic Policy I. the foremost aim is "a maximum rate of development" in order to raise the standard of living; "we believe in the need for state intervention to ensure a just distribution of the national income"; 2. respect for private ownership and initiative; encouragement of small investors; fight against monopolies; "at the same time the state believes in the principle of agrarian reform"; 3. a system of "controlled economic freedom" capable of "preventing economic activity from being obstructed or running into error"; 4. cooperation with

other Arab states, pending the establishment of economic unity; 5. encouragement of foreign capital investment; 6. revision of taxation to "safeguard lawful profits... and ensure equality of sacrifice without killing productive potentialities."

B. The Role of the State in the Economy. Direct commitments: 1. control of all public utilities such as irrigation systems, dams, transport, harbours, electricity; 2. economic projects which private persons are unwilling or unable to undertake—draining marshes, oil prospecting; 3. projects for national defence; 4. projects in the fields of education, health, housing etc.; 5. food and other basic supplies, when "exploitation or corruption is feared"; 6. agricultural and industrial guidance and research, and similar projects.

Indirect commitments: 1. control of currency, banking and insurance; 2. supply of credit facilities for lower income groups; 3. encouragement of saving; 4. control and direction of foreign trade; 5. price control.

C. Social Policies. 1. "the implementation of sound socialist policies... the increase of production... and social justice"; 2. "to ensure and facilitate work"; 3. support of trade unions and protection of workers' rights; 4. participation of workers in administration and profits of enterprises, promotion of harmony between employers and employees; 5. expansion of social and health services for workers; 6. minimum wages; 7. protection of women and children; 8. fight against disease; 9. measures to improve nutrition and housing; 10. rural development—water and electricity, transport, schools and hospitals etc.; 11. aid for private initiative in the social field; 12. encouragement of the cooperative movement; 13. encouragement of sport and scouting activities "for the creation of a mature and strong society which believes in its Arabism"; 14. "equal opportunities" in education.

D. Agrarian Reform. 1. "limitation of large-scale ownership in accordance with sound conditions"; 2. land distribution in plots sufficiently large to ensure a fair living; 3. safeguarding owners' rights as regards valuation of lands and terms of payment; 4. protection of rights already gained by peasants; 5. study of "genuine complaints raised against... the Agrarian Reform Law" and redress of injustices, "without harming peasants"; 6. financial and technical aid and guidance to peasants.

In conclusion the statement stressed the government's intention to repair the mistakes made by the previous regime, including "improvised legislation," which led to "anarchy, corruption... and the crisis of unemployment." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 17 [19]; *Nasr*, Oct 17; *Mid. Mir.*, Oct 21)

Towards Economic Liberalization. On Oct 8 it was announced that the cabinet had formed a 13-man committee on economic and financial reform under the chairmanship of Izzat al-Tarabulsi, the former governor of the Central Bank. The committee was to tender its recommendations within one month (*R. Damascus*, Oct 8 [10]; *Jaridah*, Oct 10, 14). At the same time, Dr Awad Barakat, the Minister of Economy, said that the government favoured free trade and fair competition. Parliament would deal with the question of whether nationalization should be repealed. (*Jaridah*, Oct 10)

[Pressure groups exerted their influence.] On Oct 11 the Syrian chambers of commerce and industry met in Damascus to demand the abrogation of the nationalization laws, progressive income tax and currency regulations as being "instruments for the subjection of the Syrian to the Egyptian economy." (*Nasr*, Oct 13)

Dr Barakat, however, on Oct 21 denied rumours of

the impending repeal of nationalization laws; on the other hand, he said, steps had been taken to free foreign trade, and currency and capital transfers (*R. Damascus*, Oct 21 [24]; *Jaridah*, Oct 22). A week earlier, on Oct 14, the Central Bank of Syria and the Higher Council for Credit and Currency were re-established—a step which was said to have been regarded in Beirut as auguring the abolition of currency controls. (*Financial Times*, Oct 16)

The £S continued firm. The price of the US dollar in the Syrian money market had come down to 368 piasters, only eight above the official rate; it had been 445 piasters before the revolution (*R. Damascus*, Oct 22-*IMB*, Oct 22; *R. Damascus*, Oct 24 [W Nov 2]). During Oct the volume of accounts kept with Syrian banks went up by 40% "due to return of confidence in the Syrian economy." The rise was mainly effected by the return of Syrian capital from Lebanon. (*Nasr*, Nov 26)

In Nov the government lifted limitations on the import of all goods except "luxuries"; according to the Minister of Economy, this step was calculated to encourage the return of Syrian capital from abroad. (*BBC in Arabic*, Nov 21-*IMB*, Nov 22; *Jaridah*, Nov 22)

Agrarian Reform and Cooperation. On Nov 1 Sa'id al-Sayyid was appointed Minister of Agrarian Reform. On the eve of the appointment the Premier, and later the new minister, stated that the Agrarian Reform Law would be amended so as to safeguard peasant interests whilst correcting injustices inflicted on the landowners, especially as regards compensation. Rights acquired by peasants cultivating agrarian reform lands would not be affected. (*Mid. Mir.*, Nov 4; *Ayyam*, Nov 6; *Jundi*, Nov 7; *R. Damascus*, Nov 12 [W 16]; *Nasr*, Nov 13; *Wahdah*, Dec 3)

In mid-Nov distributions of ownership certificates took place [apparently for the first time since the revolution] in the provinces of Homs, Hama and Aleppo. (*Nasr*, Nov 14, 17)

In Dec it was reported that the Ministry of Agriculture would spend £S350,000 out of the current development budget on increasing the number of agricultural cooperative societies, 250 of which were already operating. (*Wahdah*, Dec 3)

Assistance to Peasants, Drought Relief. At the beginning of Nov the Agrarian Reform Administrative Board decided, in view of the damage caused by drought during 1960, to exempt from rents for the 1960/61 winter season peasants renting state and agrarian reform lands. (*R. Damascus*, Nov 5 [W 9])

A few days later it was announced that the Agricultural Bank had decided upon a number of measures to assist the peasants in drought areas through: moratoria on debts; seed corn distribution—40,000 tons wheat and 25,000 tons barley; £S5 million were set aside for loans in case of further need; an additional £S5 million were allocated for the assistance of peasants in non-drought areas. Provincial committees headed by the governor and comprising representatives of the Bank and local agricultural institutions were to be established to determine relief priorities. (*Nasr*, Nov 14)

Labour Affairs; Safeguarding Workers Interests. [The transitional government continued to show its concern for the workers' interests.] On Oct 8 government decree No. 12 ordained that joint stock companies should have on their boards of directors one member representing the

company's salaried employees, and one member representing the workers, both to be elected by secret ballot under supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 8 [10].)

In Oct the General Federation of Trade Unions, in a memorandum to the Minister of Labour, asked for the establishment of a consultative council to assist with the framing of labour laws and to supervise the implementation of price control and labour disputes regulations; this council should be composed of workers, employers and government representatives (*Hayat*, Oct 24). [No reports were encountered on the establishment of such a council.]

On Nov 7 two decrees were promulgated granting additional benefits to workers: 1. an employer of more than 100 employees had to provide free medical treatment and medicine; if the number of workers exceeded 500, the employer had to bear also the costs of specialized treatment and surgical operations; 2. workers employed in establishments of over 15 employees were to receive half-pay for Fridays [the weekly day of rest] and holidays, which were formerly unpaid. (*Nasr*, Nov 8; *Mid. Mir.*, Nov 11)

In Dec the Ministry of Communications [sic] banned the employment of factory workers on public holidays and Fridays without permission from the ministry. (*Damascus*, Dec 4 [W 14].)

Education and Culture, Mass Communication Media. In Oct the authorities established a number of institutions in these fields.

On Oct 9 a decree was published providing for a faculty of Law at Aleppo University in addition to the existing faculties of Engineering and Agriculture (*SNA*, Oct 10). [The Syrian universities which had been closed after the revolution were not yet open.]

The Minister of Waqf appointed a committee to enquire into *waqf* laws and the state of religious education and to suggest a programme of improvements. (*Nasr*, Oct 13)

The formation of a General Administrative Council for Broadcasting and Television was also ordered. The Minister of Information would serve as chairman, with three civil servants, two university teachers and two representatives of the general public as members. (*Nasr*, Oct 20)

The Minister of Education ordered the establishment of a Supreme Scientific Council (*majlis a'la lil-ulum*), with himself as chairman and five additional members. (*Nasr*, Oct 22)

POLITICAL PROSPECTS

[There was much comment after the re-establishment of the Syrian republic on an expected struggle between the Right and Left and the prospects of the regime to steer a middle course acceptable to both.

As recorded in the foregoing chapters the coup was to a considerable degree a rightist reaction against President Abdel Nasser's brand of socialism, and the new regime acquired immediately the label of right-wing conservatism.]

Left Seen Stronger Than Before the Union. The left was thought to have emerged strengthened and the right weakened from the period of the union. Land reform was undermining the old political power of the landowners. Socialist ideas had gained a wider currency among the poorer sections of the community. In so far as the coup had reversed this trend it was only able to do so by cashing in on a popular anti-Egyptian feeling and by exploiting what amounted almost to a power vacuum.

Otherwise the populace would scarcely have acquiesced in the establishment of Dr Kuzbari's regime. (*Financial Times*, Oct 10)

Similarly it was remarked that in the end Nasserism might appeal more to the politically restless Syrians than the right-wing conservatism of the Kuzbari administration. (*Christian Science Monitor*, Oct 4)

Another observer thought the [organized] Left—both Communists and Socialists—tolerated Kuzbari only because he gave them a chance to recover ground they had lost over the past three years. (*New Statesman*, Oct 6)

The Communists. [Attention was given in the western press to a possible strengthening of the Communists, especially in view of the blessing given to the revolution by the Syrian Communist Party (see p 492 a).] It was observed that the breakup of the UAR had been a "long-term aim" of PM Khrushchov and the Arab Communists who wanted a resumption of party activities in Syria, where before 1958 the Communists had had one of their strongest footholds in the M.E. It was thought that, though suppressed under the UAR, the party had managed to preserve underground cells (*Christian Science Monitor*, Oct 4). It was assumed for certain that the new regime would continue to suppress the Communists but whilst Abdel Nasser also offered a political challenge to the agitators, it was an open question whether the new regime could end the discontent from which Communism sprang. (*Scottsman*, Oct 3)

Another view was that the potential power of the Communists in Syria was grossly exaggerated. (Letter to the Editor, *Daily Telegraph*, Oct 5)

Scepticism on Future of Regime. An optimistic view was that Syria might now experience more political stability. In the past Arab unity ranked higher than independence as the goal of Syrian political action. This caused other Arab countries to intervene in Syrian politics and in turn provoked military coups designed to foil union schemes undesirable to the army. If the priorities were now reversed, at least one factor of political instability would be removed. (M. al-Atrash in letter to the editor, *Daily Telegraph*, Oct 5)

A more sceptical and more general view was that it was only a "pious hope" that the chastening experience of four years' loss of independence and liberty could help to make factions hang together. The numerous political forces which wanted secession in order to regain their liberty were likely to use it to the full (*Sunday Times*, Oct 1). Thus it was thought, it would take the Syrians "some unforeseen alchemy" to establish a successful democracy. (*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct 12)

THE ARMY

No Official Political Status. [Right from the beginning the army made it clear that it conceived its political task to act as the guiding spirit of the nation and as arbitrator behind the scenes, whilst it would take no official part in government. Thus no officer participated in the transitional government. But at every stage in the transitional period, the army issued policy statements, which usually included a warning to would-be deviationists. The title "Revolutionary Command" ceased to appear towards the end of Oct and henceforth political statements were issued in the name of the army command or were made by the C-in-C, Gen. Zahar ad-Din. The army's publicly-stated policy was the restoration of parliamentary democracy, an understanding between right and left on the basis of "true socialism" and the independence of Syria,

possibly in the framework of a loose Arab federation; no parties were permitted, though there was much obvious party activity which was not suppressed. (Army statements and intervention have been recorded in the context of the general political development.)]

Impact of the Army. An instance of the decisive role which the Syrian army continued to play after the constitution of the provisional government was reported by western correspondents on the spot: in the evening of Oct 5 PM Kuzbari let it be known that he warmly welcomed Abdel Nasser's speech of the same day, lifting his diplomatic boycott of Syria. At midnight an official request was made to the three correspondents who had called this reaction to withdraw their messages. They agreed only to cable an official denial, whereupon they were driven to "the military junta's headquarters, where the Cabinet was still in session. The whole place was floodlit and heavily guarded with machineguns... as if they expected a siege at any minute." The next day PM Kuzbari's official reaction to Abdel Nasser's speech was "markedly less joyful in tone..." (*Daily Telegraph*, Oct 7). Another correspondent said Kuzbari's "humiliating about-face..." underlined his complete lack of real power. (*Daily Herald*, Oct 7)

Divisions Between Army and Government, Inside Army. It was remarked that it was not unduly cynical to reject the protestations of the army's determination to stay out of politics. If political developments were not acceptable to the officers' corps or if, as even more likely, it was divided into conflicting factions, the possibility of a further coup became very much on the cards. (*Financial Times*, Oct 10)

It was also thought that the army's opposition to the revival of political parties was expressive of its intention to retain the real political authority. Such a development could again lead to rival political factions inside the army, as was the case before the union, and to consequent political instability. (*Times*, Oct 6; see also *Economist*, Oct 14)

Arrest of Lieut.-Col. Kuzbari. At the beginning of Nov a Cairo source said that two groups were contending for power within the Syrian officers' corps: one, supposed to be the stronger, headed by Lt.-Col. Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi, Lt.-Col. Nasib Hindi and Lt.-Col. Hisham Abd Rabbah, and the other by Lt.-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari and Brig. Abd al-Ghani Dahmani (*Akhbar*, Cairo, Nov 7; for other Cairo versions of such groupings, see pp 614-6.)

Later in the month Kuzbari was arrested. "According to rumour" he had tried to organize support for the election of his kinsman, Ma'mun al-Kuzbari, to the Presidency of the Republic. The Revolutionary Command responded first by enlarging its membership from six to twenty-six, thus swamping Haydar al-Kuzbari and any of his would-be supporters, and then by arresting him (*Siyyasah*, Nov 24; *Nahar*, Nov 25, 26). Later Cairo reports said Kuzbari was arrested because he had conspired with King Hussein against the regime in Syria; Col. Faisal Sirri al-Husseini was arrested on the same charge in Jan 1962 (p 614 a).

A Cairo source reported in mid-Dec that Kuzbari had been released from prison, demoted and placed under surveillance (*Akhbar*, Dec 12). According to *An-Nahar* the arrest, effected "a few hours" before the resignation of the Kuzbari government [on Nov 20], lasted eleven hours in all. (*Nahar*, Nov 26)

PARTY POLITICS

[The political parties which had voluntarily dissolved at the time of the merger with Egypt, were not officially permitted to reconstitute themselves. Party activities were to some extent resumed.]

Rightist and Leftist Groupings. A Lebanese observer analyzed party life emerging after the revolution. He found evidence of two groupings: a "bourgeois front" consisting of the former Sha'ah Party and the rightist wing of the Watani Party under Abd ar-Rahman al-Kayyali; this group stood behind the provisional government and would support Dr Kuzbari's candidacy for the office of President of Syria. The other group was leftist and its main leaders were Akram Hurani, Sabri al-Asali and Khalid al-Azm. This group benefited from its record of opposition to the union under the UAR. The Ba'ath Party was in a delicate position between the two groups. [The writer thus differentiated between Hurani—the veteran Ba'ath leader—and the attitude of the Party.] The Communists were cautiously working for a National Front under the cover of which they could enter parliament, but their chances were small. (*Jaridah*, Oct 11)

Elections Promised—Without Party Lists. As recorded above, PM Kuzbari announced on Oct 3 and 5 that elections for a constituent assembly would be held within four months, on a personal basis and without party lists (*Nair*, Oct 4; *Hayat*, Oct 6)

Army Warns Against Party Activities. On Oct 8 a spokesman of the Revolutionary Command stated that anyone who indulged in party activities would be "struck down with an iron hand"; the army desired the people's unity and solidarity towards the true principles of the Arab Revolution, and not "party politics and factions." (*Nair*, Oct 9; *Mid. Mir.*, Oct 14). In a similar vein, Gen. Zahr ad-Din, C-in-C, said it was not in the national interest to return to party strife at the present "historical stage"; after the inauguration of the legislative assembly the situation might change. (*SNA*, Oct 11)

The Ba'ath Takes Issue. [The Ba'ath Party was quick to react against this trend.]

In mid-Oct the National Command of the Ba'ath Party [the all-Arab leadership of the party, based in Beirut] issued a statement accusing "Syrian reaction" of trying to divert political life in Syria towards a "military autocratic regime guaranteeing the protection of its economic and capitalist interests" and exposing the country to "great imperialistic risks." Syrian reaction, the statement said, was using the mistakes of the union in order to "strike at every popular action which might enable the progressive movement to restore its role in leading the masses." The weapon against this "reactionary attack" was a broad national front. The statement also took issue with the recent Syrian proposals to establish a decentralized Arab union (p 159 b) "before the people of Syria are able to reconsolidate their strength and express their opinion in a democratic atmosphere"; these proposals constituted "opposition to union in the name of union itself." *The Mideast Mirror* commented that the statement aroused interest since Ba'ath leaders [Hurani and Bitar] had been amongst the signatories of the joint statement in support of the revolution. (*Siyyasah*, Oct 17; *Mid. Mir.*, Oct 21)

Pro-Nasser Activity, Illegal Leaflets. On Oct 25 a Cairo source reported that leaflets bearing Abdel Nasser's por-

trait were distributed in Damascus (*MENA, Oct 25 [27]*). [This coincided with a reported Egyptian attempt to smuggle sabotage agents into Syria from Lebanon—see p 163 b.]

On Oct 26 the government warned "certain former dissolved parties," on threat of severe penalties not to distribute leaflets harmful to the country and indulge in illegal activity. (*R. Damascus, Oct 26 [27]*). Syrian newspapers justified the ministry's warning, stressing the country's delicate political situation. (*Ayyam; Sawt al-Arab, Oct 27*)

The Return of Quwatli. Shukri al-Quwatli, Syria's last President before the merger, arrived back in Damascus on Oct 16 (*Nasr, Oct 17*). On Oct 23 Quwatli broadcast a statement justifying the break with the UAR (for details, see p 618 b) and called for the support of the new regime. (*R. Damascus, Oct 23 [25]*)

THE NATIONAL CHARTER

[At the end of Oct the government commenced preparations for the holding of general elections (for which see further below). Thereafter political activities connected with the elections became noticeable, within the lines laid down by the army and the government: no party lists and maximum stress on a common programme agreeable to the authorities.]

Al-Jaridah reported contacts among Syrian politicians with a view to the establishment of a "coalition front" with a united list of candidates; a meeting was expected to take place in Damascus in mid-month to formulate a "charter" (covenant—*mithaq*) establishing the front. (*al-Jaridah, Nov 9*)

[No formal "coalition front" materialized. Instead, the contacts led, under army prodding, to the signature of a "national charter" serving as the basis for both an agreed election programme and a temporary constitution.]

On Nov 9 about 60 leading politicians met at the Damascus garrison officers' club. After an opening address by Maj.-Gen. Zahr ad-Din and 11 hours of deliberation the participants signed the "National Charter (*al-mithaq al-watani*) of the Syrian Arab Republic."

The National Charter—Synopsis. [The Charter detailed policies which, in the main, had already been declared by the provisional government, namely: 1. establishment of an Arab Federation (instead of a centralized union on the UAR pattern) which would leave a large measure of independence to the individual countries; 2. an economic and social policy which would at one and the same time (a) serve the interests of the workers and peasants, protect and even enhance the rights and benefits they had acquired under the UAR; (b) re-establish a free economy, encourage private enterprise, protect landowners and compensate those whose land came under agrarian reform. The question of nationalization was not mentioned. Foreign affairs, other than Arab, were only mentioned in passing. The political system—a parliamentary democracy—was dealt with in short beatings only. Thus the Charter, in its concentration upon economic and social questions, bore the imprint of the main issue in Syrian politics, namely the conflict between the right and the left.]

In the preamble, the signatories identified themselves as "being among those working in the national field and for the national cause" and asserted Syria's leading role

in the struggle for Arab independence and unity. They noted that "the system of rule" of the UAR had "almost shaken the faith of Arabs in unity." They affirmed their adherence to the principles of the revolution of Sept 28—whether in the framework of Arab unity or within the framework of internal work for achieving Arab socialism and true democracy, in accordance with the following principles:

1. *Arab Unity:* (a) Formation of a voluntary and comprehensive Arab unity (or union—*uwahdah*) on a decentralized and constitutional basis in order that this unity may bring equality among the Arab countries and guarantee their cooperation in meeting their "domestic requirements" within a framework of freedom and true democratic principles; (b) the implementation of an Arab spiritual renaissance.

2. *Arab Socialism and its Social Bases:* The state will (a) implement sound principles of socialism which will secure economic prosperity by increasing productivity and social justice; (b) uphold ownership (property) and protect individual competition within the limits of the law and through fair distribution of products; (c) intervene in matters of supplies and price control and fight exploitation and monopolies so as to prevent the concentration of capital in a way which may lead to domination, and open up opportunities for small investors; (d) a most important duty of the state is to secure work for the citizens; (e) the state will act to protect workers from arbitrary dismissals and safeguard their social gains and trade union freedom; (f) extend aid to labour organizations, promote labour culture (*sic*), adhere to international labour agreements, and coordinate labour and social legislation with the socialist plan of the state, in order to increase the gains of the workers; (g) the state will "attempt" to secure the participation of workers in management, to give them their share of profits, to create a spirit of cooperation between employers and employees and to follow the principle of tripartite consultations. The state will also aim at expanding social security and medical services for the workers and their families and will guarantee minimum wages; (h) the state will also protect mothers and children, the old and the sick; (i) encourage cooperative movements; (j) realize the principle of equal opportunities for all.

3. *Agrarian Reform within the Framework of Arab Socialism:* (a) the state will adhere to the principles of the agrarian reform law; (b) protect all the rights of the peasants who benefit from this law and help them to improve their crops; (c) safeguard the rights of the landowners who come under this law, make just compensation for their lands within a reasonable period and correct injustices resulting from poor implementation of the law; (d) secure financial aid and technological guidance for every peasant who possesses land; (e) work to create good relations between landowners, peasants and agricultural workers; (f) proceed with rural development; water and electricity, schools, communications, hospitals and development of domestic industries.

4. *The Principles of Democratic Rule:* (a) the Syrian Arab people is the source of all authority in the Syrian Arab Republic; (b) the system of rule is parliamentary and democratic; (c) the constitution safeguards all the general freedoms of the citizen.

In conclusion, the signatories to this covenant pledged themselves to "strive... to strengthen the foundations of the Syrian Arab Republic... we will thus enable our beloved Republic to render its services to the Arab people within a framework of positive neutrality and non-alignment, the liberation of the usurped lands in Pales-

tine, Algeria, Oman, and in other occupied parts of the Arab homeland...

Signatories: (Party designations inserted by editor; key to abbreviations on p. 503 h.) Ahmad Abd al-Karim Adh Bāgh; Edmund Humsi; As'ad al-Kurāni (Watani (J)), Sha'ab (N); As'ad Harūn; Akram al-Hurāni (Ba'ath); Amin al-Nafūri (Indep. (N), Hurani Bl. (J)); Anis Sha'rāni; Badr ad-Din Allūh; Bashir al-Azmah (Indep. Leftist); Tawfiq Nizām ad-Din; Jalāl as-Sayyid (Indep.); Hamid al-Khoja (Indep.); Hasan al-Hakīm (Indep.); Hammad al-As'ad; Khālid al-Azm (Indep.); Khulūsi al-Kuzbari (Lih. Mov.); Dahhām al-Hādī (Bedouin Tr.); Rashād Barmada (Sha'ab); Rashād Jāhri (Indep. (N), Sha'ab (J)); Rashād ad-Duqr (Indep. (N), Watani (J)); Riyād al-Mālikī (Hurani Sup. (Ba'ath?)); Riyād al-Maydānī (Wat.); Zuhayr Shattī; Salāmah Hayd; Sulṭān al-Atrash (Indep. rightist); Sa'īd al-Ghazī (Indep.); Suhayl al-Khūrī (Watani); Sahri al-Azālī (Watani); Salāh ad-Din al-Bitār (Ba'ath); Tal'at al-Taḡhlīhī; Zāfir al-Qāsimī (Watani); Abd al-'Azīz Hallāj; Abd al-Rahmān al-Azm (Indep.); Awad al-Amīrī; Abd as-Salām al-Ujaylī (Indep.); Abd al-Karīm Fayyād (Indep.); Abd al-Fattāh al-Zalī (Ba'ath); Abd al-Rahmān al-Kayyālī (Watani); Azīz ad-Din al-Karīm (Indep.); Irfān al-Jallād (Watani); Alī al-Dīn al-Jāhri (Sha'ab); Fathallah as-Saqālī; Fu'ād Dahmān (Indep.); Farīd Arsalanīan; Fahmī al-Hakīm; Philip Kabba; Luth al-Haffār; Mājīd Safīyah; Mukarram al-Atāsī; Muḥammad Sa'īd az-Za'īn; Muḥammad Talas (Watani); Muḥammad Mubārak (Mus. Br.); Muḥammad Nī'mah; Munir Shūra; Nadīm Shumān; Nasūh Bābil (Watani); Yūsuf Abu Hammūd; Ma'mūn al-Kuzharī (Indep. (Lih. Mov.)); Hānī as-Sibā'ī (Indep.); Zuhayr al-Huseīnī. (R. Damascus, Nov 10 [13]; *Jaridah* Nov 11 [=]; *Nahar*, Nov 11 [=N]; *Nasr*, Nov 12)

Pattern of Moderation Seen in Syrian Politics. In a sympathetic comment *Al-Jaridah* said that the Charter had disproved the forebodings of an old-style political struggle for Syria, deteriorating perhaps into civil war. The government had shown wisdom in its "scientific programme" for Arab unity (p. 159 b), and its safeguarding of socialist gains through a policy of moderation of "not making the rich man poor and not leaving the poor man poor."

The signing of the Charter marked three achievements: 1. the Syrian army was firmly determined to keep out of politics and to underwrite a parliamentary democracy; 2. the political parties and groupings would exercise their right of political freedom in the framework of the Charter without resorting to unethical practices; 3. the extreme Syrian Right was meeting the extreme Left on the need for a moderate socialist policy.

The Charter, *Al-Jaridah* said, was also expressive of the general will in regard to Arab unity. The Charter embodied the lessons learnt by the Syrian people. (*Jaridah*, Nov 11)

In another article *Al-Jaridah* remarked that the National Charter was certain to provide the basis for election programmes and the provisional constitution; the Charter had been signed by representatives of all the parties except the Communists (*Jaridah*, Nov 11). The Ulanā and the Muslim Brethren, it was noted, also had not signed (*Akhbar al-Uṣbu'*, *Jordan*, Nov 17). A [pro-Egyptian] newspaper claimed that Salāh al-Bitār's name appeared on the document without his knowledge. (*Ha-wadith*, Nov 17)

Army Support. On Nov 11 the army command published a statement pledging its support for the Charter

and asserting its faith in "parliamentary democratic life" without army interference in politics; it would not let past mistakes recur. (R. Damascus, Nov 11 [14])

Syrian Comments. ANA interviewed various Syrian personalities on the significance of the Charter.

Gen. Zahr ad-Din told ANA that the convention which led to the signing of the Charter was "one of the tasks which the army had taken upon itself" after the revolution. The army was determined not to intervene in politics, to remain impartial and to work only for the good of the country.

Sabri al-Azālī called the Charter a big step towards closing the ranks and expressed his hope that a moderate socialist policy would be followed, reflecting all the trends incorporated in the Charter. (*Jaridah*, Nov 11)

Akram al-Hurāni stressed that all the principles of the Charter would remain on paper only if the signatories would not work for its implementation; free elections would be the truest guarantee of the Charter. As to Arab unity, the Charter reflected the lesson learned under the UAR, that a future union must be based on "democracy, freedom, homogeneity (*takāfu'*), equality and constitutional decentralization." The Charter, *Hurāni* said, had also placed socialism within the framework of parliamentary democracy, the true road towards a future Arab union. (*Jaridah*, Nov 12)

THE TEMPORARY CONSTITUTION

[With the signing of the National Charter the stage was now set for the promulgation of the temporary constitution.]

The Temporary Constitution (*dustūr muwaqqat*) published on Nov 15 (Government Decree No. 216 of Nov 12) read as follows:

"Art. 1. The Syrian Arab Republic is an independent sovereign state constituting a part of the great Arab homeland.

"Art. 2. The people shall elect a Constituent and Parliamentary Assembly (*majlis ta'isi wa-nayyib*) through direct secret ballot. The Assembly term will be four years.

"Art. 3. The Assembly shall convene within ten days after the announcement of the election results, at the invitation of the transitional cabinet.

"Art. 4. The Assembly shall assume the task of preparing a constitution for the Republic within a maximum period of six months, and then it will become a Parliamentary Assembly.

"Art. 5. At its first meeting the Assembly shall elect its president and secretariat members.

"Art. 6. The Assembly shall wield legislative powers during the period required for preparing the Constitution in accordance with the following basis:

(a) Bills shall be proposed by the Government or by at least 10 Deputies.

(b) Laws shall be issued by the President after being approved by the Assembly and shall be published in the Official Gazette.

(c) The President can refer a law back to the Assembly within ten days for reconsideration. If the Assembly insists on the law, the President shall promulgate it.

"Art. 7. The Assembly shall elect a President for the Republic for a period of five years. Two-thirds majority is required during the first voting. If such a majority is not ensured, then an absolute majority will decide the election. If this majority is not obtainable either, then a proportional majority will decide the election during the third vote.

GENERAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM

"Art. 8. (a) The President of the Republic shall assume executive powers, assisted by the Cabinet. (b) Until the publication of the new Constitution, the President of the Republic, the Cabinet, and the ministers shall wield

executive powers in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of July 5, 1950." (*R. Damascus, Nov 15 [16]; Jaridah Rasmayah, Nov 15*)

GENERAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM

PREPARING THE ELECTIONS

[In addition to the elections for a constituent assembly, the government decided in Nov to hold on the same occasion a referendum on the provisional constitution, which it issued as a decree on Nov 15. See below.]

Electoral Law Amended. On Oct 11 Adnān al-Quwatli, the Minister of the Interior, said that he expected elections to take place in Dec 1961 or Jan 1962. (*Nasr, Oct 12*)

On Oct 29 legislative decree No. 56 provided for an amended election law. The decree cancelled the UAR Presidential Decree No. 139 of May 15, 1959 which amended the 1949 Syrian Law on General Elections (Decree No. 17 of Sept 10, 1949). At the same time the decree amended the 1949 law.

The basic provisions of the 1949 law remained in force: every Syrian national who had reached the age of 18 to have the right to vote; one deputy for every 30,000 voters; separate representation of non-Muslims and Bedouin tribes. Following are the more important amendments: women, who in the 1949 law were accorded active suffrage, provided they held elementary education certificates, were now also given passive suffrage. In constituencies having both Muslim and non-Muslim seats, the vote would be non-valid if the ballot bore the names of candidates of one community only. The government was empowered to adjust the borders of the constituencies which otherwise remained, as in the 1949 law, identical with provincial and district divisions; (PM Kuzbari later assured the politicians that—rumours to the contrary—this stipulation aimed only at correcting situations where the lack of a few eligible voters might deprive citizens of a right to an Assembly seat; *Nasr, Nov 12*.) The deadline for various pre-election procedures was set for 15 days before election day. Bedouin tribes were allocated five seats (later raised to seven—*Mid. Mir., Nov 18*). (*Jaridah Rasmayah, Oct 30*; for 1949 law see: *H.M. Davis: Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East*; Durham, N.C. 1953, p. 434 et seq.)

A central Elections Supervision Board was formed under the chairmanship of Abd al-Salām al-Tarmanīni, mayor of Damascus, with four judges as members. (*Nasr, Nov 10*)

Civil registrars were empowered to establish the place of residence of nomads for voting purposes. (*Nasr, Nov 14*)

Elections and Referendum, Date, Arrangements. Government decree No. 231 of Nov 12 defined the forthcoming vote as a dual event—a "plebiscite on the provisional constitution" and "elections to the Constituent and Parliamentary Assembly" and fixed Dec 1 as election day. (*Jaridah Rasmayah, Nov 15*)

It was later directed that [as provided in the election law] balloting would be extended to Dec 2, if by the time the poll closed on Dec 1 less than 51% of the voters had cast their vote. (*ANA, Nov 27 [29]*)

The deadline for nomination of candidates, originally

set to take place between Nov 16 to 20, was later extended to Nov 22. (*R. Damascus, Nov 14, 21-IMB, Nov 15, 21*)

Constituencies. On Nov 14 the electoral constituencies were announced. There would be a total of 165 deputies, 141 Muslims and 16 non-Muslims. (For their distribution according to constituencies, see table pp 503-5.)

CARETAKER GOVERNMENT OF IZZAT AN-NUS

(November 20)

The government reportedly decided that ministers appearing as candidates in the elections should resign from the cabinet. Dr Kuzbari, the PM, was exempted from this rule "for the good of the country and as he had been the first statesman to cooperate in the revolution" (*Hayat, Nov 15*). The Minister of the Interior denied this but said that a regulation to this effect had been suggested by some ministers. (*Nasr, Nov 16*)

Accordingly, the resignation of the following ministers was announced on Nov 18: Leon Zamariya [Finance and Supplies] Farhān al-Jandali [Health], Fu'ād al-Adil [Labour and Social Affairs] and Sa'īd as-Sayyid [Agrarian Reform] who later withdrew his resignation. (*ANA, Nov 18 [19]*)

Izzat an-Nus—Prime Minister. On Nov 20 the government created the post of deputy PM and appointed to it Dr Izzat an-Nus, the Minister of Education.

Thereupon Dr Kuzbari tendered his resignation as PM as he had nominated himself for election, and Dr Nus automatically became Prime Minister. He formed the cabinet as follows: Dr Izzat an-Nus—PM, Defence, Foreign Affairs; Fathallah Asyūn—Social Affairs and Labour; Dr Awad Barakāt—Economy and Industry; Ahmad Sulṭān—Justice, Waqfs; Abd ar-Rahmān Hurriyah—Public Works, Communications and Planning; Dr Nu'mān al-Azhari—Finance and Supply; Dr Mustafa al-Barūdī—Propaganda, Municipal and Village Affairs; Sa'īd as-Sayyid, Agrarian Reform, Agriculture; Dr Ahmad as-Sammān—Education and National Guidance; Abd al-Salām al-Tarmanīni—Interior, Health, Public Relief.

Majid al-Ghazzi was appointed mayor of Damascus in place of Abd al-Salām al-Tarmanīni. (*R. Damascus, Nov 21 [22]*)

On Nov 23 Dr Awad Barakāt, Minister of Economy and Industry, resigned in order to stand for election. The Ministry of Industry was assigned to Fathallah Asyūn, and the Ministry of Economy to Nu'mān al-Azhari. (*R. Damascus, Nov 23 [25]*)

Dr Kuzbari's resignation was ascribed to his desire "to keep neutral and shun partyism."

In a statement of policy, Dr Nus, the new PM, stressed, above all, the transitional character of his government, which had as its main task the holding of elections "at their scheduled time and in an atmosphere of neutrality, impartiality and confidence." (*R. Damascus, Nov 21 [23]*)

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The duration of the election campaign was set for the period Nov 22 to Nov 29, two days before the start of the elections. (*Mid. Mir., Nov 25*)

Regulations for "Election Charter," Election Campaign Conduct. These were made public by PM Kuzbari on Nov 10 in a speech at a luncheon in honour of the politicians who signed the National Charter. He said he had discussed the question with the government, the army and others.

The regulations were aimed at assuring full freedom: there would be a ban during the election period on anything that might harm the safety of the army or public security or contradict Arab national principles. Sincere criticism was allowed "especially of the government" which was "eager to listen to the word of justice" and to correct deviations, if any.

Propaganda on radio and television was banned. Publication of election material in the press on equal terms would be regulated by neutral committees of three persons, headed by the governor, to be established in "each town" (province). There would be no publication on the first or the last pages, "lest the candidates should object, for example, to having a statement by one candidate on the first page and by another on an inner page." The army had no intention of interfering in politics and should be kept out of the election campaign. (*R. Damascus, Nov 10* [13]; *Nasr, Nov 12*)

According to *Al-Hayāt*, the above points were incorporated in an "election charter" which was signed by all the signatories to the National Charter. A six-man committee had been appointed to supervise this charter's implementation. (*Hayat, Nov 14*; see also *Mid. Mir., Nov 18*.)

Army Confirms Its Neutrality. Three days before the official opening of the campaign on Nov 22, the army command issued a statement asserting its neutrality in the elections as "the faithful guardian of the people's gains and aspirations" and a warning that it would "strike with an iron fist" at opportunists who were trying to use the army's name in the election campaign. The statement said that several candidates were falsely claiming to be army nominees. (*R. Damascus, Nov 19* [22])

Lists of Candidates. *Al-Jaridah* reported activity among political leaders to compile lists "within the framework of the National Charter." (*Jaridah, Nov 14*)

On Nov 25 the Ministry of the Interior announced that the total number of candidates was 1,697. In the larger towns, 208 candidates had been put up in Damascus, 169 in Aleppo, 105 in Homs, 70 in Hama, 50 in Qamishli, 30 in Deir ez-Zor, 20 in Suweida, 19 in Latakia and 19 in Der'a (*Nasr, Nov 26*). However, on the eve of the elections the total was given as 1,876, including 11 women. (*Mid. Mir., Dec 2, 9*)

Lists. [The election lists were ostensibly personal combinations, with several names appearing in more than one list, like those of Kuzbari, Bitar and Khālid al-Azm; however, in many, if not in most cases there were party undertones. The Syrian press gave the lists very limited coverage. Since the voter wrote on the ballot paper the candidate of his choice, and not the list, the significance of the lists lay in the associations they elicited amongst the electorate—insofar as they became aware of them at all.]

Damascus. In Damascus the principal lists that came before the voter on election day were the Coalition List (*Mid. Mir., Dec 2*), headed by Sabri al-Asali and Dr Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari, apparently identical with the People's List (*qā'imāt ash-sha'ab* (see below); the People's Struggle List (*qā'imāt nidd al-ash-sha'ab*) headed by Salāh ad-Dīn al-Bitar [Ba'ath] and Nāsir an-Nābulisi, a trade union leader; an "independent list" with Khālid al-Azm, the former [leftist] PM, and a list of university teachers.

The People's List (according to *Al-Jaridah, Nov 30*) comprised Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari [Indep.], Adnān al-Quwatli [Indep.], Fu'ād al-Adil [Indep.], Rashād Jabri [Sha'ab], Sabri al-Asali [Watanī], Khālid al-Azm [Indep.], Nassūh Bābil ("for the journalists"), Bashir Ramadan [Mus. Br.] ("for the merchants"), Yassin as-Safadi ("for the industrialists"), Isām al-Attār [Muslim Brethren], Riyād al-Maydāni [Watanī], Mukhtār Diyāb, Nassūh al-Ayyūbi [Indep.], Zāfir al-Qāsimi [Watanī], Dr. Awad Barakāt [Indep.], Hunayn Sahnāwi (industrialist); and Jubrān Kandalaft ("for the Christians") [Liber. Mov.].

During the stage which preceded the final crystallization of election lists, a list presenting Khālid al-Azm and Salāh ad-Dīn al-Bitar was set up, but collapsed after a couple of days. (*Nasr, Nov 23-30*; *Hayat, Nov 23, 24, 25, 28, 29*; *Jaridah, Nov 29, 30*; *Siyasah, Nov 30*; *Mid. Mir., Dec 2*)

Aleppo. In Aleppo four lists competed: the Coalition Front (*al-jabha al-mu'talafah*) headed by Ma'rūf ad-Dawālībī [Sha'ab], Rashād Barnada [Sha'ab] and Alī ad-Dīn al-Jābirī [Sha'ab]; the United Cooperative Front (*al-jabha al-ta'dwiniyah-al-muttahidah*), headed by Abd al-Fattāh al-Ghudda [said to belong either to the Muslim Brethren or the Sha'ab party]; the Arab Front headed by Wahbi al-Hariri; and a fourth list to be headed by Dr Ihsān ar-Rifā'i [Watanī], chairman of the local medical association. (*Nasr, Nov 24*)

Homs. In Homs five lists were put up: the "Country" (*rif*) list headed by Muhammad Ali al-Umar; a list headed by Hāni as-Sibā'i (leftist); a list headed by Fayd al-Atāsi [Sha'ab]; a list headed by Munib Raslān [Indep. or Watanī party]; and a list headed by Muzhir al-Husseini. *As-Nasr* noted that attempts to set up a united trade union list had failed. (*Nasr, Nov 26*; *Jaridah, Nov 30*)

Hama. In Hama two factions keenly contest the elections: that of Akram Hurānī [Ba'ath] and the other headed by Ra'if al-Mulqi (a pre-union minister), Mustafa as-Sayrafi, Na'an Arwānah, Abd ar-Rahman al-Azm and Abdallah al-Barāzi. (*Jaridah, Nov 29, 30*)

Communist Leader Refused Entry Into Syria. On Nov 19 Khālid Bakdīsh, leader of the illegal Syrian Communist Party, arrived at Damascus airport from Prague, accompanied by two lawyers. They were not allowed to alight, and attempted unsuccessfully to contact the Minister of the Interior. After a four hour stay, the party returned to Prague via Baghdad.

Lebanese Communist circles said that Bakdīsh had intended to nominate himself for the elections. (*ANA, Nov 20, 21* [22, 23])

The Election Campaign. The election campaign opened officially on Nov 22, though an election atmosphere became apparent earlier. Officially permitted propaganda was very limited. Each candidate was allowed one statement only, of 63 lines, in morning and evening news-

papers, and the statement had to be approved by the election committees.

The *Times* called the election "one of the strangest in recent times. Candidates adopted a straightjacket in the hope that no passions would be aroused"; "publicity had been controlled and limited." "A few loudspeaker vans sped down the streets [of Damascus] but otherwise the city was quiet." (*Times*, Nov 30; *Mid. Mir.*, Dec 2)

Conflicting Reports on Mood of Electorate: "Pro-Government"; Pro-UAR. [Conflicting reports on a general pro-government atmosphere and specified anti-government incidents arrived in parallel, the former from Western and independent Lebanese, the latter from UAR and pro-UAR sources.]

In mid-Nov a Western observer reported that Syrians "in their present optimistic mood" believed that they could make democracy work (*Guardian*, Nov 16). To a Lebanese observer, the general interest in the elections, the great number of candidates and the resignation of the ministers who put themselves up for election, served as evidence of a free and democratic spirit which augured well for the coming Assembly (*Jaridah*, Nov 22). The campaign was reported to be progressing in a quiet and orderly fashion. (*R. Beirut*, Nov 25-IMB, Nov 27)

The heads of the Christian communities issued a joint election appeal expressing "joy at the liberation of our homeland from an era which has weighed heavily on all." (*Mid. Mir.*, Nov 25)

[Cairo and pro-UAR sources presented a different picture:] Cairo Radio repeatedly called on the Syrian people, directly and by implication, to boycott the election (e.g. *R. Cairo*, Nov 30 [Dec 2], Dec 1 [4]). Demonstrations for Arab unity had taken place in Deir'a on Nov 13; demonstrations in Aleppo on Nov 17 had led to clashes between secondary school students and the army. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 18-IMB, Nov 19)

Students had been arrested in Aleppo and Damascus, and the police raided printing presses after anti-government leaflets signed by "The Syrian People's Organization" had been distributed. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 19 [21])

A [pro-UAR] Lebanese newspaper reported that leaflets signed by the "People's Revolutionary Organization" (*munazzamat ash-sha'ab ath-thawriyah*) had been distributed throughout Syria, and especially in Aleppo. The leaflets explained that the organization had been set up by the "Free Nationalist Youths" (*ash-shobab al-wataniyyin al-ahdr*) to protect "the rights of the people from the separatist reactionary movement." In particular, they warned "free soldiers" not to hurt citizens for the sake of the "ruling clique." (*Siyasah*, Nov 19)

A week later, on Nov 25, leaflets were distributed in Damascus calling for a boycott of the elections (*Nohar*, Beirut, Nov 26). The same day Cairo Radio reported the arrest of secondary school pupils following the distribution of such leaflets in Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia and Deir ez-Zor. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 25 [26])

On the eve of the elections, according to Cairo and [pro-UAR] sources, 300 girl students demonstrated at Damascus University against the "reactionary movement" and were arrested. Pro-UAR leaflets were distributed calling for a boycott of the elections. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 29 [Dec 1]; *Kul Shay*, Beirut, Dec 2)

At the same time Egyptian sources kept reporting general public distrust in the approaching elections (e.g. *R. Cairo*, Nov 24, 25, 26-IMB, Nov 26; *R. Cairo*, Nov 29-IMB, Nov 30).

On Nov 29 two bombs were thrown in Damascus injuring two people, one at the house of Sabri al-Azali

[leader of the Watani party], the other near the officers' club (*ANA*, Nov 29 [Dec 1]; *BBC in Arabic*-IMB, Nov 30). In a press interview, Dr Kuzbari blamed supporters of Abdel Nasser for these incidents. (*NYT*, Dec 1)

Rightists Versus Leftists; Traditional Groupings. Summing up on the eve of the elections, *Al-Jaridah* saw two main factions: the rightists who wanted abolition of the socialist measures taken under the union, and the leftists who desired their retention, though both sides avoided plain words and preferred generalizations; on the other hand, all desired a democratic contest. There were also candidates representing splinter groups from the extreme right to the extreme left. The paper foresaw that in Damascus the right would emerge victorious, mainly because of disunity amongst their rivals. On the other hand in Homs and Hama the leftists were stronger because of public sensitivity there to peasant problems. In the Jazirah and the Jabal Druze the family factor was decisive. (*Jaridah*, Nov 30)

The Arrest of Lt-Col. Kuzbari. Towards the end of Nov it became known that Lt-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari of the Revolutionary Command had been arrested. "According to rumour" he had tried to canvass support for the election of his kinsman, Ma'mun al-Kuzbari, to the presidency of the Republic; (see p 496 a).

THE ELECTIONS AND THE REFERENDUM

Proceedings. The elections and referendum took place on Dec 1.

In most constituencies more than 51% of the electorate had voted by the close of the poll on Dec 1; in the remaining constituencies polling stations reopened at 5 a.m. on Dec 2. (*R. Damascus*, Dec 2 [4])

The vote in the referendum was public. The voter had to choose either a green slip marked "I approve of the temporary constitution" or a red slip marked "I disapprove of the temporary constitution," and put the slip of his choice into the ballot box in the presence of an official.

The vote for the Assembly was secret; the elector received an envelope and a blank ballot paper and stepped into a booth. He could then copy on to the ballot paper the names of candidates from his district from a list posted on the wall, or he could use a list he had brought with him.

Dana A. Schmidt, *The New York Times* correspondent, remarked that as regards the referendum "few voters under the circumstances would ask for a red slip." Thus, its results would have to be evaluated in terms of participation and abstention. At the same time he quoted "some Syrians" as calling the elections "the fairest vote in Syrian history." (*NYT*, Dec 2)

Calm Atmosphere. The election proceeded in an orderly way and calm atmosphere, according to Syrian, Western and some Lebanese sources. (*BBC in Arabic*, Dec 1-IMB, Dec 3; *NYT*; *Jaridah*, Dec 2)

During the first polling-day Abd as-Salam at-Tarmani, the Minister of the Interior, reported that the elections were proceeding in an atmosphere of peace and order; at Damascus the minister "witnessed a sportsmanlike battle." A judge was present at each Damascus polling station, and a member of the state controller's office investigated complaints at the municipality headquarters. (*R. Damascus*, Dec 1 [4])

[Cairo's story was different.] The elections were "a contest between feudalists and capitalists." The army was

investigating polling stations and compelling undesirable candidates to withdraw. Apathy, abstentions, anti-regime demonstrations and bomb-throwings marked the day. (*R. Cairo, Dec 1* [4-IMB, Dec 3])

After the results had been published, the Minister of the Interior and the C-in-C of the armed forces broadcast statements congratulating the public on its behaviour during the elections and asserting that strict impartiality and non-interference had been observed; the C-in-C added that the results proved the futility of any attempt to mislead the Syrian people. (*R. Damascus, Dec 5* [7])

On Dec 9 a delegation of religious leaders thanked the government for the fair and neutral attitude it had shown during the elections. (*R. Damascus, Dec 9-IMB, Dec 10*)

Disturbances in Hama Over Hurānī's Victory. After publication of the election results on Dec 2, there was tension in Hama, which reached the breaking point on Dec 5, when the military opened fire on demonstrators. The background to the troubles was the demarcation of the Hama constituency, which included a majority of village voters, despite previous demands for separate representation. Since the villagers voted in the main for Akram Hurānī's "Socialist List," the conservative town list headed by Abd ar-Rahmān al-Azmī lost the elections, to the dismay of conservative townspeople who considered themselves cheated of their due. Hurānī's victory was reported as having greatly disturbed merchants and capitalists in general, who had hoped for his eclipse. (*Jaridah, Dec 3, 6; Nahar; Hayat, Dec 6*)

Participation. In the absence of official figures, the electorate was estimated at between 1,000,000 and 1,250,000. (*NYT, Dec 2*)

According to the Minister of the Interior, participation in the various constituencies ranged from 48% to 84%, "a figure not reached in Syria before" (*R. Damascus, Dec 6-IMB, Dec 7*). Another official spokesman said participation had been "ideal"; in Damascus for example, participation was 46% as compared with 33% in 1954 (*Hayat, Dec 5*). [In the last Syrian elections before the merger with Egypt, in Sept-Oct 1954, participation was rather less than 50%. Initial participation was so low that on election day and the reserve election day, only

107 out of the 142 deputies were elected and an extra two days were needed to elect them all.]

Temporary Constitution Approved. On Dec 5 the following results of the referendum were officially announced: Votes—636,586 [50 to 60% of the electorate]; votes in favour of the constitution—617,880 (97.6%); against—18,706.

The constitution came into force with the announcement of the referendum results. (*R. Damascus, Dec 5* [7])

Concerning the significance of the referendum, *The Guardian*, while remarking on the absence of secrecy, nevertheless held that "the efforts made from Cairo to persuade Syrians to abstain from voting seem to have failed" and added, "one can safely assume from the ballot that a majority of Syrians are glad . . . to have been released from . . . the UAR" (*Guardian, Dec 7*). Another paper calculated that the overall participation in the plebiscite was about 60%; 20% would have abstained for reasons of old age and infirmity, so that not more than another 20% could have abstained to demonstrate their loyalty to Abdel Nasser. (*Daily Telegraph, Dec 4*)

Election Results According to Party Affiliations; Right and Left Tendencies. [Though there were only independent candidates or non-party lists the election results were interpreted on the basis of party affiliations and of rightist versus leftist tendencies. Since, however, by the time of the elections, the parties had been officially disbanded for almost four years and even beforehand there had been a certain measure of fluidity in party affiliations, the estimates of party strength varied considerably. This was also true of the right versus left estimates because of contradictory tendencies inside the various parties and groupings and because of the large number of independents.]

The most detailed tally, according to party and other affiliations, was attempted by two Lebanese papers, *Al-Jaridah* and *An-Nahar* (see accompanying table).

Below, totals are given according to these and other sources. The results of the 1954 general elections, the last before the union with Egypt, are given for comparison. The 1954 House had 142 deputies as compared with 172 in the Constituent Assembly.

Election Results According to Party Affiliation

	<i>Al-Jaridah</i> Dec 5	<i>An-Nahar</i> Dec 5	<i>Mideast Mirror</i> Dec 9	<i>Economist</i> Dec 23	<i>Cairo Radio</i> Dec 6	<i>Elections of</i> Sept-Oct 1954
Ba'ath	18	15	—	—	19	16
"Ba'ath Supporters"	—	3	—	—	—	—
Socialist Cooperative P.	—	—	—	—	—	2
Hurānī Socialist	6	—	—	—	—	—
Sha'ab	32	33	39	—	—	32
Watani	18	21	28	—	—	24
Muslim Brethren	2	10	11	7	—	—
"Ulamā"	3	—	—	—	—	—
Liberation Movement	1	4	—	—	—	—
NSP	1	—	—	—	2	2
Communists	—	—	—	—	—	1
Independents	65	62	—	—	—	55 ¹
"Bedouin Tribes"	—	7	according to law	—	—	—
"Rural Tribes"	—	—	—	—	—	9
(Kurds, etc.)	—	15	—	—	—	—

¹ The election of one Deputy was invalidated.

² Amongst the "independents" in 1954 there were some supporters of the Liberation movement, the Muslim Brethren and of various leftist trends.

As to the right-left division *Reuter* gave the following interpretation: "Conservatives"—71 seats (presumably Sha'ab and Watani parties), Independents—55, Ba'ath—9, extreme right—f2 (presumably Muslim Brethren, Ulanā, Nationalist-Social Party), extreme left—8, tribal representatives—7. (*Guardian*, Dec 6)

The Economist, writing after the election of Dr Kuzbari as the speaker of the House, thought that the 47 who voted against him and put up a former Ba'athist as their candidate gave "a very rough indication of the left-of-centre's numerical strength." (*Economist*, Dec 23)

An Egyptian view was that 126 delegates were "pro-Western," 19 Ba'ath, 12 "extreme right," 8 "left," and 7 tribal representatives. (*R. Cairo*, Dec 6-IMB, Dec 6)

Many Veteran Deputies Re-elected. [At least 56 of the 142 deputies elected to the Chamber in Sept-Oct 1954 were elected to the Assembly. At least 13 Assembly members belonged to families or clans who had others of their members elected to the Chamber in 1954. These figures do not take into account changes in the 1954 Chamber effected through by-elections. It was remarked that the brevity and the limitations imposed on the election campaign favoured the better-known candidates; however, the phenomenon of traditional, regional, family strongholds no doubt also affected these results. See list of deputies.]

The four Damascus candidates who received the greatest number of votes were Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari [the former PM]—16,578, Isām al-Attār [Muslim Brethren]—16,182, Khālid al-Azm [independent, leftist, received the greatest number of votes in the 1954 elections]—15,456, Awad Barakāt [former Minister of Economy and Industry, independent, moderate rightist]—12,999 (*R. Damascus*, Dec 4-IMB, Dec 4). [Salāh ad-Dīn al-Bitār, the Ba'ath leader, failed to be elected.]

[None of the eleven women candidates were returned.]

Rightists Predominant; Success of Muslim Brethren. It was generally agreed that the results were a victory for the right. The success of the Muslim Brethren usually defined as "extreme right" and "anti-Nasser" was especially noted. (*Jaridah*, Dec 7; *Mid. Mir.*, Dec 9; *Economist*, Dec 23; *Times*, Dec 27)

Three weeks after the elections *The Economist* summarized the relevance of the customary political terminology as follows: "The extreme Right looks for a full return to the situation before union, and would, if it could, cancel all laws relating to land distribution and nationalisation. The Left would complete the land reform programme and carry on with a limited amount of economic planning. The Centre would accept those socialisation measures that have been put into practice, but probably no more." The paper defined the Centre as "moderate conservative." (*Economist*, Dec 23)

Al-Jaridah likened the composition of the new Assembly to that of 1954. The Sha'ab Party had remained the strongest faction, which also attracted some of the many independents; the Watani and Ba'ath parties followed; the other groups were insignificant as far as their voting strength was concerned. (*Jaridah*, Dec 7)

RESULTS OF ELECTIONS TO CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES)

December 1-2, 1961

Notes. The list below has been compiled as follows: *Al-Ayyam*, Dec 4, *An-Naar*, Dec 6, both Damascus papers, and *Damascus Radio*, Dec 5-BBCM, Dec 7 (with cor-

rections in *BBCM*, Dec 8) have been used for the basic list and for the spelling of names, the papers for the consonants, the BBC monitoring for the vocal sounds.

Party affiliation has been given according to two Beirut papers: *Al-Jaridah*, Dec 5, given as (J) after the party name and *An-Nahar*, Dec 5, given as (N). *Al-Jaridah* omitted a number of names and both papers misspelled some names to an extent that made identification impossible. Where the two papers made the same identifications, no source has been indicated.

Some designations other than party-affiliations appeared: Bedouin Tribes which had special representatives; "Rural Tribes" (*ashkār al-aryāl*) employed by *An-Nahar* only for Kurdish and other settled tribes; ulanā, shaykhs and religious functionaries—employed by *Al-Jaridah* only. Whilst *An-Nahar* listed in addition to Ba'ath party members also "Socialists of the [Akram] al-Hūrani Bloc," *Al-Jaridah* listed "Ba'ath Supporters"; with the exception of one name, these two lists were not identical.

The sign ° shows that the Deputy had won a seat also in the general elections of Sept-Oct 1954.

The sign ° shows that a member of the Deputy's family or clan was elected to the Chamber in Sept-Oct 1954.

Designations have been added in square brackets where those given by the newspapers were inconsistent with the Deputy's otherwise known party affiliation.

Designations and Abbreviations. Armenian; Ba'ath (The Arab Socialist Renaissance Party); Ba'ath Sup. (porter); Bedouin Tr. (ibes); Hurani Bl. (oc) ("Socialists of the Hurani Bloc"); Indep. (endent); Lib. Mov. (Liberation Movement, i.e. Adib ash-Shishakli's *harakat al-tahrir*); Mus. (im) Br. (ethren); NSP (Nationalist Social Party or PPS-Parti Populaire Syrien); Rural Tr. (ibes); Sha'ab (*hizb ash-sha'ab*, The People's Party); Ulanā; Watani (*al-hizb al-watani*, The National Party).

Damascus Province

Damascus (3 non-Muslims)

Khālid al-Azm*	Indep. (N)
Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari*	Indep. (N) [formerly: Liberation Movement]
Isām ad-Dīn al-Attār	Musl. Br. (N)
Muhammad Abdin	Indep. (N)
Sabri al-Asali*	Watani (N)
Hussein Khatāb	Musl. Br. (N)
Sa'id al-Ghazzi*	Indep. (N)
Rashād Jabri*	Indep. (N)
Fu'ād al-Adil	Indep. (N)
Adnān al-Quwatli	Watani (N)
Rauid ad-Duqr	Indep. (N)
Umar Awdat al-Khatib	Musl. Br. (N)
Zuhayr ash-Shawish	Musl. Br. (N)
Bashir Ramadān	Indep. (N) [Musl. Br.]
Awad Barakāt	Indep. (N)
Suhayl al-Khūrī*	Watani (N)
Hunayn Sahnāwi	Watani (N)

Al-Ghawtah

Muhammad Sa'id al-Abbār	Musl. Br. (N) Indep. (J)
Abd ar-Ra'ūf Abu Tawq*	Musl. Br. (N) Ulanā' (J)
Muzhar ash-Shurbaji	Watani

Duma

Mabmūd al-Hakim	Ba'ath Sup. (N) Ba'ath (J)
Ahmad Isma'il*	Lib. Mov. (N) Indep. (J)
Muhammad Subhi Taha*	Indep.
Mahmūd al-Azm	Watani (N) Indep. (J)

<i>An-Nabk</i>					
Amin an-Nafuri	Indep. (N)	Hurani Bl. (J)			
Ibrahim Tayfur		Watani			
<i>Al-Qutaifa</i>					
Mahmūd Muhammad					
Diyāb	Indep. (N)	Hurani Bl. (J)			
<i>As-Zabādī</i>					
Jamil ash-Shammāt*	Indep. (N)	Hurani Bl. (J)			
<i>Al-Qunaitra</i>					
Fa'ūr Bin al-Amir					
Mahmūd*	Rural Tr. (N)	Indep. (J)			
Abd ar-Razzāq	Indep.				
at-Tahhān*	Indep.				
Abd ar-Rahmān Ayyūb					
<i>Qatana</i>					
Hussein Maryūd*	Ba'ath Sup. (N)	Sha'ab-Socialist (J)			
		[a former Communist]			
Adil Ajlāni*	Watani (N)	Indep. (J)			
Der'a Province					
<i>Der'a</i>					
Ibrahim Riqq Abu-Zayd	Indep. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			
Abd al-Latif al-Miqdād*	Indep. (N)	Watani (J)			
Muhammad Muftih					
as-Zu'bi	Indep. (N)	Watani (J)			
<i>Ira</i>					
Ahmad Abd al-Karim	Indep. (N)	Hurani Bl. (J)			
Abd al-Hamid al-Khalil	Lib. Mov. (N)	Indep. (J)			
Muhammad Khayr					
al-Hariri*	Watani (J)				
Khalid as-Sarhān	Indep. (N)	Ba'ath (J)			
Suweida Province					
<i>Suweida</i>					
Hussein Murshid	Indep.				
Nā'if Jarbū*	Ba'ath (N)	Indep. (J)			
		[Watani]			
<i>Salkhad</i>					
Muhammad Mustafa					
al-Attrash*	Indep.				
<i>Shahba</i>					
Nawwāf Hasan Amir*	Ba'ath				
Homs Province					
<i>Hams (1 non-Muslim)</i>					
Rātib al-Husāmī*	Sha'ab				
Faydi al-Atāsi*	Sha'ab				
Farhān al-Jandālī*	Sha'ab				
Sāmi Tayyārāh	Lib. Mov. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			
Sa'id at-Tilāwī	Watani				
Muhammad Ali Mash'al	Musl. Br. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			
Tayyib al-Khoja	Musl. Br. (N)	Indep. (J)			
Hāni as-Sibā'i*	Indep. (N)	Hurani Bl. (J)			
		[Sha'ab]			
Munib Raslān*	Indep. (N)	Watani (J)			
Abdallah Farkūh*	Watani				
Musallam Haddād*	Sha'ab				
<i>Jubb al-Jarrah</i>					
Ahmad Dahiyah	Indep.				
<i>Tadmor</i>					
Munir Ahmad al-Fayyād	Indep.				
<i>Telkalakh (1 non-Muslim)</i>					
Maniūr Tawfiq al-Hasan	Indep.				
Abd al-Karim Dabbāh					
ad-Dandashi*	Lib. Mov. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			
Khalil Jurji Da'ās	Indep.				
Hama Province					
<i>Hama (1 non-Muslim)</i>					
Akram Hurānī*	Ba'ath				
Mustafa Hamdūn	Ba'ath				
Abd al-Ghani Qannūt	Ba'ath				
Abd al-Aziz Uthmān	Ba'ath				
Muhammad Ali Adi	Ba'ath				
Muhammad Atūrah	Ba'ath				
Khalil Kallās*	Ba'ath				
<i>Salamiya</i>					
Mustafa Mirza*	Indep.				
Mustafa Tāmir*	Indep. (N)				
<i>Se'aw al-Se'in</i>					
Muhammad Bin Abd al-Karim	Indep.				
Dayyūb Nāsir					
<i>Masyaf</i>					
Qahtān al-Hawwāsh*	Ba'ath Sup. (N)	Hurani Bl. (J)			
Muhammad Sulaymān					
Ali Ma'ruf	Ba'ath Sup. (N)				
Abd al-Hādī Ahmad	Ba'ath				
Hasake Province					
<i>Al-Hasake (1 non-Muslim)</i>					
Muhammad Rashād					
as-Zūba'	Rural Tr. (N)	Indep. (J)			
Khalil Ibrahim Pasha	Rural Tr. (N)	Indep. (J)			
Ka'ūd at-Tallā'	Rural Tr. (N)				
Ziyya Malak Isma'īl	Indep. (N)				
<i>Shedada</i>					
Sulaymān Ali al-As'ad	Rural Tr. (N)	Watani (J)			
<i>Qamishli (1 non-Muslim)</i>					
Abd ar-Razzāq al-Hasu	Rural Tr. (N)	Indep. (J)			
Abd ar-Razzāq an-Nā'if*	Rural Tr. (N)	Indep. (J)			
		[Watani]			
Tal'at Abd al-Qūdīr	Indep. (N)				
Ilyās Najjār*	Indep. [Watani]				
<i>Al-Malekiya Dayrit</i>					
Dahhān Nā'if Bin					
Mustafa Pasha	Rural Tr. (N)				
<i>Ayn-Ita</i>					
Muhajjim al-Muhaydi	Rural Tr. (N)	Indep. (J)			
Deir ez-Zor Province					
<i>Deir ez-Zor</i>					
Abd as-Samad					
al-Fattayih*					
Rāghib al-Bashī*	Indep.				
Jalāl as-Sayyid	Indep.				
Abd ar-Rahman					
al-Hunaydi	Sha'ab (N)	Lib. Mov. (J)			
Abd ar-Rahman Abd al-Karim al-Fayyād	Indep.				
<i>Mayadin</i>					
Abū al-Jad'an*	Rural Tr. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			
Ahmad Shashān	Rural Tr. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			
<i>Abu Kamal</i>					
Dahhām Rajab	Rural Tr. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			
ad-Dandal*		[Ba'nin]			
Fahd Mushrif ad-Dandal*	Rural Tr. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			
Rashid Province					
<i>Ar-Ragga</i>					
Faīsal al-Huwaydī*	Rural Tr. (N)	Indep. (J)			
Hāmid al-Khoja*	Indep.				
Mustafa al-Ka'kaji	Indep.				
<i>Tal-Abiad</i>					
Khalaf al-Hisān	Rural Tr. (N)	Sha'ab (J)			

Aleppo Province**Aleppo (5 non-Muslims)**

Ma'ruf ad-Dawallibi*	Sha'ab	
Mubammad Rashād Barmada*	Sha'ab	
Alā' ad-Din al-Jābirī°	Sha'ab	
As'ad al-Kurāni	Watani (J) Sha'ab (N)	
Abd as-Salām Kan'an	Watani (N) Indep. (J)	
Abd al-Fattāh Abu Gbudda	Musl. Br. (N) Sha'ab (J)	
Ahmad Qanbar*	Sha'ab	
Abd al-Khāliq Nihād	Sha'ab	
Ibrahim Pasha	[close to Mus Br.]	
Mustafa az-Zarqā*	Ulamā' (J)	
Bakrī al-Qabbānī	Indep. (N) Sha'ab (J)	
Muhammad Talas	Watani	
Arām Karamanukian	Indep. (N) Armenian (J)	
Leon Zamariya*	Watani	
Na'um as-Suyūfi	Watani (N) Indep. (J)	
Krikov Eblighatian	Indep. (N) Armenian (J)	
Joseph Jarmaq	Indep. (N)	

Jabal Sam'an

Hussein Ali Shahin		
Awlad	Sba'ab (N) Indep. (J)	
Hussein Abd al-Karim ad-Dandal*	Sha'ab (N)	
Izzat Ibrahim Pasha	Sha'ab (N) Watani (J)	
Ismā'īl al-Hajj Barakāt	Sha'ab	
Ahmad Tawfiq Tāhir		
Agha	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	

Al-Bāb

Tāhir al-Hājī (Hishā)		
Fādīl	Indep.	
Abdallah Jassūmah	Indep. (N) Ba'ath (J)	
Ahmad Ali Agha	Indep.	

Ayn al-Arab

Sbahin Mustafa Shahin*	Indep. (N) Sha'ab (J)	
	[Watani]	
Ismat Busān Shāhin	Indep. (N) Sba'ab (J)	

Manbij

Diyāb al-Māshī°	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	
Ibrahim Shalāsh Ibrahim	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	
Hāzīm Labaniyah	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	

Afrin

Muhammad Mannān°	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	
	[a Kurd]	
Ahmad Ja'far*	Sha'ab [a Kurd]	
Nūri Arīl	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	
Dhihni Uthmān Agha	[a Kurd]	

A'sz

Ahmad Muhammad		
Hasan Kanna	Sha'ab	
Nāfi Hādi Bakkār	Sha'ab	
Ali Hasan Junaydān	Sha'ab	

Jerablus

Ali Muhli Ibrahim	Indep.	
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Idlib Province**Idlib (city)**

Muhammad Adib Asfari	Sha'ab (N) Ba'ath (J)	
Abd al-Hamid		
Duwaydari*	Sha'ab	

Idlib

Hasan Mustafa Hājj		
Hussein	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	

Hikmat Hasan Ubaydi

(Ubaydin)	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	
Muhammad Fahmi		
Ashūri	Ba'ath Sup. (N) Indep. (J)	

Jisr ash-Shughur

Na'ān Zaki Najjāri	Watani (N) Sba'ab (J)	
Najda an-Najjāri*	Watani (N) Sba'ab (J)	

Ma'rat an-Nu'man

Nūr ad-Din al-Yūsufi°	Ba'ath	
Imād al-Iārāki	Indep. (N) Ba'ath (J)	

Harim

Al-Walid Bin Ahmad		
Abd ar-Rahman	Ba'ath	
Nāzim Sa'id al-Kayyālī°	Watani (N) Indep. (J)	

Latakia Province**Latakia (city) (1 non-Muslim)**

Nabil at-Tawil	Musl. Br. (N) Ulamā' (J)	
Muhammad ash-Shawwāf	Sha'ab (N) Indep. (J)	
Adil Murqus	Indep.	

Latakia (district)

Dr Wahib al-Ghānī*	Ba'ath	
Munir al-Hāfā	Indep.	

Haffah

Muhammad Ali Kāmil	Indep.	
Nadim Mustafa Isma'īl	Indep.	

Jable

Muhammad Nazir Ali		
Adib	Watani (N) Indep. (J)	

Nabi Ali

Ahmad Shafiq al-Kanj	Indep.	
Uthmān Asbar*	Sha'ab	
Ahmad Ali Kāmil	Indep.	

Banias

Mahmūd Habib*	Indep.	
Muhammad al-Hasan	Ba'ath	

Tartūs

Badī' Isma'īl*	Indep. (N) NSP (J)	
Riyād Abd ar-Razzāq	Watani (N) Indep. (J)	
Dr Mubiy ad-Din Murhij	Watani (N) Indep. (J)	

Safita (1 non-Muslim)

Munir al-Abbās	Indep. (N) Watani (J)	
Muhammad Amin		

Raslan*

Abd al-Latif Yānis*	Indep.	
Rafiq Bashshūr*	Indep. Sha'ab	

Tribes

Shammar al-Khrese		
Dahhām al-Hādī*	Bedouin Tr.	
Munir Abd al-Muhsin	Bedouin Tr.	

Badiyah ash-Sham

wal-Hasanah		
Mut'ib Bin Fawwāz		
ash-Sha'an*	Bedouin Tr.	
Tāmir Bin Trād		
al-Mulhim*	Bedouin Tr.	

Badiyah Tadmar

(Homs Hama)		
Trād Karān al-Murshid*	Bedouin Tr.	

Mauwālī

Abd al-Ibrahim		
Bin Ibrahim		
Pasha al-Ibrahim*	Bedouin Tr.	
Faisal Nawwāf as-Sālih*	Bedouin Tr.	

POST-ELECTION POLITICS

THE ASSEMBLY AND THE PRESIDENCY

Anti-Left Pronouncements. [Soon after the elections, three prominent rightist politicians, newly elected to the Assembly, made sharply anti-Leftist pronouncements.]

Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari said that Syria would not tolerate Communism, because it opposed Islam and Arab nationalism; however, this attitude did not affect Syria's neutralism in international affairs. (*BBC in Arabic, Dec 2-IMB, Dec 3*)

Dr Dawālībī [the future PM] was reported attacking socialism as a movement of exploitation leading to dictatorship: "Our regime shall not be socialist, but humane." Dr Leon Zamariya condemned agrarian reform as economic sabotage and stated that the confiscation of lands had been expropriation pure and simple; he also attacked nationalization and directed economy in general. (*Hayat, Dec 8*)

Assembly Convened, Parliamentary Groupings. The Constituent and Parliamentary Assembly convened on Dec 12.

The day before, Maj.-Gen. Zahr ad-Din, the C-in-C, gave a dinner for the members of the government and the deputies. He promised his guests that the army would remain strong and watchful; it had made good its promise to return to the barracks and it wanted to retire from politics entirely but could not do so if ambitious politicians tried to exploit it for their purposes. He called upon those present to eschew quarrels and to lead the nation in its new epoch and said that it would be best if there were only two to three political groupings. (*Nasr, Dec 12*)

Parliamentary Blocs. As soon as the Assembly convened, parliamentary groupings or "blobs" (*kutal*) began to form:

The Country Bloc (kutlat ar-rif) of about 25 tribal and rural delegates, headed by Mut'ib ash-Shalān;

The Islamic Cooperative Bloc (al-kutalah al-islamiyah) of between 15-20 delegates "former Muslim Brethren and supported by the *ulamā'*" (*Jaridah, Dec 12*), headed by a committee composed by Isām al-Attār (secretary), and Dr Mustafa az-Zarqā, Abd al-Fattāh Abu-Riddāh and Bashir Ramadān as members;

The Constitutional Bloc (al-kutlah al-dusturiyah) of 25 members;

The Socialist Bloc (al-kutlah al-ihtirakiyah), headed by Akram Hurāni;

The Bloc of Khālid al-Azm;

The Jazirah and Euphrates Bloc and the Damascus Progressive Bloc (al-kutlah al-taqaddumiyyah fi-dimashq), both mentioned in the composition of the Dawālībī cabinet;

The Sha'ab Bloc;

The Watani Bloc.

(*Jaridah, Dec 12, 21; Hayat, Dec 16, 23; Mid. Mir., Dec 23*)

Struggle Over the Presidency. The time between the elections and the convening of the Assembly was taken up with manoeuvres regarding elections to the presidency of the Republic and the presidency of the Assembly (the speaker).

Prominent candidates mentioned were Nāzīm al-Qudsi or Ruḥdī al-Kikhya [either as nominee of the Sha'ab Party], Kuzbari and Khālid al-Azm. Kikhya, the former

President of the Sha'ab Party, categorically refused to become a candidate (he had not put up his candidacy for the Assembly either). The others were active candidates; Akram Hurāni was also reported to be canvassing support [presumably for leftist candidates].

[The outcome of the elections became a foregone conclusion] when a meeting of 100 [rightist] deputies, representing the Sha'ab Party, the Watani Party, the tribes and the Muslim Brethren unanimously decided on the candidacy of Qudsi for President, and of Kuzbari for President of the Assembly. (*Jaridah, Dec 7; Manar, Dec 10; Difa, Dec 11; R. Beirut, Dec 11-IMB, Dec 11*)

Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari—President of the Assembly. At its first meeting on Dec 12, the Assembly elected Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari as its president by 114 votes of the Sha'ab, Watani, religious and tribal delegates against 47 votes for Jalāl as-Sayyid, who was supported by the Ba'athists and leftists, and 7 votes for Sa'id al-Ghazzi. [Jalāl as-Sayyid had been a member of the Ba'ath until 1955 when he left the party because it opposed a union with Iraq under Nūrī Sa'id.] Rafiq Bashshūr and Abd as-Samad al-Futayih were elected deputy presidents, and Abd al-Latif al-Yūsini and Umar Awdah al-Khatib, secretaries. (*R. Damascus, Dec 12 [13, 14]; Jaridah, Dec 13*)

Dr Nāzīm al-Qudsi President of the Republic. On Dec 14 Dr Nāzīm al-Qudsi was elected President of the Syrian Arab Republic, when 153 of the 172 members of the National Assembly voted for him. The only rival candidate, Khālid al-Azm, withdrew "in order to facilitate the election of Nāzīm al-Qudsi" (*R. Damascus, ANA, Dec 14 [15]*). According to Cairo Radio, al-Azm issued a statement protesting the "open interference" by the authorities in favour of one of the candidates. (*R. Cairo, Dec 14 [15]*)

This outcome was regarded as another victory of the right over the left. (*Financial Times; Times, Dec 15*)

Dr Nāzīm al-Qudsi was born in Aleppo in 1905. After studying law at Damascus and Geneva he practised in Aleppo, where he was elected deputy in 1936 and was reelected in 1943, 1947, 1949 and 1954. He joined the National Bloc and later became a leader of the Sha'ab Party, elected in 1948. Between 1945 and 1949 he served as Minister to Washington and in 1949, after the Hīnāwī coup, he became Foreign Minister. From June 1950 to March 1951 he served as PM in predominantly Sha'ab cabinets. Between 1951 and 1958, he was elected four times Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. During the union with Egypt he was politically inactive and was chairman of the board of directors of the Bank of the Arab World. (*Difa, Jordan, Dec 15; Mid. Mir., Dec 16*)

In his address to the Assembly, President Qudsi expressed his sorrow that the return of Syria to parliamentary democracy should have been the result of the failure to realize Arab unity and dwelt on Syria's leading role in Arab nationalism. Syria's "dearest aim" was a "unified Arab structure." In the international field Syria was pursuing a policy of non-alignment. The democratic parliamentary system, he said, re-established in response to the people's will, had its shortcomings and entailed hardships and it was for those responsible to see that they were kept to a minimum. The social and economic policy should primarily aim at improving the lot of the individual citizen. Of the development projects to be

furthered, the President gave prominence to the Euphrates plan and to oil prospecting. Syria's obligations in regard to Arab problems—Algeria and Palestine and dependent Arab territories—made her economic development particularly urgent. The President warmly thanked the army for having enabled Syria to return to the "path of freedom and honour." (*R. Damascus, Dec 14 [15]*)

THE DAWALIBI GOVERNMENT

Under the provisional constitution, the first task of the Assembly after the election of the President was the formation of the government.

Nus Cabinet Resigns. On Dec 14 Dr Izzat an-Nus handed in the resignation of his transitional government to the President who asked him to continue in office until the formation of a new cabinet. (*Nasr, Dec 15*)

There was a consensus of opinion that the new cabinet should have the widest possible support of the Assembly. The politicians received by President Qudsi for consultations were Sa'îd al-Ghazzi, Khâlid al-Azm, Sabri al-Asali, Akram al-Hurâni, Ma'rûf ad-Dawâlibi, Leon Zamariya, As'ad Kurâni, Rashid ad-Duqr, Adnân Quwatli and Fu'âd al-Adil. (*Jaridah, Dec 17, 19, 20*)

On Dec 19 Ma'mûn al-Kuzbari, President of the Assembly, denied that there was a crisis concerning the formation of the cabinet; delays so far were due to the absence of political parties, to the fact that many deputies were new, and to the need for deputies to become acquainted with each other. (*BBC in Arabic, Dec 19-IMB, Dec 20*)

Dawâlibi Government Formed—"Right Wing Coalition". On Dec 21 President Qudsi entrusted Dr Ma'rûf ad-Dawâlibi with the formation of the government. The next day its composition was published. (*R. Damascus, Dec 21, 22 [22, 26]*)

Dr Dawâlibi was born at Aleppo in 1907; he studied law in Damascus and Paris. He was elected deputy for Aleppo in 1947 and joined the Sha'ab Party. In 1951 he served for a short time as PM and Minister of Defence until he was ousted by Col. Shishakli. In 1954-55 he served again as Minister of Defence [Dr Dawâlibi was out of office since 1955, and politically inactive under the union.] (*Mid. Mir., Hayat, Dec 23*)

The government represented the former Sha'ab and Watani parties, the Constitutional and Islamic parliamentary blocs and independents. The Socialist Bloc and the bloc headed by Khâlid al-Azm were not represented.

On Dec 22 the composition of the cabinet was published: Dr Ma'rûf ad-Dawâlibi—PM, Foreign Affairs; (Sha'ab); Jalâl as-Sayyid—Deputy PM, Agriculture (Deir ez-Zor); "Ja'irah and Euphrates Bloc" one time Ba'ath; Rashid Barnada—Defence, Education (Aleppo, Sha'ab); Ahmad Qanbar—Interior (Aleppo, Sha'ab); Muhammad ash-Shawwâf—Public Works (Latakia; Sha'ab); Abd ar-Rahmân al-Hunaydi—Industry ("Ja'irah and Euphrates Bloc"—Sha'ab); Dr Mustafa az-Zarqâ—Justice, Awqâf (Aleppo); "Islamic Cooperative Bloc"; Dr Adnân al-Quwatli—Economy ("Damascus Progressive Bloc"—independent); Fu'âd al-Adil—National Guidance and Information ("Damascus Progressive Bloc"—independent); Mahmûd al-Azm—Health (Ghoutah, "Constitutional Bloc"); Na'ûm as-Suyûf—Planning (Aleppo); "Islamic Cooperative Bloc"—Watani; Ahmad Ali Kâmil—Communications (Jebel; "Constitutional Bloc") [Independent]; Dr Suhayr al-Khûri—Municipal and Rural Affairs (Damascus; Constitutional Bloc") [Watani]; Bakri al-Qabbâni—Agrarian Reform (Aleppo; Sha'ab—Jaridah, Watani—

Hayat); Dr Rashid ad-Duqr—Finance, Supply ("Damascus Progressive Bloc"—independent); Muhammad Abdin—Social Affairs, Labour (Damascus; "Islamic Front"—Jaridah, "Damascus Progressive Bloc"—Hayat) (*Mid. Mir., Jaridah, Hayat, Dec 23*)

The following were serving as ministers for the first time: Sayyid, Duqr, Abdin, Suyûf, Qabbâni, Khûri, Kâmil and Azm. (*Mid. Mir., Hayat, Jaridah, Dec 23*)

"Right Wing Coalition". The Times regarded Dr Dawâlibi's government as a "broad coalition of right-wing elements" and therefore likely to gain a comfortable majority in the parliament "where the right-wing groups are dominant." The left-wingers were reported by the paper as having declined Dawâlibi's invitation to join the cabinet (*Times, Dec 27*). *Le Monde* held a similar view, stressing that the new government was bent on a conservative social and economic policy. (*Monde, Dec 24*)

The Ba'ath and the New Cabinet. [Akram Hurâni, the Ba'ath leader, did not entirely reject the idea of the Ba'ath joining the government.] He stated that the Ba'ath demanded of the government continued freedom for parties and the press, no interference with agrarian reform and nationalization principles, a detailed programme with guarantees of execution. Under these circumstances, the Ba'ath would not hesitate either to join the government, or to support it. President Qudsi, Hurâni added, had agreed to these points. (*Nahar, Dec 20*)

Economic Liberalization Envisaged; Pressures from Right and Left. [During the remaining days of 1961 the Dawâlibi government did not publish a comprehensive programme, but made it clear that its outlook was liberal in politics as well as in economic affairs.]

At a series of interviews and press conferences, Jalâl as-Sayyid, Ma'mûn al-Kuzbari and other prominent politicians said that the government had decided to restore civil liberties (*al-hurriyyât al-ammah*) and that the measures to be taken would be announced on Jan 8, 1962 when the government would appear before the Assembly to present its programme and receive its vote of confidence. (*Jaridah, Dec 27, 29*)

On Dec 27 Dr Dawâlibi told a delegation representing economic interests that his government would encourage economic liberalization, local capital and production (*Hayat, Dec 28*). [For Dawâlibi's anti-socialism—see p 506 a.]

It was reported that the Employers' Association (*itti-hâd arbâb al-amal*) had handed a memorandum to the government in which it requested that the Social Insurance Law No. 143/61 not be put into effect at the beginning of 1962, as stipulated in the law. The association objected to the increase in the social insurance contribution from 7% to 14% of the wage by both employer and employee, as provided for by the law; this increase, said the memorandum, did not fit the current economic situation. The government passed the memorandum to the Social Insurance Institute for an opinion. The Federation of Labour Unions was said to insist that the law be carried out as enacted. (*Hayat, Dec 29*)

Agrarian Reform. Jalâl as-Sayyid, the Deputy PM and Minister of Agriculture, said that the Agrarian Reform Law would remain in force, and that no amendments made would detract from peasant gains; he added that for the peasant the significance of agrarian reform was moral rather than economic (*Hayat, Dec 27*). At the

SYRIA: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

same time the government decided to allocate £53.7 million in loans to peasants for the purchase of seeds. (*Hayat, Dec 28*)

The Permanent Constitution. The Constituent Assembly insisted on the immediate drafting of a permanent constitution. This, the Damascus *An-Nassr* paper said, was prompted by many factors, including the army's pledge to prevent the infiltration of its ranks by politics. *An-Nassr* said that the 1950 Constitution offered "a ready plan" which merely required some amendments (*R. Damascus, Dec 21 [22]*). This approach was later confirmed by Dr Kuzbari, President of the Assembly, who

said that many deputies favoured it. (*Jihad, Jordan, Dec 31*)

Dr Kuzbari also announced that a committee of 39 deputies, representing the various trends in the Assembly, would start its work on the draft constitution during "the coming week." (*R. Amman, Dec 28-131B, Dec 29*)

Outlook for 1962. The overriding problem of Syria in the new year was described as how "with much the same men in charge, the country is to dodge the self-destructive routine of interminable but meaningless change, goaded by constant military intervention." (*Economist, Dec 23*)

SYRIA: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(FOR SYNOPSIS, SEE PP 484-6)

GENERAL

Recognition—Timetable. According to the Syrian and Lebanese press, recognitions by foreign governments of the Syrian Arab Republic after the break-up of the UAR were received in Damascus in the following order:

Sept 29: Jordan, Turkey; *Oct 1:* Rep. of China (Formosa), Guatemala; *Oct 2:* Iran; *Oct 7:* USSR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, GDR; *Oct 9:* Poland, Tunisia, Iraq, GFR; *Oct 10:* USA, Rumania, Saudi Arabia; *Oct 11:* Brazil, Spain, Argentina, Chile, North Korea; *Oct 12:* Italy, France, Hungary, People's China; *Oct 13:* UK, Haiti; *Oct 14:* Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands, Austria, Canada, Dominican Republic, Mongolia, Kuwait; *Oct 15:* Vatican, Togo; *Oct 16:* Ethiopia; *Oct 17:* Japan, Portugal, Mexico, North Vietnam; *Oct 18:* Australia, Switzerland, Nicaragua, Paraguay; *Oct 19:* Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, Gabon, Libya;

Oct 20: Pakistan; *Oct 21:* Belgium, South Vietnam, Central African Republic, South Korea; *Oct 23:* Upper Volta, Niger, Ivory Coast, Dahomey; *Oct 24:* Luxembourg; *Oct 25:* Ecuador, Salvador, Yemen, Congo, Senegal; *Oct 26:* Cameroun, Chad; *Oct 31:* Malagasy, Thailand; *Nov 3:* Malaya, Colombia, Cyprus; *Nov 5:* India; *Nov 6:* Indonesia; *Nov 8:* Lebanon, Yugoslavia; *Nov 11:* Ceylon; *Nov 13:* Ireland; *Dec 16:* Morocco.

(The sources do not always clearly distinguish between the first intimation of a government that it "had recognized" the Syrian Arab Republic, and the official presentation of the relevant document.)

Syria's Return to the UN. On Oct 13 Syria reoccupied her seat in the UN without opposition after Mahmūd Fawzi, the UAR Foreign Minister, had declared that his government would put no obstacles in the way of Syria's return. (*Nasr*, Oct 15, 17)

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

USSR-SYRIAN POLITICAL RELATIONS; COMMUNIST VIEWS ON SYRIA

Soviet Recognition of the New Regime. [The USSR was the first of the major powers to recognize the Syrian Republic after Syria's secession from the UAR; recognition came on Oct 7. (*Nasr*, Oct 8; *Izvestia*, Oct 10)]

The *New York Times* Moscow correspondent noted the "unexpected swiftness" of Soviet recognition, and ascribed it to Moscow's desire to "re-establish the close ties with Syria" which had existed in 1958 prior to the union with Egypt. Moscow had decided "to risk straining its relations with Abdel Nasser to seek a foothold quickly in Syria" (*NYT*, Oct 8). On Oct 17 PM Khrushchov was reported as declaring that he hoped for increased trade between the two countries (*Nasr*, Oct 18). A few days later an official Syrian source said that Soviet technicians continued to carry out the tasks which had been agreed upon between the two sides [before the Syrian revolution]. (*Nasr*, Oct 26)

Communist Welcome of Secession Reported in Pravda. While official Soviet sources refrained from commenting upon Syria's break-away from the UAR, statements of the Syrian CP welcoming the event were given publicity in the Soviet press. On Oct 7, the day on which the Soviet Union recognized the new regime in Syria, *Pravda* reproduced a declaration by the Syrian CP praising the secession as a "historic victory" that had met with "wide response in the Arab East." A summary of the Syrian CP declaration was broadcast from Peking. (*Pravda*, Oct 7; *R. Peking*, Oct 14 [FE 17])

As reported in *Pravda*, Khālid Bakdash, SG of the Syrian CP, said in his speech to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, that Syria's secession reflected "not the break-up of Arab unity, but the bankruptcy of anti-democratic and anti-Communist policies." Events in Syria had again shown that "the path to Arab unity does not lead through annexation, expansion and domination, [nor] through the enslavement of one Arab state by another." (*Pravda*, Oct 25)

Military Relations. On Oct 3 Amman Radio reported from "reliable sources" in Damascus that the new Syrian Government had asked all Syrian army and air force officers training in the USSR to return home immediately (*R. Amman*, Oct 3 [W 12]). One week later the Jordanian daily *Falastin* said that Syria expected the supply of Soviet equipment to the Syrian armed forces to continue. (*Falastin*, Oct 10)

Appointment of Ambassadors. The USSR Consul-General in Damascus presented his credentials as USSR Ambassador to Syria on Nov 9 (*Tass*, Nov 9 [SU 11]). The Syrian Ambassador to Moscow presented his credentials on Dec 2. (*Izvestia*, Dec 4)

Soviet Attitude to New Regime Non-Committal. The refusal of the Syrian authorities to allow Khālid Bakdash to leave his plane when he arrived in Damascus from Prague on Nov 19 (see p 500 b) was reported without comment in *Pravda* on Nov 22.

[An article in *Pravda* on the forthcoming Syrian elec-

tions contained a cautious and restrained appraisal of the new regime.] Although "the representatives of the left-wing forces" had not been invited to a conference of political leaders in Nov, and although the document that resulted from that conference "basically reflects the demands of the national bourgeoisie," the article noted that "the needs of the workers are also mentioned." "Some Syrians" were deprived of the right to vote or to be elected. The new government had released some political detainees, but "Syrian public opinion" thought that the work of the commission set up to review the cases of those still in prison was taking "longer than is permissible." The article alleged that Western states were trying to exploit Syria's economic difficulties for political ends, but noted that "the Syrians greeted with great satisfaction the announcement by the temporary government that Syria will follow a policy of neutrality and non-participation in military blocs." Referring to Syria's "famous traditions" of liberty and democracy, the article concluded: "Friends of Syria hope that in the future, too, the Syrian Arab Republic will remain faithful to these traditions which originated in the years of dauntless struggle against the imperialists and colonizers." (*Pravda*, Nov 28; *Mizan*, Dec)

Bakdash Scores "Right-Wing Camp." [The views of the Syrian CP, reproduced in Soviet and other Communist media, were more outspokenly critical of the new Syrian regime.] In an interview given by Khalid Bakdash to the Italian Communist daily *Unita*, and reported in *Pravda*, he declared that "the policy which the right wing is trying to impose is meeting with opposition not only from the popular masses but even from certain circles of the bourgeoisie," and charged that "many students who demanded the restoration of the democratic freedoms" had been imprisoned. On the forthcoming elections Bakdash said that "the representatives of the right-wing camp are doing all they can to prevent the people from expressing their will freely." (*Pravda*, Nov 24; *Mizan*, Dec)

Similar criticisms were contained in a lengthy interview with Khalid Bakdash broadcast from Prague. (*R. Prague*, Nov 23 [*EE* 24])

Cultural Relations. A communiqué, following talks held in Dec between the Soviet Ambassador A.A. Barkovski and the Syrian Premier Izzat al-Nus, stated that the conclusion of a new cultural cooperation agreement was "indispensable" for the further development of cultural relations between Syria and the USSR. Until the conclusion of such an agreement, all existing provisions regulating cultural relations between the two countries, in particular the cultural cooperation agreement of Aug 20, 1956, would remain in full force. Further talks on cultural relations would be held by representatives of the two countries not later than the end of Feb 1962. (*Hayat*, Dec 21; *Izvestia*, Dec 22)

USSR ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID

[Progress was reported on three of the major aid projects covered by the Moscow protocol of Sept 7, 1960 which amended the 1957 USSR-Syrian Aid Agreement (see MER 1960, p 84): the Homs fertilizer plant, the Qamishli-Aleppo-Latakia railway, and the surveying and prospecting programme.] Cairo reported that, in the spring of 1960, the USSR had already stated it would not finance the Euphrates dam project. (*Ahram*, June 29)

Homs Fertilizer Plant. The cornerstone of the Homs nitrogen fertilizer plant was laid on July 30 in the vicinity of the oil refinery. Construction was planned in two stages: the first to be completed by the end of 1964 would enable production at the rate of 55,000 tons annually; the second, to be completed by early 1968, would bring the capacity to 110,000 tons a year. Total cost was estimated at £\$100m., of which £\$60m. were earmarked for the import of equipment and machinery from the USSR. (*Nasr*, July 31; *ANA*, July 30 [*W Aug 8*]; *MEED*, Aug 4)

Qamishli-Aleppo-Latakia Railway. In March a Syrian official source said the cost of this line, including rolling stock and maintenance facilities, was estimated at £\$ 400m., of which £\$260m. would be expended in Syrian currency and £\$140m. in foreign currency. Work was expected to begin in July. (*ANA*, March 25 [*W 30*]; *Mid. Mir.*, April 1)

Sixteen Soviet experts arrived in Damascus in Feb to report upon plans drawn up by a Belgian firm for the 765 km. line and to conduct their own surveys (*ANA*, Feb 5 [*W 9*]; *Ayyam*, Feb 10; *Nasr*, Feb 11; *Pravda*, March 14). In May an official Syrian source stated that the experts recommended a substantial shortening of the line projected in the original Belgian plan, thus making possible a saving of "tens of millions of Syrian pounds" (*ANA*, May 31 [*W*, June 8]; *Tass in English*, June 1 [*SU 5*]). In Sept, however, it was reported that a proposal to shorten the line had been abandoned. (*MEED*, Sept 8)

In Nov it was reported that 30 Soviet railway specialists were expected to arrive in Syria by the end of the month. (*Nasr*, Nov 11)

Surveying and Prospecting. A team of Soviet surveyors was expected to leave for Syria on Jan to prepare a 1:100,000 topographical map of Syria. It was estimated that the work on the map would take two-and-a-half years (*Nasr*, Jan 1). In April it was reported that a group of Soviet experts had returned to the Soviet Union after completing work on a geological survey of an area of 138,000 sq. km. in Syria. Soviet aerial photography specialists who were compiling a 1:200,000 topographical map of an area of 126,000 sq. km. were expected to finish their work by the end of the month. (*MENA*, April 21 [*24*]; *Sawt al-Arab*, April 22)

The arrival in the Karachuk area of Soviet oil drilling equipment was reported in Feb (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 26). In May it was reported that deep drilling would begin in the Ramilan and Western Karachuk fields, where it was hoped to find deposits of at least 1,000,000 tons. (*Nasr*, May 13)

In May Damascus Radio quoted the chief Soviet geological expert, Antonenko, on the progress of prospecting carried out by Soviet specialists. He gave details concerning iron ore deposits. Prospecting for phosphorites and for rock salt had begun. (*R. Damascus*, May 21 [*W 25*])

Agriculture and Irrigation. In Jan six Soviet agricultural experts toured various regions of Syria in order to acquaint themselves with the state of Syrian agriculture. They were to assist in the drafting of an agricultural research programme, the establishment of laboratories and experimental stations and in the training of local personnel. (*Tass in English*, Jan 28 [*SU 31*]; *Nasr*, Jan 28)

In Feb it was reported that a team of Soviet experts

had completed preparations for experiments in the mechanized sowing of cotton, following the methods practiced in the Soviet Union. (*Nasr, Feb 23*)

Soviet forestry specialists visited Latakia in April in connection with a projected survey of forests in the area and the erection of a forestry research centre. (*Wahdah, April 16*)

Soviet experts had studied the utilization of the Khaur river for the irrigation of some 120,000 hectares, it was reported in Sept. (*MENA, Sept 24 [W 28]*)

Gift of Hospital Equipment. An eye hospital, with equipment provided as a gift by the Soviet government, was officially opened in Damascus on April 16. (*R. Moscow in Arabic, April 17 [SU 19]*)

BULGARIA

Bulgarian Work on Development Projects. In Jan discussions were held on the possibility of Bulgarian participation in the construction of roads, bridges and railways in Syria. (*ANA, Jan 28 [W Feb 2]*)

On March 23 it was officially announced that the Bulgarian Techno-Impex organization had completed the Rastan dam in the Syrian Region (see also MER 1960, p 86). The dam was designed to irrigate 250,000 dunams of land to operate an electric power station (*Mid. Mir., March 25*). A Bulgarian Minister was present at the ceremony for the opening of the dam, on Aug 17. (*Mid. Mir., Aug 26*)

The completion of work by Techno-Impex on the Mubrada dam, a smaller companion project of the Rastan dam, was announced in April. (*Mid. Mir., April 25*)

In Sept Bulgarian and UAR experts approved plans for the construction of two main irrigation canals in the Ghab project (see also MER 1960, p 86). It was reported that the two canals would be 65 km. long and when completed in June 1962 would irrigate 17,000 hectares of land. Cost was estimated at £820m. (*ANA, Sept 21 [W 28]*)

Bulgaria Recognizes Syria. On Oct 7 Bulgaria recognized Syria and expressed the desire for an exchange of ambassadors. (*Nasr, Oct 8*)

Bulgarian Mission Visits Syria; Cultural Agreement. An official Bulgarian good-will mission, headed by the Deputy-Chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, Zhivko Zbivkov, visited Syria in Nov as part of a tour of ME countries. A cultural agreement was signed between the two countries which renewed the agreement of 1956 and provided for the exchange of students, lecturers and specialists. (*R. Damascus, Nov 11 [4]; Nasr, Nov 12, 13, 14; R. Damascus, Nov 13, R. Moscow, Nov 14 [W 23]*)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Economic and Cultural Relations. In July, the Czechoslovak Consul in Damascus told the press that Czechoslovak trade with Syria had expanded steadily over the preceding five years. In 1960 Syrian exports to Czechoslovakia had totalled £822m. approx. and Syrian imports had reached £816m. (compare pp 82-5). Czechoslovakia was the second largest importer of Syrian cotton, he added. Czechoslovak firms had constructed a number of "giant enterprises" in the Syrian Region, including petroleum refineries in Homs, two sugar factories, one at Hama, currently being enlarged, and one at Der'a, and a timber plant at Latakia. Close on to 30 students and several engineers from the Syrian Region were studying in Czechoslovakia. (*Gumhuriyah, July 13*)

In March Czechoslovakia was approached concerning an exchange of £8250,000 worth of Syrian tobacco for cigarette-making machinery. (*ANA, March 9 [W 16]*)

Two 150 kw. transmitters were being built by a Czechoslovak company as part of a network of twenty television stations scheduled under the five-year plan. (*ANA, March 11 [W 23]*)

Discussions were held with the Czechoslovak Techno-Export organization on raising the capacity of the new Homs power plant by 15,000 kw. to 45,000 kw. to enable it to supply the projected Homs nitrogen fertilizer factory. (*R. Damascus, March 16, April 2 [W March 23, April 6]; MEED, March 24*)

Experts of the Czechoslovak Stroj-Export organization prepared plans for the construction of two bridges over the Euphrates at Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor for which international tenders were to be invited as from July 1. A Syrian official discussed the plans with Stroj-Export during a visit to Czechoslovakia in May-June. He also toured railway installations and factories producing railway equipment. (*R. Damascus, June 6, ANA, June 5 [W 8]; MEED, Aug 4*)

OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

German Democratic Republic. In June three officials of the Syrian Agrarian Reform Ministry left for a ten-day visit to the GDR. (*ANA, June 19 [W 29]*)

On Oct 7 the GDR recognized Syria and expressed its desire to exchange ambassadors. (*Nasr, Oct 11*)

In May the UAR granted the GDR mission in Damascus consular status, over West German protests (see p 662 b). In Nov, according to "official information" received in Beirut, the new Syrian regime revoked this step. This was interpreted as reflecting Syria's desire to strengthen relations with West Germany (*Hayat, Nov 8*). On the following day the official GDR news agency said that the reports had not been confirmed by the Syrian Foreign Ministry. (*ADN in Germany, Nov 9 [EE 11]*)

Hungary. On Feb 3 the Syrian Central Bank was authorized to open a credit of £5250,000 for financing the export of Syrian cotton to Hungary. (*Nasr, Feb 4*)

In Sept it was reported that Hungary had agreed to grant a credit of £510m, to finance exports to the Syrian region; details had not yet been settled. (*MEED, Sept 8*)

Poland. Polish agricultural experts arrived in Aleppo in Jan to conduct a survey of flour mills in the area and to draw up recommendations for the acquisition of new equipment. (*Ayyam, Jan 15*)

In May Polish experts discussed in Damascus the supply of furniture and equipment for the Suweida Hospital scheduled for completion in 1962. (*R. Damascus, May 4 [W 11]*)

In Sept the director of the Polish pavilion at the Eighth Damascus International Fair said that the Syrian Region had a favourable balance of trade with Poland and that there were considerable opportunities for an increase in trade. "Poland which imports cotton, leather and oil seeds from the Syrian Region can export to this Region electrical, technical and industrial equipment, as well as 400 types of industrial products, for scientific laboratories and hospitals, among other goods," the director declared. (*Eg. Gaz., Sept 7*)

Rumania. In April Rumania invited the Minister of

Communications for the Syrian Region to visit Rumania. (*MENA*, April 3 [W 6])

Trade relations were discussed in Damascus in April. The Rumanian Consul was reported to have declared that his country was interested in exporting timber, tractors and agricultural machinery. (*Wahdah*, May 1)

Yugoslavia. In Feb a project for a power and irrigation scheme on the Yarmuk river in southern Syria, designed by the Yugoslav firm of Energoprojekt and to be carried out with Yugoslav equipment, was approved in Damas-

cus. It was to consist of four pumping stations to irrigate 22,000 acres of land in the dry season, and in the rainy season to provide water for a hydro-electric plant with a capacity of 12,000 kw. The construction would take about 18 months. (*MEED*, March 3)

In July it was reported that an agreement had been reached for the Yugoslav firm Pormoskograd, which was carrying out the Tartus southern port development, to enlarge this project. The cost would increase from £532m. to £536m. (*MEED*, July 7)

Yugoslavia recognized Syria on Nov 8. (*Nasr*, Nov 9)

OTHER COUNTRIES

NATO COUNTRIES

Denmark. In Feb a Danish delegation visited the Northern Region where they discussed possibilities of technical aid in livestock breeding. (*Ayyam*, Feb 5, 8)

On March 26 a £58m. contract was signed with a Danish firm, for the building of a cement factory at Hama with a capacity of 100,000 tons per year. (*R. Damascus*, March 26 [W 30])

Under a technical aid agreement signed on Aug 6, a Danish State Organization was to build a farm in Latakia to breed cattle and other domestic animals, at a cost of £51,600,000. (*Wahdah*, Aug 7; *Mid. Mir.*, Aug 12)

France. In March it was reported that France had offered 15 scholarships for Syrian public servants in specialised courses. (*Ayyam*, March 5)

On Oct 13 it was reported that France had recognized Syria (*Nasr*, Oct 14). [However, by the end of 1961 there was no information on renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which had been cut off in the wake of the Suez campaign, in 1956.]

German Federal Republic. (See also above, under: German Democratic Republic.)

The Euphrates Dam Project: [The feasibility of erecting a major dam on the Euphrates river in Syria had been under consideration for many years.] A preliminary survey of the Euphrates basin was carried out by Soviet experts in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 84) but at the same time the USSR informed the UAR that it would not finance the project. (*Ahram*, June 29)

On July 5 it was announced that, in the framework of a GFR-UAR economic agreement, the GFR had undertaken to provide a credit of DM 500m. at 3½% interest for the building by German firms of the Euphrates dam, the total cost of which was estimated at DM 1,600m. The credit would be for 20 years, repayable from the end of the sixth year. Were the allocated credit to prove insufficient to cover the project's foreign currency requirements, the GFR, with UAR approval, would set up an international consortium to secure the balance. (*Ahram*, July 6)

An official Syrian source said the length of the dam would be 4,500 metres and its height 60 metres. The reservoir would hold 25,000 million cubic metres of water and the irrigation network would cover some 750,000 hectares (*R. Damascus*, July 11 [W 30]; *Ayyam*, July 12). In Aug it was reported that German experts had already arrived in Damascus to start on the survey work. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 15)

The GFR extended recognition to the Syrian Republic on Oct 9 (*Nasr*, Oct 10) after consultations with the UAR. (*MENA*, Oct 9 [I])

Following the recognition, Damascus reported Dr. Adenauer had declared that the GFR would stand by its obligations under the Euphrates project agreement (*Nasr*, Oct 13). On Oct 13 the first consignment of German equipment, for survey work on the Euphrates, was reported to have arrived in Syria. (*ANA*, Oct 14 [W 19])

On Oct 18 the Syrian Minister of Public Works declared that the GFR had confirmed its readiness to continue with the plan (*Hayat*, Oct 19). On the following day, however, the West German Secretary of State of the Economic Ministry said the issue was in doubt. It was yet to be established whether the credit extended to the UAR was transferable to the Republic of Syria under international law. He added that, in any new solution, Iraqi and Turkish reservations had to be considered. (*NYT*, Oct 21; on the Iraqi stand on this issue, see pp 165 b-166)

Nevertheless, on Oct 24 a German delegation arrived in Syria for high-level consultations on the project (*Nasr*, Oct 25, 26, 27). On Nov 14 German experts arrived in Syria to start the survey work (*ANA*, Nov 5 [W 9]; *Nasr*, Nov 6, 8, 21; *Ayyam*, Nov 7, 23). In Dec a Syrian delegation went to Bonn for financial talks on the project. (*Hayat*, Dec 10, 14; *Mid. Mir.*, Dec 16)

Italy. An Italian firm obtained the tender to install oil pipelines between the Homs oil refinery and the oil depots in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. In Feb, Italian experts started the survey work. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 8)

Italy recognized the new Syrian regime on Oct 12. (*Nasr*, Oct 13)

In Dec a contract worth £583,000 was concluded with an Italian company for the planning of Idlib town. At the same time "an agreement was concluded with an Italian company for the preparation of reports and plans for the development and planning of the Barada valleys and the desert." (*R. Damascus*, Dec 10 [W 14])

Norway. In March, during its tour of the UAR, a Norwegian trade delegation visited the Syrian Region to discuss intensified trade exchange. (*Ahram*, March 6-8, 10)

The United States. In June the Ford Foundation granted the Ministry of Education for the Syrian Region six scholarships (\$250 per month each) for one year, for studying methods in agricultural teaching in the U.S. (*Sawt al-Arab*, June 28)

On Sept 29 a State Department press officer said that the question of recognizing Syria was "premature." *The New York Times* held that recognition would be delayed until "readjustments in inter-Arab relations" were cleared. The next day it was reported that "experts believed that the question of general recognition... would depend on the position taken by Moscow." (*NYT*, Sept 30, Oct 1). On Oct 3 an American spokesman denied rumours published in the Egyptian press that the US had had a hand in the latest events in Syria. *UP* reported from Washington that an immediate recognition by the US of the new regime might anger the UAR, where the US had already been accused of assisting the Syrian revolution. However, some observers believed that American interests demanded the US recognize before the USSR did so. (*Ayyam*, Oct 4)

[Recognition came on Oct 10, following on recognition by the USSR and other Communist countries.] On Oct 10 PM Kuzbari received the US Consul-General at Damascus, accompanied by Senator W. Stuart Symington, who informed him of the US recognition of Syria; the Consul-General would be turned into an embassy. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 10 [12]; *Nasr*, Oct 11)

The New York Times commented that recognition came eight days after it had been asked for, and a week after the State Department had come to believe that the Syrian government was in full control of the country, in order "to let some Arab nations acknowledge the shift first and to explain the action to Abdel Nasser." The US had consulted Abdel Nasser among other foreign leaders before extending recognition and, according to officials in Washington, had succeeded in preserving cordial relations with him. At the same time it had suggested friendliness from the start for the new Syrian leadership. (*NYT*, Oct 11)

On Oct 22 P. Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, arrived at Damascus on a tour of the ME; he was received by PM Kuzbari. (*Nasr*, Oct 23)

On Nov 9 an agreement was signed between Syria and the US concerning the purchase of 100,000 tons of wheat and flour by Syria; the following day a Syrian delegation was to depart for the US to negotiate terms of payment and a loan. (*Nasr*, Nov 10)

TURKEY

Claim on Alexandretta-Hatay. The second conference of the UAR General Federation of Students, which took place in Cairo, included in its resolutions the following paragraph: "The Conference announces that the province of Iskenderun [the Turkish province of Hatay] is an integral part of the UAR and denounces the Franco-Turkish plots which led to the isolation of this usurped province. It also announces that the 1937 plebiscite is null and void." (*MENA*, Feb 11 [14]; compare also *MER* 1960, p 531)

Charges of Turkish Espionage. On Feb 5 two persons were sentenced in Syria to hard labour for life, and a third to 20 years, on charges of espionage for Turkey. (*ANA*, Feb 6 [7]; see also *MER*, 1960, p 332)

On May 9 *MENA* reported that the Syrian security authorities had "arrested members of a spy-net working for the Turkish intelligence" whom it had been pursuing for over a year. Two members of the Turkish Intelligence had been caught in the act of receiving photostats of documents containing military secrets from a retired Syrian officer. This officer had been approached by the Turkish network in Sept 1959, when he was

pensioned off from the army; he had, however, contacted the Syrian authorities and led the alleged Turkish agents into a trap. The two men concerned were reportedly an officer of the Turkish air force, a colonel or a flight-lieutenant according to different UAR sources, by the name of Mehmet Ali Okçu who entered Syria as a diplomatic courier, and Sadi Aktas, of the Turkish Consulate in Damascus. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 11; *Mid. Mir.*, May 13; *Eg. Gaz.*, *Hayat*, May 12)

Turkey protested against the arrest of the Turkish diplomats and asked for their immediate release on the basis of diplomatic immunity. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 11). On May 11 the two diplomats, "having signed confessions, were expelled from the country." The security authorities also arrested a woman, Samihah hint Arslan, who allegedly acted as go-between for the Turks. (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 18). In Sept she was brought to trial before a military court. [No further information was available.] (*Ayyam*, Sept 3; *MENA*, Sept 11 [13])

Border Incidents. [Border incidents, mostly connected with smuggling and infiltration, continued unabated until the end of Sept. (Compare *MER* 1960, p 531). No reports on incidents were however encountered during the last three months of the year. It could not be established whether this was just incidental or perhaps connected with the break-up of the UAR and the establishment of the Syrian Republic, or else with the extreme measures announced by Turkey in Aug in an effort to stop smuggling.]

Following are reported incidents: In March, Turkish forces had killed a Syrian who was attempting to cross the border. (*R. Israel*, March 9 [11]); three Turkish citizens had been wounded in a mine explosion on the border in the Aleppo region (*BBC in Arabic*, March 21-*IMB*, March 22). In April two Syrians had been killed and two injured while removing mines on the border; on the same day a Turkish patrol had shot and wounded a Syrian villager who was removing Turkish mines in the border area. (*ANA*, April 6 [W 13]; an Arab and a Turk had been killed when two mines exploded in the frontier region. (*Mid. Mir.*, April 15); a Turkish border patrol had wounded one of a group of four Syrian smugglers, all of whom succeeded in escaping. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 11); a Turkish patrol had shot and killed a Syrian youth in the Isaz border district—the Turkish authorities expressed regret. (*ANA*, April 15 [18]); two more Syrians had been killed in the frontier area, one by the explosion of a Turkish mine and the other by fire from a Turkish patrol which penetrated, according to the Syrian version, 200 metres inside Syrian territory. (*Mid. Mir.*, April 22). In May the Syrian authorities in Hasake district asked the Turkish authorities for an urgent meeting to discuss the kidnapping by a Turkish patrol of a Syrian farmer. (*ANA*, May 20 [23]); two Syrians had been "blown up" by a Turkish mine while crossing the border into Turkey near Qamishli. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 2; *Mid. Mir.*, June 3). In June it was reported that two Turkish jet aircraft had reportedly violated Syrian air space near the border. (*ANA*, June 1 [3]); seven Turkish infiltrators had been arrested while trying to cross into Syria. (*ANA*, June 1 [3]); and eight Turkish soldiers had crossed the border near Ras al-Ayn and attacked and robbed some cattle dealers. (*MENA*, June 27 [29]). In July it was reported that Syrian security forces had clashed with Turkish infiltrators near the border in the Ayn al-Arab region; the infiltrators withdrew across a minefield, one of them was wounded and captured by the Syrians

(*MENA*, July 6 [8]); two Turkish soldiers had entered the Syrian border village of Nasra and kidnapped two women, but had later been caught by Syrian border guards (*Mid. Mir.*, July 15); the Turkish gendarmes had detained several smugglers in the vicinity of Mardin and Nisib (*Cumhuriyet*, July 10); a Syrian patrol in the Hasake border area had seized a flock of sheep after an armed clash with Turkish smugglers who succeeded in escaping (*Mid. Mir.*, July 22); Turkish soldiers had opened fire at a Syrian patrol north of Aleppo—no casualties were reported (*ANA*, July 30 [Aug 2]). In Aug it was reported that a Turkish patrol had been engaged in a two-hour exchange of fire with six Syrian smugglers: a Turkish soldier was wounded, the smugglers escaped; in another clash a Turkish patrol killed four smugglers and wounded two (their nationality was not mentioned) (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 3, 13); on Aug 18, a Turkish army patrol reportedly penetrated 600 metres inside Syrian territory at Jubb al-Hawsh and seized 24 cows; the Syrian authorities had asked for an urgent meeting with the Turkish border authorities (*ANA*, Aug 19 [22]). In Sept the Syrian authorities announced the arrest of 23 Turkish infiltrators who had been on their way to work in Lebanon; they were committed to trial (*ANA*, Sept 11 [13]); also, a Turk was reported killed and two Syrian children injured by a mine explosion when attempting to cross the border into Turkey. (*Mid. Mir.*, Sept 23)

Joint Meeting Measures To Quieten Border; Cooperation in Combating Locusts. In March Syrian and Turkish officials discussed measures to combat locusts on the border. (*Mid. Mir.*, April 1)

In April, the Governor of Idlib (Syria) asked the Governor of Hatay (Turkey) to remove mines along the border north of Idlib (*ANA*, April 3 [6]). The latter was reported to have said that the Turkish authorities had agreed to the request. (*Nasr*, April 22)

On May 3-4 a meeting between Syrian and Turkish frontier authorities took place on Turkish territory to discuss frontier problems, including the movements of farmers across the border and the removal of Turkish mines. The Governor of Aleppo told reporters that the Turkish side had shown "some good will," but its true value would be proved by their future actions. (*Mid. Mir.*, April 29, May 6; *Cumhuriyet*, May 4, 5)

In July it was reported that the Turkish Army was erecting barbed wire fences on the border near Hfrin, north of Aleppo, in order to stop smuggling. (*Mid. Mir.*, July 8)

In Aug it was reported that about 36 Turkish villages on the frontier would be evacuated and the farmers resettled inland as a precaution against the ever-increasing smuggling in this area. (*Tanin*, Aug 18)

On Nov 9 [after Syria's secession from the UAR] a meeting between Turkish and Syrian border officials was held to discuss border problems. (*Nasr*, Nov 10)

Turkey's Recognition of Syria. Turkey recognized Syria on Sept 29 (*R. Ankara*, Sept 29 [Oct 2]). [It was the second country to do so, the first being Jordan.] Consequently Cairo severed diplomatic relations with Turkey (p. 670).

On Oct 1, after Egypt's rupture with Turkey, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement which based Turkey's recognition on the establishment of full control by the revolutionary forces, on Turkey's need for neighbourly relations with Syria, and on Abdel Nasser's decla-

ration of Sept 29 that unity could not be maintained by force. (*R. Ankara*, Oct 1 [3])

OTHER NON-ARAB ME COUNTRIES

Cyprus recognized independent Syria on Nov 3. (*Nasr*, Nov 5)

Ethiopia recognized independent Syria on Oct 16. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 16 [18])

Iran recognized independent Syria on Oct 2. The official Iranian announcement added its good wishes for the "progress, good fortune and greatness" of the nation and government of Syria (*R. Tehran*, Oct 2 [3]). [Relations between Iran and the UAR were severed by the latter in 1960. (See MER 1960, p. 216 ff.)] In Nov Tehran Radio sent two correspondents to Damascus to report on Syria's "recent stand for freedom." (*R. Tehran*, Nov 12 [W 16]). In Dec Tehran Radio broadcast recorded reports from Damascus criticizing Abdel Nasser's "terrorist regime." (*BBCM*, Dec 6)

Somalia. On Oct 3 the Somali National League-United Somali Party staged demonstrations in support of the unity of the UAR. Demonstrators carried portraits of Abdel Nasser and shouted slogans in his favour and against the Syrian PM, Kuzburi. (*R. Hargeisa*, Oct 3 [5])

ASIA

Ceylon. On Oct 1 it was reported that Ceylon and Syria would shortly sign an agreement according to which Ceylon would purchase 25,000 tons of gasoline from the Homs refinery, to the value of £25m., while Syria would purchase tea and coconuts from Ceylon. (*ANA*, Oct 1 [W 5])

Ceylon was among the last states to recognize the new Syrian regime, on Nov 11. (*Nasr*, Nov 12)

India. According to Cairo, India asked the UAR for a clarification of Abdel Nasser's announcement [of Oct 5] that he would not oppose Syria's admission to the UN. Only afterwards would India decide on the recognition of the new regime. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 8-10, Oct 9)

On Nov 5 the Indian Consul-General delivered to PM Kuzburi the message of his government recognizing Syria and requesting the exchange of ambassadors (*Nasr*, Nov 6). The Consul had previously stated that India had not been tardy in recognizing Syria; the Consul-General in Damascus, during the days immediately following the revolution, had addressed its correspondence to the Foreign Ministry of the Syrian Arab Republic, a procedure which amounted to official recognition. The formal announcement had been delayed due to the absence abroad of the President of India. (*Ayyam*, Oct 23)

In Dec Damascus Radio welcomed the Indian invasion of Goa as heralding a series of uprisings in Asia that would liquidate colonialist territories. (*BBCM*, Dec 20)

Indonesia. On Oct 21 the Indonesian Consul-General at Damascus called on PM Kuzburi to inform him that Indonesian recognition of Syria was delayed by the absence abroad of the Foreign Minister; the delay was of a purely formal nature. (*Ayyam*, Oct 22)

On Nov 6 Indonesia extended recognition; a Foreign Ministry statement issued at the same time said that Indonesia continued to support the idea of Arab unity. (*Nasr*, Nov 7)

LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA

Towards the end of the year it was officially announced that the two countries had decided to raise their diplomatic missions to the rank of embassy. (*Nasr, Dec 31*)

Japan. In April Wajih as-Sammān, Minister of Industry of the Syrian Region, paid an official visit to Japan, where he reached an agreement in principle on Japanese technical aid to Syrian industrial projects and the training of Syrians in Japanese industries and schools. (*Mid. Mir., April 1, 29; Ahram, April 26*)

In July a Japanese fishery expert arrived at Latakia on a technical aid mission. (*Nasr, July 27*)

LATIN AMERICA

Brazil. On Feb 22 a Brazilian delegation, including scientists, businessmen, journalists and officers, arrived in Damascus on a visit to Syria. (*Ahram, Feb 23*)

On Oct 11 Brazil recognized Syria. (*Nasr, Oct 12*)

On Oct 14 PM Kuzbari received Juscelino Kubitschek,

the former president of Brazil, "for a friendly talk." (*Nasr, Oct 15*)

Colombia. On May 31 a Colombian government mission arrived in Aleppo on a 5-day visit to the Syrian Region at the invitation of the Ministry of Agriculture. (*Mid. Mir., June 3*)

Guatemala was among the first states to recognize independent Syria, on Oct 1. (*Nasr, Oct 2*)

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Guinea. President Sekou Touré was reported by Cairo to have replied to a cable from Dr. Kuzbari requesting Guinea's recognition of Syria: "I do not permit you to address a message to me. I consider you a mutineer and a traitor. We will not have any relations save with the legitimate government in Cairo." (*H. Haykal in Ahram, Dec 1*)

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

(Türkiye Cumhuriyeti)

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

SYNOPSIS

In 1961 Turkey experienced the restoration of democratically-elected civilian government, the major aim of the military who carried out the coup d'état on May 27, 1960. Political freedom, however, enabled the re-emergence of the very forces against which that coup had been directed, namely the adherents of the dissolved Democratic Party. The military regime, while keeping faithfully its schedule of establishing the institutions of democratic government, sought to contain these forces, support of which by a large part of the public amounted to a repudiation of the revolution. To this end it also intervened in the formation of the civilian government after the elections.

Political affairs predominated throughout the year, and no progress was made in economic and social affairs. These, however, received considerable attention in the new constitution, with emphasis on comprehensive planning. There was noticeable labour agitation as well as ferment in intellectual circles.

While the government raised civil service salaries and pensions and army pay, labour demands for raising the level of minimum wages were not met. The right to strike and collective bargaining and other labour reforms, which were provided for in the constitution and enjoyed wide support, did not reach the legislative stage. This was also the case with agrarian reform, reduction or abolition of land tax and other measures designed to advance agriculture and better the lot of the peasants.

Of other issues which had occupied attention in 1960, the following developments in 1961 deserve mention. The NUC refused to reinstate the 147 dismissed professors, despite repeated efforts on their behalf by the universities. As to the press, a law was promulgated regulating the distribution of advertisements with a view to eliminating state control through advertising, though some of the newspaper owners argued that the opposite would be the case, and also another law regulating minimum employment conditions for journalists. Some owners closed down their papers in protest. There were a number of temporary newspaper closures by the authorities. In matters of religion, the translation of the Qur'an into Turkish was completed; steps were taken to close down secretly-operating religious schools and to put an end to the activities of the Nurcu sect. The call to prayer (*ezan*) was not changed from Arabic into Turkish, as Gen. Gürel had advocated. He now said he hoped for such reforms to come from the people themselves; this would be brought about by raising the standards of the religious functionaries, to which end a bill was prepared. The new constitution prohibited the exploitation of religion for political and personal benefit or for "even partially basing" the order of the state on religious dogma.

The Martial Law regime imposed in 1960 was prolonged by the NUC every three months and ended on Nov 30 after the formation of the RPP-JP coalition government.

The year opened with the convening, on Jan 6, of the Constituent Assembly in which the Republican People's Party had a vast majority. On the eve of its meeting, a new government was formed under the auspices of the National Union Committee (NUC). The Assembly's agenda was taken up by the formulation of the constitution and the electoral laws, and the budget.

After the Assembly had commenced work, the government lifted, by stages, the ban on the activities of political parties, but the dissemination of propaganda remained forbidden. Some 20 parties appealed for registration. Only four succeeded in recruiting countrywide support, two established parties, the Republican People's Party (RPP) led by İsmet İnönü and the Republican Peasants' National Party (RPNP) led by Osman Bölükbaşı, and two new ones: the Justice Party (JP) led by Reşit Gümpüşpala and the New Turkey Party (NTP) led by Ekrem Alican. The last three parties competed for the support of the members of the dissolved Democratic Party (DP). Among the leaders and cadres of the two new parties there were many former DP members and the parties set themselves up openly as successors to the DP, especially so the NTP. These activities which set the new parties against the military regime occasioned many warnings by the latter, but no drastic action.

Opposition to the regime from DP partisans also continued to manifest itself in other, partly clandestine, forms as had been the case since almost immediately after the coup. There were many arrests and trials on charges of activities and propaganda against the revolution, and also of plots to overthrow the regime; none of the latter were of serious proportions. In May and June the Government conducted a campaign against leftists and Communists and Communism was said to constitute a serious menace to Turkey; this issue, however, soon faded out. Reports of arrests on political charges became less frequent in the autumn and stopped almost completely by the end of the year.

During the year, a shift occurred in the seat of power among the military, from the NUC to the army command. This issue came to a head in June when Lt-Gen. Tansel, commander of the air force, was transferred from this post and subsequently reinstated, under pressure from the air force. There followed a purge in the air force and changes in the army command, including the resignation of the last two NUC members holding active commands. Thereafter it became even more evident that actual power had passed into the hands of the army command, but there were no more overt signs of a struggle for power among the military. The policy of return to

constitutional conditions, as scheduled, remained constant throughout this shift of power. The only known dissenters were the "fourteen radicals" who had been ousted in 1960 and stationed abroad whence some of them now challenged the introduction of the constitutional regime, advocating "social democracy before full democracy."

The new constitution, having been adopted by the Constituent Assembly at the end of May, was given popular approval in a referendum on July 9. The referendum was preceded by a propaganda campaign in which NUC members and political leaders explained the constitution to the people, calling for its confirmation. The JP, however, agitated against the constitution, especially among the peasants, though officially it supported it, and the party was severely reprimanded by PM Gürel for what he maintained were destructive tactics reminiscent of the DP. The referendum was held in a calm atmosphere and the constitution was approved by 6.3m. votes against 3.9 m. The large "No" vote which was especially heavy in western Anatolia, the DP stronghold, was considered as a censure of the military coup.

The new constitution, replacing Atatürk's constitution of 1924, provided for additional checks and balances to safeguard democratic, parliamentary rule; it guaranteed civil rights and liberties in detail, and provided for social rights hitherto unknown in Turkey, such as the rights to collective bargaining, to social security and medical care and also contained a provision for agrarian reform. The state was made responsible for making the social benefits available, in so far as means permitted. In addition to this reservation, it must be remembered that the constitution provided no more than the basis for the implementation of the social rights, as they required special legislation. By the end of the year, this had not yet been introduced.

The constitution provided for a Grand National Assembly consisting of two Houses, a National Assembly (House of Representatives) of 450 members and a Senate of 150 members plus 15 members nominated by the President and 23 members of the NUC as life members. The President was to be elected from among the Assembly members for a term of 7 years.

There remained now three months until the elections to the new Grand National Assembly, a period marked by efforts on the part of the regime to ensure (1) that the sentence passed on the DP regime by the military coup as such be legally approved, and politically endorsed and (2) a smooth transition, with as little political strife as possible, to the future civilian regime.

On Aug 14 the Supreme Court of Justice at Yassıada concluded the trials of the leaders of the former regime and went into recess until Sept 15. This interval was utilized by the regime for convening, on Aug 31, a round-table conference of the political leaders which had been suggested by the press in April. On Sept 3 the leaders of the major political parties—with the exception of the leader of the RPNP which was otherwise represented—in the presence of the NUC and the army chiefs signed a declaration in which they justified the May revolution. They pledged themselves, among other things, not to exploit for political purposes this revolution, religion, the Yassıada trials, the issue of the forests, and Turkish foreign policy; to protect Atatürk's reforms; to oppose extreme leftist and extreme rightist tendencies, and to conduct inter-party relations in a spirit of understanding. They also condemned the fallen DP regime but this section of the declaration was published only after the Yassıada sentences had been pronounced. The press followed up with a similar undertaking of its own.

On Sept 15 the Yassıada court gave its verdict on the case of violation of the Constitution, finding all principal defendants and many others guilty, and passed sentence: 15 of the DP leaders, including Bayar, Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan, were sentenced to death, 31 to life imprisonment, and 418 to prison terms ranging from six months to 20 years. One hundred twenty-three were acquitted and five cases were dropped for insufficient evidence.

The NUC, supposedly under army pressure and in order to justify the coup, confirmed the death sentences against Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan. Pleas for clemency from abroad and from local political leaders proved of no avail; Polatkan and Zorlu were executed on Sept 16 and Menderes the following day. The country remained outwardly calm, all unofficial reporting and comment having been banned.

A week later, on Sept 24, the election campaign was officially opened. In order to restrict the proliferation of minor parties while keeping to the proportional system, the electoral law passed by the Constituent Assembly in May prescribed that only parties with branches in at least 15 provinces and all their districts were qualified to participate in the elections. This condition was fulfilled by the RPP, the JP, the NTP and the RPNP. The last three parties competed for the former DP vote while the RPP was identified, for better or for worse, with the military regime. The aims for which the latter stood, mainly in continuation of the Atatürk tradition, were also endorsed by the academic youth and, it would seem, the majority of the intellectuals. The party platforms were largely identical. They promised economic and social progress in general and benefits to the peasants in particular. It was remarked that only İnönü, the RPP leader, told the people that they were in for bad times and austerity.

The elections held on Oct 15 were completely fair and free, and no incidents were reported. None of the four contending parties won a majority in both Houses. The RPP won 173 seats in the House, the JP 158, the NTP 65 and the RPNP 54 seats, while in the Senate the JP won 70 seats, the RPP 38, the NTP 28 and the RPNP 16 seats. These results were naturally considered a victory for the dissolved DP and a vote of censure against the revolutionary regime.

The next political tasks were the election of the President of the Republic and the formation of a coalition government. Both were accomplished only with the help of pressure by the army, as the outcome of the elections encouraged the extremists in the three successor parties to the DP to take a strong stand. While there seemed to be wide agreement on Gen. Gürel as the only candidate for the presidency, the strong extremist faction in the JP put up the candidacy of Prof. Bağış, an ardent DP partisan. Moreover, the three parties were said to have contemplated a coalition without the RPP, which observers generally agreed was unthinkable as it would constitute a straight return to the overthrown DP regime. There was also agitation for other measures designed to undo the May revolution. At this point the army intervened. The party leaders were summoned by the army chief on Oct 24 and, in their presence, signed a protocol in which they agreed not to consider the reinstatement of the retired officers or an amnesty for the Yassıada convicts, and to elect Gen. Gürel as President.

On Oct 26 the Assembly elected Gen. Cemal Gürel President of the Republic.

It took another three weeks to form a government. As no progress was made President Gürel, using his constitutional prerogative, appointed RPP leader İnönü as

Prime Minister. This appointment made the joining of the coalition by the three other parties no easier as the majority of their followers were İnönü's political enemies. The RPNP categorically refused to join any coalition. The NTP demanded an independent Prime Minister. The JP, the strongest of the three opposition parties, demanded among other things the resignation of İnönü from the RPP leadership and an amnesty for the Yassıada convicts.

Only renewed and very strong pressure from the army command enabled the formation of an RPP-JP coalition on Nov 20 in which the two parties participated on an equal footing. Gümüşpala, the JP leader, declined to enter the government and there was strong opposition inside the JP to the party's step. This was the first coalition government in Turkey's history. On Dec 2 the House gave the government a vote of confidence by 269 votes out of a total 448; four voted against; the others were either absent or abstained. Of the 158 JP Deputies, only 97 voted for the government.

The new government programme emphasized democratic procedure, planned economic development, social benefits, workers' rights, etc. and reemphasized Turkey's loyalty to the western alliance. Both state and private enterprise were to be encouraged.

The programme made reference to efforts to be made towards a "complete healing of the wounds caused by past political strife." This became the standard official reference to the question of an amnesty for the Yassıada convicts, the central political issue in the last month of the year. The NTP and the JP were reported to be preparing legislation for an amnesty. A warning was voiced by a former NUC member that such a measure was liable to cause another military coup, while İnönü said that political tranquillity was essential before an amnesty could be considered.

While the official policy laid down by the military regime thus met with strong opposition from what may be called the conservative camp—comprising the vast majority of the peasants and a good part of the urban population, and well organized in three out of the four major parties—a challenge was posed to it also by the intellectuals, the supporters of the Atatürk tradition. In Dec an influential group, including also former army officers, published a manifesto advocating a "new *etatisme*," a state socialism designed to overcome economic and social stagnation in terms reminiscent of those employed in certain developing states in Asia and Africa, as well as of the pronouncements of certain of the "14 radicals" who had been ousted from the NUC.

By the end of the year the military had reestablished parliamentary democracy in Turkey but had not found it possible to withdraw from politics. The majority of the electorate gave its vote to the opposition. The new government, comprising mutually antagonistic forces, was established only under military pressure. The political situation thus remained basically unstable, while the continued stagnation and lack of clear direction in the economic and social fields gave rise to new pressures.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

The economic pattern established after the army takeover in May 1960 continued throughout 1961. (Compare MER 1960, pp 444-5.) The anti-inflationary policy introduced by the military regime, combined with another year of poor agricultural harvests and a feeling of insecurity engendered by the political situation, caused a general recession in economic activity.

On the positive side the State Planning Organization, established in Oct 1960, started work on a new five-year

plan, and the government succeeded in securing foreign aid needed to cover deficits and for development.

The lack of any marked economic and social progress and the resultant unrest on the part of labour and the intellectuals as yet brought no change in official thinking in these fields. The political problems of transition to a new democratic regime remained predominant. At the end of the year, however, a group of intellectuals and public figures expressed the view that a new form of state socialism (*etatisme*) was needed (see p 576).

National Accounts. National income increased nominally by 5% from £T46,872m, in 1960 to £T49,274m, in 1961, due to the rise of the price level. Real national income remained constant, and real national income per capita declined by some 3% due to population growth and stood at £190 as compared with £200 in 1958. The main change in the composition of national income was the increase in the share of the public sector.

COMPOSITION OF NATIONAL INCOME IN 1961

Agriculture	40%	Wholesale and	
Industry and Mining	16%	Retail Trade	7%
Construction	6%	Government	10%
Transport and Storage	8%	Other Services	13%

The following table summarizes the economic resources that were available to Turkey in 1961 and the use she made of them (in £T m.).

Resources		Uses	
Gross National Product	54,023	Private Consumption	40,190
Import Surplus	1,637	Public Consumption	7,728
		Gross Investment	7,742
Total Resources	55,660	Total Use	55,660

The share of public consumption rose from 12.5% in 1960 to 14% in 1961.

Population and Labour. Turkey's population continued to increase at a rate of 3% per annum, reaching 28.6m. At the same time the slackness of economic activity brought about a contraction in existing employment, and unemployment increased considerably. Some three m. agricultural workers were thought to be underemployed. During the year several thousand workers took up employment in West Germany and this movement was on the increase. (On the political and legislative aspects of labour, see pp 531-2.)

Agriculture. Agriculture, contributing 40% of the national income and affording employment to some 70% of the labour force, was adversely affected by bad weather, even more so than in 1960. Cereals failed; the agriculture net product declined by 3%. Only cotton, hazelnut, sultana and fig yields were above the average.

In the underdeveloped eastern provinces there resulted food and fodder shortages, which necessitated government emergency measures. Because of the poor harvest Turkey, which had latterly been a net exporter of grain, had to import in 1961 more than a million tons of wheat (which she acquired from the US under P.L. 480).

There was a certain increase in the number of tractors and in the consumption of fertilizers, but no significant

ECONOMIC SURVEY

change in the area under cultivation. The main development project in hand was a ten-year plan for the irrigation of 760,000 hectares. (In 1961 the total irrigated area amounted to some 2m. hectares.) This project included the construction of six dams and the supply of drinking water to 1,280 villages. In the 1961/62 budget, the sum of £T350m. (out of a total of £T8,655m.) was allocated for this purpose.

Mining and Industry. The real net product of mining in 1961 was about 3% smaller than in 1960. The number of employees declined by a similar percentage and amounted in 1961 to 65,000.

The output of crude oil was 415,000 tons, i.e. 27% of domestic consumption. Standard Oil of New Jersey announced the failure of its explorations in Turkey during the past five years, and its decision to stop operations.

The real net product of industry did not change in 1961, while that of construction declined by 10%. Steel production rose by 6% and electric energy by 8% while the output of pig iron fell by 24% and of woollen yarn by 23%; paper production also rose.

With the help of US aid counterpart funds, several low-interest credit funds were set up to assist industry, mining and the export of manufactured goods, but the assistance extended was still small-scale. One fund, at the disposal of the Industrial Development Bank, was being used for the purchase of shares—to be resold later—in sound private industrial companies which were in need of additional capital. This scheme was intended as the initiation of a private capital market.

The main new industrial development project was the construction of the steel mill at Ereğli at a total cost of \$250m. (\$170m. in foreign exchange), which was to reach full capacity of 470,000 tons in 1965. US credits for the project amounted to \$129.6m. and there was also an Italian loan of \$10m. Another project was the erection of two tire plants by American companies with participation of local capital and a projected joint annual capacity of 400,000 tires.

Public Finance. The budget for fiscal year 1961/62 (beginning March 1) amounted to £T8,665m., exceeding the previous budget by one-sixth, and constituting about 18% of national income. Some £T6,000m. were allocated to current expenditure and £T2,700m. to development projects. Indirect taxes were the principal source of revenue. Nevertheless, compared to the previous year, direct taxes increased by 28%, whereas indirect taxes declined by 4%, reflecting probably more progressive taxation. Two other sources of revenue were aid from the US (see below) and internal loans (£T450m.).

The government continued to practise an anti-inflationary policy. The banking system contracted credits to the private sector, but at the same time expanded credit to the government.

THE BUDGET (IN £Tm.)

	Ordinary Revenue	
	1960/61	1961/62
Direct Taxes	2,231	2,862
Indirect Taxes	4,150	3,996
Income of State		
Enterprises and Miscellaneous	801	1,807
Total	7,282	8,665

Ministry	Expenditure	
	1960/61	1961/62
Finance ¹	2,310	2,106
Defence	1,238	2,114
Education	943	1,298
Justice, Police and Interior	606	687
Public Works	479	436
Health	352	393
Agriculture	228	346
State Debts	502	656
Miscellaneous	624	619
Total	7,282	8,665

¹ Mainly development expenditure.

The rise in the level of prices was relatively slight:

INDEX OF RETAIL PRICES IN ISTANBUL
(Annual averages, 1957 = 100)

1958	1959	1960	1961	Jan 1961	Dec 1961
112	143	151	155	150	158

Economic Planning. The newly established State Planning Organization worked on a five-year plan for the period 1963–1967, intended to be the first of three successive five-year plans, with the general objective of raising the rate of economic growth from 5% to 7% per annum. The first five-year plan called for investment of some £T60,000m. (\$6,600m.), about two-thirds of it by the government. Meanwhile the Planning Organization prepared an economic programme for the year 1962 for the period of transition into the first five-year plan. This programme called for investment of £T8,436m. (\$937m.), i.e. about 16% of the gross national product; 60% of the programme was to be financed by the government and 40% by the private sector. Public investments were to be directed mainly to industry (£T1,750m.) and agriculture (£T1,200m.), while private investment was to concentrate mainly on housing (est. at £T2,100m.).

The coalition government which came to power in Nov emphasized the high importance it attached to planning; but, by the end of the year, had apparently not yet discussed any of the Board's proposals.

Foreign Trade. Turkish foreign trade in 1961 followed generally the same patterns as in the previous year. Exports rose from \$317.5m. in 1960 to \$347.2m. due to an increase in the sales of tobacco, cotton, nuts and raisins, while export of industrial and mining products decreased slightly. Imports rose from \$463.5m. in 1960 to \$509.5m. There was an unfavourable change in composition; imports of consumption goods, mainly food, increased, while imports of capital goods slightly decreased.

The deficit in the balance of trade amounting to \$162m. represented an increase of 10% over the previous year.

FOREIGN TRADE (IN \$m.)

	1958	1959	1960	1961
Exports	247	335	317	347
Imports	315	443	463	509
Balance of Trade	-68	-88	-146	-162

TURKEY: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

For the direction of trade, in which there was no significant change, see tables, p 82 ff.

Turkey continued to negotiate with the European Common Market, with which she conducted a third of her total trade, for an arrangement similar to that achieved by Greece, her main competitor in the European market.

Foreign Aid and External Debt. Foreign aid (both grants and loans) received by Turkey in 1961 sufficed not only to finance the import surplus and the service of the external debt, but also to increase the foreign exchange balances. Turkey succeeded in mobilizing abroad over \$400m., more than half of this from the US, and the rest from other Western sources. (For details, see tables, pp 77, 80.)

Turkey's external debt outstanding at the end of 1961 amounted to \$1,240m. and annual payments on account of the debt to \$125m., i.e. more than one-third of Turkey's total exports.

Standard of Living. The following figures furnish some indication of the standard of living.

Items	Year	Rate
Life expectancy	1950/51	48 years
Daily food consumption per capita	1959/60	2,830 calories 91 gr. protein
Doctors (including dentists)	1960	0.4 per 1000 inhabitants
Radio receivers	1961	53 per 1000 inhabitants
Telephones	1961	9 "
Passenger cars	1961	1.8 "
Railway passenger-kilometres	1961	133 per capita
Energy Consumption (kg. of coal)	1961	229 "
Pupils	1961	13% of population
Illiterates	1957	65% "
Newspaper copies	1961	45 per 1000 inhabitants

CURRENT AFFAIRS UNDER THE NUC ADMINISTRATION

THE GOVERNMENT

New Cabinet Before the Opening of the Constituent Assembly. On Jan 4 President Gürsel accepted the resignation of the cabinet. The resignation—officially a matter of form prior to the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly—was believed to be designed to permit the appointment of a new cabinet from members of the House, where the RPP had an overwhelming majority. Sıtkı Ulay, the Minister of Communications and NUC member, had tendered his resignation two days earlier, "in order to enable the Head of State to select a more suitable Minister of Communications from among the members of the Constituent Assembly." (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, Jan 3, 5)

The NUC also decided that from the date of the formation of the Constituent Assembly, no NUC member would occupy a cabinet post. (*R. Ankara*, Jan 5 [7])

The new cabinet was formed the day after the resignation, on the eve of the opening of the new Assembly. Gürsel retained the premiership. The new cabinet included 18 ministers, of whom 12 had been members of the former government and continued to occupy their former posts (see table of government). Of the six new ministers, four were members of the Assembly: Prof. Turhan Feyzioğlu (RPP)—Education; Cihat Baban (RPP)—Press, Broadcasting and Tourism, which had again become a Ministry (see MER 1960 pp 427, 442); Ahmet Tahtakılıç (RNP)—Labour; and Orhan Mersinli (independent)—Communications. The other two new ministers were Ekrem Tüzemen, judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal, as Minister of Justice, and Lt-Gen. Muzafer Alankuş, as Minister of Defence. No NUC member was in the new cabinet except Gürsel, and the post of Deputy PM, previously occupied by NUC member Fahri Ördilek, remained vacant. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 6)

Minister of Reconstruction Replaced. Prof. Fehmi Yavuz, the Minister of Reconstruction and Settlement, who had been a member of the cabinet since the May revolution, resigned on Feb 2, "in order to be free to deal with basic and important problems of the whole country." [He re-

turned to the university of Ankara as professor of town-planning.] (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 3)

On Feb 6 Rüstü Özal was appointed in his place. Özal, an engineer, a former mayor of Konya, served as a DP deputy from 1954 to 1957. On the eve of the 1957 general elections he left the DP and joined the RPP. From 1957, he served as SG of the Association of the Chambers of Architects and Engineers. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 7)

Resignation of Feyzioğlu. Prof. Turhan Feyzioğlu, the new Minister of Education, resigned on Feb 6, reportedly because of the reluctance of the NUC to take any positive steps to solve the problem of the 147 dismissed university professors (see p 524 b). Ahmet Tahtakılıç, the Minister of Labour, was appointed acting Minister of Education. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 7)

Appointment and Resignation of Kızıloğlu. On Feb 4 Gen. Gürsel appointed Muharrem İhsan Kızıloğlu, Minister of the Interior since the May revolution, as Deputy PM and Minister of State. Nâzir Zeytinoğlu, Minister of State, became Minister of the Interior. [Kızıloğlu was the only army officer (retired in Aug 1960) who took part in the May coup and entered Gürsel's first cabinet without being a member of the NUC.] (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 5; *Times*, Feb 6)

On Feb 28 Kızıloğlu resigned from the cabinet. It was reported that his resignation had been generally expected in spite of his recent new appointments. He had been involved in a number of controversial statements and, it was believed, had incurred the displeasure of influential NUC members and in particular of some of the senior officers surrounding Gürsel. He had also been in conflict with leading RPP figures in the Constituent Assembly (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*; *NYT*, March 1). Kızıloğlu was later appointed Ambassador to the Vatican. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 16)

Ördilek, Ulay, Talas Return to Cabinet. On March 2 Gürsel announced the reappointment of NUC member

THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY

THE GOVERNMENT

Ministry	Dec 24, 1960	Jan 5, 1961	Changes to Nov 20	Nov 20, 1961	Party
PM	Cemal Gürsel	Cemal Gürsel	Fahri Özdilek, acting, Oct 26	İsmet İnönü	RPP
Deputy PM	Fahri Özdilek** (NUC)	—	Ihsan Kızıloğlu, Feb 5–Feb 28; Fahri Özdilek Mar 2; Sıtkı Ulay, June 27	Akif İyidoğan	JP
Defence	Hüseyin Ataman (Later RPNP)	Muzaffer Alankuş	Fahri Özdilek, June 27	İlhami Sancar	RPP
Foreign Affairs	Selim Sarper (Later RPP)	Selim Sarper	—	Selim Sarper	RPP
Interior	Ihsan Kızıloğlu	Ihsan Kızıloğlu	Nasir Zeytinioğlu, Feb 5	Ahmet Topaloğlu	JP
Justice	Amil Artuş	Ekrem Tüzemen	Kemal Türkoğlu, Aug 16	Sahir Kurutluoğlu	RPP
Finance	Kemal Kurdaş	Kemal Kurdaş	—	Şefik İnan	RPP
Education	Bedrettin Tuncel	Turhan Feyzioğlu (RPP)	Ahmet Tahtakılıç (RPNP), Feb 6	Hilmi İncesulu	RPP
Public Works	Mukbil Gökdoğan	Mukbil Gökdoğan	Sıtkı Ulay, acting, Aug 21	Emin Paksüt	RPP
Economy and Trade	Mehmet Baydur	Mehmet Baydur	—	Ihsan Gürsan	JP
Health and Social Welfare	Ragıp Üner	Ragıp Üner	—	Suat Seren	JP
Customs and Monopolies	Fethi Aşkın	Fethi Aşkın	—	Şevket Bulatoğlu	JP
Agriculture	Osman Tosun	Osman Tosun	—	Cavit Oral	JP
Communications	Sıtkı Ulay (NUC)	Orhan Mersinli	—	Cahit Akyar	JP
Labour	Mehmet Reşit Beşerler	Ahmet Tahtakılıç (RPNP)	Cahit Talas (NTP), March 2	Bülent Ecevit	RPP
Industry	Şahap Kocatopçuoğlu	Şahap Kocatopçuoğlu	Kemal Kurdaş, acting April 14; Ihsan Soyak, May 2	Fethi Çelikkbaş	RPP
Reconstruction and Settlement	Fehmi Yavuz	Fehmi Yavuz	Rüştü Özal (RPP), Feb 6	Muhittin Güven	JP
Press, Broadcasting and Tourism*	—	Cihat Baban (RPP)	Sahir Kurutluoğlu (RPP), Sept 1	Kamuran Evliyaoğlu	JP
Minister of State	Hayri Mumcuoğlu (Later NTP)	Hayri Mumcuoğlu	Adnan Erzi, Aug 25	Turhan Feyzioğlu	RPP
Minister of State	Nasir Zeytinioğlu	Nasir Zeytinioğlu	Sıtkı Ulay, March 2	Avni Doğan	RPP
Minister of State	Fahri Özdilek** (NUC)	—	Fahri Özdilek March 2–June 27	Necmi Öktem	JP
Minister of State	—	—	—	Nihat Su	JP

* This was again turned into Ministry in Jan 1961.

** Also holds other portfolio(s).

Fahri Özdilek as Deputy PM and Minister of State and of NUC member Sıtkı Ulay as Minister of State; the two had been cabinet members until Jan 4. Ahmet Tah-taklı, the Minister of Labour and acting Minister of Education, was appointed Minister of Education. As Minister of Labour, Gürsel appointed Prof. Cahit Talas, a founding member of the NTP, who had occupied the same post in Gürsel's first cabinet until Aug 1960 (MİR 1960, pp 441-2). (*Cumhuriyet*, March 3, 4)

Resignation of the Minister of Industry. On April 14 the Minister of Industry, Şahap Kocatopçuoğlu, resigned and was appointed managing director of the new steel plant (*Cumhuriyet*, April 15). The post was offered to Behçet Osman Ağaoglu, vice-president of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, but he declined on the ground of his existing obligations (*Cumhuriyet*, April 22). On May 2 İhsan Soyak, managing director of the Ereğli coal mines, was appointed Minister of Industry. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 3)

Resignation of Minister of Defence. Muzaffer Alankus, the Minister of Defence, resigned on June 27, in the wake of the Madanoğlu affair (for which see pp 555-6). His place was taken by Fahri Özdilek, the Deputy PM. Sıtkı Ulay became Deputy PM. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 28)

Minister of Justice Resigns. On Aug 15 Ekrem Tüzemen, the Minister of Justice, resigned on the grounds of fatigue.

The following day Gürsel appointed in his place Kemal Türkdoğan, a public notary of Istanbul and a member of the House of Representatives, on behalf of the NUC; Türkdoğan stated that his outlook was completely non-political and that he would return to his private affairs after the elections. (*Ulus*, Aug 16, 17; *Times*, Aug 16)

Minister of Public Works Resigns. Mukbil Gökdoğan, the Minister of Public Works, resigned on Aug 21, officially because of a heart condition. Sıtkı Ulay, Deputy PM, was put in charge of the Ministry. (*Hür Vatan*, Aug 21, 22)

Resignation of Mumcuoğlu. Hayri Mumcuoğlu, Minister of State, resigned on Aug 23. On Aug 23 Prof. Adnan Erzi, former professor of history at Ankara University and vice-chairman of the Department of Religious Affairs, was appointed in his place. Mumcuoğlu joined the NTP two days before his resignation. (*Ulus*, Öncü, Aug 24, 26)

Resignation of Cihat Baban. The Minister of Press, Radio and Tourism resigned on Aug 29, on the grounds of his election to the RPP central executive council and his desire to continue political activity. Several papers alleged that he had been "excluded from office" by Gen. Gürsel as he had improperly allocated a sum of £430,000. Another paper wrote that he had rarely seen eye to eye with the NUC and the Director General of his own department. The paper welcomed his resignation, as his ministry controlled the radio and it was essential that on the eve of the elections the radio should be under non-partisan control.

However, Baban's replacement, Sahir Kurutluoğlu, a lawyer, was also a member of the RPP executive. Kurutluoğlu, it was reported, was known for his brilliant defence of many of the journalists who had been brought to trial by the former regime. (Öncü; *Kudret*; *Ulus*, Aug 30, Sept 3; *Milliyet*, Aug 30)

Cabinet Resignation Withdrawn. On Sept 18 the whole cabinet tendered its resignation but withdrew it the fol-

lowing day. The resignation was believed to have been directly related to the executions of Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan which had taken place on the two previous days. *Cumhuriyet*, however, reported that the resignation was intended to make way, on the eve of the elections, for the formation of a Cabinet of independents. Gen. Gürsel told the press that on the eve of the elections his colleagues had wanted to give him a free hand to form a cabinet on which he could rely. He had told them however that he relied on them entirely, and they had withdrawn their resignation. (*Cumhuriyet*; Öncü; *NYT*, Sept 19, 20; *Times*, Sept 19)

The Future of the Revolutionary Government Ministers. The impending handing-over of power to civil authorities gave rise to the question of the future of those ministers who had served under the NUC, insofar as they did not join political parties or were not elected to the Assembly. It was suggested in Aug that they be awarded the highest possible pension, but this was widely opposed in the Constituent Assembly (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 12). The solution was found in foreign service appointments.

On Oct 25 it was reported that two former ministers, Mehmet Baydur and Fethi Aşkin, had been appointed ambassadors to Bonn and Mexico City respectively. (*Hürriyet*, Oct 3; *Milliyet*, Oct 26)

The Transfer to Civilian Government. Following the election of Gen. Gürsel as President of the Republic on Oct 26, Gen. Fahri Özdilek, the Deputy PM, was nominated acting PM. The new civilian government headed by İnönü was formed on Nov 20. For particulars, see pp 571 ff.

THE ARMY

NUC Improves Service Conditions. On March 1 a law came into force increasing the salaries of army personnel. [Figures on the old salaries were not available.]

The new monthly basic salaries for officers ranged from £T400 for a 2nd lieutenant to £T2,000 for generals. Colonels would reach the top of their grade with a salary of £T2,000 after three years' service. Generals would receive monthly allowances of £T250, £T500 and £T750, according to rank.

NCOs' monthly salaries ranged from £T350 for a sergeant to £T600 for a senior sergeant-major. Senior sergeant-majors would be promoted one grade every three years up to four times, which would provide for a maximum monthly salary of £T1,250 (grade 4), the same as senior major.

The pay of conscripts, who served for two years, was raised from 31 kuruş to £T5 a month; private soldiers were to receive monthly pocket-money of £T10, corporals £T15 and sergeants—£T30.

The *Times* correspondent wrote on the service conditions of the conscripts: "Though their pay is small, they are fed, clothed, housed, get a packet of cigarettes every two days, have free bus rides, and sometimes are given free cinema tickets. The Turkish soldier usually looks healthy and contented, and is probably in many ways better off than he would be in his village. It is being increasingly recognized, however, that conditions in the army are still somewhat primitive... A campaign was launched two years ago, with American aid, to teach recruits to read and write and 120,000 soldiers—half of the entire annual intake into the army—are being taught in this way." During 1961, 13 new schools for teaching conscripts to read and write were opened in various provinces. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 2, Feb 9, 11, 16, 24; *Times*,

Feb 17; *R. Ankara*, Feb 23 [W, March 2]; *R. Ankara*, Sept 25, 27, 28 [W, Oct 5]

The NUC also decided to establish an insurance institute for army officers, as from March 1961. The officers would pay 10% of their salary to the institute and the money would be used to build army shops and houses for the officers and to finance studies for officers' children. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 6)

Question of the Retired Officers. On Jan 8, it was announced that the appointment of pensioned officers by the NUC would end on Jan 15; after that date, they would have to submit applications directly to the departments concerned. (*R. Ankara*, Jan 8 [W12])

At the beginning of the year, the officers retired in July-Aug 1960 (see MER 1960, p 443) established the Association of the Retired Officers of the Revolution (*Emekli İnkılâp Subayları Derneği*, abbreviated: *Eminsu*).

On April 4, a delegation of *Eminsu* was received by PM Gürsel and Cen. Özdelek, Deputy PM. The head of the delegation later said they had told Gen. Gürsel that they were ready to serve if the state and army were in need of them (*Cumhuriyet*, April 5). Some days later, NUC spokesmen made it clear that there were no prospects of such reinstatement. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 8)

In April the *Eminsu* branch in Izmir denounced the retired officers in Istanbul who had accepted jobs as foremen, asking whether they were in such dire need that they had to take such employment. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 14)

On April 16 the association opened its first general congress in Ankara. On April 26 its new directorate published a communiqué stressing that *Eminsu* was determined to continue its efforts to ensure the reinstatement of those officers who wanted it (*Cumhuriyet*, April 17, 19, 21, 27). In another communiqué, in Aug, reiterating this demand, *Eminsu* said that the retired officers were awaiting the elections and felt certain that the new government would restore their rights (*Son Havadis*, Aug 19). This communiqué was the cause of the closure of the *Eminsu* Ankara branch by court order on Sept 6. Maj-Gen. Sıtkı Ulay, Minister of State, told the press that the Martial Law authorities must have had some reason for this step. "It is their concern. We do not interfere with the decision of any Court of Law."

The independent *Milliyet* commented that although the official aim of *Eminsu* was mutual assistance, the association had resorted to all possible measures in order to have the Army Rejuvenation Law revoked. In normal times, the paper said, this would perhaps have gained sympathy but immediately prior to the general elections, when the political parties and press were endeavouring to forestall unpleasantness, the association should have acted accordingly. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Ulus*; *Kudret*; *Milliyet*, Sept 7, 8)

The Ankara *Eminsu* branch was permitted to resume activities as from Sept 13. (*Cumhuriyet*, Sept 14)

In Oct lots were drawn for the distribution of 956 newly-built flats for retired officers. The latter contributed £T20m. (\$2.2m.) and the Estate Credit Bank £T16m. towards the project. (*R. Ankara*, Oct 9 [W12])

New Key Appointments to General Staff. In Jan following the appointment of Gen. Muzafer Alankus, C-in-C Land Forces, as Minister of Defence, the following appointments were announced: Lt-Gen. Celâl Alkoç—C-in-C Land Forces; Lt-Gen. Muhtit Onur—Second CCS; Lt-Gen. Refik Yılmaz—GOC Third Army, and Lt-Gen. Şefik İter—GOC Second Army. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 18)

On June 19, following the reinstatement of Lt-Gen. Tansel (see the Madanoğlu-Tansel Affair) and the retirement of several high-ranking officers, the following appointments were made: Lt-Gen. Şefik İter—member of the Supreme Advisory Council of National Defence; Lt-Gen. Muhtit Onur—GOC Second Army and acting C-in-C Land Forces; Rear-Adm. Necdet Üran—C-in-C Naval Forces. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 20)

In Aug Maj-Gen. Memduh Taşman was appointed Second CCS, Lt-Gen. Onur—C-in-C Land Forces, and Maj-Gen. Zeki İter—CCS Land Forces. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 6)

Following the promotions of Aug 30, Maj-Gen. Celâl Erikan, representative at CENTO, was retired and Lt-Gen. Ziya Komut appointed in his place. Lt-Gen. Ali Keşkiner, GOC Ankara garrison, was appointed also GOC Second Army. (*Türkisch Press*, Sept 1, 2)

Agricultural Training in the Army. In Jan the Ministries of Defence and Education introduced a joint programme for agricultural instruction for servicemen. 16 training centres were to be established and courses began on Jan 23 in two centres in Ankara. (*R. Ankara*, Jan 22 [W 26]; *Cumhuriyet*, Jan 23)

Promotions of Officers. In Aug a list of new promotion was published. There were reportedly 4,161 officers and 3,898 NCOs awaiting promotions (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 15-17; *Öncü*, Aug 15). 3,675 officers were promoted. Among the 15 Generals promoted—of all three services—were Lt-Gen. Muhtit Onur, C-in-C Land Forces, to the rank of General of the Army; Rear-Adm. Necdet Üran, C-in-C Naval Forces, to the rank of Vice-Adm.; Maj-Gen. Refik Tulga, Governor of Istanbul, to the rank of Lt-Gen.; Brig-Gen. Sıtkı Ulay, Minister of State and member of the NUC, to the rank of Maj-Gen. Other NUC members promoted were: Col. Mücüp Ataklı—to Brig-Gen.; Lt-Colonel Suphi Karaman, Ahmet Yıldız, Refet Aksoyolu, and Emanullah Çelebi (Navy)—to Col.; Maj. Suphi Cürsöytrak, to Lt-Col.; Capt. Kamil Karavelioğlu—to Maj. (*Türkisch Press*, Aug 26-30)

Women Officers Demobilized. A Defence Ministry statement of Sept 11 said that in view of the legal status and physical conditions of women officers and cadets, and in consideration of Turkey's social structure, women would be posted to auxiliary services and exempted from military exercises, training, and guard duties. Women officers already in the service would be demobilized and become civil servants. Women cadets would continue their education as civilian students on Defence Ministry scholarships. Those who would not accept this arrangement would have to repay the cost of their education.

Commenting, *Milliyet* stated that one would have wished to see Turkish women fulfilling their patriotic duties in the ranks of the armed forces, as in many modern countries. Though it was natural that women officers would not be given front-line duties, the paper believed that there was a great deal of service that women could give in the rear to a modern, mechanized army. (*R. Ankara*, Sept 11 [W21]; *Milliyet*, Sept 14)

The Future of Army Officers in Civil Service. About 120 army officers who had been transferred to civil service, especially in the provinces, after the coup d'état, were asked by the NUC before the general elections if they wished to return to the army or to be pensioned off according to Law No. 42 (see MER 1960, p 443). By Oct 19 the NUC had confirmed the retirement of gene-

als in the civil service. Other requests from lower-ranking officers were still under discussion (*Cumhuriyet*, Oct 20). [No further details were available.]

THE UNIVERSITIES AND ACADEMIC YOUTH

Insufficient Accommodation in Institutions of Higher Learning. [Turkey was facing three inter-linked problems in the field of higher education: (1) insufficient facilities to accommodate the numerous graduates who wished to obtain higher education; this problem became a major issue at the end of 1961; (2) the lack of hostels for students, especially those coming from the provinces, though several provinces had built hostels for their students in the university towns; (3) the growing demands to establish universities in the provinces in order to solve problems one and two and to increase local cultural prestige.]

In Feb popular demands were heard from provincial capitals such as Edirne, Eskişehir, Diyarbakır to establish universities with the assistance of the universities of Ankara and İstanbul. In Diyarbakır [S.E. Anatolia] the university was to bear the name of Ziya Gökalp [b. 1875, Diyarbakır; d. 1924, sociologist and theoretician of Turkish nationalism], in the hope that the Turks would support the establishment of a university bearing this name.

Siddik Sami Onar, Rector of İstanbul University, said that the major problem was not one of more universities but of the emphases in education; the country was in urgent need of physicians, pharmacists, dentists and chemical engineers and these studies he would suggest for Edirne University. There was, however, no need of additional chairs in archaeology, and employment prospects for graduates must also be taken into consideration. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 13, 18, May 17)

During the year the government took several decisions on university expansion. In May, it was decided in principle to establish a university in Edirne, under the auspices of İstanbul University, to open in the following academic year. A faculty of medicine and schools for dentists and chemists were to open first. A chair of economics was also contemplated. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 17; *R. Ankara*, Nov 4 [W9])

In Aug the House of Representatives endorsed a bill on the establishment of a school of sciences at the Aegean University [İzmir] (*R. Ankara*, Aug 16 [W 24]). Other government measures to alleviate the problem of lack of space included the granting of 165 scholarships for studies abroad and permission for 250 students to study abroad at their own expense. (*R. Ankara*, Sept 2 [W 7])

Yet, when the new academic year opened in Nov, many hundreds of students found the universities closed to them for lack of space. These students held silent demonstrations in Ankara and İstanbul between Nov 2-8, carrying banners which read: "We want to study," "Is this the struggle against ignorance?" "What was the purpose of the revolution?" On Nov 2 the İstanbul demonstrators started on a march to Ankara but the police managed to persuade them to turn back. On Nov 8 they mobbed Prof. Onar, Rector of İstanbul University. Ahmet Tahtakılıç, Minister of Education, stated that every possible measure was being adopted to solve the problem, including the introduction of evening classes at the universities, and the opening of new universities and technical institutes. [There were, however, no reports of any immediate practical steps having been taken to admit more students.] (*Cumhuriyet*; *Hürriyet*; *Yeni Gün*, Nov 3-9; *Times*, Nov 7, 9)

Regarding student accommodation, the government de-

cided in Feb to encourage private building of hostels (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 14) and in Aug the Constituent Assembly endorsed a bill under which loans would be provided for needy students, and modern hostels would be built by the government. (*R. Ankara*, Aug 10, 16 [W 17, 24]; *Yeni Gün*, Aug 11)

Students' Organizations, Various Activities, Unification. The two students' organizations: the Turkish National Students' Union (*Millî Türk Talebe Birliği*) and the National Students Federation of Turkey (*Türkiye Millî Talebe Federasyonu*) voted for unification at their general congresses, but refrained from implementing this resolution. Efforts in this direction had begun following the May revolution and were supported by the NUC. According to *Cumhuriyet*, the reasons for this move were the spirit of national unity and the wish to put an end to political exploitation of the organizations.

The Turkish National Students' Union held its 45th general congress in Jan and April in İstanbul. It approved of the merger. The elections were contested by "two cliques": an "anti-idealist clique" defeated "the idealists" and Özer Gürbüz became chairman.

The National Students' Federation of Turkey held its 16th general congress in İstanbul, attended by 130 representatives of six unions, including those of İstanbul and Ankara Universities, and three independent associations. This congress also accepted the merger proposal, but was mainly concerned with the election of a chairman. The two initial candidates, both RPP supporters, failed to obtain the 3/5 majority, as a number of delegates desired a politically-neutral chairman. The congress chairman took the opportunity to warn the political parties against interfering with youth organizations, as was the case under the former regime. Finally, however, Kemal Kunoğlu, the candidate of the Ankara University Students' Union, was elected, although a RPP supporter.

The NUC followed closely the efforts to unite the two organizations. In May and July several students' associations warned the executives of the union and the federation that if they did not bring about the unification they would themselves take the initiative. [Nonetheless, the merger was not carried out during 1961], reportedly owing to differences between the two organizations and to internal dissensions in the Union. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 17-23, Feb 10, March 14, 17, 21, 23, 24, April 18, 19, May 21, 22, July 15)

Activities of the Youth Organization. In April, the Turkish National Youth Organization (*Türkiye Millî Gençlik Teşkilatı*), held its tenth annual congress in İstanbul. The following youth associations sent delegations to the congress: the National Students' Federation [but not the National Students' Union], the Turkish Women's Union (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*), the Boy Scouts' Union of Turkey (*Türkiye İtçiler Birliği*) and the Turkish Revolutionary Clubs (*Türk Devrim Ocakları*). (*Cumhuriyet*, April 24-5)

In June the Organization joined in the campaign for the new Constitution, calling on the public to approve it in the July 9 referendum. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 26)

During Nov 17-24 a seminar on the role of young women in a changing world was held in İstanbul under the auspices of this organization and of the "World Youth Organization," attended by representatives of 18 countries. (*R. Ankara*, Nov 12 [W 16]; *Cumhuriyet*, Nov 18)

The Problem of the 147 Dismissed Professors. [Through-

out 1961, efforts continued, but to no avail, to secure reconsideration of the case of the 147 professors who had been dismissed on Oct 27, 1960 in accordance with a special law issued by the NUC (see MER 1960, p 446). The case remained a major issue in the Turkish press throughout the year.]

On Jan 5 it was reported that the NUC was discussing a bill which would enable the 147 to be reinstated, but the next day it was reported that the NUC had decided to delete the bill from its agenda. This report caused disappointment in university circles. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 6, 7)

On Jan 14 this issue was discussed in Istanbul by the rectors of the Turkish universities, Prof. Siddik Sami Onar (Istanbul), Prof. Suut Kemal Yetkin (Ankara), Prof. Fikret Narter (Istanbul Technical University), Prof. Mustafa Uluöz (Izmir) and representatives of the universities' senates. They addressed a memorandum to the Minister of Education, which reportedly emphasized the great need for teachers in the universities and the interruption in scientific research caused by the dismissals and called for a review of said law by the Constituent Assembly. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 15, 17, 18)

The resignation, on Feb 6, of Prof. Turhan Feyzioğlu, Minister of Education, after only one month in office, was believed to have been caused by the reluctance of the NUC to reinstate the 147. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*; *NYHT*, Feb 7)

On Feb 18 the 147 published a communiqué, claiming they were suffering from injustice and that there had been no connection between them and the Menderes regime. They expressed their trust that the Constituent Assembly would deal with their problem (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 19). The next day students of Ankara University published a communiqué claiming that the law dismissing the 147 had infringed upon the universities' autonomy, [the NUC issued this law and the University Autonomy law on the same day, Oct 27, 1960], calling for guarantees of non-interference with academic freedom. They demanded the revision of the law and so did the National Students' Federation of Turkey, two days later. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 20, 23)

On Feb 20 Deputy PM İhsan Kınaloğlu told the press that only the Constituent Assembly had the power to change the law, but if it did so it would also find itself bound to reconsider the law according to which the army officers had been pensioned off. He said that if mistakes had been made, they must be accepted as one of the risks of the revolution. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 21)

On Feb 24, the matter was discussed in the Constituent Assembly when several deputies, in the debate on the budget of the Ministry of Education, attacked the Ministry for doing nothing to settle it. They stated that the reasons for the dismissals were unknown, that the universities' autonomy had been violated and that the universities were in urgent need of professors. Dr Muammer Aksoy, member of the constitution committee, said that the law dismissing the 147 was anti-democratic, whilst Prof. Bahri Savcı, member of the constitution committee, claimed that the scientific world was "following with suspicion the [developments regarding the] Turkish universities," and added: "Our universities' prestige must be saved and the Turkish nation expects this from you [the government]." The Minister of Education answered: "Our government has taken no decision in principle on this subject... This is true. These are my last words on this subject as Minister of Education of the NUC government. It is the predestination (*takdir*) of the Assembly not to take a decision in this matter." (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 25)

At a press conference on March 2 General Gürsel asked the universities not to regard the problem of the 147 as a question of self-respect, adding that the law was passed by the revolutionary government, a fact impossible to ignore. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 3)

On March 8 and 9 Prof. Sami Onar and Prof. Fikret Narter told the press that no new appointments would be made to the positions held by the 147, except in the faculty of medicine [Istanbul University]. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 10)

On March 10 one and a half months before the day on which, according to law, the 147 would be automatically pensioned off, they published a statement demanding that the government make known its attitude and grant them the right of defence in case the law remained in force (*Cumhuriyet*, March 11). There followed more statements by the Minister of Education as well as by the 147 and a meeting between the rectors of Istanbul University and Istanbul Technical University with Fahri Özdilek, the Deputy PM, but no change in the official attitude was discernible. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 14, 15, 16)

On March 29, following a request by the 147, Gen. Gürsel received a delegation of their representatives. Later they told the press that Gen. Gürsel had promised to deal with this matter personally. Following upon two more meetings with members of the government and the NUC, the 147 issued a statement expressing the hope that their problems would soon be satisfactorily settled. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 30, 31)

About this time, Mün Küley, member of the House of Representatives, drafted a bill to permit the reinstatement of the 147. To be submitted, this bill required the signature of one NUC member [which apparently was not forthcoming]. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 5)

After having discussed the problem of the 147 in the presence of Gen. Gürsel, the NUC issued the following announcement on April 13: "Comments likely to arouse doubts in the public mind about the application of Laws 114 and 115 [the dismissals law and the university autonomy law] are being encountered in the press and in various circles. It has therefore been considered necessary to inform those concerned that the laws in question will be applied as they are." University circles and the 147 reacted sharply, declaring that they would continue their fight until the problem was settled. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 14, 15, 17)

Meanwhile, a proposal that the 147 establish a private university was supported in the Constituent Assembly by a professor, who demanded that the new constitution permit the opening of private universities in general. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 19, 22)

In April, 24 of the 147 were appointed to the civil service, four of them to diplomatic posts abroad. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 25, 26, 28, 29)

In May the Minister of Education told the press that of the 147, 12 had been pensioned off, 42 had been given posts in the Ministry of Education, several had been appointed to other ministries; the government would establish in Istanbul a scientific and technical research centre which would provide employment openings for the others. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 9)

In Aug the issue came up again when over 100 members of the House of Representatives submitted to the NUC a bill for the revision of the dismissal law (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 12). [This bill, too, could not be submitted to the Assembly, as it failed to receive the required signature of one NUC member.]

Following the general elections of Oct 15, it was reported that the government was preparing a bill for the

reinstatement of the 147. [By Dec 31, none of the 147 had yet been reinstated, nor had any such bill been submitted to the Assembly.] (*Kudret*, Nov 4; *Cumhuriyet*, Nov 5; *R. Ankara*, Nov 18 [W23]; *Ulus*, *Öncü*, Dec 22)

RELIGION—GOVERNMENT MEASURES

Until Oct 1961, when power passed into civilian hands, the NUC and the government continued their efforts to separate religion and politics, to stop any religious activity contrary to the law, to reorganize the Directorate of Religious Affairs and to advance and modernize religious education. The new constitution prohibited the exploitation of religion for political or private benefit.

Courses For Religious Functionaries. *Cumhuriyet* reported that a Committee established to "save our religion" from functionaries without adequate schooling, had decided to open courses for preachers (*khatib* and *vaiz*) and muftis in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Erzurum and Konya. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 25)

Issue of the Call for Prayer in Arabic (see also MER 1960, pp 447-8). At a press conference on March 2, Gen. Gürsel was questioned on the proposal to change the call to prayer (*ezan*) from Arabic to Turkish, as had been the case under the Republican Party regime. He replied: "This is not the time to discuss this question. The path we are following is such that the day will come when, because of the enlightenment of our people, the demand for the recitation in Turkish of the call for prayer and of the Qur'an will come from below, from the people themselves... We are preparing the relevant organizations and training the necessary elements in such a way as to ensure that our people are trained and prepared in this way." (*R. Ankara*, March 2 [4]; *Cumhuriyet*, March 3)

The chairman of the club (*fikir kütübü*) of the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara, issued a proclamation in support of the statement and the call for prayer in Turkish and called for discussion of this problem in the Constituent Assembly. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 8)

New Head for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanı*). At the beginning of April, Hasan Hüsnü Erdem was appointed Head of Religious Affairs [a government department] in place of Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, who retired for health reasons.

Erdem, born in 1889 in Akseki [S.W. Anatolia], was a religious scholar who worked as a teacher of Islam and Turkish in high schools until 1944, when he was appointed member of the Religious Affairs Advisory Committee (*Diyanet İşleri Müşavere Kurulu*). (*Cumhuriyet*, April 8)

Following his appointment, he said that he favoured the translation of the Qur'an into Turkish (see MER 1960, p 448), that he would quickly prepare the new Organization Law (see below) and would endeavour to improve the living conditions of religious functionaries. The standard of learning in the Supreme Islamic Institute and the Faculties of Theology and *İmam-Hatip* schools would be raised and persons of higher education would be appointed to the offices of mufti. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 10)

NUC Charged with Intent of Religious Reform. During April-May, while the Constituent Assembly discussed the new constitution, several pamphlets and articles were published which discussed an alleged intention on the part of the NUC to carry out religious reform. An article

by deputy Kardinian Kalfı caused an uproar in the Assembly; several deputies accused Kalfı of using religion as an instrument of political propaganda and demanded his resignation. To prevent incidents, Kalfı was ushered out by Assembly members.

A 55-page brochure by Osman Nuri Çerman discussed a bill for religious [Islam] reform, allegedly prepared on behalf of the NUC and the Constituent Assembly.

[The NUC and the government reacted by denying any intention of religious reform and stating their support for Islamic institutions.]

On May 17 the Premier's Office issued a statement, which said that freedom of worship was guaranteed; religious training would be given government protection and support, in line with other educational institutions; Muslim functionaries would enjoy the same rights as civil servants; the educational and cultural standards of imam and preachers' schools and other higher theological institutes would be raised; the public could rest assured that the state intended to provide all the necessary facilities for the free functioning of religious institutions.

A spokesman for the NUC again denied on June 23 that a religious reform bill was being prepared or that "our religion would be replaced by Atatürkism, that the call to prayer in Turkish would be made obligatory, that carpets would be removed and rows of seats placed in mosques as in churches, etc. All this is evil, perverted and mendacious propaganda designed to create doubts in the public mind... [and] antipathy against the great Atatürk. Çerman's brochure has been confiscated and he is being prosecuted... previous statements show the sincerity of the NUC, the House of Representatives, and the government on the subject of religion." (*Cumhuriyet*, May 15, June 24, July 27; *R. Ankara*, May 18, June 23 [May 20, June 26])

Bill for Reorganization of Religious Affairs Department.

In July the government submitted this bill to the Constituent Assembly. It included the following provisions: (1) the establishment of a supreme council for religion (*Yüksek Din Kurulu*) under the chairmanship of the head of religious affairs and comprising the following members: four heads of offices in the Religious Affairs Department, Dean of the Faculty of Theology, Ankara University, Director of the Supreme Islamic Institute, representatives of the Universities' Council, of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces HQ, head of the personnel department (PM's Office), secretary of the State Development Office, two members to be elected by the Council itself, two advisors. The Council would convene once a year, but the chairman had the right to call extraordinary meetings; (2) the establishment of a council to study problems of Islamic religious law (*Şer'i meseleler Danışma Kurulu*), to examine problems of worship and belief and the civil law of wills and inheritance; (3) the establishment of a Directorate for Religion and Schools of Theology (*Din ve Meshep Müdürlüğü*), to prevent differences of opinion and to examine immediately any movement or propaganda under the guise of religion; (4) the grading of the muftis and preachers according to their education; (5) the improvement of working conditions and salaries of religious functionaries; (6) the opening of courses for advanced studies for religious functionaries; (7) the setting-up of a committee for religious services in every province by the local director of waqfs. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 22-July 8)

Issue of the Çarşaf (see MER 1960, p 448). One of the

regulations published in July by the Governor of Istanbul on the behaviour of citizens in the main streets, gardens and other places frequented by tourists, forbade the wearing of the *garaf* in these localities. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 25)

Gürel Against Arabic in Islam (see MER 1960, p 449). In an interview with Iraqi and Pakistani journalists in Aug, Gen. Gürel said that for the development of Muslim countries it was essential that the religion of Islam should first be rescued from enslavement to the Arabic language. Islam, he said, was dynamic, but the Muslim peoples were lazy and lethargic, mainly because they were unable to understand the Qur'an in Arabic. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 25)

Translation of the Qur'an (see MER 1960, p 448). In Nov 20,000 copies of a translation of the Qur'an into Turkish were issued in Istanbul; another 30,000 were to follow. The translation was the work of two professors of the Faculty of Theology at Ankara University and was reviewed by a committee of five graduates of the Supreme Islamic Institute in Istanbul. The Arabic text appeared alongside the Turkish text. This was obligatory for any officially-sponsored translation of the Qur'an, since, according to Muslim theology, the Qur'an was communicated verbally from heaven to Muhammad in the Arabic language, and only an Arabic text could be authentic. (*Times*, Nov 23)

RELIGION—ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES

Secret Religious Schools Closed. Though schools for the study of the Qur'an (*mekteb*) had been forbidden since the introduction of the secular state by Atatürk, a few continued to operate secretly. These schools had been raided from time to time by the police, even under the Menderes government—which was more favourably inclined towards Islam—but only in Jan 1961, the first time since the days of Atatürk, was a government order issued instructing provincial governors to close these schools "immediately" and to initiate appropriate legal proceedings. (*Times*, Jan 10)

In March the Konya province authorities closed 48 "schools teaching Arabic" [*mekteb*] in villages in the Doğanhisar district and registered there for state schools more than 800 pupils aged 8–14. In several villages the citizens attacked the state school teachers and about 150 persons were detained and brought to trial (*Cumhuriyet*, March 13). At the same time, about 40 such schools and 14 "Qur'an courses" were closed down in the town of Tutugulu [Izmir province] and surrounding villages. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 15)

Nurcu Sect Activities (see MER 1960, p 439). *Cumhuriyet* reported from Konya that following the granting of permission to organize political parties, the Nurcu sect was renewing its activities. These were followed closely by the local security authorities. For instance, on Jan 30 15 members of the sect came from various places to Konya to follow the trial of six of its members who had been arrested in Jan 1960. After the trial they held a meeting with local Nurcu members and then left for Antalya. The same day, the Konya authorities arrested a man for making propaganda for the sect in his restaurants and cafés and distributing books by Saidi Nursi, the sect's founder. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 1)

In April, 13 persons were arrested in a village in Denizli province for performing the *Nurcu* *âyin* [rite]; books and pamphlets by the sect's founder were found in their houses. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 18)

The sect continued clandestine activity, distributing Nursi's writings and propaganda pamphlets, while its leaders kept in touch with each other and met to co-ordinate activities.

In Aug the government launched a major campaign against the sect. Large-scale arrests of its members took place in the following provinces: Ankara, Istanbul, Kütahya, Eskişehir, Afyon, Urfa, Gaziantep, Isparta, Konya, Adana, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Balıkesir, Kayseri, İnönü, Nazilli, Maraş and Antalya.

Fifty to eighty of the detainees were said to belong to the sect's leadership. Searches in private homes and bookshops produced large quantities of books and pamphlets, a printing press and a tape-recorder with records of meetings of the sect's leaders. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 3, 5, 6, 7)

On Sept 8, 11 members of the sect were arrested in Istanbul. (*Cumhuriyet*, Sept 9)

Sentences For Utilizing Religion as Political Instrument. On Feb 25 an Istanbul court sentenced the owner of the magazine *Hür Adam* to three years' imprisonment and one of its managers to one and a half years' imprisonment for publishing political propaganda in their magazine and using religious affairs as an instrument in this propaganda. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 26)

Society for Promotion of a Religious Regime. The Martial Law authorities revealed on Aug 8 that they had arrested in Çengelköy [Istanbul] 13 persons who had established a secret society which aimed at basing the state's political, social and judicial systems on religious [Islamic] principles. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 9, 10; *Kudret*, Aug 9)

Nakşibendi Sect Activities. In Feb it was revealed that two months after the May 27 revolution, a Nakşibendi [Sufi mystic sect] Shaykh from Konya had smuggled ten children, aged 12–15, from villages in the Konya area over to Syria [for Islamic studies?]. The Shaykh was supported by a former DP member of the Grand National Assembly for Konya, who had studied in Al-Azhar and whose father was a *mürîd* [disciple in an order of dervishes] of the Shaykh. The children returned from Syria after having been discovered by the Turkish Consul there. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 27)

Cumhuriyet reported on March 24 on a trial held in Istanbul of several members of the Nakşibendi sect, accused of performing the *âyin* [rite] of the sect in a house in Eyüp [Istanbul]. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 24)

On the night of June 19, 42 members of the sect were arrested while performing the Nakşibendi *âyin* in a private house in Eyüp [Istanbul]. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 21)

Other Sufi Sects' Activities. On July 16, ten persons belonging to the Halveti Tarîqah [a Sufi order] were arrested in Arnavutköy [Istanbul] for performing the Halveti *âyin* [rite] in a private house which they had turned into a Dervish monastery (*tekke*). Among those arrested was Mehmet Emin Güvener, who claimed to be the Shaykh of the Tarîqah. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 18)

THE RURAL POPULATION

Adult Education. In 1960 the Ministry of Education, within the framework of the campaign against illiteracy, opened adult schools in the provinces; they were attended by 24,876 pupils according to official figures. In Jan such schools were opened in villages in the Erzurum province. The number of such schools in Istanbul province

was expected to reach 423 by Feb 15, 238 of them in villages.

The governor of Konya, the local director of education and the teachers jointly decided to convert [sic] the town's coffee houses—some 150—into evening People's Schools (*Halk derhanehi*) as of March 20. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 1, 16, 28, March 13)

The Turkish Cultural Society. In Dec the first congress of the Turkish Cultural Society, founded in Aug 1960, was held in Ankara in the presence of President Gürel and PM İnönü. The Central Committee reported that it had established 76 branches (*Cumhuriyet*, Dec 3). (In Nov 1960, it was stated that 115 branches had already been formed; an aim of the Society was "to take the Turkish Intellectual to the Turkish village." See MER 1960, p 449.)

The Deported Ağas (see MER 1960, p 450). On Jan 20 it was reported that investigations against one of the Ağas who had been resettled in Denizli were completed and he was sent to prison. [No more details were available.] (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 21)

In Aug it was reported that lands owned by the 55 deported Ağas in the provinces of Mug, Mardin and Erzurum, would be distributed among the peasants evacuated from the southern border areas which had been mined to check smuggling. (*Milliyet*, Aug 23)

On Nov 6 Talât Ögüz, RNP deputy from Mardin, told the press that he had prepared a bill calling, in the name of democracy, for the abolishment of the Law of Compulsory Settlement, according to which the 55 Ağas had been deported. An independent daily commented that it was a joke to speak of the freedom of the individual when the peasant was still a vassal of the Ağa in the feudal East. "Democracy becomes the tool of exploiters when a man such as Mahmut Makal, who gave a true picture of Turkish villages in his book 'Our Village,' (*Zaim Köy*, İstanbul 1950; *A Village in Anatolia*, London 1954) is denied a passport to travel to England, but a Deputy and Ağa is allowed to hold a press conference in defence of feudal conditions." (*Milliyet*, Nov 7, 8)

In Dec it was reported that about 100 deputies from the four political parties had joined Ögüz in preparing his bill. In view of this development, the PM's office had ordered the completion of all legal procedures against the 55 Ağas [no further details were available]. (*Cumhuriyet*, Dec 9). *Milliyet* again attacked the proposed bill. (*Milliyet*, Dec 11)

Various Plans For Agricultural Progress. In Jan the students of the Agriculture Faculty, Ankara University said they had submitted questions to their teachers on how to advance Turkey's agriculture, and from the answers they had prepared a report which they had sent to the NUC and the Ministry of Agriculture. The main points in the report were: (1) all peasants to be taught to read and write; (2) the system of agricultural credits to be reformed; (3) the country to be divided into agricultural zones; (4) agricultural products to be enabled to compete abroad; (5) "producing organizations" to remain non-political; (6) sufficient "agricultural technicians" to be prepared; (7) soil erosion to be prevented; (8) the army to be employed in afforestation; (9) a land reform to provide every peasant family with land sufficient for its subsistence and ensure the employment of modern agricultural methods. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 10)

On Feb 24 the Agricultural Engineers' Chamber said they had prepared a basic agricultural programme which

also discussed the urgent need for land reform, and a reform in agricultural methods in order to ensure the food supply for Turkey's growing population. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 25)

[All political parties advocated the advancement of the peasants and improvement of agricultural methods. See also the proposal for a "new *Etatisme*," p 576.]

The Question of Agrarian Reform. Article 37 of the new Constitution made it obligatory for the government to adopt measures for efficient utilization of land, to provide land for farmers with no or insufficient land, and to assist farmers in acquiring agricultural implements. Article 38 gave the state the right to expropriate lands—for distribution to peasants and other purposes—for which payment in instalments with interest must not exceed ten years. Payment for land expropriated, worked by the farmer himself and indispensable for his upkeep, must be made in advance. (For sources, see: The Constitution.)

On June 1 *Cumhuriyet* reported that an agrarian reform bill had been completed and would be submitted to the House of Representatives on June 15. The bill had been in preparation since the revolution. The bill, to be implemented with American aid, provided for the distribution of land to 600,000 farmers who would pay for it in instalments over ten to twenty years. £21,000 millions yearly would be allocated in the budget for the implementation of this bill (*Cumhuriyet*, June 1). [No such bill had been discussed in the Assembly by the end of the year.]

On June 19 *Cumhuriyet* reported that the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement was speeding up the inventory of treasury lands—at first in the eastern and south-eastern provinces—which would be allocated to farmers with no or insufficient land. Land distribution had been stopped pending the completion of the inventory. The Minister said that the government land distribution—in accordance with the Land Law of 1945—had not yielded the results expected. According to the new Agrarian Reform Bill, every farmer would receive land producing at least ten tons of wheat or an equivalent crop. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 19)

Question Of Taxes on Peasants. (On the question of income taxes on peasants see MER 1960, p 441.)

[In the election campaign all political parties called for the reduction or abolition of the land tax.]

In Nov eight RPP deputies drafted a bill for the abolishment of the Land Tax on the basis of the argument that such a measure would greatly increase the farmers' purchasing power (*Ulus*, Öncü, Nov 5). The abolition of land tax for agricultural land was included in the İnönü government programme published on Nov 27. (*Cumhuriyet*, Nov 28)

THE PRESS

Suspension of Newspapers. On Dec 30, 1960 the political magazine *Oy* was banned indefinitely, its contents having been found to be "prejudicial to the national interest." Proprietor Ali Duran, editor-in-chief İlhan Bardakçı and two editors were taken into custody. (*R. Ankara*, Dec 30, 1960 [Jan 2, 1961])

On March 23 the Ankara daily *Öncü* was suspended indefinitely for distorting Gen. Gürel's answer at a press conference on March 22, with the aim of creating an atmosphere of unrest in the country. It represented Gürel as saying that the officers retired from the army in Aug 1960 and the 147 university professors dismissed from their posts in Oct 1960, were among the subversive

elements which the NUC had purged. Gürel denied this personally. This was the second time that *Öncü*, which was closely linked with the New Turkey Party, had been closed down since the May revolution (see MER 1960, p. 459). (*R. Ankara, March 23 [25]; Cumhuriyet; Times, March 25*)

Öncü was to resume publication from April 7. (*Cumhuriyet; Times, April 6*)

The Ankara daily *Yaman* was suspended for seven days from July 29, for publishing on July 24, 25, 26, a series of articles with banner headlines: "Illegal Wealth and Gains Revealed," "The Position of the State Radio" and "Incorrect Accounts Will be Found Out Sooner or Later," which caused harm to the national interest. (*Cumhuriyet, July 29*)

On Nov 10 and 14 three newspapers were suspended: the Istanbul daily *Son Havadis* (an unofficial organ of the extreme pro-Menderes wing of the Justice Party), the Ankara daily *Öncü* (a supporter of the NTP) and the Ankara Weekly *Zafer Miletindir* (a supporter of the JP), for publishing articles against the national interest [no details were given].

The *Times* correspondent wrote that the rest of the press, which in the days of Menderes was highly sensitive to the suspension, even for a few days, of the most insignificant journal, had made almost no mention of the indefinite closing down of these papers. Following the formation of İnönü's government on Nov 20 the papers were permitted to reappear. Kamuran Evliyaoğlu, the new Minister of Press, Radio and Tourism, told the press that he disapproved of the closing down of newspapers. (*Cumhuriyet; Uluş, Nov 11, 15, 21, 22; Times, Nov 11, 16*)

Trials of Journalists. On Feb 25 the owner and manager of the *Hür Adam* magazine were sentenced to three years and one and a half years' imprisonment respectively, for using religion as a tool in their political articles. (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 26*)

(On the trial of the editor and a journalist of the Istanbul daily *Tanin*, see p 545 b.)

New Press Laws. (On press laws enacted by the NUC, see also MER 1960, p. 452.) On Jan 4, two days before the convention of the Constituent Assembly, the NUC issued two new press laws which were published on Jan 10 in the Official Gazette.

The Intellectual Workers Law (*Fikir İşçisi İş Kanunu*) laid down minimum employment conditions for working journalists and stipulated that henceforth employment contracts were to specify the work and pay and provide for seniority allowances. The law provided for payment of compensation in the event of cancellation of contract, and other stipulations protected the workers' rights in the event of sickness and termination of appointment through suspension of publication. Journalists also became entitled to paid leaves and holidays, overtime pay, regular promotion and the settlement of their disputes by labour courts.

The Advertisement Law (*Başın Reklam Kanunu*) provided for the establishment of a 32-man steering board consisting of 15 journalists, eight independents (professors and lawyers) and nine government representatives to control distribution to the press. State advertisements were to be distributed only via the board; private advertisers could resort to the board if they so wished. The board would receive a commission of 10% on official and 15% on private advertisements and give not less than 5% of its profits to the newspaper trade unions. The

board was empowered to suspend or withhold advertising for three months if it considered the standard of the paper's contents unsuitable.

The owners of nine Istanbul daily newspapers suspended publication for three days from Jan 11 in protest against these laws. On Jan 10, eight of these papers—*Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Dünya, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Tercüman, Yeni İstanbul* and *Yeni Sabah*—published a joint declaration, in which they argued that the advertisement law was undemocratic because it effected a type of state control of the press through the steering board, while the workers' law was unnecessary and would only serve to confuse employer-employee relationships and create mistrust. The new laws, the owners claimed, would "undermine basic press rights and liberties."

A spokesman for the NUC said that the owners had declined repeated invitations to discuss the new laws while they were in preparation. The Ankara Radio commentator added that the state's right to control the press has been entirely eliminated, as proved by the composition of the advertisement steering board.

Other Turkish newspapers, including the whole of the Ankara Press, condemned the action taken by the nine owners. The Federation of the Journalists' Trade Unions of Turkey, the Ankara Journalists' Trade Union and the Ankara Newspaper Publishers' Association cabled the nine owners as follows: "The fact that you have decided to stage a three-day boycott upon the enactment of the law ensuring the rights of the intellectual workers who are employed in your establishments, and from whose labour you have made fortunes, while you did not resort to any similar action even in the days of the ousted rulers who gambled with the fate of the country... has merely revealed to the public your psychological decline and your domineering mentality... your clamour that the press is being placed under tutelage is due to the legal recognition of the rights of the intellectual workers who until now were doomed to your exploitation... we hope your common sense will triumph over your commercial mentality..."

The intellectual workers staged silent demonstrations on Jan 10 in Ankara, Istanbul and İzmir in support of the NUC and the new laws. Students in Istanbul bought a number of newspapers which they tore in pieces and burned. Debates on the new laws continued in the press and at workers' meetings for some days and then the issue began to fade out of the news. (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 8; Turkish Press Jan 10-15; R. Ankara, Jan 9, 10 [11, 12]; Times, Jan 11-13*)

The steering board was established in May and was to start distribution of advertisements on June 1. Private advertising would be uncontrolled. (*R. Ankara, May 25 [26]*)

At the end of June, the board stopped the distribution of official advertisements to four Ankara daily papers (*İnkılâp, Karar, Medeniyet* and *Mücadele*) because they had not complied with the advertisement law. The four newspapers appeared on July 1, with the decision in banner headlines, and were distributed gratis. (*Cumhuriyet, July 2*)

Ahmet Emin Yalman. On Jan 31 Yalman left *Vatan* which he had edited for 21 years, having been outvoted at a stockholders' meeting, after prolonged struggle for control of the paper (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 1; Times, Feb 2*). [Later, with some members of the *Vatan* staff he opened a new paper in Istanbul called *Hür Vatan*.]

[Ahmet Emin Yalman, one of the best-known Turkish journalists and author of books on modern Turkey, was

born in 1889, studied at the Istanbul Law School and Columbia University where he obtained the Ph.D., and began his career as a reporter in 1907. He also served as associate professor of sociology at Istanbul University. In 1940 he became part-proprietor and editor of *Vatan*. As a protagonist of the freedom of the press, he went to gaol or into exile five times for this cause.]

On May 28 the International Federation of Newspaper and Magazine Publishers awarded the first "Golden Pen of Freedom" to Yalman. The Federation president, Tommaso Astarita, said that Yalman appeared in the eyes of the world as a symbol of the suffering which the Turkish press had to endure in its fight for freedom. (*Cumhuriyet*; *NYT*, May 30)

The Press Proposal for Round Table Conference of Political Parties and Press Agreement not to Discuss Certain Matters During Election Campaign, see pp 556-8.

WORKERS AND TRADE UNIONS

In 1961 there were in Turkey 483 trade unions with 418,300 members.

293 unions with 204,883 members were affiliated to the Confederation of the Workers' Trade Unions of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*, abbreviated: *Türk-İş*). The Confederation was composed of (1) 11 trade federations (*Mesleki Federasyonlar*), which comprised 181 unions with 135,791 members; (2) 11 regional associations [of various trades] (*Makallı Birlikler*) which comprised 100 unions with 48,832 members; (3) two "type trade unions" (*Tipi Sendikalar*), one of oil workers and the other of miners with 12,000 members; (4) ten unions affiliated directly to the Confederation, with 8,269 members. (*Türkiye Yılı*, 1962)

Unions Promote Study of Kemalism. The Eskişehir Turkish Revolutionary Club [such clubs were established in 1952 to safeguard Atatürk's reforms] and the local trade unions jointly organized a series of seminars in the town. At the first of them, the Atatürk seminar held on Jan 8, professors and trade union leaders lectured on Kemalism. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 9)

Support For Constitution. The Türk-İş Confederation decided on April 21 to vote "Yes" in the referendum on the Constitution as it guaranteed collective contracts and the right to strike. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 22)

Workers Support the Regime; Demonstration Against Subversive Activities. On May 20 the Federation of the State Railways Workers' Unions organized a meeting in Eskişehir, attended by thousands of workers, to protest against subversive activities. Banners displayed inscriptions such as: "Our principles are food, peace and freedom," "welfare, freedom from fear and liberty for the workers," "the workers who built the homeland are the army which defends it" "their beads were crushed, let us crush their tails" [*Kuyruk*, meaning DP partisans]. Union leaders expressed the workers' support for the government and their wish for freedom and democracy, denounced subversive activities by DP partisans and also expressed themselves against totalitarianism, Communism and reaction. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 21)

Protest Gatherings Against Dismissal of Workers. [On the rising unemployment, see p 518 b.] The Istanbul Workers' Unions Association (*Istanbul İşçi Sendikaları Birliği*) held a protest meeting on Jan 15 against the dismissal of workers by many factories and institutions during the

previous six months. The workers' representatives in the House participated. Banners on the walls proclaimed: "Employees, don't encourage unemployment," "there is no unemployment insurance and the worker's lot will be misery," "permanent work—not promises and advice." Speakers demanded the right to strike. A deputy promised that the workers' representatives in the Assembly would endeavour to incorporate guarantees for the workers in the new constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 16)

More protest meetings were held on Jan 22 in Istanbul by 300 glass workers, who had been dismissed, and in Izmir by the Trade Unions' Association against the dismissals, and on March 1 by 450 workers dismissed by Ankara municipality. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 23, March 2)

Civil Service Salaries Raised. On Jan 20 the government approved a 35% rise in salary for civil servants, of which 20% would be paid as from March 1, 1961 and 15% as from Feb 1, 1962. (On pay increases in the armed forces, see p 522 b.) The increase was provided for in the 1961-62 budget. Pensioned civil servants were to get a 25% increase by stages during 1961. The Assembly, however, decided to raise the pensions also by 35%. The new rates came into force as of March 1. The lowest grade (14) now received £T360 as compared with £T300 before, and the highest grade (1) £T2,400, as compared with £T2,000 (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 21, 24, 26, Feb 4, 17, 18, 21, 27)

In June the government decided to amend the Pension Fund Law in favour of the civil servants. (For particulars, see *Cumhuriyet*, June 16.) [No further reports were seen on this topic.]

Demand For Higher Wages. In Jan agitation began for higher wages, encouraged by the forthcoming increase in civil service pay. [The Ministry of Labour was empowered by the Labour Law to establish minimum wages.]

The General Congress of the State Railways Workers' Unions held in Eskişehir on Jan 29 was dominated by this issue. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 30)

In Feb Bilâl Şimşek, SG of the Textile Workers' Federation, pointed out that as of March 1 the lowest salary of a civil servant would be £T360 a month as compared with minimum wages of about £T180-240 a month for workers, and there were workers who received only £T100 a month (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 26). In March the Federation asked the government to raise the wages of all workers by 25%. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 10)

On March 23, at a press conference, representatives of the Ankara Workers' Trade Unions Association demanded a 50% increase in wages, 20% of which would be deducted for savings bonds. [Such deductions from wages had been made for some time.] They sharply criticized the authorities for deduction from the workers' wages for savings bonds without raising wages. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 24)

Two days later there was a meeting on this issue of representatives of the Istanbul Workers' Trade Union Association, with the participation of the governor of Istanbul, Refik Tulga, and union representatives in the Constituent Assembly. The latter were attacked for inactivity on this subject. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 26)

On April 8 the chairman of the State Railways Workers' Federation told the press, that the workers demanded a minimum increase of 40%. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 9)

On April 16 the chairman of Municipal Workers Trade Unions Federation told the press that the 60,000 municipalities workers demanded a 30% salary increase. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 17)

Government Non-committal. On April 20 Prof. Cahit Talas, Minister of Labour, told a correspondent that the raising of the people's standard of living was a main object of the revolutionary government, which was giving priority to a review of the minimum wages frozen since 1957. He added, however, that economic considerations, the state of unemployment and the views of the employers must be taken into account. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 21)

On June 24 the Minister of Industry declared that prices would be lowered and industrial wages raised. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 25)

The Arbitration Council; Resignation Workers' Representative. [In May?] Halil Tunç, SG of the Türk-İş Confederation, resigned from the Supreme Arbitration Council (*Yüksek Hakem Kurulu*). [Arbitration of labour disputes was compulsory under laws passed before the May revolution. Disputes not settled by direct negotiations were referred to provincial arbitration boards and, on appeal, to the Supreme Arbitration Council composed of two representatives each of employers and employees, a representative of the Ministry of Labour and a judge of the Court of Appeal.]

Tunç said he resigned because the Minister of Labour was attempting to influence the Council which was an independent institution. "My sole wish," he said, "is that our teacher, Prof. Cahit Talas, put into practice as a Minister what he has taught us as a teacher." (*Cumhuriyet*, June 5)

Earlier, on May 30, Talas in a press interview denied that the resignation would make the Council suspect. He said that the council was completely independent. One hundred thirty eight work disputes had been submitted to it since the beginning of 1960; in 98 cases, the final decision was in favour of the workers and on 92 occasions the decision had been unanimous. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 31)

Talas on Social Justice, Unemployment. Speaking on social justice in the above-mentioned interview, the Minister of Labour said it meant the prevention of poverty, an equitable distribution of the national income, "between the human and material factors of production," and the establishment of reasonable work conditions in accordance with human dignity and honour. "The need of the day is to socialize the state, i.e. to protect the economically weak." Therefore, he said, the state "is obliged if necessary" to intervene in the economic and social life of the masses in order to establish amongst them "freedom from anxiety, harmony, social peace and understanding." "Social justice," he added, "is the base of this peace."

Unemployment. The Minister said, was temporary. Social progress was closely connected with economic realities. The revolutionary regime had stabilized prices and undertaken to secure the true value of wages. The 1961 budget, the largest in Turkey's history, would help to secure work for everyone by granting money to various development schemes. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 31; *R. Ankara*, May 31 [W, June 8]; *R. Ankara*, June 6 [8, W 15])

Labour Legislation. [Following the Assembly approval of the new constitution, which included provisions for labour rights including the rights to strike and to collective bargaining (see p 549 b), the government began to prepare appropriate bills, but none of them reached the discussion stage in the Assembly by the end of the year.]

Labour agitated mainly for laws granting the rights to strike and to collective bargaining. There was also to be an amendment of the basic Labour Law of 1936 (Law

No. 3008 of June 8, 1936, as amended by Laws No. 3516 of June 28, 1938, and No. 5518 of Jan 25, 1950.)

In April the Minister of Labour said that his Ministry was preparing several labour bills in line with the provisions in the constitution, to be submitted to the Assembly after the referendum on the constitution: a bill on the right to strike; a trade union bill which would correct many points which had been the subject of complaint and enable the unions to develop democratic organization; and an amendment of the Maritime Labour Law [No. 6379 of March 10, 1954] in favour of the crews. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 21)

On June 2 the government submitted to the Constituent Assembly the Trade Unions' Bill, amending the law of 1947 [No. 5018 and Law No. 5518 of Jan 1950.] It was reported that the Assembly would debate the bill on June 8 [but by the end of the year, it had not yet done so.] (*Cumhuriyet*, June 3)

On June 9 the Minister of Labour told the Istanbul Chamber of Industry: "The employers must know this: within two years, the workers will be granted the right to strike and there will be collective bargaining." (*Cumhuriyet*, June 10)

Bill on the Right to Strike. In mid-July *Cumhuriyet* reported that the bill on the right to strike had been drafted. Strikes and lockouts would be forbidden in the civil service, municipalities and state enterprises, in time of mobilization or state emergency, under martial law, in works controlled by the Ministry of Defence, in communication services, the information service, radio and television, medical services, life- and property-saving occupations, water, electricity and gas works, flour mills and bakeries. If a strike or a lockout was liable to threaten state security, health, the economy or social order, representatives of government, workers and employers would meet to discuss the matter, and report their conclusions within 20 days to the PM; within 15 days, the government would decide whether the strike or lockout may continue, or be suspended or prohibited.

A decision to strike would have to be approved in secret vote by at least 75% of the workers in the place of work concerned, and to be reported to the local labour official and the Ministry of Labour; a strike or lockout decision could be implemented only 30 days after these reports were made; during this period the Ministry and the Supreme Arbitration Council would endeavour to prevent their taking effect. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 15)

Several trade unions rejected the draft bill claiming that the constitutional right to strike should be unconditional and accorded to all workers in every place of work. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 19)

[The bill had not been submitted to the Assembly by the end of the year.]

Workers' Requests from the New Government. On Nov 23 the Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions of Turkey issued a communiqué containing ten requests to the İnönü government: (1) all state and municipal employees who had been dismissed since the revolution without reason, as well as those who had been transferred to different fields of employment, should be returned to their former positions; (2) the new trade unions law should be the first item on the government's agenda; (3) the law on the rights to strike and collective bargaining should be passed immediately; (4) the Labour Law should be revised; (5) agricultural workers should come under the Labour Law; (6) an unemployment insurance scheme should be established; (7) retirement pay should be raised; (8) the granting of housing

facilities for workers should be seriously considered; (9) the Ministry of Labour should be provided with funds for social assistance; (10) deduction from wages for savings bonds should be stopped and sums hitherto deducted should be repaid. (*Ulus*, Nov 24)

In Ankara, Izmir and Zonguldak workers' demonstrations took place, especially of workers employed in state enterprises. They complained that wages were low and often held back and demanded the right to strike and collective bargaining. (*Milliyet*, Dec 4)

The new Labour Minister, Bülent Ecevit (RPP), told the press on Dec 3 that laws on the right to strike and collective bargaining would be submitted to the Assembly, and the Trade Unions' Law and Labour Law would be amended. The Ministry, he said, must be reorganized in keeping with economic and social change and its budgets increased. He also said the government would improve and supervise standards of occupational safety throughout the country and had decided to exempt workers from the obligation to buy savings bonds. He assured the workers that the government believed in social justice strongly enough to consider these matters without having to be reminded of them by various demonstrations. (*Ulus*; *Öncü*, Dec 4)

Miners' Wages Increased. On Dec 27 the government decided to raise the wages of some 40,000 miners as from Jan 1, 1962. The daily wage of miners working underground was to be raised from £T6. to £T8.5 and of those working above ground from £T6 to £T7.5 (*Cumhuriyet*, Dec 28)

Workers' Mass Protest Meeting. On Dec 31 workers from Istanbul and neighbouring provinces held a mass meeting in Taksim Square in Istanbul; estimates of the number of participants varied from 25,000 to 100,000. The speakers and the banners called for social justice, and the right to strike, and collective bargaining. One speaker stressed that the workers fully supported the new Minister of Labour, Bülent Ecevit.

The labour leaders originally asked for permission for a silent march after the meeting, but this was refused. The authorities took security precautions, including the transfer of army units to Istanbul, but the meeting was conducted in an orderly manner. (*Milliyet*, Dec 21; *Cumhuriyet*, Dec 26-31; *Turkish Press*, Jan 1, 1962)

Turkish Workers to West Germany. In autumn 1960, the German Federal Republic began to recruit workers in Turkey for German industry. At first, the German Consulate in Istanbul dealt with the applications, but when the number of applications grew, a German government commission was set up in Istanbul.

On Oct 30 Turkey and the GFR signed an agreement providing that the Turkish workers would receive the same conditions and benefits as the Germans. The Turkish Minister of Labour said that the supply of workers to Germany would eventually provide Turkish industry with well-trained manpower. Before the agreement was signed, about 7,000 workers had already gone to Germany. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 26, June 13, July 17, Aug 13, Nov 1, 2; *Times*, July 3)

POLITICAL PARTIES

POLITICAL PARTIES AUTHORIZED; NEW PARTIES ESTABLISHED

Political Parties Allowed; Appearance of New Parties. The ban on party activities dating from the day of the coup (May 27, 1960) was partially abolished as from Jan 13, 1961. It was permitted to establish new parties and to alter existing party statutes.

The parties were allowed to set up branches at provincial and district levels but neither in villages nor in sub-districts, as had been provided in a law of July 8, 1960 (see MER, p 444). Party statutes would have to be submitted to the authorities within one month. Propaganda was forbidden. (*R. Ankara*, Jan 12 [14]; *Ulus*, Jan 13)

Up to Feb 13, 20 parties applied for registration. The party programmes were not published, being considered political propaganda. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 16)

Parties Registered. Below is a list of the parties which registered with the authorities. Only the first four, however, actually participated in the ensuing political struggle. Details on internal developments in these four, as well as in some other parties, are given under separate headings below:

1. *The Republican People's Party*, led by İsmet İnönü;
2. *The Republican Peasants' National Party*, led by Osman Bölükbaşı;
3. *The Justice Party*, a new party, led by Rağıp Gü-müşpala;
4. *The New Turkey Party*, a new party, led by Ekrem Alican;

5. *The Homeland Party*;
6. *The Republican Professional Improvements' Party* (*Cumhuriyetçi Mesleki İslahat Partisi*), led by Salih Adil Başaran, economist, who said that he had considered the formation of this party whilst on diplomatic service in India in 1948; Ahmet Süer, retired Col. vice-chairman; Muhiittin Salur, retired Gen., SG;
7. *The Labour Party*, headed by Bedrettin Ertenmo-y;
8. *The Turkish Workers' and Farmers' Party* (*Türk İşçi ve Çiftçi Partisi*);
9. *The Moderate Liberal Party* (*Mutedil Liberal Partisi*);
10. *The Workers' Party*, headed by trade union leaders;
11. *The Principle Party* (*Düstur Partisi*), led by Tarcan, a retired Col;
12. *The Confidence Party* (*Güven Partisi*);
13. *The Service to the Nation Party* (*Millete Hizmet Partisi*). Among the founders of the last two parties there were retired military and civil servants, journalists and merchants;
14. *The Conservative Party* (*Muhafazakâr Parti*), led by Yaşar Yurtöven, businessman; Ekrem Yurtöven and Fahri Sezen. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 12-15, 18; *Times*, Feb 13; *Birmingham Post*, Feb 23)

Gürsel Meets Party Leaders. In the second half of Feb and during March, President Gürsel met the following party leaders, as he said, in order to learn their ideas: İsmet İnönü (RPP) and Ekrem Alican (NTP), Gümüşpala (JP), Akif İyidoğan and Necmi Akyıldız (Homeland Party), Osman Bölükbaşı (RPNP) and İsmail Rüştü Aksal

(RPP). (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 18, 20, 23, March 5, 23, 29, 30)

In May Gürsel met. Yaşar Yurtöven, leader of the Conservative Party. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 31)

More Restrictions on Party Activities Lifted. A further extension of party activities as from April 1 was permitted by a presidential decree issued on March 27. This legalized organizational activities in general and indoor political meetings, but propaganda was still forbidden (and was permitted only on the eve of the elections, in Sept.).

Gen. Gürsel answered in the negative to a press question as to whether state funds should not be allocated to prevent parties from coming under the influence of certain wealthy persons who were financing newly-formed political parties. He added that if wealthy people thought that they could serve their interests through party influence, they were mistaken. "We shall not let this happen." (*R. Ankara*, March 25 [28]; *Cumhuriyet*, March 26, 28)

The parties now began to prepare the holding of provincial and district congresses. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 28, April 3)

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY VOTE

Parties Solicit DP Vote. [The newly-established Justice Party and New Turkey Party and later also the Republican Peasants' National Party competed for the former DP vote. To this end, they enlisted former DP officials who in turn endeavored to recruit the former DP rank and file.] It was observed in March that especially the JP and NTP were making "remarkably uninhibited attempts to attract the former DP vote estimated at nearly half the total electorate." Speeches and articles openly justifying many aspects of the fallen Menderes regime had appeared. (*Times*, March 13)

At the beginning of April it was reported that DP supporters, through their daily newspaper, *Son Havadis*, were constantly urging the NTP, the JP and the RFPN to unite in order to preserve the former DP vote intact and keep RPP out of power. (*Times*, April 4)

Gürsel Warns the Parties. In an address to the Constituent Assembly on March 10 Gürsel warned the parties on the subject of the DP vote. He said that those who would raise the DP from its grave, who were opposing the constitution and were courting by devious methods honest and innocent former Democratic citizens, didn't know how dangerous was the fire with which they were playing. "They will never, never succeed." (*Cumhuriyet*, March 11)

The Turkish press in general approved of Gen. Gürsel's statement. So did the leaders of the RPP and the RFPN, who pointed out that the former DP members were joining the new parties. The leaders of the JP and the NTP, on the other hand, suggested that Gürsel's remarks must have been intended for persons other than themselves. (*Turkish Press*, March 11-13; *Times*, March 13)

On May 12 Gen. Gürsel gave what he called "my last warning" to the political parties. Warning former DP members to stop their subversive activities (see p 544 a), he said that some of them, who were more patient and cautious, had joined the new parties, and were trying to re-establish the DP under a new name. These were the men who, especially after 1957, had served as DP officials and participated in the unlawful activities of the government. The public conscience had condemned them as criminals and they must not be allowed a voice in national affairs. Some of the new parties

thought that they could win votes by making use of the influence of such men. In fact, the vast majority of former DP members were honest and patriotic people, regarded these men as criminals and hated them. Some people were so audacious as to say: "We are former Democrats. We shall come to power and take our revenge." Gürsel stated that, of the new parties, the Homeland Party in particular had refrained from taking this course. For the time being this party had not grown very much, but its honest attitude constituted a proper guarantee both for its members and for the future of the country. (*R. Ankara*, May 12 [15]; *Cumhuriyet*, May 13)

NTP, JP Intransigent. While the RPP and the Homeland Party welcomed the President's statement, Ekrem Alican, the NTP leader, and Ragıp Gümüşpala, the JP leader, declined to comment upon it. Their parties, however, issued general statements in support of it as well as of the arrests of former DP members charged with subversive activities. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 13, 14, 15)

When *Cumhuriyet* reported that the new parties in Istanbul were now planning to purge their ranks of former DP members, the NTP secretary said this was not the case as far as his own party was concerned but might be true of the JP. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 16, 17)

The JP issued an additional statement on May 21, the gist of which was that former RPP members who had founded the DP and later left it to found the Freedom Party and [when this party failed in the 1957 elections] rejoined the RPP, were now serving as deputies and in official positions of responsibility and power [whereas former DP members now joining the JP were regarded as criminals]. The statement concluded: "Every day produces new evidence of the leftist and socialist tendencies of our adversaries." (*Cumhuriyet*, May 22)

The authorities immediately interrogated the JP central executive council members on this statement; Gümüşpala reportedly claimed that it was not directed at any institution or person. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 25, 29)

THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

(*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)

This party, established by Kemal Atatürk and, since his death in 1938, led by İsmet İnönü, began its reorganization by reopening its centre in Istanbul and modifying its regulations which were submitted to the authorities (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 17, 18, Feb 8; on further RPP organization, see *Cumhuriyet*, Jan 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, Feb 7, 10). [The party's organ was the Ankara daily *Ulus*. The party had a vast majority in the Constituent Assembly which had not been popularly elected.]

Attracting Officers, Academic Circles, Students, Youth. Following a concentrated effort by the party to enlist into its ranks officers pensioned off after the May revolution, 57 such officers joined the party in Istanbul in Feb. Fourteen professors of the 147 dismissed in Oct 1960 (MER 1960, p 466) also joined.

At the beginning of Feb the party began to open youth branches. In March, following the first reading in the House of a bill granting suffrage to citizens from the age of 18 [which in the end was not passed], the party started a campaign to attract youth, especially students. On March 22 a group of 116 students at the Istanbul universities joined the party. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 7, 9, 10; March 23)

In April the party established a youth branch directorate, with Erol Unal, former chairman of the Students'

Federation, as chairman, and Beşir Hamidi, former chairman of the Students' Union, as SG. The directorate organized youth branches in the provinces (*Cumhuriyet*, April 6). The first provincial congress of an RPP youth branch was held in Eskişehir on April 8. During April and May, youth congresses as well as women's congresses were held in other provinces. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 9, 16, 23, 24, 30, May 1, 5, 8, 15, 22, June 5, Aug 3)

Meeting with Minorities. In June the RPP Istanbul Executive, it was reported, held a secret meeting with a delegation of the chairmen of the pious foundations [*awqâf*] of the minorities. They listened to complaints and received certain promises. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 8)

An RPNP Leader Joins the Party. On July 27 Deputy Kcnaan Esengün, a retired General and a leader of the RPNP, joined the RPP. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 28; see also the RPNP.)

Kasım Gülek's Bid for Power. [Gülek, b. 1910, an intellectual and a landowner in Adana province, represented this province in the Assembly from 1940 onwards. He was minister in the RPP government in the years 1947-49 and, following the RPP defeat in the 1950 elections, was elected SG of the party, a post which he held until Oct 1959. He successfully reorganized the party in the critical period after the loss of power and built up a strong personal following, but also alienated a powerful opposition nucleus. In 1959 he resigned his post because of differences of opinion with several leading members of the party, including İnönü. He immediately began regrouping his forces for an attempted comeback but was stopped by the May revolution, when all political activity was banned.]

When party activities were resumed, Gülek renewed his efforts to regain his position as party SG at the party congress due to be held in Aug. To this end, he organized a group of supporters in the Istanbul branch, who prepared to capture the branch at the forthcoming elections. He also published a newspaper named *Tania* as from March 1 (on this paper, see also p 545 b). Gülek's activities caused the RPP Istanbul provincial executive to demand that he be brought before the party's court of honour and ousted from the party; it accused him of creating a faction within the party and of various other disruptive activities.

In the party's central executive, a strong group supported the expulsion of Gülek, in order to settle this problem before the RPP came into power. They claimed that such a step had already been planned in 1959 when Gülek resigned, but had not been carried through at the time for fear of weakening the party under the DP regime. Another strong group opposed this measure, claiming that Gülek, as SG, had strengthened the party in its critical period, and could not be simply expelled. The issue, they thought, should be brought before the party congress which would request Gülek either to work as a disciplined party member or to leave the party.

Gülek himself said he had many opponents, but if a man had no opponent, he was second-rate. He had served the nation and would continue to serve it.

The party HQ decided to bring the issue before the general congress instead of submitting it to the party court, as demanded by the Istanbul executive. Thereupon the latter's members resigned, cabling the party HQ: "Either Gülek or us." They were, however, prevailed upon to withdraw the resignation.

Gülek's supporters protested against the attitude of the

Istanbul executive while his opponents at party HQ endeavoured to weaken his position in Adana province, his main stronghold. Nevertheless, Gülek's supporters captured the provincial branch by an absolute majority at the elections on July 30. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 22-24, 29, 31, June 1, 5, 9, 10, 19, 26; July 30, 31)

The Istanbul provincial congress, held on Aug 12-13, on the other hand, ended with the victory of Gülek's opponents who were supported by the party HQ. Ali Sohtorik was re-elected chairman of the branch. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Ulus*, Aug 13, 14)

RPP Congress Dominated by Gülek Issue. The RPP held its 15th general congress in Ankara from Aug 24-28 with the participation of about 1,300 delegates. In his opening speech İsmet İnönü, the party president, praised the NUC for its decision to hand over power by a process of free elections, and emphasized the need to solve outstanding economic and financial problems and to further education which had always been one of the party's main interests and had been neglected.

The party SG, İsmail Rüştü Akal, said the RPP refused to be associated with the party squabbles and would enter the elections in the spirit of brotherhood of the May revolution.

Gülek, asked to explain his resignation from the post of party SG in 1959, said it had been forced by elements inside the party. He spoke of two incidents. He stated that it had been falsely alleged at the time that the RPP had organized the incident at Geyikli (an attack by peasants on a group of RPP deputies in 1959; at the Yassıada trials, DP members were found responsible for provoking the incident. He also spoke of the immediate cause of his resignation, his letter to Col. Fens at NATO headquarters, which, when published by the Turkish government, created an uproar because of his interference in government affairs and offence given to the Turkish representative at NATO). He said that in this letter he had urged the inclusion of a greater number of opposition members in the Turkish parliamentary delegation. The letter never reached Col. Fens; a Turkish official intercepted it and sent it to the government which in turn published it with alterations.

Gülek also advocated the introduction of the majority election instead of the proportional system which he had supported earlier, as he maintained, the RPP could not win elections under proportional representation.

Some delegates wanted İnönü to explain his side of the resignation, and although the congress voted against this proposal, İnönü took the rostrum. He said that Gülek had lied at the time about the content of his letter to Col. Fens. "There is no place for liars in the party," he said, adding "you cannot force me to do something which I do not want [i.e. accept Gülek as SG]... if you want me to, I can resign from the leadership of the party." A number of newspapers reacted to this declaration by accusing İnönü of anti-democratic behaviour.

İnönü, the only candidate, was re-elected president of the party by 1,164 votes out of 1,309; some of the 145 blank ballots carried the name of Metin Toker, editor of the weekly *Aksu* and İnönü's son-in-law, an apparent reference to rumours that İnönü was very much under Toker's influence.

Akal was elected SG by 957 votes against 335 votes for Gülek, whom many delegates had in vain tried to persuade not to put up his candidacy. This result was attributed to İnönü's strong support of Akal. All former members of the central executive council were re-elected except five, one of whom had opposed Gülek in Adana.

The congress resolved that as from the 16th congress the SG would be elected by the central executive from among its members instead of by the congress. The congress did not empower the central executive to appoint 10% of the candidates for the Assembly, as requested by İnönü, but only 15 candidates, and on condition that they be workers or small businessmen and be approved by the party council in their election district.

The congress unanimously adopted a declaration of basic aims, which was in the main identical with the party's election platform (see p 565 b). (*Cumhuriyet; Ulus, Aug 25-29; Hürriyet, Aug 26; Kudret; Son Havadis, Aug 27, 28; Times, Aug 29*)

Kasım Gülek told the press after the conference that he would continue his struggle undeterred, not for personal gain, but for principles and democracy within his party. (*Tanin, Aug 29*)

Selim Sarper Joins the RPP. In mid-Sept it was reported that Selim Sarper, the Foreign Minister, had joined the RPP and would be a party candidate in İstanbul in the forthcoming elections. *Son Havadis*, however, reported that Sarper had declared that he had not joined any political party; he was not sure he would enter politics, but if he ever did "the normal thing to do will be my joining the RPP." (*Hür Vatan; Son Havadis, Sept 12*)

Sarper appeared on the RPP list as candidate for the House (*Hürriyet, Sept 22*) [and was elected].

THE REPUBLICAN PEASANTS NATIONAL PARTY (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*)

Synopsis. The Republican Peasants' National Party, traditional and religious, was established in 1937 through the merger of the Republican National Party (founded 1948) and the Peasants' Party (founded 1952) and was led by Osman Bölükbaşı. Following the granting of permission for party activity, the party reorganized itself and endeavoured to recruit former DP members.

A majority of the RPNP Deputies in the Constituent Assembly did not participate in the vote on the constitution.

Bölükbaşı took a firm stand against the military regime. He refused to attend the round-table conference of the party leaders, demanded that there should be no death sentences at Yassıada and continued to comment on the subject in the election campaign, after the death sentences had been carried out, though other prominent politicians abstained from doing so.

The party emerged from the elections as the fourth group in both Houses of the Assembly, winning 13.5% of the votes. The party declined to enter any coalition government and preferred to remain in opposition.

Bölükbaşı's leadership gave rise to a strong opposition inside the party, led by Ahmet Tahtakılıç. An attempt to oust Bölükbaşı in May failed but at the end of the year he resigned. Whether this opposition was prompted by personal considerations, by policy differences or by both, the sources available did not make clear, though at least one source regarded the resignation as a victory for the party's progressives.

The party's unofficial organ was the Ankara daily *Kudret*.

Former DP Members, Officers Join Party. (On RPNP organizing, see *Cumhuriyet, Jan 27, 30, Feb 2, 7, 10, 11, 12*.) In April the party began organizing youth branches. (*Cumhuriyet, April 9*)

The party was joined by a number of former DP

deputies who had not been re-elected in 1937; [all DP members of the last Assembly, it will be remembered, were put on trial at Yassıada]. The party also endeavoured to recruit high-ranking officers pensioned off after the May revolution; by Feb 6, two retired generals joined. (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 27; Feb 7, 10*)

In May Bölükbaşı said that former DP members were joining the party in large numbers. (*Cumhuriyet, May 22*)

Arrests. On May 31 three RPNP members and ten former DP members were arrested in Polatlı [Ankara province] for propaganda against the revolutionary administration. RPNP spokesmen said that earlier another 12 party members had been arrested; they said they ascribed no importance to these arrests. (*Cumhuriyet, June 1*)

Attempt to Oust Bölükbaşı. At the beginning of May, while Bölükbaşı lay ill, a group named "The Strugglers" (*Mücadeleler*), led by Ahmet Tahtakılıç, the Minister of Education (who was formerly, like Bölükbaşı, a prominent member of the Republican National Party), tried to oust him from the leadership. They claimed that the party had made no progress since the May revolution owing to Bölükbaşı's personality, and succeeded in getting a resolution passed in the executive demanding his resignation or at least his *de facto* retirement until the party congress, leaving the direction of the party to their group. Bölükbaşı refused to comply. He attended the executive meeting on May 5 but, according to his opponents, failed to secure a majority and left the meeting. The executive then reaffirmed its request for his resignation (*Cumhuriyet, May 6*). This report was not denied, but in a letter to *Cumhuriyet*, the party SG said that Bölükbaşı was elected president by the party congress and, according to party regulations, could not be forced to resign. (*Cumhuriyet, May 7*)

New Members and Resignations. In June the members of the JP executive in Konya joined the RPNP. No reason was given. (*Cumhuriyet, June 5*)

In July Deputy Kenan Eşengün, a retired general, left the party and joined the RPP. (*Cumhuriyet, July 20, 28*)

At the same time two deputies joined the party: Hüseyin Ataman, who had served as Minister of Defence in Gürsel's second cabinet, and Col. (ret.) Halim Önalp. (*Cumhuriyet, July 29*)

The Party Congress. The RPNP held its general congress in Ankara on Aug 27-29. In his opening speech, Bölükbaşı said that the new constitution contained all the party was fighting for and that the party stood for honest and effective administration.

Ahmet Tahtakılıç said he would not run for party president and that he was opposed to the creation of factions in the party. Thus, for the time being, a struggle for power within the party leadership was prevented. Bölükbaşı was re-elected president by an overwhelming majority and the congress ended on Aug 29 without adopting resolutions. (*Cumhuriyet; Kudret, Aug 28-30*)

Bölükbaşı Resigns. On Dec 10 Bölükbaşı submitted to the party executive his resignation from the party leadership. Efforts to persuade him to withdraw his resignation failed. Bölükbaşı described his resignation as a "changing of the guard" and added that it should not be interpreted as a "deviation from my allegiance to the party and to the great masses who have supported me for long years." The press claimed that his resignation was caused

by his differences with members of the central executive council and especially Ahmet Tahtakılıç. *Hür Vatan* described the resignation as the triumph of the progressive members of the RPNP. (*Milliyet; Hür Vatan; Tercüman, Dec 14-16*)

THE HOMELAND PARTY (*Memleketçi Partisi*)

Synopsis. The Homeland Party was organized in Jan by former members and supporters of the Freedom Party and the Democratic Party, and retired officers.

The party soon underwent a crisis, apparently on the question of political orientation. First there were attempts to unite it with the JP and the NTP, both of which courted the former DP vote. Then in May the party was praised by Gen. Gürsel for not seeking the DP vote as others were doing. Thereupon the party acquired some prominent new members but, soon afterwards, a number of its leading members left the party and joined either the NTP or the JP (among the latter was the Homeland Party's first president). In July the party changed its president twice. Thus weakened, the party failed to establish branches in 15 provinces, as required by law to enable a party to participate in the general elections. The party, however, continued to exist and Gen. Gürsel appointed one of its members to the Senate.

Founding Members. The Homeland Party was the first party to submit its request for registration. The seven sponsors were: Col. Naci Bozkurt and Maj-Gen. Necmi Akıldız, both retired; Hakkı Ketenöğlu, a former State Attorney-General; Akif Iyidoğan, a former provincial governor and RPP Assembly member; Şakir Zorluoğlu, an industrialist; Nedret Pinar, a lawyer; and Talât Akdoğan. They told the press that there were 120 founding members, among them 16 former Assembly members, 15 physicians, 27 jurists, 15 financiers, 12 engineers, five former provincial governors and 12 army men. They refused to reveal their political programme and only said that they supported economic freedom and social justice within a democratic framework. (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 15*)

DP Influence. Several former members of the DP and the Freedom Party joined the party, among them Enver Safer Öder, Bayar's defence counsel (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 16*). The party, and especially Safer Öder, endeavoured to recruit members of the DP. (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 10*)

Unsuccessful Bids to Unite with Other New Parties. [There were unsuccessful bids to unite the party with two other emerging parties which became in time the successors to the DP vote.] There was an abortive effort at the beginning to unite the party with a group led by Ekrem Alican, which later became the New Turkey Party (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 23-31*). Three weeks later, after the party had registered, a joint communiqué by Gü müşpala for the Justice Party (see below) and Naci Bozkurt for the Homeland Party announced that the two parties had decided to unite. The next day, however, several founding members of the Homeland Party said that there would be no unification. Bozkurt thereupon stated that he and 11 other party leaders in Ankara had resolved on the unification but the party leaders in Istanbul had refused consent. (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 14, 15*)

Organization. In Feb the party began to organize its branches. Prominent among the organizers were Hayati Ataker, a former commander of the gendarmerie and Nihat Şu, [who both later left the party and respectively joined the NTP and the JP.] (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 6*)

On Feb 11 Öder, Hayati Ataker and three other party members submitted the party regulations and programme to the authorities. (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 12*)

In March the party decided to open branches in 21 [out of 67] provinces, but in July the party president said it had established [only] five and was preparing to set up another 26 (*Cumhuriyet, March 27, July 8*). In the end, the party failed to establish branches in 15 provinces and all districts thereof, needed to enable it to participate in the elections, as provided by law. (*Cumhuriyet, Sept 23*)

Party Programme. The president of the party, Akif Iyidoğan, told journalists on March 17 that the party's programme could be summarized in seven words: soul (*can*), way (*yol*), water (*suy*), light (*nur*), house (*ev*), village (*köy*) and work (*iş*). As to the former DP members, he said "We are in a period of healing wounds, there is no reason to create complexes in vain among former DP members." (*Cumhuriyet, March 18*)

Ataker Leaves Party. On March 28 Lt-Gen. (ret.) Hayati Ataker, one of the party founders and member of its central committee, left the party. No reason was published. (*Cumhuriyet, March 29*). [He later joined the NTP.]

Gürsel's Praise Enhances Party's Prestige. President Gürsel's praise for the party in his speech of May 12, for refraining from canvassing the DP vote (see p 553), enhanced its prestige especially among the deputies; party spokesmen claimed that many independents had joined the party but gave no names. According to *Cumhuriyet*, they included Hayri Mumcuoğlu, the Minister of State; the former Minister of Labour, Mehmet Reşit Beşerler; and three Deputies, Col. (ret.) Halim Onalp, Eşat Çağa and Mahmut Yalay. (*Cumhuriyet, May 13, 15*)

Party In Crisis, Changes Chairman Twice, New Members and Resignations. On July 4 Gen. (ret.) Fahri Belen, a Deputy and former Minister of Public Works (in a DP cabinet), was elected party president. [Iyidoğan left the party and joined the JP.] In his first public appearance, he broadcast an appeal for the approval of the constitution in the forthcoming referendum (*Cumhuriyet, July 5*). He told a press conference that Gürsel was his only candidate for the presidency. He revealed that the following deputies had joined the party: Nihat Reşat Belger, Eşat Çağa [who had left the NTP], Gen. (ret.) Enver Adakan [a co-founder of the DP and later of the Freedom Party], Hüseyin Ataman [a retired general and Minister of Defence in Gürsel's second Cabinet who later left the HP and joined the RPNP] and Hulusi Onal. He added that Muharrem İhsan Kınıkçılı would be a party candidate in the coming elections. (*Cumhuriyet, July 8*)

On July 28 a new party president appeared before the press: Enver Adakan. He said that the party had changed its name to Free Homeland Party (*Memleketçi Serbest Partisi*) and had adopted a liberal programme, especially in the economic field. [No reason was given for these changes.] Many of its leading members now left the party, among them Nedret Pinar and Enver Safer Öder, both founding members. Fahri Belen became honorary president of the party. He stated that it was natural for these persons to leave the party and join the JP, but it would be easier now to work in the party. (*Cumhuriyet, July 28, 29, Aug 9, 11*)

Party Leader Appointed Senator. One of the 15 senators appointed by President Gürsel at the end of Oct in accordance with the constitution was a HP member: Eşat Çağrı, the party SG. (*Cumhuriyet*, Oct 31)

THE JUSTICE PARTY (Adalet Partisi)

The Justice Party was founded in Jan by Gen. (ret.) Ragıp Gümüşpala, first Chief of Staff under the NUC. The party contained three main elements: former officers retired after the May revolution, adherents of the dissolved Democratic Party and former members of the Peasants' Party.

The party soon acquired a reputation as a successor to the DP and clashed with the military regime. Many former DP members who joined the party were active against the revolutionary regime and were arrested and tried. The party was repeatedly warned by the government to refrain from recruiting former DP members and from subversive activities. The most severe warning followed the referendum on the constitution, against which the party agitated.

The former DP members in the party's leadership and in its provincial cadres attracted many former DP votes in the general elections and the party emerged by far the strongest group in the Senate and the second strongest in the House of Representatives, winning about 36% of the votes.

Following the elections, differences of opinion appeared in the party. The extreme right proposed Prof. Bağış, who had become their champion, against Gen. Gürsel for the presidency and refused to enter a coalition with the RPP, while Gümüşpala and his group supported Gürsel and were prepared to enter such a coalition under certain conditions. A middle-of-the-road attitude was taken by a third group (see p 571 b).

Under army pressure, the party entered a coalition government with the RPP, a step that was followed by serious dissension inside the party. By the end of the year, however, it appeared that Gümüşpala had succeeded in restoring unity within the ranks.

The Istanbul daily *Son Havadis* supported the extremist wing of the party.

Gen. Gümüşpala Founds Party. At the end of Jan Gen. Ragıp Gümüşpala, who was appointed Chief of the General Staff after the May revolution but was retired in Aug 1960 (MER 1960, pp 435, 443), took active steps towards the formation of a party. He left Izmir for Ankara where he met Gen. Gürsel and NUC members as well as founder-members of Alican's NTP (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 30, 31). On Jan 31 Lt-Col. (ret.) Şinasi Osma, formerly Gen. Gümüşpala's aide-de-camp, told the press of the founding of the Justice Party under the leadership of Gümüşpala (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 1). The party, it was reported, would continue on the road started by Atatürk, would make no concessions to the right or left and would not compromise for the sake of votes; its economic policy would be liberal. Gümüşpala denied that his party had approached former DP deputies. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 4)

Peasants' and Union Parties Incorporated in JP. On Feb 6 the JP and the former Peasants' Party agreed to unite. (The Peasants' Party (*Köylü Partisi*) was founded in 1952, united with the Republican National Party in 1957 and thus formed the Republican Peasants' National Party. Several leading members of the Peasants'

Party who had left the RPNP in 1959-60, now joined the JP.) (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 6, 7)

On Feb 8, on Gümüşpala's initiative, they were joined by the Union Party (*Birlik Partisi*), a small party founded in 1957 in Istanbul with branches in 17 provinces and 30,000 members. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 7, 9)

On Feb 11 Gümüşpala, Necmettin Öktem (a retired general), Şinasi Osma, and three former members of the Peasants' Party, Tahsin Demiryaz, Ethem Menemencioğlu and Muhtar Yazır, submitted the party regulations and programme to the authorities. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 12)

A project to unite the party with the Homeland Party was unsuccessful (see: The Homeland Party).

Former DP Members Enlisted. Party organization concentrated mainly on W. Anatolia (the former DP stronghold), the European parts and Ankara. Gümüşpala himself organized the branches in Izmir and the Aegean regions. The party leaders also went to the other regions to examine the prospects there. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 21). In Izmir the party committee was composed mostly of former DP members of the town council. Retired General Mehmet Ali Aytaç, a DP supporter, was appointed chairman of the committee (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 28). The Istanbul committee was chaired by Lt-Gen. (ret.) Enver Akoğlu, a former leading DP member in Ankara. Of the ten members of the Committee, four had belonged to the DP and one to the RPNP. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 4)

Certain newspapers and part of the public soon called the JP *Kıyrcık* (tail, satellite) of the DP. In reaction, Gümüşpala declared that the JP had expressed its confidence in the government and the NUC; it was "not a hate party." (*Cumhuriyet*, March 6)

Arrest and Trial of Mehmet Yorgancıoğlu Causes Crisis Inside Party. On March 15 Yorgancıoğlu, Deputy SG of the JP in charge of organization, and a former DP member, was arrested in Izmir on a charge of conducting propaganda aimed at destroying public order. He had allegedly stated at a party meeting that the JP was a continuation of the DP, and to have referred to the present military leaders as "ignorant men, who thought they could overthrow the legal government of the country and make a revolution." The following day, four members of the JP Izmir province executive, all former DP members, were arrested. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 16, 17, 30; *Times*, March 17)

This affair led to the resignation from the party of several leading members of its Istanbul branch and it was reported that Gümüşpala intended to resign from the party leadership. On March 20 Gümüşpala told the press that the JP was striving for unity and fraternity and was a party of law and order. Though ill-intentioned persons might have infiltrated into the party, they would not find their place in it. The JP, he said, was no successor to the DP. Gümüşpala then met President Gürsel. On March 23 the JP Central Committee issued a declaration to the effect that the arrested men had acted in accordance with the principles of the party and the law of the country. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 18, 21, 24)

Yorgancıoğlu's trial opened on April 29 in Izmir. (The other four JP detainees had been released.) Yorgancıoğlu, who was defended by five lawyers, rejected the charges against him. He denied that he had said: "When I shall be President I shall rescue Members." He added: "I understand the May 27 revolution. A man must be mad to say such words." The trial ended on May 10 and Yorgancıoğlu was set free. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 30, April 9, 16, 30, May 11). [No more details were available.]

In Sept Yorgancıoğlu was expelled from the JP; he protested that he had not been given the opportunity to defend himself. (*Yeni Gün*, Sept 1, 5; *Cumhuriyet*, Sept 3)

Difficulties in Gaziantep. At the end of March Gümüşpala came in person to Gaziantep to organize a party branch, but failed to gather together even a directing committee [no reasons for this were published]. Only when he made a second effort towards the end of April did he succeed in his endeavour. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 1, 26)

JP Wins Members From, Loses Members To, Other Parties. The JP Edirne Province executive nominated on April 21, and composed mostly of merchants and retired officers, included among others, three former DP members, one RNP member and one RPP member. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 22)

Later, however, there was a reverse movement. In June all the members of the JP executive in Konya left the party and joined the RNP. No reason was given. In July the NTP announced that JP leaders in the provinces of Aydın, Gaziantep, Kars and Adana had left the party and joined the NTP. This was denied by the JP. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 5, July 7, 8)

Further Arrests and Trials of DP-JP Members. On March 23 it was reported that Ahmet Gürkan, a former DP deputy, who was the JP organizer in Tokat, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for giving false evidence, while another former DP deputy, Rifat Öçten, who was accused of "destructive activities" in Tokat, received a warning. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 24)

On May 27, the anniversary of the revolution, former DP members in the town of Iğdır (near the Russian border) placed DP leaflets against the NUC and the army in the RPP building in that town. Seven persons were arrested, among them the local JP chairman who had served the DP in the same capacity, and three staff members of the local newspaper which belonged to the JP. Tempers in the town began to flare up and army units were moved in to prevent fighting between DP adherents and supporters of the new regime. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 29; *Daily Telegraph*, May 30)

On April 29 a member of the JP provincial committee in Trabzon was arrested for disparaging remarks about the government. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 30)

On June 7 it was revealed that five members of the JP executive who had been arrested some time previously had been released. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 8)

The Ahmet Çiftçi Affair. On June 26 the Martial Law authorities in Istanbul arrested Ahmet Çiftçi, a 30-year-old former student of philosophy, who was—according to the official statement as well as his own during the trial—a co-founder of the JP and in charge of organizing party branches in Anatolia. He was accused of attempting to organize a counter-revolution and was arrested while distributing pamphlets inciting the people to this end. The pamphlets said that the signal for the overthrow of the military government would be given shortly and continued: "If among the soldiers there are some who use arms against you, do not hesitate. First kill the traitor officer who gives the order, and then kill the soldiers. If we die, we shall be martyrs; if we live we shall be *gazi* (warriors of the faith)."

A JP spokesman said that following his arrest, Çiftçi was expelled from the party and that since the JP was

a new and large party, it was difficult to make a proper scrutiny of all its members. He accused the press of blaming the whole party for the deeds of one person and also revealed that Çiftçi had been a member of the Peasants' Party (see p 535 a).

Çiftçi's trial opened on July 28 before a military court in Istanbul. Çiftçi pleaded not guilty. He said the pamphlet was a call not for revolution but for reform. The court found Çiftçi guilty and on Aug 4 sentenced him to death in accordance with Art. 149 of the Turkish Criminal Code. Çiftçi exercised his right of appeal, while his family tried in vain to secure an audience with Gen. Gürsel. [No further reports on this affair were encountered.]

During the trial, the JP leaders including Ragıp Gümüşpala were interrogated by the Martial Law authorities who said that Gümüşpala had stated that Çiftçi had been a JP member and had worked on the party regulations. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 28-July 1, 29, 30, Aug 5, 6, 11-13; *Times*, July 1, Aug 5; *Öncü*, *Ulus*, Aug 11-13)

JP Agitation Against Constitution; Gürsel Warns Gümüşpala. The JP called for a rejection of the constitution in the referendum of July 9. On July 14 Gen. Gürsel sent a letter to Gümüşpala, the JP leader, which was published only on July 25, in which he referred to the propaganda methods used by the JP (for details, see p 551). He wrote that such activities would lead the nation to disaster. It was frightening to think how persons employing such tactics might administer the country. As things stood now, no change in the party's conduct was possible, for all its key positions were in the hands of former DP members, who were accustomed to irresponsibility and plundering. Gürsel recalled that he had repeatedly exhorted Gümüşpala to change his ways, but to no avail. He was now definitely informing him that he would not close his eyes to such activities. In conclusion, Gürsel called on Gümüşpala to purge the party, to stop sowing the seeds of revenge and enmity and to direct party efforts towards an honest and democratic regime. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 25)

Gümüşpala declared that he was preparing a reply to Gen. Gürsel. He claimed that Gürsel had received false information on the JP activities. He pointed out that the NTP and RNP were trying to take the place of the DP and even the RPP had invited many former DP members to join it. Those joining the JP were innocent, otherwise they would have been brought to trial. He said he hoped the party would continue to exist. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 26)

Gürsel said on July 27 that he had received no reply from Gümüşpala. He said that many of the former DP members were honest patriots but about 80% of them had voted "No" on the constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 28)

Rumour of Impending Suspension of JP Denied. Following the publication of the above letter as well as the Çiftçi affair which coincided with it, there were rumours that the JP would be suspended. This, however, was denied by Gen. Gürsel and others. RPP leaders also expressed themselves against the suspension of parties. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 1-6, 9, 11, 13)

Differences Inside the Party. In mid-July differences of opinion on organization and preparations for the forthcoming elections were reported between the three groups which had founded the party: the retired officers, the former members of the Peasants' Party and the former

DP members. There was also a division of opinion on the question of unification with the NTP. This was supported by the former DP members and opposed by the other two groups. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 16)

Prof. Bağıl Emerges as Right-Wing Leader in Party. On Aug 21 Prof. Ali Fuat Bağıl agreed to become an "independent candidate on the JP list" in the coming elections. He said he considered the NTP, the JP and the RPNP as sister organizations (*Cumhuriyet*; *Son Havadis*, Aug 22). [Bağıl was regarded as the leader of the extreme right in the JP, though apparently he was not a full-fledged member.]

Earlier, in Jan, Bağıl had been arrested. On Dec 20, 1960 he had published in the Istanbul magazine *Dünya ve Türkiye* an article entitled: "How Can the Constituent Assembly Function Under Present Conditions in the Country?", which was found by the Istanbul Martial Law command to constitute propaganda in favour of the dissolved DP and an offence under the Penal Code. In Jan the magazine was banned and its owner, as well as Bağıl, was detained (*Ulus*, Jan 12; *R. Ankara*, Jan 12 [14]). Their trial opened on March 15 before a military court in Istanbul and at the end of the month they were released on bail. On Aug 11 they were acquitted. (*Times*, March 17, Aug 12; *Cumhuriyet*, March 28, June 27, Aug 12)

In May, while his trial was still pending, Bağıl testified at Yassıada in favour of the former regime (see p 560 h).

In Oct, after the elections, Bağıl appeared as a candidate for the presidency in opposition to Gen. Gürel. He was supported by the extremists within the JP, who also wanted him to replace Gümüşpala in the party leadership. Bağıl withdrew his candidacy only after considerable pressure by the regime, and also resigned from the Senate (see p 572).

More Arrests of JP Members; Charge of Plotting Coup. At the end of July a JP member was arrested in Antalya for propaganda against the new Constitution and the Yassıada trials. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 1)

On Aug 5 a JP official was arrested in Rize for saying "We shall obtain power, by bloodshed if necessary." (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 6)

On Aug 7 two JP members were arrested in Urla [near Izmir] for praising the former regime and insulting the NUC. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 8)

On Sept 7, 14 persons, most of them JP members, were arrested on a charge of plotting a counter-revolution; they had planned to take over the radio station, the post office and the electric power stations in Istanbul, to release the Yassıada prisoners and to overthrow the revolutionary regime (*Cumhuriyet*, Sept 8, 9). [No further reports on this affair were encountered.]

THE NEW TURKEY PARTY (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*)

Synopsis. The New Turkey Party was established in February by former leaders of the Freedom Party which split off from the DP in 1955 (see MER 1960, pp 424-5). They were joined by a number of prominent DP leaders who had not been elected to the Assembly in 1957 (those who had were all in prison). The party set itself up as a successor to the DP; in its programme (for which see p 565 b) and policy statements, the emphasis was on the DP in its early years, namely on democracy and liberalism; in its tactics, however, the party presented itself as the direct successor to the Menderes regime. In the general elections, the party won close to

14% of the votes and emerged as the third strongest out of the four parties represented in both the House and the Senate; most of the former DP votes, however, went to the JP.

The party's unofficial organ was the Ankara daily *Öncü*.

Alican Founds Party with Freedom Party and DP Members. Ekrem Alican was Minister of Finance in Gürsel's cabinets until he resigned in Dec 1960 in order to form a political party. He was elected to the Assembly in 1950 as a DP member, was expelled from the DP in 1955 and joined the Freedom Party (FP); after this party's eclipse in the 1957 elections, he became politically independent.

On Jan 13 Alican convened a meeting in Ankara with a number of politicians who decided to form a party; among them were Enver Adakan, a co-founder of the DP and later of the FP; İrfan Aksu, a former FP and later an RPP member, and Esat Çağa, a former RPP member (these two had left the RPP on Jan 13); Fethi Aşkın, the Minister of Customs and Monopolies; Orhan Merinli, the Minister of Communications; Prof. Cahit Talas of Ankara University and Minister of Labour in Gürsel's first cabinet; and Raif Aybar.

Alican also contacted the group which formed the Homeland Party, in an abortive attempt to unite these groups into one party under his leadership. Subsequently, "with persons close to him," he founded the New Turkey Party (NTP). (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 14, 15, 17, 21, 23-31; Feb 4)

Alican said there were a number of former DP members among the founders. [The most prominent among them] was Prof. Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, who revealed on Feb 4 that he had joined the NTP, since he was a good friend of Alican, but would not become politically active. Gökay, a physician and diplomat, former governor and mayor of Istanbul, was put on trial at Yassıada on charge of complicity in the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul in Sept 1955 (see MER 1960, p 456) but was acquitted on Jan 5. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 6, Feb 5, 6)

Party Registered. On the eve of the final party registration day, there was a rift in the party, reportedly on the questions of liberalism and state control in the party programme, and three members resigned: Enver Adakan, Mahmut Yalay and Esat Çağa (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 14). [All three joined the Homeland Party.]

Thus, only at the last minute, on Feb 13, did the party submit its regulations and programme to the authorities. The following signed as founders: İrfan Aksu, Ekrem Alican, Raif Aybar (member of the Constituent Assembly), Hikmet Bellez (lawyer), Esat Eğilmez (retired General), Hasan Kangal (lawyer), Sırrı Öktem (retired Maj-Gen.), Mithat San (former Deputy), Cahit Talas and Aydın Yalçın (journalist). (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 14)

On Feb 19 Alican was elected chairman of the party, Raif Aybar—vice-chairman, İrfan Aksu—SG, İhsan Serel Dura (retired Lt-Gen.), Hasan Kangal and Ertuğrul Altal—assistants to the SG. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 20)

Organization; Former DP Deputies Join the Party. During the last week of Feb the party was joined by 109 persons who have been DP Deputies in the National Assembly before the 1957 elections. Twelve of them were immediately appointed party inspectors in the following provinces: Van, Tunceli, Çankırı, Elazığ, Kastamonu, Sivas, Samsun, Bingöl, Bolu, Urfa and Manisa. [In most of these provinces, the party later won a majority at the general elections.] (*Cumhuriyet*, March 1)

In the party's organization committee in Istanbul, there were four former DP members. Alican declared that the party would accept as members persons who had been detained after the May revolution, but had been acquitted. He added that his party would not renew the old regime. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 10, 16)

According to the party secretary, by the end of March the party had organized itself in 33 provinces and 114 former DP deputies had joined it. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 30)

In April, 26 of the 147 university teachers who had been dismissed by the NUC in Oct 1960 (MER 1960 pp 446-7), joined the NTP. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 6)

A number of JP members also joined the party (see: The Justice Party).

Gürsel's Brother Temporary Member of NTP. Sırrı Gürsel, President Gürsel's brother, an industrialist, was appointed by the party to organize the Aydın province branch; in May, however, he resigned from the party. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 6, May 20)

Arrests of DP-NTP Members on Charges of Propaganda Against the Regime. From April to Aug the following arrests were reported:

In April, Süreyya Sofuoğlu, NTP İsmi province chairman, former DP chairman; on April 18, Reşat İker, a former DP member and a co-founder of the NTP, in Burdur (south-west Anatolia); on June 21, the NTP Hani district (Diyarbakır province) chairman, who formerly served the DP in the same capacity and also as mayor of Hani, for propaganda against the government; he had been arrested and deported earlier but was later freed (*Cumhuriyet*, April 8, 19, June 22); on July 26, four NTP members, formerly DP members in a town in Adana province, for conducting propaganda for their party, although this was forbidden. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 27)

On July 31, after interrogating İrfan Aksu, a prominent NTP member and a former DP member, on the meaning of the phrase "we shall begin from where we left off" which he had employed in a speech, the Ankara prosecutor decided to bring him to trial. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 1)

Party Claims Adherence of Associations and Cooperatives.

On May 24 the NTP announced that in elections to a drivers' association in Bolu (N W Anatolia), the NTP candidate had defeated the RPP candidate by 157 votes to one, while in the agricultural cooperative elections in Cihanbeyli (Konya province), the NTP won by 174 votes to 71 for the RPP. *Cumhuriyet* considered this report as typical DP conduct; such associations were non-political according to law and those who involved them in politics ought to be subjected to sanctions (*Cumhuriyet*, May 25). Later the governor of Cihanbeyli informed *Cumhuriyet* that the NTP announcement was incorrect and those who had given this information to the NTP would be brought to trial. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 6)

Alican: NTP Successor to DP. On May 6 Alican told the press that the economic policy of the NTP would be the same as that of the DP until 1954. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 7)

In his provincial tours during June and July to organize party branches, Alican repeatedly stated: "We have taken the place of the DP!" (*Cumhuriyet*, July 26). He declared that the NTP had adopted two points of the DP programme of 1946 (a) the task of governing

should be entrusted to the political group which won the nation's trust and vote; (b) a bold and dynamic economic policy' (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 12). Again, he said that the NTP was following the DP programme of the 1946-54 period, and added: "If this is interpreted as our being a continuation of the DP, then let it be so." (*Milîyet*, Aug 28)

Party Strength. On Aug 8 the party issued a bulletin giving a detailed account of its organization and its material assets: The party was organized in 57 provinces out of a total of 67, had some one million registered members and an executive and administrative staff of 6,500. The party owned 1,300 cars, 1,240 buses and trucks, 72 small printing presses and 67 local newspapers. (*Öncü*, Aug 9)

The Case of Yüksel Menderes. On Aug 29 Yüksel Menderes, the eldest son of Adnan Menderes, stated at a press conference in the presence of Ekrem Alican that he had resigned his post in the Foreign Ministry and joined the NTP: he intended to become a candidate for the House of Representatives in Aydın province [his father's former constituency] and thus to "continue to work for the prosperity of the country."

At the same time, relatives of former DP leaders, lawyers defending Menderes and other DP leaders joined the NTP. Among them were the widow of Namık Gedik, the former DP Minister of the Interior, who had committed suicide in prison; Nilüfer Gürsoy, daughter of ex-President Celal Bayar; and Süreyya Ağaçoğlu, sister of Samet Ağaçoğlu, a former DP Minister. They proposed to stand as candidates for Aydın, Bursa and Manisa respectively which had been represented in the DP regime by their respective relatives. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Hürriyet*; *Ulus*, Aug 30, 31, Sept 1)

Burhan Felek in *Cumhuriyet* and Ahmet Emin Yalman in *Hür Vatan* condemned the NTP for trying to put up Yüksel Menderes as an heir apparent to his father and thus defying the revolution. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Hür Vatan*, Aug 31)

Asked about this development within the NTP, Gen. Gürsel said: "They are overdoing things. They are getting out of hand. At one time the JP was acting that way, but I warned them in a personal letter, and... they mended their ways [and]... became the best party... Young Menderes entering political life is not so important; although he has inherited some of his father's traits he is not like him... he is a passive person." (*Hürriyet*, Aug 31)

There were reports that the NUC had again warned the NTP and the JP and requested their leaders to purge their ranks of former DP elements. In an official statement, the NUC declared that "the DP mentality" would never be allowed to revive. (*R. Ankara*, Sept 1 [5]; *Yeni Gün*, Sept 1; *Times*, Sept 4)

Following the execution of his father, Yüksel Menderes resigned from the NTP, declaring that for domestic reasons he would not enter active politics and would not be a candidate in the forthcoming elections. NTP leaders said that he had not resigned from the party. There were reports, however, that he would apply again for a post in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Yeni Sabah*, Sept 21)

Arrest and Trial of Yalçın. On Sept 1 Aydın Yalçın, a founder member of the NTP and editor of the Ankara daily *Öncü*, was arrested after stating at the NTP İzmir province convention on Aug 31 that "the DP period in

Izmir was a golden period, notwithstanding its mistakes and faults." Alican, who was also in Izmir, told reporters that he knew no details regarding the arrest and that Öncü though sympathetic to the NTP was not the party's official organ. (*Cumhuriyet; Öncü; Kudret; Yeni Gün, Sept 2, 3*)

Yalçın's appeal against his arrest was rejected on Sept 7 and on Sept 21 he was sentenced by an Izmir court to six month's imprisonment and fined £7500. The execution of the verdict was delayed and Yalçın was released from prison. (*Öncü, Sept 8; Cumhuriyet, Sept 22*)

THE WORKERS PARTY, THE SOCIALIST PARTY, THE LABOUR PARTY

The Workers Party (*İşçi Partisi*). Among the party's founders were a number of trade union leaders, including Baki Ersoy and Feridun Şakir, two of the trade union representatives in the Constituent Assembly. Its leadership, elected on Feb 18, included: Avni Erakalin, President of the Istanbul Trade Unions Association—chairman; Kemal Türkler, president of the Mine Workers Union—vice-chairman; Şaban Yıldız, founder of the Workers' Trade Unions Confederation—SG; and Rıza Kuvas, president of the Rubber Workers' Union—Treasurer. (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 12-15, 18, 19*)

On March 13 the party opened its branch in Ankara. Deputy Şakir said the party would not unite with the Socialist Party (see below). (*Cumhuriyet, March 14*)

[The party did not succeed in organizing the branches in 15 provinces and all the districts thereof, required by law to enable them to participate as a party in the elections.] On Aug 7 Erakalin stated that the party was fully organized in seven provinces and was continuing its organizational efforts. The party had 6,000 registered members. He said the party advocated the extension of compulsory elementary education from five to seven years and also the freedom to strike. (*Cumhuriyet, July 28, Aug 8; Son Havadis, Aug 8*)

After the elections, at a meeting of the party's Central Committee in Istanbul on Nov 5, speakers claimed that other parties had "lured" the workers by putting up as many as 30 candidates but had failed to assure the election of even one of them. President Gürsel was criticized for having failed to nominate any trade union leader to the Senate in his quota of 15 nominees. The meeting called upon the TU leaders belonging to other parties to join the party. (*Hür Vatan, Nov 6*)

The Labour Party (*Çalışma Partisi*) was headed by Bedrettin Ertensoy, an industrialist. The party was formed in 1950, and suspended in 1958. Ertensoy said his party stood for social justice, raising the standard of living, unemployment and other social insurances, and distribution of land to landless peasants. (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 12-15*)

The Socialist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*). [Only scant information was available on this party. Its SG was Allettin Tiritioğlu.]

During the first weeks after permission was granted for party activity, the party was reported to have opened branches in Ankara, Bursa, Istanbul, Izmir, Konya and Uşak and to be examining the prospects for opening branches in Adana, Eskişehir, Hatay, Şanlıurfa and Zonguldak. (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 21*)

The members of the party's central committee had been on trial on charge of political activity and were acquitted on Feb 6. (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 7*)

[There were no reports on the registration of the party.]

Merger Between Socialist Party and Labour Party. At the beginning of March, the Socialist Party and the Labour Party merged on the initiative of Tiritioğlu, SG of the former. The united party was named the Socialist Party of Turkey; Ertensoy, who was appointed president of the party council, told the press on March 3 that the party's aim was to bring an English and north-European type of socialism to power in Turkey. The party also suggested a merger with the Workers' Party, but this was rejected by the latter. (*Cumhuriyet, Feb 24, 25, March 4, 14*)

Following the referendum on the new constitution, Tiritioğlu accused the administration in the provinces of preventing his party from organizing branches though Gürsel had declared that the country needed a socialist party. The administration should allow the party to organize branches in order to prevent the growth of Communism in the country. He claimed that the dangers inherent in the administration's policy became clearly apparent when there was a majority of "No" votes in the referendum in the provinces of Bursa, Izmir and Zonguldak in spite of their masses of workers and notwithstanding the rights that were granted them in the constitution. The party had called upon the workers to approve the constitution but, with no branches in these provinces, the party was not effective. (*Cumhuriyet, July 15*)

INTER-PARTY RELATIONS

RPP Bid For Understanding With Other Parties; Parties' Honeymoon. On April 1 the RPP Istanbul branch gave a cocktail party for the other parties in the city as a gesture of friendship. Representatives of the NTP, RNP and the Homeland Party attended. (*Cumhuriyet, April 2*)

The following day İsmet İnönü, the RPP leader, made a political statement to the press for the first time since the May revolution. He said that there must be a radical change in the country's political life. The parties, which would be more numerous than in the past because of the introduction of the proportional system, must live together and assist each other, whether they were in power or in opposition. The RPP, though attacked from several quarters, would strive to achieve this new way of democratic life. He also called upon the parties and the citizens to help the NUG in this critical period of transfer of power by maintaining law and order. (*Cumhuriyet, April 3*)

İnönü's declaration was supported by the leaders of the NTP, RNP and JP. Bökükbasi, the RNP leader, issued a statement in a similar vein (*Cumhuriyet, April 4, 7*). So did Alican the NTP leader, but he added that the RPP was in danger of becoming short-tempered, "seeing itself already in power and finding that the new parties, and especially the NTP, are growing quickly." (*Cumhuriyet, April 10*)

Breach in Honeymoon; RPP Altercations with JP, NTP. At the beginning of May the parties' honeymoon was interrupted when Alican, the NTP leader, repeatedly declared that the RPP would not win the forthcoming general elections. These declarations, according to *Cumhuriyet*, violated the rules authorizing political activities and were resented by the RPP leaders who stressed their belief that the party would return to power. Gümüşpala, the JP leader, joined in the debate by supporting Alican's declarations; he added that the JP would not let the RPP

win and would not join any grouping with the RPP. The debate tapered off when an NTP leader from Istanbul said that his party was friendly towards the RPP as well as towards the other parties. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 7, 10, 12)

An incident occurred between the RPP and the NTP on May 18 in an Anatolian village, when RPP members in the village intercepted NTP members. The NTP leader, Alican, demanded official intervention and the Minister of the Interior informed him that the matter had been submitted to the local court. The RPP SG claimed that before the May revolution, the local NTP chairman had been the local DP chairman and in this capacity had caused a local official to be beaten up and expelled from the village. The injustice had now been corrected, but several villagers became angry when this former DP chairman became NTP chairman. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 23)

Another similar minor incident occurred in Gaziantep but was given considerable publicity. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 9)

On June 9 a free-for-all took place between RPP members and NTP members in a town in the province of Siirt; it was suppressed by the police, and 16 NTP members and four RPP members were detained. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 10)

At provincial conferences held by the RPP in June, Alican, the NTP leader, was repeatedly attacked for his criticism of the RPP and its leader, and was accused of being Menderes' successor. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 5, 7)

JP-NTP Merger Contemplated. In June and July there were contacts and public discussion on a possible merger between the JP and the NTP. RPP leaders saw in such a possibility an attempt to re-establish the DP. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 20, July 13)

[The NTP seemed more inclined to favour such a project than the JP.] On July 13 Alican, the NTP leader, asked by a member of an audience "in the name of the DP followers and the whole Turkish nation" to unite his party with the JP, replied, "if all of you want it, there is nothing that is not possible." Gümüşpala, the JP leader, on the other hand, stated earlier (June 19) that unification was impossible because of differences in the parties' programmes.

It was reported that there were differences on the subject than the JP. On July 13 Alican, the NTP leader, DP members advocated unification on the grounds that the JP's prospects in the forthcoming elections were dim, whereas the retired officers and the former Peasants' Party

members were of the opposite opinion. On July 17 the JP Central Executive Council stated that a merger was not feasible for legal reasons, as the new united party would be barred from participation in the elections. It expressed the hope that cordial relations between the two parties would continue and that the project would be discussed again after the elections. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 20, July 13, 15, 16, 18)

Government Calls for Cessation of Propaganda. On July 15 the PM's office requested the parties to cease their propaganda activities while organizing provincial branches and holding congresses there, as this was not yet permitted by law. Heavy punishment awaited the offenders. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 16)

The following day, in his message on the referendum, Gen. Gürel exhorted the parties to "abandon destructive efforts" to destroy each other and to divide the citizens into hostile camps. (*R. Ankara*, July 16 [18])

Such warnings continued until the beginning of Aug, but all this time the parties, quite undeterred, continued to attack each other. Only the RPP called upon the parties to ease the tension though it also continued its propaganda. The most outspoken attacks were those of Bölükbaşı on Gümüşpala [his rival in the opposition to the regime]. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 17, 19-26, 29, Aug 4, 6)

Press Criticism of Political Parties. The Istanbul [independent] paper *Akşam* wrote that, in various degrees, all parties were on the wrong path. None of them had taken up the country's genuine problems and their leaders were arguing with each other like rivals in a village coffee shop. The new parties had brought nothing new to the country, the old parties had been unable to rid themselves of their traditions, and the people, watching "this struggle of the blind," were becoming pessimistic. The success of the democratic experiment depended on the alteration of this situation. Change, however, could be effected only by going to the roots of the matter, not by closing down a party (*Akşam*, Aug 7). Ankara radio, which broadcast this article, followed up with comments in similar vein. (*BBCM*, Aug 16)

In the (pro-JP) Istanbul daily, *Son Havadis*, Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, similarly expressing dismay at the prevailing political atmosphere, suggested a "four-power meeting" between Gümüşpala, Alican, Bölükbaşı and İnönü whose responsibility encompassed not only their own parties but the affairs of the country as a whole. (*Son Havadis*, Aug 10)

OPPOSITION AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

NOTE: Opposition and subversive activities attributed to members of a legitimate political party are recorded under the headings of the respective parties. All other such activities as well as arrests and trials and other government countermeasures are recorded hereunder.

OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES AND ARRESTS

Arrests on Charges of Propaganda and Other Activities Against the Revolution. Following is a list of such arrests during Jan-Feb:

the most prominent person to be arrested during the period was Prof. Ali Fuat Bağış (Jan 11) [for his case, see p 539 a];

other arrests made: three persons in Lapseki (Darda-

nelles) on a charge of tearing up Atatürk's pictures in village schools (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 3);

on Jan 4 a tax collector and a coffee-maker in Eskişehir for writing under Atatürk's statue "Menderes forgive us"; they told their interrogators that they wanted to provoke a new revolution and the return of the DP; the offence was denounced by the town's revolutionary organizations (*İnkılapçı Cemiyeti*, *Eskişehir Türk Devrim Ocağı*) as well as by three trade union federations and the local youth association and education society. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 6, 7);

on Jan 30 ten workers at a power station near Istanbul; no reason was given [perhaps in connection with the Silahlaraga affair—see below]; also seven former DP

members in Gaziantep, for subverting public order (*Times*, Feb 1);

on Feb 5 seven former DP members in a village near Aydin, for sending to the village schoolmaster threatening letters protesting against a theatrical play "Tails (*Kuyraklar*) Seeking a Head" performed by the school. [After the May revolution "Kuyraklar" was a popular nickname for DP partisans]; six were released; the letterwriter was imprisoned;

on Feb 6, 13 former DP members in the towns of Tire and Degirmendere near Izmir; among them the former DP District Committee chairman, the former Mayor of Tire, and a preacher (*vaii*), who had been previously under arrest for exploiting religion for political purposes; pamphlets and arms were found in their houses. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 6, 7)

The Kirdar Funeral Demonstrations. On Feb 19 demonstrations took place in Istanbul during the funeral of Dr Lütfi Kirdar, a former governor of Istanbul and Minister in the Menderes government, who died of a heart attack on Feb 17 while giving evidence at the Yassiada Court. The crowd which followed the funeral from the Mosque—mostly former DP members—cried "Freedom, Freedom," intoned the Tekbir (*Allahu ekber*), banned from recital in public by Atatürk's secular laws, and tried to seize the coffin. Gen. Refik Tulga, military governor of Istanbul who appeared in the midst of the demonstrators, was booed. About 25 persons, most of them former DP members, were arrested; seven were soon released.

The Istanbul University Students' Union called for strict measures against persons violating Atatürk's ideals and laws.

The authorities were said to have taken "an exceptionally grave view" of the incident because it showed the strong support the fallen Menderes government continued to enjoy. On Feb 21 the government issued a statement condemning the incident as running counter "to our laws and traditions" and warning that the revolution would "not allow its noble ideals to be harmed... The Turkish nation and government, which, in the light of Atatürk's ideals and in the fresh spirit and beliefs ushered in by the May 27 revolution, have undertaken great tasks, are determined to crush immediately any attempt to harm the fatherland..."

The governor of Istanbul followed this up with a warning of his own: "We shall crush those who exploit religion for political purposes." (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 20-23; *Times*, Feb 20, 22, 23; *R. Ankara*, Feb 21 [23])

Thirty-seven persons were brought to trial before a military court in Istanbul. On June 17, 13 of the defendants were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to one year; 18 were transferred to a civil court; six were acquitted. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 18)

The Silahtaraga Affair: Plot to Liberate Yassiada Prisoners. On Feb 13 and 22, arrests were made in Istanbul in connection with an attempt to sabotage the electric power station at Silahtaraga, Istanbul. The power station was put under military guard. First reports said that about 160 persons had been detained but most of them subsequently released, and that several hundred houses of former DP members had been searched.

The Martial Law authorities opened an inquiry under the direction of the governor of Istanbul. The Minister of the Interior followed the investigations on the spot. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 23-25; *Times*, Feb 23, 24)

On March 16 it was announced that the investigations

had been concluded; 49 persons—whose names were given—had been arrested and would be brought to trial. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 17)

The trial opened on May 4 before a military court in an army camp near Istanbul. The defendants, all of them former DP members, were mostly workers, drivers and clerks from the power station; there were also three sergeant-majors, a corporal, three private soldiers and two housewives. The indictment said they had plotted, under the leadership of Mehmet Inanli, a former president of the Electric, Gas and Vehicle Transport Workers' Trade Union, to blow up the Silahtaraga electric power station, to take Istanbul with the help of arms which were found in their possession, and to release the DP leaders from Yassiada. (Earlier, on March 25, Gen. Gürsel told the press that even if such a result had been achieved, they would have found at Yassiada "only flesh and bones"—*R. Ankara*, March 25 [26]; *Cumhuriyet*, March 26.) They planned to enter Yassiada disguised as soldiers. The defendants pleaded not guilty. The trial continued until Sept.

On Sept 19 the court acquitted 19 of the defendants, and sentenced 28 to prison terms ranging from six months to five years and ten months. One defendant had died and one had been acquitted earlier. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 5, 9, 16, July 29, 31, Aug 1, 8, 12, 15, Sept 5, 20)

Further Arrests on Charges of Propaganda and Activities Against the Revolution. The following arrests were made during March-April (arrests of members of legitimate parties not included):

on March 3 in the Ereğli coal mines, a pensioned officer, two officials and four workers; also the muhtar of a village near Denizli—all for hostile propaganda;

on March 4, 12 persons in a village near Aydin including the schoolmaster, who was accused of educating children against the revolution; also eight persons in a village in Izmir province, who had assembled before the house of the muhtar to demand his resignation and, when he refused, inveighed against the revolution;

on March 21, an imam in the town of Beyşehir (Konya province), for attacking the revolution and the government in his sermons; also a former DP muhtar of a village in the same province and his brother, for a similar offence;

on March 23, 15 persons, among them two former mayors in Orhangazi and Gemlik (Bursa province), for subversive activities—nine of them were released a month later;

on March 27 five persons in Istanbul for subversive activities and attempts to revive the dispersed DP;

on March 28 four persons in a village in Izmir province for conducting propaganda against the revolution; the next day, a person in Istanbul for a similar offence;

on March 29 the mufti of Zara (Sivas province) who had declared in his sermon that the defendants in Yassiada were innocent, whereupon the congregation had immediately left the mosque (*Cumhuriyet*, March 4, 5, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, April 18);

at the end of March three persons in Istanbul; one on charge of sending threatening letters to the members of the Yassiada court, the Supreme Investigation Committee, and to the Attorney General and his deputies; the others on charge of propaganda against the revolution;

on April 1, 14 persons in the province of Bursa for subversive activities, among them a village teacher;

on April 5 a person in Denizli for painting pro-Menderes and anti-Gürsel slogans on traffic signs; also six persons in a tavern in Istanbul for drinking to the health

of Adnan Menderes and after clashing with supporters of the new regime;

on April 9 five persons in an illegal arms workshop in a village near Bursa; also a person in a café in Tuzla (Adana province) for preventing the guests from listening to the Yassiada radio programme;

on April 10 two persons in a village in central Anatolia for tearing up the pictures of Atatürk and Gen. Kâzım Karabekir, [one of Atatürk's earliest supporters] in the village office; also eight persons in Bayındır [near İzmir] for talk at a banquet "against the President of the Republic and the RPP";

on April 12 seven persons in Adana for anti-revolution activities in a textile factory;

on April 17 six persons in Bursa for subversive activities;

on April 21, a village teacher in Sivas province, for propaganda against the revolution;

on April 25, a former chairman of the DP club in a village near Nazilli for activities against the revolution; the next day, six adherents of the Akifî Tarikatı religious order in a village near Bursa for attacking and destroying a statue of Atatürk; 50 students from Bursa went to the village to talk to the villagers on Atatürk's revolution (*Cumhuriyet*, April 1, 2, 4, 8, 11, 13, 18, 22, 27, 28);

on May 1 five persons in Kuyucak (SW Anatolia) for tearing down pictures of Atatürk and Gürsel from the walls of a café. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 2)

Charge of Plot to Reinstate DP Regime. During May 9-11 large-scale arrests were made in İstanbul, İzmit, Bursa and Ankara; 140 according to Gen. Gürsel; 200 according to unofficial reports. The detainees were mostly former DP members, among them several members of the JP. They were accused of armed subversive activities with the aim of reviving the dissolved DP. They had tried to infiltrate into military units and establishments with saboteurs.

Some of those arrested in İstanbul had, according to the military authorities, succumbed to the "subversive influence of foreign ideologies." *The Times* correspondent wrote that hammer and sickle signs were found painted on walls in İstanbul at the beginning of May.

This affair was described in officially-inspired circles as the most serious challenge yet made to the revolutionary regime.

Students' unions warned the "dark forces" that they would "perish under the strong blows of the Atatürk youth," and the students at Ankara and İstanbul universities staged demonstrations in protest of the reported plot and in support of the NUC.

On May 12 Gen. Gürsel warned the leaders of the new parties who were trying to take the place of the dissolved DP, which thought of nothing but revenge on the military who had overthrown Menderes. He added that such a policy was liable to lead to civil war. Two days later, Gen. Gürsel warned that no quarter would be given to those who sought, through subversive activities, to prevent the holding of elections.

The detainees were interrogated in army camps in İstanbul and Bursa. On May 16 there were 25 more arrests while eight persons were released. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 10-14, 17; *R. Ankara*, May 9-11 [12, 13]; *Times*, May 11-13, 15; *Economist*, May 13; *Sunday Times*, May 14; *Guardian*, May 20)

On June 2 ten persons out of 35 arrested in İzmit were released. On June 7 it was reported that following the conclusion of investigations in Bursa, out of 80 detainees

only 13 had remained under arrest. Of these, it was reported later, ten were charged with being Communists and were to be brought to trial before a Criminal Court (*Cumhuriyet*, June 3, 7, July 13). [No report was found of any trial in connection with the alleged plot.]

More Incidents and Arrests. On May 12 slogans against the "national revolutionary government" were painted on the walls of the school and mosque in Kuyucak; some 30 persons were interrogated. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 13)

The following arrests were reported from May to Sept, excluding the arrests of members of legitimate parties:

on May 9 a former member of the DP and of the Nurcu order, in a village near Nazilli, for tearing down Gen. Gürsel's picture in a café;

on May 14 and 16, eighteen persons in Burdur, including two JP members, after leaflets attacking the revolution and carrying the letters DP (Democratic Party) had been broadcast in the streets (all except the two JP members and a former DP member were released during the following days);

on May 15 a woman in Adana for talking at a bus station against the revolution and in praise of Menderes; also a secondary school teacher in Uşak, for propaganda against the revolution and in favour of the Nurcu order, and a person in Manisa for "activities not in accordance with the national interest";

on May 16 a person in Germeçik (Aydın province) for cursing President Gürsel;

on May 21 four persons in two villages near Kuyucak for anti-revolution and pro-Menderes talk and propaganda;

on May 29 four former DP members in towns in Denizli province, for activities against the revolution (*Cumhuriyet*, May 11, 16, 17, 22, 30);

during the last week of May, some 21 persons in Uşak province for uttering threats against Gen. Gürsel and propaganda against the revolutionary regime; some were caught tearing up photographs of Gen. Gürsel and members of the NUC (*Times*, June 2);

on June 3 a policeman in Ardahan [Kars province] for shooting at a picture of Atatürk in a coffeehouse;

on June 7 a former DP member and mayor of Manisa was arrested in Balıkesir, no charges were published;

on June 14 three persons from Akpınar [Sivas province] for felling two telephone poles and cutting down the telegraph line; also three persons in Ankara in front of the Defence Ministry while smoking hashish in a taxi and having in their possession a letter [the content of which was not revealed] to Salim Başol, the President of the Yassiada Court (*Cumhuriyet*, June 5, 8, 15, 16);

on July 6 a policeman in Burdur, for propaganda against the regime (*Cumhuriyet*, July 7);

on Aug 6 a person in İstanbul for throwing stones at a statue of Atatürk; also a man in a village near Isparta for insulting the government in a coffeehouse.

On Aug 7 it was reported that a retired General and another person had been detained in Ankara for talking for about six months against the NUC and the revolution but were freed for lack of evidence. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 8)

On Aug 8 it was reported that two men had been arrested while trying to escape, after having attempted to derail the Anatolia Express. (*Öncü*, Aug 8)

On Aug 12 five arms smugglers were arrested in Ankara. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 13)

On Sept 17 two persons were arrested in İstanbul on a charge of talking in the streets against the revolution. (*Cumhuriyet*, Sept 18)

TRIALS ON CHARGES OF OPPOSITION AND SUBVERSION

Note: Trials of members of legitimate parties as well as of Communists and Leftists are not included hereunder, but are recorded under the respective headings.

Trial of a Group Charged with Planning Coup. On Jan 26 a trial opened in an Ankara military court of 32 persons accused of attempting to overthrow the government and to release Adnan Menderes and members of his deposed regime. The defendants included a lawyer, two NCOs, three minor clerks, two farmers, six workers, seven craftsmen, seven small merchants, two servants, a taxi owner and a housewife. The two NCOs, the indictment said, were to ensure the cooperation of the armed forces. Twenty one of the defendants were among the group of 62 arrested in Dec 1960 in Ankara (see MER, 1960, p 459; *Cumhuriyet*, Dec 29, 1960).

Twenty-seven of the defendants were found guilty and, on March 15, sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to four years; the others were acquitted; twelve of them were released before completing their terms (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 27, 28, Feb 1, 3, March 16, 17; *Times*, Jan 28, March 17). On Aug 2 the Military Supreme Court of Appeal quashed these verdicts on grounds of defective procedure, and acquitted the defendants. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 3)

Trials on Charges of Propaganda and Activities Against the Revolution. On Jan 26 four former DP members were put on trial in Aydin on charges of inciting the people against the revolution. (*Monde*, Jan 27)

In the first half of April, a former DP member was sentenced to five years' imprisonment by a court in Uşak for activities against the revolution and praising Adnan Menderes. (*Times*, April 12)

On April 13 two lawyers, one of them a woman, who had been arrested in Ankara in Dec 1960, were sentenced to imprisonment by a military court in Ankara for insulting Gen. Gürsel, the NUC, the government and the army, and for writing anonymous letters and distributing pamphlets against the revolution. Mrs Necla Carpan was sentenced to nine years and two months' imprisonment, and to six years and two months' forced residence in Istanbul after the end of the prison term. The man, Mehmet Emin Akyuz, was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and five years' forced residence in Ankara. Both were former members of the DP. The trial began on Feb 16 (*Cumhuriyet*, April 14; *Times*, April 15);

On April 28, 25 clerks and workers of the Sümerbank textile factory in Adana were acquitted of charges of activities against the revolution by a court in Adana and were released. The audience in court shouted: "Long Live Turkish Justice," it was reported, while the eyes of the young prosecutor brimmed with tears. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 29)

On May 9 Mrs Müjgan Çeren, former President of the DP women's branch in Istanbul province, was sentenced to one year imprisonment by a military court for activities against the leaders of the country. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 10)

On May 11 a 24-year-old imam from Istanbul, who had preached against the revolution in a mosque in Turgutlu, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a fine of £T600. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 12)

On July 3 two persons were fined £T500 each by an İzzit court for tearing down posters calling on the people to vote "Yes" in the referendum on the constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 5)

Trial for 1960 Plot to Overthrow the Regime. On June 15, 11 persons, among them two Air Force NCOs, were brought to trial before a criminal court in Eskişehir on a charge of plotting a rebellion on Oct 29, 1960 with the aim of overthrowing the NUC and returning the DP to power. They had been in contact with Col. Alpaslan Türkeş, then a member of the NUC, and had prepared to recruit a force of 11,000 persons in Eskişehir province. They had planned to occupy the premises of the Eskişehir province administration and municipality, to issue communiqués from there and then to take over the power station and the anti-aircraft unit. [No further reports on this trial were encountered]. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 16)

LEFTISTS

Trial of Leftist Journalists. On May 18 Aziz Nesin, a journalist, and İhsan Ada, editor of the Istanbul daily *Tanin*, were arrested in Istanbul. Nesin was charged with writing articles which included pro-Communist propaganda and Ada with publishing them. *Tanin* was owned by Kasım Gülek, former SG of the RPP and a member of the Constituent Assembly. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 20)

On July 8 Nesin and Ada were released on bail (*Cumhuriyet*, July 9) and in Aug tried by a military court in a public trial in Istanbul. In his defence, Nesin said that Turkey's future lay in a leftist orientation and that whilst most Turks claimed they were following the principles of Atatürk, the present trend in Turkey was not the same as in Atatürk's era. He said: "I am a socialist; even in the most capitalistic countries there is a trend towards socialism." He pointed out that in his allegedly offensive articles this was the line he had taken (*Yeni Sabah*, Aug 23). At the end of Oct, both Nesin and Ada were acquitted of charges of Communist propaganda. (*Tanin*, Nov 1)

Arrest of Leftist Artist. İbrahim Balaban, one of Turkey's best known young painters, was arrested towards the end of May; no charges were published but it was remarked that Balaban was generally regarded as holding left-wing views, and as his arrest followed that of the two journalists of similar opinions, it was presumed to form part of an "unexpected move by the military authorities against certain leftist personalities... who have presented a new element in the situation" (*Times*, May 27). Balaban was released but arrested again on July 12. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 13)

COMMUNISTS

Gürsel said in answer to a press question: "Ours is a very liberal government, but I hardly think it would run to permitting a Communist party. All the same, I personally think it would be a good thing if a Communist party were formed, as it would be on the surface and not conducting subversive activities underground." (*Cumhuriyet*, March 26; *Times*, March 27)

Communists Charged with Plotting Against Regime in Collaboration with DP, JP Members. At the beginning of May, when a group composed mostly of former DP members was charged with conspiring to overthrow the regime, it was reported that Communists as well as JP members were among them. In July it was reported that ten of the 13 persons who still remained under arrest at Bursa in connection with this affair were Communists. (See above: Charge of Plot To Reinstall DP Regime.)

Campaign Against Communists. At the end of May, the government opened a campaign against Communism and

Communists. It was noted that street banners in Ankara, Istanbul and other cities read: "We do not want Bolshevism in Turkey" though most of the slogans were, as before, directed at "reaction." This was something new, a correspondent noted. (NYHT, June 3-4)

Commencing June 4 Ankara radio broadcast anti-Communist slogans between programmes. Those broadcast on June 5, with the introductory words "Attention, fellow-countrymen," included the following: "The aim of Communism is to infiltrate and turn brother against brother"; "Communism and lie-spreading is considered a fictitious art"; "Water sleeps but Communism does not"; "Communism has several kinds of clothes; if you wash them the enemy you know emerges from them"; "The Communist mixes with you in the guise of Turk and Muslim." (BBCM, June 8)

On June 6, 12 persons, among them two women, were arrested in Eskişehir on charges of collecting some \$T10,000 from former DP members, buying arms and inciting women to demonstrate against the regime; some also for encouraging people to listen to "Our Radio," the clandestine Communist radio station. (Cumhuriyet, June 7; Times, June 8)

Charges of Communist Subversion. On June 7 the authorities announced that they had arrested a group of 22 Communists, among them physicians and engineers who had engaged in subversive activities. They had mingled with the citizens and incited them to act against the revolutionary regime, and had prepared acts of sabotage aimed at creating anarchy. (Cumhuriyet, June 8)

The Times correspondent in Istanbul wrote that the operations against the Communists were accompanied by an apparently inspired press campaign. Most of the leading daily newspapers wrote on June 8 under banner headlines, that "a great struggle against Communism" and other forms of subversion against the revolution was now opening while at the same time, somewhat paradoxically, the papers printed statements by Gen. Gürsel and other NUC members apparently designed to reassure the population that such activities presented no serious danger. Gen. Gürsel said on June 7: "Five or ten persons are not important. There is nothing to worry about." The correspondent noted the tendency of recent official pronouncements to represent religious reactionaries and the adherents of Menderes as acting in collaboration with the Communists in opposition to the regime.

Observers were puzzled both by the publicity now being given to the "struggle against Communism," which until a few weeks before was officially regarded as practically non-existent in Turkey, and by the apparent desire of the military authorities at the same time to play down the extent of the police operations. The government had been anxious about the increasing number of listeners to "Our Radio," but this could hardly explain the need for the present campaign. It was believed possible that the revolutionary regime wished to put an end to rumours abroad that it had leftist tendencies which might have adverse effects on Turkey's allies or alternatively, that it wished to have reasons acceptable to public opinion in Turkey for suppressing dangerous elements among adherents of the former government. (Times, June 9)

At the end of June the Minister of the Interior, Nasir Zeytinoglu, was reported to have said that about 400 suspected Communists who had infiltrated into various organizations had recently been arrested. (Times, June 30; NYT, July 1). Zeytinoglu denied that he said this; only three had been arrested. (Cumhuriyet; Guardian, July 1)

More Arrests and a Trial. On Aug 4 it was reported that a group of 24 Communists had been arrested in Istanbul, most of them "intellectuals: doctors and lawyers," led by Dr Şerif Kırkçu. As the names of these persons, it was reported, did not appear in the Security Directorate's lists of Communists they had easily infiltrated into various organizations and had worked for a long time with impunity. (Cumhuriyet, Aug 5)

In Oct, Lamiya Iren, a teacher of English, was sentenced in Istanbul to six years and eight months' imprisonment for Communist propaganda and attacking the country's leaders. "Our Radio" said she had delivered a lecture praising the scientific value of Gagarin's space flight. (Cumhuriyet, Oct 30; Our Radio, Oct 31 [W, Nov 9])

SECURITY MEASURES

Martial Law Prolonged. Ankara and Istanbul remained until Nov 30 under the Martial Law which had been imposed on April 28, 1960 by the Menderes government. It was prolonged every three months. (R. Ankara, Feb 20 [23], May 22 [W, June 1], Aug 16 [W 24])

On July 31 Martial Law was extended to the whole of Turkey on the grounds that negative elements, working against the principles of the May 27 revolution, were trying to sabotage Turkey's movement towards democracy and the holding of general elections. The Times correspondent commented that this measure had been prompted by the many "No" votes in the referendum on the constitution; "the military leaders are clearly nervous about popular reactions during the critical final stages of the Yassıada trials..." (Cumhuriyet; Times, Aug 1)

Public Warnings; Security Decrees. [There were many public warnings to desist from opposition activities. These have been recorded under general developments.]

In April, in a tour of Anatolia, Col. Osman Köksal, an NUC member, told the peasants that if subversive elements among the former Democrats tried to make serious trouble, they would be crushed immediately; plans were ready for putting down a revolt. (Cumhuriyet, April 12; Times, April 15)

On July 15, six days after the referendum on the new constitution, an administrative circular was issued which stressed the following points: (1) polemics likely to confuse the minds of people in regard to the new constitution would not be permitted; (2) as elections were approaching, propaganda likely to spoil the national unity would not be tolerated; (3) apart from the organizing activities permitted to the political parties, no party or election propaganda would be allowed; (4) printing or distributing leaflets on elections and the constitution was contrary to law; (5) public discussions and propaganda on the subjects of the revolution and the Yassıada trials were forbidden; (6) the ban on carrying arms would be rigorously enforced; (7) the administrative authorities should well appreciate their powers and responsibilities and act in a more determined and dynamic manner in regard to disruptive activities which ran counter to the national interest. (R. Ankara, July 15 [18]; Cumhuriyet, July 16)

On Sept 2, as the country entered the critical period leading to the announcement of the Yassıada sentences and the general elections, the Constituent Assembly passed a law which provided for the immediate arrest and trial of persons committing offences detrimental to the state in the period between Sept 2 and two months after the general elections (see also p 564 b).

Martial Law Ended. On Nov 30 at midnight, the Martial Law was lifted after a duration of 19 months and two days. Gen. Cemal Tural, Commander of the Martial Law in Istanbul, said that the Martial Law courts had dealt

with 1,013 cases since the revolution; 286 has resulted in convictions and 633 in acquittals, 34 cases were dropped. The remaining 60 cases had been transferred to ordinary courts. (*Cumhuriyet; Milliyet, Dec 1*)

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Eighteen Members Nominated by NUC. The elections and nominations to the Constituent Assembly were concluded in the last days of 1960 (see MER 1960, p 454) except for the 18 members of the House to be nominated by the NUC whose names were published on Jan 3. Among these were Prof. Hifzi Veldet Velidedeoğlu and Prof. Ragıp Sarica, both members of the constitution committee (see MER 1960, p 453); Col. (ret.) Recip San, the former Director-General of Security; Gen. (ret.) Fahri Belen, a former Minister of Communication; Gen. (ret.) Zekai Okan, brother of the NUC member Sezai Okan and a former Ambassador; and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, a leader writer for *Ulus* and a former ambassador. (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 4*)

RPP Majority in the House of Representatives. According to *Cumhuriyet*, the House comprised 222 RPP supporters, 25 RPNP supporters and 25 independents. The paper noted that the law provided that members of the House should represent the Turkish nation alone and not any political or other body which happened to elect them, and may not receive directions from any quarter (see MER 1960, p 453). (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 2*)

New Government Before Assembly's Opening. On Jan 5, on the eve of the inauguration of the new Constituent Assembly, Gen. Gürsel formed a new government which included six new ministers, four of them members of the Assembly. (For details see: The Government.)

The Opening Session. On Jan 6 the House of Representatives was opened in the new building in Ankara. Fahri Ördilek opened the session in the name of President Gürsel, who was ill. He read a message from Gürsel in which he said that for nearly a century and a half the Turkish people, in quest of science, law, justice and liberty, had made great efforts to establish a stable administration. Their aspirations had not been realized. Democracy in Turkey had failed up to the time of the May revolution because it was not sufficiently prepared for. As a result, the country had drifted into inexperienced and adventurous hands which had endangered Atatürk's reforms. The message concluded: "Today the real aim of the revolutionary government is to establish a democratic order with full safeguards, based on the principles of law, justice, freedom and virtue."

Thereafter the representatives, one by one, took the oath pledging to work with all their might for the "rule of law, democracy and human right" and to hand over power in the shortest possible time to a new elected Assembly.

Outside, in Ankara, students celebrated the events. (*Cumhuriyet; Times, Jan 7*)

Commenting on the formation of the Constituent Assembly, Abnet Emin Yalman, the prominent Turkish writer and journalist, recalled that on the day of the revolt foreign correspondents insisted that there was no example in history of a secret military committee turn-

ing over power to a legal civilian government. Gen. Gürsel had replied: "This is sure to happen this time, and you will witness it." "It has to be admitted," Yalman continued, "that this was a most optimistic prediction." Describing the efforts of the 14 radical officers to frustrate constitutional developments, their exile and the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, Yalman concluded: "This positive result attained in Turkey after a radical military revolt represents one happy development against an infinite number of adverse chances. It seems to be likely that the Turkish nation will prove to have learned something in the course of its intermittent struggles for reforms, lawful government and liberty over the last 150 years..." (*Rome Daily American, Jan 10*)

Elections of the House Chairman and Committees. On Jan 9 the House elected Gen. (ret.) Kâzım Orbay as President of the House, Lütfi Akatlı and İbrahim Senil as his deputies, and four secretaries.

Orbay, born in 1886, served in the army from 1912 to 1950 when he was pensioned off by the DP government. From 1944 to 1946 he served as Chief of the General Staff. Following his election he declared: "The fact that you have elected an old soldier, ... is a new proof of confidence in the ... armed forces."

The same day, the House elected its two most important committees, each consisting of 20 members: the constitutional committee and the electoral law committee, to prepare the drafts of the new constitution and electoral laws respectively.

Enver Ziya Karal (RPP) was elected chairman of the first and Şefik İnan (RPP), who had served in Gürsel's first cabinet, chairman of the second committee. Both committees included RPP, RPNP and independent members. Five of the members of the constitutional committee were former members of the constitution committee, which had been appointed by Gen. Gürsel immediately after the coup (see MER 1960, p 453)—Professors Aksoy, Sarica, Savcı, Tunay and Velidedeoğlu. Amil Artun, former Minister of Justice, was also on the committee. (For full list, see *Cumhuriyet, Jan 10; Ulus, Jan 11.*)

THE CONSTITUTION ADOPTED

Work of the Constitutional Committee. On Jan 13 the draft constitution, prepared by the constitution committee which had been established on May 28, 1960 (MER 1960, p 453), was handed to the House of Representatives' constitutional committee. This draft was to form the basis for the committee's work. (*Cumhuriyet, Jan 14*)

Commencing work, the committee resolved on Jan 20 that the new constitution should be drafted in pure and intelligible Turkish, without employing uncommon terms or new words and without attempting to replace Turkified Arabic words in common use. (*R. Ankara, Jan 20 [23]*)

On March 9 the committee submitted the draft constitution to the House of Representatives. (*Cumhuriyet, March 10*)

Discussion in the Constituent Assembly. The House began discussions on the draft at a ceremonial session on March 30 (*Cumhuriyet*, March 31). On May 4, following two readings, the House approved the constitution by a 222-0 vote, with five abstentions (two RNP and three RPP members). The draft was then submitted to the NUC, in its capacity as the Upper House of the Assembly. Various minor changes suggested by the NUC were discussed and mostly accepted by a joint committee of the NUC and the House. The third reading took place at a joint session of the two houses on May 25-27. (For sources, see below.)

Constitution Approved in Assembly. On May 27 the new constitution was approved. Of the 295 members of the two houses of the Assembly, 262 were present, 260 voted in favour, and two abstained—Orhan Köprülü, the son of Prof. Fuat Köprülü (see MER 1960, p. 436) who had been appointed to the Assembly by Gen. Gürsel, and Yekta Karamustafaoğlu, one of the ten representatives of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Of the 33 absent, some were preoccupied with affairs of state, others were on leave by permission of the Assembly, or ill; the rest consisted mainly of Osman Bölükbaşı, the RNP leader, and his "close friends." However, on May 30 Bölükbaşı declared that the RNP was supporting the constitution. He added: "It is our most sincere wish that with this constitution a period of freedom and merit will be opened." (*Cumhuriyet*, April 1, 8, 11-15, 18-22, 26-30, May 1, 2, 4-6, 9-11, 13, 15, 18-21, 29, 31)

QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE

Following are the principal points in the Assembly debate on the constitution:

Article 2: The Terms "Social Justice" and "Nationalist." Article 2 of the new constitution was the cause of a heated debate in the House because of the innovations introduced in it in comparison with Art. 2 of Atatürk's Constitution.

The relevant article in the latter read: "The Turkish state is republican, nationalist, populist, étatist, secular and reformist."

Art. 2 of the draft constitution read: "The Turkish republic is democratic and secular, based on human rights and liberties and on the fundamental principles of work and social justice."

A number of representatives criticized the omission of the words "nationalist," "étatist" and "reformist..." They described the reference to the principles of "work and social justice" as the thin end of the wedge for a possible future Communist regime and equated "social" with socialism and socialism with Communism.

The chief protagonists of the nationalist idea, an observer stated, tended to "be found among traditionalists and representatives of Islamic interest in the country, in what might roughly be called the extreme right wing of Turkish politics." Since about 80% of the representatives were members or supporters of the RPP, he added, the debate on the terms "nationalist" and "social justice" reflected to some extent a latent political division in the RPP between right and left wings. After reconsideration, the constitutional committee suggested the following text: "The Turkish Republic is a judicial, national, democratic, secular and social state, based on human rights."

The new text was again criticized, especially the employment of the term "national" (millî) instead of "nationalist" (milliyetçilik) but this was rejected by the House, and the word "national" was finally adopted.

There was a demand to reinstate the term "social justice." The Assembly, however, decided to include the term among the fundamental principles of the state in the Preamble, with a reference to the latter in Art. 2. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 1, 8, 11, 27, May 19, 20; *Times*, April 10, 12, May 13)

Future of the NUC Members. A heated debate was caused by two articles inserted by the NUC to secure the future of its members: Art. 70 providing for life tenure in the Senate for the NUC members, and Transitory Art. 4, providing that in no circumstances could NUC members be brought to trial for their acts and deeds in the period between May 27, 1960 and Jan 6, 1961 (see also: *The NUC*).

The House did not approve the latter article until a provision was added that the acts and deeds of the NUC during this period might be repealed or modified in the same way as other acts of the republic, though no claim of unconstitutionality could be brought against them. The leaders and members of the House for the RPP, RNP and NTP signed the text of the Article. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 5)

Proposal to Purge the Judiciary. In the debate on Transitory Art. 8 dealing with the status of the institutions of the former regime, 87 deputies submitted a motion to establish a supreme council of judges to carry out a purge among the judges within four months (i.e. before the new institutions came into being following the elections). The motion was aimed at judges who had supported the dissolved Democratic Party. Only after İnönü intervened in the debate saying that no good could come to the country from a purge, was the motion taken to a vote and rejected. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 5)

THE CONSTITUTION

Sources: Following is an outline of the new constitution with emphasis on the points in which it differed from the constitution of 1924. The new constitution was published in Official Gazette No. 10,816 of May 31, 1961, and the Turkish text also appeared in *Türkiye Yılığ*, 1962: English translations: (1) *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 215 ff; (2) *The Turkish Constitution*, translated by *The Week*, Ankara, 1961; (3) *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*, *Türk Argus Ajansı*, İstanbul, 1961; (4) a précis may be found in *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 18,647 et seq. Comparison between the new Constitution and that of 1924 may be found in *Türkiye Yılığ*, 1962; *Times*, March 10, May 29; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 5. (For appreciation by a Turkish authority see: Prof. İsmet Giritli: Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution, *ME Journal*, Vol. 16; No. 1, Winter 1962)

General: The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası*) was approved by the Constituent Assembly on May 27, published in the Official Gazette on May 31, submitted to a popular referendum on July 9, and following its approval in the referendum was promulgated as Law 334 in the Official Gazette of July 20.

The constitution contained a preamble and six parts divided into 137 articles and eleven transitory articles.

Preamble: The preamble said that the constitution was proclaimed in the name of the Turkish nation, which had lived in freedom and fought for its rights and liberties throughout history; carried out the May 27,

1960, revolution in exercise of its right to resist a power which had lost its legality, inspired by Turkish nationalism; fully conscious of the principle of "Peace at Home, Peace in the World," the spirit of national independence and the reforms of Atatürk, and in order to establish a state of law and democracy which would ensure and protect the social and human rights and liberties, national solidarity, social justice, and the prosperity of the individual and society. [There was no preamble to the 1924 constitution. As to "social justice," see debate on Art. 2, above.]

Part I. General Principles (Articles 1-9) provided that Turkey was a republic and "a national, democratic, secular, and social state" governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble (Art. 2).

Sovereignty was vested in the nation, would be exercised through the authorized agencies as prescribed in the constitution and could not be delegated. Legislative power was vested in the Grand National Assembly and could not be delegated; executive functions would be exercised by the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers; and judicial functions would be exercised by independent courts. The Republican form of the state could not be amended nor may any motion therefore be made. [The emphasis on the prescription to delegate powers was new.]

Part II. Fundamental Rights and Duties (Art. 10-62).

[The provisions for the freedoms and the political rights included in this part were much more detailed and more safeguards were provided for them than in the 1924 constitution. The provisions for social rights, including labour rights, and the duties of the state in the economic-social field were, except for free and compulsory primary education, a complete innovation.] The constitution provided that every individual was entitled to such inalienable rights and made it incumbent upon the state to remove all political, economic and social obstacles, restricting them "in such a way as to be irreconcilable with the principles embodied in the rule of law, individual well-being and justice and to prepare the conditions for the development of the individual's material and spiritual existence."

All individuals were "equal before the law irrespective of language, race, sex, political opinion, philosophical views, or religion," and no privileges would be granted to "any individual, family, group, or class."

Articles 14 to 34 provided for the rights of the individual "to improve himself materially and spiritually," to personal freedom, privacy, immunity of domicile, freedom of communications, travel and residence, of thought and propagation of opinions, the right to education, the freedom of the sciences and the arts, the freedom of the press and book publishing, the right of individuals and political parties to avail themselves of public communication facilities, the right of rebuttal, the right of assembly and the forming of associations; protection against unwarranted arrest (24 hours limit of custody without court judgement); the right to seek justice and various kinds of judicial protection.

Art. 19 providing for freedom of faith and worship also prescribed the exploitation of religion for the purpose of political or personal benefit "or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religious dogma." Political parties violating these provisions might be permanently closed down. [This was an innovation.]

Articles 35-53 concerned social and economic rights and duties. They provided for the protection of the family, "the foundation of Turkish society," and the right to ownership and made it incumbent upon the state to provide land for farmers with no or insufficient land, authorized expropriations and nationalization in the public interest and provided for full compensation (see also p 528 b), and provided for the right to and freedom of contract and private enterprise. Economic and social life was to be regulated in a manner consistent with justice and full employment, with the objective of a dignified standard of living for everyone; it was the duty of the state to encourage economic and cultural development by democratic procedure.

Every individual had the right and duty to work. It was incumbent upon the state to protect workers, promote employment and assure decent wages. Children, youth and women were to be accorded special protection; the workers had the right to paid days of rest. Trade unions might be established and the workers would be given the right, by special legislation, to collective bargaining and to strike.

The state was charged with establishing or assisting in establishing a social security system, as well as with ensuring medical care, providing housing for low-income families, providing free (compulsory) elementary education and assuring capable students of higher education, promoting cooperation, protecting agriculture—with special reference to soil erosion—and the farmer and taking measures to provide the people with adequate nourishment.

The state was to carry out the above duties "only insofar as economic development and its financial resources permit."

Political Rights and Duties. (Articles 54-62). This section provided for the right of all citizens, with the usual exceptions, to elect and be elected in free, secret, equal and direct elections. Political parties could be founded without prior permission and operate freely; "whether in power or in opposition, political parties are indispensable entities of democratic political life." Parties were answerable to the Constitutional Court which also could dissolve them if they failed to conform to "the principles of a democratic and secular republic based on human rights and liberties, and of the state's territorial and national integrity." [There was no reference at all to political parties in the 1924 Constitution.]

Part III. The "Basic Organization of the Republic."

Articles 63-75 dealt with the legislature. The Grand National Assembly (GNA) would be composed of the National Assembly (NA) and the Senate of the Republic [formerly the GNA consisted of one chamber only]; the NA to consist of 450 deputies elected for four years by general direct ballot; the Senate to consist of 150 members elected for six years and of an additional 15 members appointed by the President of the Republic; every two years, one-third of the senators would rotate.

GNA members would enjoy the customary immunities. Legislation could be initiated both by the Council of Ministers and the members of the GNA, bills being debated first in the NA and then in the Senate. In case of disagreement between the two houses, the NA could override the senate vote after certain proceedings.

The elections would be held under the direction and control of judicial organs (Art. 75). [This was a major innovation. This task has formerly rested with local administrative authorities.]

The President of the Republic (Articles 95-101) would

be elected for seven years from among members of the GNA by secret ballot and by a two-thirds majority, or by an absolute majority in the third ballot. He would not be eligible for re-election and would have to disassociate himself from his party, and his parliamentary membership would terminate upon his election. He would preside over the Council of Ministers whenever he deemed it necessary; ratify and promulgate international conventions and treaties; and exercise the right of reprieve. [Formerly the President was elected for four years and was eligible for re-election. He was not obliged to disassociate himself from his party.]

The Council of Ministers (Articles 102-111). The Prime Minister would be designated by the President from among the members of the GNA, while other Ministers would be nominated by the PM and appointed by the President either from Assembly members or [and this was an innovation] other qualified persons. A new Council of Ministers had to submit its programme to the Assembly for a vote of confidence. If the cabinet had been twice defeated on a non-confidence vote within 18 months, and if another such vote was passed thereafter, the PM might request the President to call new elections, the final decision lying with the President after consultation with the chairmen of the two Houses. Before elections, the Ministers of Justice, the Interior, and Communications must resign, and be replaced by independent members of the GNA. [This provision, as also Art. 75, was introduced as an additional guarantee for free and fair elections.]

The office of Commander-in-Chief would be "integrated in spirit" in the GNA and be "represented" by the President. The cabinet would be responsible to the Assembly "for ensuring national security and preparing the armed forces for war," while the Chief of the General Staff, appointed by the President on the nomination of the Cabinet, would be Commander of the Armed Forces. The National Security Council would consist of Ministers, the CGS and representatives of the armed forces, under the chairmanship of the President.

The articles concerning administration (112-125) provided *inter alia* [for the innovation] that all administrative acts or procedures would be subject to judicial review. Art. 119 forbade government officials and certain categories of employees in public institutions to join political parties. Art. 120 guaranteed the scientific and administrative autonomy of the universities. [This was not provided for in the former constitution.] University teachers might be party members but must not assume executive functions outside the parties' central organizations.

Art. 121 guaranteed the impartiality of the state broadcasting (radio and television) and news agencies, [another innovation].

Economic and Fiscal Provisions (Articles 126-131). Economic, social and cultural development would be based on a plan [an innovation], the organization and functions of the State Planning Organization [established in Oct 1960] and the preparation, execution, and revision of the plan being regulated by special legislation. The right to explore and exploit natural resources would belong to the state, and participation by private enterprise would be subject to explicit legal permission. Special provision was made for conservation and development of forests, [to cope with the major problems of soil erosion which had reached catastrophic dimensions, partly because for political reasons the peasants had been allowed to devastate the forests.]

The Judiciary (Articles 132-152). This section pro-

vided for [two major innovations to ensure] the independence of the judiciary. Judges might not be dismissed, or retired without their consent, except in specially defined cases. Decisions on all personnel matters regarding judges would be entrusted to a Supreme Council of Judges, [similar to the French *Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature*] which would also elect the members of the Court of Cassation. All court proceedings would be open. Military courts could try civilians for military offences only. High courts included the Court of Cassation, the Council of State (an administrative court), the Supreme Military Court and the Court of Conflicts (to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary administrative and military courts).

There would also be a Constitutional Court of 15 ordinary and five alternate members, all with judicial qualifications and elected respectively by the Court of Cassation (4), the Council of State (3), the Court of Accounts (1), the NA (3), the Senate (2), the President (2) with the main functions of: (1) reviewing the constitutionality of laws and by-laws passed by the GNA; (2) trying for offences connected with their duties the President, ministers, judges of the Supreme courts, the chief prosecutor, the chief attorney, and its own members; (3) fulfilling the other tasks assigned to it by the constitution, e.g. decisions on the dissolution of political parties. [The court was a major innovation. The lack of it had been generally considered a serious defect and had led to the passage of laws which were now regarded as having been unconstitutional.]

Part IV. Miscellaneous. Art. 153 under the heading: "Protection of the Revolutionary Laws," provided guarantees for the following reforms of Atatürk: (1) the unity of education (1924); (2) the wearing of hats (1925); (3) the prohibition and abolition of dervish monasteries (1925); (4) the principle of civil marriage (1926); (5) the adoption of international numerals (1928); (6) the adoption of the modern Turkish (Latin) characters (1928); (7) the abolition of titles such as Efendi, Bey, Paşa (1934); (8) the ban on wearing certain types of clothes (1934).

Part V comprised provisions for the transition to the institutions elected according to the new constitution and provided guarantees for the NUC—which would cease to exist with the convening of the GNA—for their acts and deeds during the period May 27, 1960-Jan 6, 1961 [the day when the Constituent Assembly began to function].

Part VI. Final Provisions (Articles 155-157) stated, *inter alia*, that amendments to the constitution required a two-thirds majority in both Houses and that the constitution would come into force following the referendum.

THE REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION

The Referendum Law. The referendum law was approved by the Constituent Assembly on April 26 and came into force on May 2. Voting rights and administration of the referendum would be the same as in the general elections; voting would be by two ballot papers marked "Yes" and "No"; the new constitution would come into force if over half of the total number of valid votes would be in favour. (*Cumhuriyet*, Feb 28; *Türkiye Yılıgi*, 1962)

Propaganda Campaign. On June 3 the NUC decided to hold the referendum on July 9. It also decided on a pro-

paganda campaign as of June 21, to be conducted by its members, members of the cabinet, deputies, political parties and workers' organizations, to explain the constitution to the people. From June 28 to July 4 representatives of political parties gave radio talks, according to a time-table determined by lots at the Supreme Electoral Council. NUC members toured the country explaining the constitution to the people. The campaign ended on July 5 (three days before the referendum) according to law. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 4, 21, 23, 24, 28, July 1, 3-6; *R. Ankara*, June 22, 27 [24, 29])

"Steps Towards Democracy; Vote of Confidence in Regime." *The Times* correspondent commented that the leaders of the revolutionary regime were taking the vote seriously. "Though there had been sardonic allusions in some quarters regarding the practicability of holding a referendum on something so complicated as a constitution in a country like Turkey (where the literacy rate is still only about 35 per cent) the Army leaders, and their associates, clearly consider it an essential step on the road to a Western-type democracy. Its more significant, though less publicized, aspect is that it is also clearly intended as a vote of confidence in the May 27 coup and in the revolutionary regime." (*Times*, July 7)

Workers, Youth Organizations Support the Constitution. The Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions decided on April 21 to support the new constitution in the referendum, as it gave the right to collective contract and the right to strike. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 22)

On June 16 the General Congress of the Zonguldak Mine Workers' Union decided unanimously, in the name of its 40,000 workers, to vote "Yes." (*Cumhuriyet*, June 17)

The National Students' Federation and the National Youth Organization resolved to campaign for the approval of the constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 19, 26)

"Constitution Favourable to Religion." In a pamphlet calling for support of the constitution, the head of the [government] Religious Affairs Directorate praised the attitude of the regime towards religion and said the constitution was "the most favourable according to our view." (*Cumhuriyet*, July 2)

Political Parties' Support. All political parties, old and new, large and small, except the Justice Party, expressed their support for the new constitution, even before the campaign began. In provincial and district congresses, broadcasts, bulletins and public meetings, their leaders called upon their members and the citizens in general to participate in the referendum and approve the constitution.

[The RPP leaders endeavoured to counteract the apparently widely-held view that the constitution was something of a private party enterprise.] Prof. Feyzioğlu declared that, although the RPP had a majority in the Constituent Assembly, the new constitution "is not the constitution of the RPP but the constitution of the whole Turkish nation."

Party speakers generally emphasized that the new constitution was an extension of Atatürk's political ideas, pointing out that it contained all necessary safeguards for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizen and for his economic and social welfare. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 2, 5, 9, 20, 26-30, July 1-5)

Opposition by Justice Party. The Justice Party, which, according to Gen. Gürsel, was dominated by members of

the dissolved Democratic Party (*Cumhuriyet*, July 25), was the only legal party to criticize the constitution openly and also to conduct a clandestine propaganda campaign against it. A bulletin issued on June 26 by the JP and signed by its leader Gümüşpala, stated: "We believe in the capacity of the administration but we leave the last and definite decision to the nation." One must look, it continued, for defects in the form and contents of a constitution which had been formulated in a single year and in a revolutionary atmosphere.

This statement was generally regarded as an invitation to JP followers to abstain or even to vote "No." Gen. Gürsel said that he understood it so. A member of the party's executive council, Dr. Mukbil Özyörük, left the party, claiming that after he had explained the new constitution to the party's chairmen in the provinces, Gümüşpala's statement had left him no other recourse. Gümüşpala's statement was immediately condemned in a spate of official declarations and editorials.

The party's public attitude still remained equivocal. On June 29 Gümüşpala stated: "We called upon the people to vote in favour," but the executive council had considered itself unqualified to guide the people as to how to vote, since the party had not had time to convene its congresses and find out the views of the people.

In a broadcast to the people on July 2, Kamuran Evliyaoglu, member of the party's executive council, said that the party had decided to vote "Yes," but warned that the principle of a social state was dangerous and contradicted party principles. Other JP members claimed that a regime of social justice might lead Turkey towards the establishment of a Communist state. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 27-30, July 3; *Times*, July 7)

JP Propaganda Campaign; the Story of "Monsieur Referendum." The JP was also accused of spreading rumours against the constitution among the peasants, whose attitude, *The Times* correspondent wrote, was "as usual, enigmatic." When the hitherto unknown word "referendum" was first introduced, Anatolian peasants were said to have been told that a foreigner named "Monsieur Referendum" was being brought to Turkey by the military government, and that this gentleman proposed to close down all the mosques and abolish the Qur'an. Others were told that "Monsieur Referendum" was really Archbishop Makarios in disguise, and they should have nothing to do with him. (*Times*, July 7)

On July 7 four JP members, one of them a former DP member, were arrested in Istanbul for calling upon the people to vote against the constitution, though propaganda was banned during the last three days before the referendum. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 8)

In a letter to Gümüşpala, written after the referendum and condemning the party's policy, Gen. Gürsel listed "what your party has suggested to the nation: do not vote for the constitution and let's hope for the best. Use the red colour (the referendum ballot marked "No" was in red) which is the colour of our banner... If you vote 'Yes'... they will hang Menderes. If you vote 'Yes'... the Communists... will take over the country; they put the word 'social' in for them. In addition, for the strengthening of the party [your party told the voters] we shall re-establish the DP; when the time comes we shall take revenge, we shall save those in Yassıada... Such provocative efforts were exerted amongst innocent villagers." (*Cumhuriyet*, July 25)

Gürsel's Call; Attacks on the JP. In a broadcast on July 4 Gen. Gürsel called on the nation to affirm the consti-

tution. He said that the parties had praised the new constitution and he called on the citizens to endorse it. "Our scholars, intellectuals, politicians and administrators" had carefully worked on it and it was good and splendid work. Unfortunately there were some wretched people who wished to prevent the nation from reaching this goal and expected to benefit from instability, to which end they were employing lies and rumours. "Do not be deceived by them... Our national interests lie in taking another important step towards achieving a democratic regime by national endorsement of the constitution..." (*R. Ankara*, July 4 [6])

Two days later at a press conference Gürsel was asked whether any measures were being contemplated against the JP. He answered: "My belief is what all the citizens believe. I think that those who do not know that this party is not following a good path, are those innocent citizens who are the followers of this party and the party leader himself." Gümüspala immediately asked for a meeting with Gürsel, to take place following the referendum, but the following day cancelled this request. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 7, 8, 9)

Voting Day Procedure. The referendum, the first popular vote of that kind ever to be held in Turkey, was held on July 9.

Voters arriving at the polling stations were given an empty envelope and then entered a curtained booth. In the booth were two piles of paper slips, white ones marked "Yes," and red ones marked "No." The voter put one of the slips into the envelope in private, and then deposited the envelope in a sealed box in the presence of the officials.

During the day, the radio stations called on the citizens to participate in the voting, stressing that it was a national duty. Participation in the voting was larger in the villages of Anatolia than in the big towns.

The vote seemed to have taken place in most areas in a calm atmosphere; no serious incidents were reported. A few persons were detained for conducting propaganda, which was contrary to law. There were some complaints about irregularities, which were immediately corrected, in the voters' lists; it was also reported that some "Yes" slips had been stolen from the booths. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 10-13; *Times*, July 10)

Constitution Approved. On July 19 the Supreme Electoral Council published the final results of the referendum, as follows:

registered voters—12,735,009; votes cast—10,322,169 (81%);
invalid votes—39,608; valid votes—10,282,561; "Yes"—6,348,191 (61.7%); "No"—3,934,370 (38.3%).

Thus, according to the law, the constitution was approved. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 20, 21)

Western Anatolia Voted "No." The majority of the "Yes" votes came from the eastern and southern provinces; in Mardin province they reached 97.7%. Istanbul and Ankara affirmed the constitution by an overwhelming majority. "No" votes were in the majority in W. and N.W. Anatolia, stronghold of the dissolved Democratic Party. In 11 provinces, "No" exceeded "Yes" votes: Adana (Sakarya), Aydin, Bolu, Bursa, Çorum, Denizli, Izmir, Kütahya, Manisa, Samsun and Zonguldak. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 11-13; *R. Ankara*, July 11-12 [13]; *Times*, July 11; for detailed results see table below.)

Reasons for the "No" Vote. *Cumhuriyet* advanced the following reasons for the considerable "No" vote, on

the basis of on-the-spot investigations by its correspondents:

1. increased taxes exacted by the government;
2. "the influence of the coloured paper slips" [the paper does not explain this point further. Perhaps it meant to suggest that the voters, especially the rural population, found the red "No" slip more attractive than the white "Yes" slip. Also, as recorded above, the Justice Party was accused of having told the people to use the red slip; possibly the conspicuous colour made its work easier.]

3. the fact that the parties had not been sufficiently organized to conduct effective propaganda. (A leader of the Socialist Party claimed that if the party had had organized branches in the provinces of Bursa, Izmir and Zonguldak, where there were many workers, it could have prevented the large "No" vote there. The party claimed that the authorities had prevented it from organizing—for details see: *The Socialist Party*.)

4. the hope that a "No" vote would result in lighter sentences for the former DP leaders who were being tried in Yassıada, whereas a "Yes" vote would result in more severe sentences. [This, it will be recalled, was a feature of the Justice Party propaganda.]

5. strong underground propaganda (*Cumhuriyet*, July 11-13, 15). On this clandestine campaign, Gen. Gürsel said: "What lies were circulated! What comparisons were drawn! And above all what large amounts of money were spent by clandestine hands! No hesitation was shown in resorting to all sorts of dirty, mean provocations to mislead the citizens..." (*R. Ankara*, July 16 [18])

6. a vote against the revolutionary regime. Foreign observers remarked that the large "No" vote could be interpreted less as a reflection on the constitution itself than as a criticism of the revolutionary regime in general. Many Turks were not convinced that it had been either necessary or right to overthrow Menderes. The referendum was the first opportunity they had of registering their disapproval of the coup. (*Times*, July 11; *Economist*, July 15)

Conversely an Ankara Radio commentator said: "The 'Yes' votes for the constitution could also mean support for the revolutionary government." (*BBCM*, July 13)

7. the "No" vote was a DP vote—see below.

Democratic Party Versus Republican People's Party. A RPP spokesman claimed that all RPP members and supporters had voted "Yes" and those who voted "No" were all former members of the DP. He pointed to the fact that the results of the 1957 general elections in Kütahya province had been the same as the results of the referendum. Thus, he claimed, DP followers had revived the RPP-DP struggle. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 11)

A foreign observer remarked that the referendum was in many ways a trial run for the coming elections. The strongest party in the field, the RPP, could not be very happy with the results. It was thought unlikely that the "Yes" votes would go en bloc to the party. (*Scotsman*, July 21)

Free and Secret Vote; Non-Interference by NUC; The Military As Defenders of Democracy. Foreign correspondents commented that the referendum had evidently been fair and secret; the voters felt able to vote as they pleased—hence the large "No" vote—and the government had apparently attempted neither to tamper with the results, "which could not be very palatable to it," nor to disguise them. (*Times*, July 11; *Economist*, July 15; *Observer*, July 16; *Scotsman*, July 21)

The Christian Science Monitor commented that the Turkish military class had often provided more reliable defenders of constitutional progress than had the politicians, with few notable exceptions. Those familiar with the rôle played by the officer class in bringing Western ideas into Turkey did not share the concern sometimes expressed about Gen. Gürsel's intentions. Actually, Gen. Gürsel was among those most impatient for a new constitution to take the place of his own military government. (*Christian Science Monitor*, July 14)

[Such points were naturally emphasized by spokesmen for the regime.] Nowhere else in the world could one find such an example of the evolution of a military administration into a democracy, said an Ankara Radio commentator. (*BBCM*, July 13)

In a message to the people on July 16, Gen. Gürsel said: "I am addressing you today proud and moved to be a Turk." The participation in the referendum—over 80%—was such as even nations with a long established democratic regime hardly attained. "The Turkish people... have proved how seriously interested they are in their own vital problems..." Some citizens were worried by the large percentage of "No" votes. This attitude was not correct. If some citizens voted "No" as a result of their own views, they should be respected. "If, however, they were misled... and provoked into this decision, we should denounce the instigators and the provocators rather than blame the citizens." Gen. Gürsel went on to describe the clandestine propaganda which had been

conducted, but, he said, the Turkish people found the right path.

"My dear people," Gen. Gürsel concluded, "you are a great nation... I bow before the supreme power of your maturity, dignity and perfection, and especially before your patriotism... How happy one must be to call oneself a Turk." (*R. Ankara*, July 16 [18])

Agitation Against Constitution, Arrests of JP Members, Others. Following the approval of the new constitution, 16 persons, among them former DP members, were arrested in Izmit province for propaganda against the constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 15)

On July 13 a large-scale brawl took place in a village in Siirt province between those who had approved and those who had voted against the constitution; several persons were injured. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 15)

On July 14 ten JP members in Denizli province were arrested for declaring that "those who voted in favour of the constitution are Communists"; nine of them were later released. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 15)

In mid-July, a former DP chairman in a village near Izmir was arrested for propaganda against the government at the time of the referendum. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 20)

On July 23, 15 persons were arrested in Istanbul for acting in opposition to the rules issued on July 15 banning all public discussion of the referendum, the Yasa trials or the forthcoming elections. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 25)

THE ARMY IN POLITICS

THE "FOURTEEN RADICALS"

More on The Fourteen Before Their Ouster. (Compare MER 1960, pp 436-9.) In Jan, Ahmet Emin Yalman [the well-known writer and journalist], writing in a foreign paper, said that Gen. Gürsel's declaration on the day of the coup that the army would turn over power to a legal civilian government, had been "most optimistic" and was hardly supported by history, particularly in this part of the world.

"The committee was working secretly and was soon surrounded by a large group of irresponsible persons—assistants, experts, flatterers, denouncers." In this "gloomy atmosphere" it was easy for a group of "activist, ambitious young officers" within the committee, led by Col. Türke, "a potential Turkish Abdel Nasser," to gain the initiative. In public speeches throughout the country, they expounded the view that Turkey was a retarded country and that slow progress was insufficient. Their programme for a more dynamic course was "a totalitarian regime in the form of a revolutionary national socialism and racism. They made no secret that they considered the free and independent universities and the free press as obstacles." Their primary way of action was to incite students and ambitious young members of the faculties against the senior members, and to create a conflict in the press by promising young journalists a "socialized" press, in which they would be the bosses.

"They tried to capture the... masses by spreading hatred against the well-to-do classes and appealing to the feelings of fanaticism and ignorance—in opposition to the modern and rational spirit created by the reforms of Kemal Atatürk. An underground of dissenters was formed, where partisans of the fallen DP, religious fanatics, ra-

cists, Communists, all sorts of ambitious and impatient elements were amalgamated..."

The moderate members of the NUC endeavoured to avoid an open conflict and urged the activists to respect their military oath to turn over power to a civilian government. At the same time, the NUC became convinced that it would be too dangerous to keep in its own hands the entire responsibility for running the government and preparing the constitution and electoral law. It therefore prepared to establish a Constituent Assembly (see MER 1960, p 453).

"As this move tended to frustrate the wish of the activists to retain the power in their own hands, they immediately plotted to seize power and arrest their opponents. They were found out and, on Nov 13, 1960 arrested and exiled... The reason for their mild treatment was the desire to avoid further controversy on the eve of the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly." (*Rome Daily American*, Italy, Jan 10)

In Nov, Senator Suphi Karaman, a former NUC member, declared that the 14 had been in favour of a referendum to determine whether the NUC should remain in power for a period of four years, during which time social reforms could be realized. They had not wanted a military dictatorship. (*Ulus*, Nov 2)

Şefik Soyuyüce Welcomes Establishment of Assembly. Soyuyüce, one of the 14, who had been posted to the Turkish Embassy in Copenhagen, conveyed his congratulations to his "friends, the members of the NUC" on the establishment of the Constituent Assembly which would bring safety and stability within the democratic system to the nation. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 6)

The Question of the Future of the 14. [The question of the future of the 14 and especially their return to Turkey was repeatedly raised.] On March 2 Gen. Gürsel said at a press conference that the government to be established after the elections would have to decide on this question (*Cumhuriyet*, March 3). Two months later [when it became clear that the NUC members would be constitutionally assured of immunity against possible prosecution on political charges in the future—see p. 548 h] Gürsel was asked at a press conference what would be the "security guarantees" for the 14 after the general elections. He answered: "Such a question... seems strange to me. The main thing is not the security of persons but the security and safety of the country..." (*R. Ankara*, May 13 [16]; *Cumhuriyet*, May 14).

In mid-June, at the time of the Madanoğlu-Tansel affair (see below), rumours spread that several NUC members were considering the return of the 14, as Lt-Gen. Madanoğlu, their chief opponent, had resigned from the NUC (*Times*, June 14). This was denied on June 15 by Gen. Gürsel (*Cumhuriyet*, June 16). When the rumours persisted, there were more denials by the NUC spokesmen during July and Aug. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 29, Aug. 1, 2).

In mid-Aug a spokesman for the NUC criticized the press for making an issue out of the 14, and said they could not lawfully return. He said they had been pensioned off in accordance with Law No. 126, had been assigned to their present duties abroad in accordance with Law No. 127 and could not be brought back for at least two years. The names of the 14 did not appear among the names of NUC members listed in Law No. 157 [the Constituent Assembly Organizations Law—see MER 1960, p. 453] and only the latter were, according to the constitution, "natural [i.e. permanent] members" of the Senate. Personal wishes and views had no value in face of the provisions of the law, the spokesman said. (*R. Ankara*, Aug. 12 [15]; *Cumhuriyet*, Aug. 13).

NUC Praise for the 14. On Oct 16, following the general elections, the NUC issued a communiqué stressing its pleasure at having kept its promise to hold free elections. It added: "This happy end is the result of the common belief of 38 comrades in the revolution. These 38 friends have equally participated in the preparation and execution of the revolution. But as it is in the nature of revolutions, differences appeared on the methods to be employed afterwards" and the 14 had to be sent abroad. "They have accomplished their duty with success..." (*Ulus*, Oct 17).

Six of the 14 Challenge the Constitutional Regime. Following the general elections, it was reported that seven of the 14 officers residing in Europe [Mustafa Kaplan, İrfan Solmaz, Dündar Taser, Münir Köseoglu, Şefik Soyuyüce, Orhan Kabibay and Numan Esin; Kabibay had initially been posted to Ottawa] had met at The Hague in mid-Oct for two days (*Cumhuriyet*, Oct 24). According to another version, the meeting had been held in Brussels with the participation of all the 14. They had charted their future course of action. (*Ulus*, Oct 31).

On Oct 29 six of the 14—Türkes, Kabibay, Erkanlı, Kaplan, Esin and Solmaz—held a press conference at the office of the Turkish press attaché in Paris. Declining to be quoted as individuals, they declared that the indicative results of the general elections proved that they had been right in opposing a ballot so soon after the revolution. Asked about their plans for returning to Turkey they said: "We are going back as soon as the

national interest demands it, and as soon as the situation is favourable." Until they returned, the six said, they would work through their many friends in Turkey in intellectual circles, the army, youth organizations and among the people.

They stated that the present situation in the National Assembly, where no party had a majority, was a vindication of what they had predicted a year ago. It was therefore only natural that they should now make proposals "to our friends in the political parties." They refused to be pinned down on specific points in their programme beyond saying that they felt that "social democracy should be achieved before full democracy can be realized." They said they believed that "the Assembly as presently constituted cannot deal with the grave problems existing in Turkey," and added: "As long as the deep problems which caused the May 1960 Revolution are not solved, our service is not completed."

It was reported that the six came to Paris to attend the receptions on Republic Day, Oct 29. They had asked the press attaché, Aydemir Balkan, to permit them to hold a press conference in his office, and he in turn asked the advice of the embassy. The answer from the embassy was not known (*Ulus*; *Cumhuriyet*, Oct 31). Öncü wrote that the press attaché was reported to have told Ankara that he had acted upon instructions from the embassy. The embassy, Öncü continued, would hardly have done so without referring the matter to Ankara; and it was clear that the government must have been acquainted with the matter. (*Öncü*, Nov 3).

Türkiye: No Hostility Towards Parties; Reform Necessary. On Nov 1 Alpaslan Türkeş, telephoning from Brussels, told *Son Havadis*, as reported: "We are not hostile to the existing political parties... We believe that the armed forces... are the sacred trust of our nation. We also believe that Communism presents the greatest danger to our country" and must be fought. "Ideological activities, the strengthening of national customs and morals and social and economic measures to end poverty are necessary," he said. He also denied that they opposed the holding of elections. (*Son Havadis*, Nov 2).

Intimations of Legal Action Against the 14 Fail to Materialize. On Oct 31 the government empowered the Foreign Ministry to conduct an investigation into the position of the six. They could be charged with making a political statement in their capacity as civil servants, which was contrary to law. President Gürsel indicated that legal action would be taken. [However, by the end of the year, there was no report of any action taken against the six.] (*Ulus*, Nov 1-3). On Nov 3 it was reported that the Foreign Ministry had asked them to return to their duties (*Yeni Sabah*, Nov 3). Another report said they were now in Rome (*Öncü*, Nov 3). Kızıloğlu, ambassador to the Vatican, who arrived in Ankara on Nov 7, denied that he had come to submit a file on the six to President Gürsel. (*Ulus*; *Öncü*, Nov 8).

Other Official and Army Reactions. On Nov 1 President Gürsel told the press: "[The 14] are just ordinary people with no superior qualities whatsoever. It is you, the journalists, who play them up as heroes by writing something about them daily."

Gen. Cevdet Sunay, the CGS, questioned regarding the possibility that the 14 enjoyed some support in the army, replied that they no longer belonged to the army. He was convinced of their patriotism; however, the Second

Republic was now established, so what else could they want? He could not believe that they would try to put the army to the test and "anyway the army is not so unrealistic and glib that it will acquiesce in becoming a puppet." (*Yeni Gün*, Nov 3)

THE MADANOĞLU — TANSEL AFFAIR

(June)

The Tansel Affair. On June 3 a brief announcement, which failed to make the front pages, stated that Lt-Gen. İrfan Tansel, commander of the Air Force, had been transferred to head the military mission in Washington; Maj-Gen. Süleyman Tulgan had been appointed acting commander. (*R. Ankara*, June 3 [W 8]; *Cumhuriyet*, June 4)

Five days later, on June 8, Lt-Gen. Tansel was returned to his command "to the satisfaction of all air force personnel," while Maj-Gen. Tulgan retired. An order to this effect was issued on the same day by Gen. Cevdet Sunay, the CGS. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 9)

Changes in the High Command; Purge in the Air Force. The same day, drastic changes were reported in the high command. Two NUC members who were in command of army units were reported to have resigned their posts. They were Lt-Gen. Cemal Madanoğlu, commander of Ankara garrison, and Col. Osman Köksal, commander of the presidential guard. [The first in fact resigned; the resignation of the latter was officially confirmed only two months later; see below.] Lt-Gen. Celâl Alkoç, commander of the land forces, and Col. Agasi Sen, President Gürsel's chief aide-de-camp, retired. It was reported that Muzaffer Alanus, the Minister of Defence, would also resign. Twenty to thirty high-ranking officers were reportedly purged upon the reinstatement of Tansel.

There was no official statement. Asked by journalists about the purge, Gen. Gürsel said: "What are they to you? What was done was done." (*Cumhuriyet*, June 9-11; *Times*, June 12, 13)

Atmosphere of Crisis; Madanoğlu Resigns from NUC. On June 9 an atmosphere of crisis engulfed Ankara and jet aircraft repeatedly buzzed over Ankara and Istanbul. This was understood by foreign observers as an act of pressure on the NUC, while NUC members described it as a celebration of Tansel's reinstatement.

The same day, Lt-Gen. Madanoğlu informed the NUC of his decision to resign his membership of the NUC.

The NUC held three meetings during the day. Finally, it issued a communiqué in which it approved the reinstatement of Lt-Gen. Tansel, denied the reports of changes in the high command, accepted Lt-Gen. Madanoğlu's resignation from his command but not his resignation from the NUC and granted him leave, and appointed Lt-Gen. Ali Keskiner commander of Ankara garrison, Maj. Kadri Ertek was appointed President Gürsel's chief aide-de-camp, in place of Col. Agasi Sen, who had retired.

Lt-Gen. Madanoğlu told journalists that he had resigned as he was in need of rest and his resignation was final; the decision to grant him leave was only a jest on the part of his friends in the NUC. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 10, 11; *Times*, June 12; *NYT*, June 16)

Lt-Gen. Madanoğlu was regarded as one of the most powerful figures in the NUC. He was generally supposed to have been the principal rival of Col. Türkeş, leader of the 14 "radical" officers and the prime mover in the elimination of this group. It was believed that he

bad acted with the approval and possibly the active support of İnönü, as he was considered a chief advocate inside the NUC of the return to power of İnönü and the RPP (*Times*, June 12-17). (Compare also MER 1960, pp 436-38; Madanoğlu was thought to be the leader of the "moderates" but in the reports on the election of the 14, his role was overshadowed by that of Col. Çökük.)

The Background: Army Commanders Against NUC. Foreign observers thought that the events described above amounted to a test of strength between senior commanders of the armed forces and the NUC, in which the former had gained the upper hand. The decision to transfer Lt-Gen. Tansel had been taken by Gen. Gürsel and other members of the NUC, presumably including Lt-Gen. Madanoğlu. This was immediately followed by a sort of rebellion in the air force, which caused the NUC to reverse its decision. The air force had also demanded the resignation of Lt-Gen. Madanoğlu from active command and when the NUC acquiesced, Madanoğlu resigned from the NUC. The part played by Gen. Cevdet Sunay, CGS, was enigmatic. It was known that the General Staff had approved the posting of Lt-Gen. Tansel to Washington, and was the first to announce his reinstatement.

These developments signified an apparent shift of power within the ruling group. There had been a growing rift in recent months between the command of the armed forces and the NUC owing to resentment in the forces at the Committee's interference with military appointments and more generally dissatisfaction at the NUC's conduct of national affairs. The removal of the two members of the NUC from command of troops and the appearance of the new and dynamic figure of Lt-Gen. Tansel could mean a strengthening of the leaders of the armed forces outside the NUC, vis-à-vis the NUC.

A senior officer was reported to have told *The New York Times* correspondent: "So far as I am concerned, there is no Committee. There is only the army. After all it was the army that carried out the revolution. The Committee depends on us, not we on the Committee." (*Times*, June 12, 13, 17; *NYT*, June 15, 16)

Postponement of Transfer of Power Rumoured and Denied; Army Chiefs Participate in NUC Deliberations. The crisis gave rise to speculations that the transfer of power to civilian hands would be postponed and a military dictatorship meanwhile established. Gürsel and other NUC members endeavoured to minimize the importance of the crisis and repeatedly promised that the referendum and general elections would be held according to schedule. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 10, 11; *Times*, June 12, 13)

On June 11 the NUC held a four-hour meeting. Cevdet Sunay, the CGS, and Lt-Gen. Muhtittin Onur, his deputy, participated in this meeting. This was the first time the army chiefs took part in the NUC meetings [thus affirming the view that a shift of power had taken place in favour of the armed forces.] A statement issued following this meeting noted that "some people, who are acting with concealed aims... are trying to confuse national opinion by attempting to spread untrue reports and propaganda... efforts are being made to exploit some appointments and changes in commands which were made within the authority and responsibility of the armed forces and entirely in accordance with the interests of national unity, and to exploit the report of one resignation from the NUC. These changes have been made because of the joint belief of the C-in-C and of the armed forces that they were necessary... The NUC, headed by

its Chairman, Gen. Cemal Gürsel, [and] fully supported by the Turkish armed forces... is firm in its determination to attain democratic and honest elections... during the period pledged... it will most probably be possible to put the new constitution to a public vote on July 9..." [It will be noted that the statement excludes the NUC—though not Gen. Gürsel, its chairman and C-in-C, from responsibility for appointments in the armed forces. On the other hand, the NUC, "supported by the armed forces," remains responsible for the political sphere.] (*R. Ankara, June 11* [13]; *Cumhuriyet, June 12*)

Commanders of the Armed Forces Retired. On June 19 the Ministry of Defence announced the following retirements, in accordance with Law No. 42, [which, *inter alia*, provided more favourable pension terms, see MER 1960, p. 443]: Lt-Gen. Celâl Aikoç, Commander of the Land Forces [this had been reported already on June 9, see above]; Vice-Adm. Zeki Özak, Commander of the Navy; Rear Adm. Emin İker, Commander of the Fleet; Rear Adm. Muhlis Güreman, Commander of the Straits and Marmara Zone. Lt-Gen. Şefik İter, Commander of the Second Army, was appointed member of the Supreme Advisory Council of National Defence (*Millî Savunma Yüksek İstisare Kurulu*). Lt-Gen. Muhiittin Onur, Deputy CGS, was appointed Commander of the Second Army and Acting Commander of the Land Forces. Rear Adm. Necdet Uran, Commander of the War Fleet, was appointed Acting Commander of the Navy. *Cumhuriyet*, which reported these changes a day before the official announcement, also reported the retirement of three staff colonels and two majors of the Air Force. *The Times* correspondent wrote that these changes were believed to be a further consequence of the crisis described above. (*Cumhuriyet, June 18, 20; R. Ankara, June 19* [22]; *Times, June 19, 21*)

Retirement and Resignation of the Minister of Defence. On June 14 *Cumhuriyet* reported that Lt-Gen. Muzaffer Alankuş, Minister of Defence, had asked to be retired from the army on the grounds that there were officers of higher rank than his on active service, and his transfer to civilian status would rectify this situation (*Cumhuriyet, June 14*). Two weeks later, however, Alankuş resigned [as *Cumhuriyet* had already predicted on June 9—see above]. Fahri Özdilek, the Deputy PM, was appointed Minister of Defence while Sütkü Ulay, Minister of State, became Deputy PM. (*Cumhuriyet, June 28, 29; Times, June 29*)

Madanoğlu's Final Resignation. During June and July, efforts to reinstate Lt-Gen. Madanoğlu in the NUC were reported. Gen. Gürsel declared that Madanoğlu had resigned "for reasons of fatigue"; this was his fifth resignation. Madanoğlu explained that he had resigned only once before in order to bring about the expulsion of Türkiye; when he achieved his purpose, he returned. Later he had twice threatened to resign, as a warning. Gen. Gürsel

met Madanoğlu twice. İnönü declared his hope that Madanoğlu would return to the NUC. (*Cumhuriyet, June 11, 21, 22, 23, 29*)

On July 20, NUC announced that it had accepted Madanoğlu's resignation from the NUC. Gen. Gürsel expressed his grief and said that "it is not good that so honest, pure and good a soldier is leaving us." (*Cumhuriyet, July 21, 22*)

Following a meeting with Gen. Gürsel, on Sept 9, Madanoğlu declared that he would neither join any political party, nor would he become a member of the Senate [which NUC members were automatically to become]. He added that he was working for the Ministry of Defence as a member of the Supreme Advisory Council for National Defence. (*Cumhuriyet, Sept 10*)

The Resignation of Köksal. On Aug 11, two months after the crisis broke out, the NUC announced that it had accepted the resignation of Col. Osman Köksal from his duties as Commander of the Presidential Guards on the grounds that with the freeing of political parties from Sept 10 and the move towards elections and a democratic administration "the duties of the NUC members, which is a legislative organ, have become heavier." (*Cumhuriyet, Aug 12*)

On this occasion the NUC spokesman again criticized the press. He deplored "the difference between the information released [on Köksal] and the news carried... by the newspapers." "My honourable friends," he told the pressmen, "let us for a while turn our eyes to our friends and foes abroad. More than ever before, we must be united as a nation..." (*R. Ankara, Aug 12* [15])

On Sept 9 Köksal handed over his command to his deputy, Lt-Col. Nedim Denizlioğlu. (*R. Ankara, Sept 9* [W 14])

New Army Junta Seen. Writing after the general elections in Oct, the Ankara correspondent of *The Economist* wrote that it had been clear for some months that the real rulers in Turkey were not the junta, "who are powerless and partly discredited, but a secret cabal of some two hundred officers in the armed forces known as the Ordu Şurası (the council of the army)." This "powerful body" was said to include the chiefs of the air and naval staffs and to have the patronage, though not the actual membership, of Gen. Cevdet Sunay, the CGS. Four or five extremist members of the junta were also in it, and it was said to have high-placed civilian members in the ministries. It was primarily Ordu Şurası which insisted on the execution of Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan and ruled out a government that did not include the Republican Party. (*Economist, Oct 21*)

NUC Ceases Existence. In accordance with the new constitution, the Constituent Assembly, and with it the NUC as its Upper House, legally ceased to exist with the inauguration of the newly-elected Grand National Assembly on Oct 25.

ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Press Suggestion for Conference Endorsed by Gürsel. On April 28, the first anniversary of the students' demonstrations in Istanbul (MER 1960, p. 429), ten Istanbul newspapers published a joint proposal for an agreement between the political parties. A round-table conference of all parties should be convened under the chairmanship

of President Gürsel to reach an overall agreement on Turkey's political future and the conduct of the forthcoming elections. The parties should also agree: (1) to remain loyal to the principles of Atatürk's reforms and to the new constitution; (2) not to follow the reactionary policies of the fallen regime; (3) to accept any sentences

which might be passed on the former leaders by the Yassıada Court. Such an undertaking, the papers said, would create an atmosphere of confidence, which was a fundamental condition for the speedy establishment of a democratic regime.

The *Times* correspondent commented that the reason for this move appeared to be the anxiety felt in some quarters, not least the military junta itself, lest some political parties appeal to the large mass of supporters of the Menderes government, and lest, in free elections, a reactionary government be returned to power. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 28, 29; *Times*, May 3)

President Gürsel said the same day that this was "a most patriotic proposal," and that this was in his programme for the future (*Cumhuriyet*, April 29). When Gürsel was asked later if he intended to convene the conference, he said "after May 27" [the anniversary of the coup]. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 14)

Reaction of the Parties. This idea was endorsed by İsmail Rüstü Aksal, the RPP Secretary-General, Turhan Feyzioğlu of the RPP central committee, Bedrettin Ertensoy, leader of the Socialist Party, and by the Homeland Party.

Ekrem Alican, the NTP leader, said that his party would support any effort to put an end to political disputes—for the benefit of the state, but not for the benefit of the political parties.

The JP declared, in essence, that though there was no need for it, such a conference was feasible if the national interest required it and the President approved it. However, the party desired to include in the agenda the conduct of several parties which led to tension. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 29)

Osman Bölükbaşı, the RPNP leader, at first refused comment but on May 10 said that if the President called such a meeting, he would make his attitude public. He added that the party could not agree to the suggestion that the political parties confirm in advance the verdict to be issued at Yassıada and thus assume the status of some strange supreme court of appeal. As to the reforms of Atatürk, they were embodied in the party's programme. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 30, May 11)

Preparing the Conference. In Aug. [after some delays] an NUC sub-committee opened talks with the party leaders. The talks concentrated mostly on ways and means of guaranteeing completely free elections. The sub-committee, *Milliyet* wrote, dealt with the question as to whether the NUC should take steps to guarantee the security of elections and the security of the post-election regime. In the present tense atmosphere, the paper said, some security steps were necessary but, if they were imposed by the NUC, some politicians would make the voters believe that the elections had not been fair. To avoid this the politicians at the round table would most probably sign an undertaking to accept the conference decisions as binding. The party leaders also met Gen. Gürsel. (*Hürriyet*, Aug 18; *Tanin*, Aug 23; *Milliyet*, Aug 25; *Cumhuriyet*, Aug 24, 26)

The Conference; NUC Proposals. The conference took place from Aug 31 to Sept 3 behind closed doors. The parties participating were the RPP, the JP, the RPNP, the NTP and the Free Homeland Party, each represented by its SG and three other prominent members. Nine members of the NUC participated, one of them acting as chairman. The NUC suggested the following 12-point agreement, to be signed by the party leaders:

1-5, 12) The following issues to be kept out of po-

litical controversy—the May 27 revolution, the reforms, religion, the Yassıada trials and verdicts, the forestry problem, foreign policy; 6) No suspicion should be cast upon the legality, freedom and fairness of the forthcoming elections under the present regime; 7) The public service should be assured of stability, impartiality and continuity; 8) A common front should be formed, in the NUC spirit, against destructive trends such as revenge, spite, regionalism and separatism; 9) The principles included in the declaration should be adopted and applied by all party members; 10) It should be confirmed that the reestablishment of party branches in the villages would not be advisable for some time; 11) The parties should make it clear that they shared a spirit of common understanding, so that after the elections no political tension would harm the interests of the country.

This proposal was accepted as an agenda by the party representatives.

The first day of the conference was marked by heated exchanges between the parties. The JP and the NTP accused the RPP of trying to create the impression that the May 27 revolution was made by one group for the benefit of another group (presumably the RPP). The RPP representatives replied that the JP and the NTP were trying to sow seeds of dissension among the citizens.

The NUC press office denied any tension in the conference. (*Turkish Press*, Sept 1-5; *R. Ankara*, Sept 2 [5]; *Times*, Sept 4)

Joint Declaration Signed. The final meeting of the conference, on Sept 5, was attended by the party leaders and presided over by Gen. Gürsel. Members of the government, the NUC, the chiefs of staff of the three services, many high officials and members of the press were present.

This meeting had been postponed for two days as the RPNP representatives refused to sign on the grounds that they had not been given full powers by their party, and because Osman Bölükbaşı, the RPNP leader, refused to participate and to sign.

The declaration was signed on behalf of their parties by the following leaders: İsmet İnönü (RPP), Ekrem Alican (NTP), Enver Adakan (Homeland Party), Rağıp Gümüşpala (JP), and by Ahmet Öğüz (RPNP)—according to *Ankara Radio*, in the name of Bölükbaşı.

The declaration, called by the press a "national pact" (*Millî Antlaşma*), stated that the conference was convened on NUC initiative for the purposes of eliminating harmful disputes from political life and achieving a democratic state of law—"the noble aim of the May 27 revolution."

Authorized delegations of the parties had debated and unanimously approved the items of the agenda drafted by the NUC. There had been a complete identity of views at the conference. "We have, therefore, decided to sign this declaration in the presence of... Gen. Gürsel... and to proclaim it to the great Turkish nation as a document of undertaking."

The undersigned pledged themselves not to allow the May 27 revolution to be exploited for political purposes, for the Turkish armed forces used "the right of the nation" to resist an illegal government of oppression and tyranny; pledged themselves to protect Atatürk's reforms in accordance with the new constitution;

pledged themselves to respect freedom of religion and conscience, not to wage propaganda likely to lead to doubt and hesitation, or to exploit religious feelings in any way;

pledged themselves not to make any statement likely to affect the decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice (Yassıada) nor to allow these decisions to be debated or exploited;

expressed the belief that the NUC and the neutral administration would hold free and fair elections;

stated that it was natural to exercise the rights of objection, but unfounded arguments liable to "overcloud" the elections and to create doubt in the minds of the people were acts against the democratic order and national peace;

pledged themselves to keep the administration and public services free of partisan interference;

pledged themselves to oppose "the extreme Left, Communism, the extreme Right, racialism, and every form of totalitarian mentality, zonal division, separatist activities, animosity, feelings of revenge and subversive movements," as running counter to democratic and lay republican principles;

agreed that the creation of a "front of enmity" of one party against another rendered the establishment of democratic order difficult, and created dangers to national unity and existence;

agreed that the question whether the district and sub-district party organizations should be revived or not should be left to the Assembly to be formed after the elections;

pledged themselves to reject any form of pernicious propaganda on the subject of forests;

stated that foreign policy, "which has assumed a national character, should not be the subject of disputes which might prejudice our national interests";

expressed the belief that to prevent political tension damaging to the country both before and after the elections, political parties should act in a civilized and sensible manner and regulate their relations, whether in power or in opposition, in accordance with the principles of democratic understanding;

pledged themselves not to tolerate any attempt to violate these principles, which were based on the national interests. (*R. Ankara, Sept 5 [8]; Turkish Press, Sept 6-7*)

Condemnation of the Democratic Party. A further section of this declaration which condemned the deposed regime was only published by the NUC on Sept 16, the day after the Yassıada verdicts, on the grounds that it might have influenced the verdicts of the Court. In this section, the parties declared that they would not permit political exploitation of the May revolution, staged by the armed forces in compliance with the nation's willingness and right to resist a regime which, (a) after assuming power by free elections, attempted to eliminate political rivals and perpetuate its power at any cost, gradually deviating from the conception of freedom; (b) brought heavy pressure to bear on the press, universities, judiciary and public institutions which ensure democracy; (c) exploited religion for political purposes; (d) paved the way to the rejection of the [Atatürk] reforms, "the foundations of our civilized existence"; (e) caused social deterioration and harmed the country's financial prestige abroad by an inflationist, extravagant and planless policy and abuses; (f) attempted to use the army, "the symbol of our national existence," for its political ends; (g) increasingly prevented the expression of the national will through free elections; (h) employed the state radio and state property for party purposes; and (i) rendered the parliamentary right of control virtually ineffective, thus causing a deterioration into an illegal rule of tyranny and oppression.

"We vehemently reject all forms of behaviour which may tend to represent or sustain the Democratic Party ideology overthrown by the revolution and condemned by the national conscience." (*R. Ankara, Sept 16 [19]*)

Presence of Army Chiefs Noted. The presence of the chiefs of staff of the three services at the signing ceremony was noted. "Few doubt that the politicians, by accepting a declaration so much limiting their activities, must have received a thinly-veiled warning from the military leaders." It was also thought symptomatic of the fact that the army had moved "more into political focus, and has to a large extent taken over the running of the country during the critical period of the trial, verdicts and elections." (*Times, Sept 7, 21*)

Round-Table Conference of the Press—Self-Censorship for Elections. The Turkish press, which warmly welcomed the results of the round-table conference, decided, at a conference held in Ankara on Sept 6, to undertake self-censorship for the period of the elections. The Minister of Radio, Press and Tourism was present, together with seven NUC members, one of whom presided. The editors signed a declaration in which they undertook: (1) to accept the joint declaration by the political leaders; (2) to criticize infringements of the declaration by party leaders; (3) to observe the 1960 press code of honour (see MER 1960, p 451); (4) to avoid sensational headlines and photographs, prejudicial to the elections; (5) not to publish declarations by political leaders liable to obscure public opinion, or harm democracy or the national interest; (6) to devote more space to economic and social questions; (7) to help in maintaining public order and in "explaining the motives of the revolution"; (8) to promote "national cohesion" and not become instruments of disruptive ideologies.

The *Times* correspondent wrote that this declaration was apparently considered necessary by the military authorities, though no penalties were provided for those who would infringe this form of self-censorship.

A delegation of editors and an NUC member presented a copy of the declaration to Gen. Gürsel who expressed his satisfaction at the declaration and the conduct of the press in general. (*Cumhuriyet; Ulus; Hür Vatan, Sept 7, 8; Times, Sept 7*)

Implementation of the Joint Declaration Discussed. On Sept 14, on the eve of the publication of the Yassıada verdicts, and again on Sept 16, Gen. Gürsel held meetings with the party leaders to discuss the implementation of the conference decisions, as well as pre-election topics. Osman Bölükbaşı, the RNP leader, did not participate. He accepted Gen. Gürsel's invitation to the first meeting but did not attend it; to the second meeting he was not invited. (*Cumhuriyet; Onca, Sept 15, 17*)

Resentment Within the Justice Party. Following the publication of the second part of the joint declaration, there were reports of mounting discord within the JP, especially in the Aegean region, the former stronghold of the DP. JP members there, it was reported, wished to replace Gümüşpala by Prof. Ali Fuat Başgil as leader of the party and called for the resignation of two leaders who had attended the conference, Party SG Şinasi Özma and Vice-President Cevdet Perin. Many JP members had left the party. In the Aegean region they joined the RNP, whose leader, Bölükbaşı, had refused to sign the declaration, in Antalia province, they joined the NTP.

Gümüşpala declared that the rumours of his resigna-

tion were unfounded and deplored allegations that he had been "sold out" at the round table conference. *Milîyet* believed that the reasons for this discontent were indignation at the Yassıada verdicts, since the party HQ had given assurances of a different verdict, and at the condemnation of the DP regime in the declaration.

It was also reported that the JP central executive council insisted on publishing the conference minutes. Gen. Günel said he saw no harm in such a step, though no reason for it either. (*Cumhuriyet*, *Son Havadis*; *Milîyet*, Sept 19, 20, 22)

TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF LEADERS OF OLD REGIME

The trials of DP leaders which opened in Oct 1960 at Yassıada (MER 1960, pp 454-8) continued until Aug 15. The final verdicts and sentences were given on Sept 15. Fifteen defendants were condemned to death. On Sept 16 the NUC confirmed the death sentences on Adnan Menderes, Fatih Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan; the last two were hanged the same day and Menderes the next day.

THE TRIALS

SOURCES: *Türkiye*, Yılıgi, 1962; *Cumhuriyet*, Jan 6-Aug 15; *Times*, Jan 6, 9, 11, 13, 20, 30, Feb 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 27, March 11, 15, 17, April 5, 18, 20, May 12, 17, 22, 24, 30, June 2, 14, 24, July 3, 22, 25, Aug 11, 12, 15.

NOTE: Where, in the cases recorded below, no verdict is mentioned, the court decided to link the verdict to the central case of violation of the constitution, which was tried last.

Case of the Anti-Greek Riots of 1955 (see MER 1960, p 456). This trial ended on Jan 5. The Court withdrew the charge against Bayar and acquitted Prof. Fuat Köprülü (former Deputy PM and Foreign Minister), Prof. Fahrettin Kerim Gökay (former Governor of Istanbul) and all other defendants except Menderes, Zorlu and Kemal Hadımlı (former Governor of Istanbul), who were found guilty.

Irregular Currency Deals—the İpar Case (see MER 1960 p 457). This case was concluded on Jan 19. Zorlu and İpar were found guilty of irregular transactions, and Menderes, Polatkan, Erkem, Ataman and Berk of aiding and approving these transactions.

The Çanakkale (Geyikli) Case (see MER 1960, p 458). On Jan 24 the prosecutor altered the charge to violation of the constitution, on the ground that the incitement to attack opposition (RPP) deputies was part of a policy of suppressing democratic opposition; he asked for the death penalty for Menderes and the other three DP leaders. Menderes attributed the resort to violence on this occasion to the former Minister of the Interior (who, after the May revolution, committed suicide in prison).

On March 10 the court found all the defendants guilty.

Case of Attempt to Murder İnönü (see MER 1960, p 457). On Jan 28 the prosecutor altered the charge from attempted murder (which carried 20 years' imprisonment) to violation of the constitution (which carried the death penalty), on the ground that the alleged plot was part of a policy of suppressing the opposition; he demanded the death penalty for Bayar, Menderes and 13 other defendants, and heavy prison sentences for the remainder.

The accused denied that there had been any such plot

and maintained that the crowd had gathered to greet a member of the government who was returning from abroad, and the rioting had reflected prevailing political tension.

Bayar, Menderes, Ethem Yetkiner (former governor of Istanbul), Kemal Aygün (former mayor of Istanbul), and 39 other persons were found guilty (April 17). Seventeen persons, including the former Generals Mecit Tokan and Namık Argüç, were acquitted; the latter, however, remained under detention on other charges.

Case of Menderes' Misuse of PM's Secret Fund (see MER 1960, p 458). On Feb 9 the Court found Menderes and Korur guilty on this count.

The Kayseri Case. On Jan 9 Bayar, Menderes, Ahmet Kinik, the former Governor of Kayseri province, two officials and eight DP deputies from Kayseri were put on trial on charge of violating the constitution by employing troops to prevent İnönü from attending the RPP congress in Kayseri in April 1960 (see MER 1960, p 428).

Kinik stated that Menderes had ordered him to prevent the congress from taking place and İnönü from reaching Kayseri. Menderes contended that Namık Gedik, his Minister of the Interior (who had committed suicide while under arrest), had given the order.

On April 20 the court found Bayar, Menderes, Kinik and the officials guilty. The former deputies were acquitted but remained under detention on other charges.

The "Demokrat İzmir" Case. On Jan 12 Menderes, Hadımlı (former governor of İzmir), Cemal Gökten (former Director-General of Security), İsmail Kuntay (former Assistant Director of Security in Ankara), four former DP deputies and 20 DP members from İzmir were put on trial on charge of inciting a mob on May 2, 1959, to burn down the offices of the opposition newspaper *Demokrat İzmir*.

All pleaded not guilty. The prosecution demanded the death penalty for 18 of the accused, including Menderes, on the ground that the riot was part of a deliberate policy of destroying the freedom of the press, and therefore constituted a violation of the constitution. On March 11 the court found Menderes, Hadımlı and 13 other persons guilty; 13 persons were acquitted.

The Case of the Student Riots—April 1960. On Feb 2, 117 persons were put on trial and charged with offences in connection with the student demonstrations at Istanbul and Ankara universities on April 28 and 29, 1960, when police used firearms within the university precincts and one student lost his life and others were wounded (see MER 1960, p 420). The defendants included Bayar, Menderes, all the members of the last Menderes Cabinet, the CGS Gen. Rüştü Erdelhan and a number of generals, the governors and mayors of Istanbul and Ankara,

the chief of police and police officers and policemen in the two cities, as well as physicians from Istanbul.

Police officers gave evidence that they had been attacked by about 1,000 students and had been obliged to fire into the air for fear of being lynched. Medical witnesses differed on whether the student was killed by a direct shot or by a ricochet; the policeman accused of shooting him maintained that he had fired into the air.

The trial soon ranged widely over the whole political situation during the last months of the Menderes government. A letter written after the demonstrations by Gen. Gürsel, then Commander of the Land Forces, to the Defence Minister (see MER 1960, p 430) was read in court. Menderes and other ministers claimed that they had not seen the letter and beard of it only after the coup. Extracts were read from notes taken by Abdullah Aker, a former minister, during Cabinet meetings on proposals to suppress the opposition. Semi Ergin, former Minister of Communications, told the court that at that time Bayar had headed a faction in the government which wished to suppress the opposition, whereas Menderes had favoured moderation. Bayar, he said, had given orders to suppress the demonstration by "brutal methods" and had also advocated the employment of the army for this purpose. This was denied by Bayar, who added: "I have always been against army intervention in politics, and I am still against this today."

Lütfi Kırdar, former Minister of Health, collapsed and died of heart failure on Feb 17 while being interrogated by the judge.

The prosecutor asked for death sentences for 44 of the 116 remaining defendants, including: Bayar, Menderes, the whole Menderes cabinet and Gen. Erdelhan. On July 27 the court found Bayar, Menderes and 67 other defendants guilty; 47 were acquitted.

Cases of Illegal Expropriation in Istanbul. On April 17 the court heard a new case against Menderes; four of his ministers; Mümtaz Tarhan and Ethem Yetkiner, two former governors of Istanbul; Kemal Aygün, a former mayor of Istanbul, and Kemal Hadimli, former governor of Izmir, who were charged with unlawfully evicting citizens of Istanbul from their homes in order to carry out road improvements, without providing either adequate compensation or alternative accommodation. The defendants pleaded not guilty. All except Menderes contended they had acted on Menderes' instructions. Menderes claimed that the improvements involving the expropriation had been absolutely necessary; he did not know that there had been no compensation.

On June 3 the court found Menderes and Aygün guilty; the others were acquitted, but except for Tarhan remained under detention on other charges.

The "Patriotic Front" Case. On April 27 Menderes, Koraltan and 20 members of the DP Central Executive Council, among them ministers and deputies, were put on trial on the charge of unconstitutionally establishing an organization known as the Patriotic Front (*Vatan Cephesi*) [a front organization] "with the aim of... annihilating organizations defending democracy... to which end it was granted vast powers and means and exempted from all restrictions and control; and thus an apparatus of oppression was created." The prosecutor said the aim was to bring about absolute DP rule and demanded the death sentences for all defendants except one.

On June 21 Menderes and 18 other persons were

found guilty. Three were acquitted but remained under detention on other charges.

The Main Case: Violation of the Constitution. The trial opened on May 11. The defendants, Bayar, Menderes and 396 former ministers and deputies, were charged with violating the constitution and attempting to set up a dictatorial regime. The indictment had been read at the opening session on Oct 14 1960 (see MER 1960, p 455).

Questioned on the confiscation in 1954 of large properties belonging to the RPP, namely the popular education centres known as the People's Houses (*Halkokulleri*) established under Atatürk, Menderes and others replied that the RPP, when in power, had itself appropriated this property from the state, and violated the constitution. This was rectified by the return of the property to the state.

Questioned on the demotion of Kırşehir province to district status after the province had voted against the DP in the 1954 elections (MER 1960, p 455), Bayar, Menderes and others replied that this decision had been taken for "geographical and psychological" reasons. Menderes did not reply when reminded that he had admitted previously that this measure had been a "political error."

The evidence included notes taken at DP meetings by ministers, deputies and others to prove the party's intention to suppress the opposition and to set up a dictatorial regime. Notes made by Etem Menderes, the former Minister of Defence, quoted Adnan Menderes as saying, "I shall never abandon power even if threatened by force of arms." Adnan Menderes denied having made this statement. Other defendants also denied the accuracy of such notes concerning them. Zorlu admitted having advocated the dissolution of the RPP, but said that this had often been proposed inside the DP ruling group and named two other deputies who, he said, had made the same proposal.

Şevki Erker, a former DP deputy from Erzurum, was released on May 16, after it had been established that he had objected to such proposals at the DP meetings.

Experts on constitutional law were divided as to whether the laws concerning the Committee of Inquiry Into the Activities of the Opposition (MER 1960, pp 428-9) were unconstitutional. The evidence was of the highest importance as these laws were regarded as the principal violation of the constitution by the Menderes regime. Prof. Ali Fuat Başgil held that a law passed by a parliamentary majority could not be unconstitutional, though its subsequent application might be so; he stated that when asked by Bayar and Menderes whether the laws were constitutional, he had replied that they were legally sound but politically unwise, and that the government had better resign. Other professors of law held that some or all of the measures concerned had been unconstitutional. The defendants maintained that the charge could not be considered proven when experts had given conflicting testimony.

Statements by Bayar and Menderes. Speaking in his own defence, ex-President Bayar said: "When I entered public life just before the Young Turks revolution of 1908, I was warned about the risks. I was told I might end up before the firing squad or on the gallows. Both risks I accept." After declaring that "the services I have rendered my country are written in Turkey's history," he recalled his long association with Atatürk and the many high posts, including those of PM and President, which he had held. "Now I am 78," he continued, "I have

nothing further to expect in life. I know that revolutions mean that human rights and lives have to be set aside, but if I had thought that this was a revolutionary court I should never have bothered to address it. [The trials were subject to the penal code.] Consult your consciences well and... try to render impartial judgement."

Menderes said that only since Atatürk's death had conditions been favourable for the growth of a democratic regime. He suggested that the elections held in 1946 under İnönü's presidency (the first two-party elections held in Turkey) had been falsified, and asked: "Were there no violations of the constitution before 1950, or was there no constitution?" He denied that he had made any attempt to set up a dictatorship, and said that relations with the army would have made any such attempt impossible, as "we had no contact with the army, from the topmost general to the lowest private."

Defence Statement. A joint statement submitted to the court by 97 of the defence counsel, representing 231 defendants, maintained that the legitimacy of the May 27 revolution derived not from the guilt of the accused, but from the armed forces' obligation to intervene in politics to prevent civil war between the political parties. Thus the fact that the revolution took place did not automatically imply the guilt of the members of the former regime. Speaking of the extraordinary phenomenon of a whole parliamentary majority being put on trial, the document said: "In the history of democracy, many cases have been seen of laws being sent to a constitutional court for annulment, but this is the first time that we have ever seen the legislators themselves sent up in a body for trial"; one of the defence counsel added that this was equivalent to condemning the majority of the electorate.

This trial (for violation of the constitution) ended on Aug 11; the verdict was postponed.

The Concluding Session. On Aug 14 a general session was held in the presence of all the 633 defendants including those who had been previously acquitted. Salim Başol, president of the court, announced that the court had decided to go into recess for a month to consider its verdict and sentences, which would be pronounced on Sept 15. A number of defendants availed themselves of the final opportunity to speak briefly or present written petitions.

In all, 19 separate cases were heard, of which one was dropped—the case of the flour mill deals (MER 1960, p 457). There had been 278 sessions in 203 days, at which 1,068 witnesses had given evidence. The prosecution had asked for 228 death sentences, including death sentences on eight charges for Menderes and on four for Bayar.

Deaths Among the Defendants. During the trials, four defendants died: Lütfi Kırdar, a former minister (on the demonstrations during his funeral, see p 543 a); Gazi Yiğitbaşı, retired General Nuri Yamut and Kenan Yılmaz, all former DP deputies (*Türkiye Yılı*, 1962). At the end of the year, the former Minister of Public Works, Tefvik İleri, died of cancer. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 1, 1962)

Menderes' Defence Counsel Tried. The two defence counsels for Menderes, Talât Asal and Burhan Apaydın, who had been arrested in Dec 1960 (MER 1960, p 458), were released on bail in Feb and March respectively. In June they were brought to trial, before the Istanbul

Martial Law Court together with a journalist who was charged with having aided Apaydın in publishing the pamphlet. Apaydın and the journalist were sentenced to 11 months and 23 days imprisonment; Asal was acquitted. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 13)

SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS: POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS

Comments on Trials Banned. On Aug 21 a statement on the trials by Osman Bölükbaşı, the RNP leader, was censored at the last minute. He was reported to have said that it would be best for Turkey if the bloodless revolution were kept bloodless, and that if the court were to hand down death sentences, the NUC should not confirm them.

The same day, the NUC issued a decree, signed by Gürsel, banning all oral or written comment liable to influence the Yassıada court or excite and confuse public opinion. There ensued, *The Times* correspondent wrote on Sept 14, "an uncanny silence on the subject."

On Sept 5 the political parties agreed in the round-table conference not to challenge or discuss the forthcoming verdicts and sentences. The following day, the newspapers reached an agreement to the same effect (see p 558 b).

On Sept 13 it was announced that no authority or person was authorized to issue reports on the verdicts except the NUC liaison office. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 22, 23, Sept 6, 7, 14; *Times*, Aug 22, 23, Sept 14)

Security Measures. Strictest security measures were taken throughout Turkey on the eve of the judgement. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Hür Vatan*; *Times*, Sept 14, 15)

On Sept 15 the NUC warned the public against "certain rumours apt to hurt awareness" and "prejudice the NUC's legal authority"; the communiqué assured the nation that the NUC would "use its lawful authority... without being influenced by any factor save their conscience and in the manner best suited to the interests of the nation." (*R. Ankara*, Sept 15 [18]; *Cumhuriyet*, Sept 16)

Appeals From Abroad For Clemency. Before the sentences were announced, the representatives of the majority of the NATO countries, as well as of Sweden, Switzerland and India, informed the Turkish government of their hope that there would be no death sentences. The UK Ambassador handed a personal message to this effect from PM Macmillan to Gen. Gürsel. (*Keatings' Contemporary Archives*, 1961/2, p 18377A)

Verdict on Case of Violation of Constitution, Death Sentences. On Sept 15 the court announced that 352 defendants out of 398 charged with violation of the constitution had been found guilty.

During the same session, the court announced the sentences.

Bayar, Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan were unanimously condemned to death; 11 other defendants were condemned to death by a majority of the judges: Refik Koralan, Ağah Erozan and İbrahim Kırakoğlu (former president and vice-presidents of the Assembly respectively); Gen. Rüşü Erdelhan (the former CGS), Emin Kalafat (a former minister and member of the DP executive council), Osman Kavrakoğlu (a former deputy who promoted the formation of the parliamentary investigation committee), Ahmet Hamdi Sancar, Nurettin Kırıçoğlu and Bahadır Dülger (chairman and members

of that committee), Zeki Erataman and Baha Akjir (former DP deputies).

Thirty-one defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour, including Medeni Berk (the former Deputy PM), Celal Yardımcı, Tevfik İleri, İzzet Akçal (all former ministers), Ethem Yetkiner (the former governor of İstanbul), Kemal Aygün (the former mayor of İstanbul), and former DP deputies and prominent leaders.

Four hundred eighteen defendants received prison terms ranging from six months to 20 years, 123 were acquitted, and five cases were dropped for insufficient evidence.

The highest fine was imposed by the court on Ali İpar, the shipowner, who, in addition to two years' imprisonment, was fined £T 26,790,285. Menderes did not appear in court; he was believed to have taken an overdose of sleeping tablets in an attempt to commit suicide. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*; *NYT*, Sept 16)

Death Sentences on Menderes, Zorlu, Polatkan Confirmed by NUC; Executed. The following day, Sept 16, the NUC announced that it had confirmed the death sentences on Bayar, Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan, but had commuted Bayar's sentence to life imprisonment on account of his age. The other death sentences were also commuted to life imprisonment. (*R. Ankara*, Sept 16 [18])

Fatın Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan were hanged on Sept 16, on the prison island of İmralli, in the Sea of Marmara. The execution of Adnan Menderes was postponed owing to his illness. Meanwhile numerous attempts were made to secure his reprieve. The British and French ambassadors approached the Foreign Minister, Sarper; Pope John XXIII sent an appeal for clemency to Gen. Gürsel; İnönü and other leading public figures also interceded for him at the request of Menderes' wife who had been refused permission to see Gen. Gürsel—but all to no avail. After five doctors had certified that he was in normal health, Menderes was taken to İmralli and hanged on Sept 17. (*Türkiye Yılı*, 1962; *Cumhuriyet*, Sept 17-18; *Times*, Sept 18)

Those sentenced to prison terms were transferred to the prison at Kayseri in central Anatolia. (*Cumhuriyet*, Sept 18, 23)

Speculation on Motives for Executions; Army Pressure; Justifying the Coup; Warning to Deviators From Path of Reform Movement. There were no comments in Turkey owing to the ban on all public discussions.

The *Times* correspondent wrote that until only a few days before the sentences it had been thought that a spirit of mercy and moderation was prevailing in the ruling circles, but a sudden hardening seemed to have taken place. It was reliably reported that there was no majority in favour of executions in the NUC, but the army and air force, especially younger officers, reportedly threatened to take direct action if their demands for executions were not met. The NUC was finally obliged to compromise with three executions. The army's attitude was believed to have been due to growing anxiety at recent activities of political parties. The executions were thought to be intended as a warning to "so-called reactionary elements" that subversive activities would not be tolerated. (*Times*, Sept 19, 21; see also *Observer*, Sept 24)

The *Economist* and Dana Adams Schmidt writing in *The New York Times* thought that the executions as well as the reprieves were a matter of practical political

considerations. To commute all sentences could have been considered as a disavowal of the military coup. If on the other hand the committee had shown no mercy at all, it would have been accused by many Turks of carrying out a blood bath. Thus a majority of the NUC arrived at the following compromise: the sentence on President Celal Bayar, aged 78, could be commuted to life imprisonment in view of his age (though the committee had itself abrogated a law which in the past excluded capital punishment for persons over 65—see MER 1960, p 455). Eleven of the others could be spared on the ground that the high court's decisions in their case had not been unanimous. Menderes had to be executed as the principal defendant, the man who had inspired the abuses of power which violated the guarantees given in the Turkish constitution. Zorlu and Polatkan had to be executed because they were prime symbols of corruption, men who had greatly enriched themselves while in office.

The *Economist* added that the Turks had had only a brief 40 years in which to accept a new identity as a nation-state. There had been no deep yearning for more modern ways except among an educated, westernized minority. "The Turks have had change and reform thrust upon them and they have not always been pleased. Kemal Atatürk tried to propel them forward by administering a series of symbolic shocks, like the abrupt prohibition of the fez. His successors in Gen. Gürsel's military junta staged the Yassıada trials, partly no doubt to justify their own coup, but partly also to teach the Turkish people in the most dramatic possible way how their rulers should not behave." (*Economist*, Sept 23; *NYT*, Sept 24)

Government Resigns in Protest? On Sept 18, the day after Menderes' execution, the whole cabinet submitted its resignation but were prevailed upon by Gen. Gürsel to withdraw the resignations on the following day. Officially, the resignation was designed to enable the formation of a transitional government for the election period but unofficially it was reported that this was a protest against the executions. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, Sept 19, 20)

Intelligentsia Debates Issue; Menderes Regime. Reporting on Turkish public opinion, D. A. Schmidt distinguished between the reactions of the urban intelligentsia and officers' corps on the one hand and the Turkish peasants on the other. It was only in the two former groups, he wrote, who were the most progressive forces in Turkey, that anything like a debate on the merits of the case had taken place. Legal arguments showing that the defendants were guilty under article 146 of the criminal code providing penalties up to death for "attempting by force to change, replace or abrogate" the Turkish constitution were countered by those who argued that under the constitution the National Assembly, which approved the Menderes regime's actions, was the sole arbiter of what was or was not constitutional.

What the westernized elite in the towns and the armed forces really resented was that the Menderes regime used for its own political purposes the reactionary forces in the country, particularly the forces demanding a return to Islam. This charge was refuted by Menderes supporters who insisted that popular reaction against Kemalist reforms had begun before they took over in 1950 and that a democratic regime must follow the tide of public opinion. (*NYT*, Sept 24)

Public Reaction in General. The people, *The Times* correspondent wrote, seemed to be "either stunned or completely unmoved," for the following reasons: (a) "the Turks are an undemonstrative people"; (b) martial law; (c) the ban on all public discussion of the trials, on pain of severe penalties. The people kept their thoughts to themselves. (*Times*, Sept 19, 21)

The peasants, D. A. Schmidt wrote, conservative if not reactionary, retained a bright image of Menderes as their friend, a man who taxed the townspeople so as to raise the price of wheat. "To them execution of their idol was an offence calling for vengeance, if not physically, in the vendetta tradition, certainly in the political arena." (*NYT*, Sept 24)

On Nov 7 the *Mevlüt* [a requiem mass held 40 days after a death] was read in memory of Menderes by DP partisans in the town of Sakarya. *Cumhuriyet* reported

that the *Mevlüt* had all the aspects of a political demonstration rather than a religious ceremony; crowds unable to find seats in the mosque followed the ceremony in the streets through loud speakers, and local papers advertised the event with banner-headlines.

The [pro-JP] *Son Havadis* denied that the ceremony had had political overtones. The paper added: "The new regime set up the... [Yassıada] court, and the hangmen executed the three persons who were convicted by this court. We left them on Yassıada, some of us cried, some of us rejoiced and the curtain fell." The dead should be left alone, once and for all. (*Cumhuriyet*, Nov 8; *Son Havadis*, Nov 9)

Repercussions in General Elections and Formation of Government, see below.

THE GENERAL ELECTIONS

The general elections took place on Oct 15.

THE ELECTORAL LAWS

Preparation and Approval of the Electoral Laws. The Electoral Law Committee of the Constituent Assembly under the chairmanship of Sefik Inan (see p 547 b), completed its work on Feb 10 and submitted the draft laws to the House. They were:

1. law on the referendum on the constitution (for which see above);
2. law on fundamental provisions of the electoral procedure and the roll of electors (*Seçimlerin temel hükümleri ve seçmen kütükleri hakkında kanun*), which would be applicable to elections for the Assembly, provincial and municipal councils, and for the councils of elders of town suburbs and villages;
3. law on elections to the Senate. (*Cumhuriyet Senatosu üyelerinin seçim kanunu*);
4. law on elections to the House (*Milletvekili seçim Kanunu*).

The House debated the second of these laws between March 8 and April 6. Major subjects in the debate were the minimum voting age and the voting rights of regular army personnel. The law was approved on April 26 and came into force on May 2.

The third and fourth laws were approved on May 27, after a heated debate on the election system, and came into force on May 30. (For sources see below.)

The Minimum Voting Age. The electoral committee proposed a minimum voting age of 18 years as compared with 22 years under the former law. This would have increased the number of eligible voters by about two million and was held likely to work in favour of the RPP since a large proportion of the younger people were expected to vote for that party. The House approved this proposal but the NUC, in its capacity as the Upper House, rejected it and suggested instead a minimum voting age of 21 years; this was accepted. (For sources see below.)

Voting Rights of Regular Army Personnel. Retired officers, members of the House, opposed the proposal that army officers and regular NCOs be granted voting rights; they demanded that the army be kept completely out of politics as in the past. Others rejected the claim that

voting would involve the army in politics. On April 6 the House adopted the proposal (Art. 7 of the law No 2 above) by 163 to 38 with four abstentions. The NUC also approved it. Conscripts were denied the right to vote. (For sources, see below.)

Composition of Electoral Council; Elections Under Judicial Control. The new constitution provided that elections would be controlled by the judicial authorities; the Electoral Law provided for the organization of that control. Elections would be conducted by electoral councils headed by the supreme electoral council of judges. Provincial electoral councils would consist of the three highest-ranking judges of the province concerned. District electoral councils would be presided over by judges, and their members would be teachers elected by the teachers of the district. Polling committees (one for every 300-400 electors) would consist of a chairman and four local citizens. The electoral rolls would be prepared by officials under the control of the judges. [In addition to the council members mentioned] political parties participating in the election would have one representative each on each of the provincial and district electoral councils. (For sources, see below.)

Participation of Political Parties in the Elections. The electoral law provided that only political parties, which had organized branches in at least 15 provinces and in all of their districts six months before the election, would be able to appear in the elections. (For sources, see below.)

Elections to the Senate. For the elections of the 150 senators the majority representative system was adopted. Each province would become an election circuit except for Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir, which would be divided into three circuits each. Each province would elect at least one member. As the term of the Senate was six years, one third of the Senators to be elected every two years, the provinces were divided into three groups, each to elect 50 senators. After two years, lots would be drawn between groups A and B, and the losing group would hold new elections. Two years later, lots would be drawn between the two remaining groups.

Proportional System for Election to the House of Representatives. For the elections to the House, the elec-

toral committee suggested proportional representation according to the system evolved by Prof. d'Hondt of Belgium, which had been accepted by several North European countries. A suggestion in Committee to use split ballots was rejected as incompatible with this system. In the debate in the House, some members claimed that the proportional representation system had led to Mussolini's dictatorship and demanded the employment of the small county system. Other members urged the use of the majority system as in the elections to the Senate, possibly, so wrote *The Times* correspondent, in view of the danger that minority parties, especially those representing supporters of the former DP, might gain too much strength. The Committee members replied that the small county system was unsuitable for Turkey and would give rise to many dangers, and that the majority system also could lead to a dictatorship.

The Assembly adopted the proportional representation system at province level. (*Cumhuriyet*, Jan 28, Feb 11, 15, March 9, 23, 28, April 6, 7, 8, 13, 22, 27, May 3, 10, 11, 13, 16, 20, 29-31; *Türkiye Yılıgi*, 1962; *Times*, March 13, 17, April 10, 12; *R. Ankara*, Feb 27 [March 1], March 10 [14])

PREPARATIONS

Election Date. On July 21 the Constituent Assembly decided to hold general elections on Oct 15. It had already been reported in March that the NUC and the government had decided on this date. (*Cumhuriyet*, March 29, July 22)

Preparing the Elections. On May 3 the 11 members of the Supreme Electoral Council were elected from among the members of the Court of Appeal (6) and of the Council of State (5) by the members of these institutions, as prescribed by the electoral law. The next day the council members took the oath and elected Recai Seçkin (President of the Court of Appeal) as their president. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 4, 5)

On May 6 the Minister of the Interior instructed the province governors to prepare the electoral rolls with the greatest zeal and care. (*Cumhuriyet*, May 7)

Political Parties Licensed For Elections. In June and July the Supreme Electoral Council confirmed that the RPP, RPNP, JP and the NTP had completed the establishment of their branches in 15 provinces and in all their districts, as prescribed by the electoral law, and therefore were entitled to send representatives to the electoral councils and to appear in the elections. The Council rejected the application of the Free Homeland Party on the ground that the party had not completed the organization of its branches as prescribed by law. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 8, July 16, 27, Sept 23)

NUC Manoeuvres To Restrict Election Campaign. According to the Electoral Law, the election campaign was to begin 35 days before the election date.

On Aug 11 the House of Representatives decided to reduce the period to 30 days so that the campaign would start only after the Yassıada verdicts which were due to be given on Sept 15. It was also decided to ban discussion of the Yassıada trials during the campaign. (*Cumhuriyet*, Aug 11, 12)

Two weeks later, on Aug 25, the House reduced the campaign period again, to 21 days. The bill, prepared by the NUC, was passed after a heated debate by 109 votes to 58, with seven abstentions. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Yeni Sabah*, Aug 26)

During the same period, there were reports that the NUC was preparing an amendment to the Electoral Law, forbidding mention in the election campaign of "deeds and activities of parties and individuals, prior to Jan 6, 1961." The political parties protested vehemently and there were rumours that several deputies had threatened to resign their mandates. The NUC claimed that it had never prepared such a bill. Finally, Gen. Sıtkı Ulay declared that the parties had "given us their word of honour" that "they are ready to take the test of the elections" and such a law was no longer needed. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Kudret*; *Milliyet*, Aug 16-27)

Security Provisions. On Sept 2 the House passed a law, submitted by five NUC members and seven House members, providing for the immediate arrest and trial of all persons committing offences against the revolutions (of Atatürk and of May 27, 1960), the head of State, the NUC and the Council of Ministers, during the period immediately before and after the forthcoming elections. The law came into immediate effect and was to be in force for two months after the new government resulting from the elections had been installed in power. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Milliyet*, Sept 3-4; *Times*, Sept 4)

On election day (Oct 15) the Martial Law Commander of İstanbul announced that prosecutions in respect to all "election offences" throughout the election campaign until voting ended on the evening of Oct 15 were the province of the public prosecutor's office, thus keeping the armed forces out of political controversy. Thereafter, all violations of public order would be dealt with by the Martial Law Command, as before the election campaign.

The following day the Martial Law Commander of Ankara notified the public that pre-election propaganda activities were at an end and henceforth propaganda, demonstrations and processions likely to disturb the peace were forbidden. (*R. Ankara*, Oct 15, 16 [18]; *Cumhuriyet*, Oct 16)

Ensuring Impartiality of the Administration. On Sep 8, the PM's Office sent a circular to all governmental departments and public institutions stating that in order to ensure elections "within the democratic principles" all those concerned should faithfully abide by the laws pertaining to the elections and all civil servants, employees of state economic enterprises and other government and public organizations should refrain from participating in election propaganda in order to preserve impartiality. "Managers of institutions and factories serving the public" were held responsible for ensuring that no propaganda activity took place on their premises. (*Milliyet*; *Cumhuriyet*, Sept 9)

An order to the governors, directing them to ensure that all government employees observe strict impartiality, was issued on the eve of the election campaign. (*R. Ankara*, Sept 23 [26])

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The election campaign was officially opened on Sept 24, twenty one days before the general elections. There were public meetings, radio broadcasts and gatherings in coffee houses, which stayed open all night. On the whole the election campaign was free of incidents. Several JP members were arrested for violating the law. Before the campaign opened the chairman of the National Students' Federation, the Chief of the General Staff and the President—in that order—broadcast messages to the people.

"Students The Chief Protectors of Democratic Order." On Sept 14 the chairman of the National Students' Federation broadcast to the people, stressing the need to abandon feelings of spite and rancour and to prepare for a prosperous future. He expressed his hope that the political parties would remain loyal to their joint declaration and, when in power, would no longer "be able to deviate" from the constitution. He added that the forces which had cooperated in bringing about the revolution, headed by the students, would continue to defend it and the new democratic order. He praised the other revolutionary forces, the press and especially the armed forces, the nation's "last hope."

He called upon the students to follow events with restraint as it appeared that "the heaviest tasks during the coming era will again rest on the... shoulders of the Turkish university students." (*R. Ankara, Sept 14 [16]*)

General Sunay: The Army Restored Democracy. In a broadcast on Sept 19, Gen. Cevdet Sunay, Chief of the General Staff, said that in the May revolution the armed forces had rescued the nation from "the illegal actions of a dictatorial mentality," and opened the way to democracy. The final stage, elections, had now been reached. The armed forces, which made the May 27 revolution together with the nation, its intellectuals, its youth and the press, had never departed from the path leading to a democratic régime, and had supported the NUC and the government to this end. They would continue to perform their duty of protecting the country against internal and external dangers. (*R. Ankara, Sept 19 [22]; Öncü, Sept 20*)

Cumhuriyet commented that the army had always kept aloof from political ambitions and expressed the hope that the politicians would take to heart the statement that the army would continue to guard against all internal and external dangers: if the people went astray, they would find the armed forces once more on the march. (*Cumhuriyet, Sept 21*)

Gürel Warns People To Beware of Enemies of Democracy. Gen. Gürel broadcast twice, on Sept 20 and on Sept 23, on the eve of the opening of the election campaign. In his first message Gürel asked the people to beware of "the arch-enemies of our country," agitators who were trying to turn the people against each other and thus delay elections.

In his second broadcast, Gürel called the people to listen to the advice of "a man who thinks of nothing but his country's security" before listening to the speakers of the political parties. He asked the people to "listen to all the speeches with patience, dignity and maturity... even if the speakers tell lies and you do not believe what they say" and not to allow themselves to be provoked. The people should bear in mind that they would be voting for persons who, if elected, "will either destroy or brighten your future as well as that of the nation." The elections would be absolutely fair, and the people should not be misled by rumours.

Gürel called upon the party leaders to refrain from provocative speeches and from exploiting religious sentiments, belittling the reforms, and attempting to deceive the people. He concluded by saying: "The forces of evil, which have exerted every effort to secure a 'No' vote on the constitution, which embodies all the human rights and dignity for the Turkish nation, should not be given a chance to mingle with us..." (*R. Ankara, Sept 20, 23, [22, 26]; Hürriyet, Sept 21, 24*)

The Party Platforms. On Sept 30 the parties, except for the Justice Party, broadcast their platforms.

Platform of Republican People's Party. İsmet İnönü, leader of the RPP, said the party would enact legislation for the proper functioning of all institutions covered by the new constitution; establish a constitutional court; plan investment and combat inflation; increase investment in the state economic institutions and encourage private enterprise; reform the taxation system in keeping with social justice; plan agricultural development and increase production to raise the peasants' standards; industrialize rapidly and support small artisans and industrialists; remedy the education situation by making the teaching profession more attractive; disseminate the principles of social justice; give attention to "labour problems," reform working conditions, health and social security, reorganize syndicalism in accordance with the new laws; improve communications and transport; seek a favourable foreign trade balance and encourage exports; improve service conditions in the armed forces and equip them with new weapons. In foreign policy, "alliance with the western democracies is our great principle... This is by no means an obstacle to our maintaining good relations with our neighbours." (*R. Ankara, Sept 30 [Oct 6]*)

Platform of Republican Peasants' National Party. Ahmet Ögüz, deputy leader of the RPNP, said the party would keep the administration free of party influence and would govern democratically, improve economic, cultural and scientific standards, respect expert knowledge and scientific development programmes, resist monopolies, prevent waste and combat corruption. In order to encourage economic development, it would seek long-term credits, domestic and foreign, encourage exports, and develop the tourist industry, it would increase agricultural productivity by irrigation works, credits, use of fertilizers, land distribution, crop price policy, writing off some agricultural debts, development of livestock and of the eastern and southern provinces, prevention of livestock smuggling on the southern border and improvement of forests. It would favour free enterprise and seek to hand over state economic enterprise to it, review the commercial activities of the Land Produce Office and the meat-fish establishment and the law tending to protect recalcitrant debtors, abolish taxation of minimum earnings and taxes which hampered trade, review wage levels according to employers' ability to pay and the cost-of-living index. It regarded the right to strike as an essential element of social justice; it favoured a social health scheme but regarded this as a long-term aim and felt that the free practice of medicine should be preserved. [There was no mention of foreign affairs.] (*R. Ankara, Sept 30 [Oct 6]*)

Platform of New Turkey Party. Ekrem Alican, leader of the NTP, said that the party's first duty was to introduce a stable investment policy. A fundamental reform of agriculture was essential. Agricultural investment and productivity must be multiplied. Relations between the state economic sector and private enterprise must be reconciled. Private enterprise was fundamental to the country's economic development and should be encouraged. The flow of foreign capital and technical knowledge into the country must be encouraged. The peasants' standard of living must be raised to increase their consumption and thus provide a basis for economic expansion. The state of education was unsatisfactory since 16,000 villages

lacked schools and over 2 million children had no access to elementary education. Freedom of religion and conscience were basic human rights; religion should be separated from politics. [There was no mention of foreign affairs.] (*R. Ankara, Sept 30 [Oct 6]*)

Regarding labour, İhsan Şerif Dura said that the party's aim was the equitable distribution of national income. It would give priority to full employment by diverting at least 15-20% of the national income to investment, extend social insurance to all workers, introduce full health insurance by stages, and adjust old age pensions to the cost of living, provide homes for workers and put agricultural workers under state protection. It would recognize the right to strike. (*R. Ankara, Oct 2 [6]*)

Justice Party. No official JP platform was quoted in the sources available to the editor. Various party spokesmen advocated the re-establishment of democracy, support for private enterprise, ending of discrimination between the urban and the rural sectors, support for the right to work, productive use of manpower, harmony in labour relations, ensuring a high standard of living for all citizens, decentralization of the administration, recognition of the right to strike, introduction of collective labour agreements and unemployment insurance, brotherhood and tolerance among political parties. (*R. Ankara, Sept 30-Oct 3 [Oct 6]*)

Foreign comments stressed the similarity of the various party programmes. They were "not very interesting. They all promise social advance in freedom, reduction of taxes, and a better life for everybody." (*Times, Oct 13; see also Daily Telegraph, Oct 13*)

Justice Party Members Arrested. During the first two weeks of the election campaign, some 26 persons, apparently mostly or all JP members, were detained for having been too free in their criticism, and for praising the DP leaders and regime. Amongst them were the following JP leaders: Gen. Mehmet Ali Aytaç of İzmir, for stating that "they" had made a martyr of Menderes, that Zorlu and Polatkan were heroes, and that nobody had ever matched the achievements of the DP administration; Muhtetin Güven of İstanbul, for declaring: "Just look at my eyes and you will know what I am trying to convey"; and Nebahat Aslan, also of İstanbul, who spoke to the public "on behalf of the İzmir Democrats." (*Kudret; Öncü, Sept 30, Oct 1; NYT, Oct 13*)

Tahsin Demiray, deputy leader of the JP, in his broadcast on Oct 1 complained of these detentions and said that JP leaders were being followed and reported on. He indicated that "the methods of the old days still prevail." (*R. Ankara, Oct 1 [6]*)

Bülükbay and the Yassıada Verdicts: His Attacks on Gürsel, Osman Bölükbaş, the RPNP leader, and Ragıp Gümüşpala, the JP leader [who both competed for the Democratic Party vote], conducted a campaign of mutual recriminations (see e.g. *Son Havadis; Kudret, Sept 25*). Gümüşpala criticized Bölükbaş's refusal to participate in the round-table conference. Bölükbaş answered that he had not attended, as it was against his principles to make a judgement which was liable to influence the verdicts of the Yassıada Court. (*R. Ankara, Oct 2 [6]; Yeni Sabah, Oct 3*)

On Oct 3 Gen. Gürsel, speaking of "some politicians," said: "The leniency which we show seems to serve them well." He said Bölükbaş had acted "in an unethical manner" and his speech was an abuse of the free radio

facilities. He added that he had telephoned [Ankara] "but it was too late. The radio authorities should have made him shut up and thrown him out... It has happened once, it shall not happen again." (*Öncü, Oct 4*)

The NUC again published the text of the joint declaration, with the comment that as the declaration bore the signature of all party leaders or official representatives, there was no excuse for any of them to violate the promises made. (*Cumhuriyet, Oct 4*)

Bölükbaş, however, did not retract. In a radio broadcast, he said that as Gümüşpala was an admirer of the RFP, former DP adherents should transfer their allegiance to the RPNP (*R. Ankara, Oct 3 [6]*). The following day, in Konya, Bölükbaş replied to Gen. Gürsel, saying: "Your recent statements cannot be reconciled with impartiality... There is no legal power that can... throw me out of the radio building... We do not look for kindness from anyone, nor do we fear unfair attacks... We are not among those sham politicians who have arrived on the political scene with encouragement, and conduct politics under protection... There is no power on earth which can stop our party from stating that which is true, just as your statement yesterday will not deter us from our ideals or our path... We are not under anyone's orders. It is only the nation which may judge us." (*Kudret, Oct 5*)


The NUC answered Bölükbaş in a communiqué on Oct 5: "The political parties which are the necessary elements of a democratic regime, are under protection of the constitution and of no other authority. Within the law, every Turkish citizen has the right to express his ideas freely, bound only by his own concern for our national unity, his respect for our society, his love of our country and his moral obligations." (*Milliyet, Oct 6*)

Bölükbaş continued to press his attack on President Gürsel, the NUC and other political parties in his speeches in the provinces and declared that he had sent nobody to the round-table conference (*Öncü, Oct 7*). He also read the text of a letter, dated Aug 20, which he said he had sent to Gen. Gürsel asking him not to confirm death sentences which might be passed on the former DP leaders. [The verdicts were given on Sept 13.] He said the publication of his letter at the time had been prohibited on the grounds that he had asked pardon for the accused and this might affect the verdicts by the Yassıada Court. Yet he had been blamed for not participating in the round-table conference because he had believed it would influence these same verdicts. (*Kudret; Yeni Gün, Oct 9*)

Bölükbaş was accused by most of the press of ignoring his own party's signature to the joint declaration and trying to appear as the only successor to the DP regime which he had so vehemently opposed; the JP demanded that an end be put to the "regrettable tactics" he employed against the other parties; the authorities investigated whether his speeches violated the law. Bölükbaş, however, was undeterred and whilst he continued to attack the regime, he was not otherwise molested. An NUC member said that Bölükbaş was hoping he would be arrested, "but we do not want to create cheap heroes" (*R. Ankara, Oct 2 [6]; Milliyet; Öncü; Hür Vatan, Oct 6*). Foreign correspondents were impressed by Bölükbaş's "courageous appearance" and it was thought that he had won the RPNP many supporters. (*NYT; Daily Telegraph, Oct 13*)

Election Campaign Free. "Tame." *Cumhuriyet* wrote that the election campaign had been conducted in complete freedom. With some exceptions, the paper continued,

TURKEY: THE GENERAL ELECTIONS



RESULTS OF REFERENDUM ON THE

Province	Referendum (July 9)		General Elections — Senate (October 15)					
	"Yes"	"No"	JP			RPP		NTP
			Groups	Votes	Senators	Votes	Senators	Votes
Adana	121,421	98,507	B	128,684	4	107,131	—	—
Adıyaman	57,512	28,809	A	2,255	—	29,806	—	38,775
Afyonkarahisar	107,039	72,633	B	47,459	—	43,176	—	—
Ağrı	57,543	12,099	C	5,185	—	22,747	—	11,392
Amasya	60,806	46,758	C	56,632	1	37,264	—	—
Ankara	320,199	147,889	B	95,313	—	181,155	4	26,888
Antalya	68,369	64,980	C	89,908	2	51,408	—	—
Artvin	—	—	C	29,132	—	30,991	1	—
Aydın	83,924	106,921	A	128,192	3	61,446	—	—
Balıkesir	154,507	138,544	C	169,175	4	101,842	—	3,892
Bilecik	40,981	27,187	A	34,649	1	27,494	—	—
Bingöl	36,204	9,252	B	—	—	15,776	—	21,666
Bitlis	26,174	13,174	C	—	—	13,747	—	22,397
Bolu	64,246	78,724	A	32,085	—	39,232	—	40,115
Burdur	48,242	20,055	C	23,027	—	28,937	1	14,470
Bursa	143,433	160,131	B	187,613	4	87,215	—	5,148
Çanakkale	76,580	70,189	C	44,451	—	48,545	2	34,555
Çankırı	54,802	43,580	A	12,038	—	20,512	—	—
Çorum	88,781	97,123	A	89,042	2	51,590	—	—
Denizli	78,137	81,780	B	95,471	2	67,431	—	—
Diyarbakır	101,515	36,148	B	24,085	—	42,452	—	51,086
Edirne	73,304	42,585	A	29,438	—	43,537	1	26,229
Elazığ	57,416	33,203	B	35,295	2	29,036	—	623
Erzincan	66,723	20,622	C	2,612	—	35,456	—	41,793
Erzurum	121,433	84,423	C	13,608	—	37,025	—	82,287
Eskişehir	98,491	52,207	B	55,690	2	51,270	—	2,794
Gaziantep	91,531	69,723	A	48,082	—	73,344	2	37,550
Giresun	74,547	45,860	B	4,234	—	47,958	—	51,530
Gümüşhane	52,102	36,634	B	20,623	—	32,465	—	32,945
Hakkâri	20,125	1,535	C	742	—	7,977	1	7,684
Hatay	86,133	58,171	C	35,531	—	53,318	1	51,677
Isparta	58,056	31,589	C	47,081	1	30,156	—	11,279
İçel	72,963	62,507	A	90,542	2	67,486	—	—
İstanbul	545,523	159,227	C	309,744	8	277,753	2	25,601
İzmir	216,558	218,471	A	243,297	6	175,508	—	5,628
Kars	—	—	C	41,483	—	87,381	3	50,473
Kastamonu	114,778	72,691	A	15,541	—	51,783	—	62,264
Kayseri	103,076	71,808	B	80,797	3	71,881	—	8,159
Kırklareli	58,837	39,603	A	14,337	—	39,088	1	33,742
Kırşehir	58,956	4,565	A	8,539	—	12,997	—	—
Kocaeli	64,247	45,225	B	50,113	2	42,625	—	2,198
Konya	218,891	133,178	A	84,664	—	121,297	5	52,626
Kütahya	65,254	90,814	C	49,675	—	39,555	—	—
Malatya	125,627	16,039	A	5,230	—	89,647	2	30,403
Manisa	118,476	151,518	A	156,330	4	84,992	—	—
Maraş	61,697	58,825	A	68,431	2	44,210	—	4,294
Mardin	130,354	3,078	C	—	—	51,821	2	39,323
Muğla	57,330	55,704	B	72,732	2	50,544	—	—
Muş	44,882	11,883	C	13,904	—	14,376	—	23,071
Nevşehir	48,905	20,464	A	23,432	—	22,607	—	—
Niğde	68,421	47,536	B	28,868	—	32,939	—	10,156
Ordu	97,302	64,683	A	36,503	—	63,271	3	44,938
Rize	45,920	29,379	C	47,110	1	28,548	—	1,179
Sakarya	66,793	74,632	B	49,979	2	37,238	—	30,114
Samsun	106,667	141,526	C	143,254	4	86,778	—	—
Sırt	73,613	6,630	C	—	—	33,009	—	36,772
Sinop	70,804	29,793	A	21,628	—	36,668	1	—
Sivas	185,355	68,468	A	11,831	—	95,467	—	99,740
Tekirdağ	67,435	42,717	B	7,122	—	40,352	—	53,155
Tokat	100,824	75,831	C	26,808	—	66,132	1	64,899
Trabzon	80,155	54,293	B	90,502	3	69,281	—	2,015
Tunceli	43,367	2,449	B	—	—	13,822	—	20,909
Urfa	106,106	26,148	B	21,840	—	53,201	2	40,915
Uşak	49,206	15,949	B	13,816	—	28,799	1	—
Van	56,916	13,550	C	5,652	—	18,556	—	25,082
Yozgat	103,354	49,449	C	17,437	—	45,108	—	17,206
Zonguldak	108,811	123,202	A	122,202	3	68,126	—	—
TOTAL	6,348,191	3,934,370		3,560,675	70	3,734,285	36	1,401,637

NOTES: 1. In the sources, and consequently in the above table, there are slight discrepancies between the sum total of the individual results and the totals given, which could not be accounted for.

2. "Groups": see, p 563 b: Elections to the Senate.

CONSTITUTION AND GENERAL ELECTIONS

Senate		General Elections — House of Representatives (October 15)							
RPNP		JP		RPP		NTP		RPNP	
Votes	Senators	Votes	Deputies	Votes	Deputies	Votes	Deputies	Votes	Deputies
9,373	—	126,365	7	108,161	5	—	—	10,347	—
11,082	—	2,372	—	31,034	2	40,423	2	8,881	—
75,978	3	47,715	2	42,032	2	1,972	—	76,349	3
27,143	1	7,411	—	21,759	—	14,974	—	23,094	3
6,542	—	55,548	2	39,940	2	—	—	7,469	—
162,312	3	92,734	3	181,147	8	23,646	1	166,535	8
4,278	—	90,614	5	51,952	2	—	—	5,560	—
5,293	—	30,197	2	29,158	1	—	—	6,563	—
—	—	124,272	6	59,587	2	1,790	—	7,326	—
10,095	—	167,088	7	101,784	4	4,670	—	11,933	—
4,854	—	33,900	2	27,684	—	—	—	5,140	—
3,210	—	—	—	12,768	—	22,442	2	4,814	—
—	—	—	—	11,496	1	17,465	1	8,310	—
24,940	—	32,353	1	40,150	3	40,321	2	26,497	1
—	—	24,600	—	29,595	2	13,593	—	—	—
15,238	—	188,362	8	87,410	3	6,114	—	16,792	—
13,755	—	43,730	2	49,304	2	33,720	1	13,942	—
55,671	1	12,741	—	20,910	—	—	—	56,166	4
30,851	—	89,903	4	50,563	2	—	—	27,502	1
—	—	92,355	4	65,426	3	2,119	—	2,904	—
4,183	—	25,401	1	39,857	3	52,012	3	6,331	—
9,802	—	29,075	2	42,551	2	27,046	1	11,182	—
21,600	—	35,909	2	30,017	2	573	—	18,610	1
—	—	3,893	—	39,458	2	36,033	2	1,648	—
33,417	—	13,748	—	53,008	3	85,468	4	53,262	2
35,192	—	54,841	3	51,627	2	2,640	—	36,171	1
2,842	—	46,066	2	73,766	4	32,776	1	4,313	—
33,657	—	3,860	—	48,162	2	53,996	3	32,439	1
—	—	23,225	1	32,784	2	30,714	1	—	—
—	—	667	—	8,846	1	5,426	—	—	—
5,469	—	31,588	1	54,279	3	49,697	3	5,145	—
—	—	46,155	3	30,357	1	13,886	—	—	—
4,558	—	90,903	4	67,483	3	—	—	5,457	—
89,094	—	296,568	14	270,920	12	23,473	1	87,696	4
12,829	—	241,753	10	174,014	7	6,388	—	13,456	—
—	—	38,115	2	83,806	4	53,365	3	—	—
41,591	—	16,125	—	53,131	2	59,903	3	44,185	2
15,431	—	77,751	4	72,405	4	8,242	—	13,971	—
7,975	—	13,774	—	38,653	2	35,240	2	8,225	—
39,382	1	6,591	—	16,048	—	—	—	39,560	3
14,895	—	49,404	3	42,752	2	2,609	—	15,507	—
87,783	—	81,098	4	120,768	6	58,614	2	88,761	4
51,748	2	50,156	2	40,177	2	3,237	—	53,155	2
6,119	—	5,556	—	89,252	5	30,671	1	7,145	—
18,269	—	159,369	7	86,721	4	—	—	18,667	—
7,213	—	65,069	4	48,694	2	2,456	—	7,514	—
26,214	—	—	—	50,734	3	40,927	2	25,622	1
—	—	—	—	46,398	2	—	—	2,532	—
—	—	71,698	3	16,530	—	23,162	3	2,274	—
24,759	1	23,473	—	23,034	—	—	—	25,608	3
38,030	2	32,912	1	34,305	2	4,619	—	39,611	2
10,929	—	38,212	2	62,890	4	43,417	2	10,734	—
12,353	—	47,315	3	27,994	1	1,348	—	11,984	—
15,842	—	51,242	3	37,333	2	28,039	1	16,578	—
16,919	—	141,387	7	89,220	4	—	—	12,068	—
—	—	—	—	33,576	2	35,879	2	—	—
33,482	—	24,368	1	34,612	2	—	—	33,988	1
20,767	—	11,055	—	90,290	5	101,245	5	22,546	1
7,564	—	7,505	—	39,577	2	53,675	2	7,979	—
7,249	—	26,567	1	63,617	3	66,901	3	9,513	—
11,076	—	90,012	5	69,014	4	3,993	—	11,818	—
628	—	—	—	15,466	1	15,587	1	3,137	—
38	—	24,741	1	51,544	4	36,456	2	7,299	—
25,042	—	14,592	—	29,398	2	—	—	26,540	1
14,066	—	5,085	—	20,963	—	24,428	3	13,757	—
61,763	2	17,614	—	47,186	2	14,544	—	63,825	4
26,507	—	121,938	5	69,695	3	—	—	27,453	1
1,350,892	16	3,527,435	158	3,724,752	173	1,391,934	65	1,415,390	54

Sources: Referendum: R. Ankara, July 10-11 [13], July 12-14 [17]; Cumhuriyet, July 11, 12.
Elections: Türkiye Yıllığı 1962; R. Ankara, Oct. 18 [20], Oct. 20 [26].

3. No referendum results were available for the provinces of Kars and Artvin.

the politicians had disregarded the joint declaration and had used all the means at their disposal to win the people over to their side, and to fight for the former DP votes. The people, however, appeared to have realized where their real interests lay; they had remained calm, realizing that feelings of revenge and hate could only bring disaster. (*Cumhuriyet*, Oct 14; see also Tanin, Oct 15)

Foreign correspondents noted that, compared with previous Turkish elections, the campaign had been "oddly tame." Party meetings were orderly, and in most parts of Turkey one would hardly have known that elections were being held. There were no posters and banners in the streets; the only portrait on the walls was of Atatürk. (*Times*; *NYT*, Oct 13; *Economist*; *Daily Herald*, Oct 14)

The Parties in the Campaign. The Istanbul independent daily *Milliyet* assessed the attitudes of the parties in the campaign.

The RPP had been faithful to its motto of "friendship, not enmity" and had created the hope that if it gained power, it would make a serious effort to ensure peace and quiet in the country. The RPNP, on the other hand, had shown that it was not fit to bear the responsibilities of the future administration, the paper said.

The DP, which had been supported by millions, should not have been dissolved, but entrusted to new and honest leaders. As it was, the NTP and the JP had been formed as the successors to the DP. The NTP leadership had created a good impression in discussing mostly economic and social questions. If the party did not become the tool of the "fanatical politicians," who had penetrated its lower ranks, it might perform its political duty with success. The JP, on the other hand, "has shown that it wants to come to power in order to continue the past and take revenge. Among the candidates there are the wives, brothers and relatives of people who were convicted at Yassiada. Although Gümüşpala has given the impression that he is a good and moderate leader, he is not strong enough to prevent the development of the obvious intentions of his party." (*Milliyet*, Oct 14)

Whereas the RPP had its regular supporters, *The Times* correspondent wrote, the other three parties had to depend on capturing the former DP vote. For these parties, the question was how close to the wind they could sail in convincing the former Democrats that they stood for the same politics as Menderes. The politicians were doing their best, *The New York Times* correspondent wrote, to attract former DP voters, without involving the names of Menderes or his party.

Of the four political campaigners, the correspondent continued, İnönü was the only one who was telling the Turks they were in for hard times and austerity. Without taking issue directly with İnönü on this point, Bölükbaşı, Alican and Gümüşpala were all committed to reducing or abolishing land taxes, supporting crop prices and assuring other benefits for the peasants, who made up 70-80% of the population. (*NYT*; *Times*, Oct 13; *Economist*; *Daily Herald*, Oct 14)

THE ELECTIONS: RESULTS AND EVALUATION

The Candidates. Only the RPP put up candidates for all seats in the two Houses, i.e. 450 for the House and 150 for the Senate. The JP had 424 and 146 candidates respectively; the RPNP—353 and 132 and the NTP—353 and 110. There were also 66 independent candidates for the House and 21 for the Senate. The majority of

the candidates were lawyers, doctors of medicine, former civil servants and retired officers. (*Hürriyet*, Sept 22; *Cumhuriyet*, Oct 1)

Elections in Calm Atmosphere. The elections were held on Oct 15 in a calm and peaceful atmosphere. No incidents were reported. The vote was completely fair and free, according to all observers. For the benefit of illiterate voters, the ballot papers carried the party symbols. Foreign observers noted that there was hardly a sign of the police or the army, and it was difficult to remember that Turkey was still under military rule.

The Times correspondent wrote that the good order was probably largely due to the elections being held under army and not under a party government which the other parties could accuse of rigging the elections. *Cumhuriyet* gave three reasons for the peaceful atmosphere: (1) the electoral rolls were accurate; (2) the local polling committees were composed of educated and capable people; (3) the voters had shown maturity and refused to be exploited by extremist politicians.

The voting ended at 5 p.m., the ballot boxes were opened and the votes were then counted in public, in the presence of the party delegates. (*Turkish Press*, Oct 16, 17; *Times*; *NYT*, Oct 16; *Guardian*, Oct 17; *Scotsman*, Oct 18)

The Results: Victory for the Successors of the Democratic Party. [The elections resulted in a simple majority for the Republican Party in the House, and for the Justice Party in the Senate. The Republicans, however, were in a minority vis-à-vis the three other parties who were jointly regarded as successors to the votes previously given to the dissolved Democratic Party.]

The final results, published by the Supreme Electoral Council on Oct 20, were as follows:

House of Representatives: registered voters—12,925,395; votes cast—10,522,716 (81.41%); valid votes—10,141,243; RPP—3,724,752 (173 seats); JP—3,527,435 (158 seats); NTP—1,391,934 (65 seats); RPNP—1,415,390 (54 seats); Independents (66 candidates)—81,732 (none).

Senate: registered voters—12,926,837; votes cast—10,519,659 (81.37%); valid votes—10,087,039; RPP—3,734,285 (36 seats); JP 3,560,675 (70 seats); NTP—1,401,637 (28 seats); RPNP—1,350,892 (16 seats); Independents (21 candidates)—39,350 (none). [In addition to the 150 elected members the senate would comprise 22 NUC members and 15 senators appointed by the President.] (*Türkiye Yalığı*, 1962)

The JP won the elections in W. and N.W. Anatolia, former strongholds of the Democratic Party, as well as in certain towns in the south and along the Black Sea coast, and, to everyone's astonishment, in the cotton city of Adana on the Mediterranean shore, a traditional RPP stronghold.

Also unexpectedly, a number of RPP strongholds in the 1937 elections, especially in eastern Anatolia, including Erzurum, had fallen to the recently created NTP. (*Times*, Oct 17)

"DP Victory." Foreign and local observers pointed out that the majority of the votes had been polled by the three parties, the JP, NTP and RPNP, which were known to have appealed to the supporters of the dissolved DP, and gave the following reasons for the result: (1) the delayed shock of the Yassiada trials and the execution of Menderes and his two colleagues. People in

Ankara were saying: "The winner of the elections is Menderes"; (2) the peasants had been hit hard by a bad harvest and deflation; (3) the hatred of a large part of the population for the RPP [because of its reformist, anti-religious policies] and the identification of this party with the military regime—with, in the words of *The Economist* "the frustration and sterility of eighteen months of army rule culminating in the executions." (*Times*, Oct 17, 18; *Guardian*, Oct 17; *Milliyet*, Oct 18; *Washington Post*, Oct 18; *Economist*, Oct 21)

"A Vote Against Kemalism." *The Times* correspondent said the elections had proved that half of the voters were out of sympathy with the revolutionary leaders and that this result amounted to "little less than a legal counter-revolution." (*Times*, Oct 17, 18)

The Economist correspondent thought the vote undermined the basic fact "that Turkey still has a built-in majority that does not accept the reforms of Atatürk which tried to make Turkey into a European nation. This is a fact which made Atatürk himself despair, and which brought Menderes in the end to the gallows because as a Democrat leader he came inevitably to represent the reaction (which in Turkey means the movement away from Atatürk back to Islam and the ways of the East) ... there was nothing else that his party could represent." The JP, NTP and RPP all represented reaction; so, to some extent, did even Atatürk's own Republican Party. The writer pointed out that during the election campaign the name of Atatürk was almost never mentioned, even by the RPP. A highly-educated Turk, a member of the NTP, told him after the elections: "We Turks can never be Europeans. We

can only pretend to be Europeans. We must stay Turks and develop our religion of Islam." One of Atatürk's most convinced followers had told him after the May coup: "We shall never be able to impose Atatürk's ideas on our people." The correspondent concluded that the elections had shown that reaction away from Atatürk was stronger than ever in the Turkish people. It was reasonable to suppose that the twin force which had made the May revolution, the army officers and the Kemalist intellectuals who seemed genuinely devoted to a western-type democracy, was still strong enough to impose its will. "But how is Turkey to continue Atatürk's revolution, and combine it with democracy, if what the people want is reaction?" the writer asked. (*Economist*, Oct 21)

Lack of Social Responsibility. The Istanbul daily *Milliyet* found *The Economist* analysis superficial. It wrote: "The crux of the matter is that in Turkey both the intellectuals and the ignorant are competing with each other to cheat the state and get the most out of society while giving the least possible in return. Politics and the elections were exploited for the purpose and even the most intellectual leaders of parties made concessions to the ignorant on religion and reaction in order to preserve their personal gains. The most important question in Turkey at present is whether the individual shall work for himself or for society." Kemalism began by a move towards the second alternative, but soon the trend was completely reversed and there was no ideological movement to counter it. The fight between reaction and progress was only a detail arising from this state of affairs. (*Milliyet*, Oct 28)

THE NEW CIVILIAN REGIME

THE ASSEMBLY AND THE PRESIDENCY

According to schedule, the new Assembly was to hold its inaugural meeting on Oct 25, the new President was to be elected by the Assembly on Oct 26 and the new government was to be presented to the Assembly on Oct 29.

The Need For a Coalition Government. As none of the political parties had won a majority in the Assembly, the non-party press wrote, a national coalition must be formed with an independent PM. A coalition excluding the RPP or, in other words, dominated by the JP, was deemed out of the question as influential army circles were thought to be determined to stage another coup should former Democrats re-acquire a dominant political position. Gürsel supported a national coalition. (For sources see below.)

Gürsel Candidate for Presidency. At the same time, it was reported, "political circles" stressed that Gen. Gürsel was the best and only candidate for the presidency. On Oct 18 Gürsel announced his candidacy; he told the press he could not leave work half-done. "Although I do not want it and my health is not up to it, I cannot leave my nation under the prevailing conditions." (*Cumhuriyet*; *Yeni Gün*; *Milliyet*; *Hürriyet*, Oct 16-20; *Times*, Oct 17, 20; *Daily Telegraph*, Oct 17)

Party Attitudes. Following are the initial attitudes taken by the parties on the questions of a coalition government and the presidency.

The RPP. In the RPP, many leaders appeared to favour remaining in the opposition, as a show of anger at the election results, and out of concern for the future of the party, on the assumption that if the party came to power now it would continue to lose public support [apparently because it would continue to be identified with the military regime].

Party leader İnönü, however, told the press that no attempt to form a coalition would fail because of the RPP. Gülek also declared that a national coalition would be in the national interest.

The party declared its support for Gürsel's presidency. (For sources see below.)

The JP Divided. Attitudes in the JP were divided according to the different groups which had formed the party.

The retired officers, led by Gümüşpala, the party leader, supported Gürsel for the presidency and would agree to a national coalition, but if the RPP were to form the government, they would support it only with either Prof. Nihat Erin or Kasım Gülek (and not İnönü) as PM.

The former Democrats generally took no definite stand. Some of their leaders, however, wished to remain in opposition until the spring in order to force new elections in which they hoped to win 300-350 seats; others favoured a coalition with the NTP and RPP.

A third group, "the extreme rightists," as they were called in the press, also wanted the party to remain in the opposition or to form a coalition with the NTP and RPP. They claimed that a coalition with the RPP

would contravene the *raison d'être* of the party. In addition they opposed Gen. Gürsel for the presidency and put up the candidacy of Prof. Ali Fuat Başgil. They also wished to oust Gümüşpala from the party leadership and to replace him by Başgil if the latter were not elected to the presidency.

The [pro-JP] *Son-Havadis* claimed that the JP rank and file supported Başgil's candidacy. This was denied by Gümüşpala who said that he would resign from the party if Başgil were elected president. (For sources see below.)

The NTP supported the formation of a national coalition and refused to join a coalition with either the JP or the RPP alone. The party also decided to vote for Gürsel. (For sources see below.)

The RPNP decided to remain in the opposition and to abstain in the presidential elections. (*Cumhuriyet; Dünya; Hürriyet; Hür Vatan; Milliyet; Kudret; Öncü; Son-Havadis, Oct 19-23; Times, Oct 20, 23*)

Political Crisis; Army Intervention. A crisis was reached on Oct 23 and 24, on the eve of the inauguration of the Grand National Assembly. There were reports that the JP, NTP and RPNP were endeavouring to form a coalition without the RPP, and that Başgil had agreed to be a candidate for the presidency and that his supporters were canvassing support for him.

On Oct 23 Gen. Gürsel met the four party leaders, İnönü, Gümüşpala, Alican and Bölükbaşı, at his invitation. After the meeting, the leaders said that a solution was in sight. Gürsel then met the armed forces' commanders in the presence of the NUC members. After this meeting, which lasted until the morning of Oct 24, the four party leaders were again summoned to the presidential palace where they met Gürsel in the presence of the army high command.

The party leaders signed a protocol containing the following points: (1) no amnesty would be considered for those condemned by the Yassıada court; (2) the laws concerning the armed forces, issued by the NUC, would not be amended [i.e. the army officers pensioned off by law in Aug 1960 would not be reinstated]; (3) the party leaders were "to make great efforts" to have their respective parliamentary groups vote for Gürsel in the presidential elections.

Many Turkish papers saw in army intervention the only way to solve the problems of the transitional period although this could not be reconciled with democracy. (*Akşam; Milliyet; Cumhuriyet, Oct 24, 25; Times, Oct 25, 26*.)

In a message issued after the meeting the CGS, Gen. Sunay, said that the Turkish people, Turkish youth and Turkish armed forces—the unshakable guardians of Atatürk's reforms and the spirit of May 27—were confident that the future would bring happiness to the country. He added that there was no difference between the army and the parties as regards the operation of the democratic regime within the framework of the constitution. (*R. Ankara, Oct 24 [26]*)

Başgil Withdraws His Candidacy for President. On Oct 24 Prof. Başgil stated that he was under no obligation to recognize the above-mentioned protocol. "The nation wants me, I shall be a candidate for the presidency," he said. The same day Başgil, accompanied by several JP members, met Deputy PM Özdilek and later called on Gümüşpala and on Bölükbaşı. Early the following day

he left Ankara in a hurry for Istanbul from where he submitted his resignation from the Senate "for reasons which make it necessary." Thus automatically, according to the constitution, his candidature was withdrawn. Two days later, he said that the need arose to withdraw his candidacy following his contacts of Oct 24. As he had promised many senators and deputies that he would run for president but could not keep his promise, he had resigned from the Senate.

Gürsel now remained the sole candidate for the presidency. (*Cumhuriyet, Oct 25-28*)

Assembly Convened. The inaugural meeting of the Grand National Assembly took place on Oct 25 under the chairmanship of the oldest member, İsmet İnönü. Gen. Gürsel and İnönü were warmly welcomed by all sides except for a group of JP deputies and senators who did later join in the applause during Gürsel's opening speech. Only Mrs. Gedik, widow of the DP Minister of the Interior, who had committed suicide (see MER 1960, p 435), and Mrs. Agaoglu, wife of Samet Agaoglu, a former DP Minister serving life imprisonment, stood aside. After the opening speech, the deputies and senators were sworn in.

Two senators resigned: Prof. Başgil, (see above) and Cemal Madanoğlu, the former NUC member (see p 556).

With the opening of the new Assembly, the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist, and with it the NUC which had functioned as its Upper House. (*Cumhuriyet; Öncü; Yeni Gün, Oct 26*)

Gürsel Elected President. The following day, Oct 26, the two Houses in a joint meeting elected Gen. Gürsel as President of the Republic by 434 votes, thereby exceeding by 30 votes the two-thirds majority required by the constitution. There were 156 abstentions and 17 votes for other candidates. (*Cumhuriyet; Times, Oct 27*)

Election of the Presidents of the Two Houses. The Senate and the House of Representatives ran into difficulty on Oct 26 in electing their presidents. Each of the four parties proposed its own candidate and none commanded the required majority of over 50%. On Oct 28 the four parties informally agreed on Suat Hayri Urganlı, a JP Senator for Kayseri, as President of the Senate; the JP having a majority in the Senate. Urganlı was a former Ambassador to Washington. He was elected by 140 votes; 25 votes were given to other candidates. Three deputy-presidents were elected, one each from the RPP, the NTP and the RPNP.

The President of the House in which the RPP held a majority was only elected on Nov 1. The JP at first refused to support Fuat Sirmen, the RPP candidate who was nominated by İnönü, and suggested Prof. Nihat Erim, a supporter of Gülek, but in the end a number of JP deputies voted for Sirmen, who was elected by 227 votes, one vote more than the minimum required. Eighty-nine abstained and 23 voted for other candidates. Fuat Sirmen, RPP Deputy from Rize, had been Minister of Economy and Justice in RPP governments in the years 1943-50, and had been responsible as Minister of Justice in 1948 for the preparation of the new liberal electoral law. (*Milliyet, Oct 27-31, Nov 1, 2; Times, Oct 30, Nov 2*)

THE FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

Deadlock on Formation of Coalition Government; JP Opposed to RPP Premier. At the beginning of Nov, after meeting the CGS, Gen. Sunay, President Gürsel

contacted the party leaders on the forming of a national coalition.

Bölükbaşı, the RPNP leader, informed Gürsel that his party was firm in its decision not to join any coalition. JP efforts to persuade the RPNP to change its attitude failed.

Each of the other three parties was reported to be prepared to join a coalition, the JP and the NTP only on condition that all the three parties participate in the government. Each party demanded the premiership for its leader and the JP and the NTP declared their refusal to enter a coalition with a RPP PM. A suggestion by President Gürsel for a rotating premiership was reportedly accepted by the NTP and the RPP; the JP, however, not only opposed it—holding to its policy of not joining a coalition with an RPP Premier—but also sought to persuade the RPNP to reverse its stand. This led to speculation that the JP was planning a coalition without the RPP, whereupon Gürsel told the press that a government without the RPP would lead to renewed national unrest, and the "former ones" might believe they had returned to power; "the inclusion of the RPP is a must!" (*Milliyet*; *Yeni Gün*, Nov 3-10; *Times*, Nov 7)

Gürsel Appoints İnönü Premier; Army Pressure Seen. On Nov 10 President Gürsel summoned the party leaders and the presidents of the Senate and the House and told them that as the parties had failed to reach an agreement on a coalition and owing to the urgent need to form a government, he had decided to use his constitutional right to appoint a PM without further consultations, namely İsmet İnönü. He added that he was appointing İnönü not as the RPP leader but as a national figure.

İnönü declared that he would try to form not a party government, but "one which will aim at national peace and the establishment of democracy."

The *Times* correspondent claimed that Gürsel's choice of İnönü was made under direct pressure from the army. *Milliyet* wrote: "The army, which keeps a constant vigil at the doors of the Assembly, will go back to its barracks in peace only if it sees İsmet Paşa [İnönü] at the helm."

Many papers welcomed Gürsel's choice. *Öncü* [pro-NTP] and *Son Havadis* [pro-JP], however, attacked the choice of İnönü, claiming that he was a most controversial political figure and not a national figure, having obtained only 38% of the vote. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Milliyet*; *Hürriyet*; *Öncü*; *Son Havadis*, Nov 11, 12; *Times*, Nov 11, 13; *NYHT*, Dec 2-3)

JP, NTP Conditions for Joining Government. The *Times* correspondent commented that the JP and the NTP, especially the former, were now in the difficult position that the bulk of their supporters were political enemies of İnönü. If their leaders now agreed to work under İnönü, these voters might consider that they had been betrayed, and the JP in particular would be in danger of disintegration. (*Times*, Nov 13)

On Nov 12 İnönü had individual meetings with the leaders of the JP, NTP and RPNP. Bölükbaşı, the RPNP leader, reiterated the determination of his party to remain in opposition. Gümüşpala, the JP leader, and Alican, the NTP leader, promised to discuss the matter with their parliamentary groups. The following day, the JP and the NTP submitted to İnönü their conditions for entering a coalition.

The JP made the following conditions: PM İnönü to resign as leader of the RPP; the government programme to contain the following subjects: a general amnesty for members of the former regime; abolition of the compulsory declaration of private assets, no new taxes to be imposed, the tax laws to be modified, the savings bonds system to be abolished; Martial Law to be ended; the JP to have nine ministers.

The NTP demanded an independent PM and equal rights in the coalition. The party proposed Recai Sevinç, President of the Supreme Electoral Council, as PM and alternatively senators Sıtkı Ulay or Fahri Özdilek, both former NUC members.

These conditions were unacceptable to the RPP and to the army leaders. A member of the former NUC said that a general amnesty for the political prisoners would amount to a negation of the May revolution. (*Hürriyet*; *Yeni Gün*; *Ulus*, Nov 13, 14; *Times*, Nov 16)

Army Pressure; The JP Decides to Enter Coalition. On Nov 14 and 15 the political atmosphere in Ankara became very tense and was relieved only after the JP decided to enter the coalition. The *Times* correspondent said that the army had thrown all its weight behind İnönü's attempt to form a coalition and the JP deputies, who held the key to İnönü's success in their hands, were kept in no doubt that if they decided not to enter the government, there would be another army takeover. The press had been openly writing that the two most important political figures in Turkey at present were "Mr... Thompson and Mr Sten" [a reference to two makes of submachine guns]. On Nov 14 İnönü had made a cryptic utterance: "If difficulties arise, I shall find other means. That is my custom."

In these circumstances, the JP parliamentary group met on Nov 15 in the Assembly building while at the same time senior army officers met in the HQ nearby and the members of the former NUC, who acted as liaison between the army leaders and the politicians, met in an upper room at the Assembly.

The JP parliamentary group took a ballot vote in which 89 voted for participation in the government, 84 voted against, 14 abstained and two votes were invalid. This vote was declared invalid on the grounds that there had been more ballots than deputies present. A party spokesman told the press that in accordance with party regulations, the final decision would now be taken by the Central Executive Council. The Executive met immediately and decided to enter a coalition with the RPP by a vote of 15 to 6—Şinasi Osma, Tahsin Demiryaz, Kamuran Evliyaoğlu, Mehmet Turgut and Ahmet Gürkan (the name of the sixth was not reported)—who said they were not opposed to a coalition with the RPP, but only to İnönü's leadership. Gümüşpala declared that the decision had been taken "in the higher interests of the nation." (*Milliyet*; *Times*, Nov 16)

The *Times* commented that a coalition without the RPP was unthinkable and so "a shot-gun wedding has been arranged between it and the JP... Only pressure from the army and consciousness of the desperate need for a government could have brought this alliance into being." (*Times*, Nov 21)

The NTP leader, Alican, welcomed the JP decision and said he thought the new government's programme would not clash with the views of his party. Leading NTP members, however, were reportedly shocked at the JP decision and claimed that the demand they had made for an independent premier had left the door open for further negotiations with them. (*Hür Vatan*, Nov 16)

Adverse Reaction Inside JP. A large number of JP members and provincial leaders in western Anatolia, the former stronghold of the DP, e.g. the Izmir DP executive, openly protested at the executive's decision. There were reports that several JP provincial leaders had resigned and were forming a new party. This was denied by Gümüşpala. Towards the end of Nov, Gümüşpala visited Izmir in an effort "to prevent disintegration." It was reported that he told JP members that the subject of a political amnesty would be included in the government programme (*Milliyet*, Nov 17, 25; *Kudret*, Nov 17; *Cumhuriyet*, Nov 25). [Towards the end of the year, the opposition inside the party became less apparent.]

Formation of RPP-JP Coalition Government. Representatives of the RPP and JP met on Nov 16 and issued a protocol containing the basic principles for the coalition government: the need to form a stable government quickly and efforts to be made "to heal the wounds of the past" [this became a standard reference to an amnesty for those convicted at Yassıada]; the government to safeguard the democratic regime, to find a way of resolving economic stagnation, cure unemployment, encourage foreign investment, reform agricultural taxation, discontinue deduction for Savings Bonds from workers' wages, continue loyalty to the western alliance. Both parties were determined to protect the country against extreme Leftist and Rightist movements and totalitarianism. (*Yeni Gün*, Nov 17)

It was agreed that each party would appoint 11 ministers (including İnönü, the PM, on the RPP side), whereupon İnönü nominated the RPP ministers and Gümüşpala the JP ministers. Gümüşpala himself and the party SG, Şinasi Oğma, declined to enter the government.

On Nov 20 the new government was presented to President Gürsel and held its first meeting. (*Milliyet*, Nov 18-20; *Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, Nov 21)

THE RPP-JP COALITION GOVERNMENT

The Government. *RPP ministers:* İsmet İnönü—Prime Minister (b. 1884, leader of the party, army officer, joined Atatürk in 1920, PM 1923-24 and 1925-37, President of the Republic 1938-1950).

Fethi Çelikbaş—Industry (b. 1912, Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara, joined DP in 1950, Minister of Commerce, co-founder of Freedom Party in 1955, joined RPP in 1961).

Bülent Ecevit—Labour (b. 1925, journalist, studied sociology in USA, RPP Deputy from Ankara since 1957). Avni Doğan—Minister of State (b. 1892, RPP Deputy for 34 years).

Turhan Feyzioğlu—Minister of State (b. 1922, Deputy of Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara 1956-57, RPP deputy 1957-60, after May revolution President of ME Technical University Ankara and member of the Constituent Assembly).

Şefik İnan—Finance (b. 1913, served in Ministry of Finance, DG of the Statistics Department 1954-59, Minister of State in first government after May revolution). Hilmi İncesulu—Education (b. 1917; provincial governor 1946-50, Under-Secretary of PM Office after May revolution—see MER 1960, p 437).

Sahir Kurutluoğlu—Justice (b. 1910, lawyer, RPP deputy 1946-50).

Emin Pakiüt—Public Works (b. 1914, lawyer, President of State Railways Inspection Council, co-founder of Freedom Party, joined RPP in 1958).

İlhami Sancar—Defence (b. 1909, lawyer, a party leader in Istanbul).

Selim Sarper—Foreign Affairs (b. 1899, Ambassador to Moscow and Rome, permanent Representative at UN and NATO, Director General of Foreign Ministry, after May revolution Minister of Foreign Affairs).

JP Ministers:

Akif İyidoğan—Deputy PM (b. 1895, provincial governor and Director of Local Administration Dep. in Ministry of Interior, RPP deputy 1946-50, co-founder of Homeland Party which he left to join JP).

Cahit Akyar—Communications (b. 1910, lawyer, worked in Ministry of Communications 1940-59, recently İTİT Director General).

Şevket Bulutoğlu—Customs and Monopolies (b. 1914, inspector in Ministry of Customs and Monopolies).

Kâmurân Evlioglu—Press, Radio and Tourism (b. 1926, journalist, worked for former DP organ *Zafer* and *Sen Havadis*; voted against JP joining coalition).

İhsan Gürsan—Economy and Trade (b. 1887, worked in Ministry of Finance, was director of the Agricultural Equipment Concern).

Muhtittin Güven—Reconstruction and Resettlement (b. 1917, architect, president of Architects' Union).

Necmi Öktem—Minister of State (b. 1908, army officer, retired after May revolution with rank of Maj-Gen.).

Cavit Oral—Agriculture (b. 1905, agronomist, RPP deputy 1935-50, Minister of Agriculture 1948-50, DP deputy 1954-57).

Suat Seren—Health and Social Welfare (b. 1910, physician, Director of Social Welfare Department).

Nihat Su—Minister of State (b. 1918, lawyer, legal advisor to ME Technical University).

Ahmet Topaloğlu—Interior (b. 1914, provincial governor, pensioned off after May revolution; DP deputy 1954-57).

The Government Programme. On Nov 27 PM İnönü presented the government programme to the Assembly in considerable detail. A précis follows:

İnönü first remarked that a coalition government was an innovation in Turkish political life; it had been formed by parties thought to be unable to come together and was proof of the nation's political maturity. The government was agreed on the principles of Atatürk's reforms and of a democratic regime.

The government would work to ensure political tranquillity—the main internal problem; it would eliminate official discrimination because of political differences, though it would take time to achieve this, and work to enhance the efficiency and prestige of the police and the gendarmerie [which would again become responsible for internal security] after the withdrawal of the armed forces.

While speaking of the affairs of the Ministry of Justice, İnönü said that "the establishment of permanent peace throughout the country... as well as the complete healing of the wounds caused by past political strife... will receive our constant... attention, and work toward this end will begin soon." [This was a reference to a contemplated amnesty for those convicted at Yassıada as later stated by İnönü himself. See below: Question of Amnesty.]

The government aimed at "speedy economic development in freedom." To this end there should be the largest possible investments by both the state and private enterprise. There must also be thorough planning to which end the State Planning Organization had been established. Turkey, he said, must not remain "a nation which does not take heed of its future or which does

not know how to handle its financial affairs." Development must not be accompanied by inflation. There should be regional planning.

The government would prepare tax reforms, including the abolition of land taxes for agricultural land. The economic burden on "poorly paid workers" would also be alleviated (apparently a reference to the compulsory buying of Savings Bonds).

Organic laws would be drafted, establishing the Supreme Council of Judges and the Constitutional Court. There would be various judicial reforms.

Agricultural development would concentrate on increasing productivity through irrigation, pest control, seed selection, etc., as all arable land was now under cultivation.

Laws to effect land reform would be drafted in conformity with the spirit of the constitution and in a manner compatible with the economic and cultural structure.

Speaking of a public works policy, İnönü mentioned irrigation and drainage, drinking water for villages, hydroelectric power, country roads, railways, airports and harbours. "In the field of public works, the government will consider it a duty to assist the private sector."

İnönü then reviewed trade policy. He said that industry's foremost problem was that it did not work to full capacity. New industries should be carefully planned and private industry encouraged.

At a time of industrial growth, an "important government problem is to protect workers' rights." Measures would be taken to ensure a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of economic development, to improve the mechanism for determining minimum wages, to provide new work opportunities, to preserve harmonious relations between employers and employees, to prevent discrimination against workers for political reasons, to improve health and safety conditions in work places. Laws would be submitted to the Assembly "regulating workers' collective contracts and their right to strike."

As regards housing in towns and villages, "the state has tasks to perform as guide, model and assistant."

"We regard it as necessary to make experiments in the question of socialization of health services, based on the work of the State Planning Organization."

The broadcasting services would be politically neutral and be converted into an autonomous institution.

Elementary education should be universal in ten years' time. Education in general would be furthered, with emphasis on the technical fields.

"The needs of the Directorate of Religious Affairs will be deemed important and valuable" and it would be provided with sufficient means. Freedom of conscience and religious belief would be protected.

"As far as means permit we shall endeavour to provide for social justice and charity, for which the Waqfs with assets of over £T1,000m. have been established."

As regards international relations, İnönü spoke of Turkey's wish for peace, and her position as a partner of the Western world, and reiterated her adherence to the UN Charter, to NATO, CENTO, and the European Council and her wish to join the EEC. He mentioned her friendly relations with the US, her interest in tranquillity in Cyprus and good relations with Greece. He expressed the desire for improved relations with the USSR in the framework of Turkey's existing international obligations. He said Turkey felt sympathy for "all Near East and ME countries" and singled out Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan for special mention. He also mentioned in this sense Yugoslavia, Latin America, the Far East and

especially Japan. Turkey supported a general and internationally-controlled disarmament, termination of nuclear tests, and aid to underdeveloped countries.

The army, beloved by the whole nation, would be kept powerful. Bills on the armed forces, in accordance with the provisions in the constitution, would be submitted to the Assembly.

The government would "regard the control to be exercised by the opposition as an assistance." (*R. Ankara, Nov 27 [30]; Turkish Press, Nov 28*)

Vote of Confidence. While the Senate and the House of Representatives discussed the government programme, PM İnönü met the JP Parliamentary group in an effort to persuade them to vote for the government. He said an amnesty had been carefully considered in the discussions between the two parties. Of the two ways possible, first peace and then amnesty or amnesty first and peace later, the first was chosen because above everything Turkey needed peace and a stable government. (*Öncü, Nov 30*)

On Dec 2 the House gave the coalition government a vote of confidence by 269 votes out of 448. The President of the House (RFP) had no vote, according to the constitution. One NTP deputy was evicted from the House, having been found ineligible because of a criminal record. The break-down of the votes was as follows:

	RPP	JP	NTP	RPNP	Total
For	166	97	3	3	269
Against			4		4
Abstention		2	38	38	78
Absent	6	59	19	13	97
Total	172	158	64	54	448

(*Cumhuriyet, Dec 3*)

QUESTION OF AMNESTY FOR YASSIADA CONVICTS

(December)

[Though the parties agreed on Oct 25 not to consider an amnesty for the Yassiada convicts and though the coalition agreement gave priority to pacifying the country, the question of amnesty was raised again in mid-Dec.]

NTP-JP Initiative. There were reports that the NTP and the JP Parliamentary groups had both formed committees to prepare an amnesty bill. PM İnönü and Deputy PM İyidoğan endeavoured to persuade the deputies to desist on the grounds that it would be better if the government prepared such a bill. İnönü met Burhan Apaydın [who had been Menderes' defence counsel] and they were reported to have agreed to leave the matter to the government. Apaydın left for Kayseri to visit the convicts in this connection. It was reported, however, that the two party committees continued to work on a bill. (*Yeni Gün; Öncü; Milliyet, Dec 13-16*)

Warning of a New Military Coup. On Dec 20 Senator Mucip Ataklı, a former NUC member, issued a warning in a press interview that an amnesty might cause another revolution. "There is a tendency to show that those who made the [May] revolution are tyrants and those who were the cause of it are the oppressed. Those who look back with nostalgia to the period of oppression

and the administration of gangsters must realize that the forces which carried out the revolution will not hesitate to prepare a more terrifying one for these people." He urged members of the political parties to take drastic action against people campaigning for a political amnesty. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Milliyet*, Dec 21)

The Deputy PM, İyidoğan, said the following day: "The government is strong and can punish those who by their acts try to undermine its authority." (*Cumhuriyet*; *Milliyet*, Dec 22)

PM İnönü told the Assembly on Dec 25: "We first need tranquillity and once such a state will be reached then an amnesty will become a necessity and a useful thing. The term 'to heal the wounds of the past' appearing in the government programme is a clear promise. But the government should be left alone on this matter." Hinting at Ataklı's statement, he added that the "forces" were under the orders of the government, which was backed by a vote of confidence from the Parliament. (*Cumhuriyet*, Dec 26)

PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF STATE SOCIALISM

Influential Group Advocates Full State Socialism. A declaration advocating a "new *étatisme*," signed by 150 Turkish intellectuals and public figures, appeared on Dec 20 in the first issue of an Istanbul political weekly with a socialist trend, named *Yön*. The paper called upon those in agreement with the views expressed to append their signatures to the declaration.

The authors of the declaration believed that the intellectuals, "who are in a position to give a direction to Turkish society," should agree on the main lines of a certain philosophy of development which they named "new *étatisme*."

Their principal tenet was that only through rapid economic growth could Turkey attain the aims charted by Atatürk, namely modern civilization, democracy, a high level of education and social justice. Economic growth would advance westernization by changing the social structure; democracy could not co-exist with hunger nor could misery direct the masses towards education; social justice could not be realized by sharing poverty.

Turkey was at present in the throes of a social crisis which had grown out of the economic crisis. A backward agriculture and landlessness led to rapid urbanization, which in turn gave rise to unemployment and slum conditions—all this while population growth was rapid, and a large segment of "this avalanche of children" would be deprived of education and a secure future.

Those in power had not realized the seriousness of these problems nor formed "an applicable philosophy of development"; they overlooked the fact that development could not succeed without basic reforms, and sincerely believed that it could be achieved through an increase in foreign aid and in agricultural exports, and the development of tourism. The State Planning Organization would be of no help without such a philosophy.

As a starting-point for their philosophy, the authors considered it "essential to utilize all our capabilities, to

increase investments rapidly, to plan the entire economy, to bring about social justice for the masses, to put an end to exploitation and to make the masses masters of democracy." These goals could be attained through a new concept of *étatisme*.

The economy would continue as a mixture of private and state enterprise, but development based on private enterprise was slow and expensive, created suffering and in an under-developed country could not be reconciled with social justice. Moreover, it was also undemocratic because political power, to a large extent, would be dominated by economic power. If some existing state enterprises were unprofitable, the cause lay in a failure to apply a systematic and sufficiently extensive policy of *étatisme*.

The "new *étatisme*" would take the form of "judicious state intervention": It would help to increase national savings while achieving just taxation. Planning would be accompanied by "the authority and the means to direct economic activity towards the desired goals in due time and in their entirety." Planning required large economic units, to which end cooperation in all economic fields would be established. The basic goal of the new *étatisme* was to raise the level of the working class; a system which permitted their oppression and allowed speculators to enjoy incomes far superior to those of civil servants and intellectuals "cannot continue to operate in the twentieth century." A land reform would replace the landlords with farmers' organizations and cooperatives.

The authors concluded by calling for a debate on the issue which should lead to an agreed philosophy of development.

The signatories included 36 university teachers, 28 of them of junior rank, as well as journalists, engineers, teachers, experts of the State Planning Organization, trade unionists, politicians (mostly RPP members) and three former NUC members (Senators Sami Küçük, Vehbi Eriş, Suphi Karaman). (*Yön*, Dec 20; English text in *Middle Eastern Affairs* Vol. XIV, No. 3, March 1963)

Adverse Press Reaction. Some papers which emphasized the authors' socialist tendencies saw no cause for alarm. *Vatan* wrote that the most extreme leftist in Turkey was no more extreme than a well-intentioned and liberal Christian Democrat in France or Italy. (*Yeni Gün*; *Öncü*; *Vatan*, Dec 20, 21)

One criticism was that the ideas proclaimed were already outmoded in the West and that private enterprise was needed for Turkey's development. (*Hür Vatan*, Dec 25)

Cumhuriyet said that the "conscious state intervention" desired by the authors did not suit Turkey's conditions, for the western conception of the state was not yet clearly established in the minds of the people. (*Cumhuriyet*, Dec 24)

Yeni İstanbul warned the government that Turkey was threatened by Communism and called on it to declare that it would never allow a socialism which inevitably lead to Communism. (*Yeni İstanbul*, Jan 3, 1962)

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(Al-Gumhuriyah al-Arabiyyah al-Muttahidah)

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SYNOPSIS

1961 witnessed the disintegration of the union between Egypt and Syria, following a Syrian military coup d'état. This event was preceded by the issue of the "revolutionary decrees" in July, a new stage in the introduction of "Arab socialism," and by the unification of the government of the two regions in August. Both these measures were thought to have been contributory factors to the break-up of the union. The Egyptian regime survived the Syrian crisis and President Abdel Nasser, who held that "capitalist reaction" was responsible for the Syrian secession, took drastic measures to deprive the moneyed class in Egypt of most of their remaining wealth and their potential influence.

The National Union (NU), finally established in 1960 to succeed the defunct Liberation Rally as the regime's mass political organization, continued routine activities until the break-up of the union; thereafter, in practice, it ceased to function. An outstanding feature among NU activities was the provincial popular congresses in the Egyptian Region. However, the regional congresses and the second National Congress of the NU, which should have met in June and July respectively, were postponed, and finally did not meet at all.

The NU had failed, President Abdel Nasser said, because it had been infiltrated by "reaction," had become a mere "organizational facade" and had been "unmoved by the forces of the masses and their genuine demands." The NU had failed in its allotted task of activating the masses in providing active organized support for the regime and eliciting participation in building the economy and new society. Disillusionment with the NU on this account had indeed become apparent in 1960 (compare MER 1960, pp 461, 487-8.)

The National Assembly, the second Assembly formed in Egypt after 1952, also ceased to function before it completed its first year of life. (The first one was established in 1957 and dissolved a year later, following the formation of the UAR.) In the two sittings of its second annual session (January-February, April-June), the Assembly elected a constitution drafting committee—which soon ceased to function—and approved the budget. Many issues of general or local significance were brought up by members during the sessions. Among the more important measures passed was a bill for the reorganization of Al-Azhar, which provided for the secularization of this ancient Islamic university and its subjection to complete government control.

The Assembly, however, played no part in the issue of the "July revolutionary decrees" or the unification of the government of the two regions of the UAR. It was later revealed in Cairo that at the time the July decrees were issued it was proposed to purge from the Assembly elements in consonance with the new policy, and the President himself remarked that had the decrees been brought

before the Assembly they would have been discussed indefinitely because "interests clash, of course."

Thus, though they were established and supervised by the government, both the National Union and the National Assembly, the two political popular bodies, were found to be wanting before they were a year old.

The "July revolutionary decrees," an official declaration said, were aimed at "completing the construction of the socialist society"; later, they came to be known in the UAR as the "socialist revolution." The decrees constituted indeed a "completion" or, to be more exact, a continuation of a well-established trend, but at the same time, because of their scope and innovations, they also constituted a revolutionary change.

As a result of the decrees, some 400 establishments were partly or wholly nationalized, in industry, communications, public utilities, commerce and finance. The decrees provided for compensation in interest-bearing negotiable government bonds. The private sector was completely eliminated from banking, insurance and the import trade, almost wholly expelled from heavy industry, and reduced to a minor partner in medium industry, transport and the export trade. The public sector of the economy, which had its beginnings in the nationalization of foreign properties in 1956 and which had grown in the following years through the establishment of government development projects and further nationalization, was now invested with a dominant influence over all branches of the economy, with the exception of agriculture, retail trade and real estate.

The agrarian reform law of 1952 was amended by reducing the maximum land ownership to 100 feddan; the former maximum was 200 plus 100 feddan for children. Not affected were the "middle class holdings" of between 50-100 feddans (often owned by families of civil servants and army officers) whose number almost doubled under the first reform. Abdel Nasser said that the agrarian reform was not effectively implemented; some families had managed to retain as much as 3,000 feddans and continued to behave like feudal lords; the landowners had also imposed a land rent on the fellahin much in excess of the official rate. Under the new law, an estimated 380,000 feddan were to become available for distribution in addition to the 500,000 feddan appropriated under the 1952 law. Another decree, aimed to benefit the rural sector, provided that loans by the Agricultural Bank should be interest free.

The July decrees made a complete innovation (in the UAR) by providing the industrial employees and workers with a share in profits and the management of companies: 25% of net profits (10% in cash; 15% to be allocated for social services), and two representatives on the board of directors of any company, the total number of directors being restricted to seven. The working week

in industrial establishments was reduced from 48 to 42 hours without a reduction in wages; this measure was primarily aimed at providing additional employment opportunities.

On the other hand, the benefits and positions of influence enjoyed by the moneyed class were drastically reduced. In addition to the nationalization, the decrees stipulated that no person could hold more than one post in public organizations, companies, societies etc., limited the maximum remuneration which a person might receive from any establishment to £E5,000, restricted holdings of any person in all major companies to £E10,000, and drastically increased the rates of the income and buildings taxes.

One consequence of the decrees was the placing of the heavy burden of managing practically the whole economy on the shoulders of a bureaucracy, which, as Abdel Nasser declared later in the year, did not prove equal to all the tasks imposed upon it.

Speaking on the decrees, President Abdel Nasser said that from the beginning the revolution had been both political and social; it had successfully faced its enemies and was now politically consolidated, and the time had come to effect the social revolution. At the same time, Abdel Nasser said, the social revolution would further consolidate the political achievement. The July decrees had two aims: 1) the protection of the revolutionary regime from "feudalism, monopoly and exploiting capitalism" by depriving them of their "weapons," namely lands and capital; 2) the elimination of class contradictions from a society which, when the revolution started in 1952, was composed of two classes, namely the exploited—95% of the people—and the exploiters who owned the country—less than 5% of the people. Hence the redistribution of national wealth and benefits.

Abdel Nasser spoke of a revolution by the working class which he defined as all wage earners from the President of the Republic to the manual labourer. The "capitalist exploiting class" on the other hand, he said, did not comprise all owners but only those who used their wealth to exploit others. The working class, which the President identified with the people, wished to achieve the revolution by peaceful means, "without killing anyone and without bearing malice against anyone"; the new society provided for "private ownership without exploitation, and public ownership without confiscation."

Abdel Nasser enlarged on the duties of work and efficiency, now that the factories were "owned by the people," and warned against bribery and negligence. A law was being drafted making negligence a crime against the state, punishable by hard labour. Referring to the opinion that the expansion of the public sector would lead to mistakes, the President said that these would be fewer than those made by the capitalists. He also said that more nationalization was the remedy for bribery.

Abdel Nasser took issue with "religious fanaticism" and "political sectarianism" which, he said, the enemies of the revolution had used to divide the working class and defend the interests of reaction. He said that socialism was based on the world religions and expounded the view that Islam had established the first socialist state.

Abdel Nasser emphasized that the "July 22 revolution" was no reform movement but aimed at radical change, at the building of a totally new political, economic and social system. He declared that more measures would be taken during the year, for socialism was an "endless road."

After the decrees had been issued, Hasanain Haykal, Abdel Nasser's leading spokesman, published an article on the differences between Arab socialism and Communism.

While the July decrees aroused no significant opposition in Egypt, in Syria they served to intensify the steadily growing disillusionment with the union; (compare MER 1960, pp 462-3). The decrees came on top of a series of measures taken by the government in February-March to tighten control over the Syrian economy; namely, currency control, price control, import restrictions, the Arabization of banks, and the abolition of the currency board. President Abdel Nasser, who was then on his fifth (and, as it turned out, last) visit to Syria under the union, sharply denounced Syria's previous "so-called economic freedom" and emphasized that the government aimed at a controlled economy. The fears and resentment which this policy aroused in the economic circles affected were evident, inter alia, in the flight of capital and the spreading of rumours detrimental to economic activity but they only found their full public expression later, in the coup d'état and after. The Syrian anxieties were heightened by reports that the economies of Egypt and Syria would soon be fully merged under Cairo's control, and by other reports which lent themselves to the interpretation that Syria would be kept as a primarily agricultural country to serve as a market for Egypt's industry, (though the President emphasized that industry in Syria would be encouraged). The dislocation caused to trade, and a grave shortage in foreign currency attributed by the President mainly to the flight of capital, led to serious food shortages. Imports in the first half of 1961 fell drastically.

In August Cairo's tightening control over Syria was extended to the political field. The regional executive councils were abolished, and all executive power concentrated in the central government in Cairo. Two weeks later, the Local Government Law introduced in 1960 in the Egyptian Region was extended to Syria, making the provisional government directly responsible to the President. As early as June, it was later authoritatively reported in Cairo, Abdel Nasser had told Sarraj and a number of Syrian ministers that present conditions in Syria could not continue; each of them had his own men in Syria, and these groups were "splitting the country." A foreign paper remarked that Egypt had resolved to strengthen the union through a "progressive dissolution of the Syrian personality," and Damascus had now been transformed into a provincial capital; that many Syrians shared these sentiments was made clear in and after the coup d'état.

At this juncture, while the public's disaffection with the union was growing apace, the government in Syria itself was seriously weakened by a power struggle between President Abdel Nasser and Abd al-Hamid as-Sarraj. Sarraj, as President of the Syrian executive council and Syrian Minister of the Interior and head of the security service, had accumulated extensive power, and had become the lynch pin of the regime in Damascus; (MER 1960, pp 463, 500). By all accounts, he had also become a much-hated man because of the police terror which he employed as an instrument of rule. For both reasons Abdel Nasser resolved to remove him from Damascus. Thus, under the new government set-up, Sarraj was made Vice-President for Internal Affairs and transferred to Cairo while Field Marshal Amer, the President's most trusted assistant, was assigned to Damascus to supervise the effective unification of the two regions. (Amer and Sarraj, it may be recalled, had previously engaged in a power struggle in 1956-60 when Amer was in Damascus as the President's representative to supervise Syrian affairs; at that time, however, Sarraj gained the upper hand.) In mid-September Sarraj returned to Syria and

engaged Amer in a power struggle that ranged over the National Union, the political field, and—most important of all—the security service. Abdel Nasser personally intervened, calling both of them back to Cairo, but to no avail. On September 26 Sarraj submitted his resignation, whereupon Abdel Nasser ordered Amer to return to Damascus immediately. Sarraj lost no time in following Amer there and resuming the struggle. With these events security in Syria deteriorated, the atmosphere became tense and uncertain, demonstrations broke out, and the dissolved political parties showed signs of life, demanding that the question of union be reconsidered. These conditions aided a conspiracy of army officers which had been hatching for a long time, and in the early morning of September 28, a coup d'état was launched in Syria which led before the day was out, to the break-up of the UAR. (A special synopsis on this topic will be found below.)

In Egypt (which retained the name of the United Arab Republic) stability was preserved though there was some unrest. Foreign, mostly unfriendly, sources alleged that the country was on the brink of revolution. In the first fortnight after the Syrian secession, Abdel Nasser later said, "reactionaries" had started to move against the revolution. A number of army officers, reported by Cairo to have been involved in a "grave affair," were arrested. However, no emergency security precautions were reported during this period except for the reinforcement of the guards around the President's home. The President later said that while there was a tendency to "talk and philosophize," he had then come to feel that the country was stable. Indeed, no verifiable evidence was available to the contrary.

For Abdel Nasser and the ruling group this fortnight was a period of stocktaking. In a speech on October 5, Abdel Nasser lifted the diplomatic blockade he had imposed on Syria, and thereafter the emphasis shifted from preoccupation with Syria to a re-evaluation of Egypt's internal situation.

Immediately after the coup Abdel Nasser stated that Egypt would continue to pursue Arab unity. On October 16 the President announced his new internal policy. He said that there were only two alternatives: submission to despair or revolution, and, he proclaimed, "I have made my choice . . . ours is the road of revolution." (Beginning with his speeches on the day of the Syrian coup—and in contrast to his past habit, Abdel Nasser emphasized his personal task and responsibilities in Egyptian and Arab affairs). Abdel Nasser enumerated five errors that, he said, the revolution had made, and outlined remedies: (1) The Syrian secession was a counter-attack on the socialist revolution by reaction, aided by imperialism. This was made possible because the revolution had made peace with reaction. Henceforth reaction would be fought without compromise. (2) The National Union had been allowed to lapse into a mere organizational facade; it must be remade into a revolutionary tool of the masses. (3) Inadequate efforts had been made to mobilize the masses for active participation in the revolution; henceforth they must be inculcated with revolutionary fervor. (4) The administration had proved unequal to the huge revolutionary task imposed upon it and must be reorganized on a revolutionary basis. (5) Opportunism had not completely disappeared; it must be eradicated, and the ideals and morality of society must be reformed. In conclusion, Abdel Nasser assured his audience that he would remain at the head of the revolution "as long as God wills."

The new policies were soon given concrete form. Ac-

cording to Egyptian figures, some 55 persons were detained and the monetary property of some 820 "capitalist reactionaries" was sequestered; foreign sources believed the numbers to have been much higher. Non-Arab names, chiefly Jewish, Greek, American, Lebanese and Syrian—were much in evidence on the sequestration lists; the Egyptians affected were leading families in commerce and industry. In addition to their declared purpose these measures were regarded also as a further advance on the road of Egyptian socialism. They also constituted a practically final step in the Egyptianization of the economy; henceforth not only the ownership but also the management of the big companies would be virtually all Egyptian.

The government was reshuffled, without, however, any significant changes in the key positions. Committees and a technical office were set up for the organization of the administration, under the supervision of Vice-President Abd al-Latif al-Baghaddi. The practical measure that issued from these preparations before the end of the year was the establishment of a Supreme Council for [Economic] Public Organizations, chaired by the President of the Republic. The Council was to supervise 38 public organizations comprising a total of 367 companies. (A decree for the establishment of a similar council, to be headed by Amer, had also been issued in April.)

The remaking of the National Union was launched by the President on November 4 with a declaration on the "reorganization of all national popular powers." The reorganization, the declaration said, must ensure the mobilization of the people; the revolutionary action must be closely linked to a definite plan, and the people itself must steer the revolutionary movement. The following steps would be taken: (1) A Preparatory Committee would be called to examine the question of representation in a National Congress of Popular Powers. (2) Elections to the National Congress would be held in time for it to convene in January 1962; the Congress would debate and finalize a charter for national action presented to it by the President. (3) The charter would serve as the basis for general elections to constituent committees of the National Union in every village and town; from these committees would arise the General Congress of the National Union, the supreme popular authority in the country, which would decide on the drafting of a permanent constitution. The National Assembly was terminated, as already mentioned above.

The Preparatory Committee, comprising 250 members, was appointed by Presidential decrees on November 18, and commenced work on November 25. In his opening address President Abdel Nasser stressed that the "reactionaries," the "enemies of the masses" must be "isolated," as a prerequisite for "full freedom and democracy for the people."

The debate, which was held in open session and in which the President repeatedly intervened, revolved around three main topics: who are the "popular powers" and how are they to be represented in the National Congress?; who are the enemies of the people and how should they be treated?; questions of democracy and the freedoms. Views on these questions differed widely. The chief proponent for the liberal outlook was Khālid Muhammad Khālid, the well-known Islamic modernist; he maintained that the "popular powers" were all the citizens, including the reactionaries, he opposed "isolation" as undemocratic, and he demanded the immediate restoration of democratic liberties. Khālid's principal opponent in the debate was the President himself; he insisted on "political isolation" of the "enemies of the re-

volution," and reiterated his oft stated view that there was no room in the UAR for a Western-type democracy, with its political parties and implied "dictatorship of capital." A position to the left of Abdel Nasser was represented by Ihsan Abd al-Qudus, who advocated the establishment of a socialist cadre party. The President, however, continued to oppose a one party system on the grounds that it would exclude the majority of the people from the political process.

The Preparatory Committee adopted resolutions on the question of "isolation" and the composition of the National Congress. There were to be two forms of "isolation": (1) "isolation" of the "enemies of the people's

socialist revolution"; (2) "exclusion" of "those whose interests are incompatible with the interest of the people at the present stage of socialist reconstruction"; the resolutions went on to define these categories. The National Congress would consist of 1,500 members, with a fixed percentage for eight sectors of the popular powers: farmers (25%), workers (20%), "national capitalists" (10%), professional associations (15%), civil servants (9%), university teachers, students and women—7% each. In each of these sectors fixed allocations were provided for sub-sectors, institutions etc.

The Preparatory Committee completed its task on December 31.

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE UAR (EGYPT)

The following survey (apart from the demographic details) is largely based upon the following sources:

- National Bank of Egypt: Economic Bulletin, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 1961.
- MEED, Monthly, June 1962: Extracts from the Report of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Egypt for the Year 1961.
- Federation of the Industries in the UAR: Year Book, July 1962.
- Central Bank of Egypt: Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1961.

GENERAL

In 1961 the Egyptian economy underwent a radical change following the issue and implementation of a long series of nationalization decrees and laws, particularly the "July revolutionary decrees." These decrees invested the public sector with a dominant influence over all branches of the economy with the exception of retail trade and agriculture. The private sector was eliminated completely from many economic branches (banking, insurance, import trade) and reduced to a minor partner of the public sector in others (heavy and medium industry, transport, export trade). The government justified these measures and the general reorganization of the state institutions as necessary to ensure the implementation of the overall plan for economic and social development, the building of a socialist society and the ending of "monopolist exploitation." The property confiscations in October-November, affecting over 800 Egyptian nationals and members of minority groups, were motivated mainly by security and political considerations arising from the implications of the break-up of the UAR. An immediate effect of all these measures was the greatly increased managerial and technical burden placed upon the Egyptian state bureaucracy.

The performance of the Egyptian economy in 1961 was less satisfactory than in 1960. A serious deterioration in agricultural production contributed to an increased trade deficit and renewed pressure upon the balance of payments, resulting in a further decrease in net foreign exchange holdings. The government was forced to rely more heavily upon credit from the banking system to finance greater budget expenditure, both for current needs and for development projects. Dependence upon foreign assistance also increased.

Positive developments included a relatively large increase in industrial production and the continued implementation of the 5-year economic development plan, although at a slower rate than originally envisaged.

DEMOGRAPHY

The population of Egypt in 1961 was estimated at 26,716,000, an increase of 732,000, or 2.8%, over the 1960 census figure of 25,984,000.

Life expectancy at birth for the average Egyptian male and female was estimated at 51.6 and 53.8 years respectively in 1960. This represented a major improvement on the figures for 1955 which were estimated at 35.63 and 41.48 respectively.

The economically active population of Egypt in 1960 was estimated at 7,769,067, of whom 4,402,925 were in agriculture and fishery and 881,576 were in industry and construction. 614,200 were females. Employers and independent workers totalled 2,318,628, while salaried employees and wage earners totalled 3,836,459. Family workers accounted for the bulk of the remaining economically active population.

The following table shows main developments in pupil enrolment:

<i>(Thousands of pupils)</i>			
	1953/54	1960/61	1961/62
Primary Schools*			
Total number of children of compulsory age	3,253	4,300	4,402
Enrolled in schools	1,502	2,610	2,754
% of enrolment	46.0	60.7	62.2
Secondary Education			
General	92	132	132
Technical	19	75	74
University Education			
Total enrolment	90	93	98
(of which Al-Azhar)	3	6	6

NOTE: * The 1953/54 primary school statistics include 1st and 2nd preparatory classes.

As regards literacy, of the 18 million included in the education survey of the 1960 Census, 69.7% were illiterate.

ECONOMIC LEGISLATION

(March-July)

On March 2 the Miar Organization was established as a public economic organization having an independent

entity and attached to the Presidency of the Republic (Rep. Decree No. 249/1961). The capital of the organization was to be formed from Bank Misr capital and its shares in the capital of joint-stock companies, in addition to the capital of other public organizations to be fixed by a Presidential Decree.

Also on March 2, another public organization was established under the name of "Al-Nasr Organization" (Rep. Decree No. 250/1961). The capital of the organization comprised the capital of all companies established by the General Organization for the Execution of the Five-Year Industrial Plan, in addition to other companies and public organizations specified.

The functions of the Misr and Al-Nasr organizations were similar to those of the Economic Development Organization (EDO) set up in 1958, i.e. to lay down investment policy and to supervise the activity of the companies and establishments attached to each organization.

On April 8 a Supreme Council for Currency, Credit and Banking was formed (Rep. Decree No. 317/1961). The Council, headed by the Central Minister of Economy, was to undertake the definition of a general credit policy aimed at meeting the requirements of economic activities, and to take the appropriate measures for stabilizing and stimulating the national economy, to supervise the banking machinery, and to advise the government on financial and currency affairs.

Rep. Decree No. 486/1961 of April 16 provided for the establishment of a Supreme Council for [Economic] Public Organizations which would undertake the formulation of policy for these organizations. The Council was to be headed by Vice-President Abd al-Hakim Amer, with ten Central and Executive Ministers as members. [In December such a council was again established by a decree which made no reference to the above decree. See below.]

On June 6 Law No. 47/1961 was issued for the organization of the business of commercial agencies. All commercial agents were to register with the Ministry of Economy; registration was limited to UAR nationals and to companies entirely owned by UAR nationals. (On July 9 private persons were excluded altogether from agency business. See below.)

On June 22 three laws were promulgated reorganizing the cotton trade. Law No. 69 suspended the Alexandria Futures Market for an indefinite period. Law No. 70 authorized the Egyptian Cotton Commission to purchase the 1961/2 cotton crop, as well as cotton remaining from previous seasons, at prices defined in the schedule attached to the Law. Law No. 71 ruled that any cotton export establishment must assume the form of a UAR joint stock company with capital of not less than £E200,000 in which a public body or organization of economic character should have a share of at least 35%. Law No. 120/1961, issued on July 20, raised the public sector's participation in cotton export firms to 50% and granted a delay of six months to comply with the provision of Laws No. 71 and No. 120. On June 30 Pres. Decree No. 972/1961 was issued defining "The Egyptian Cotton Commission" as a public organization with an independent legal entity and attached to the Ministry of Economy.

Law No. 102/1961, issued on July 5, authorized the Central Bank of Egypt to grant loans from public funds deposited with the Bank to public organizations for projects scheduled under the development budget. Previously these organizations had resorted to grants-in-aid from the development budget.

THE JULY DECREES

The decrees of July, which marked a new stage in the development of the UAR towards a state directed society, were issued in four sets.

The First Set. On July 9 President Abdel Nasser issued five decrees, three of which aimed, according to the official commentary, "to complete the construction of a socialist society on strong and solid foundations and to put an end to all monopoly exploitation or damage to the national interest."

Decree 1174/1961 provided for the reorganization of maritime transport in the Southern R. All maritime transport companies [i.e. the Khedivial Mail Lines, the Alexandria Navigation Company, the Société Misr Navigation Maritime, and the General Navigation Company of Egypt] were to be incorporated into the General Maritime Navigation Company—a government corporation coming under the Southern R. Ministry of Communications. A further law (No. 109/1961) stipulated that the Khedivial Mail Line Co. [owned by Ahmad Abid] was to be nationalized. An explanatory note listed 12 charges of anti-national, anti-social and fraudulent behaviour on the part of Khedivial Mail as reasons for its nationalization.

Law No. 107/1961 restricted the business of commercial agencies to state-owned corporations or companies affiliated to public organizations comprising a governmental participation of at least 25% in their capital. A delay of one year was fixed for its application.

Law No. 110/1961 provided for the transference of the ownership of four cotton pressing enterprises to the state. The law provided for the formation of a General Organization for Cotton Pressing to take over the assets and liabilities of the nationalized firms. The shares of these companies were converted into 15-year 4% state bonds (as amended by Law No. 121 issued on July 20).

Finally a fifth decree [No. not available] laid down that purchases for governmental and public organizations might be effected only through the state-owned corporations concerned, without the invitation of tenders.

Rep. Decree No. 143 of July 12 provided for the conversion of the end-of-service indemnity system into a pensions system as from Jan 1, 1962.

The Second Set. On July 19 several far-reaching laws were promulgated.

Law No. 111/1961 provided for the amendment of the Companies Law No. 26/1954. Companies ready to distribute net profits would do so as follows: 5% for the purchase of government bonds; 75% of the balance to shareholders and 25% to employees and workers. The distribution of this 25% share was to be as follows: (1) 10% in cash upon the distribution of shareholders' dividends; (2) 5% to be appropriated for social services and housing as agreed upon between the company board and the labour syndicate; (3) 10% to be allocated for "central social services" for employees and workers.

Law No. 113/1961 set a £E5,000 p.a. ceiling for the total remuneration which any person might receive from any establishment, private or public.

Law No. 114/1961 stipulated that the number of members of the board of directors of any company or organization should not exceed seven, and that the board would include an employees' representative and a workers' representative. These two representatives would be elected by a secret general ballot for a one-year term of office, starting from July 1.

Law No. 115/1961 amended Law No. 99/1949, the general income tax law. The new law allowed tax exemption on incomes up to £E1,000. Tax rates ranged from 8% for the £E1,000-£1,500 bracket to 90% for all incomes over £E10,000. (A previously imposed defence tax on income was abrogated, as from the 1961 income, by Law No. 131 issued on July 25. The former maximum tax rate was 80% on incomes above £E30,000.)

Law No. 116/1961 provided for the closing of the Cairo and Alexandria stock exchanges for a period of two months as from the date of issue of this law. (The exchanges were reopened at the end of September, but were allowed to deal only with government bonds and shares of companies in which the government had an interest.)

The Third Set. On July 20 three laws were issued providing for a major extension of the public sector.

Law No. 117/1961 provided for the complete nationalization of all banks and insurance companies as well as certain specified companies and establishments. The shares of the companies and the capital of the establishments affected were to be converted into 15-year 4% state nominal negotiable bonds, redeemable wholly or partly after ten years. The price of each bond was fixed according to the last closing quotation of the share at the Cairo stock exchange. The nationalized firms would maintain their legal form and continue their activities and functions. In addition to 25 banks and insurance companies, 50 companies and establishments were affected in the Egyptian R. (as well as 23 in the Syrian R.). Among the more important companies affected, the following may be mentioned: The Delta Trading Co.; Société Misr pour le Commerce Extérieur; The Abu Zaabal and Kafr El Zayat Fertilizer and Chemical Co.; The Egyptian Copper Works Co.; Les Grands Hôtels d'Egypte; The United Egyptian Maritime Shipping Co.

Law No. 118/1961 provided for the participation of the government in the capital of certain companies and establishments. The law stipulated that 83 specified companies in the Egyptian R. as well as 12 in the Syrian R. would assume the form of Arab joint-stock companies with no less than a 50% participation in their capital by one of the public organizations. Compensation would be on the same basis as provided for in law 117. Some of the more important companies affected were: The Industrial & General Enterprises Engineering Co. (Osman Ahmad Osman); The Kafr El Zayat Cotton Co., Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Co.; Philips Orient Co.; Al-Alamia Trading and Industrial Co.

Law No. 119/1961 limited the holdings of any natural or legal person in 147 specified companies in the Egyptian R. (and 11 in the Syrian R.) to a market value of £E10,000 (or £E100,000). The excess shares were to be transferred to the state against compensation as provided in the two laws above. Among the companies subject to Law No. 119 were: The Delta Engineering Co.; Société Générale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA); The Egyptain Chemical Industries Co. (KIMA); The Egyptian Mining and Manganese Co.

Law No. 122/1961 of July 20 terminated the concession held by the Lebon Co. "for the exploitation (*istighlāl*) of gas and electricity in Alexandria," and transferred its assets and liabilities in this regard to a new public organization, "The Alexandria Electricity and Gas Organization."

Law No. 123/1961 of July 20 terminated the concession held by the Cairo Tramways Company "for the exploitation of transport by tram and trolley-bus in Cai-

ro" and its property taken over by "The Cairo Public Transport Organization."

Rep. Decree No. 1203/1961, also issued on July 20, stipulated that the government, public authorities and companies with public participation of 25% or more may not, except by a Republican Decree, assign contracts worth more than £E30,000 to companies other than those in which the government or the public sector held no less than 50% of the capital. No single contractor could receive contracts from the public sector worth more than £E30,000 in the course of one year.

Law No. 125/1961 of July 21 stipulated that no person may be appointed to more than one post whether in government, public organizations, companies, societies or other establishments. A delay of one month was allowed for the enforcement of this law.

The Fourth Set. Law No. 127/1961 of July 25 amended the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law by reducing the maximum land ownership to 100 feddans while Law No. 128/1961 reduced the payments by recipients of agrarian reform lands by 50%. (For details, see below: Agrarian Reform.)

Law No. 129/1961 of July 25 provided for a progressive tax on buildings, ranging from 10-40 per cent of annual rent value, (instead of the former 10 per cent.)

Law No. 133/1961 of July 27—to be implemented within one year—provided for a forty-two hour week (excluding breaks) in industrial establishments to be designated by the Minister of Industry. Workers would not be allowed to work in more than one establishment, nor could establishments ask workers to work overtime or engage workers of other firms for part-time work without the permission of the Ministry of Industry. On the same date Law No. 134/1961 was issued authorizing the Minister of Industry to determine the quantity and the number of working shifts for each industrial establishment.

On July 28 and 30 and on August 1 the Minister of Industry published a list of a total of 370 firms—all Egyptian—affected by the decree. These steps were assumed to provide employment for 29,000 additional workers. The Minister also decreed that the reduction in working time would not entail a reduction in wages; this was later provided by Law No. 175/1961 of November 7.

Further Measures. Rep. Decree No. 1250/1961 of August 10 stipulated that loans—in cash or in kind—extended by the Crédit Agricole et Co-opératif to farmers and Cooperatives should be interest-free.

On August 31, a Rep. Decree was issued prohibiting the employment of any person with an annual salary or remuneration of £E1,500 or more in public organizations or in companies to which the state subscribed capital, except by a special Rep. Decree.

A further decree stipulated that old age, disability and death pensions, as well as Rep. Decree No. 143 (see above) would apply also to establishments employing less than five workers.

Steps to Aid Shareholders. On August 11 the following steps were announced to aid shareholders affected by the recent legislation: (1) "small shareholders" whose total holdings did not exceed £E5,000 might cash up to £E1,000 in lieu of bonds; (2) shareholders might obtain up to £E5,000 in bank loans on the security of bonds, at 85% of their value, at 3.25% annual interest; (3)

shareholders might obtain up to £E5,000 in bank loans on the security of shares, at 40% of their value and at 5% annual interest.

Economic Legislation after Syrian Secession. Law No. 166/1961 promulgated on October 21 provided for the postponement of the repayment of debts of nationalized companies for a period of six months.

On November 2 two laws were promulgated concerning house-rents. Law No. 168/1961 provided for a reduction of 20% on the rentals of houses built after June 1958. Law No. 169/1961 provided for certain exemptions from the tax on buildings in favour of tenants through deductions from the rent.

In conformity with Presidential Decree No. 1899/1961 promulgated on December 16, a Supreme Council for [Economic] Public Organizations was established under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, with the vice-presidents and the competent ministers as members. Each minister was made responsible for the supervision of one or more of the public organizations. The Council was to define production targets of public organizations, ensure their inter-coordination, and follow up the progress of work in its various stages. The Council would approve the budget of the public business sector and its final accounts. The public business sector was grouped in 38 public organizations comprising a total of 367 companies. (For full details, see *National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 1961*.)

Presidential Decree No. 1900/1961, also issued in December, defined the competence and responsibilities of

guiding, organizing, controlling and supervising all public organizations within the competence of the respective ministers.

On December 27, Law No. 189/1961 imposed a new tax on exports, with a maximum rate of 20% of their value.

Law No. 190/1961, issued on the same day, provided for the cancellation of the tax imposed on transfers and foreign exchange authorized for travellers abroad.

On December 31, three ministerial decrees were promulgated regarding foreign payments and receipt and repatriation of Egyptian banknotes. The first decree, No. 1492/1961 [*sic*; 1942?], stipulated that a premium of 20% would be collected or granted upon all payments and receipts. (This was, in fact, an unofficial devaluation of the Egyptian currency.) The second decree, No. 1493 [*sic*; 1943?], prohibited taking Egyptian banknotes into or out of the country. The third decree, No. 1494, [*sic*; 1944?], granted a period of grace, ending February 1, 1962, during which Egyptian notes held outside the country could be repatriated through authorized banks.

NATIONAL INCOME

National income (gross value added) at current prices was estimated at £E1,364m. in 1960/61, and at constant prices (1952=100) at £E1,147m. This represented an average annual rate of increase since 1952 of 6.8% at current prices and 4.5% at constant prices.

The following table shows the composition of national income for 1952/3 and 1960/1 at current prices and constant prices (1952/3 prices).

THE NATIONAL INCOME

(£E million)

	1952/3	1960/1 current prices	1960/1 constant prices (1952/3 prices)	Average Annual Rate of Change %	
				current	constant
Agriculture	252	403	320	6.3	3.0
Industry and Electricity	127	297	218	11.1	7.0
Construction	25	44	38	7.3	5.4
Transportation and Communication	54	102	97	8.3	7.6
Commerce and Finance	72	147	117	9.3	6.2
Housing	59	74	74	2.9	2.9
Other Services	217	297	283	4.0	3.4
Total	806	1,364	1,147	6.8	4.5
Per capita National Income (£E)	37.5	51.3	43.1	4.0	1.75

(Source: The Growth of National Income in the UAR (Egypt) by Prof. Bent Hansen, Memo No. 343, June 17, 1963, issued by the Institute of National Planning,

Cairo; per capita national income based upon Prof. Hansen's national income figures and population estimates given in the UN Demographic Yearbook.)

INDUSTRY

Industrial Development. Industrial production during 1961 rose by 11.6% over 1960 and by 135% over 1952, according to official Egyptian statistics.

VALUE OF EGYPTIAN INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION
(£E million)

	1952	1960	1961
A. Manufacturing Industries			
Textiles	84.6	230.5	259.0
Foodstuffs	122.3	177.1	179.4
Chemicals	20.5	49.0	64.7
Engineering	30.1	80.9	93.9
Building	8.4	20.0	21.4
	265.9	537.5	618.3
B. Mining	3.6	7.5	8.4
C. Petroleum	34.2	66.4	74.0
D. Electric energy	10.1	29.4	37.1
Total	313.8	660.8	737.8

Industrial exports in 1961 reached a record figure of £E45.3m., an increase of 11% over 1960. The spinning and weaving industry accounted for 45% of the export volume.

The following table illustrates trends of main industrial products.

	(in 000's tons)		
	1952	1960	1961
Crude Petroleum	2,379	3,319	3,819
Phosphate	527	566	627
Manganese	191	286	278
Iron Ore	—	239	422
Cotton Yarn	56	102	111
Cotton Fabrics	43	64	73
Jute Fabrics	4	27	48
Refined Sugar	—	338	330
Fertilizers:			
Superphosphates	106	188	178
Nitrate of Lime	111	257	274
Paper and Cardboard	20	49	50
Cement	951	2,047	2,141
Car tyres (units 000's)	—	280	295
Iron bars	50	160	176
Steel products	—	113	132
Electricity (mill. K.W.H.)	992	2,639	2,759
Transistor radios (units)	—	24	46
Ordinary radios (000's units)	—	40	57
Electric refrigerators (000's units)	—	15	22
Washing machines (000's units)	—	5	7
Television sets (000's units)	—	—	17

During 1961 contracts were signed for the following major industrial projects. (Nationality of contracting firm in brackets.)

Coke plant (USSR); pharmaceutical plant extension (USSR); sulphuric acid (UK); petrochemical plant for carbonization of mazout (Italy); prospecting for lead and copper (Germany); power plant (USSR); auto assembly (Italy); tractor assembly and manufacture (Yugoslavia); power plant (UK); power plant (Czechoslovakia).

AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM

Agriculture. 1961 was an unsatisfactory year for agriculture. While the area under cotton was increased at the expense of other crops, the average yield per feddan deteriorated by about one third as a result of worm attack. The dislocation caused by the nationalization of cotton trading firms in June also contributed to the crop failure as these firms had previously played an important role in supplying working capital, insecticides and other services to the cotton growers. The wheat crop was reduced in proportion to the smaller area allocated to it, thus necessitating larger imports of wheat, flour and maize (most of which were received from the US under PL 480). Owing to the insufficiency of waters from the previous flood, the area under rice decreased by 24%, providing a quantity hardly sufficient to meet local requirements.

The following table reflects the production trends for main agricultural crops.

		Area (000's feddans)	Production (000's metric tons)	Yield (metric tons/fed)
Cotton	1960	1,873	479	0.26
	1961	1,936	336	0.17
Wheat	1960	1,456	1,499	1.03
	1961	1,384	1,436	1.04
Maize	1960	1,821	1,691	0.93
	1961	1,603	1,617	1.01
Millet	1960	453	603	1.33
	1961	457	631	1.38
Barley	1960	148	156	1.05
	1961	121	133	1.10
Rice	1960	706	1,486	2.10
	1961	537	1,142	2.13
Beans	1960	362	290	0.80
	1961	328	161	0.49
Lentils	1960	85	50	0.59
	1961	63	34	0.54
Sugar cane	1960	111	4,555	41.04
	1961	112	4,195	37.46

Agrarian Reform. The most important event in agrarian reform was the promulgation on July 25 of Law No. 127/1961 amending the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law. According to President Abdel Nasser, the 1952 law had not always been effectively implemented; certain families had managed, by devious methods, to retain as much as 3,000 feddans instead of the maximum 200 plus 100 for all the children, as permitted by law; the rents imposed by the landowners on the tenants had been considerably higher than those fixed by law (seven times the annual land tax).

The new law reduced the maximum ownership limit from 200 to 100 feddans. Excess land was to be seized by the government against compensation in the form of 15-year 4% nominal state bonds. As from the agricultural year 1961/2, no individual was allowed together with

his wife and minor children, to acquire through rent, seizure or other means more than 50 feddans of agricultural land minus what they already owned. Also on July 25, Law No. 128/1961 was issued providing for a reduction of 50% in the instalments and interests still due on the price of land distributed or to be distributed to beneficiaries in accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law.

The law of 1952 resulted in the government's appropriation of about 500,000 feddans of excess holdings.

By 1961 about 430,000 feddans had been distributed among 160,000 families. Under the new law an estimated 380,000 feddans were to become available for distribution. The following table shows the distribution of land ownership in 1952 before the introduction of agrarian reform, and in 1961. It also gives an estimate for the situation after the distribution of lands in the framework of the new law. The table apparently does not include in the 1961 figures some 80,000 feddans of new lands reclaimed in the period from 1952 to 1961.

(In 000's)

Holdings in Feddans	1952*		1961**		After completion of 2nd agr. reform	
	No. of owners	Area owned	No. of owners	Area owned	No. of owners	Area owned
Less than 5	2,642	2,122	2,870	2,660	2,920	3,040
5-10	79	526	79	530	79	530
10-50	69	1,291	69	1,300	69	1,300
50-100	6	429***	11	630***	11	630
100-200	3	437	3	450	3	500
Over 200	2	1,117	2	430	—	—
Total	2,801	5,922	3,034	6,000	3,084	6,000

* Actual census

** Estimates

*** The increase in this category in both the number of owners and the area owned was thought to result mainly from the provisions of the first Agrarian Reform Law, as it authorized the owners of more than 200 feddans to concede 50 feddans to each child, with a maximum of 100 feddans for all the children of each landlord.

THE BUDGET; DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Expenditure. The 1961/2 budget (July to June) estimated total expenditure at £E778.1m., an increase of £E78.8m. over the estimates for the previous year. The breakdown was as follows:

ESTIMATES OF BUDGET EXPENDITURES

	1960/1 £E m.	1961/2 £E m.
Ordinary Budget (including contribution to UAR unified budget)	301.0	335.0
Development Budget	285.9	320.0
Annexed Independent Budgets (Posts, institutions etc.)	176.9	197.3
	763.8	852.3
Less: Contribution of Ordinary and Development Budgets to Annexed Budgets	63.7	73.4
	700.1	778.9

The preliminary results of the 1960/1 final accounts showed that ordinary expenditures fell short of the estimate by about £E14.8m., whereas ordinary revenues at £E337.6m. fell short by £E33.3m. Actual development budget expenditures amounted to £E198m., while actual revenues of the development budget aggregated £E163m. As a result of these developments, public debt rose by £E66m.

The increase in ordinary expenditure estimates in 1961/2 as compared with the previous year was mainly

attributable to the increase in allocations to the armed forces (from £E87m. to £E103m.) and the increase in cost of living and supply subsidies (from £E16.5m. to £E36.5m.).

Revenues. Ordinary budget revenues in 1961/2 were estimated at £E423m. as compared with £E371m. in 1960/1. A newly introduced revenue item was government profits from public organizations (£E40.2m.) which comprised profits accruing to the government from publicly owned and nationalized enterprises. In addition, an increase of £E22.8m. was estimated in the contribution of public organizations with annexed budgets to the development budget (from £E16.9m. to £E39.7m.). Customs receipts estimated at £E130.2m. continued to represent the largest single source of revenue.

Development Budget. As set out above, actual expenditure under the 1960/1 development budget fell considerably short of the estimate. The 1961/2 development budget of £E320m.—representing the second year of the 5-year plan—was to be financed by a £E87m. surplus in the ordinary budget with the balance (£E232.8m.) to be financed from foreign loans and facilities, private savings and bank credit. The original development budget estimate (to which £E5.0m. was added by the National Assembly) was distributed as follows:

Development Projects. (For industrial projects, see above: Industry). Execution of the 1960-1964 5-year development plan continued during the year, although at a considerably slower rate than originally envisaged, as may be seen from the figures of actual expenditure in 1960/1, below.

	£E m.	%
Agriculture	40.3	12.8
Irrigation and drainage	18.2	5.8
High Dam project ¹	13.7	4.3
Industry	93.3	29.6
Electricity	15.3	4.9
Transport, Communication and Storage	36.5	17.9
Suez Canal	18.0	5.7
Housing	13.6	4.3
Public Utilities	10.3	3.3
Security, Justice and Defence	1.4	0.5
Services	27.8	8.8
Miscellaneous	6.6	2.1
Total	315.0	100.0

¹ The total budget allocated to the High Dam project amounted to £E27.3m., but £E13.6m. of this was distributed among other sectors associated with the High Dam project.

Aswan High Dam. The work on the Aswan High Dam project ran behind schedule owing to a number of factors: a shortage of technical personnel, the inexperience of local contracting companies, the delay in the completion of certain preparatory work (roads, electrical installations, housing, warehouses etc.), the unsuitability of certain Soviet mechanical equipment for local conditions and the frequent exchanges of Soviet personnel owing mainly to difficult living conditions at Aswan. Towards the end of the year, Egyptian army units were ordered to contribute personnel (mainly drivers and mechanics for heavy equipment) to help speed up the work. (On the dam, see also p 660.)

Suez Canal. In April the eighth plan for the development of the Suez Canal, allowing for the passage of ships with a 37 ft. draught, was completed. At the same time the implementation of the 10-year Nasser development plan began. The plan was designed to eventually allow the simultaneous passage of ships of 47 ft. draught in both directions.

Other transportation projects included the inauguration of a new international airport at Cairo, the award of a contract for building a major bridge over the Suez Canal at Firdan to a German firm, and the completion of a new oil wharf at Suez allowing two 65,000 ton tankers to berth. The United Arab Airlines ordered another two Comet 4 airliners for delivery in 1962, which would bring their number to seven, and bought three DC 6 aircraft. New air routes opened during the year included links between Cairo and Accra, Lagos, Conakry, Benghazi, and Tripoli, and the renewal of the Cairo-Nicosia route.

Oil Field Discovery. The Compagnie Orientale des Pétroles, an Egyptian-Italian enterprise, discovered in the Gulf of Suez Egypt's first off-shore oil field. In November this company was awarded two new concession areas, in Sinai and in the Delta.

FOREIGN TRADE, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Foreign Trade. The Egyptian foreign trade deficit in 1961 was the largest since 1952.

There was relatively little change in the composition of imports. Foodstuffs accounted for £E59.8m., other consumer goods for £E32.5m., raw materials and capital goods for £E144.3m., and other goods for £E2.0m.

FOREIGN TRADE 1960/1 (in £E m.)

	1960	1961
Imports	225.0	238.5
Exports	191.6	161.2
Trade Balance	-33.4	-77.3

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (£E million)

	1960	1961
A. Current Transactions		
<i>Receipts:</i>		
Proceeds of exports	200.2	161.3
Transit trade	3.5	3.6
Insurance	0.5	0.8
Shipping	15.2	8.2
Suez Canal dues	50.1	51.2
Interest, dividends and other revenues	5.3	5.8
Travel and maintenance	3.8	3.3
Other receipts	23.1	21.9
Total	301.7	256.1
<i>Disbursements:</i>		
Payments for imports	255.2	224.3
Transit trade	2.9	3.6
Films	0.1	0.1
Other commercial payments	3.8	4.5
Insurance	0.5	1.0
Shipping	14.8	7.8
Interest, dividends and other revenues	3.2	4.5
Travel and maintenance	12.2	9.7
Government expenditures	25.3	30.9
Other disbursements	7.3	9.5
Total	325.3	295.9
Balance of Current Transactions	-23.6	-39.8
B. Capital Transactions		
<i>Inflow:</i>		
Capital remittances	2.0	1.0
US counterpart funds and loans in £E	33.8	28.7
IBRD loan to Suez Canal Authority	10.6	2.0
Total	46.4	31.7
<i>Outflow:</i>		
Capital remittances	1.9	3.3
Compensation payments	33.4	8.0
Total	35.3	11.3
Net capital transactions	+ 11.1	+ 20.4
C. Overall Surplus or Deficit	-12.5	-19.4
D. Accounted for as follows:		
Net foreign exchange holdings (decrease, -)	-27.4	-23.4
N/R accounts (decrease, +)	+14.2	-2.8
Net IMF position (increase, -)	-6.2	+0.9
Errors and omissions	+6.9	+5.9
Total	-12.5	-19.4

Almost all of the net decline of 15.8% in exports was due to the decrease in raw cotton exports from £E134.7m. in 1960 to £E104.6m. in 1961. Exports of rice also decreased from £E9.8m. to £E7.2m. There was little change in industrial exports, the most important of which were cotton yarn and piece goods—£E13.8m., and mineral and chemical products—£E15.5m.

Direction of Trade. The Communist bloc accounted for 24.2% of Egypt's imports and 45.1% of her exports (24.9% and 44.5% respectively in 1960). The countries of the European Common Market accounted for 12.2% of her exports and 19.2% of her imports (12.3% and 27.1% respectively in 1960). The countries of the Arab League accounted for 14.5% and 7.4% of her exports and imports respectively (10.0% and 8.6% in 1960). Countries of Black Africa accounted for 0.2% and 0.7% of her exports and imports respectively (0.7% and 0.6% in 1960). (For details see Tables of Trade pp 82-7 ff.)

Balance of Payments. The 1961 balance of payments showed a deficit of £E39.8m. on current account (£E23.6m. in 1960), which was balanced mainly by US foreign aid and by a further deterioration of the net foreign exchange holdings. Suez Canal revenues continued to play a major role among current receipts. Compensation payments in 1961 (to Sudan and the Suez Canal Co. shareholders) were much smaller than in the previous year, when a large payment to Britain was effected. The previous table presents the detailed position.

Foreign Reserves. According to the International Monetary Fund, Egypt's net foreign reserves (including gold, foreign exchange and short term liabilities) at the end of 1961 amounted to £E27.9m., compared with £E49.4m. at the end of 1960, and £E229.4m. at the end of 1953. Gold reserves remained stable at £E60.6m.; foreign exchange dropped to £E48.8m.; net drawing from the IMF reached £E17.6m.; the residue of £E63.9m. represented other net short term liabilities (mainly bilateral accounts).

Foreign Aid. Egypt continued to receive large scale foreign economic assistance, and several new technical and

economic assistance agreements were signed during the year. The most important agreement was that concluded with West Germany in July, providing DM550m. credit for Egyptian development. (For details, see pp 77-9.)

MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS

Total money supply (as defined by the Central Bank of Egypt and not compatible with IMF estimates) expanded from £E653m. at the end of 1960 to £E712m. at the end of 1961, an increase of 9% compared with an increase of 8% during 1960. This expansion was mainly attributable to the rise in the claims on the government by the banking sector as a result of larger deficit spending, and to the expansion of the public sector. Claims on government reached £E397m. at the end of 1961, compared with £E328m. and £E246m. at the end of 1960 and 1959 respectively. Strong pressure was thus created, both upon the external balance of payments and upon internal monetary stability.

The official wholesale price index at the end of 1961 stood at 102, compared with 100 at the end of 1960 (1958 = 100). During the year the National Bank of Egypt began operating as a purely commercial bank, after handing over its issue department to the newly constituted Central Bank of Egypt, which began to undertake all the usual functions of a central bank.

In accordance with the Egyptianization Law affecting banks operating in Egypt, several foreign banks (including banks of Italian, American and Japanese nationality), were absorbed by local Egyptian banks.

EGYPTIAN AID TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES

1961 saw a concerted Egyptian attempt to enhance Egypt's economic relations with the new nations of Africa. In March 1961 an agreement was reached whereby Egypt extended a £E3m. loan to Mali, at 2.5% for a period of seven years. This loan was to be utilized to pay for Egyptian services and goods involved in executing in Mali development projects to be decided upon by the two governments. By the end of the year implementation of these projects had not yet begun. In May Egypt extended a £E6m. loan to Guinea, on similar terms; utilization of this loan had not begun by the end of the year.

CURRENT AFFAIRS BEFORE THE BREAK-UP OF THE UAR

THE NATIONAL UNION

(January-September)

THE NU AT THE GOVERNORATE LEVEL

Organization. On March 20 Kamāl ad-Dīn Husseini, Controller-General of the NU in the Southern R., issued certain amendments to Decree No. 9 of 1959 concerning the organization of the NU. (Compare MER 1960, p 480 and adjacent table.)

The Governorate General Committee would include the executive committees of the districts (*marāḳiā*), town quarters (*aḳḳām*) and autonomous sub-districts (*banādīr*),

as well as representatives of public organizations and government departments whose number in the committee was not to exceed that of the elected members. The Governorate Congress would consist of the members of the General Committee and all other NU executive committees in the governorate. The Governorate General Committee was to convene at least once every three months; the Governorate Congress was to convene at least one month before the Regional General Congress.

The chairman of the Governorate Executive Committee would serve as chairman of the Governorate General Committee and Congress. (*Ahram, March 21*)

On March 21 Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein issued a decree determining the functions of the Governorate Congress: resolutions concerning NU activities and programmes in the governorate; direction of NU governorate committees in accordance with the policies fixed at the national and regional levels; discussion of resolutions taken by the Governorate General Committee. (*Ahram, March 22*)

On April 4 Hussein appointed rapporteurs (*mugarrirīn*) to the executive committees at all levels above the village. (*Ahram, April 5*)

Governorate Congresses and Meetings. The first Governorate Congress took place before the issue of the decree determining its functions, at Buhayra, on March 7 (*Ahram, March 8*). After the issue of the decree the following governorate congresses took place: at Daqhalīya (*Ahram, May 8*), Damietta (*Ahram, May 9*), Qina (*Ahram, May 15*), Sawhaj (*Ahram, May 15*), Gharbiya (*Ahram, May 24*), Cairo (*Ahram, July 6*). Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein participated in all these congresses. The discussions dealt with local questions; resolutions called for broader government services in the fields of health, education, cooperation, rural industries, and the establishment of tourist facilities; the Cairo congress also passed resolutions on Arab affairs.

[The governorate executive committees, in addition to organizing the governorate congresses, also held joint meetings with local authorities.] Thus, in Feb the Alexandria committee met in joint session with the members of the Governorate Council, the [Alexandria] members of the National Assembly and the "heads of the services" [departmental directors?] to discuss the implementation of the five-year plan in the governorate (*Ahram, Feb. 13*). Similar meetings took place at Sawhaj in April and at Damietta in May. At Sawhaj it was decided to form 20 social centres and eight village councils; at Damietta NU members took it upon themselves to rebuild the harbour with the aid of the government and the local authorities. (*Gumhuriyah, April 4; Ahram, May 9*)

Proceedings of Congress Described; People Exhorted to Self-Help; Grievances of Private Economy Sector Aired at Port Said. Following are excerpts from a description of an NU governorate meeting at Port Said at the end of December, 1960. This meeting preceded the series of governorate congresses.

Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein opened the meeting saying that the citizens of Port Said must start exercising self-help, and then they would receive help from the government; if everything was expected from the central authorities there would be no need for local government. A debate developed when Dr Aziz Sidqi, Minister of Industry, blamed local interests for their lack of initiative and cooperation with the authorities in the furtherance of industrial projects. A local NU member explained that, "to be candid," industrial awareness was not developed at Port Said, whose population consisted first and last of traders. Here he was interrupted by Hussein who demanded: "Well, whose fault is that? Mine? Or the minister's? Or the government's?" He put the responsibility on the population, since "there are, after all, committees of consciousness (*was'y*) and of guidance." The NU member then complained of the bureaucratic entanglements over the allotment of building sites to industrialists. To this Hussein replied: "You have now an

independent governorate; do as you see fit." The same NU member told of a privately-owned enterprise for the sorting of citrus fruit which had only just been established when the Ministry of Economy decided to take it over. Dr Sidqi intervened to say that the takeover was not carried out, but the Exports Promotion Council had found it necessary, for the public good, to put the enterprise under its control. Hussein remarked: "You see, nothing has happened after all!" When the NU member replied that the intention to appropriate the firm was there anyway, Hussein said: "Even in that case we should understand that the public and private sectors complement each other. The state and the people are not on opposing sides..." Hussein cited West Germany, which he had visited shortly before, as an example of economic reconstruction achieved primarily by the people themselves; the industrial labourer there had worked for half-pay because he understood that by rebuilding his country he was working for his own interests.

Another NU member brought up the merchants' grievances. After the Suez campaign, the government, recognizing the damage suffered by the merchants, had granted them loans, and it was unjust that repayment should be demanded. Dr Hasan Salāh ad-Dīn, the [Southern R.] Minister of Finance, replied that debtors who could prove their insolvency would not be liable. The announcement roused applause.

There were complaints concerning health conditions at Port Said, lack of doctors and hospital space. Hussein turned sharply on the Director of Health, who promised in each case redress, "God willing."

There were difficulties about the verification of birth certificates, due to the havoc wrought during the Suez campaign. Hussein suggested the transfer of the copies kept at Cairo to Port Said. There was more applause.

Members asked for the suspension, pending repeal by the next NU General Assembly, of an antiquated law which complicated customs procedure. Hussein replied that nobody had the right to disobey a valid law; if the law was bad, it could be changed by the National Assembly.

Mahmūd Yūnis, Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, was criticized for issuing regulations which prevented Port Said merchants and artisans from trading with passing ships. Yūnis claimed that these regulations were necessary for the smooth functioning of Canal traffic. Hussein then asked Yūnis to give sympathetic attention to a definite proposal to lengthen the stay of ships at Port Said, thus increasing the business of local merchants.

The meeting had lasted seven hours. (*Musawwar, Dec 23, 1960*)

Positive Effects of Congresses Seen; Education of People in Democratic Procedure; Freedom of Speech Exercised. An article in *Al-Akhabr* in March extolled the merits of the NU governorate congresses: They brought the people into contact with the authorities. They led on the road to unity. They made the various sections of the public coalesce into the socialist society. They helped create a new leadership. They turned out new ideas. Finally, they instilled into the people a sense of order; e.g. when discussions grew stormy, when disputing groups emerged and disorder broke out, Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein would bang his gavel, all would calm down, and he would say: "Get used to order; get to know your rights and duties, let everyone speak his mind and not interrupt anyone who has something to say and permission to say it!"

The author said the congresses were completely democratic and cited instances of the freedom of speech ruling there. Thus, at Awan the local Director of Municipal Affairs "fearlessly charged the Ministry's representatives at the congress with administrative defects, such as a scarcity of officials. The Cairo representative rejected the charge and quoted figures which the local man rebutted as incorrect. Hussein was compelled to intervene and promised that the quota of officials would be fulfilled. In another instance the local Director of Education told Dr Nagib Hāshim, the Southern R. Minister of Education, that the Awan technical secondary school had no teacher of electricity. The general consternation at this was shared by Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, who served also as UAR Minister of Education. He asked why the Director had kept silent and had not requested the loan of a teacher from one of the firms working on the High Dam. The Director replied that he had despatched many letters to Cairo asking for a speedy settlement. Hussein cut him short, turned to Hāshim, and demanded that the Cairo official responsible should be disciplined: "this disorder and irresponsibility must be stopped!" Hāshim promised to look personally into the affair upon his return to Cairo. (*Akhbar, March 19*)

At the Congress of Gharbiya Governorate a fellah complained to Hussein that he had grown a record crop of cotton, and yet the prize had gone to another grower whose yield had been lower. Hussein gave orders to pay the fellah £E100 "by 9 a.m. next morning" and told the man to send him a telegram if he had not received the money by 9.05 a.m. The fellah shouted: "Long live justice! Long live the Revolution! Long live Gamāl Abdel Nasser!" and everyone applauded. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, May 27*)

Shortcomings of Congresses. An *Al-Masā'* correspondent, after enlarging on the importance of the governorate congresses as the embodiment of true democracy and the real source of legislation, also enumerated their shortcomings. These were locquacy; vagueness as to the range of subjects which could be treated at these congresses profitably; selfishness (at Tanta a delegate had asked that the NU members be granted free tickets on buses, thereby incurring the wrath of Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein); the absence of women (at Sawhaj the chairman of the NU Women's Committee blamed the [male] delegates of the congress for the inactivity of women in the NU, in answer to Hussein's question.) (*Masā', May 26*)

Mūsā Sabri, in *Al-Gumhuriyah*, criticized the congresses on three points: (1) some of the resolutions were "contrary to socialism," e.g., in Qina there had been demands for the return of lands leased by small tenants to their owners; (2) some of the demands were extravagant and could not be satisfied even if the state budget were doubled; (3) "The most important point" was that "the new principles had not so far been spread among the population." (*Gumhuriyah, May 17*)

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NU

NU for Women. In March it was reported that the NU in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs had prepared a plan for the formation of a General Women's [National] Union in the Egyptian R. (*ittihād āmm li-anisā' fi al-īqlīm al-miṣri*.) This organization would include representatives of the women's union which would be established in the governorates and which would comprise representatives of women's leagues, the rapporteurs of the NU Women's Committee, women students' organizations,

working mothers' councils and others. (*Ahram, March 24*)

The aims of the organization would be to enable women to participate in the building of the socialist democratic cooperative society, to assist in economic development and to establish ties with women's organizations in Asia, Africa and the world at large. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, April 22*)

In June details were published on the organizational setup of the Women's NU as prepared by the sub-committee for Women's Activities, headed by Fātimah Anān, and as amended by Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein. Every woman of 16 and above would be eligible for membership. (For further details see *Ahram, June 21, July 6*.) (There were no further developments.)

Activities of Committees. [The Supreme Executive Committee (headed by President Abdel Nasser) apparently did not meet at all.]

In Jan the Executive of the Egyptian R. Executive Committee resolved that ministers should take part in the deliberations of the permanent professional committees dealing with matters pertaining to their ministries (*Akhbar, Jan 2*), discussed the definition of the [practical] meaning of cooperative democratic socialism in all sectors [of the public] (*Gumhuriyah, Jan 9*), and agreed to establish a labour-health organization within the NU. (*R. Cairo, Jan 11 [W 19]*)

The Permanent Committee of Suggestions proposed changing the name of the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of General Security (*al-amn al-amm*), "in accordance with its real function" (*Ahram, March 2*). It devoted a session to the problem of unemployment among university graduates, particularly in arts and commerce; various suggestions were made concerning the creation of posts (*Ahram, June 27*). It also dealt with the following proposals, among others: To fight obsolete customs, and to allow girls the free choice of a husband; to require worshippers to buy a television receiver for every mosque; to ensure the inviolability of homes and to prevent informers (*muhabirin*) from harassing people in public; to make obligatory the exposure of immoral houses. (*Ahram, April 29*)

During the first half of the year reports appeared on sessions of various functional committees discussing the execution of the resolutions taken at the 1960 National Congress and new proposals. (*Ahram, Jan 2, April 29, May 14, 17; Ruz al-Yusuf, April 3*)

[Reports on the committees ceased to appear after the breakup of the UAR, but] in Dec it was reported that all the institutions of the NU continued to be active. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, Dec 18*)

NU Vetoes Umdah Candidates. Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, on behalf of the NU, vetoed 15 candidates out of 200 for 45 posts of village headman (*umdaḥ*) in Egypt. (*Ahram, March 3*)

NU Seen to Have Failed at Village Level. Mamdūh Rida of *Rūs al-Yūsuf*, in a interview with Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, cited examples of NU shortcomings at the village and district levels. Some committees were completely inactive while others included five members of the same family. There were instances of NU membership being used as a means of intimidation. Hussein replied that the first steps were the hardest and that mistakes were being studied and overcome. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, May 29*)

A journalist who visited the village of Fawriyah in

Bani Suef Governorate found that the landowners were exploiting the fellah in various ways. Strong ties between the landowners and officials made this situation difficult to correct. The only way was to teach the fellah his rights and how to insist on them. All agreed that this was the task of the NU. The local NU Secretary told the journalist: "I do a lot for the peasants... but I cannot do everything alone." Other NU members told the journalist that they were ready to take part in the effort. "If this is so," the journalist concluded, "what are they waiting for?" (*Gumhuriyah*, Aug 19)

High Level Congresses Postponed; Regional Committees Abolished. In April, after a meeting with Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, SG of the Syrian R. NU, Kamal ad-Din Hussein announced the postponement to Oct of the regional congresses planned for June, as well as the Second National Congress, planned for July, "to avoid any interference with the dates of the National Assembly meetings." (*R. Cairo*, April 15 [18])

Asked by a correspondent for the "real reasons" for the postponement, Kamal ad-Din Hussein gave three: (1) the months June-July were the last two of the financial year (*sic*; the financial year ended on June 30) and it was difficult to inspect the financial records before the close of the year; (2) the new plans of the ministries would not be completed by then; (3) it was the hottest

season (*Ruc al-Yusuf*, May 29). [Another reason might have been the inactivity of the NU in the Syrian R.]

On Sept 19 a Presidential decree abolished the regional executive committees and ordered the formation of a Supreme NU Executive Committee consisting of the President of the NU (*i.e.* the President of the Republic) and 20 members. The Governorate Committees would be directly responsible to the Supreme Committee. This step was considered complementary to the unification of the government of the two regions in the previous month, and to the abolishment of "regionalism." The NU General Congress was postponed from Oct 1961 to Feb 1962. (*Ahram*; *Gumhuriyah*, Sept 20; *MENA*, Sept 20 [22])

General Criticism; Abdel Nasser; NU Became Mere Facade. Mûsa Sabri in *Al-Gumhuriyah* argued that Kamal ad-Din Hussein's speeches were not enough. Every citizen, particularly every villager, should know and understand the principles of the NU, and of the socialist cooperative democratic society. NU committees should work, not just talk. (*Gumhuriyah*, May 17)

Following the break-up of the UAR, President Abdel Nasser, in his speech of Oct 16, said that reaction had infiltrated the NU, paralyzed its revolutionary potential and "turned it into a mere organizational facade, unmoved by the force of the masses and their genuine demands." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 17)

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

(January-November)

SECOND ANNUAL SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY — FIRST SITTING

(January-February)

Second Annual Session. The second annual session of the National Assembly opened on Jan 9 as scheduled (see MER 1960, p 473); its first sitting, in which it passed eight bills, terminated on Feb 8. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 10; *Ahram*, Feb 9)

Of the 374 questions asked by members of the Assembly during the sitting, 127 were answered; the rest, as well as 35 bills proposed by members, were not dealt with for lack of time and were considered invalidated. (*Ahram*, Feb 17)

Ministers were questioned, among other subjects, on housing, food supply in the Northern R., the cost of living, reduction of fares between the two regions, the encouragement of fruit exports, the rising prices of text books, the plight of the Cairo homeless. (*Ahram*, Jan 10, 11, 12, 18)

Among matters debated were higher education (*Ahram*, Feb 2), agricultural policy in the Southern R., and medical services in the Northern R. One member complained that agricultural production lagged behind planned targets and criticized the Ministry for administrative shortcomings, particularly in the distribution of cotton seed and seed potatoes. The Southern R. Minister of Agriculture replied by explaining the agricultural development plan and quoted results achieved since 1952. (*Ahram*, *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 1)

The Constitution Committee. Having returned from the Casablanca conference, Abdel Nasser reported on it to

the Assembly on Jan 23. He then asked the Assembly to begin work on the permanent constitution of the UAR in accordance with the provisional constitution of 1958 and also to discuss the ten-year development plan in the light of the six months experience since its inauguration. (*Nasser's Speeches*, p 12)

Anwar as-Saadât, President of the Assembly, explained that the draft constitution approved by the Assembly would be submitted to a general referendum. He said that it was impossible to estimate how long it would take the Assembly to complete the draft. The first draft would be prepared by a special constitution committee. (*Ahram*, Jan 24)

Following a debate on the procedures involved, the Assembly decided to elect by ballot a constitution committee of 90 members. The voting took place on Feb 7. There were 123 candidates; Saadât achieved first place with 460 votes. The committee was composed of 27 lawyers, five former ministers, two former civil servants, eight former army officers, seven physicians, one pharmacist, three journalists, five men of religion, one contractor, nine teachers, three workers, six businessmen and two accountants: three members were women. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 31; *Ahram*, Feb 7, 8, 9)

On April 19 the first meeting of the committee took place. Saadât, its chairman, proposed that the public should be enabled to offer suggestions and appear before the committee: he expressed the hope that the constitution would serve as a model for the entire Arab nation. (*MENA*, April 19 [21]; *Eg. Gaz.*, April 20)

On April 25 a work plan presented to the Assembly provided for the following four sub-committees within the general constitution committee: principles and basic

elements of society; system of government; phrasing; proposals. (*Eg. Gaz., April 26*)

A session of the committee was called on June 24 and later postponed for one day (*Ahram, June 24, 25*). [No later reports on the committee were encountered.]

LAST SITTING

The second [and last] sitting of the Assembly opened on April 11 and closed on June 23. Its main business was the annual budget.

On the first day of the sitting, Dr Qaysūni, the Central Minister of Economy and Finance, introduced the 1961/2 budget, which reached the record sum of £E903.4m.—£E774m. for the Southern R. and £S1,151m. for the Northern R. Dr Qaysūni analysed the threefold basis of UAR socialism: "socialism in ownership"—private ownership and enterprise without feudalism, exploitation and monopoly; "socialism in wealth"—development of the country's resources and a "reasonable standard of wealth" for "all who work hard and produce"; "socialism in combined production effort"—cooperation of the public and the private sectors. "Our pattern of socialism may require the public sector to exercise control over certain aspects of activity or perform them itself to ensure economic security," Dr Qaysūni said. Regarding foreign economic relations, Dr Qaysūni outlined a policy of "positive economic neutralism." (*Ahram, Eg. Gaz., April 12*)

The Assembly submitted the budget to the budget committee which in turn set up nine subcommittees (*Ahram, April 13*). On June 12 the Assembly began its discussion of the report of the budget committee. The committee suggested an increase in the development budget and Dr Qaysūni informed the Assembly that the Government had agreed. On June 21 the Assembly unanimously passed the amended budget in its final form with total expenditure amounting to £E910m.—£E780m. for the Southern R. and £S1,161m. for the Northern R. (*Ahram, June 13, 20, 22; Eg. Gaz., June 22*)

Questions and Debates. Questions to ministers concerned the plans for water supply to Syrian villages, high train fares (*Ahram, April 25*), relations with Muslim peoples and dissemination of Islamic culture (*Ahram, April 26*), the kidnapping of Eichmann by "Zionist gangs." (*Ahram, May 3*)

Among the subjects discussed were Algeria (*Ahram, April 25*), the failure of the government to prevent the slump of onion prices (*Ahram, May 4*), shortcomings of the railway and PTT services (*Ahram, June 2*), the harshness of the tax authorities in the Northern R. (*Ahram, June 7*)

Assembly Approves Al-Azhar Reorganization. In its final meeting on June 22–23, the Assembly approved a law for the reorganization and modernization of Al-Azhar in the face of strong opposition by a number of men of religion and others, among them Fathi Radwan, a former minister. According to the law Al-Azhar would comprise five bodies: the Supreme Council, the Islamic Studies Academy, the Islamic Culture and Missions Department, Al-Azhar University, and Al-Azhar Institutions. The law stipulated the establishment of faculties of Arabic studies, engineering and industries, agriculture, medicine, and administration, in addition to the faculty for Islamic studies. Al-Azhar would be attached to the Presidency of the Republic with a special minister responsible for it; the Rector would be appointed by the President of the Republic from among members of the Islamic Studies Academy. The Academy would be composed of 50 Islamic scholars—of whom 20 at the most might be non-UAR citizens—to be appointed by Presidential decree; it would undertake the "modernization of Islamic culture and the discarding of all forms of intolerance," and assist the University in directing Islamic studies. The Supreme Council which would establish the overall policy of Al-Azhar would be composed of the President of the University, four members of the Academy, the deans of the faculties, the undersecretaries of the ministries of Waqfs, Education, Justice, and Finance and three experts on education. The University's degrees would be made equal to those of other UAR universities. (*Ahram, June 23, 24; Eg. Gaz., June 24*)

Assembly Dissolved. [The Assembly played no part in the issue of the "socialist decrees" in July or the reorganization of government in Aug. Following the break-up of the UAR the 200 Syrian members resigned their seats. On Nov 7 the Assembly was terminated by a Presidential Decree. Later Abdel Nasser said that had the July decrees been brought before the Assembly, they would still be under discussion because "interests clash, of course." See p 627 b.]

REVOLUTIONARY DECREES AND GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

THE JULY REVOLUTIONARY DECREES

(July)

From July 9 to July 27 a number of decrees and laws were issued, which aimed at "completing the construction of the socialist society... and putting an end to all monopoly exploitation or damage to the national interest," by large scale nationalizations, further restrictions on landholdings, provisions for workers to share in management and profits of companies, and related measures.

A survey of these laws will be found on pp 581–2. (See also p 601 for the impact of these laws on the Syrian R.) Below are given excerpts from President Abdel Nasser's speeches on this subject, as well as from an article

by Muhammad Hassanein Haykal on the subject of Arab socialism versus Communism.

Abdel Nasser on the July Decrees. The July decrees were the main theme in President Abdel Nasser's speeches on the occasion of the revolution anniversary. Following is a précis, including direct quotations, of the major points Abdel Nasser made in his speeches in Cairo on July 22 and in Alexandria on July 26. (His speech of July 27 at Alexandria University was also relevant to the theme. For sources, see below.)

Social Revolution Launched Following Political Consolidation. Abdel Nasser said that from the beginning the

revolution had been both political and social. The political revolution came first; the enemies had to be beaten back and a revolutionary political structure had to be established. Now political conditions had been consolidated; "we have therefore decided to put the social revolution into effect."

Abdel Nasser gave two reasons for the new measures: (1) the need to protect the political system which carried out the Socialist revolution from "feudalism, monopoly, and exploiting capitalism"; (2) the elimination of "class contradictions." In this connection he described the society which the revolution had inherited as the product of an alliance between imperialists, feudalists, and exploiting capitalists; it was a society of two classes, namely, the exploited and oppressed, who constituted 95% of the people, and the exploiters, who were less than 5% of the people, but who owned virtually all the country.

The New Society. Abdel Nasser said that during the previous decisive days the features of the new society—whose creation had been the intention of the 1952 Revolution—had been defined. Imperative revolutionary measures were being implemented. The new society provided for "private ownership without exploitation, and public ownership without confiscation"; it was a "society wherein every citizen could exercise his rights without humiliation or fear, a right which derives its prestige from its being a right."

Not Reform but Radical Change. Abdel Nasser said that the July 22 Revolution did not reform things, but was making a "complete change." "If we had said that we would reform society, God knows that we would not have been able to do much. We must change society completely from the base... We must build a totally new state... with a new political system, a new economic system, and a new social system... as a base for justice, just distribution and equal opportunities."

Nationalization to Protect Political Structure of State, Eliminate Class Contradictions. Abdel Nasser said that to protect the political structure of the state, which in turn guaranteed the attainment of the objective of the revolution, it was necessary to destroy "feudalism, monopolies, and the domination of exploiting capital." The feudalists and exploiting capitalists had been waiting for an opportunity to pounce on the revolution and to take over the government again. The weapon of the first was the land and the weapon of the latter was the means of production. The revolution had to deprive them of their weapons; hence the agrarian reform, introduced in 1952, and the nationalizations, which were started in 1956 with British and French properties.

Abdel Nasser said that these enemies of the revolution had used "sectarianism" (or confessionalism—*ta'ifiyah*) as a means of creating "religious fanaticism" (*ta'asub dini*). This "political sectarianism" was designed to divide the working class and safeguard the interests of reaction. [The President did not identify the protagonists of "sectarianism" and "religious fanaticism." In connection with the latter, see below—the justification of socialism on religious grounds.]

Failures of Agrarian Reform. Abdel Nasser said that the agrarian reform had not been as fully implemented as intended. The provision that land rent should amount to seven times the annual land tax had never been complied with; the landowners took much more from the fellahin, by fraudulent methods. Nor was feudalism destroyed, as was the aim. The law allowed for the landowner to re-

tain 200 feddan, plus 100 feddan [for all his children]. In fact, families managed through fictitious bequests and sales to retain much more, and there were cases where families owned 3,000 feddans and continued to consider themselves feudal lords of the town and the peasants as their serfs. It was impossible for the revolution to permit this state of affairs to continue. Hence the new limitations on ownership.

Eliminating Class Contradictions without Malice. In the last few days, Abdel Nasser said, 400 establishments had been nationalized and transferred to the public sector. The aim was to eliminate class contradictions, so that ownership would not remain limited to a small group while the people as a whole remained deprived. The intention was not to punish anybody, hence the compensation for the nationalized properties. "We wanted to achieve this by peaceful means, without killing anyone, and without bearing malice against anyone." Abdel Nasser repeatedly emphasized this point, saying that the people, the working classes, in carrying out their revolution, were just yet generous.

Definition of Classes. Abdel Nasser defined the working class as "anyone who gets a wage for his work, from the President of the Republic to the worker using an axe." As to the capitalist exploiting class, it did not comprise all owners; there were those whose wealth was the result of their labour and who did not use their wealth to exploit others. "By the exploiting capitalist class I mean those who use their money to exploit the people and suck their blood." Ownership was a "social function, and when it turns to exploitation it departs from its function."

Duties of Work and Efficiency; Punishment for Negligence. Abdel Nasser enlarged on the duties of work and efficiency: "The way open to us... is to work... The factories are now owned by the people... By work alone shall we reach our goals—justice and sufficiency. Work is the only cause of the honest citizen. Without work he will have no place in society."

Abdel Nasser said that in the socialist cooperative democratic society class differences would, of course, remain; socialism did not mean equal wages. People were paid in accordance with the work they did, and with their efficiency. He said that every individual would have his place in society, but he should also know his duties. Service in the public sector was social service and carelessness in this sector was a crime. Whoever failed to carry out his responsibilities would be punished; negligence of the public interest would be regarded as endangering state security, and the penalty for this crime would be prison; the laws would be amended accordingly. The manager of a new textile mill whose roof collapsed was now in prison. (On July 26 it was announced that a committee had been set up to prepare a draft law making negligence a crime against the state, punishable by hard labour—*MENA*, July 26 [27].)

Abdel Nasser referred to the opinion of "some" that the expansion of the public sector would lead to mistakes being made. He said it was the reactionaries who were reiterating this. Mistakes were unavoidable, but the public sector made less than the capitalists.

As to bribes, anyone caught involved in a bribe was sent to prison. It had been discovered that private export and contracting companies had paid bribes. Administrative control and investigation would be employed against bribery, but the only real solution was the "nationalization of contracts, so that the public sector deals with the public sector."

"Islam Established First Socialist State." The President said that all religions called for social justice. He said that "the Islamic state was the first socialist state." The prophet had said that three things were common property, namely, water, pasture, and fire. These were the essentials of primitive society, just as factories were the essentials of modern society. "Does nationalization differ from that in any way?" the President asked. The first caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar, "gave to the poor from the rich," and under Umar "they nationalized land and distributed it among the peasants." Alms were a foundation of socialism at that time. As Islam required alms giving of 1/40 of the funds available at the end of the year, then "in 40 or 50 years one would have paid 100% of these funds." In addition, "there were no poor men, there was no destitution. There was complete social tranquility. There were only some corrupted [religious] shaykhs who, in the service of the feudalists, sometimes issued a *fatwa* prohibiting ownership; they were serving 'reaction, feudalism, and capitalism.' Abdel Nasser asserted that in the beginning all Muslims worked; 'there was no commerce at all.' Christianity and Judaism, Abdel Nasser added, also ruled that the *zakāt* was actually a proper application of socialism.

"Socialism an Endless Road"; More Moves Foreseen. The President said that the new socialist measures taken would not be the last; more steps would come "this year"—first among them the gradual introduction of the seven-hour working day. Socialism was "an endless road," a "continuous evolution of society... determined by the needs of society." Some people asked him, the President said, "Where do we stop? Why do you not draw a line...?" He said he could not do it, because there was no end. He gave two examples: The worker would be getting 25% of the profits now, but in "15 years or so" he will say he wants a villa, later a car, and so on. The new cooperative society had inherited from the old the system of usury and interest—which it detested; now the Agricultural Cooperative Credit Bank would lend the peasants money without interest. (*Ahram*, July 23, 27; *R. Cairo*, July 22, 26 [25, 28]; *Nasser's Speeches*, pp 128-172)

Haykal Compares Arab Socialism with Communism. An article on this topic by Muhammad Hassanin Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, appeared on Aug 4, after the issue of the "socialist decrees." Haykal enumerated seven points of difference between Arab socialism and Communism:

- 1) *Attitude to classes:* "Communism advocates the dictatorship of the proletariat... while Arab socialism advocates the dissolution of class distinctions... within the framework of national unity." "In Communism, the first step is punishment and retaliation, while in Arab socialism it is justice and equity, achieved in a peaceful, bloodless manner."
- 2) *Attitude to ownership.* "Communism maintains that every owner is an exploiter, and hence must be eliminated. Arab socialism draws a line between exploiting ownership and between ownership which is the result of diligence and honest labour... [It] regards individual ownership as a right which must be promoted and expanded to embrace more and more former paupers so that they may be given the opportunity of a decent equal life." The exploiter should not be killed, but stripped of the means of exploitation and then allowed to re-enter society.

- 3) *Confiscation versus compensation.* "Communism stands

for confiscation while Arab socialism stands for nationalization in return for compensation."

- 4) *The role of the individual in society.* "While in the Communist system the individual feels that he is a small cog in a vast machine, the individual under Arab socialism feels that his creative faculties are unrestricted..." "Communism regards the individual as a product of history, while Arab socialism believes that the relation between the individual and history is complete and continuous."

- 5) *Duty and right of present generation.* "The Communist regime, particularly in the time of Stalin, sacrificed generations of human beings..." Arab socialism, on the other hand, was concerned with the present as well as with the future; while it was the duty of the present generations to work for the attainment of mass production, they had also the right to live. "Sacrifice, Arab socialism says, should not exceed the limit, or the sense of freedom and humanity will vanish from the heart of man. We call for work, but we refuse conscription... There is no annual leave for workers in Communist China to this day. Arab socialism has cut down working hours."

- 6) *Doctrinaire rigidity versus pragmatism.* "The Communist cannot hodge from a fixed ideological framework... The Arab socialist feels that the entire legacy of world thought is laid open before him, but also feels that he is capable of developing and adding to this legacy. While the Communist is a faithful, obedient disciple of all that he has been indoctrinated with, the Arab socialist is a faithful disciple of the history, problems, reality, and aspirations of his nation and homeland."

- 7) *Party versus National Union.* In Communism, authority was in the hands of the Communist party alone. "According to Communism, democracy is only achieved through the dictatorship of the monolithic Communist party. Arab socialism advocates the National Union, which embraces all the strata of the nation." Haykal added, however, that the idea of the National Union required more explanation and development. (*R. Cairo*, Aug 4 [8]; *Ahram*, Aug 4)

[Haykal did not refer to a difference in the attitude to religion.]

UNIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT

(August)

A "New System of Government." On Aug 15 it was announced that President Abdel Nasser had formulated a "new system of government." The UAR would have one cabinet instead of three (one central and two regional) and a number of vice-presidents, each "in charge of a phase of national activity."

Dr Abd al-Qādir Hātīm, Minister of State, defined the purposes of the reorganization as follows: (1) to consolidate the unity of the two regions; (2) to define executive responsibilities clearly; (3) to enable the public sector institutions to fulfil their role in the general framework. [This measure was seen as designed mainly to tighten control over Syria. For details, see pp 601-2.]

The New Cabinet. On Aug 17 the composition of the new unified government was announced. It included seven vice-presidents (two of them Syrian), 36 ministers (14 Syrians), and three deputy ministers. (See table for detailed list, according to *Ahram*, Aug 17.)

Five ministers were appointed for the first time: Abd al-Muhsin Abu an-Nūr, Sayyid Yūsuf, Salāh ad-Dīn Hīdayat, Ahmad Farag [Egyptians] and Farid Zayn ad-Dīn [Syrian]. (*Ahram*, Aug 17)

Six departments—Health, Planning, Finance and Economy, Local Government, Supply, Waqfs—had more than one minister; the responsibility and work were to be divided between them.

The following ministries were newly created: High Dam, Scientific Research, Higher Education, Housing and Public Utilities. The Ministry of Agriculture was renamed Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs was abolished and the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities established instead. (See MER 1960, pp 475-6; *Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 31.)

The Duties of the Vice-Presidents. On Aug 29 Abdel Nasser issued a decree defining the duties of the vice-presidents as follows: (1) Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh, Vice-President for Production. He would supervise and coordinate, in regard to the implementation of the general policy on production, the Ministries of Economy, Finance, Industry, Agrarian Reform, Agriculture, Land Reclamation, Public Works, Communications, Supply and High Dam; (2) Zakariya Muhyi ad-Dīn (Public Organizations) would plan the general policy and supervise and coordinate the work of the public organizations; (3) Hussein ash-Shāfi'i (Public Organizations)—as above; (4)

Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein (Local Government) would supervise the implementation of the [new] local government system as well as supervise and coordinate the implementation of the general policy on public services of the following ministries: Local Government, Health, Labour, Housing and Public Utilities, Culture and National Guidance, Social Affairs, Higher Education, Scientific Research, Waqfs as well as Al-Azhar University; (5) Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj (Internal Affairs) would supervise and coordinate internal affairs including the Ministry of the Interior, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Administrative Supervisor (*ar-rikābah al-idāriyah*), the State Controller, the Audit Department and the Civil Service Commission.

Regulations prepared by the vice presidents concerning the division of the work between ministries would be subject to the approval of the President.

The following inter-ministerial committees were established at the Presidency of the Republic: (1) Planning, headed by Vice-President Abd al-Latif Baghdādī; (2) Legislation, headed by Vice-President Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein; (3) Executive Affairs, headed by Vice-President Abd al-Hamid Sarrāj; (4) Economy, headed by Vice-President Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh. (*R. Cairo*, Aug 29 [31]; *Eg. Gaz.*, *Ahram*, Aug 30)

THE UAR GOVERNMENT

NOTE: The UAR government of 1960 (see MER 1960, pp 475-78) continued until August 16, 1961 when the two regional executive councils were abolished and a unified central government established. The only change made before that date was on Feb 13 in the Syrian R. Executive Council when Husni as-Sawwāf, Minister of Economy, was appointed Governor of the Central Bank of Syria and Akram Dayri received the

Economy portfolio in his place as an addition to his other portfolios. In the unified government several ministries had more than one minister, who were to divide the responsibility and work between them. Following the Syrian secession (Sept 28) the resignation of the Syrian ministers was officially reported on Oct 7. On Oct 18 the composition of the new government of the UAR-Egypt was announced.

<i>Post</i>	<i>Unified Government of the UAR August 16</i>	<i>Government of the UAR (Egypt) Oct 18</i>
President	Gamāl Abdel Nasser	Gamāl Abdel Nasser
Vice-Presidents	Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādī (Planning) Abd al-Hakim Amer Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh [Syrian] (Productn.) Zakariya Muhyi ad-Dīn (Public Organizations, Production) Hussein Mahmūd ash-Shāfi'i (Public Organizations)	Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādī (Productn.) Abd al-Hakim Amer Zakariya Muhyi ad-Dīn Hussein Mahmūd ash-Shāfi'i
	Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein (Local Government) Abd al-Hamid Sarrāj [Syrian] (Internal Affairs)	Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein (Public Services)
Foreign Affairs	Dr Mahmūd Fawzi	Dr Mahmūd Fawzi
War	Abd al-Hakim Amer	Abd al-Hakim Amer
Interior	Abbas Radwān	Zakariya Muhyi ad-Dīn
Justice	Nihād al-Qāsim [Syrian]	Fathi ash-Sharqāwī
Planning		Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādī
Social Affairs	Thābit al-Aris [Syrian]	Hussein Mahmūd ash-Shāfi'i
Labour	Kamāl ad-Dīn Mahmūd Rif'at	Kamāl ad-Dīn Mahmūd Rif'at

THE GOVERNMENT

<i>Post</i>	<i>Unified Government of the UAR August 16</i>	<i>Government of the UAR (Egypt) Oct 18</i>
Education	Sayyid Muhammad Yūsuf	Sayyid Muhammad Yūsuf
Higher Education	Amjad at-Tarābulṣi [Syrian]	Abd al-Azīs as-Sayyid
Scientific Research	Salāh ad-Dīn Hidāyat	Salāh ad-Dīn Hidāyat
Public Works	Ahmad Abduḥ ash-Sharbāsi	Ahmad Abduḥ ash-Sharbāsi
Culture and National Guidance	Tharwat Ukāshah	Tharwat Ukāshah
Housing and Public Utilities	Tu'mah al-Awdatallah [Syrian]	Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein
Communications	Dr Mustafa Khalīl	Dr Mustafa Khalīl
Health	Dr Nūr ad-Dīn Tarrāf Dr Shawkat al-Qanawāti [Syrian]	Dr Muhammad an-Nabawī al-Muhandis
Local Government	Jādu Iz ad-Dīn [Syrian] Abd al-Muḥsin Abu an-Nūr	Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein
Finance	Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūnī Hasan Abbās Zaki	Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādī
Economy	Akram Dayrī [Syrian]	Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūnī
Industry	Dr Aziz Sīdqi	Dr Aziz Sīdqi
Supply	Kamāl Ramzi Astīno Jamāl as-Sūfī [Syrian]	Kamāl Ramzi Astīno
Agriculture	} Sayyid Mar'i	Dr Muhammad Nagīb Hashshād
Land Reclamation		} Abd al-Muḥsin Abu an-Nūr
Agrarian Reform	Ahmad Hunaydi [Syrian]	
Waqfs	Ahmad Abdallah Tu'aymah Yūsuf Muzāhim [Syrian]	Hussein Mahmūd ash-Shāfi'i
High Dam	Mūsa Arafah	Mūsa Arafah
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs	Ali Sabri	Ali Sabri
Ministers of State for Planning	Abd al-Wahhāb Hūmad [Syrian] Ahmad Ali Farag	Ahmad Ali Farag
Minister of State for Agriculture and Land Reclamation	Ahmad al-Hājī Yūnis [Syrian]	
Minister of State for Agrarian Reform	Ahmad al-Mahrūqī	
Minister of State	Ahmad Husnī	Abbās Radwān
Minister of State	Fākhīr al-Kayālī [Syrian]	
Minister of State	Kamāl ad-Dīn Mahmūd Rif'at	
Minister of State	Dr Abd al-Qādir Hātīm	Dr Abd al-Qādir Hātīm
Minister of State	Farid Zayn ad-Dīn [Syrian]	
Deputy Ministers:		
Foreign Affairs	Hussein Dhu al-Fiqr Sabri	Hussein Dhu al-Fiqr Sabri
Education	Muhammad Ali Hāfīz	Muhammad Ali Hāfīz
War	Abd al-Wahhāb al-Bishrī	Abd al-Wahhāb al-Bishrī

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

New Governorates Created. On June 5 Abdel Nasser decreed the creation of three new governorates: (1) Matruh—capital, Matruh; (2) Al-Wadi al-Jadid (New Valley), Al-Wahat al-Kharga; (3) Al-Bahr al-Ahmar (Red Sea), Ghardaqa (*Ahram*, June 6). [The new governorates lie outside the Delta and the Nile Valley—the two former to the west, the last to the east.]

Town Councils Appointed. On June 6 Abdel Nasser nominated 120 heads (*ru'asā'*) of the town councils in the Southern R. On the same day Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, in his capacities as Minister of Local Government and SG of the NU, nominated the town councillors from among the active members of the NU (in accordance with the Local Government Law—see MER 1960, p 495: The Town Council). (*Ahram*, June 2, 7)

Extension of Governor's Authority. On Aug 30 a Republican Decree amended 21 articles of the Local Government Law of March 26, 1960. Mainly, it extended the application of the law to the Syrian region [following the unification of the government of both regions two weeks previously] and enlarged the executive authority of the provincial governors. (Details in *Ahram*, Aug 31.)

Appointment of Governors. On Nov 13 the governors of nine governorates were replaced, and appointments were made to the three new governorates. Eight of the appointees undertook the office of governor for the first time, while four were transferred from one governorate to another. Following is a list of the changes; otherwise the governors remained as listed in MER 1960, p 496 (which see also for biographical details of the governors transferred).

Governorate	Governor as of Nov 13	Details of New Governors
Alexandria	Muhammad Hamdi Ashūr	Transferred from Damietta
Suez	Sharāwī Muhammad Gum'ah	Army officer, Deputy Director of Intelligence
Al-Qalyubiya	Ahmad Kamāl Abu al-Futūh Rīzq	Army officer, head of the first military mission in Yemen in 1954-5, Deputy Commander of Intelligence
Damietta	Mahmūd Tal'at	Transferred from Suez
Bani Suef	Muhammad Isām ad-Dīn Muhammad Hassūnah	Transferred from Asyut
Asyut	Muhammad Sa'ad ad-Dīn Zāyid	Transferred from Aswan
Sawhaj	Abd al-Hamid Hayrat Abd ar-Rāziq	Police officer; Director of Security of Cairo
Qina	Abdallah Muhammad Ghubārah	Police officer; Director of Security of ad-Daqhaliya
Aswan	Muhammad Izzat Salāmāh	Assistant Professor of Engineering at Cairo University, Under-Secretary of Ministry of Industry
Al-Bahr al-Ahmar	Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Mustafa	Army officer, Maj.-Gen., Director of Cavalry; Under-Secretary of Ministry of War
Al-Wadi al-Jadid	Anwar Abd al-Halīm al-Barūdī	[Army officer] Maj.-Gen. In 1957 appointed Governor of Northern District; since 1960 Director of the Frontier Force
Matruh	Fu'ād Hasan al-Mahdāwī	Member of the NA for the Western Desert

(*Ahram*, Nov 14)

THE SYRIAN REGION

POLITICAL PARTIES AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

[Political parties, it will be remembered, had been disbanded.]

Jan: Alleged Note from Politicians to Abdel Nasser. According to Lebanese newspapers, in mid-Jan Sabri al-Asali [Watani], Akram Hurāni [Ba'ath] and Khālid al-Azm [leftist independent] sent a joint note to Abdel Nasser in which they described the pressure exerted on them by their followers and asked for the restoration of civic freedoms, including that of party activity. A few days later, Rushdi al-Kikbya and Nāsim al-Qudsi (Sha'ab) reportedly expressed their solidarity with the note (*Jaridah*, Jan 19; *L'Orient*, Jan 25). During his

visit to Syria Abdel Nasser denied, however, reports that he had received a note from a group of former Syrian politicians. (*Ayyam*, Feb 21, 23)

The Syrian Communist Party. As in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 498), occasional statements appeared in the Syrian press in which the signatory denied that he had any affiliation with the Communist Party. (e.g. *Ayyam*, Jan 30; *Wahdah*, Aug 20)

According to charges made by Lebanese Communists, the following prominent Communists were murdered in Syrian gaols: Riyād at-Turk (*Nida'*, May 12, 17); Farajallah al-Hilu, SG of the Lebanese CP (see: Lebanon, Internal Affairs); and Jamāl Isma'il. (*Akhbar*, Beirut, July 16)

In June it was announced that a Communist hide-out had been uncovered in the Jisr al-Abid quarter of Damascus, containing central committee protocols and propaganda material. (*Wahdah*, June 7)

(See also below: The Democratic Party of Kurdistan; also: The Sarraj Affair, Party Stirrings.)

The Ba'ath Party. As in the case of the Communist Party, a number of personal announcements appeared in the press, dissociating the signatories from the dissolved Ba'ath Party and professing support for President Abdel Nasser. In Aug and at the beginning of Sept a number of persons from Suweida (Jabal Druze) published such announcements. (*Ayyam*, June 30, Aug 31, Sept 7)

(See also: The Sarraj Affair, Party Stirrings.)

Islamic Liberation Party. [This extreme Islamic group was founded in Jordan and was illegally active mainly in Jordan and Lebanon; see index]

In Jan the Syrian authorities arrested a number of members of this party following the distribution of leaflets. Party leaflets, typewriters and duplicating machines were discovered in two places in Damascus. Among the detained were 11 Jordanian students and a Saudi Arabian engineer. (*Ayyam*, Jan 20)

The Democratic Party of Kurdistan; Kurdish Affairs. In Jan a number of Syrian Kurds were tried before the Supreme Military Court for State Security on a charge of establishing in Syria the Kurdish Democratic Party (*al-bert*) [United Democratic Party of Kurdistan] which aimed to unite the Kurds in one Greater Kurdistan.

According to the prosecutor, the party in Syria was founded by Rashid Hamu, who had withdrawn from the Communist Party with the aim of securing the adherence of Kurds in Syria to the movement for the establishment of a Kurdish state. He was joined by a number of other "scattered remnants" of the Syrian Communist Party: Muhammad Ali Khoja, Khalil Muhammad, Shawkat Hanan Uthman Sabri, Hamzah Nuwayran and Abd al-Hamid Sulayman. A number of soldiers and policemen also joined the party. Nur ad-Din Zaza became its president. The party had a central committee composed of the founders, regional committees in Damascus, Aleppo and the Jazirah, and also local committees. The party acquired printing equipment and disseminated leaflets and literature of a Marxist character, including articles by Mao Tse-tung. It called for a united independent Kurdistan and claimed that this aim could be achieved only by a democratic and progressive mass organization of the Kurds. (*Ayyam*, Jan 30; no further reports on this affair were available.)

Tashnaq Party Charged with Espionage. On Aug 1 an official Syrian spokesman announced the discovery of an espionage and sabotage network of the [right wing] Armenian Tashnaq Party, working for Israel and other countries. The party, which had been active under cover before the union, had a well-organized hierarchy and its members were subject to military discipline. "Military councils" (*majlis arakiyah*), divided into "committees" (*tijân*), obtained arms and equipment and distributed them among "chosen elements" trained in Syria and Lebanon. There were also special, carefully chosen commandos. The espionage activities had benefited from the party's complete authority over its members.

Wireless sets, arms and explosives had been discovered in the party's centres in Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia and

Qamishli. They had been smuggled from Lebanon in cars belonging to diplomatic missions in Beirut; the latter also paid the party for information gathered.

The party had covered up its activities with the aid of [Armenian] clubs, schools registered in the names of religious functionaries, and benevolent societies. (*Jaridah*, Aug 2)

Two weeks later, it was reported that a large quantity of modern arms, including automatic weapons, had been discovered in hiding places in an Armenian Red Cross dispensary in the Maydan quarter of Aleppo. (*Ayyam*, Aug 13)

The above announcement occasioned a great many declarations by Syrian Armenians, especially the clergy, denouncing these activities and the Tashnaq party in general, and professing loyalty to the UAR (*MENA*, Aug 2 [4]; *R. Cairo*, Aug 3 [5]; *ANA*, Aug 6 [9]; *MENA*, Aug 7 [9]; *Wahdah*, Aug 10). Armenian organizations in the Egyptian region in a similar statement pledged their firm allegiance to Arab nationalism and its leader. (*MENA*, Aug 4 [8])

After the UAR break-up on Nov 6, the military prosecutor submitted to the Supreme Military State Security Court an indictment against 37 members of the Tashnaq Party on charges of spying for Israel and an unnamed foreign power; 16 of the accused were still at large. The trial opened on Nov 25. By then, the charges related to 43 persons, nine of whom were still at large, and believed to have escaped to Lebanon. According to information given by a member of the tribunal outside the courtroom, the ringleader was an Armenian Lebanese Deputy (see below); he also mentioned the USA as one of the "other foreign powers" which the Tashnaq had supplied with information by way of other espionage networks abroad (*Mid. Mir.*, Aug 5, Nov 11, Dec 2). The trial was adjourned until Jan 21, 1962. (*Mid. Mir.*, Jan 27, 1962)

On Nov 8 the Syrian Court announced that Moisa Dirkalusyan [member of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies and head of the Tashnaq party in Lebanon] was wanted for participation in the espionage activities (*Jaridah*, Nov 9). In Dec it was reported that Lebanon had refused to comply with a Syrian request for the extradition of Dirkalusyan. (*Kul Shay'*, Aug 19)

Syrian Charges of Jordanian-Organized Terror and Assassination Plots. Syria, which had charged Jordan with organizing terror and assassination plots at the end of 1960, continued to make such charges until mid-March. These activities were allegedly based partly on Lebanon and partly on Jordan itself. (See: Inter-Arab Relations; UAR-Jordan, UAR-Lebanon.)

Sept: Suspicion of Arson. In Sept a Lebanese Communist newspaper expressed doubts whether the recent fire in an industrial undertaking in Damascus had really been due to an accident, as the authorities made out. The paper posed the same question regarding the "increasing number" of fires in Syria of late. (*Akhbar*, Beirut, Sept 10)

LABOUR AND TRADE UNIONS

The General Federation of Trade Unions. The establishment of the GFTU was completed at the beginning of Jan when it elected its representative bodies. (See MER 1960, p 502; for details of the elections and names, see *Ayyam*, Jan 9.)

Workers Organized in National Union. On April 13

Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, as SG of the Northern R. NU, published a decree on the formation of a regional National League of Labour and Workers (*rabitah qawmiyah lil-samal wa-al-ummah*) within the NU, embracing all union members. The regional League would be composed of governorate leagues to be headed by governorate committees.

These committees would deal with local labour problems. Cases of difficulty would be handed over to the Office of Labour and Workers in the NU. A governorate Committee would meet once a month, or when summoned by its president or half its members.

The regional League would be headed by the following bodies:

(1) *The General Committee of Labour and Workers*, composed of the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour (president), the Director of the Labour and Workers' Office in the NU Secretariat (vice-president), 5 members of the regional [Syrian] GFTU, five members of the National League of Labour and Workers' Council, a representative each of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, of the Institute of Social Insurance and of workers' institutions in the fields of health, culture and social affairs.

The functions of the General Committee would be:

(1) to examine proposals made by the lower level committees and make suggestions for the amendment of labour legislation; (2) to take part in the shaping of a general labour programme; (3) to supervise social, health and labour services, as well as technical education in accordance with the requirements of the economy; (4) to supervise workers' culture (*thaqafah ummalayah*); (5) to supervise the execution of all measures affecting labour and workers. The regional committee would meet every four months, or when convened by the president or half its members. (*Ayyam, Wahdah, April 14*)

(2) *The General Committee (al-lajnah al-ammah) of Labour and Workers of the NU Regional Congress*, composed of the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour, the Director of the Labour and Workers' Office in the NU Secretariat, the representatives of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, representatives of the Institute of Social Insurance, of workers' institutions in the fields of health, culture and social affairs, of the ministries of Health, Industry, Economy, Rural and Municipal Affairs, Communications and Public Works and experts in labour affairs. The experts and representatives of the ministries would be chosen by the regional SG of the NU [Sarraj] from among candidates put up by the ministries and the Office of Labour and Workers in the NU. The Committee's task would be general supervision and inspection of labour affairs. (*Ayyam, Wahdah, April 14*)

July Decree: Workers To Receive 25% of Profits; To Participate in Management: 42-Hour Working Week: See below.

Formation of a Journalists' Union. On Sept 7 Sarraj published the provisional rules which were to be binding on the preparatory committee for a Northern R. Journalists' union established in July. Only NU members might join; no non-union members were to be employed by newspapers; the preparatory committee would have the right to suspend or expel members for infringing the rules; the preparatory committee would dissolve after the election of the union council [no date fixed]. (*Ayyam, Sept 8*)

On Sept 12 a membership list was published giving 62 names, 47 from Damascus and 15 from Aleppo. Journalists not included were given 15 days to apply for membership. (*Ayyam, Sept 12; L'Orient, Sept 13*)

GOVERNMENT STRENGTHENS CONTROL OVER ECONOMY

(January-April)

At the end of Jan the UAR government, presided over by Abdel Nasser, reportedly discussed the Syrian economy. The Syrian ministers had advocated economic liberalization in view of the difficult situation in Syria, and in accordance with the findings of the Swedish economist Bent Hansen who had visited the UAR at the invitation of the government to study economic development. (*Jaridah, Jan 19, Feb 5; L'Orient, Feb 4; Nida', Beirut, Feb 7*)

Resignation of Issat Tarabulsi. Dr. Issat at-Tarabulsi, the Governor of the Syrian Central Bank, resigned at the end of Jan, allegedly in protest against Cairo's refusal to free Syrian assets frozen in Egypt. (*Jaridah, Feb 5*)

Tarabulsi was said to have recently warned Dr Qaysuni, UAR Minister of Economy, of the economic strain the union was imposing on Syria, and of the danger to the union itself should the plans for nationalization and currency unification be carried out (*BAPP, Feb 3*). Tarabulsi was described as "the businessmen's hope and disciple of free economy" and his resignation as a sign of impending currency control. (*Economist, Feb 18*)

Huani as-Sawwāl, the regional Minister of Economy, resigned in order to take over the post of Governor of the Central Bank (*Ayyam, Hayat, Feb 7*). (Akram Dayri was appointed Minister of Economy, in addition to his post as Minister of Social Affairs and Labour.)

Currency Control. On Feb 5, currency control was imposed. The export from the Northern R. of local and foreign currency of sums over £S100 was forbidden. Trade in foreign currency, in any form, was also forbidden, except in cases to be specified by the Ministry of Economy. Agricultural produce, textiles, leather and glassware could henceforth be exported only against foreign currency (*Ayyam, Feb 6, 7*). All foreign currency deposits were frozen. All holders of foreign currency (including £E) were required to declare their assets by March 9. (*Ayyam, Feb 8, 13, March 2*)

The foreign currency declared would be bought by the Currency Office (*maktab al-qat'*) at a special rate of 385 Syrian piasters per \$ to prevent losses to persons who had bought their foreign currency at higher rates (*Ahram, Eg. Gaz., March 2*). The official rate was 358 piasters to the dollar.

Additional regulations dealt in detail with financial transactions connected with foreign trade, with the status of non-resident foreigners and foreign firms, and with Syrians travelling or studying abroad. (*Ayyam, Feb 17, 26*)

The measure caused a fall of the Syrian pound on the Beirut exchange on Feb 8 by 3 piasters, from P.L. 81 to P.L. 78. Thereafter, the Syrian pound strengthened and stood at P.L. 84 at the beginning of May. The official rate in Damascus was P.S. 113.95 = £L1 (1£S = P.L.86.9). (*L'Orient, Feb 8, 9, May 6*)

Causes and Consequences. According to an official spokesman, the main aims of this measure were to build up foreign currency reserves for the import of vital consumption goods and the execution of the five-year plan, to keep imports under control and thus prevent the import of luxuries, and to prevent the removal of capital from the country. (*Ayyam, Feb 10*)

The *Economist* wrote that currency control had been contemplated and expected for some two years and consequently much capital fled the country; the measure was intended to prevent further capital flight and steady the Syrian pound. The other contributing causes were the impoverishment of the Syrian economy following three years of drought and the crisis in the textile industry which had lost its natural markets in Turkey, Iraq and Jordan through political disagreement. Damascus had had to accept £2m. from Cairo to redress its budget deficit. "And having paid the piper, Cairo called the tune." (*Economist*, Feb 18)

The *Times* saw in it a test of the union between Egypt and Syria. Syria, some people said, was beginning to pay the price economically for her political partnership with Egypt; but on the whole the step was seen as a consequence not only of the link with Egypt but also of Syria's own economic situation. (*Times*, Feb 10)

New Import Restrictions. Currency control was followed by new import restrictions. On Feb 10 it was reported that existing licences were no longer valid; new licences would have to be taken out for all imports, with minor exceptions. A list of commodities, which might be licensed for import, included foodstuffs and drugs, medical, industrial and agricultural equipment and industrial raw materials. (*Ayyam*, Feb 12, 12)

Price Control Imposed. At the same time the Government informed the public that there were sufficient reserves for the import of vital commodities, and prices must not be raised. Merchants were warned that strict measures would be taken against profiteers. (*Ayyam*, Feb 9)

Merchants dealing in imported goods were instructed by the Supreme Supply Committee to sell at Sept 1960 prices on pain of punishment. In cases where the Sept 1960 prices entailed profits higher than the legal maximum [fixed by the Ministry of Supply in Dec 1960], they were to be suitably reduced. Sept 1960 was chosen because at that time the Syrian pound was stable, and the profit margin "reasonable." (*Ayyam*, Feb 12, 20, March 30)

There were subsequent warnings against hoarding and profiteering [which indicated that maximum-price regulations were not generally observed.] (*Wahdah*, March 24; *Ayyam*, April 27, 30; see also below: Public Reactions).

Arabization of Banks. On March 4 a presidential decree ordered that all banks in the Northern R. were to become joint-stock companies owned by UAR citizens or cooperative societies. The Economic Organization was to hold 35% of the shares of each bank. The President was empowered to permit non-UAR Arabs to own up to 25%. The minimum paid-up capital of a bank would be £53m. The decree was to become operative on Jan 31, 1962; in the interval, state inspectors were to supervise banking activities (R. Damascus, March 4 [5]; *Ayyam*, March 5). Of the 19 banks operating in Syria at the time, 6 were UAR-owned, 6 non-UAR Arab and 7 non-Arab. (*Hayat*, March 5)

Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysuni, the UAR Minister of Finance, defined the aims of the decrees as follows: (1) to transfer ownership into "national (*wataniyah*) and faithful" hands; (2) to enable the government to exercise control for the benefit of the people. (*Eg. Gaz.*, *Hayat*, March 5)

[An immediate decrease in deposits, partially made up during the following weeks, indicated some public uneasiness.] Deposits in Syrian banks amounted to £5348.5 millions on March 3, £5328m. on March 16, and £5336m. on April 23. (*Ayyam*, April 30)

Central Bank Abolished. On April 8 the Currency and Credit Board (CCB) was abolished by presidential decree, and its functions transferred to the Central Bank. (*Bureau des Documentations Syriennes & Arabes*, Damascus, 1961—*Notes Chronologiques*). The CCB was established in May 1953 as "the central monetary authority [with] the task of regulating and coordinating monetary and credit policy." "More questionable... is the fact that one-third of the voting members of the CCB... represent sectional private interests..." (*Asfour: Syria, Development and Monetary Policy*, Harvard ME Monographs, 1959).

Abdel Nasser Denounces Liberal Economy; Justifies State Control, Socialization. Justification of the economic control measures came in a series of speeches by President Abdel Nasser himself. The President arrived in Syria on his fifth visit there on Feb 20, after currency control had been introduced, and stayed there until March 8. He was thus on the spot when the Arabization of the banks decree was issued.

In reference to the currency control, Abdel Nasser said the people would squander their rights if they allowed money earned in Syria to be invested abroad instead of at home. The "so-called economic freedom" of the past which "they talked about" was in fact economic and social exploitation; it meant domination by 5% of the population and led to the dictatorship of capital. No opportunity would be left to speculators and merchants to play about with the value of the currency or to make illegal profits and exploit the people. Some self-appointed economists who were advocating economic freedom in Syria were not even capitalists, but not being fit to do any other work, they worked for "the exploiters, the bankers, the financiers and other kindred blood-suckers" and naturally defended them.

On the day the decree was issued, Abdel Nasser said, hard currency reserves in the Syrian region were £52m. of which £522-23m. were foreign loans. The real balance was £53m. against which there were import applications for about £550m. The foreign exchange rate for hard currency went up, causing a rise in prices.

The President denied rumours that the Syrian gold reserves had been transferred to the Southern R. On the contrary, as the Northern R. was suffering from consecutive years of drought, the Southern R. had helped it out both in financing the budget and in foreign currency. At the same time, Syria's free economy "or better, the economic anarchy," had allowed currency to find its way abroad.

A planned economy combined with social justice would provide not only a decent living for all but also the elements of power needed, e.g., to liberate Palestine.

Industries would be established in the north, just as they had already been established in the south. The country would be developed on the basis of the official rate of the Syrian pound and if the value of the pound was affected abroad, this would have no effect on the building up of the country.

On the Arabization of banks, he said that banks could be a "terrible weapon if employed against the objectives of the people." The UAR had had to ensure that the investment of the deposits of the people's money served

the interests of the people instead of being disposed of from Paris. The President mentioned, e.g., that the capital of the Syria-Lebanon Bank and the National Bank was 100% French. By paying 3% interest and lending against 6.5% interest the banks had also caused a retrenchment in the economy. Loans made available to agriculture and industry had been insufficient. All this would now be rectified.

Regarding trade, the merchants would be given their rights but they could not be allowed to raise prices and exploit the people. As the national income rose through development, trade would expand, but if trade expanded without an increase in production, the national wealth would go abroad and the growth of the national economy would be retarded. Certain merchants had laid in a 3-year supply of imported goods for fear of impending control; this was a waste.

"What we want," the President said, "is simply a controlled economy." He emphasized that he had given orders for the establishment of any kind of industry to be permitted in the Syrian R. even though such an industry might already exist in the Egyptian R. (*Nasser's Speeches*, pp 14-95)

Adverse Public Reaction, Rumours, Syrian Ministers Reassure Commercial Circles. [There were no open protests against the above-mentioned measures—indignation in economic circles found its public expression after the coup d'état of Sept 28—but there was evidence of apprehension followed by economic repercussions.]

[An indication of public unrest, apprehension and opposition was to be found in the rumours which spread throughout the country.] These were some of the rumours reported: currency control was introduced because Egyptians had been smuggling their capital out of the country by way of the free Syrian exchange (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, Feb 11); the Cairo authorities intended to raise the value of the £E vis-à-vis the £S; foreign currency earned by Syrian cotton exported through Alexandria was taken by the Egyptians, who paid the Syrians in £S (*Gumhuriyah*, Feb 20); no foreign currency would be available for vital commodities and the rich were therefore hoarding it (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 6); the prices of sugar and rice would be raised. (*Ayyam*, April 16)

From Feb to May many merchants, money-changers and chambers of commerce sought clarifications from the economic ministers and senior officials regarding the latest economic measures, or presented specific problems arising from them. (e.g. *Ayyam*, Feb 7, 9, 10, March 15, 30, 31, April 2, 30, May 2, 7)

Official spokesmen repeatedly referred to the "anxieties" which had beset certain people (e.g. Sarrāj on Feb 15—*Ayyam*, Feb 16). The Syrian Minister of Economy denounced "criminal interests" for rumour-mongering designed to force up prices and thus enable them to make illegal profits. (*Ayyam*, Feb 20)

[The Syrian ministers, however, endeavoured in the main to reassure economic circles.]

Following a series of contacts between the money-changers and the authorities, the former with official sanction established a joint stock company to trade in gold and securities. (*Ayyam*, Feb 7, March 15, May 2, 19)

A meeting of merchants with economic ministers and officials took place in Damascus on March 29 with the participation of 300 merchants headed by Adil Khoja [of the Company of Five], chairman of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce. The meeting was concerned with the imposition of currency control. Akram Dayri, Mi-

nister of Economy, promised that import licences for foodstuffs, medical and other vital supplies would be issued within ten days. Jamāl Sūfi, the Minister of Supply, stated that the government did not think that all merchants were aspiring to make exaggerated profits. He also promised to request that charges which had been brought against merchants for violation of price regulations be withdrawn. Commercial circles were quoted after this meeting as saying that the ministers had allayed their apprehensions as regards government policy towards them. (*Ayyam*, March 30, 31)

More meetings of this kind took place in Aleppo, Damascus, and the Jazīrah, where promises were made of a moratorium on farmers' debts and of additional loans. In May Akram Dayri, the Minister of Economy, told Damascus merchants that the Economic Organization was not intended to supplant the private sector but to complement it in those sectors in which the latter was not active. Repeated assurances were given that all obligations of the Arabized banks would be honoured, and that import licences would be issued for vital commodities; the merchants were asked to cooperate in making the supplies available to the public. (*Ayyam*, April 2, 30, May 7, June 9)

The Syrian press participated in the effort to calm the population and news such as the rise of the £S on the Beirut exchange was given much publicity. (See Syrian press, Feb to Sept)

Issue of Unification of Syrian and Egyptian Economy. [As will have been seen from the rumours which circulated in Syria and even more from the analyses and the mutual recriminations between Syrians and Egyptians after the secession, Syrians feared or said they feared that Egypt intended to exploit Syria for her own economic interests. News such as the following which appeared in March, in the wake of economic control measures, might have contributed to such apprehensions.]

A report by Dr. Qaysūni, the UAR Minister of Economy, to Abdel Nasser said the Egyptian Economic Organization and Misr Bank would play a considerable part in the industrialization of Syria together with the Syrian Economic Organization, but the supervision of the joint companies would be in the hands of the latter (*Akhbar*, March 7). M.F. Dandāshi, Director of Programming at the UAR Ministry of Planning, published a study of trade prospects between the two regions, in which he found that 83.9% of Syrian exports to Egypt would consist of foodstuffs and other agricultural produce, while 76.5% of Egyptian exports to Syria would consist of industrial products (*VEFRPA*, March). Rūs al-Yūsuf reported that within the year the two regions would be fully brought together (*taqārūb kāmīl*); to this end it had been decided to integrate the economic systems, legislation and financial regulations. The expert committees which had been set up for this purpose had been asked to speed up their work. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 13)

Food Shortages; Official Action. At the beginning of July the authorities took measures to alleviate food shortages which were becoming acute. On July 1 the Minister of Supply ordered the seizure, against payment at official prices, of grain stored by farmers and merchants, with the exception of grain for seed and domestic consumption. On July 4 it was reported that the government would import a considerable quantity of cattle in order to relieve the meat shortage, since private importers had made no use of the opportunity given them

almost a month before (see above: *New Import Restrictions*). (*Ayyam*, July 2, 4)

The value of imports in the first half of 1961 dropped to £5319m, as compared with £5384m. during the same period in 1960. Shortages were felt in such commodities as edible oils, drugs, woollens, motorized vehicles and various metal products. (*Ayyam*, Sept 24)

THE JULY DECREES

(July)

In July President Abdel Nasser promulgated a series of "revolutionary decrees." (See p 581) Of these decrees, the following applied to the Northern R.: workers and employees were to receive a 25% share of profits and be represented on boards of directors; salaries were not to exceed £550,000 per annum; banks, insurance companies and certain other named enterprises were to be nationalized; other named industrial undertakings were to go into equal partnership with the government; no natural or corporate person (except for public institutions) could hold shares of a market value above £5100,000 of certain other named enterprises; undertakings in which the government held at least 25% of the capital could not give contracts to companies in which the government held less than 50% of the capital; payments due from beneficiaries for land distributed under the agrarian reform were to be reduced by half; a general income tax was imposed, [this was the first time a progressive general income tax was levied in Syria]; working hours were reduced from 8 to 7 a day or 42 hours a week with no reduction in wages and overtime work was prohibited. (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, July 20, 26, 29)

Nationalization; "Al-Khumasiyah" Nationalized. On July 20 the list was published of firms to be nationalized. It included, besides the banks and insurance companies, a number of industrial enterprises among them the United Commercial and Industrial Corporation ("The Company of Five"—*Al-Khumasiyah*). [This was the most prominent Syrian company, founded in 1946. It operated a textile mill in Damascus with some 3,000 employees and derived its name from the five constituent family firms which together exercised a considerable influence on the Syrian economy. This group was later charged by the Egyptians with having played a part in preparing the coup d'état which led to the break-up of the UAR. The five firms were (founders in brackets): Sté Diab Frères (Badr ad-Din Diyab), Sté Mohammad Abdel Khoja et Cie (Muhammad Adil Khoja), Sté Hage Yassine et Fils (Abd al-Hamid Diyab), Sté Rabbath et Dessouki (Abd al-Hadi Rabbat), Sté Anouar el Kotb (Anwar al-Kutb)]. Another list contained twelve firms in which the government would take over half the shares. (*R. Cairo*, July 20 [22])

The Ministry of Economy immediately forbade trading in the shares of all nationalized insurance companies. It also froze the deposits and securities of the insurance companies, except where a special release was obtained from the minister. The directors of six banks were discharged and new managements appointed to nationalized firms. (*R. Damascus*, July 21 [W 27]; *Wahdah*, July 22)

Jādu Iz ad-Din, the Minister of Public Works, Jamāl as-Sūfi, the Minister of Supply, and Tu'mah al-Awdatallah, the Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, left for the north to supervise the implementation of the nationalization measures. (*Wahdah*, July 22)

On Aug 20 the Ministry of Industry required all share-

holders of the nationalized and semi-nationalized firms to register their holdings before Sept 30.

Owners of shares up to £550,000 in value (according to the assessment of a valuation committee—see below) could exchange up to £510,000 worth of stock for cash, and the remainder for 4% tax-free government debentures (*Wahdah*, Aug 20, 22, 23). Shareholders of the Industrial Bank received preferential treatment "in view of their cooperation with the state in development plans"; they were permitted to sell up to 100 shares at their nominal value of £525 for cash or else exchange them for debentures carrying 5% interest. (*Wahdah*, Aug 9, 20)

On Aug 15 the formation of share evaluation committees was announced; and on Aug 20 their functions and powers were published in detail (*Wahdah*, Aug 16, 20). During Sept the committees assessed the compensation value of the shares of various firms. (*Ayyam*, Sept 15, 17, 28)

Public Reactions. *Al-Wahdah* claimed that the workers of the Northern R. had received the nationalization decrees with enthusiasm. Tal'at at-Taghlabi, SG of the Northern R. General Federation of Trade Unions, sent Abdel Nasser a cable of thanks for "the establishment of true socialism." (*Wahdah*, July 21)

[There were some indications of the fears aroused in sections of the public]. Soon after the nationalization decree was published, Akram Dayri, the Minister of Economy, denied that the government intended to touch bank deposits; "we are no Communists." He asked bank managers to convince the public that there was no reason for panic and that bank deposits should not be withdrawn (*Wahdah*, July 22). It was again rumoured that the currency of both regions would shortly be unified. (*L'Orient*, Aug 5)

In Sept Dr. Qaysuni denied rumours spread amongst "opportunistic circles" that the government intended to tax the debentures issued against shares of nationalized firms. (*Ayyam*, Sept 26)

Public uneasiness caused a large-scale flight of capital to Lebanon and consequently the £S fell again on the Beirut exchange, from P.L. 83.5 on July 13 [the eve of the July decrees] to P.L. 73 on Sept 27 [the eve of the revolution]. (*L'Orient*, July 14, Sept 28; *Ayyam*, Sept 2)

ABOLISHMENT OF SYRIAN CABINET

(August)

On Aug 16 President Abdel Nasser announced the abolition of the regional executive councils and the establishment of a unified government. The composition of the new government was announced the next day. (See pp 593-5)

The Syrian Representation in the New Government. The following Syrians were appointed in the new Government [* member of the previous central government; ** member of the abolished northern executive council]:

- (1) Abd al-Hamid Sarraj**—Vice President for Internal Affairs
- (2) Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh*—Vice President for Production
- (3) Dr. Abd al-Wahhāb Hūmad**—Minister of State for Planning
- (4) Fākhīr al-Kayālī*—Minister of State
- (5) Ahmad al-Hājī Yūnis**—Minister of State for Agriculture and Land Reclamation

- (6) Amjad al-Tarāhulsi**—Minister of Higher Education
- (7) Shawkat al-Qanawātī**—Minister of Health
- (8) Tu'mah al-Awdatallah*—Housing and Public Works
- (9) Nahād al-Qāsim**—Justice
- (10) Ahmad al-Hunaydi**—Agrarian Reform
- (11) Akram Dayri**—Economy and Finance
- (12) Jādu fzz ad-Dīn**—Local Government
- (13) Jamāl as-Sūfī**—Supply
- (14) Thābit al-Arīs**—Social Affairs
- (15) Yūsuf Muzāhim**—Waqfs
- (16) Farid Zayn ad-Dīn—Minister of State (*R. Cairo, Aug 17 [18]*)

Official Explanation. Abd al-Hamid Sarraj explained at the NU Executive Council of Damascus Governorate that the reorganization was to fulfil the nation's desire for unity, "the constitution of which it firmly guaranteed." The three years and a half since the union was established had shown the need to unite the country under one single regime. (*Ayyam, Aug 25; Abdel Nasser made no public statement on the measure*)

Background and Comments. [As will be seen below, in the section on the Sarraj affair, President Abdel Nasser had made up his mind, at the latest in June, that "conditions in Syria could not continue as they were," with a number of officers and politicians and their respective cliques "splitting the country." Also, he was resolved to remove Sarraj from Syria. The indignation in Syrian military and political circles over this measure was, according to their own accounts, one of the factors which led to the coup d'état. (See: The Break-up of the UAR Post Mortem.) At the time, however, little attention was given to the issue in the world press and the measure was generally seen as strengthening the structure of the UAR.]

A *Times* report saw in the reorganization an attempt to establish an administration capable of pushing through the latest measures for state control and remarked that the circumstances in Syria after the 1958 union, which had demanded the retention of a separate Cabinet, were now "obviously regarded as having ended." (*Times, Aug 18*)

Another western report spoke of a move by President Abdel Nasser to tighten his control over Syria. (*NYHT, Aug 18*)

[An unfriendly comment in a Beirut paper foreshadowed some themes which were to appear in the *post mortem* of the union.] Egypt had resolved to strengthen the union through a "progressive dissolution of the Syrian personality"; thus one politician after another, and one party after another, was removed from the scene, and the Syrian character of the army was also changed. The last step had now transformed Damascus into a provincial capital. But this development was good for Syria, as she had demonstrated before the union that she was not fit to govern herself, and incidentally was also beneficial to Lebanon which had served the Syrians as a scapegoat for their internal instability.

Syria's political dismemberment, the comment continued, had made impossible the cutting of her ties with Egypt, and Syria could now rest from her varied activities, both open and secret, aimed either at recovering her individuality or else at orienting herself towards Iraq, "finding the orientation towards Cairo unnatural." Syria was now given the opportunity to direct her energies towards other fields, farming for instance... (*Jaridah, Aug 19*)

Further Centralization Through Local Government Law. [The unification of government was followed by the application to the Syrian Region of the new Local Government Law, introduced in 1960 in the Southern Region and projected for Syria for 1961 (*MER 1960, pp 493-497*); on Aug 30, a Republican Decree applied the LG Law of 1960 to the Northern R. with certain amendments.] The division of the Northern R. into 11 governorates was confirmed without any changes.

The status and authority of the government was defined, pending the publication of executive regulations. [They were never published.] The governor would be appointed and dismissed by presidential decree. He represented the executive authority; his task was to see that the government's general policy was implemented, and he was directly accountable to the Minister of the Interior. He would supervise the branches of the ministries in his governorate, unless the law specifically provided otherwise, and he had to receive a copy of all correspondence between the ministries and their branches within the governorate. The governor would preside over a governorate council consisting of elected and nominated members. (*Ahram, Aug 31; Ayyam, Sept 1, 14, 15*)

Al-Ayyam stated that the application of the LG Law to the Northern R. intended to "provide the governors with wide powers... to build the new society" (*Ayyam, Sept 15*). The present governors continued in office for the time being. (*L'Orient, Sept 5*)

THE LAST FORTNIGHT: THE SARRAJ AFFAIR

(September)

Sarraj Resents Removal From Power in Syria. According to Hassanain Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, writing after the break-up of the UAR, Sarraj's "feelings were aroused" after the abolition of the regional cabinets in Aug, when he learned that in his new post as vice-president of the UAR [for Internal Affairs] he was required to establish his seat in Cairo. Sarraj had been a most enthusiastic supporter of the unified government scheme. Haykal said, so long as he imagined that his seat as vice-president would be in Damascus. "All you wanted," Haykal quoted Abdel Nasser as saying later to Sarraj (see below), "was to rule Syria." Already in June, Abdel Nasser recalled, he had met Sarraj and a number of Syrian ministers in Alexandria and told them "in complete frankness" that conditions in Syria could not continue as they were. "Each of you has his own men in the region," he was quoted as saying, and these groups were splitting the country and causing him [Abdel Nasser] more difficulties than the enemies of the union. Thus, Haykal continued, the difficulties created by Sarraj's "lust for power" and his exaggerated police methods made it impossible to keep him as vice-president in Damascus.

Consequently Sarraj was transferred to Cairo while vice-president FM Abd al-Hakim Amer was assigned to Damascus for the period of government unification and the application of the July revolutionary decrees. It was at this point "that the problem started between Sarraj and FM Amer," Haykal said. (*Ahram, Nov 24; R. Cairo, Nov 24 [27]*)

FM Amer arrived in Damascus on Aug 13, on the eve of the announcement of the unification of the government. Sarraj meanwhile remained in Damascus and the two met frequently. On Aug 26 both went to Cairo for a meeting of the cabinet and shortly afterwards returned to Damascus. While Amer stayed there, Sarraj

went to Cairo at the beginning of Sept. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 13 [16]; *Ahram*, Aug 15, 27, Sept 1)

Sarrāj Returns from Cairo. On Sept 15 Sarrāj suddenly returned from Cairo to Damascus and, in his capacity as SG of the Northern R. NU, summoned its Executive Committee to a meeting the following day.

The next day, it was reported, the first signs of a crisis became apparent when FM Amer declared that Sarrāj had no authority to convene the Committee, as he himself constituted the highest authority in the NU in the Northern R. [as its Inspector-General.] Sarrāj replied that he was the elected SG and would perform his functions until superseded as a result of new elections.

The Committee met and was told by Sarrāj that he had gone to Cairo at the invitation of Abdel Nasser, who had entrusted him with the maintenance of internal security in the whole of the UAR. Once installed in his office, however, he found himself with no duties to perform and failed to secure any response from his subordinate Abhās Radwān, the Minister of the Interior. Sarrāj had then requested an audience with Abdel Nasser who received him after a delay of five days, told him he would inquire into the matter, and asked him to return to his duties. Sarrāj said that he had found himself compelled to bring the matter before the Committee which, in his opinion, constituted the supreme authority in the state. He stressed his loyalty to Abdel Nasser and the union. While the Committee was in session, it was reported, the building was surrounded by police.

The Committee decided to summon all Northern R. committee chairmen to a session on Sept 18. At that session, a heated debate took place during which it was argued that the NU could not interfere with the administration under a presidential regime. No resolutions were passed. (*Hayat*, Sept 20; *L'Orient*, Sept 26, 28; *Nahar*, Sept 28)

Amer-Sarrāj Struggle Over Security Services. [With Sarrāj's return to Syria, a struggle ensued between him and FM Amer over the control of the Syrian security and intelligence services, which for the past years had constituted Sarrāj's principal stronghold. The resulting dialogues were thought to have facilitated the coup d'état of Sept 28.]

Some of Sarrāj's fellow officers, Haykal related later, abandoned their assignments, and contacted "certain elements" in order to instigate disturbances and pressure which would result in Sarrāj's remaining in Syria. Some of these officers were effective in these contacts, and it was deemed fit to remove them from Damascus. Sarrāj accepted a request to assign them to work with him in Cairo, but they procrastinated and continued their activities. (*Ahram*, Nov 24; *R. Cairo*, Nov 24 [27])

[During Sept 16-17 Amer took measures to eliminate Sarrāj's influence from the services.] He relieved of his post Marwān as-Sibā'i, the Director of Security who supervised the "Special Bureaus" (*al-makātib al-khāssah*) which, Haykal later wrote, "assumed the authority to arrest any person and to deal with him as they saw fit on the pretext of security"; in his stead, he appointed Col. Rashid al-Qutayni. Sibā'i had been Sarrāj's direct subordinate and close collaborator until recently, when the latter was Northern R. Minister of the Interior. It was also reported that other senior intelligence officers known to be supporters of Sarrāj had been dismissed or arrested. Twelve had received orders to report to Cairo

but two of them disobeyed; one of the latter was Abd al-Wahhāh al-Khatib, director of Sarrāj's office.

On Sept 17 Amer also published a decree forbidding the detention of any person without a warrant issued by the attorney-general's office.

These measures, Haykal later wrote, were regarded by Sarrāj as an insult to him. (*Ayyam*, *Nahr*, Sept 18; *L'Orient*, Sept 23; *Nahar*, Sept 28; *Ahram*, Nov 24)

"Immediately thereafter," Cairo sources recounted after the dissolution of the UAR, it was decided to unify the intelligence services of the two regions, thereby abolishing the Syrian service and Special Bureau. According to Haykal, this step was taken after certain intelligence officers had ignored Amer's orders transferring them from their posts. This measure met with opposition from Sarrāj and Syrian intelligence officers. Officers of the General Intelligence (*al-mukhabarāt al-ʿammah*) were dispatched from Cairo to Syria to effect the unification but they had no opportunity to become familiar with the situation before the coup d'état of Sept 28. (*Haykal* in *Ahram*, Oct 14; *Akkir Sa'ah*, Oct 25)

Tug-of-War in Political Field. Simultaneously with the struggle over the intelligence services, the contest between Amer and Sarrāj also moved into the political sphere.

On Sept 17 Amer published a decree awarding pensions to the former ministers Salāh ad-Dīn al-Bitār, Abd al-Ghani Qannūt, Mustafa Hamdūn [all Ba'ath members] and Sahri al-Asali [Watani Party]. It was thought possible that this was a step towards conciliation between Cairo and the Ba'ath on the basis of the implementation of socialism and the removal of Sarrāj [the enemy of the Ba'ath]. (*Ayyam*, Sept 18; *Hayat*, Sept 23)

Amer also met delegations from various circles—merchants, chambers of commerce, the Jazīrah tribes, NU committees—and explained to them Abdel Nasser's policy towards Syria, blaming Sarrāj for shortcomings. (*L'Orient*, Sept 23, 28)

On Sept 18 Abdel Nasser ordered the merger of the two regional NU executive committees into one central committee of 20 members, to be appointed by presidential decree. The provincial executive committees would be subordinated directly to the central committee. This measure was described as complementary to the unification of government of the two regions but, it was remarked, it also brought to an end the role of Sarrāj as SG of the NU in Syria, and thus resolved the dispute between him and Amer on this point. Abdel Nasser, it was reported in Beirut, also ordered the reorganization of all NU local committees which had shown loyalty to Sarrāj. (*Nahr*, *Ahram*, Sept 20; *L'Orient*, *Mid. Mir.*, Sept 23)

It was reported that on Sept 18 demonstrations took place in Damascus against Abdel Nasser and FM Amer and in support of Sarrāj. Among the demonstrators, there were security officers who had been relieved of their posts. (*Nahar*, Sept 23)

Abdel Nasser Intervenes; Amer, Sarrāj Recalled to Cairo. On Sept 18 Abd al-Qādir Ḥakīm, UAR Minister of State, arrived in Damascus. According to various reports, he endeavored to mediate between them and delivered messages from Abdel Nasser censuring both of them for various actions, and summoning them to Cairo. The three arrived in Cairo on Sept 20, and were received by Abdel Nasser together as well as separately. (*Hayat*, Sept 20; *Amal*, Sept 22; *L'Orient*, Sept 28; *Ahram*, Nov 24)

A Lebanese source said Amer was reprimanded for assuming authority over the Northern R. NU, and for dismissing security officials who were under Sarrāj's jurisdiction (*Amal*, Sept 22). Haykal wrote that Abdel Nasser severely rebuked Sarrāj, whom he accused of ambitions to "remain the sole ruler of Syria," as already recorded above. (*Ahram*, Nov 24)

On Sept 21 Sarrāj resumed his functions as UAR Vice-President in charge of Internal Affairs, and was appointed by Abdel Nasser to head the ministerial committee for the administrative reform of the UAR. (*L'Orient*, Sept 24)

Situation in Syria Deteriorates; Political Parties Become Active. On the eve of the departure of Amer and Sarrāj, the security situation in Syria sharply deteriorated according to reports received in Beirut. The atmosphere was reported to be very tense. Ba'athist and Communist students reportedly demonstrated in the streets of Damascus [no mention was made in the report as to what they demonstrated against or for]; they were dispersed by the police. Armoured cars were patrolling the towns, and units had taken up positions at road junctions, etc. (*Jaridah*, *L'Orient*, *Nahar*, Sept 22)

A report was denied that Mahmūd Riyād, political adviser to the President and former Egyptian Ambassador to Damascus, had arrived in Damascus to take over the reigns of government. (*Hayat*, Sept 22; *Nahar*, Sept 23)

On Sept 24 it was reported that the atmosphere had become less tense. The armour had disappeared from the streets of Damascus and the army was now guarding key buildings only. There had been some demonstrations but an attempt by Sarrāj supporters to organize a general strike in protest against his removal to Cairo had failed, supposedly because the public held Sarrāj responsible for the police regime. (*L'Orient*, *Jaridah*, Sept 24)

It was reported that Shukri al-Quwatli, the last President of Syria before the merger, who was abroad, was expected to return to Damascus on Sept 24, in order to pacify Damascus, but preferred to remain abroad after being requested to pass through Cairo and to meet with Abdel Nasser. (*Jaridah*, Sept 24, 27)

Sarrāj, Amer Return to Damascus. Sarrāj, it was reported, regarded his appointment to the administration committee as an affront and insisted on the assumption of his proper functions, namely the supervision of internal affairs in both regions; there was no response from the president.

On Sept 25 Sarrāj absented himself from a meeting of the administration committee, ostensibly for reasons of health. The next day Sarrāj submitted his resignation from the vice-presidency of the UAR to Abdel Nasser, who accepted it. The Cairo papers of Sept 27 announced the resignation without comment.

Abdel Nasser ordered Amer to return immediately to Damascus. Amer did so, and Sarrāj arrived four hours

after him. It was remarked that while Amer was received at the airport by the Commander of the 1st Army, no official reception was accorded to Sarrāj. (*Ahram*, *Gumhuriyah*, *L'Orient*, *Amal*, Sept 27; *Hayat*, Sept 28)

In Damascus, Sarrāj explained that he had resigned because he felt himself unequal to the task with which Abdel Nasser had entrusted him. There were not, and would never be, any differences between himself and Abdel Nasser whom he would always follow as the "pioneer of Arabism." (*Hayat*, *Nahar*, Sept 28)

The Last Day of the Union; Party Stirrings. On Sept 27 Amer again took government affairs in his hands and also pensioned off two of Sarrāj's intelligence aides, Marwān as-Sibā'i and Ahd al-Wahhāh al-Khatib. Meanwhile, rumours spread that Sarrāj was planning a military coup.

In Hama [the stronghold of Akram Hurāni and also Sarrāj's hometown], Homs and some other districts, Ba'ath party leaflets were reportedly distributed, calling for a reconsideration of the question of the union and the internal regime in Syria.

The same day, the Communists were reported trying to form a national front in order to fight the union; while the Sha'ath party was reluctant, the proposal was said to have enjoyed some support in the Ba'ath party. (*L'Orient*, *Jaridah*, *Nahar*, Sept 28; *Ahram*, Oct 14)

[The same day, the army officers who had plotted a coup d'état independently of Sarrāj, had completed their preparations, and the next day, Sept 28, witnessed the break-up of the Egyptian-Syrian union. Of the two antagonists, Ahd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj soon found himself imprisoned, and Amer was on his way back to Cairo some 48 hours after his latest arrival in Damascus.]

Observers Did Not Expect Serious Trouble For Union. [None of a number of political commentaries which appeared on Sept 28, the day of the UAR break-up, actually forecast such an event, though some saw a test ahead for the regime.]

All commentators observed that Sarrāj's resignation completed the evolution of the regime into the complete centralization of power in the hands of President Abdel Nasser. Henceforth, the Syrians were to take orders only from Cairo. Sarrāj, in fact, had been the President's last middleman in Syria, all others having been eliminated earlier. *L'Orient* (Beirut) remarked that Abdel Nasser's steps showed above all his faith in the loyalty of the Syrian people. It was idle to ask whether this calculation was justified. *Al-Hayāt* said that with the centralization of power achieved, the regime now had to pass a test. *The Times* expected a general improvement in the atmosphere to follow Sarrāj's removal, witness Amer's recent ban on arrests without warrant: "... there is no reason to suppose that the latest change will weaken the structure of the UAR." (*Hayat*, *Jaridah*, *L'Orient*, *Guardian*, *Times*, Sept 28)

THE BREAK-UP OF THE UAR

NOTES: This section deals with the revolt itself and an evaluation of the event. The establishment of the Syrian Republic is dealt with under that heading. Inter-Arab repercussions are dealt with on pp 159 ff.

Damascus and Cairo local time on Sept 28-29 was three hours in advance of GMT. All times given by the BBC and Itim Mirrah (IMB) monitoring services have been converted accordingly.

SYNOPSIS

The political union between Egypt and Syria, established in 1958, was broken up by a Syrian military coup d'état on September 28.

At about 2 a.m. mobile and armoured units moved from military camps in the vicinity of Damascus towards the capital, where they joined forces with the local garrison. Strategic points in and around the capital were occupied at about 4.30 a.m. The two UAR vice-presidents then in Damascus, Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer and Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj as well as the high command of the Syrian Army, and a number of Egyptian and Syrian officers and Syrian ministers were placed under arrest. An early-morning attempt by Egyptian officers to launch a military counter-move with Syrian troops was foiled by Syrian officers.

At 7.25 a.m. the insurgents broadcast their first communiqué to the public, calling themselves the "Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces." In this and Communiqué No. 2, broadcast some minutes later, the grievances of the insurgents were made fairly clear: the rising was directed against "corruption and tyranny" and intended to restore the "legitimate rights of the people"; a "power-hungry, oppressive and corrupt clique" had caused the union to fail; the insurgents condemned the "so-called revolutionary decisions," i.e. the "July decrees" (see above: UAR, Internal Affairs); the Syrian army had been purged according to a "vile plan." Neither this nor the communiqué that followed during the day said explicitly whether or not the insurgents intended the union to be preserved.

President Abdel Nasser in Cairo had probably been in contact with Field Marshal Amer in the early morning. At 9 a.m. he broadcast from Cairo Radio station—the broadcast having been announced an hour before. He said that the fate of Arab nationalism was at stake in Syria and declared that under no circumstances would he proclaim the dissolution of the UAR; "I am responsible," he emphasized. He said that only some small units had rebelled and the First (Syrian) Army was now moving on Damascus. He wanted to avoid bloodshed, he claimed. Immediately after the speech the commander of the Egyptian commando units was ordered to prepare for action in Syria.

Meanwhile, talks had been going on in Damascus since 8 a.m. between the insurgents and FM Amer. The insurgents later said they wished to give the authorities an opportunity "to reform the situation." The insurgents reportedly made the following demands: the UAR should be turned into a federal union, with equal status for Syria; the latest socialization measures should be rescinded, the agrarian reform law be amended, and "opportunists" be removed from positions of authority. They also asked that Amer join them in a declaration that the revolt had ended. Amer was reported to have been ready for compromise, but when he was allowed to contact

Cairo, Abdel Nasser said that the situation allowed for no "bargaining or a middle of the road solution"; the President clearly refused to condone a situation in which a form of union would be preserved but actual power in Syria would have passed from his hands to those of the Syrian insurgents.

At 1.26 p.m., the insurgents broadcast Communiqué No. 9, which conveyed the impression that the revolt was being ended on the basis of "appropriate measures" taken by Amer. By this time, all armed forces except those in the Aleppo and Latakia regions had adhered to the insurgents and it was thought that they were now confident of their power to resume the revolt at will. Abdel Nasser, however, continued to insist that there must be no give and take. Consequently, the insurgents cancelled Communiqué No. 9, nine hours after the negotiations started, and sent off FM Amer, Gen. Faisal and the Syrian ministers to Cairo.

Close to 7 p.m., while Amer was on his way to Cairo and while Egyptian forces were starting on their move to Syria, Abdel Nasser broadcast for the second time that day, categorically refusing any "bargaining" and calling on the armed forces to do their duty. Fifty minutes later, a Presidential decree was broadcast dismissing from the army six officers who led the revolt. Another hour passed and Damascus Radio opened with a direct attack on Abdel Nasser and his "odious tyranny."

The Egyptian armed intervention hinged on the fact that throughout the day Aleppo Command and the Latakia garrison had remained loyal to the UAR. The Egyptian forces were thus assigned to land on friendly territory, and the question of how they were to restore the situation in Syria at large remained a matter for speculation; initially, in any case, the force had orders not to open fire, according to Egyptian sources. Two thousand parachutists and a considerable sea-borne force embarked for Syria. At 7.30 p.m., when the first wave of transport aircraft started out from Egypt, carrying some 200 officers and men, both Aleppo and Latakia were still loyal to the UAR, but before the force reached the landing area both had been taken over by the insurgents. A landing now was liable to set off a shooting war immediately. Confronted with this possibility, Abdel Nasser called the operation off just before midnight; the first 200 parachutists, among them the commander of the Egyptian commandos, had already landed in the Latakia area, where they soon surrendered.

By midnight the secession of Syria from the UAR was an established fact; and in the morning of September 29 the officers who led the revolt entrusted a civilian, Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari, with the formation of the government. On the same day, the Syrian Arab Republic, as the old-new state was now called, was recognized by two of its neighbours, Turkey and Jordan.

The coup was led by army and air force officers whose

exact number could not be established. The names of six of them, two brigadiers and four lieutenant-colonels, became known on the day of the coup when they were publicly dismissed from the Army by President Abdel Nasser. Six others, ranking from Major to Colonel, became known later.

Reliable information on the origins of the conspiracy was scant. Most of the information available came from Cairo—an interested party. It was said to be partly derived from an alleged Syrian bill of indictment issued some months after the coup, which charged Brig. Hussein, a leader of the coup, and others with conspiring with Jordan.

Spokesmen of the insurgents said the revolution was first conceived a year after the formation of the UAR. According to Cairo sources, there were two groups among the insurgent officers: prominent in the one being Lieut.-Col. Kuzbari and Col. Hussein, and in the second Lieut.-Colonels Nahlawi and Dahman. There were family and business connections between these officers and their backers. The brothers of Kuzbari and Hussein, who were among the initiators of the conspiracy, were business partners. The Kuzbari family, in turn, was connected with the "Company of Five," Syria's largest private business concern, Dr Ma'mun al-Kuzbari, the first Premier after the coup, being the son-in-law of a prominent partner in the Company. Col. Hindi, another leader of the coup, was a relative of Lieut.-Col. Nahlawi.

Again according to the Cairo sources, the Kuzbari-Hussein group—connected with "capitalist-reactionary" circles—began forming at the end of 1959 and allegedly established contact with King Hussein, who in turn enlisted the financial aid of King Saud. In Jan 1961 Kuzbari approached Nahlawi and thereafter the conspiracy began to take its final shape. In the Nahlawi group, according to Cairo, there were officers who wished only to "correct mistakes," not to break up the union, and they were responsible for issuing Communiqué No. 9. The Kuzbari-Hussein group, on the other hand, had issued Communiqué No. 2, attacking socialism.

The conspirators held posts which facilitated the execution of the coup. Lieut.-Col. Nahlawi was Director of Officers' Affairs as well as Director of the Office of FM Amer and, according to Egyptian sources, it was he who posted his fellow conspirators to key commands in Qatana, Syria's largest military base, close to Damascus, and elsewhere. Brig. Dahman was Commander of Damascus Garrison and Brig. As'ad Deputy Commander of the Air Force, Northern Region. It was generally agreed that, while Col. Abd al-Hamid Sarraj had no part in the conspiracy, his falling out with President Abdel Nasser aided the coup, in particular by gravely weakening the security services just when the conspiracy was coming to a head (see also pp 602 ff, on the Sarraj crisis).

The reasons for the failure of the union were much commented upon by foreign observers and the two interested parties. While, of course, Egyptians and Syrians differed fundamentally in placing the blame for the failure, there was nevertheless a widespread consensus on the general factors involved. These factors can be usefully grouped under two headings: (1) fundamental weaknesses; (2) actual political causes.

Fundamentally, it was thought, conditions had not been ripe for the union: Arab nationalism proved weaker than "regionalism." The Egyptians themselves admitted that Egypt had been lacking in Arab consciousness. In Syria, on the other hand, the consciousness of being different and separate grew under the union. The behaviour of the

Egyptians in Syria had "caused the Arabs to detest unity," the Syrians said. Syria, in an Egyptian view, had not in fact been attracted to a union with Egypt as such, but was attracted by the "Arab hero personality" of Abdel Nasser; this "hero personality," however, could not hold the union together unaided.

Further fundamental weaknesses were thought to have been the differences in economic organization, social development, and political temper and tradition. When the union was established, Egypt was well on the way to a state-owned economy under the banner of the "socialist democratic cooperative society" and power was completely centralized; Syria's was a *laissez faire* economy, and political power was diffused between the officers corps, traditional and regional groups, interest groups, parties and trade unions, all of which in turn were represented in the army by political-minded officers. Moreover, Syrian politics were traditionally volatile, and the Syrians were hard to govern.

Abdel Nasser said that in 1958 he realized the difficulties involved in the union and would have preferred a gradual approach, but he "submitted to the popular will." There was indeed general agreement that the union had been established at the urgent request of the Syrians; the Egyptians added that the Syrians had been seeking a way out from internal political strife and defence against external dangers, and it had been the desire to help Syria and defend Arab nationalism that had prompted Abdel Nasser to agree to the union despite his misgivings. Another fundamental weakness of the union, it was widely agreed, was the geographical division between the two regions.

The two most potent political factors which actually led to the coup were obviously discontent in the army and among the economic strata adversely affected by the UAR policy of "Arab socialism"—especially by the July decrees. More generally, there was widespread resentment at what was termed "Egyptian domination" of Syria, politically and economically. A major grievance in this connection was the abolition of the Syrian political parties (which had been demanded by Abdel Nasser as a condition for his consent to the union) and, even more so, the barring of the former party leaders from any access to power; the case of the Ba'ath party stood out because of its important role in the formation of the union.

However, Syrians and Egyptians disagreed as to who was responsible for these factors. The Syrians contended that the whole Syrian army had become disaffected by a policy of "mass liquidations" and "Egyptianization"; the Egyptians countered that there were only a few power-hungry and reactionary-minded officers behind the coup. The Syrians charged that the Egyptians, in disregard of the peculiarities of the Syrian economic system, had suppressed free enterprise and endeavoured to turn Syria into an agricultural country to provide a market for Egyptian industry. In the Egyptian view, the "destruction of feudalism and monopoly" had been "the decision of the Syrian people"; the economy and the people at large, the peasants and the workers, had benefited from the union. The Syrians charged that the Egyptians had instituted a regime of Egyptianization, using extreme repressive measures, and had worked to eliminate the local political leadership, thereby disrupting the Syrian body politic. Egyptians posted to Syria had been overbearing and had exploited the country, they declared. These charges were summarily rejected by Abdel Nasser, though Hassanenei Haykal, his spokesman, admitted that such grievances indeed existed, but said they were unfounded.

In the Syrian view, the union should have been a partnership while in fact an Egyptian overlordship had been established. In the opinion of Abdel Nasser, his policies had been right, but they should have been more determinedly and effectively implemented; in particular, there should have been no "reconciliation with reaction," which, in the end, had engineered the coup. Haykal said that the "new power" in Damascus had not exercised genuine authority because Cairo feared the label of tyranny; thus the Syrian politicians had been able to perpetuate a state of non-union, struggling for power against the central authority and each other. The effectiveness of government was also hampered by Cairo's insufficient knowledge of Syria, a point made—in different forms—by both Egyptian and Syrian commentators.

To sum up, in the absence of a partnership on the one hand, and a strongly entrenched Egyptian authority on the other, the government in Damascus lacked a genuine power base. The July decrees and the abolition of the separate Syrian government in August brought Syrian discontent to a head. On the other hand, the Sarraj crisis, itself a consequence of the centralization of government in Cairo, seriously weakened government control in Damascus. Thus, conditions grew ripe for the coup.

A natural cause also contributed to the difficulties of the union; the years of the union were marked by a severe draught, which aggravated the dislocation caused to the economy by the agrarian reform and the "socialist decrees."

THE COUP D'ETAT

THE SEIZURE OF DAMASCUS AND THE FIRST COMMUNIQUE

Zero Hour Determined. The decision to seize Damascus on Thursday, Sept 28 at dawn was reported to have been taken by the officers of the future "Revolutionary Command" either on Tuesday, Sept 26 (M. Amin in *Al-Mustawwar*, Oct 12) or Sept 27. The timing was said to have been triggered by the rumour that FM Amer was about to decree the deposition of the officers concerned, who had already contacted him at an earlier date on Syrian grievances. (*Hayat*, Oct 1; *Times*, Oct 5; see also below: The Antecedents of the Coup.)

The Seizure of Damascus. The insurgents approached Damascus from two directions. The two columns set out from their bases at about 2 a.m. The Desert Guard led by its CO, Lieut.-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari, moved south from its base at Dumeir, 39 km east of Damascus, and tank units moved north from Qatana [the largest military base in Syria, 17 km SE of Damascus], reportedly led by Brig. Jasim Alwan. [Brig. Alwan was a pro-Nasser officer and was never mentioned later as belonging to the insurgents; it would seem that those of his forces that participated in the coup did so without his knowledge and certainly were not led by him.] Close to 4 a.m. these forces reached the outskirts of Damascus, where they were strengthened by the forces of Damascus garrison, commanded by Col. Abd al-Ghani Dahman, Commander Damascus District. (*Hayat*, Oct 1; *Sunday Pictorial*, Oct 8)

At about 4.30 a.m. strategic points in and around the capital were occupied according to a pre-arranged plan. The installations seized were Damascus airport, the wireless station, GHQ Northern Region (i.e., the Syrian Army Command); positions were taken along the main thoroughfares of the city, and the tanks from Qatana patrolled the streets. (*Hayat*, Sept 29, 30, Oct 1; *NYT*, Oct 1)

Army Heads, Amer Detained. Lieut.-Gen. Jamāl Faisal (a Syrian) and Maj.-Gen. Anwar al-Qādi (an Egyptian), Commander and Deputy Commander of the 1st (Syrian) Army, were arrested in their homes and taken to GHQ. A further number of senior officers, both Egyptian and Syrian, Syrian ministers of the UAR then in Damascus, and former Vice-President Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj were placed under house arrest. (*Hayat*, Oct 1)

Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, UAR Vice-President, C-in-C UAR Armed Forces, and special represent-

ative of the President in Syria, was soon a prisoner of the revolutionary officers at GHQ. There are two versions as to how this happened. According to *Al-Hayat* he was arrested in his house in Abu Rumana quarter by the forces of Lieut.-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari, after an exchange of fire, and taken by armoured car to GHQ "in his pyjamas." (*Hayat*, Oct 1)

According to the other version, [probably the correct one.] Amer rushed from his residence to GHQ at about 4 a.m., when the first news of unusual activities reached him, and was there apprehended by the insurgents when they occupied the building. Kuzbari laid siege to Amer's residence shortly after his departure, in the belief that he was still there, and the exchange of fire ensued until the surrender of the defenders, whereupon Kuzbari rejoined his colleagues at GHQ. Three of the commandos guarding the residence were killed during the fight. (*Sunday Pictorial*, Oct 8; *Ahram*, Dec 1)

Abortive Military Move by Egyptian Officers. At 4 a.m. Maj.-Gen. Anwar al-Qādi contacted an Egyptian brigade-major of the Field Artillery Brigade at Quteifa [40 km NE of Damascus] and ordered him to bring the brigade up to Damascus. [The Syrian statement on this affair does not say where al-Qādi was at the time.] The major, ignoring his Syrian CO who was at that time at home in Damascus, and the protests of the Syrian duty officer, immediately alerted the brigade; Egyptian officers were assembled and put in charge of key command and staff positions in place of the Syrian officers who were off duty and mostly at home; according to Damascus Radio, the "other ranks" in the brigade were told of a Jewish surprise attack which necessitated immediate and unorthodox action. These improvisations completed, the brigade set out for Damascus. Meanwhile, the Syrian NCOs had become suspicious and had sent emissaries to the Syrian officers. The move came to an abrupt end when the brigade column en route met its commanding officer, Lieut.-Col. Ahmad Saif Wāni, who had heard of the events afoot and was rushing back to Quteifa. Soon afterwards, the other Syrian officers arrived. The brigade was ordered back to base and obeyed without demur; the Egyptian officers were arrested, and later joined the general exodus of Egyptian personnel from Syria. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 3 [4]; *Jundi*, Oct 5; *Mid. Mtr.*, Oct 7)

Informing the Public, The Damascus Communiqué. After the seizure of Damascus the insurgents addressed

themselves to the public and broadcasted a series of communiqués from Damascus from 7.25 a.m. onwards. (IMB, Sept 28). These were issued in the name of "The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces" (*al-qiyadah al-arabiyah ath-thawriyah al-ulya lil-quwat al-musallahah*). Damascus Radio came on the air under this name instead of the usual "Broadcast of the UAR from Damascus" (Hayat, Sept 29). The communiqués were repeated from time to time and interspersed with military music and songs "from the days of the struggle against the French" (Hayat, Sept 29) as well as messages of support from various units of the armed forces.

Communiqué No. 1: Army "Removing Corruption and Tyranny." Communiqué No. 1 announced that the army, "which has been and will always remain a firm national support in protecting the freedom, safety, and dignity of the homeland," had that morning begun to "remove corruption and tyranny" and restore "the legitimate rights of the people." This "natural uprising" had no connection with any particular person or group, and had come after all efforts to redress the "unlawful situation" had failed. "We shall never benevolently accept anything for Arabism but victory!" (BBCM, Sept 29; Nasr, Sept 29)

Communiqué No. 2: Hails "Sacred Arab Unity," Details Grievances Against Abdel Nasser's Socialism. [The opening paragraph of communiqué No. 2 sought to convey the impression that Egypt too was rising.] It said that "the struggling Arab people in Syria and Egypt, supported by the Arab army in both countries, have carried out with the help of Almighty God an organized Arab revolutionary movement to eradicate the deviators, those who have struck at the heart of the sacred Arab unity..." The communiqué detailed accusations against "the oppressive, corrupt clique"—no names mentioned—which had caused the union between Syria and Egypt to fail. "The clique" had discredited political unity in the Arab countries. Its overriding desire had been for personal power. It had broken pledges and agreements. It had wasted public funds on corruption and bribery "in the form of salaries"; it had spread false propaganda and libels; it had tried to mislead the people by "theatrical behaviour."

[This communiqué also contained the first, implicit, attack on Abdel Nasser's "socialist laws."] The clique had issued "so-called revolutionary decisions from which the revolution dissociates itself, decisions whose outward appearance shows mercy while they hide misery" in order "to deceive... particularly the workers and peasants." It had also followed a "vile plan" to purge the army of officers "in the prime of youth and full strength." The communiqué concluded that "the Arab people [of Syria] are now stretching forth honest and strong hands to take over their sacred right, and to work with loyalty and faith to strengthen the sacred Arab unity... and to preserve agreements... and to adopt any measures which will improve relations with the [Arab] sister states in particular, and with the foreign states in general." (BBCM, Sept 29; Nasr, Sept 29)

Communiqués Nos. 3-4: Insurgents Claim "Full Control." Communiqué No. 3 announced that the Revolutionary Command was "in full control" of the situation. It called upon the population to treat their "brother Egyptians" and foreigners with "generosity, care and sincerity," and declared that it would strike at saboteurs and intriguers "with a mailed fist."

Communiqué No. 4 (8.37 a.m.) announced the closing of all Syrian airports and harbours until further notice. (BBCM, Sept 29)

No further communiqués were issued until 10.40 a.m. local time. Meanwhile President Abdel Nasser broadcast from Cairo, and subsequently talks commenced between the insurgents and FM Amer.

ABDEL NASSER'S FIRST REACTION

Abdel Nasser in Radio Contact with Amer; First Impression, Scope of Revolt Limited. [President Abdel Nasser was probably in contact with Field Marshal Amer in Damascus from the early hours of the morning. The latter may have established communication from HQ perhaps even before it was reached by the insurgents.]

Later, a Syrian claimed that on the morning of Sept 28 he had accidentally intercepted a conversation on a short-wave band between Abdel Nasser and FM Amer. The conversation had indicated that Abdel Nasser was ordering Amer to play for time and then attack Damascus in accordance with a "plan." Amer had said that the insurgent officers were unimportant and had no prestige. (R. Damascus, Oct 3 [5])

At 8.00 a.m. Cairo Radio announced that President Abdel Nasser would shortly broadcast to the nation. No reference by Cairo to the happenings in Syria was monitored before the President's address which commenced at 9.07 a.m.

"Revolt More Serious Than 1956 Aggression." Abdel Nasser opened his address by saying: "Com patriots, I am speaking to you from the radio station in Cairo;" never before had he come to the station, not even when Egypt "faced the British-French-Israeli aggression." Some small army units from Qatana camp had taken over the Damascus Radio station and surrounded army headquarters. This affected national unity and was far more dangerous than foreign aggression; the fate of Arab nationalism itself was at stake, "the major target for which we have struggled."

"I Shall Not Proclaim the Dissolution of the UAR. I am Responsible." Abdel Nasser continued that some people might believe he would now proclaim the dissolution of the UAR but this "is neither in my power nor my nature." The enemies of the Arabs—imperialism and Israel—called for the dissolution of the UAR; Abdel Nasser could not join them. "I am responsible for every Syrian, every Egyptian and every Arab in this homeland... for this Republic... the vanguard of... Arab nationalism." And so was every "individual of the UAR." Abdel Nasser returned to these themes again and again: "I am responsible for this Republic from Qamishli to Aswan"; "Never, under no circumstances, will I... pronounce the dissolution of the UAR."

"Syria Imposed the Union"; Justification of Socialist Measures. The President said that it was Damascus, "the throbbing heart of Arabism," which had "imposed" the union in 1958. He recalled how before the union the Syrian army was torn by political strife and asked what would be the result if such strife were renewed. "The enemies are lying in wait for us on all sides." Referring to Damascus Communiqué No. 2 which attacked the "revolutionary decrees," the President repeatedly said that they had been issued for the sake of the people, the workers and the peasants.

"First Army Moving on Damascus To Stop Mutiny"; "Bloodshed to be Avoided." Asking "what will our at-

titude be now," Abdel Nasser said: "We want to avoid bloodshed." He stated that the First [Syrian] Army "everywhere" was now marching on Damascus to put an end to the mutiny.

The President concluded with an assurance that the UAR would live on; the Arab people would never consent to a setback to their political and social revolution. (*R. Cairo, Sept 28 [29]; Akram, Sept 29*)

Abdel Nasser Orders Preparations For Intervention by Egyptian Forces. Speaking on Sept 29 Abdel Nasser said he had taken the decision to send armed forces from Cairo to supply the Aleppo-Latakia area and "to protect the people" "yesterday morning, yesterday lunchtime" (*R. Cairo, Sept 29 [Oct 2]*). Maj. Huraydi, commander of the Egyptian commandos who paraded at night near Latakia, said that he had received his preliminary orders at about 9.30 a.m., after the President's speech. (For details see below: The Egyptian Armed Intervention.)

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE INSURGENTS AND AMER

Negotiations between the insurgents and FM Amer started at 8.00 a.m. and continued until 4.30 p.m. (*Hayat, Oct 5*)

[During the same time, Syrian forces in the south—the majority of the armed forces—announced their adherence to the revolution, while in Cairo preparations went ahead for armed intervention in the Aleppo-Latakia region where the forces still remained loyal to UAR. This situation later gave rise to mutual accusations that negotiations had taken place only in order to gain time.]

NOTE ON SOURCES: In the following report on the talks, three main sources have been used: *Al-Hayât, Sept 30, Oct 1*; Abdel Nasser's broadcast on the evening of Sept 28 (*Akram, Sept 29; BBCM, Sept 30*) referred to below as (*Abdel Nasser*); and a statement issued by the Syrian "Revolutionary Command" (*R. Damascus Oct 2 [4]; Nasr, Oct 3*) referred to below as (*Syrian Version*).

The Negotiations. Having taken Damascus, *Al-Hayât* wrote, the insurgents resolved that the union between Egypt and Syria was of historical significance and ought to be preserved. They sent a delegation to FM Amer who agreed to exploratory talks, with a view to finding a peaceful solution which would safeguard the continued existence of the union (*Hayat, Sept 30*). [The insurgents were more explicit: "After their revolution had succeeded, they wanted to give the authorities an opportunity to reform the situation against which they had revolted, knowing that this offer during their revolutionary moves might cost them their lives if the authorities pretended to accept their offer" (*Syrian Version*). The talks took place at GHQ. [It may be assumed that on the insurgents' side, the participants were the six officers whose deposition Abdel Nasser announced later that day (see p. 614 a).] On the other side were FM Amer, Lieut.-Gen. Faissal, and the Syrian ministers of the UAR: Jädu Izz ad-Din, Ahmad al-Hunaydi, Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah and Akram Dayri (all of them former officers). (*Hayat, Sept 30, Oct 1*)

The first stage of the talks was charged with tension. The insurgent officers claimed that they were acting neither from personal motives nor from spite against Egypt, nor did they represent partisan interests. It was the general good that dictated their steps; the Syrian situation would have to be remedied if the union was to be saved. The Syrian ministers saw in these allegations an attack on their stewardship of office and mutual recriminations ensued. One of the insurgent officers drew

his revolver and shot Akram Dayri [Minister of Finance and Economy] in the thigh. (*Hayat, Sept 30, Oct 1; Jihad, Jordan, Oct 2; MENA, Sept 30 [Oct 3]*)

Insurgents Demand Change to Federation, Retraction of Socialist Measures. When the atmosphere calmed down, it was further reported, the revolutionary officers put forward the following points as a basis for a settlement: (a) the latest socialization measures should be rescinded; (b) the Agrarian Reform Law should be amended, since it was a failure; (c) opportunists should be removed from positions of authority; (d) the UAR should be turned into a federal union, in which Syria would have a status equal to Egypt's (*Hayat, Sept 30*). [Save for para. (c) there was no direct confirmation that these were the demands put forward, but in the light of the Syrian communiqué and statements as well as subsequent events it is highly probable that these were indeed the insurgents' demands, except perhaps for para. (b).]

Amer Conciliatory. The insurgents' version of Amer's response was as follows: "The Field Marshal promised on his military honour—after we had explained to him the justice of our demands, the nobility of our principles and pointed out to him the mistakes committed by his lackeys—to work for the removal of the causes which led to the revolutionary movement... the FM promised to take measures which would restore to the people their freedom and dignity... He also promised to hold the officials to account for the deterioration in the military and political conditions in the country. When agreement on all these points had been reached, the FM also announced his approval of the holding of a military parade the next day to demonstrate the army's unity. The FM actually began signing orders connected with some of the movement's demands with regard to the army. When the Revolutionary Council asked him at the same time to issue orders which would reform general conditions in the country and restore to the people their freedom and dignity, the FM asked for direct contact with Cairo." (*Syrian Version*).

According to a neutral source, Amer told the insurgents that it was possible to find a peaceful solution satisfactory to them. He then had a radio conversation with Abdel Nasser and, it was reported, suggested the acceptance of the insurgents' demands. When, however, Amer refused a demand by the insurgents that a joint declaration be issued announcing the end of the revolt (on this point see also *Abdel Nasser*, below), the insurgents issued Communiqué No. 9 by themselves, at 1.26 p.m. (*Hayat, Sept 30, Oct 1*)

Communiqué No. 9. [This communiqué conveyed the impression that the issue would be settled on the basis of "appropriate measures" by Amer.] *Al-Hayât* remarked that the insurgent officers were confident of their power to resume their movement at will [by this time all armed forces, except for some officers in the Aleppo-Latakia area, had adhered to the revolution] and thus had nothing to fear by issuing this communiqué. (*Hayat, Oct 30*)

Broadcasting Communiqué No. 9, Damascus Radio identified itself again as "Radio Station of the UAR in Damascus."

In the communiqué the Revolutionary Command said that it had been motivated by its concern for Arab unity and declared that it did not intend "to jeopardize the victories accomplished by Arab nationalism." How-

ever, it had "felt the presence of subversive, opportunist elements which sought to harm our nationalism, and therefore carried out its blessed movement in response to the desire, hopes, and aims of the Arab people."

"The command also declares that it has submitted the problems and aims of the army to HE the Field Marshal, the Vice-President of the Republic and C-in-C of the Armed Forces, who understood the real affairs of the army and took appropriate measures to solve them in the interest of the unity and strength of the armed forces and the UAR."

"Military matters have returned to their normal course through confidence in the prudence of the C-in-C of the Armed Forces and the Commander of the First Army who realize the aims of the armed forces and the UAR." (*R. Damascus, Sept 28 [29]*)

Abdel Nasser said in the evening that he had contacted Amer after the broadcast of the communiqué and the latter told him that he had not "agreed" to it (*Abdel Nasser*); the insurgents themselves only said (in Communiqué No. 10; see below) that Amer's "promises" had prompted them to issue it.

Abdel Nasser Adamant: "No Bargaining," Resolves on Armed Intervention. In his radio contacts with Abdel Nasser, Amer told him of the insurgents' attitude; Abdel Nasser strongly opposed any hargaining and when Amer told this to the insurgents, they resolved to carry on with the revolution. (*Hayat, Oct 1*)

According to the insurgents, they had no need to be informed of the President's attitude as they listened in to the radio contacts. When Amer's request to contact Abdel Nasser was granted, said the insurgents' statement, it became apparent that everything he did was intended to deceive. Abdel Nasser had asked the FM—through coded messages "which your alert army discovered"—to play for time, because measures were being taken to quell the movement; these measures involved the bombardment of Damascus by rocket units and heavy artillery.

"At this point the FM changed his attitude... His going back on his promise... was for no other reason than that he had learned that the paratroopers were being sent to our Arab land to shed Arab blood with Arab blood. It was therefore necessary to put the revolution back on its track, after the FM had hacked down on the demands of the people, as though he had made no promises..."

"Nine hours passed in vain, and the FM refused to broadcast the statement which he had promised to make about realizing the demands of the people and protecting the unity of the army. Then the Revolutionary Council decided to deport the FM to Cairo..." (*Syrian Version*)

As already mentioned, Abdel Nasser, in his account of the talks, said that Amer had not agreed to Communiqué No. 9. The President also confirmed that the insurgents had demanded of FM Amer "that we should issue a statement saying that the whole situation was settled, but at the same time they placed FM Amer under armed guard. In fact they asked Lieut.-Gen. Jamāl Faisal, Commander of the First Army, to issue a statement saying that the mutiny and this movement had ended, but they at the same time were in control of Command HQ in Damascus. But [he] refused... [for] by doing so he would be deceiving the people. What happened this morning allows for no bargaining or a middle-of-the-road solution. Thus I believe and thus I see my duty in these moments..." [In other words: The President refused to condone a situation whereby a form of union would be

preserved but actual control of Syria would have passed from the hands of his appointees to those of the Syrian insurgents.] Abdel Nasser continued: "We can never compromise our Arabism and nationalism, because if we bargained about our Arabism, nationalism, Republic and honour we would at the same time be signing a bond of servitude of this Republic..." (*Abdel Nasser*)

Breakdown of Talks; Amer Expelled; Communiqué No. 10. When later in the afternoon the insurgent officers asked Amer for the results of his contacts with Abdel Nasser, he told them that he was continuing his efforts and asked for more time. The officers however, afraid of Egyptian armed intervention, told him that further postponement was impossible. Under further pressure, Amer told them of Abdel Nasser's refusal to negotiate. Consequently, nine hours after the negotiations began, the insurgents issued Communiqué No. 10. (*Hayat, Sept 30, Oct 1*)

The communiqué announced that the revolutionary course had been resumed. Communiqué No. 9 had been issued after FM Amer had promised "to do away with the opportunists and the saboteurs." However, the FM had gone back on his promise, and therefore the Revolutionary Command regarded that communiqué as cancelled; it "has placed its hands on everything, and it pledges to God and the country to protect the nation's security, to preserve its rights and dignity." It called on the people to be vigilant so as to prevent "opportunists and hirelings, if any" from infiltrating into the people's ranks. (*R. Damascus, Sept 28 [29]*)

At the same time, the insurgents escorted Amer, Faisal and the Syrian pro-UAR ministers to the airport, where they took off for Cairo at 5:20 p.m. Twenty-five minutes later Amer's departure was announced over Damascus Radio in Communiqué No. 12. (*BBCM, Sept 30*)

The Final Break: Abdel Nasser's Broadcast and Dismissal of Insurgents; Damascus Attacks Abdel Nasser. [Whilst Amer was on his way to Cairo and the Egyptian forces were starting on their move to Syria] Abdel Nasser, at 6:55 p.m., broadcast for the second time that day. As already recorded above, he categorically refused to make the unity of the UAR an object of hargaining and called the armed forces to their duty.

This was followed 50 minutes later by the announcement over Cairo Radio of a decree by Abdel Nasser dismissing the six "rebels" from the army, i.e. the officers who led the revolt. (For their names, see p 614 a.)

Damascus reacted to this decree in Communiqué No. 13, saying that Cairo did not realize that the Revolutionary Command was backed by the whole army, and added that the people in Syria alone had the right to determine their future.

An hour later Damascus opened up a direct attack on the "tyrant" Abdel Nasser and "his trumpets." It accused the President of wishing to instigate bloodshed, of turning the "sons of this noble nation" against each other "for the sake of his interest, domination and odious tyranny." (*R. Cairo, Damascus, Sept 28 [30]*; see this source also for later statements.)

Egyptian Armed Intervention. [The next stage in the course of the coup d'état was the Egyptian parachutists' drop near Latakia. Before dealing with this event, however, it is necessary to record the attitude to the rising taken by the army and the country in general.]

THE ADHERENCE OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE PUBLIC

Synopsis: By noon of Sept 28, army headquarters in the S., S.W. and E. military areas, as well as those of directorates and arms located in Damascus, had been quoted by Damascus radio as supporting the revolution. There were no subsequent contradictions.

About that time, Aleppo radio announced the continued loyalty to the UAR, of the commanders of the Northern and Coastal commands, and quoted messages of support in the same spirit from civilians—official and semi-official sources—from as far south as Homs, and from the Eastern region.

During the early hours of the night, first the Northern Command (HQ Aleppo) and then the Coastal Command (HQ Latakia) were taken over by forces loyal to Damascus.

By the time the Egyptian parachute descent materialized, all Syria was militarily in the hands of the revolutionaries.

Anti-UAR demonstrations took place in the forenoon and pro-UAR demonstrations in the afternoon. In the latter, apparently, Palestinians were prominent. Though much publicity was given by Abdel Nasser and Cairo broadcasts to reports of public pro-UAR sentiment, there was no evidence that the demonstrations influenced the course of events one way or the other.

Adherence of Armed Forces in the South. At about 9.30 a.m. Damascus Radio started broadcasting messages of support for the Revolutionary Command. By noon, all higher military headquarters in the south had declared their support.

The commander of the Southwestern Command [the Israel border area, where a large part of the army was concentrated] based his declaration of support for the Revolutionary Command on his "wish to prevent bloodshed and guard the borders of the homeland." (*R. Damascus, Sept 28 [29]; IMB, Sept 28*)

[Damascus Radio did not broadcast the support of non-military bodies or persons by name until the morning of Sept 29, when the formation of the Kuzbari government was announced.]

Adherence of the Armed Forces in the East. The support of the Eastern Command (Deir ez-Zor) was announced by Damascus Radio at 12.15 a.m. (*R. Damascus, Sept 28-IMB, Sept 28*). This announcement was not denied by other sources; however, for the attitude of the provincial governor, the police commander and Deir ez-Zor broadcasting station—see below.

Aleppo and Coastal Command Loyal to UAR. At about noon, Sept 28, Damascus Radio announced that the Northern (Aleppo) and Coastal (Latakia) commands were supporting the revolution.

At 12.10 p.m., however, Aleppo Radio, which until then had been relaying Damascus Radio, asserted on behalf of Brig. Hikmat Jamil ad-Dayah, Commander of the Northern Command, that the officers and their commands were loyal to the UAR. Brig. Dayah threatened to "strike with a mailed fist at every separatist element" and demanded "the carrying out of necessary reforms to maintain the safety of the situation."

In Latakia the key personality was Col. Kâzim Zaytûnah, Commander of Latakia Garrison and of the Navy, Northern Region. At 12.13 p.m. Aleppo Radio broadcast a cable from him, denying the declaration of support for the revolution imputed to him some minutes earlier

by Damascus Radio; the station gave his appointment as Commander of the Coastal Command [also situated at Latakia. (This was a (deliberate?) error. Commander of the Coastal Command, as well as of the 10th Infantry Brigade stationed in that area, was Col. Muhammad Mansûr, one of the leaders of the coup. It later transpired that on the day of the coup Col. Mansûr was in Damascus. Thus Col. Zaytûnah was the senior officer on the spot.]

During the afternoon, Aleppo Radio occasionally relayed Cairo Radio. It also broadcast messages of loyalty to the UAR from dignitaries in the north, including the governors of the provinces of Aleppo, Hama, Latakia and Deir ez-Zor, and Col. Fu'ad Jâbir, police commander of Deir ez-Zor province. Aleppo Radio also broadcast an appeal for a statement by FM Amer and Lieut.-Gen. Jamâl Faïsal, "freely and clearly explaining the situation." (*R. Aleppo, Sept 28 [29, 30]*)

Deir ez-Zor broadcasting station relayed Aleppo Radio and Cairo Radio from 1.10 p.m. till 1.50 p.m.; before and after this, it transmitted in parallel with Damascus Radio. Tartus broadcasting station [south of Latakia, with a small military garrison] broadcast in parallel with Damascus Radio throughout the day. (*BBCM, Sept 29, 30*)

Aleppo And Latakia Change Sides. [The sources available did not make sufficiently clear the sequence of events in the switch-over of the armed forces from loyalty to the UAR to support for the insurgents. The changeover was effected by stages; the main part in rallying the area to the side of the insurgents was apparently played by Col. Faïsal al-Hasan, Commander of the 2nd Training Centre.]

At 6.10 p.m. Aleppo Radio broadcast a communiqué from HQ, 2nd Training Centre (in Aleppo), announcing that it had been joined by the 20th Armoured Battalion of the 5th Armoured Brigade and by officers of the Reserve College, and that all these forces were "in full control of the situation" [the communiqué did not state whom these forces supported] but 45 minutes later Aleppo Radio still showed itself to be on the side of the UAR by relaying Abdel Nasser's second speech.

At 9.10 p.m., however, Aleppo Radio broadcast the adherence to the "blessed revolution" of the 2nd Training Centre, and added that this unit supported "officers who fully controlled the situation in Aleppo" (*R. Aleppo, Sept 28 [30]*). What happened, according to a Cairo source, was that Col. Faïsal al-Hasan, Commander of the 2nd Training Centre, at the head of 200 soldiers, had taken over Aleppo broadcasting station after a fight during which eight people were killed; at the same time Brig. Dayah was put under guard and sent to Damascus. (*Ahram, Sept 30, Oct 5*)

Fifteen minutes later Aleppo broadcast announcements by Col. Hasan supporting the revolution and imposing curfew in Aleppo. (*R. Aleppo, Sept 28 [30]*)

Two more hours passed before Aleppo Radio announced that "all the forces in the city had joined the revolutionary movement"; it specifically mentioned the commando battalion. At the same time, it announced that the governor of Aleppo and the president of the executive council of the National Union there had declared to Col. Hasan their support for the revolution. It was now some time after 11.00 p.m. (*R. Aleppo, Sept 28 [30]*)

Meanwhile in Latakia, during the afternoon, Col. Zaytûnah had been urgently asking Cairo for reinforcements. He repeated his request after the takeover at Aleppo, adding that he feared a march by the insurgents

on Latakia, "in which case a clash would be inevitable." "Suddenly the situation changed in the city... and the mutineers were able, by threats, to remove the national [i.e. pro-Egyptian] elements amongst the Latakia troops" (*Ahram*, Sept 30). According to *Al-Hayāt*, armoured units had been sent from Aleppo in readiness for the Egyptian airborne intervention (*Hayāt*, Sept 29). At 11.40 p.m. the adherence of the Coastal Command, as well as the Navy HQ at Latakia, to the revolution was definitively reported by Damascus Radio. (Sept 28-IMB, Sept 29)

Public Demonstrations. In the morning of Sept 28, as soon as the people of Damascus learned of the revolution, demonstrations in its support took place in the capital. Syrian flags were carried and hoisted in public places; UAR flags and pictures of Abdel Nasser were torn and Egyptian institutions stoned. (*BBC in Arabic*, Sept 28-IMB, Sept 28; *Hayāt*, Sept 29, Oct 1)

Indirect evidence of public demonstration throughout the forenoon may be found in Communiqués Nos. 3 (7.15 a.m., quoted above), 6 (11.30 a.m.), 7 (12.30 p.m.) and 8 (1.11 p.m.), all of which demanded that there should be no demonstrations and warned that the Revolutionary Command would strike with "a mailed fist" at saboteurs, opportunists and intriguers. The first of these communiqués asked the public to "protect their Egyptian brethren" and the second asked them to "cease expressing collective signs of support" [probably in response to the anti-Nasser demonstrations]; the latter two spoke of demonstrations in general. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 28 [29]; *Nassr*, Sept 29)

While Damascus was reported quiet at noon, pro-Nasser demonstrations in which Palestinians were prominent took place in the early afternoon, after the publication of Communiqué No. 9. In a clash near Damascus broadcasting station, two insurgent officers were reported killed. Anti-UAR demonstrations may have been taking place at the same time. The demonstrators were finally dispersed by the army. At about 5.30 p.m. Communiqué No. 11 announced the imposition of curfew from 7 p.m. that night until 5.30 a.m. the following day. (*R. Cairo*, *R. Damascus*, Sept 28-IMB, Sept 28; *Hayāt*, Sept 29; *BAPP*, Oct 13)

Aleppo Radio, while still in the hands of authorities loyal to the UAR, described demonstrations taking place in the city in support of the UAR (*R. Aleppo*, Sept 28 [29, 30]). According to an Egyptian source, just after units of the 2nd Training Centre had brought the city over to the revolution, a stormy demonstration of Palestinian refugees from a near-by camp passed through the streets. It was dispersed by armoured troops, which then occupied the camp (*Ahram*, Oct 5). Curfew was imposed on Aleppo from 9.30 p.m. Early next morning, Damascus Radio exhorted the population of Aleppo to abstain from demonstrations of joy, in order not to give undesirable elements an opportunity for provocation. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29-IMB, Sept 29)

EGYPTIAN ARMED INTERVENTION

Abdel Nasser had reached the decision on armed intervention on the morning of Sept 28 (*Abdel Nasser's speech of Sept 29; R. Cairo*, Sept 29 [Oct 2]; *Ahram*, Sept 30, henceforth: *Abdel Nasser*). This was confirmed by the Egyptian Maj. Galāl Huraydi, the officer commanding the commando units (*ṣāṭiqah*), in his interview with Syrian examining officers later. (*Nahar*, Beirut, Oct 29, quoting Damascus Television, henceforth: *Huraydi*)

Abdel Nasser's Decision and Orders: Air and Seaborne Troops to Intervene in Aleppo-Latakia Area. On the basis of reports of continued support for the UAR in the Aleppo-Latakia area, and in particular in response to the appeals of Col. Zaytūnah (see above), Abdel Nasser said he had decided "to supply these areas and protect the people by sending armed forces from Cairo." (*Abdel Nasser*)

[Abdel Nasser conveyed the impression that the intervention was meant to be massive]: He said that he had issued orders for the despatch of two parachute brigades to Latakia as well as orders "to all the navy forces to move" (which they immediately did) and "all our [merchant] ships to be commandeered for transporting the troops." Soon afterwards these forces were ready to move: 2,000 parachutists were ready to be dropped. (*Abdel Nasser*)

Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, [and the President's foremost spokesman] later wrote that the navy was transporting to Syria "two divisions"—some 35,000 men as well as armour. "The force was sufficient to take Northern Syria and to move on Damascus" (*Ahram*, Oct 6). [This no doubt was a vast exaggeration; it was completely impossible for the Egyptians to move a force of such dimensions at such short notice. It seems that Egyptian spokesmen, when praising the decision to call off the intervention, would exaggerate the size of this force in order to emphasize the magnanimity of this decision.]

Question of Participation of Syrian Troops. The parachute force, "which moved yesterday" [i.e. on Sept 28], Abdel Nasser said, included Syrians from the Syrian parachute battalion in Egypt who insisted on going as this was their battle (*Abdel Nasser*). [The words employed by Nasser would seem to imply that he referred to individual soldiers.] A Syrian source claimed that "Lieut.-Gen. Ali Amer [the UAR Chief-of-Staff]... went to the Syrian paratroop battalion in Cairo and offered money to the officers and soldiers to persuade them to land in Aleppo and occupy its broadcasting station at all costs." The Syrians refused with "scorn and told the Egyptian rulers to their faces: an Arab cannot be bought with money." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 10 [12])

[No reports were found of Syrians among the 120 officers and men who actually dropped at Latakia.]

Abdel Nasser's Briefing; Says Troops Ordered Not to Shoot. The first troops to be alerted were Maj. Huraydi's commandos.

Huraydi received the alert and preliminary instructions at about 9.30 a.m. and by noon his troops were ready for action; later Huraydi stated that because of pressure of time he had not even inspected his troops before take-off. (*Huraydi*)

Early in the afternoon Huraydi received an additional briefing from Abdel Nasser to person at GHQ, in the presence of Lieut.-Gen. Ali Amer, the Chief-of-Staff. According to Huraydi, Abdel Nasser told him that there was chaos and looting in Syria. Nobody knew exactly what was happening there and who was behind it all, "the Communists, the socialists, the Ba'athists or the Muslim Brethren." The putsch was the work of "4 or 5 officers without much support, either in the army or among the public." FM Amer had been detained (a fact, Huraydi said, which caused him a great shock as "I love Amer so much as to be his slave").

Despite much prompting by his Syrian army interrogators, Huraydi did not admit—though he did not ex-

publicly deny—that he had been ordered to suppress the rising. His impression was that the President thought that he had to deal only with some junior officer who would surrender to a threat. He also said that he had received no orders to establish a bridgehead for additional forces; Abdel Nasser told him that Latakia and Aleppo were "in our hands" [meaning that he understood that he was to drop in a friendly area; hence the questions of shooting or a bridgehead would not arise]. (*Huraydi*)

Abdel Nasser said that the parachutists were told before leaving "not to open fire either on the people or on the army" (*Abdel Nasser*). *Al-Akram* said in addition that Huraydi had been ordered to surrender to Col. Zaytūnah "if he should find himself and his group exposed to military resistance." (*Akram*, Sept 30)

Huraydi described how Abdel Nasser had ordered Salāh Nasr, Director of Intelligence, to supply him with "all the Syrian money he had," as well as with dollars, pounds sterling and Lebanese money, "but they did not find any dollars and pounds sterling" (*Huraydi*). When he surrendered Huraydi had in his possession £S and £L 1,000,000." (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [Oct 2])

The Airborne Operation. On Sept 28 at 7.30 p.m. [while Aleppo Radio was still supporting the UAR, and Col. Zaytūnah at Latakia was awaiting Egyptian reinforcements], the first wave of seven transport aircraft started out from Egypt, carrying Maj. Huraydi, 13 officers and 105 other ranks. Huraydi himself dropped at Latakia airport between 11.30 and 11.45 p.m. on Sept 28. The last aircraft arrived over the area at approximately 1.30 a.m. on Sept 29, Huraydi said. [By now Aleppo was firmly in the hands of the insurgents and the adherence of Latakia was just being announced.]

Landings Called Off. After the insurgents had taken over Aleppo, a situation arose, Abdel Nasser said, which "required thought: should one Arab's blood be shed by another... and in the interests of whom do we fight each other while there are enemies lying in wait" (*Abdel Nasser*). Haykal elaborated on Abdel Nasser's decision: a shooting war would only have deepened the rift and the union would have ceased to appear as an expression of the will of the people. As to the enemies: the US Sixth Fleet was on its way; Turkey, which had well-known "designs on Northern Syria," could have intervened militarily; Israel could have used the opportunity to occupy some part of the Arab homeland—and the Arab reaction in Amman and elsewhere was lying in wait. (*Akram*, Oct 6)

Thus, just before midnight, Abdel Nasser called off the operation, and issued orders to recall the planes already in the air and the naval forces which were by then near Latakia. However, Huraydi and the men with him had already been dropped. Huraydi was contacted by wireless and ordered in Abdel Nasser's name "not to fire a single bullet and to report to the commander of the naval area of Latakia" (*Abdel Nasser*, *Akram*, Sept 30). [This was not corroborated by Huraydi. If he did not omit this accidentally, it is possible that the order was issued but not received by him.]

Huraydi Surrenders. According to Huraydi, some of his men came down quite far from the target area, and he did not succeed in assembling them in the darkness. There were casualties, too, Huraydi and those with him at the airport waited for dawn, when he established contact with the Syrian army. While Huraydi with several of his officers waited at Syrian headquarters in Latakia

for his men and their equipment to be collected from the airport, he said, he understood that he was under arrest and he contemplated suicide, "for his failure as a *sid'iqah* commander and officer." Later the entire group was sent under guard to Homs, which had meanwhile been reached by the parachutists who had missed the target area. From Homs, Huraydi was despatched to Mezze prison, Damascus (*Huraydi*).

Syrian Sources. Just after midnight on Sept 29 [when Huraydi and his men had long since landed and the main Egyptian force had already been recalled] the "Revolutionary Command" in Damascus announced that it understood Abdel Nasser's speech that evening to mean that he was about to employ his armed forces against the Syrian uprising, and that it had made preparations to meet force with force. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 28, 21.36 GMT [30])

At 7 a.m. (Syrian time) on Sept 29 Damascus Radio announced that some paratroopers had landed in the Latakia area in a pirate-like operation and had been destroyed. At 1 p.m. Damascus Radio said that 120 soldiers under Huraydi had been sent by Abdel Nasser "to fight their brothers," but they were "forced to capitulate without a single drop of blood shed." (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [30])

[Major Huraydi was returned to Egypt via Lebanon towards the end of Nov.]

The Significance of the Operation. According to *Al-Hayāt*, the ill-starred airborne operation decided the issue in favour of Syria's complete separation; its impression on the Syrian public had been devastating (*Hayat*, Oct 1). Damascus Radio jeered at Abdel Nasser for believing that he could occupy Syria with 200 paratroopers (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [30]) and one of the Syrian officers interviewing Huraydi suggested that it was stupid of Abdel Nasser to try and subjugate Syria by force (*Huraydi*).

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

[As recorded above, by midnight of Sept 28 all the military and civilian authorities throughout Syria had expressed their adherence to the Revolutionary Command in Damascus.]

At 1 a.m. on Sept 29 all Syrian broadcasting stations closed their programmes with the old Syrian national anthem (*BBCM*, Sept 30) [the term "UAR" not having been mentioned by Damascus Radio since the morning, except for the abortive episode connected with Communiqué No. 9 recorded above.]

Provisional Government of "Syrian Arab Republic." During the night hours of Sept 28–29, the officers of the Revolutionary Command consulted political leaders of different trends on the establishment of a government. It was agreed that a provisional government should be set up to supervise elections, and it was unanimously decided to entrust this task to Dr Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari, who accepted the assignment. (*Hayat*, Sept 30; *R. Damascus*, Nov 10 [13])

At 7.30 a.m. on Sept 29 the Revolutionary Command announced in an unnumbered communiqué that "in fulfilment of the pledge which it had made to the people" it had charged Dr Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari with the formation of a cabinet, "which will run the affairs of the country so as to restore constitutional conditions" (*R. Damascus*, Sept 29 [30]). Within three hours Damascus

Radio broadcast the composition of the new government, and that night the new Prime Minister read his statement of policy (see pp 486-7).

The new government called itself the "Government of the Syrian Arab Republic" (*al-jumhuriyah al-arabiyyah as-suriyah*) (*Hayat*, Oct 1; *BBCM*, Oct 2) [thus giving the new state its name. Before the establishment of the UAR the state was called the Republic of Syria (*al-jumhuriyah as-suriyah*).]

On Sept 29, the first day of its existence, the Syrian government was recognized by Jordan and Turkey, while the Prime Minister of a third neighbour, Iraq, delivered

a guarded speech which indicated that he viewed the new Syrian regime with goodwill (see p 148 h).

In the afternoon of Sept 29, Abdel Nasser publicly confirmed that he "would not agree to turn unity into a military operation." (*R. Cairo*, Sept 29 [Oct 2])

[The sequence of events leading to the dissolution of the UAR may be regarded as concluded on Sept 29. Abdel Nasser's address of Oct 5, in which he called off the diplomatic boycott of the Syrian Republic, and the resignation of the Syrian ministers of the UAR, officially reported on Oct 7, merely confirmed the existing situation.]

THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE COUP

Syrian Version: Coup in Making for Two Years; The Leaders of the Revolt. On Oct 4 two of the officers who led the coup told the Press of its antecedents. The officers refused to identify themselves; *Al-Hayat* said they were Brig. Muwaffaq Asāsah and Brig. Abd al-Ghani Dahmān.

They said the revolution was first conceived one year after the merger with Egypt [i.e. at the beginning of 1959] but "one year was lost in just talking about putting an end to those troubles" [caused by the Egyptians]. Things however went from bad to worse and thus "about a year ago" it was decided to take action. "Secret meetings were held throughout the army on different levels and in small numbers... When they [the leaders of the conspiracy] came to the conclusion that the whole Syrian army was determined, they started to act." (For sources, see below.)

The Officers Leading the Coup. The two brigadiers said that "those who started the revolution were the heads of different armed services all over Syria." They said that the six officers dismissed by Abdel Nasser on Sept 28, the day of the coup, were not the men who led the revolution but among the officers who started it. (*Hayat*, Oct 5; *Mid. Mir.*, Oct 7) These officers were:

Brig. Abd al-Ghani Dahmān [Commander of Damascus Garrison];

Brig. Muwaffaq Asāsah [Deputy Commander of the Air Force, Northern R., who was in command of the air force on the day of the coup in the absence of the commander. In Abdel Nasser's decree the name was given as Brig. Muwaffaq Asāsah; according to *Al-Musawwar* of Oct 12 he had served as an intelligence officer until he was transferred by Lieut.-Col. Nahlāwī to the "infantry command." However, there were no later reports on the existence of such an officer nor did an "infantry command" seem to have existed in the Syrian army. Asāsah, on the other hand, became a power behind the Syrian political scene];

Lieut.-Col. Abd al-Karīm an-Nahlāwī [Director of Officers' Affairs; Director of the Office of FM Amer];

Lieut.-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari [OC Desert Guard, a cousin of Ma'mūn al-Kuzbari, the first Syrian premier after the coup];

Lieut.-Col. Nasīb Hindī [Chief of Staff of the 72nd Brigade, at Qatana camp];

Lieut.-Col. Hishām Abd Rabbūh [a battalion commander in the 72nd Brigade at Qatana camp; according to Abdel Nasser, Abd Rabbūh served as his escort during his stays at Damascus Guest Palace (*Ahram*, April 27, 1962)].

[Col. Faisal Sirri al-Husseini, Director of Artillery, was

another officer prominent among the conspirators; see below.]

Three additional officers mentioned among the leaders of the coup were: Col. Zuhayr Aqil, [Air Force];

Col. Muhammad Mansūr, [Commander of the Coastal Command, and the 10th Infantry Brigade];

Maj. (later Lieut.-Col.) Fā'iz ar-Rifā'i, [a tank officer in Qatana camp].

In Jan 1962 these three met with Abdel Nasser in Cairo where they had gone together with other officers to settle matters outstanding between Egypt and Syria. (*Haykal in Ahram*, April 20, 27, 1962)

[Lieut.-Col. Fakhri Umar and Maj. Bassām Asali apparently also belonged to the conspirators.]

As to Maj.-Gen. Abd al-Karīm Zahr ad-Dīn, who after the coup became C-in-C of the Syrian armed forces, the two spokesmen said in answer to a question as to whether he was among the officers who engineered the revolution: "Yes and no; he was not fully in the picture when it all started but when we told him we were going to negotiate with Marshal Amer, he agreed." (For sources, see below.)

"Sarrāj Not Connected With The Coup." The two brigadiers said that the dispute between Abdel Nasser and Col. Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj, (see pp 602 ff) had no connection with the coup; Sarrāj had been placed under arrest at Damascus [on the day of the coup] but he had broken his word and gone to Hama [this apparently meant that he had been under house arrest only]; there he was arrested again and imprisoned in Damascus. (*Hayat*, Oct 5; *Mid. Mir.*, Oct 7)

The Kuzbari-Husseini-Jāda Officers' Group; Alleged Contact With Jordan. According to a Cairo source, the conspiracy began to take shape in Jan 1961 when Lieut.-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari approached Lieut.-Col. Nahlāwī. Kuzbari claimed to be speaking on behalf of a group which was ready to bear any expense for the sake of changing the status quo. (M. Amin in *Al-Musawwar*, Oct 12)

More detailed information on the group of conspirators to which Lieut.-Col. Kuzbari originally belonged appeared during the first half of 1962. Kuzbari had been arrested some two months after the coup, in Nov 1961, [ostensibly] on charges of interfering in the elections (see p 496 a). In Jan 1962, Brig. Faisal Sirri al-Husseini was arrested [after the coup, he had become Director of Operations] (see e.g. *Ahram*, Jan 12, 1962; *Awadith*, Jan 19, 1962). The three Syrian officers who met Abdel Nasser in Cairo in Jan 1962 (see above) reportedly told

him that Kuzbari and Hussein were arrested when it was discovered that they had received money from King Hussein. (*Ahram*, April 27, 1962)

In May 1962 Hassanein Haykal, *Al-Ahrâm* editor, published what he claimed was a bill of indictment against Brig. Faisal Sirri al-Husseini, retired Lieut-Col. Khâlid Jâda, a major, two sergeants and eleven civilians. The defendants were charged by the Syrian prosecution with conspiring with a foreign country (Jordan) and armed mutiny.

The alleged indictment contained the following story which begins at "the end of 1959" [no further dates are given throughout the "indictment"]. At that time Sharif Islâm, one of the defendants who used to visit relatives and "members of his tribe" in Jordan, met Wasfi Mirza, Jordanian Minister of Interior, who told him that Jordan was ready to extend every aid to a coup in Syria. On his return to Syria Sharif accidentally met Lieut-Col. Khâlid Jâda, a retired officer and professional revolutionary (according to *Al-Anwar* April 27, 1962, he had participated in the Hînwî coup in 1949) whose means of livelihood had been cut off under the UAR regime. Jâda, having been told by Sharif of his conversation with Mirza, went to Zuhayr al-Husseini, a disaffected merchant, through whom further contacts were established with Brig. Faisal Sirri al-Husseini, Zuhayr's brother; Dr. Khulûsi al-Kuzbari, Zuhayr's business partner and Lieut.-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari, the latter's brother. Both officers agreed to participate in the conspiracy. Among others who joined the conspirators at this stage were Khâlid Isâ, a retired major who was to train retired soldiers "to act as *fidâ'iyyîn* in the execution of the coup, and Nash'at Kulunya who promised to secure the participation of Albanians in Marshal Amer's guard and in the units at Qatana.

At the request of Khâlid Jâda, Sharif Islâm again went to Jordan to see Wasfi Mirza; the meeting was attended by Col. Fathi Yasin, King Hussein's aide-de-camp. Mirza wished to meet one of the officers, but the Syrians, fearing discovery, were reluctant. Finally, a meeting took place in Beirut between Mirza and Col. Yasin on the one hand and Khâlid Jâda on the other. It was agreed that Jordan would pay £3300,000 as a contribution to the movement. This sum was actually transferred through Khulûsi al-Kuzbari and Zuhayr al-Husseini; the indictment details the distribution of the money among the conspirators.

Meanwhile the conspirators sought to enlist additional recruits to their ranks and set to work on the operational plans for the coup. Meetings took place at Zuhayr al-Husseini's premises and Khulûsi al-Kuzbari's farm.

As the conspirators realized that their forces were insufficient, they thought of enlisting the aid of a Jordanian armoured brigade; the Jordanians, however, declined on the ground that this would cause international complications; Brig. Hussein also rejected the idea. Another plan, originated by Khâlid Jâda, was to start the coup in Homs, where he contacted a retired officer named Salim al-Azî; the latter, however, was of the opinion that such a plan was not feasible for lack of adequate forces and a radio station in Homs. The final plan, as related in the "indictment," was as follows: 48 hours before zero hour, Khâlid Jâda and the other conspirators would mobilize their paid *fidâ'iyyîn* and dispatch them to the village of Dumeir where they would join the armoured force and the desert guard units commanded by Lieut.-Col. Kuzbari. The joint forces would then move on Damascus where they would occupy the vital positions. Hishâm al-Husseini would disrupt foreign communications

and place internal communications at the service of the movement. Brig. Faisal Sirri al-Husseini would take control of Qatana camp.

In case of success a cabinet would be formed under Asad al-Kurâni [of Aleppo, Watani party]; in case of failure, the plotters would escape to Jordan which had guaranteed them asylum.

Thus ends the indictment. It makes no mention of Lieut-Col. Nahlâwi other than that Jâda, when trying to recruit a certain officer, asserted that Nahlâwi and Brig. Dahmân were among the conspirators.

The "indictment" does not specifically mention the aim of the conspiracy; however, it relates that Jâda told one officer that its object was "to restore Syria to its previous international position." (*Ahram*, May 4, 1962; *MENA*, May 4, 1962 [May 7, 1962])

While Haykal claimed that no trial was held because the Syrian politicians feared that might undermine the "secessionist government," a Lebanese paper said a week earlier that a trial was being conducted and mentioned as the defendants Brig. Hussein, his brother Zuhayr, Khulûsi al-Kuzbari and Suhbi al-Halabi, a Jordanian merchant close to King Hussein. They had been charged with plotting to implement the "Greater Syria" plan and to make Hussein king of Syria. (*Anwar*, April 27, 1962)

Egyptian Charges of a Kuzbari-King Hussein-King Saud Conspiracy. In an earlier article, Hassanein Haykal claimed that in the course of the conspiracy, Lieut.-Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari had met King Hussein. Haykal said that Kuzbari was the most prominent of the revolt's leaders. He had no qualifications for further advancement in the army, had been due to go on pension, and loved money; thus "he was a good catch for the men of King Hussein" who were headed by Sharif Nâsir [the King's uncle, Commander Royal Armoured Arm]. King Hussein had contacted King Saud already at the beginning of 1961 and received a sum of money from him to finance a coup in Syria. Later in the year, Haykal continued, Kuzbari crossed into Jordan and met Hussein. He told him of plans for a coup in Aug when Abdel Nasser was scheduled to be in Syria; the coup would thus encompass Egypt too and "the whole question will be solved at once"; Egypt would be free to separate from the union if she wished to. King Hussein agreed, flew to Riyadh (on Aug 1, see p 158 a) and obtained an additional sum of money from Saud. The plan for the coup at that time failed to materialize as Abdel Nasser changed his schedule. (*Ahram*, Dec 1)

Both King Hussein and Saudi Arabia denied any connection with the coup; see pp 146 b, 152 a.

Lieut-Col. Nahlâwi Enters the Picture: Financing by the Company of Five? As already mentioned above according to a Cairo source, Mustafa Amin in *Al-Musawwar*, Lieut-Col. Kuzbari approached Lieut-Col. Abd al-Karim an-Nahlâwi in Jan 1961 and told him that he was speaking on behalf of a group which was ready to bear any expense involved in changing the situation in Syria. Nahlâwi was at the time Director of FM Amer's office and Director of Officers' Affairs. The latter post enabled him to place officers in such a way as to facilitate the coup. He had been appointed to this post on the recommendation of high-ranking Syrian officers as being uninvolved with factions in the army.

Amin continued that Lieut-Col. Kuzbari arranged a meeting between his cousin, Dr Ma'mûn al-Kuzbari [who became the first Syrian FM after the coup], and Nahlâwi; the former declared the readiness of the "Company of

Five" to place about £1 million at the disposal of the movement. (Dr Kuzbari was the son-in-law of Adil al-Khoja, a prominent partner in the "Company of Five.") (The spokesman for the Revolutionary Command denied on Oct 4 that Dr Kuzbari had been privy to the coup. (*Times*, Oct 5))

Nahlawi agreed in principle, but stipulated deliberate and unhurried planning and preparation.

The July socialization measures, Amin continued, convinced the plotters of the need to hurry. Nahlawi forged the signature of FM Amer on orders transferring a number of loyal officers from key positions. Members of the insurgents' group were posted to Qatana; Brig. Abd al-Ghani Dahman was appointed commander of Damascus area, Brig. Muwaffaq Asafah OC Infantry [as already pointed out, it would seem that Amin erred here and that the officer concerned was Brig. Muwaffaq Asafah, COS Air Force, Northern Region]; Col. Nasib Hindi, cousin by marriage of Nahlawi, was appointed commander of the armoured force in Damascus.

Meanwhile Nahlawi's contacts with Dr Ma'mun al-Kuzbari continued. The latter went to Amman to clinch negotiations with King Hussein which had been started by Lieut.-Col. Kuzbari, then went to Europe to raise additional funds and obtain the approval of the great powers. He succeeded in his task and returned to Damascus on Sept 25 at the summons of the plotters. At a meeting in the afternoon of Sept 26, zero hour was fixed for Sept 28 at dawn. The sudden arrival at Damascus on Sept 26 of FM Amer and Sarraj, the resignation of Sarraj and rumours that he was planning a coup himself did not deter Nahlawi from his plan. (*Musawwar*, Oct 12)

A western source added to this story that Nahlawi had persuaded Amer to retire or transfer 150 Syrian officers on the grounds that their loyalty was suspected; he then told the officers that the Egyptians were planning to replace them by Egyptians and so secured their support. (*Manchester Guardian*, Weekly, Oct 12)

"Two Groups: Extremists and Reformists." As already mentioned, in Jan 1962, three of the Syrian officers who led the coup visited Cairo on business of state and were twice received by President Abdel Nasser. They were Col. Zuhayr Aqil, Col. Muhammad Mansur and Lieut.-Col. Fa'iz al-Rifa'i. Hassanain Haykal, *Al-Ahram* editor, published what purported to be a detailed, in part verbatim, record of these meetings.

They told Abdel Nasser, who gave them a friendly welcome, that they had come to him as Syria was in danger from both imperialism—the coup in Lebanon (pp 398 ff) was aimed at Damascus—and from Israel. They now wished "to restore unity in a new form." They said that secession had not been in their plans [of the coup]; they had aimed only at the correction of mistakes. They told Nasser that some of them had met FM Amer at noon on the day of the coup and told him that they wished Abdel Nasser to remain President. Communiqué No. 9 (see p 609 b) was issued on this basis and correctly represented their attitude. They further claimed that they had not read Communiqué No. 2 which, Abdel Nasser said, showed the "reactionary and secessionist character" of the coup, nor had they had anything to do with Damascus Radio's attacks on Abdel Nasser as a "tyrant." Already early in the morning they had felt that events were being steered by certain persons in a pre-determined manner, against their wishes. They accused Lieut.-Col. Kuzbari and Brig. Hussein, who had meantime been imprisoned, of treason for having received

money from King Hussein. The officers also declared themselves against "the capitalists, the feudalists, the political parties, the agents of reaction..." (*Ahram*, April 27, 1962)

Hassanain Haykal, writing of these officers, said that it had been known since four days after the coup that there were two groups among the insurgent officers.

The first group, "those who had been bribed," such as Kuzbari and Hussein, received King Saud's money from King Hussein, intended to kill FM Amer on the morning of the coup [Lieut.-Col. Kuzbari shelled Amer's residence, see above], issued the communiqué against socialism and handed Syria over to the reactionaries.

The second group comprised "power-hungry and unscrupulous plotters" such as Lieut.-Col. Nahlawi and Lieut.-Col. Dahman, as well as "dupes" who were made to believe that Syria had lost her personality in the union, but who were opposed to reaction. This group, responsible for Communiqué No. 9, wished to preserve a form of union under the presidency of Abdel Nasser. Haykal does not name "the dupes" but was probably thinking of the three officers mentioned above. It must be remembered that Haykal wrote these articles after the Syrian coup of March 28, 1962 (not dealt with in this volume), following which Nahlawi and Dahman were exiled while there was hope in Cairo of a possible understanding with other Syrian officers. (*Ahram*, April 4, 20, 1962)

"Where Was The Security Service?" [This question was publicly asked by the Egyptians themselves, especially in view of the closeness of the plotters to Marshal Amer and even to Abdel Nasser himself.] A Western correspondent spoke of the "unhappy Field Marshal... whose responsibility it was to keep Syria loyal to the President and who was completely duped by his Syrian subordinates." (*Manchester Guardian*, Weekly, Oct 12)

Hassanain Haykal wrote that there had been a security service report on the leaders of the conspiracy, its organization and aims, but it had not received sufficient attention. (According to *The Guardian* of Oct 10, Amer himself had been handed this report by the Egyptian intelligence service in Syria.) Haykal asked how this could have happened and continued that such things happened even in the most powerful of countries. (*Ahram*, Oct 6)

M. Amin, on the other hand, claimed that the success of the plot was due to the absence of an effective Egyptian intelligence service in Syria, in deference to Syrian sensibilities; even the two or three Egyptian agents in Damascus, who had been directly attached to [Vice-President and Minister of the Interior] Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din in Cairo and whose duties related solely to the Egyptian region, had been withdrawn by request of Syria. Subsequently, the Syrian intelligence began to run wild and a few days before the coup the two intelligence services were merged—over the opposition of certain Syrian intelligence officers. Whether Syrian intelligence did or did not have knowledge of the conspiracy, the fact was that no one gave Cairo prior warning. (*Musawwar*, Oct 12)

Syrian sources did not agree that Egyptian intelligence had been weak—at least not in quantity: "6,500 intelligence agents used to receive salaries... totalling about £81 million per annum." (*SNA*, Oct 4)

Sarraj Crisis Aided The Conspirators. Foreign observers remarked that the dispute between FM Amer and Col. Abd al-Hamid as-Sarraj (for details see pp 602-4) had gravely weakened the security services just when the plot was coming to a head. (*Times*, Oct 6; *Weltwoche*, Oct 13)

CAUSES OF THE UNION'S FAILURE

GENERAL ANALYSIS

Army Discontent. A major cause of the revolt of the Syrian army was seen in its discontent with Egyptian predominance in the armed forces. The Syrian officers resented Cairo's policy of replacing with Egyptian officers the Syrians purged from the army en masse. An aggravating factor in this connection was "the mania of Arab officers for spying on one another" (*Weltwoche*, Oct 13). There had been no corresponding influx of Syrian officers into the Egyptian army. Two spokesmen for the Syrian army were quoted after the coup as saying that "two and a half times as many Egyptian officers had served in the Syrian army as vice versa" (*Times*, Oct 5). It was even thought that "the main cause of the break-up of the UAR was jealousy among military men over promotion and perquisites." (*Daily Telegraph*, Oct 5)

Syrian spokesmen enlarged upon what they claimed to have been the dishonourable and disloyal treatment meted out to the Syrian army as a whole (see Syrian Views). Egyptian spokesmen claimed that there had been no general discontent in the Syrian army but only intrigues and treason on the part of a few disgruntled officers (see Egyptian Views).

The Geographical Factor was quoted in two connections. The separation of Egypt and Syria "by a hostile Israel" impeded relations (*Observer*, *Sunday Telegraph*, Oct 1; *Haykal* in *Ahram*, Nov 3). Even more basically, geography was responsible for the different character of the two peoples, which lay at the root of all their differences. (*NYT*, Oct 1)

Syria "Difficult to Govern"; The Syrian "National Character." A traditional propensity for mutinous conduct, or at least for lack of cooperation with government, was also held to be one of the causes of the dissolution, apart from any Egyptian misjudgement or excesses.

It was remarked that "Syrians of high calibre" were notably lacking in obedience (*Economist*, Sept 30), that "the Syrians are hard to satisfy and to keep satisfied" (*Times*, Oct 16), that "Syrian politics had always been volatile" (*NYT*, Oct 1). An unnamed Egyptian official was quoted as saying: "Those Syrians are certainly difficult to govern" (*NYT*, Sept 29). Syria's pre-union past, in which military risings were a prominent feature, was noted in this context. (*NYT*, Oct 2)

Haykal wrote that when Shukri al-Quwatli, President of Syria, signed the agreement on the union in Cairo, he told Abdel Nasser: "You have no idea, Mr President, what you have taken upon yourself. You have accepted a people every individual of which regards himself as a politician. Half of them imagine themselves to be leaders, a quarter of them prophets and at least 10% of them gods. You have accepted people among whom there are worshippers of God, worshippers of fire, worshippers of the devil and worshippers of..." "Quwatli here used a word," Haykal remarked, "which I can't put down on paper." (*Ahram*, Oct 20)

Opposition to "Socialist Measures"; Other Economic Factors. It was generally agreed that economic factors were among the main causes of the dissolution. Syria is richer than Egypt, it was observed. Widespread disquiet was caused by rigid import and currency restrictions, imposed in Feb 1961 on Syria's previously free economy, and in July by the nationalization measures. (*Observer*, Oct 1)

Abdel Nasser's "Arab Socialism" had frightened the Syrian middle-class which was far more powerful than Egypt's and "accustomed to an almost nineteenth-century freedom from State controls" (*Spectator*, Oct 6). The *New York Times* wrote that these measures as well as land reforms had put "the old Syrian élite group's traditional way of life... clearly in jeopardy." Three years of bad harvests caused by drought aggravated the situation. (*NYT*, Oct 1; *Spectator*, Oct 6; *Observer*, Oct 8)

The pressure of Egyptian industrial imports on the Syrian market was also mentioned: "Some Syrian factories were closed as a consequence of the union; one Damascus paper estimates 65 factories" (*Financial Times*, Oct 16). The *New York Herald Tribune* quoted individual complaints: "A textile man" said that his business had been hurt by a flood of cheap Egyptian goods; "a farmer" said that he had been getting on well with the sharecroppers who helped work his land, until the Egyptians gave much of it away to landless people who were unable to cultivate it because they were given no equipment or technical assistance; a lawyer maintained that a new tax recently imposed had merely been the last straw. (*NYHT*, Oct 8)

Economic factors naturally played an important part in the explanations offered by Cairo and Damascus. The Egyptian view, in its essence, was that Syrian feudalism and capitalism, with the "Company of Five" at the centre, had engineered the dissolution because their existence was threatened by economic progress and social justice, as embodied in UAR policy. According to the most extreme Syrian view, the dissolution was an outcome, in the economic field, of plain oppression and exploitation; in other analyses, the economies of Syria and Egypt were presented as basically different and incompatible under centralized direction (for details see below: Syrian Views).

Regional Versus Arab Nationalism. The crux of the problem, according to many observers, was the fact that the two peoples had not coalesced into one nation. The Syrians never ceased to regard the Egyptians as foreigners (*Times*, Oct 16), and they began to fear that Syria might lose her "separate personality." The Egyptians on the other hand were lacking in Arab consciousness, it was pointed out by Haykal himself (see below: Haykal). The pan-Arab nationalism which had been responsible for the union in the first place had begun to recede within months of the formation of the UAR (*NYT*, Oct 1). Haykal stated that the union had been premature, and that Arab nationalism, by its very embodiment in the UAR, became more vulnerable, (see below: Haykal.)

Overcentralization and Egyptianization. This cause is closely linked to the foregoing. Western papers held the increasing preponderance of Cairo in Syrian affairs to be one of the main factors responsible for the insurrection (*NYT*; *NYHT*, Sept 29, 30); in the words of *The Times*, "the Syrians... disliked being, as they thought they were, told what to do by people whom they regarded, Arab unity or no Arab unity, as foreigners" (*Times*, Sept 30). "Abdel Nasser's attempt to centralize in Cairo all real control over that artificial hybrid, the United Arab Republic, had given increasing offence in Damascus." (*Sunday Times*, UK, Oct 1)

Abdel Nasser endeavoured to meet opposition by Egyptianization (*Daily Telegraph*, Oct 1); "Further centrali-

zation in the UAR—a single Parliament, a single Cabinet—placed more power in Egyptian hands" (*NYT, Oct 1*); Abdel Nasser's ideas of reorganization with "Damascus reduced to the status of an unimportant provincial city" served only to confirm long-held suspicions that Syria's... population were destined to become second-class citizens" (*Irish Times, Oct 5*). The opinion of the man in the street was reported by *The New York Herald Tribune*, quoting a lawyer who "thanked God he wouldn't have to deal with Egyptians heading government departments." (*NYHT, Oct 8*)

Fear for the disruption of the Syrian body politic was expressed by Shukri al-Quwatli, Syrian President before the merger (see: Syrian Views).

The abolition of parties was seen as an important grievance. "Political frictions began as the old Syrian parties were abolished, and their leaders side-tracked in favour of Egyptians" (*NYT, Oct 1*); this theme was treated in the same vein by almost every foreign observer. The case of the Ba'ath stood out because of its important role in the original formation of the UAR. (*Daily Telegraph, Oct 1*)

A Catholic paper thought the Syrian Christians had been particularly firm in their opposition to the UAR. (*Catholic Herald, UK, Oct 6*)

Both Abdel Nasser and Hassanein Haykal justified the political line taken by Cairo in Syria and attacked "selfish and disgruntled" Syrian politicians; Abdel Nasser stressed the former aspect, while Haykal tended to concentrate on the latter theme (see below: Nasser, Haykal).

The "autocracy" of the Egyptian rulers was the main theme of Syrians commenting on the political causes of the dissolution, (see below: Syrian Views.)

Abdel Nasser's "Failure of Charisma." Joseph Alsop in *The Washington Post* attributed a part in the break-up of the UAR to Abdel Nasser's "failure of charisma." Abdel Nasser was "one of the ablest" of those who lead "by stirring the emotions and fanning the passions of his followers." But inevitably "the paroxysms of passion diminish as the years go by. The mobs that writhed and howled instead begin to think, in particular, about what the leader has done and is doing for them." In the case of Syria, the result of this evolution was damaging to Abdel Nasser. (*Washington Post, Oct 2*)

Hassanein Haykal, [Abdel Nasser's chief spokesman] elaborated on the point that Abdel Nasser's "hero personality" alone—in the absence of supporting factors—was unable to sustain the Union. (*Ahram, Oct 5*; see also below: Haykal.)

The Police Regime. The personality and ruthless police methods of Col. Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj, head of the secret service, was widely regarded as an important factor in building up dissatisfaction in Syria (see e.g. *Financial Times, Sept 29*). Hassanein Haykal also admitted that it had been a mistake to permit Sarrāj to have his way in maintaining an all-embracing net of internal espionage (see below: Haykal), while Syrian sources enlarged upon "the stifling political rule violating human dignity and freedom... corrupting behaviour and conscience." (*R. Damascus, Oct 2* [4]; see also: Syrian Views.)

SYRIAN VIEWS

Blow to Dignity; Oppression; Purge of Officers; Nationalization; Pro-Soviet Leanings. The Syrian case for dissolution of the UAR was given in a statement by Dr Kuzbari, head of the provisional government on Sept 29, the day of its formation. It said that Syria had made the

greater sacrifice in establishing the union. Soon, however, "those who undertook to lead the union began to lead in 'an Eastern direction' and 'along a course which separated the Arabs from their aspirations for a noble, true unity free from domination and hypocrisy.' They also did not respond to appeals... to rectify the situation... and establish full equity 'as regards dignity and the dealings between two sister countries.'"

The result was "the liquidation of the sincere national elements, particularly the Army officers and the... youth." When the cup was full, "the Arab revolutionary movement in this country" arose.

In carrying out its "blessed revolutionary uprising," the Arab [Syrian] army truly expressed the sufferings of the Arab people in Syria from blows to their dignity, wounds in the core of their Arabism, oppressive and dictatorial measures, and improvised laws which led to the deterioration of the country's economic situation and its currency. Confidence between the ruler and the ruled was lost. Arab capital evaporated. Free men and those working in the economic, social, political and military fields were dispersed. Unity was converted into factionalism, fraternity into slavery and joint economic interests into embezzlement... Those in power violated the principles and the constitution (of the Union). (*R. Damascus, Sept 29* [Oct 2])

Syrian Body Politic, Government Disrupted; Political Leadership Eliminated. Shukri al-Quwatli, the last Syrian President before the union with Egypt and "First Citizen" of the UAR, who had been abroad at the time of the coup, published a statement in support of the separation after his return to Syria.

Quwatli said that the "regime which ruled us" had called a large number of people traitors and reactionaries merely because they belonged to a certain group or social class. Under these conditions, only the social concord among the various strata of the people prevented the spreading of rancour and malice. Those who for 40 years had served Syria's national cause could not be deprived of their honour and dignity simply because they belonged to certain social strata. Socialism must be achieved by a long and phased process, and if economic measures are not accompanied by psychological and social adjustments, they will fail.

All the errors committed had one common denominator—reliance on a minority, while the majority was held in suspicion. Fake organizations and opportunists were entrusted with the implementation of a cooperative socialism they themselves did not believe in or understand. The Syrian people were entirely ignored where their system of government was concerned. The National Union, the only popular organization permitted, was in reality ruled by the executive. The National Assembly was felt by the deputies to be a farce. Government was not merely authoritarian, it was utterly inefficient as well. "It was the system which had a thousand and one spies." It was firm when it should have been lenient, and cowardly when it should have been strong-willed. It fell short in experience, intelligence, vigilance and faith. "It came close to the people only as the people's executioner." "Had this regime continued," Quwatli said, "the Republic would have dissolved into a number of regions ruled by mutually antagonistic individuals; a strange, wondrous machinery (system) sprouting many heads out of one body, and endowing each head with a number of inclinations, whims and lusts; a system suffering successive shocks as the one rebels against the other and the right hand ambushes the left... until the regime became like that in the last

phase of the Arab Caliphate." (*Nasr*, Oct 24; *R. Damascus*, Oct 23 [25])

One of the complaints of the Army's Revolutionary Command was that the Egyptians had relied "in government on the feeble elements, working for the full autocracy of the rulers." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 2 [4])

Terror, Egyptian Overbearing and Exploitation. Mustafa al-Barudi, Minister of Propaganda, said that Syria had been responsible for the creation of the UAR. But "they have caused the Arabs to detest unity." "Not a day passed without hearing of victims who were tortured... Was anyone safe when uttering a word within his own four walls?" Exploitation was rife: "The smallest member of the (Egyptian) retinue thought that he had inherited our country... Is it lawful that the Arab funds should be spent to buy the people's conscience and Arab soil seized by false pretences? Have not the departments of state been inflated by the hundreds of posts created? Have not the funds of the state been squandered...?" (*R. Damascus*, Sept 30 [Oct 3])

Suppression of Free Enterprise; Anti-Industrialization Policy. The economic case for the dissolution was given in detail in a joint statement by the Syrian chambers of commerce, industry and agriculture and other economic organizations. The burden of the statement was that Syria's prosperity and progress depended on her system of economic freedom, "completely different from the conditions in Egypt." Under the Union, Egypt tried from the beginning to subvert that freedom through legislation, administrative coercion and sabotage, with "the sole purpose of weakening the country's economic potentialities, blocking its way to industrialization, converting it into an agricultural country supplying agricultural products and raw materials to Egypt and, at the same time, opening Syria's vast markets to Egypt's industrial products." Industrialization and economic planning, currency, external trade, economic unification and measures bearing on social justice were analyzed to support the conclusion. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 30 [Oct 3])

Army Grievances. The army's grievances were detailed in a statement by the "Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces." The "disastrous errors" of the Egyptian rule included: "The weakening of the Arab army in Syria, its mass liquidation, and the attempt to humiliate it..."

The policy in the army was "Egyptianization instead of unification." While able Syrian officers were sent south, Egyptians infiltrated the northern intelligence service and from there spread "like octopuses" everywhere. They offended discipline by by-passing their [Syrian] direct superiors. Mass transfers and pensionings of Syrian officers were put through with the aim of "liquidating every northern Arab officer." Important measures, such as the preparation of the Army Law, were carried without any Syrian participation whatsoever. Stocks and equipment were carried off to Egypt in great quantities under specious pretexts, although Syria's share of the defence burden was proportionally much larger than Egypt's. Syrian representations and protests were of no avail. (*R. Damascus*, Oct 2 [4])

Regionalism. Gen. Zahr ad-Din was quoted to have said on Oct 5 that "certain Egyptian elements tried to dominate us. We could not tolerate the history of this nation being buried." (*Mid. Mir.*, Oct 7)

Izzat an-Nus, Minister of Education and National Gui-

dance, said that the 1952 revolution in Egypt had no "Arab basis." The Egyptians had adopted Arab unity "politically, but not as a mission." (*R. Damascus*, Oct 5 [7])

(Compare below: Haykal: "Egypt was lacking in Arab consciousness; Regional Chauvinism.")

"Abdel Nasser Failed To Understand Syria." A Damascus paper wrote that Abdel Nasser had failed to understand Syria, the mentality of the people. Instead of establishing direct contact with the people he had relied on intermediaries and intelligence reports. He had rebuffed those Syrians who went to Cairo to tell him the truth. And even now, on the morrow of the revolution, he still refused to understand. (*Ayyam*, Sept 30)

EGYPTIAN VIEWS

Abdel Nasser. [The image of the revolution and its background, as formed by President Abdel Nasser, was contained in six public addresses—between the day of the coup and Oct 16. This image was simple and unblurred: Abdel Nasser had taken upon himself the formation of the UAR at the urgent request of the Syrian public, though he knew the dangers involved and preferred a gradual approach. He resolved however to do his duty by the Arab nation and save Syria from its perils. The years of union were a tale of high endeavour and mounting success. Israel was held in check, the imperialist powers impressed, the army built up, huge sums invested in development. However, the main purpose of the union was the creation of a socialist society—free, just, dignified, in which the ordinary man would be liberated from feudalism and capitalist monopoly, and Arab nationalism would fulfil itself. It was this purpose which roused the enmity of the former exploiters of the people's wealth, chief among them the "Company of Five" in Damascus, and their imperialist allies. They engineered the insurrection of Sept 28, carried out under cover of darkness by a group of treacherous or misled officers, abetted by disgruntled politicians. The mass of the people were, and are, steadfastly in favour of the UAR. Abdel Nasser abstained from an armed showdown, since an Arab union should not be achieved by force; he abstained from urging boycott and civil disobedience against the separatist government, so that Syria, under whatever regime, might take her place in the Arab front. Contributory to the collapse of the UAR were a number of mistakes, chief among them Abdel Nasser's "reconciliation with reactionaries," but also the failures of the National Union, the government machinery and the masses.]

[In later speeches, Abdel Nasser often returned to these themes, mainly elaborating on the "capitalist coup against socialism," but without any significant addition to his basic analysis.]

The excerpts below are marked according to their source, as follows:

- (A) Address of Sept 28 (morning)—(*BBCM*, Sept 29; *Ahram*, Sept 29)
- (B) Address of Sept 28 (afternoon)—*BBCM*, Sept 30; *Ahram*, Sept 29)
- (C) Address of Sept 29—(*BBCM*, Oct 2; *Ahram*, Sept 30)
- (D) Address of Oct 2—(*BBCM*, Oct 4; *Ahram*, Oct 3)
- (E) Address of Oct 5—(*BBCM*, Oct 7; *Ahram*, Oct 6)
- (F) Address of Oct 16—(*BBCM*, Oct 18; *Ahram*, Oct 17)

Abdel Nasser Bowled to Syrian Request for Union Though He Realized Difficulties Involved. "Syria told me: Let us unite... will you leave Syria to be torn by strife?... I had already realized in 1958 that union as a constitutional concept is no easy matter, [but when pressed by the Syrians] I said I agree to union and now that I have accepted it, I will not forsake it under any circumstances" (A). "In 1958 all the Syrian parties and all the blocs of the Syrian Army asked me to accept union... I knew that when union was established every self-seeker would want to serve his interests only. There would be a conflict of interests, a conflict in the aims of the politicians... of the capitalists. They agreed to union, but everyone of them had his own interests. In the referendum, the people unanimously approved the union." (C)

The Benefits of the Union; Arab Nationalism Strengthened, Israel Contained. "These three-and-a-half years were years during which the Syrian people exercised great power in supporting the Arab struggle. From Syria the national revolution in Iraq was supported;... the Syrian Army was able to prevent Israel from the complete diversion of the river Jordan;... Syria also exerted great influence on the progress of the liberation movement in Africa... and the forces of peace against the evils of war" (E). "We all know the fear that gripped Israel with the establishment of the union... Israel knew that if she moved in the north, she would meet force from the north and south; if she moved in the south, she would meet force from the north and south." (D)

"In these three-and-a-half years we did our utmost to direct the Syrian people to devote their whole potential to building the homeland and the citizens... there was a plan to double the Syrian national income within ten years or less." (Abdel Nasser quoted many facts and figures in this context.) (E)

Accusations of Egyptian Domination, Exploitation, Police Regime Rejected. Abdel Nasser said the Egyptians in Syria had been neither exploiters, nor parasites, nor oppressors. "Who were the Egyptians in Syria?... They were army officers... on Israel's borders. They were not in Damascus, they were not in Aleppo... They were air force officers. (The President mentioned his brother, a pilot officer, and the brother of Anwar as-Saadat, both serving on the Israel front.) They were engineers who went to supplement the Syrian engineers... They were doctors in the villages..." No Egyptian merchant went to trade with Syria; on the contrary, Syrian tradesmen opened businesses in Egypt. (D)

No "thousands" had been detained without trial under the UAR, but only 95, most of whom were Communists (D). The economic policy of the UAR had benefited Syria, and not impoverished her (D, E). Finally, no attempt had ever been made to suppress the rebellion either by bloodshed or bribery (E). All these points would be established by a committee to be set up by the Arab League (see also p 159 b). (E)

The Progress of Socialism Desired by the Syrian People. "[Before the Union] monopoly was dominant and capitalism was exercising its dictatorship in order to acquire illegal profits... Feudalism controlled the life of the peasants... Five persons [the 'Company of Five'] formed the capitalist dictatorship." "In these three years great gains were realized which could not be achieved in decades. Feudalism ended and land was distributed among the peasants... Laws were made to eliminate the dictatorship of capitalism. Socialist decisions were published..."

to effect social democracy... The Syrian people decided to destroy feudalism, to destroy monopoly, that these factories should be theirs..." (C). "There could be no political freedom without social freedom." (E)

Coup Engineered by Monopolistic Capitalism; Treacherous and Minded Officers. Who then carried out the insurrection, and why? Abdel Nasser said: "... certain misled members" of the forces in Qatana; they betrayed the army in Syria which, in itself, was overwhelmingly loyal (A,C,D). The real initiators of and beneficiaries from the insurrection were the Syrian capitalists, represented above all by the "Company of Five." They saw their monopolistic grip loosened under the UAR, and they had everything to gain from separation; their claims that they would preserve the social gains of the Union were ridiculous hypocrisy (C,D,E). The people as a whole abhorred the insurrection; proof lay in the demonstrations at Aleppo, and reports on recurrent incidents all over Syria, when faithful nationalists braved bayonets and machine guns to demonstrate their faith in the UAR. (C,D)

Coup Succeeded Because of Power of Capital, Abdel Nasser's Abstention from Use of Force. How, then, could the uprising prevail? Abdel Nasser said: "Capital has the power of arms and tanks" (E); "this small force... dominated through temptation, threat and deceit" (C). And it prevailed because Abdel Nasser decided not to attempt military suppression (C) and would neither endanger Syrian patriots by calling them out against the separatist government, nor weaken Arabism by having Syria boycotted internationally. (E)

The Mistakes Made: Suddenness of Union; Reconciliation with Reaction; Failure of Popular Organization, Government Machinery, Mobilization of the Masses. [Abdel Nasser did not term the suddenness of the merger in 1958 a mistake but he said]: "My opinion was that preparations for it [union] should have been made gradually over a period of years in order to enable us to lay sound foundations before building its constitutional framework. But I had to submit to the popular Syrian will. And I felt that thus I was protecting Syrian nationalism and helping to save the Syrian homeland from internal dissension and... imperialist forces." (E)

In his programmatic speech of Oct 16, which heralded a new stage in the implementation of "Arab socialism" in Egypt, Abdel Nasser enumerated five mistakes which had "enabled reaction to secure the bridgehead in Damascus":

1. Reconciliation with reaction allied to imperialism. It was an illusion to think that because the reactionaries belonged to the Arab nation they would hesitate to sacrifice national interests to imperialism in order to regain their positions. Imperialism must be fought in the palaces of reaction, and reaction—in the lap of imperialism (F). In an earlier speech Abdel Nasser included in this mistake also the reconciliation with King Hussein who had deceived him by his conciliatory letters (p 146 a). (D)

2. The National Union had been inadequate as a popular organization; it only served as "a framework for class strife," it was not truly revolutionary; witness, some of its leaders emerged as leaders of the coup.

3. Insufficient efforts had been made to mobilize the masses for active participation in the revolution.

4. The government machinery had been unequal to the huge tasks imposed upon it by the revolution.

5. Opportunism had not been eradicated. (F)

Hassanein Haykal's Analysis. Commencing Oct 6, Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahrām*, devoted nine weekly articles in *Al-Ahrām's* Friday supplement to an evaluation of the background of the recent events in Syria and the lessons to be drawn from them.

Herewith are the major points made by Haykal. (All the articles, except the first, are also given in BBCM, though not always in full.)

Background of the Merger—Syria: Political Strife Within: Imperialist Dangers Without. Prior to the union, Haykal wrote, Syria was torn by political strife. It was under the rule of rival army cliques, cabinets of selfish party politicians without roots in the people, and monopoly capitalists. While internally Syria was on the verge of chaos, it was also threatened with foreign domination. The threats came from the Communists, in alliance with the Chief of Staff General Alif Bizri and supported by the Soviet Union; they also came from imperialism and Arab reaction: from the Baghdad Pact, from the Hashimite family which had sold its Arab heritage for crowns and thrones, from Riyadh warring with the Hashimites in Damascus; behind them all were the US and Britain. Thus, finding itself on the brink of the abyss, Syria sought salvation in immediate union. (*Ahrām*, Oct 6, 13, 20; BBCM, Oct 16, 23)

Background of the Merger II: Emergence of Abdel Nasser as Arab Hero Figure; His Identification with the Arab Masses; The Establishment of the Union. While the political situation in Syria deteriorated, Haykal continued, Abdel Nasser emerged as the Arab hero, the conqueror of the enemies of the Arabs and their guide towards a glorious future; thus he was acclaimed as their leader by the Arabs everywhere.

The Syrian army took the initiative in establishing the union. "Twenty-two officers representing 22 groups in the army," as well as Syrian politicians, came to Cairo. Abdel Nasser tried to discourage them, dwelling on the difficulties to be expected, but to no avail. Abdel Nasser then put before them three conditions for union: a plebiscite on the union, dissolution of the Syrian parties and cessation of party activity, cessation of military intervention in politics. Under the pressure of the Syrian masses, the politicians, including the Ba'athists, as well as the officers, accepted Abdel Nasser's conditions; the politicians, however, only intended to realize their old ambitions in the new framework. When disappointed, they joined the ranks of reaction personified by the Damascus "Company of Five" and by Kings Saud and Hussein. (*Ahrām*, Oct 13, 20, 27; BBCM, Oct 16, 23, 28)

The Union as a Defensive Measure Achieved Results. Haykal said that in the given conditions, the establishment of the Union was a "natural defensive measure" by the Arab nation. As such, the Union achieved three important results: it dealt a mortal blow to the Baghdad Pact; it purged Syria of Communism; by its social and economic policy it compelled the forces of reaction to drop their mask of promoters of nationalism and progress.

However, the union should have been more than a defensive measure. (*Ahrām*, Oct 6, 13)

Defects and Weaknesses of the Union, Errors Committed. Asking why the Union foundered, Haykal wrote that, in addition to the conditions prevailing in Syria on the eve of the merger and the scheming enemies abroad, the "revolutionary energy" emanating from Cairo was itself

converted into a "negative factor in the history of the union." He detected the following reasons:

1. *Conditions for Union were not Ripe.* Solid economic and social foundations were lacking; unity of spirit, language, consciousness and history were no more than a prelude to economic and social unity. Only history would be able to judge whether Abdel Nasser was right to bow to Syrian pressure.

2. *Arab Nationalism Lost its Flexibility in the Union.* Whereas before the Union, Arab nationalism waged a war of movement and was like a phantom which could not be touched, it became much more vulnerable to attack as a result of the Union. Was it right to have abandoned the former state?

3. *Egypt was Lacking in Arab Consciousness.* The Egyptian awakening fed on the greatness of its ancient history; "Ottoman tyranny" had separated Egypt from the Arab people east of Sinai, while Napoleon's conquest brought in its wake exclusive contacts with European civilization. Egypt's belief in Arabism which was nevertheless emerging was shaken again when the Hashimites stabbed the Egyptian army in the back in the Palestine war. Since 1952 the belief in Arabism had been growing again and the 1958 plebiscite, in which the Egyptians voted for the union, constituted an "emotional revolution." Still, even then, "hundreds of people" wrote Haykal expressing their apprehension lest Egypt "with all her glory" give up her separate identity.

4. *Unequal Social Development.* On the eve of the union, Egypt was on the threshold of the socialist revolution, having successfully concluded the battle against foreign imperialism; Syria, however, was still in a stage of capitalism collaborating with imperialism and its Arab agents. Thus "a tug-of-war in social development" ensued within the republic.

5. *Cairo had Insufficient Knowledge of Syria.* The "new power" found itself helpless in Damascus since the interested Syrian parties withheld statistics on the real situation and much valuable time was lost.

6. *The Geographical Division Between the Two Regions proved a stumbling block to the union.*

7. *Deference to "Regional Chauvinism."* The "new power" in Damascus did not exercise genuine authority because Cairo feared the label of tyranny. Cairo's sensitivity to imperialist propaganda in this respect was enhanced by the fact that its population of 25 million gave it a natural preponderance over Syria's four million. The trend towards unity was unable to overcome regional chauvinism (*a-na'arāt al-wataniyah al-iqlimiyyah*).

8. *Semblance of Unity.* Genuine unity was never achieved because of the aforementioned factors; there remained only the facade—one president, one flag and one national anthem. The politicians helped to perpetuate this state of non-union, struggling for power against the central authority and each other. (*Ahrām*, Nov 3)

"Abdel Nasser's Hero Personality not Sufficient to Unite the Arabs." Under the above circumstances, Haykal reflected, the only factor holding the union together was Abdel Nasser, his personality and popularity. A "hero personality" could serve as the driving force towards a genuine union, but it alone could not hold the union together. It could lead—but there must be powerful popular forces to be led. (*Ahrām*, Oct 6)

Slander of Egyptian Domination and Exploitation. Haykal enumerated a series of what he called "small problems" which contributed to the dissolution. He claimed

deliberate misrepresentation by interested Syrian parties of Egyptian activities in Syria;

1. The difficulties inherent in the early stages of industrialization were presented as an Egyptian intention to keep Syria as an agricultural country.

2. The voluntary, pioneering work of Egyptian technicians in Syria gave rise to the charge that Egypt was unloading her unemployed on Syria.

3. The posting of Egyptian officers to the Syrian army, enfeebled by prolonged involvement in politics—in order to strengthen it—led to the accusation that Syria was being ruled by the Egyptian military.

4. When Mahmūd Riyād, Egyptian Ambassador in Damascus, stayed on after the merger, he was termed "the Egyptian high commissioner," while Vice-President Amer when he came to a Syria torn by party strife to solve certain problems "in a neutral spirit" was called "the Viceroy," an allusion to the British Viceroy in India. (*Ahram*, Nov 10; *BBCM*, Nov 13)

Personalities: Asali, Bizri, Sarraj. Haykal also "included in the small problems" which adversely affected the Union the behaviour of specific Syrian personalities: Sabri al-Asali, former Vice-President of the UAR, Haykal wrote, had opposed the Union because of his financial interests. Haykal also told in great detail the story of Afif al-Bizri, Commander of the first [Syrian] army after the Union and "undoubtedly a Communist during his youth" who was deposed by Abdel Nasser because of his promotion of Communism in the army and in general. (*Ahram*, Nov 10; *BBCM*, Nov 13)

Haykal devoted a whole article to the case of Abd al-Hamid as-Sarraj, the central Syrian figure in the Union. He was, Haykal said, a "faithful, national Arab youth," "despite his faults." As head of the Deuxième Bureau before the Union, Sarraj had protected Syrian independence and foiled dangerous plots; in the Suez affair he had supported Egypt and was responsible for the blowing up of the oil pipelines; in 1958 he had refused King Saud's enormous "bribe" to plot against the Union. Sarraj's faults were his lust for power, the fact that he was not a social revolutionary and his police methods.

Under the Union Sarraj grew in importance; he thus became an easy target and aroused the envy of other nationalist officers. His lust for power exposed him to danger, and with him the whole UAR. Haykal went on to give his version of Sarraj's dispute with Cairo on the eve of the coup; for details see p. 602. (*Ahram*, Nov 24; *BBCM*, Nov 27)

The Ba'ath Party. Haykal devoted a whole article to

describing how, to his mind, the behaviour of the Ba'ath party contributed to the weakening of the union.

In general, Haykal asserted, the party suffered from great deficiencies: it had failed to turn its ideas into a workable ideology; its leaders, Aflaq, Bitar and Hurani, were nonentities; its policy was one of manoeuvring in the dark; consequently, the Ba'athist rank and file, valuable patriots in themselves, were worthy of pity.

The party, Haykal said, was largely responsible for the failure of the Union because of its manoeuvring to gain exclusive power in Syria. The story began immediately after the union when Bitar, who had been Syrian Foreign Minister, was disappointed in his ambition to become Foreign Minister of the UAR. Some weeks later the Ba'ath leaders began to complain that they were not being allowed to participate in power. Their proposal to establish a council of state under the presidency of Abdel Nasser, consisting of the three Ba'ath leaders and three Egyptians, was vetoed by Abdel Nasser, who refused "to elevate the Ba'athists over other Syrians."

After the Iraqi revolution in July 1958, Haykal continued, Aflaq went to Iraq to advocate immediate union with the UAR, a move which Abdel Nasser rightly thought premature and which indeed caused much harm to the Arab union movement. [Haykal failed to mention that the Syrian Ba'ath intended, with the help of Iraq, to redress the balance inside the UAR in favour of itself.]

Meanwhile, in Syria, Haykal continued, the Ba'ath instituted patronage in favour of its members, and Hurani even tried to intervene in army appointments. Thereupon the Ba'ath was told "delicately" that they must no longer act as partisans. But the Ba'ath now began to complain to the President about persecution by Abd al-Hamid Sarraj.

There followed the story of the elections to the National Union: The Ba'ath demanded the deletion from the election lists of rival candidates; when Abdel Nasser refused to do so on the grounds that it would jeopardize the soundness of the elections, Haykal said, the party boycotted the elections.

Then came the decisive story, Haykal continued, namely the resignation of the Ba'athist members of government in Dec 1959 [2 months after the appointment of Abd al-Hakim Amer as President Abdel Nasser's representative in Syria] which they handled in an under-handed manner. Bitar, in an interview with Abdel Nasser, made clear the real reason for this step: the fact that he and Hurani were kept in posts "far away in Egypt" while Sarraj was "all alone there in Syria." (*Ahram*, Nov 17; *BBCM*, Nov 20; compare Haykal's account with details in MER 1960, pp. 462, 497-8)

SIGNIFICANCE

The Blow to the Cause of Arab Unity. Among foreign observers there was unanimity of opinion that the dissolution constituted a grave setback for the cause of Arab unity. *The Times* analyzed the question in the light of the profession of belief in unity which was an axiom of Arab politics everywhere. "The only conclusion to be drawn from the success of the Syrian separatist movement is either that the UAR was not a symptom of unity or that practical unity must always founder on local interests." "Many good nationalists" would hold to the former view, namely that the Union foundered either

because of particular difficulties incident to an Egyptian-Syrian combination, or because it was not a genuine partnership, but the domination of one country over another. The paper, however, adopted the latter thesis: practical unity was impossible; past experience proved conclusively that "the Arab nations remain as individualistic as ever" (*Times*, Oct 7). This view was echoed in many variations. *The New York Times* spoke of "a severe blow to Pan-Arabism, in the view of Near East experts" in Washington (*NYT*, Sept 30). A Swiss political weekly noted that "the Arabs, until recently confident in their

endeavours for unity, which they saw as sweeping over all accidental or enforced frontiers like an irresistible tidal wave, are now thrown back into their old condition of disunion and separatism" (*Weltwoche*, Oct 13). Abdel Nasser himself subscribed to this pessimistic view immediately after the outbreak of the revolution in Damascus when he said that "this movement... poses a threat to the safety of the Republic and to the call of Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and represents a great setback." (*R. Coiro*, Sept 28 [29])

"The Cause of True Arab Unity not Affected." The Syrian authorities held from the outset that the dissolution was no defeat for Arab nationalism. In the words of Dr Mustafa al-Barudi, Minister of Propaganda in the provisional government: "The Arab army's insurrection... broke out... [for the sake of] true Arab unity... Our aim is the liberation of all parts of the Arab homeland—its liberation from imperialism and the foreigner... from internal oppression... This revolution is Arab in origin, Arab in significance... The mission of the government [is] to pursue Arab unity." (*R. Damascus*, Sept 30 [Oct 3])

On Oct 11 the Syrian government made public a plan for an Arab federation. (For details, see pp 159 b-160.)

Abdel Nasser, in explaining his acquiescence in the dissolution, said "this experiment [in Arab unity]... was a forerunner operation... National unity in Syria is a... true preparation for realization [of Arab unity]." (*R. Coiro*, Oct 5 [7])

A letter to the editor from an Arab correspondent read: "Although the Syrian revolt was a blow to the UAR, it did not in any case constitute a great peril to Arab national awakening or unity... No ruler can eradicate the growing national feeling in the Arab countries for reform, progress and unity." (*Chr. Sc. Monitor*, Oct 27)

Abdel Nasser's Standing. [The impact of the breakup of the UAR on Abdel Nasser as the foremost leader of Arab nationalism was a major topic commented upon. Immediately after the revolution, observers stressed the blow to Abdel Nasser's prestige to the point of doubting his chances of survival; later, they tended to be impressed with his renunciation of attempts to restore unity by force.] Typical pronouncements during the first stage: "Abdel Nasser's helplessness in the face of [the sudden break-up of the UAR] has unjustifiably surprised many influential circles in Britain, who had consistently overestimated Abdel Nasser's strength and appeal, and forecast the inevitable downfall of his rivals. The event should

restore a sense of proportion" (*Sunday Telegraph*, Oct 1); "Abdel Nasser's prestige had been damaged throughout the Arab world... Once again, as at Suez, his armed forces had failed to offer serious resistance... He must seek new victories" (*NYT*, Oct 2). "For the first time it is soldiers who have staged a coup against [Abdel Nasser], for the first time he has suffered a heavy setback at the hands of his own Arabs, not of imperialists, colonialists or Zionists." (*Die Welt*, Oct 2)

A later assessment in *The Guardian* was that Abdel Nasser had "adroitly" rounded off the Syrian episode in a masterly speech [of Oct 5, see p 162] (*Guardian*, Oct 9), while a church publication attributed to Abdel Nasser "a wisdom and forbearance that sets him above most ME politicians" (*Church of England Newspaper*, Oct 13). [There was much Arab comment in the same vein.]

Effect on the Middle East Scene. A representative summing up the effect of the dissolution on the ME countries appeared in *The New York Times*: "Israel can [probably] look forward to a moment of quiet while the Arab states seek new relationships among themselves... [At any rate] Israel now faces a hostile Arab front divided among four powers instead of three. Lebanon, which survived a Syrian-based push for Arab nationalism in 1958, can rest a bit easier. She can also look forward, perhaps, to easier relations with a Syria oriented toward a free economy. Turkey never trusted Abdel Nasser and now finds he has vanished from her southern frontier... Qassim has seen a grievous blow dealt to his strongest Arab rival and a threat to his regime removed. He is likely to press his own claim for influence in Syria... Hussein is obviously delighted. He is no longer pinched between the northern and southern jaws of a UAR that tried to dethrone him... Saud and [the] shaykh... of Kuwait can feel only relief that the force of Arab nationalism, so deeply felt by their educated young men, has diminished for a time." (*NYT*, Oct 1)

Global Implications. Western opinions on the influence of the dissolution on the position in the ME ranged from the comment that the "Syrian revolt may aid NATO" because of its rightist government (*Daily Telegraph*, Oct 6) to the view that Soviet influence might be strengthened; the latter opinion was based on the satisfaction with the dissolution shown by Lebanese Communists (see p 378 b) and an expected comeback of the Syrian Communist Party. (*Chr. Sc. Monitor*, Oct 4)

THE UAR (EGYPT) AFTER THE SYRIAN SECESSION

(October-December)

THE NEW DEPARTURE

(October)

Stability Preserved: Period of Stocktaking: Abdel Nasser's Speeches. [From the break-up of the UAR on Sept 28 and until mid-October matters inside Egypt—as reported by the Cairo press and radio—continued much as usual. No emergency security precautions were reported] except for heavily reinforced guards around Abdel Nasser's home (*Jaridah*, Oct 20). [Possibly the arrest of army officers which was later officially announced (see below) started during this period.] There were reports [from unfriendly sources] that Abdel Nasser was considering the removal of Field Marshal Amer because of their differing attitudes on the day of the Syrian revolution (e.g. *R. Amman*, Oct 9-10; *IMB*, Oct 10). It was also reported that Abdel Nasser had told his vice-presidents that he was "prepared to abide by their decision" and they resolved to ask him to continue in his job. (*Hayat*, Oct 10)

In his opening speech before the National Congress Preparatory Committee, on Nov 25, Abdel Nasser [referred to this period when he] said that the "reactionaries" who had been arrested (see below: Detentions) had started to move against the revolution in Egypt. They had been encouraged by false allegations of unrest in the armed forces, made in hostile broadcasts. Rumours had been spreading "in the clubs." But all this had had no effect, Abdel Nasser said, and he had come to feel at that time that the country was stable; there had been a tendency to talk and philosophize but this indicated only interest in the state of the country, which was a positive sign. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 25 [28]; *Gumhuriyah*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 26)

The government announced some measures benefiting the public; e.g. an extra month's pay for Egyptian officials who had served in Syria, "at the wish of Abdel Nasser" (*R. Coiro*, Oct 4-10; *IMB*, Oct 5); reduction of school fees by 50%. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 10)

[At Abdel Nasser made clear in his speech of Oct 16, the period between Sept 28 and this day was one of stocktaking and the determination of a new policy.] In his five speeches between Sept 28 and Oct 5 (Sept 28 (two), 29, Oct 2, 3) Abdel Nasser dwelt upon one central point, namely that the uprising in Syria had been engineered by reaction in collaboration with imperialism, and that it had been a serious error on the part of the regime to compromise with reaction. He said that this lesson must be learned well, and the appropriate conclusions drawn. Another major point he repeatedly emphasized was that the UAR-Egypt would continue to aim at the goal of Arab union.

In his speech of Oct 5 he declared that in order to save the Arab nation from catastrophe and to avoid civil war in Syria, from which the enemies of the nation hoped to benefit, he was lifting the diplomatic blockade he had imposed on that country (*Nasser's Speeches* pp 243-296; see also p 162.) [From then on the ruling group's main preoccupation apparently became Egypt's

internal situation]. Abdel Nasser held a series of meetings with the vice-presidents—Abdel Hakim Amer, Abd al-Latif Baghdadi, Hussein ash-Shafi, Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din and Kamal ad-Din Hussein, and with Anwar as-Saadat (*R. Coiro*, Oct 6, 10, 12, 13-10; *IMB*, Oct 6, 10, 12, 13; *Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 12, 14). [These meetings were followed by Abdel Nasser's speech of Oct 16.]

Abdel Nasser: "I Have Chosen Revolution." The gist of Abdel Nasser's address of Oct 16 was: "I have made my choice... ours is the road of revolution"—the alternative being "the road of submission to despair." He said that he had spent the past few days in "careful meditation," "feeling the pulse of this nation," then adding: "I have made my choice in the name of God, in the name of this nation..." [The President made no reference to any consultations preceding his choice.]

Past Achievements. The President continued that a frank appraisal of the facts was imperative at this hour, and he proceeded to survey past achievements as well as mistakes. The objectives of the nation in the 1952 revolution, he said, could be summed up as the restoration of political and social liberty to the fatherland and its citizens. Political freedom had been largely achieved in the struggle culminating in the Suez victory. Imperialism, however, had not yet been completely exterminated. The national forces had therefore embarked on the struggle for social liberty to consolidate and guarantee the achievements of the political battle. The bases of social liberty were economic self-sufficiency and social justice. The President went on to enumerate the achievements in these fields.

Economic Achievements. Regarding economic achievements, the President mentioned a progressive budget, increased yields in agriculture, land reclamation, the agrarian reform, rapid industrialization, the building of the Aswan High Dam, the plan for doubling the national income in ten years, and the creation of the public sector of the economy—"we feel proud that it started with [the nationalization of] all the British, French and Belgian monopoly establishments"—which now possessed a capital exceeding ££1,000m., but whose dynamic impact on the economy exceeded this amount by far.

Social Justice and Socialism. As regards social justice, the President said that it was to be achieved through socialism, whose complicated definition he would set aside for the moment. Social justice essentially meant the right of every citizen to share in the national wealth in accordance with his real efforts in its obtaining, and equality of opportunity. Neither the law of justice nor the divine law allowed either wealth or poverty, learning or illiteracy, human dignity or human degradation to be

hereditary. The enemies in the battle for social freedom were "the exploitist and reactionary class" in collaboration with imperialism. Progress in this struggle was marked by the agrarian reform, the nationalization of industries and banks, the granting of rights to workers in management and sharing of profits, and the limitation of individual income—as prescribed by the socialist decrees of July.

The Syrian Secession A Counter-Attack By Reaction. The President went on to say that just as the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956—the victorious outcome of the struggle against imperialism—was followed three months later by the counter-attack of imperialism at Suez, so the July 1961 victory in socialism was followed two months later by the counter-attack of reaction which strove to recoup its losses and "established a bridgehead in Damascus"; and just as imperialism was beaten back at Suez, so would reaction be forced to retreat from Damascus. It was, however, imperative to learn the lesson from the happenings in Syria and to apply it to the whole Arab struggle.

The Errors Made, the Lessons Drawn. Abdel Nasser enumerated five mistakes that had been made and pointed out in a general way the correction to be applied.

(1) *Fighting Reaction without Compromise.* It had been a mistake to make peace with "reaction" allied to imperialism. It was an illusion to think that the reactionaries would hesitate to sacrifice national interests to imperialism in order to regain their position. It was an illusion to think it possible to reach a compromise with reaction and to remove class distinctions peacefully in the framework of national unity. Imperialism had changed its methods of infiltration; it had now "hidden itself in the palaces and safes of millionaires," while the methods of combating it were still opposition to military alliances and bases. Abdel Nasser drew the conclusion that imperialism must be fought in the "palaces of reaction," and reaction, "in the lap of imperialism."

(2) *Making National Union a Tool of Socialist Revolution.* Popular organization as embodied in the National Union (NU) had been inadequate. It had been a mistake to open the NU to the forces of reaction which succeeded in "paralyzing [the NU's] revolutionary potential and turning it into a mere organizational facade, unmoved by the force of the masses and their genuine demands." "The most important thing now" was to convert the NU into a "revolutionary tool" of the masses—"the workers, the peasants, the educated, the professionals, the property owners whose ownership is not based on exploitation... to the officers and soldiers who were the pioneers of the great July 23 [1952] Revolution... to those whose hope lies in socialism."

(3) *Inculcating The Masses With Revolutionary Fervour.* No adequate efforts had been made to mobilize the masses for active participation in the revolution. This must be changed; every association and institution, every village, every school, every individual must be turned into "a lively and fertile revolutionary cell."

(4) *Reorganizing Administration on Revolutionary Basis.* The government machinery had proved unequal to the huge revolutionary task imposed upon it; in some cases, in fact, it had become a liability in its rigidity and aloofness from the masses. This state of affairs must be radically rectified. The right man must be put in the right place and equitably rewarded for his honest efforts.

(5) *Opportunism,* struggle for power, selfishness, deviation from the objective of the masses to serve personal

ends—all this had not been completely eradicated. This must be done now; the ideals and morality of society must be reformed.

The Call For Revolutionary Action. In conclusion Abdel Nasser emphasized that the need was now for "revolutionary action," not for revolutionary legislation—which was adequate. He reiterated that he was not against private property as such but against "exploiting property"; there was "no room in our society for millionaires." He said he wanted to eliminate class distinctions through equality of opportunity. He wanted no mere revolutionary slogans but "a society throbbing with revolutionary activity."

"I Will Remain Here." Abdel Nasser ended his speech on a personal note. He said he had devoted his life to the Arab revolution and would "remain here as long as God wills." The nation on the other hand, had given him "such support as I never dreamt of." [A similar phrase appeared also in his letter to King Hussein, in March; see p 143 b.] (*Ahram*, Oct 17; *Nasser's Speeches* p 287 ff)

CABINET AND ADMINISTRATION

(October)

Cabinet Reshuffled. On Oct 18 the reshuffle of the government which Abdel Nasser "forecast in his address to the nation last Monday (Oct 16)" was announced. The majority of key posts were unaffected. The new set-up included the five [Egyptian] vice-presidents, 20 ministers and three deputy ministers. There were four newcomers among the ministers, while six [apart from the Syrians] had been dropped.

The new ministers were: Dr Abd al-Aziz as-Sayyid—Higher Education (aged 54, administrative director [? *muḍir*] of Alexandria University); Fathi ash-Shargawi—Justice (aged 45, a lawyer, member of the National Assembly); Dr Muhammad Nagib Hashshād—Agriculture (aged 50, Manager [? *wakil*] of Ayn Shams (Cairo) University; head of the General Federation of Students); Dr Muhammad an-Nabawi al-Muhandis—Health (aged 45, university professor of medicine and secretary of the doctors' association).

The six Ministers who had been dropped were: Dr Nūr ad-Dīn Tarrāf (Health); Ahmad Husni (State); Sayyid Mar'i (Agriculture); Hasan Abbās Zaki (Economy and Finance); Ahmad al-Mahrūqī (Agrarian Reform) and Ahmad Abdallah Tu'aymah (Waqfs). (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 19; see also table of government)

A foreign comment was that of the removed ministers, Hasan Abbās Zaki, Nūr ad-Dīn Tarrāf and Sayyid Mar'i, none could be described as a failure in his job. "It is hard to find any explanation for their dismissal other than they are men of means and might seem too bourgeois in a revolutionary administration." (*Christian Science Monitor*, Oct 24)

In Nov Vice-President Hussein ash-Shāfi' was given the responsibilities of Minister for al-Azhar Affairs (*R. Cairo*, Nov 11 [W 16]), and in Dec it was announced that he was to take over the affairs of the Islamic Congress [which had been in the charge of Anwar Saadāt]. (*MENA*, Dec 4 [6])

The Government Machinery. The reorganization was supervised by Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghādī, Vice-President for Production and Minister of Planning and Finance. On Oct 21 eight committees were set up for "the technical

study of questions" raised that day at a meeting chaired by Baghdadi on the reorganization of government machinery.

The questions were: the synthesis of a projects' budget in the development plan; the revision of financial legislation and regulations; the procurement and disposition of stores; the revision of the customs system; the reorganization of the budget and accounts departments of the ministries; the reorganization of local administration; the revision of the taxation system; the revision of the civil service law; a unified pension scheme "in line with socialist principles." The committees were to complete their tasks within one month. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 22)

On Oct 27 Vice-President Baghdadi, in a statement on the reorganization, enlarged upon Abdel Nasser's pronouncements on this matter in his speech of Oct 16 (see above). [Baghdadi gave no indication of the form of the new organization but elaborated on the principles governing the method of approach to it.] He said that the first requirement was to determine the problems involved and to decide on the path to be taken to achieve the desired aims. This in turn demanded "dividing each process into stages." No process [of reorganization] should be started unless success was assured, and no new stage initiated until the preceding stage had achieved its object. All this took time, perseverance and complete co-operation among all concerned. (*Ahram*; *Eg. Mail*, Oct 28)

On Oct 31 it was reported that Vice-President Baghdadi had set up a technical office for the reorganization of government administration (*maktab fanni li-hu'un tanzim al-adat al-hukumiyyah*) responsible directly to himself; it was to examine proposals made by committees to be set up in each ministry [apparently a development of the committees mentioned above]. The ministerial committees were to make their reports by Nov 30. (*Ahram*, Oct 31, Nov 1)

In December a Presidential Decree provided for the establishment of a Supreme Council for Public Organizations to direct and supervise the public sector of the economy. (See above: *Economic Survey* (Economic Legislation).)

DETENTIONS AND PROPERTY SEQUESTRATION

(October)

Detention and Sequestration of Property "In Defence of Revolution." On Oct 21, five days after the President's speech, Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din, Vice-President and Minister of the Interior, announced the detention of "reactionaries" and the sequestration of properties, in defence of the revolution. Three persons discharged from prison before serving their full terms were rearrested: Ibrahim Farag Masliah [former Wafd Minister, sentenced to prison in 1953 and released in 1955], Fu'ad Sarraj ad-Din [former Wafd SG and Minister of the Interior, sentenced to 15 years prison in 1953 and released in 1955] and Muhammad Atif Nasar [former Maj.-Gen., sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy in 1957 and released in 1958]. Thirty-seven named persons were detained and the monetary property of 167 named persons, including those detained, was sequestered. Muhyi ad-Din declared that these measures were taken in fulfilment of the revolutionary policy announced by the President, and their aim was "to protect [the people's] ability to ward off any stab in the back" such as the Syrian revolution. The persons affected were "reactionaries and their followers." (*Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 22)

Abdel Nasser: Those Arrested "Started to Move." In his opening speech at the National Congress Preparatory Committee on Nov 25, President Abdel Nasser said the Syrian coup had set the "reactionaries" in Egypt thinking that this feat could be repeated in Egypt; they "started to congratulate each other... and considered the socialist revolution at an end." They looked for British help, as they had formerly. They believed the allegations by the Damascus, Amman and Israel radio stations on unrest in the armed forces, and they became bold and "started to move." Rumours began to be heard in the clubs. Abdel Nasser mentioned in this respect "the Badrawi, Sarraj ad-Din, Hämüd Zakis, and Zaki Abd al-Mut'als." But the revolution had also learned the lesson of Syria. These people were arrested. They had been cursing the revolution since its beginnings but had been left alone because cursing did not matter; what did matter was plotting against the people. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 25 [28]; *Gumhuriyyah*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 26)

Arrest of Army Officers. At the same time [unconfirmed] reports reaching Beirut claimed that 150 army officers had been arrested over the previous fortnight. Most, if not all, were said to be signatories of a petition to FM Amer calling for reforms which in sum meant a slowing down of the nationalization drive launched in July. (*Jaridah*, Oct 20; *Sunday Telegraph*, Oct 22)

However, in his speech on Nov 25 before the Preparatory Committee of the National Congress, Abdel Nasser admitted the arrest of four officers only, "for a reason of which you will be told in the future" (*Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 26). Later, the arrest of a UAR ambassador to a Communist state was also mentioned in connection with the "grave affair" in which these officers were said to have been involved. (*Musawwar*, Dec 8)

Further Sequestrations and Arrests; Many Non-Egyptians Affected. On Oct 30 a further list was published of 255 "capitalist reactionaries" whose property was sequestered (*Ahram*, Oct 31; *Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 1). On Nov 25 Abdel Nasser announced that the total number of sequestered properties was 650, plus that of 168 persons who had "made their wealth trading in narcotics" (*Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 26). However, the *New York Times*, quoting "informed sources," was of the opinion that many more properties had been sequestered than was reported. (*NYT*, Nov 24)

Prominent on the sequestration lists were non-Arab names, chiefly Jewish, Greek and Armenian, and also Lebanese and Syrian; among those with Syrian connections were Fa'iz Abdallah al-Ijl, son-in-law of Shukri al-Quwatli, and Adnan Hashim al-Atasi, son of the former PM. In his announcement of Oct 21, Muhyi ad-Din said that among persons affected there were those who had come to the country under circumstances of colonialist protection and could not care less about the interests of the nation. Egyptian families affected included the Badrawi, Abud and Farghali, leading in industry and foreign trade. (*Ahram*, Oct 22, 31; see also comments in *Jaridah*; *Daily Telegraph*, Oct 24; *Sunday Times*, Oct 29; *NYT*, Nov 1)

In Dec *Al-Ahram* reported that 15 more persons had been detained in addition to the 37 whose detention was announced on Oct 21; ten of the latter had meanwhile been released by order of Muhyi ad-Din. (*Ahram*, Dec 28)

Foreign Comments. That Abdel Nasser was going all out to make Egypt "a Tito-type socialist state," was one British comment. (*Sunday Telegraph*, Oct 22)

The Sunday Times offered two explanations—the one “superficially the more obvious”—that Abdel Nasser was out to annihilate the circles who might, he feared, engineer a coup against him in Egypt as they had in Syria; this view was shared by *The Times*. The other possible explanation, “more economic and less political” was that “Egyptian socialism... [was] unable to stop half-way because, having frightened private enterprise, the govern-

ment is compelled to take over more and more itself.” (*Sunday Times*, Oct 29; *Times*, Oct 24)

As to the future, the *Economist* suggested that “the flamboyance of these arrests and of the seizure of private property point to a much rougher road towards Arab socialism than was indicated by the sophisticated, but jumbled, principles laid down three months ago.” (*Economist*, Oct 28)

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL UNION

(November-December)

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED

Preliminary Consultations, “New Alignment Sought.” Soon after his address of Oct 16 Abdel Nasser entered into a series of cabinet consultations to work out “the basic principles of the popular revolutionary organization to bring society into line with the socialist revolution which began in July 1961.” (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 20)

The following fortnight saw frequent reports on the progress of the consultations and leading articles in the press in the spirit of Abdel Nasser's address. (*Ahram*, Oct 21, 23, 27, 29, *Nav* 1, 2, 3, 4)

Abdel Nasser was believed to be planning a new drive to enlist the active support of the intelligentsia in a move to reorganize the government and make fundamental changes in the National Union. The ultimate objective would be a broad alignment of workers, university graduates, professors and soldiers. Abdel Nasser was reported to believe that he needed a wider base of support than the military one on which he had depended heavily until now. Such a “national front,” he reportedly believed would protect him from any attempt at revolt by “reactionaries.” (*NYT*, *Nav* 1)

Abdel Nasser's Declaration on Organization Of “Popular Powers.” On Nov 4 Abdel Nasser issued a declaration on the “reorganization of all national popular powers on a democratic basis” which was called for by the “enormous responsibilities” carried by the UAR in its “historic role” as the “base of the Arab pioneer movement.”

Fundamental considerations were: (1) The organization of the “popular powers” must ensure a genuine mobilization of the people of the UAR and their representation “on the largest possible scale”; (2) the “national revolutionary action” must be “closely linked” with a definite plan; (3) the “people itself” must steer the revolutionary movement.

The following steps would be taken:

1) A Republican Decree would be issued for the formation of a committee to be called The Preparatory Committee for the National Congress of Popular Powers (*al-lajnah at-tahdriyah lil-mu'tamar al-watani li-quwa ash-sha'abiyyah*), which would examine the representation through free elections of the “real genuine power of the people” in a National Congress, within one month.

2) The elections for the National Congress would be held in time for it to convene in Jan 1962. The President would inaugurate the Congress with a report embodying a charter of national action. This report would then be debated by the Congress in open session. The final result of the report and the debate would “constitute the practical crystallization of the charter of national

struggle, including the methods and aims of popular action.”

3) This charter would be the basis for the general elections which would eventually be held for the constituent committees (*al-lijān at-ta'sisiyah*) of the National Union in every village and town throughout the country; the National Congress would define the date and system of these elections. From these committees would arise the General Congress of the National Union—the supreme popular authority in the country which would decide on the drafting of a permanent constitution for the UAR. (*Ahram*, Nov 5; *R. Cairo*, Nov 5 [7])

Dissolution of National Assembly. [At the time of the break-up of the UAR the National Assembly (on which see p 590) was not in session.] Following the break-up the 200 Syrian members of the Assembly resigned their seats. (*R. Baghdad*, Oct 9-10; *IMB*, Oct 10)

On Nov 7 Abdel Nasser abolished Law No. 249 of 1960 relating to the National Assembly, thereby terminating its existence. Otherwise, the provisional constitution of 1958 remained in force. Abd al-Qādir Hātim, Minister of State, issued a note explaining that in view of the new phase into which the social revolution had entered since the July decrees, and in the light of Abdel Nasser's call for elections to the National Congress of the Popular Powers, it was inevitable that the Assembly, formed prior to these “radical developments,” should be terminated. (*Eg. Gaz.*, *Nov* 8)

It was reported that already at the time of the inauguration of the “socialist revolution” in the summer of 1961 it had been proposed to purge from the Assembly elements in consonance with the new policy. But this had been rejected as undemocratic, for the people alone had the right to make such changes (*Musawwar*, *Nov* 11). In Dec during the debates in the Preparatory Committee for the National Congress, Abdel Nasser said: “Had we taken the socialist laws [of July 1961] to the National Assembly we would have stumbled and would still be debating to this day because interests clash, of course.” (*R. Cairo Dec* 3 [6])

Appointment of Preparatory Committee for Congress of Popular Powers. On Nov 18, after a further series of discussions with members of the cabinet (*Ahram*, *Nov* 6, 8, 10, 12, 15), Abdel Nasser issued a Republican Decree appointing the “Preparatory Committee for the National Congress of Popular Powers” composed of 250 members. The Committee included the entire cabinet, all provincial governors, many senior officials, the Speaker and 26 members of the dissolved National Assembly and

representatives of the universities (including Al-Azhar) and public enterprises, journalists, peasants, workers and students; there were 11 women members, drawn from various walks of life. (*Ahram; Eg. Gaz., Nov 19*)

Anwar as-Saadat was appointed Secretary-General of the Committee. (*Ahram, Nov 23*)

The Preparatory Committee. On Nov 25, the day of the inauguration of the Preparatory Committee, a Republican Decree established its procedural regulations. The significant clauses were: Art. 1: The SG convenes the Committee and supervises its work. Art. 2: The sessions would be public. A majority of members would constitute a quorum. Recommendations would be made by an absolute majority of the members present. Arts. 3, 4: Members would speak in order of their requests to do so. The SG would close the debate as soon as the members scheduled had finished their address. Art. 6: Motions would be put by the SG only. Art. 7: Voting would be by show of hands. Arts. 8-10: Sub-committees to report on special subjects would be set up accordingly. Art. 11: Members of the public would have the right of submitting proposals to the SG. (*Ahram; Eg. Gaz., Nov 26*)

The Preparatory Committee convened on Nov 25. Further sessions were held on Nov 26, 27, 28, 29, Dec 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 21, and finally on Dec 31—nineteen in all. (*Ahram, passim*)

THE DEBATE

Abdel Nasser: "Isolation of Reaction" Prerequisite for "Freedom and Democracy for the People." The first session of the Preparatory Committee was taken up by a three-hour address by Abdel Nasser devoted for the most part to a critical survey of the years since 1952, along the lines evolved in his earlier pronouncements since the July decrees. The phase of the "political revolution," Abdel Nasser said, was complete; in it, the Liberation Rally and the NU had done "splendid" work, but they had not been able to eliminate reaction, which the new, socialist phase of the revolution was to tackle.

Abdel Nasser spoke at length of the "infiltration of reaction" into the state apparatus and the NU. The Suez war, the [West's] economic blockade of Egypt in 1957, and the merger with Syria in 1958 had prevented the revolution from dealing effectively with this problem. Now the reactionaries, "the enemies of the masses" must be "isolated." These enemies were those who opposed the socialist revolution and aimed to revive the capitalist regime. Their isolation was a prerequisite for "full freedom and democracy for the people." Abdel Nasser said that he had often felt that people were afraid, but after the "isolation" the people would have the opportunity of speaking their mind freely, of making mistakes and of correcting them; for once the reactionaries were isolated, the remaining differences between various classes and groups of the people could be resolved peacefully and democratically inside the revolutionary movement. There were "inevitable differences" between such groups as the farmer, the agricultural worker and the small merchant, the intelligentsia and the fellahin, officials and fellahin, the shopkeeper and the customer—but such differences were "purely internal" [to the revolution]. There would, however, be no freedom and democracy for the enemies of the people. Capitalist democracy was but a screen for capitalist exploitation. The formation of two parties would mean the end of the revolution. Never had a capitalist parliament made a social revolution. Democracy was not an end in itself, but a means for creating a society

embodying equality of opportunity. (*Ahram; Eg. Gaz., Nov 26*)

Working Schedule Adopted. On Nov 26, its first working session, the Preparatory Committee unanimously accepted its "terms of reference" as proposed by Anwar as-Saadat, the SG: (1) General discussion of (a) the nature of "the popular powers of the people"; (b) the method by which these powers should be represented in the National Congress; (c) the size of the Congress. (2) A sub-committee to draw up a report based on the general discussion. (3) Discussion of this report. (4) Another sub-committee to "study the representation of the various branches of the popular powers in the Congress." (5) A coordination committee to prepare proposals to be submitted to the Committee for final action. (*Eg. Gaz., Nov 27*)

Following are the main points of the ensuing debates, in a number of which President Abdel Nasser participated, and repeatedly intervened.

Who Are the Popular Powers? And How Are They to Be Represented in the National Congress? Three main outlooks were expressed:

1) The popular powers are all the citizens: this was the opinion of [the well-known religious modernist] Khālid Muhammad Khālid who explicitly included "the reactionaries"; he added that it was the task of the members to convey their views to the government and not necessarily to share its views. This was also the view of [the authores] Dr A'ishah Abd ar-Rahmān ("Bint ash-Shātī") who said: "The popular powers are the whole people; the ignorant as the university graduate, the rich as the poor." (*Ahram, Nov 27, 28*)

2) Popular powers are the working people—in the widest sense of the term: the worker, the peasant, the engineer, the student, the mother in her home. This opinion was expressed, among others, by Shaykh Ahmad ash-Sharāsi and Mustafa Kāmil Murād. (*Ahram, Nov 27*)

3) An ideological approach: the popular powers are those who believe in the socialist democratic and cooperative system—Dr Jābir Abd ar-Rahmān. (*Eg. Gaz., Nov 29*)

The popular powers are all working people "united by one aim: the struggle for a better society" and "having the energies we need for building the socialist structure, and for protecting its laws"—Muhammad Galāl ad-Dīn Sayyid, Ahmad Kāmil al-Badrī, Dr Hamdī al-Hakīm. (*Ahram, Nov 28, Dec 6; Eg. Gaz., Nov 30*)

Abdel Nasser defined the popular powers by elimination: "Anyone not an opportunist, a capitalist, a reactionary, a political parasite or a satellite politician." (*Eg. Gaz., Nov 29*)

The quantitative aspects of the representation were discussed. Hussein Muhammad Mahmūd, a peasant representative, demanded that peasants should make up 80% of the National Congress, because of their preponderance in the population. (*Ahram, Dec 4*)

Dr Nīmat Mahrān, a woman member, demanded enlarged representation of women; various other members concurred. (*Ahram, Dec 6*)

Another controversial point was whether the existing organizations were to be the base of the elections. Yūsuf Ali and other members claimed that the election to the National Congress should be based on the existing labour unions (*Ahram, Nov 29*); Dr Gamāl ad-Dīn Sa'īd suggested that the industrial workers' representatives should be elected through the factories. Mustafa Kāmil Murād, Ali Sayyid Ali and Siyām Farag argued that the agri-

cultural cooperative associations and the trade unions, until reorganized, were not fit to represent the working people. (*Ahram*, Nov 27, Dec 6, 10)

Abdel Nasser rejected the idea that the present unions and the executive committees could set up true representations of the people's powers. He also said that the time had not yet come for all peasants to join cooperative associations and to set up trade unions for agricultural labourers. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 28)

Proposal to Set Up Socialist Cadre Party. Ihsan Abd al-Qudus, editor of *Rûz al-Yûsuf* and also a member of the Preparatory Committee, supported—in an article in his journal—the proposal to isolate the reactionaries, but stressed that this was not enough. He suggested making a distinction between the "special socialist base" and the "general national base," organizing the former in a "socialist, democratic, cooperative party" which would be bound together by common socialist ideology and interest. He agreed that the term "party" aroused apprehension because it had been misused in the past, but there was no alternative. He stressed that not all the people could be regarded as socialist; therefore, the socialist elements had to be organized in a special party. Only such a party could provide the strong leadership needed. He wrote that he had advocated the establishment of such a party since 1952 and argued that the failure of the Liberation Rally and the National Union was due to their non-partisan form. (*Rûz al-Yûsuf*, Dec 4)

Who Are the Enemies of the People and How Should They Be Treated? Question of "Isolation." Abdel Nasser: National Guard to Defend Revolution.—An extreme view was expressed by Ali Sayyid Ali who argued that whoever was affected by the latest "socialist revolutionary laws" must be "isolated" (*Yûsuf*). Abd an-Nabi Mahmûd Sayyid suggested "isolating" only those who were hurt by the agrarian reform, all umdahs [village heads] and their assistants (*Ahram*, Dec 6, 7). Other speakers argued that the "feudalists," politicians of the old regime, "opportunists," "exploiters," "agents of foreigners", (explicitly including Communists) and whoever impeded socialist expansion should be isolated to prevent them from betraying the people as they had done in Syria. (*Ahram*, Nov 27, 30, Dec 4)

The most outspoken opponent of "isolation" was again Khâlid Muhammad Khâlid who said that "isolation" was undemocratic and asked whether it was really necessary to restrict democracy in order to protect socialism. Among the moderates was also Gamâl Mursi Badr who argued that nowadays there were no entire groups that might be dubbed "enemies of the people"; even individuals were entitled to equitable treatment (*Ahram*, Nov 27, 28). Dr Ahmad Sayyid Darwish said that "isolation" should be based on legality; special laws should be enacted and only a judge be qualified to pronounce on political "isolation." (*Ahram*, Dec 5)

Abdel Nasser reiterated the major theme of his opening address: the revolution must be protected from its enemies. "Those who forced their way into your homes, beat and wounded you, still exist," the President said, and they would repeat these deeds if given the opportunity. It was unreasonable to turn a former owner of 5,000 feddan, of which 4,900 feddan had been requisitioned. The "isolation" of such men did not mean that they would be put in a military prison, but that they should not be allowed to occupy positions of authority.

Political isolation only—not judicial prosecution—was

necessary to protect the socialist revolution; "I shall sign no death warrant" the President said, and recalled that in the past also the Egyptian revolution, unlike other revolutions, had been bloodless and merciful. There had been only a few political trials: of the Muslim Brethren because they attacked the revolution in 1954; of the Communists because they received orders from abroad—not because the revolution was against Marxism; and of people like Sarraj ad-Din [the Wafdist] who were soon pardoned.

At the same time, the President said, the people, everyone, must share with the leadership the task of protecting the revolution, defending it "with his blood. We will set up national resistance groups, and a national guard, and include the fellahin in it." Addressing the Committee, he said: "Should the people here formulate a reactionary constitution, I would not hesitate to put on my military uniform once more and fight it out."

Abdel Nasser said he did not wish to define who were the "enemies" of the people. In any case, "I consider a traitor anyone who suggests the revival of feudalism." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 28, 29, 30)

Democracy and Freedoms. A debate developed on this point between President Abdel Nasser and Khâlid Muhammad Khâlid. Khâlid said: "Ten years have passed since the Revolution raised its banner. We must restore its liberties to the people without delay." He added: "Socialism does not differ from democracy; if socialism is a means to liberate humanity from hunger, democracy is a means to liberate humanity from fear" (*Ahram*, Nov 27). In a later speech Khâlid took issue with Abdel Nasser's opposition to parliamentary democracy and the party system. He said that these must "not be held responsible today for the circumstances under which they worked yesterday," just as it could not be argued that the army should be dissolved because of the corruption in its ranks before July 1952. "To me," Khâlid said, "democracy is simply to enable the people to select its rulers by free poll..." Under the former regime it happened that when Parliament was dissolved by royal decree it would meet unauthorized and force the holding of free elections. If the people thus succeeded in "imposing its will and power" when it was enslaved, Khâlid asked, why should it not do so today "when the government... is at its fingertips and it is not oppressed...? Indeed why should we be afraid to let it rule itself on the largest democratic scale?" Addressing the President directly, Khâlid declared that a phenomenon existed that must be faced courageously: in a capitalist society the people enjoyed more freedom and control of government than in a socialist society. Socialism limited liberty and "indulged in domination and suppression" because of its fear of capitalism. The UAR should adopt the "golden mean" between socialism—which Khâlid advocated—and capitalism, adopting from the latter this asset of freedom. Khâlid also advocated the road of "evolution instead of revolution" [yet at the same time he said, "The whole people have faith in their revolution"—an apparent contradiction which, Abdel Nasser, in his reply, pointed out. What he meant to express, it seems, was "revolution by evolution."] He said that there was no need for "non-democratic measures" such as a "protective war" [against the "reactionaries"], to which the President had referred, in order to safeguard UAR democracy. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 4)

Dr A'ishah Abd ar-Rahman maintained that the people could be relied upon in the choice of their representatives (*Ahram*, Nov 28). Mustafa al-Baridi, Chairman of the Bar Association, said: "Despite all that has been

said about freedom of expression, the fact is that the people are afraid to talk... We must do something to improve this situation... The people must feel secure and feel that they are under genuine liberal rule." He demanded an opposition party, because "parties would work for the interest of the country" and because "this was the freedom which had been known by every Arab." Dr Rashwan Fahmi, Chairman of the Medical Association, demanded free elections and a permanent constitution, giving the legislative precedence over the executive. (*Ahram; Eg. Gaz., Dec 7*)

The main argument of the opponents to this view was the failure of parliamentary democracy under the former regime. Fu'ad Galil said that the people learned what "democracy" was when they were forced to vote for the ruling parties against their own interest (*Ahram, Nov 27*). Ahmad Munisair recalled that the political parties in the pre-revolutionary days used to buy votes. The least that could be done was to prevent new opportunities from being presented to reactionary elements (*Eg. Gaz., Nov 28*). Dr Tu'samah al-Garf said opposition meant freedom of criticism and expression and this was guaranteed, but there was no room in the country for parties as they represented special interests. (*Ahram, Dec 7*)

Mustafa al-Barad'i also demanded freedom of the press. He said that "the press should give space to sincere and liberal opinion." Something must be done, he added, to secure freedom of expression in the nationalized press (*Eg. Gaz., Dec 7*). Kamal al-Hinnawi answered that freedom of the press existed. Censorship had been imposed only at the first stage of the revolution; afterwards it was abolished. "Now, the censorship rises from the conscience of the journalists themselves and from their understanding of the policy of the country... The press has never felt so much liberty as it feels at present." (*Ahram, Dec 7*)

Abdel Nasser repeatedly elaborated on this subject, once in direct reply to Khalid whom he challenged to cite a single example of anything he had written not being published under the revolutionary regime. Socialism, the President said, implied the restriction of certain freedoms, mainly economic. He was emphatic that freedom of expression was safe, as it had been over the last ten years, except for the advocates of feudalism or those who received their instructions from abroad, such as the Communists. Abdel Nasser reiterated that there was no room for political parties and western-type democracy with its implied dictatorship of capital, or a one-party system of the Communist type which excluded the majority of the people from the political process. The UAR's was "a democracy of all the popular forces, all the people"; a democracy both political and social, to be established by forming National Union committees throughout the Republic. It was, however, essential for the establishment of this democracy that the people should know how to defend themselves against the reactionaries, the President reiterated. (*Ahram, Eg. Gaz., Nov 28, 30, Dec 4*)

The Sub-Committees. On Dec 5 the Preparatory Committee decided to establish a sub-committee to prepare resolutions on the following subjects: (1) Who are the popular powers?; (2) the size of the National Congress; (3) the proportion of the various sectors of the popular powers in the composition of the Congress.

Eighty-nine members of the Preparatory Committee put forward their own names. The Preparatory Committee then decided that its SG, Anwar as-Saadat, should

choose the sub-committee members from among these candidates. On Dec 6 Saadat announced the names of the 21 sub-committee members. (*Ahram, Dec 6, 7*)

On Dec 9 the sub-committee, in its first session, unanimously elected Dr Gâbir Gadd as its rapporteur (*mu-qarrir*). The sub-committee held 11 sessions in all, and on Dec 19 submitted its report to the plenary. (*Ahram, Dec 10-20*)

The Preparatory Committee then decided to establish five sub-committees to be nominated by the SG—to discuss the representation of various groups inside each sector at the National Congress as follows: farmers, workers, "national capitalists" (*ar-rasmiyah al-wataniyah*), officials and women, university teachers and students. (*Ahram, Dec 22, 24*)

On Dec 27 the five sub-committees submitted their reports to a coordination committee which, on Dec 29, affirmed the reports with minor amendments and submitted them to the Preparatory Committee. (*Ahram, Dec 28, 30, 31*)

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE RESOLUTIONS

The Preparatory Committee in plenary session adopted its resolutions by affirming one by one the reports of its various sub-committees, with occasional amendments.

"Isolation of Enemies of the People." As regards "isolation," the Committee resolved: "Isolation" (*asil*) meant "deprivation of the right to exercise the political prerogatives enjoyed by the people; of the right to participate in any political body; of the right to occupy any leading post in any socialist body connected with it, such as trade unions, cooperative societies and professional associations." Isolation should be limited to the isolated persons alone, and should not imply deprivation of civil rights. There would be two forms of isolation: (1) isolation of the "enemies of the people's socialist revolution"; (2) removal or exclusion (*istib'ad*) of "those whose interests are incompatible with the interest of the people at the present stage of socialist reconstruction."

"Enemies of the People's Socialist Revolution": The following were so defined:

1) Whoever had been found guilty by the Revolutionary, People's, Treasury, State Security and Supreme National Courts of committing a crime against the country, unless completely amnestied.

2) Whoever had helped foreigners, directly or indirectly, to gain power over the country or to harm its interests.

3) Whoever had misused his influence to thrive at the expense of the people or to realize personal gains for himself or others in an unjustifiable manner.

4) Whoever had participated in corrupt political life by violating the constitution, falsifying elections, attacking political freedoms or supporting monarchical tyranny. This applied to members of the royal court, ministers, party members and MPs.

5) Members of the former royal family.

The "Excluded" (*mustab'adin*) were banned from taking part in political organizations during the constructive stage of socialism on the grounds that their interests were in conflict with those of the people. The following groups were defined as excluded:

1) Those who were affected by the agrarian reform laws. Those who had proved "responsive to socialism" and those who had rendered "well-known services to the people" were exempted.

2) "Reactionary and exploiting elements opposed to

socialism" among those who held shares to a value of more than £E10,000 and those who were affected by the nationalization of the Mir Bank and National Bank of Egypt, and certain (detailed) decrees of July 1961.

3) "Reactionary elements hostile to socialism" among those whose funds had been sequestered or those who had been put under arrest on security or economic grounds since July 22, 1961.

4) Those who had been convicted of having had a share in corrupting the political life of the people through their influence on public opinion, or who had received secret funds, whether from internal or from foreign sources; those who had been convicted of abusing their authority in labour unions, cooperative organizations, or chambers of commerce and industry in order to further private interests or to distort the principles on which these organizations had originally been founded.

The Committee recommended that "isolation" in both forms should remain in force until the persons affected could prove that they had adopted themselves to the socialist system. They would enjoy the right to appeal before a special committee which would include professional judges. The Committee also recommended that the President set up a committee for the protection of the socialist revolution in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres. [The resolutions said nothing about who was actually to implement the "isolation."] (*Ahram*, Dec 20, 22, 1961; Jan 1, 1962; *Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 20)

Composition of National Congress. Concerning the National Congress, the Preparatory Committee affirmed the sub-committee report as follows:

1) The Congress should have 1,500 members.

2) The popular powers would be divided into 8 sectors composed as follows:

Farmers	375 members	25%
Workers	300 members	20%
"National Capitalists"	150 members	10%
Professional Associations	225 members	15%
Non-Union Civil Servants	135 members	9%
University and College		
Teachers	105 members	7%
Students	105 members	7%
Women	105 members	7%

(*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 20; *Ahram*, Dec 20, 21)

On Dec 31, at its final session, the Preparatory Committee affirmed the reports of the five sub-committees concerning the representation of various groups within each sector. Seats were allocated as follows:

The 375 seats of the farmers: 80 to the members of agrarian reform cooperatives; 265 to agricultural co-operative associations; 7 to members of agricultural labour unions; 15 to government agricultural labourers, and 8 to members of fishermen's unions.

The 300 seats of the workers: 120 to industry workers, 26 to commerce, 64 in the services and 90 in government employ.

The 150 seats of "national capitalists": 75 to businessmen and 75 to industrialists.

The 225 seats of the professional associations: 17 to physicians, 8 to dentists, 8 to veterinarians, 9 to pharmacists, 16 to lawyers, 83 to teachers, 18 to agronomists, 31 to the engineering professions, 8 to bookkeepers and auditors, 10 to journalists, 8 to scientists and 9 to artists.

The 135 seats of non-union civil servants were assigned by governorates according to the number of officials in each governorate, with a minimum of 2 representatives for each, except for the four desert governorates which were allocated one representative each.

The 105 seats of the academic teaching staff: 4 to Al-Azhar, 27 to Cairo University, 18 to Ayn ash-Shams University, 17 to Alexandria University, 6 to Asyut University, 22 to colleges and 11 to Technical Research Commissions (*hay'at al-buhūth al-fanniyah*).

The 105 seats of students—4 to Al-Azhar, 20 to Cairo University, 15 to Ayn ash-Shams University, 14 to Alexandria, 4 to Asyut, 13 to the colleges, 30 to secondary school pupils and 5 to students studying abroad.

The 105 seats of women—8 to physicians, 1 dentist, 1 veterinarian, 3 to pharmacists, 5 to lawyers, 34 to teachers, 4 to agronomists, 1 to the engineering professions, 2 to scientists, 1 bookkeeper, 3 to journalists, 5 to artists, 10 to workers, 21 to members of cooperative associations and 6 to members of women's associations. (*Ahram*, Dec 27, 28, 31, 1961, Jan 1, 1962)

On Dec 31, at the final session, Anwar as-Saadāt declared that the Preparatory Committee had finished its task and its resolutions would be submitted to President Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram*, Jan 1, 1962)

THE UAR: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYNOPSIS

General. The UAR's objectives in foreign policy remained the same as in 1960; (MER 1960, p 510). In her prime aim, the establishment of an Arab union under her leadership, the UAR experienced a grave setback when her only achievement, the Egyptian-Syrian union, disintegrated (Sept). The damage caused by this event to the UAR's (Egypt's) international standing, however, seemed to have been relatively slight.

The UAR continued to pursue her policy of "positive neutralism" or—as it came to be called—"non-alignment." Her increased activity in the neutralist sphere which had become apparent in 1960 (MER 1960, p 514) found its expression in her sponsoring of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. (See pp 56 ff.)

Certain changes took place in the relations of the UAR with the world powers, during the period under review. At the beginning of the year, the UAR took an extreme anti-American and anti-UN line over the Congo crisis which led to the impression in the West that she was coordinating her efforts with those of the Soviet Union. In the spring, however, when the first steps were being taken in Cairo for convening the Belgrade conference, the UAR emerged in a "middle of the road" position between the so-called "leftist" and "rightist" neutralists. Simultaneously, her relations with the US improved. At the same time, while her ties with the Soviet Union continued to be close, the UAR became involved in a public dispute with her in which she demonstrated that she meant to preserve her independence and freedom of action. The impression that Abdel Nasser had adopted an attitude of relative moderation was reinforced by his position at the Belgrade Conference, in September. Thus by the end of the year, even though Cairo had meanwhile renewed vehement attacks on "Western imperialism"—this time as personified by Britain and France—she appeared to have become more neutral between East and West. Basically, however, the UAR's position between the world powers had not changed. She still sought to attain her objectives, in particular Arab union and leadership in Africa, at the expense of Western positions, and as far as the elimination of the latter was concerned, her interests continued to correspond with those of the East.

The UAR secured large scale economic aid from both East and West, with the importance of Western aid growing. Regarding foreign trade, Egyptian exports were divided about equally between Communist and Western countries, but her imports from the West were about threefold those from the East.

At the United Nations General Assembly, the UAR, together with Morocco, Iraq and Yemen, recorded the highest coincidence of votes with the Communist countries and the lowest with the US, of any ME country. At the 15th session coincidence with the Communist

countries was 71% and with the US 20.6%; at the 16th Assembly the figures were 67.2% and 14.4% respectively.

The struggle against Israel continued to figure prominently in the UAR's foreign policy, in her relations with the world powers, and in diplomatic and other efforts all over the world, especially in Africa. (See: The Arab-Israel Conflict)

The Arab World. The UAR continued to strive towards the establishment of an Arab union, with a political system after its own pattern and under its leadership. Until the Syrian secession, however, the UAR accommodated itself to working in the framework of "Arab solidarity," the concept opposed to that of Arab union which was embodied in the Arab League and upheld by all other Arab governments (see p 97 ff.). This trend was strengthened by an improvement of relations with Jordan, at King Hussein's initiative. In the crisis evoked by Iraq's claim to sovereignty over Kuwait (June) the UAR was in accord with the Arab majority in supporting Kuwait's independence. The Bizerta episode, when President Bourguiba momentarily joined the camp of militant Arab nationalism, led at long last to a truce between Tunisia and the UAR. Thus, by mid-summer the UAR was on speaking terms with all Arab governments for the first time since her establishment in 1958.

Only six weeks later, all this changed drastically, in the wake of the Syrian secession. The basic difference between Cairo and the majority of Arab governments reappeared with a vengeance, and Egypt reverted to the revolutionary path in pursuance of her objectives in the Arab world. First, however, President Abdel Nasser had to clarify whether Egypt would continue on the course of Arab nationalism at all, in view of the Egyptian public's disappointment at Egypt's Arab venture and the apparently widespread desire that Egypt should now keep to herself. This the President did immediately, repeatedly emphasizing that Egypt would continue to lead the "Arab struggle." In keeping with his conclusion that the Syrian coup had been engineered by "reaction" in alliance with imperialism, Abdel Nasser declared that he would now "fight imperialism in the palaces of reaction." Socialism, according to this doctrine, had to precede Arab union, lest reaction strike again; the UAR therefore raised the banner of socialism in the Arab world. In this struggle, it was explained, Egypt would act as a state on the formal level, but as a revolution on the popular level everywhere in the Arab nation. At the beginning of 1962, this doctrine was finally termed "unity of aim before unity of rank."

Initiative in the inter-Arab struggle which followed the Syrian secession was, however, by no means one-sided. The new regime in Syria became Cairo's number one enemy and the Syrian leaders showed no more

willingness to come to terms with Abdel Nasser than he with them. King Hussein broke his truce with Abdel Nasser by recognizing Syria's independence on the morrow of the coup. Iraq and Tunisia made it quite plain that they viewed the event with favour. In the case of Saudi Arabia, Cairo opened the attack. In Dec the UAR dissolved its federation with Yemen (the United Arab States) which had been formally established in March 1958 but never actually implemented; previously the Imam had attacked Cairo's nationalization policy. The UAR remained on speaking terms only with Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Kuwait and Morocco, but these countries were no less opposed than the others to the UAR's aims. By the end of the year, the UAR was isolated among the Arab countries of the ME but took the offensive on the assumption that in her revolutionary policies of anti-imperialism, quest for union, and "Arab socialism," she dissolved its federation with Yemen (the United Arab people).

The Communist Countries. Relations with the Soviet Union continued on the established pattern. (See MER 1960, p 511.) The correspondence of interests and policies of the two countries was most clearly seen at the beginning of the year in the Congo crisis where both supported extremist, anti-Western elements, and strongly attacked the West and the United Nations. Significantly, however, in regard to the UN, the UAR did not go quite as far as the Soviet Union, in consideration of the support the UN enjoyed among the Afro-Asian nations. PM Khrushchov noted the two governments' "correspondence of views" on "such important questions of our time" as the struggle for peace, disarmament and the liquidation of colonialism. The UAR continued to rely exclusively on Soviet arms and on Soviet aid for her foremost development project, the Aswan High Dam.

That there were differences as well as cooperation between the two countries was amply demonstrated when they engaged in a propaganda campaign in May-June. The campaign was launched by the Soviet press on the issue of the alleged maltreatment of Communists in the UAR and specifically the alleged death or murder of two Communist leaders, one Syrian and the other Lebanese, in a Syrian prison. The wider issues involved were Communist criticism of the UAR regime, the Communist attitude to the Egyptian-Syrian union, and the UAR's neutralism.

PM Khrushchov himself raised the issue of the UAR regime in a meeting with a UAR parliamentary delegation headed by Anwar as-Saadat, on May 3. Khrushchov told them, in essence, that the UAR's future lay in Communism, though he did not propose to transform the Arab nationalists into Communists "now". He emphasized that Communism consisted of ideas and as such could not be "buried in prison." This encounter was followed, three weeks later, by a concentrated attack on the UAR regime in the Soviet press, on the issue of the Arab Communists. According to the articles, the UAR was not a "national democracy" but a dictatorship, and UAR socialism was "a society where exploiters rule... while progressive people languish in torture chambers." The UAR press reported that Moscow was in fact requesting the UAR to grant absolute freedom of action to the Communist parties; it was challenging the UAR's sovereignty and dignity; the UAR, however, would not allow any interference in her affairs.

The issues of Communist opposition to the Egyptian-Syrian union and the alleged Soviet intent to "subvert the UAR's neutralist policy" were not mentioned by the

Soviet press, but were brought up in the UAR's counter-campaign.

Outright appeals by the Syrian Communists to fight against the union had been published in the *World Marxist Review* in 1960 (MER 1960, p 81), and in 1961 this journal continued to publish articles, by a Soviet commentator among others, attacking Cairo's call for unity as disguised Egyptian colonialism. The UAR information media now claimed that the Soviet campaign had really started at the time of the Egyptian-Syrian merger and that its aim was to strike at the union. Three months later, when the UAR broke up, the Arab Communists enthusiastically welcomed the event, and the Soviet Union preceded the Western powers in recognizing the new regime in Syria.

In contrast to the issues of Communism and the union, there was no direct evidence to support the UAR charge that the Soviet Union sought to divert her from her path of non-alignment. UAR commentators charged that the Soviet Union had interpreted the concept of positive neutralism as a kind of alignment with her own camp. It was also pointed out that the propaganda campaign coincided with the meeting in Cairo of the preparatory committee of the Belgrade Conference on Non-Aligned Countries, which the Soviet Union was thought to dis-favour. In any case, UAR spokesmen stated that the UAR had been given the opportunity to demonstrate the genuineness of her neutralism before the assembled neutrals, and Western observers thought that she had indeed thus strengthened her position among them.

While the campaign underlined the differences between the two countries, it also showed that both sides wished to maintain their cooperation. Thus some days lapsed before the UAR took public notice of the Soviet attacks, and it was only at the height of the campaign that the UAR made public the Khrushchov-Saadat encounter which had taken place a month earlier. It was also noted that in contrast to the UAR's anti-Western campaigns, the UAR reaction in this case was directed against the Soviet information media and did not extend to the Soviet government. There was apparently only one intimation that the difference on Communism might affect Soviet-UAR cooperation, when *Pravda* warned the UAR "not to cut the tree that provides the shade." On this, the UAR papers recalled that in 1957 Khrushchov had stated his willingness to cooperate with Abdel Nasser even though he hailed the Communists in his country; they also remarked that the USSR too derived benefits from the aid she extended. The campaign subsided in mid-June. On the occasion of a Muslim holiday, the Soviet leaders sent the UAR President messages of friendship, and Abdel Nasser replied in the same spirit. An article in *Pravda*, obviously designed to end the campaign, said that it could please only Western imperialism which was intent on driving a wedge between the two countries. Two weeks later a new UAR ambassador to the USSR, whose departure had been delayed, finally took up his post.

After the break-up of the UAR, however, there were renewed altercations between the Soviet and the UAR information media, started apparently by the latter. The UAR press, including Hamanein Haykal, President Abdel Nasser's leading spokesman, condemned the Arab Communists as enemies of Arab nationalism and collaborators with imperialism. Self-interest was the only motive imputed to the Soviet Union in extending aid to the Arabs, and she was even alleged to have reached an understanding with Britain on a common policy in the area. Soviet radio commentators reacted sharply to these articles, saying i.e. that Haykal was trying to harm the coopera-

tion between the socialist states and the Arab countries in the interests of imperialism.

In the latter part of the year there were some instances in international politics where the two countries did not see eye to eye. When, on the eve of the Belgrade Conference, the USSR announced its intention to resume nuclear tests, Abdel Nasser, in his speech at the conference, expressed his "shock" at this step. (An authoritative Cairo comment said, however, that Abdel Nasser had acted on a hint from Khrushchov). Also, Abdel Nasser's attitude on the German question at the conference did not accord with that of the Communist bloc. In Nov., the Soviet Union vetoed the UAR-sponsored admission of Kuwait to the UN; there was no public UAR comment on this Soviet step which was described in the West as a "blow at President Abdel Nasser." At the end of the year, Soviet-UAR cooperation was however again underlined, when the C-in-C of the Soviet navy visited the UAR and the Eastern bloc delivered a batch of naval units, including submarines.

Soviet economic and technical assistance continued in fulfillment of the general aid agreements signed in former years; there was no new general agreement during the year. The USSR was reportedly assisting in the construction of over 90 industrial and other enterprises, in addition to the Aswan High Dam.

Regarding other Communist countries, an important development was the elevation, in May, of the East German trade mission in Damascus to the status of Consulate-General, which caused a clash between Bonn and Cairo. There was also a marked expansion of economic relations between the two countries. Economic co-operation continued with other Communist countries, especially Czechoslovakia.

Close cooperation was maintained between the UAR and Yugoslavia in both the political and the economic spheres. Presidents Abdel Nasser and Tito met three times during the year, and they jointly sponsored the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

Western Countries. UAR relations with Western countries in general continued to improve. Western economic aid assumed the greatest importance not only for the development of the country but also for current needs, in the form of the supply of US food surpluses. Apart from an agreement with Yugoslavia, all the new aid and credit agreements signed in 1961, which totalled \$534 million, were with Western countries and Western-financed international funds. (On relations with the US, see separate synopsis below: The United States).

The improvement of relations with one Western power—which brought with it the benefits of economic aid—were, however, balanced by attacks on the "neo-imperialism" of others. Thus at the beginning of the year, when the UAR's relations with the US reached a low point over the Congo crisis, she re-established diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, and subsequently also received a sizable British credit. Even in this period, though, UAR suspicions of British intentions were not allayed—and they were probably strengthened by the British intervention in Kuwait in June; the UAR continued to attack "British imperialism," and especially the British positions in Southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf and East Africa. France was also denounced throughout the year over Algeria and other issues.

Towards the end of the year, however, when UAR relations with the US had noticeably improved, Cairo strongly intensified her attacks on Britain and France—though the British forces had meanwhile been withdrawn from Kuwait, and Britain, to show her good faith, had

delayed her recognition of Syria even longer than the US. The two countries were attacked over their attitude on the Congo question and were depicted as the leading enemies of Arab nationalism. Hassanin Haykal classified the following countries as the enemies of the UAR: France and Britain, Iran and Turkey—the Middle East CENTO Members—(but significantly not the US—the chief backer of CENTO) and the Arab countries with Western ties; these countries, Haykal alleged, were scheming to deal the UAR a deadly blow. At the same time, the UAR arrested members of the French Assets Mission, the only French official representatives in Cairo, on charges of espionage and a conspiracy to assassinate President Abdel Nasser, among others.

As for the other Western countries, UAR relations grew closer in particular with West Germany and Italy, especially in the fields of economic and technical assistance. West Germany extended large scale credits for development projects; significantly, however, a short time before the agreement was reached, the UAR permitted East Germany to open a Consulate-General in Damascus, and, rejecting Bonn's protests as "threats," declared that West Germany had stronger political and economic interests in the Arab countries than vice versa. There were certain friendly contacts with the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Austria, among others. The usually friendly relations with Greece were marred—though apparently not on the official level—by the exodus of the Greek community from Egypt following the nationalizations by which many Greeks were deprived of their livelihood and all of their security. Belgium cut off diplomatic relations with the UAR, after her embassy in Cairo had been sacked following the murder of the ex-premier of Congo Patrice Lumumba; Cairo had already confiscated Belgian properties in the UAR, in connection with the Congo crisis, at the end of 1960.

Africa. In Africa, rather like in the Arab world, the UAR, in her quest for influence and leadership, supported revolutionary movements and became identified with a minority of countries which took an extremist, anti-Western stand. In January, these countries, the UAR, Morocco, three sub-Saharan states—Ghana, Guinea and Mali—and the Algerian Provisional Government participated in a conference at Casablanca, which was called primarily to discuss the Congo crisis. The conference issued an "African Charter" aimed at giving the group a permanent character. (See synopsis pp 48-9) The policies of the Casablanca group were opposed by the great majority of African countries who took a more moderate stand and supported the established order; these countries also joined forces, at conferences in Brazzaville (of 12 French speaking countries) and in Monrovia, where these 12 and another 7 countries participated. This division affected especially UAR relations with the countries of the Brazzaville group, whom she attacked as imperialist stooges. In the Congo itself the UAR intensified her support for the Stanleyville government of Antoine Gizenga, and, during the first quarter of the year, the Congo crisis visibly occupied the UAR more than any other issue in foreign affairs. (See separate synopsis below: The UAR and the Congo).

This concentration on Africa indeed gave rise to the impression that the UAR had shifted her efforts from the Arab arena, where she had been contained, to Africa. It was pointed out, however, that nobody could ignore Africa, and certainly not the UAR, who was a part of it. Abdel Nasser himself, and his partisans, justified the efforts in Africa also as a service to the Arab cause, especially crucial in combating Israel's "infiltration" of the

continent. At the Casablanca conference, Abdel Nasser in fact achieved the condemnation of Israel as a tool of imperialism.

In charting her policy in Africa, it appeared that the UAR encountered a number of problems and contradictory situations which were not easily overcome. There was the fundamental issue that Egypt was white, while African nationalism was basically black; it was also remarked that Africans still remembered the Arabs as slave traders. It was further noted that in his quest for African leadership, Abdel Nasser, while enjoying high prestige as a leader of the African liberation movement, encountered similar aspirations by black Africans, such as President Nkrumah of Ghana with whom he cooperated in the Casablanca group. Further, Africa was crisscrossed by internal dissension, and wooing one party involved the risk of alienating the others. The UAR's increasing reliance on Islam as a means for spreading its influence in the continent sometimes aroused resentment in the countries concerned. Moreover, the UAR's "obsession with Israel," it was observed, imposed a certain strain on her relations with the African countries which enjoyed Israel's aid. There were also differences on the aims of African nationalism; President Nkrumah, for instance, strove towards the unification of Africa, while Abdel Nasser declared that such a goal was not yet feasible, because of the differences in the continent; the potentially contradictory claims of Arab and African nationalism were probably also a factor in the UAR attitude on this question. By the end of the year, certain observers indeed claimed to have detected a policy change in Cairo, in consideration of such factors (see p. 675 a.)

Cairo's activities in Africa encompassed a variety of fields. Her most important ties were on the political level, as witnessed by the Casablanca conference and the involvement in the Congo. The UAR continued to harbour African nationalists from non-independent territories; nine countries were represented by offices in Cairo. On the same level, the UAR was a prime mover of the All-African People's Conference, a non-governmental, anti-Western organization, in which dissident movements were prominent. The political activity was strongly supported by Cairo broadcasts to Africa—10 hours daily in 12 languages. The UAR, as has been mentioned, endeavoured to develop Islamic ties in the continent. She also sought to extend educational assistance, by sending out teachers and receiving African students in her institutions; many of the projects in this field failed to materialize during the year, but an "Afro-Asian Technical Institution" in Cairo started to function.

In the economic field, a number of missions were sent to Africa and new trade agreements concluded; the volume of trade with African countries remained insignificant, but progress was made in establishing maritime and air communications. The UAR vehemently opposed the association of African countries with the European Common Market and sought to promote inter-African economic co-operation in the framework of the Casablanca group. In the important field of economic and technical aid the UAR effort remained largely in the

realm of plans and projects, but some practical beginnings in technical assistance were made, and the UAR extended credits of ££6m, each to Guinea and Mali, for purchasing equipment in the UAR for development projects.

(For synopses on relations with individual African countries, see under countries.)

Non-Arab Middle East Countries. As was the case with the majority of Arab countries, the UAR was also in conflict with most of the non-Arab Middle East countries, primarily, of course, with Israel as has already been mentioned. Cairo accused the two CENTO members in the area, Iran and Turkey, of conspiring with the West to harm the UAR. In 1960 the UAR had cut off her diplomatic relations with Iran, over the latter's friendly ties with Israel; on Oct. 1 she severed relations with Turkey, for having been the first country to recognize the independence of Syria, on the morrow of the coup d'état. The UAR supported Somalia's irredentist claims on Ethiopian territory and the secessionist movement in Eritrea which opposed the federation with Ethiopia. Ethiopia's *de jure* recognition of Israel aroused resentment in the UAR. The two countries maintained normal official relations, however, and, while in Africa Ethiopia joined the Monrovia group, she met with the UAR at the neutralist conference in Belgrade.

The UAR's ties with Somalia, on the other hand, remained closer than with any other ME or African country, and she extended her assistance in a variety of fields. Relations with Cyprus also grew closer, especially as a tendency towards neutralism began to emerge in the newly-independent country; President Makarios visited the UAR.

Asia. The UAR's most important political ties in Asia were with India and Indonesia, the continent's leading neutralists. Abdel Nasser's position on international issues differed, however, from both those of PM Nehru and President Sukarno, lying somewhere between the moderation of the former and the extremist, militant, "leftist" attitude of the latter. Other Asian countries with whom the UAR met on the neutralist level were Afghanistan, Burma (PM U Nu visited Cairo), Cambodia, Ceylon and Nepal. UAR economic ties expanded somewhat in the continent, especially with Ceylon and Japan. The UAR also sought to establish contacts in the Islamic sphere.

Latin America. As had been noted in 1960, the UAR showed increased interest in Latin America. This interest was thought to have been among the considerations that brought the UAR to sponsor the neutralist Belgrade conference instead of an exclusively Afro-Asian one. However, of the five Latin American countries invited to the conference—Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador and Mexico—only Cuba attended as a member. The UAR established a number of new diplomatic and other contacts in the area, and also bestowed decorations on a long list of Latin American personalities.

THE UAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS

SYNOPSIS

At the beginning of the year the UAR continued and even intensified its policy of aiding the Stanleyville government of Antoine Gizenga. The UAR also persisted in its sharp criticism of the UN—especially the Secretary-General—and the Western powers—on lines similar to those of the USSR.

From January 4-7 the heads of the neutralist, anti-Western African states—the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco as well as representatives of the Algerian Provisional Government, Libya and Ceylon—convened at Casablanca. The Congo crisis—among other factors—had brought these countries closer together, and it was the foremost item on the agenda. They endorsed the withdrawal of their contingents from the UN force in the Congo, and reserved for themselves "the right to take appropriate action" if in their opinion the purposes and principles which justified the presence of the UN force in the Congo were not realized.

Between January 31-February 6 the UAR contingent in the UN force in the Congo was actually withdrawn. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's appeals to reconsider the decision having been rejected. The UAR commander made it quite clear that this move might aid the Gizenga forces in Orientale Province in invading neighbouring Equateur Province where the UAR units had been stationed. At the same time the UAR denied repeated charges by the Congo central government, and press reports, that the UAR was supplying Gizenga with war materials.

The news of the murder of Patrice Lumumba in Katanga, published on February 13, proved the occasion for an extreme anti-Western and anti-UN outburst in the UAR. The Western powers, Belgium and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld were charged with responsibility for the murder. Western embassies, particularly the Belgian, and the local UN headquarters, were attacked by rioters. Belgium, her protests unanswered, severed relations with the UAR, while Cairo sequestered all properties of Belgian private citizens in the UAR. Immediately following the news of Lumumba's death, Abdel Nasser announced the UAR's recognition of the Gizenga government as the Congo's legitimate and national government. The UAR was thus the first state to follow the USSR's example.

At this juncture, President Kennedy warned that the US would oppose any attempt by any government to intervene unilaterally in the Congo, and Secretary of State Rusk let it be known that the warning was addressed to the UAR as well as to the USSR; he reportedly also said that the UAR was closely coordinating its efforts with those of the USSR. The Cairo information media replied that the UAR would not be intimidated, and repeated its charges against the US. The US press attaché in Cairo was detained for ten hours for having allegedly distributed leaflets on the Congo.

At the Security Council, however, the UAR, which was a member at that time, did not follow the USSR's lead in demanding the dismissal of Hammarskjöld—though the Cairo information media reiterated this demand. Together with Ceylon and Liberia she sponsored a resolution which omitted any mention of the Secretary-General as the executive authority. It authorized the UN to use force to prevent civil war in the Congo and urged the withdrawal of foreign military and political personnel. The resolution was endorsed by the

West, with some reservations, and adopted on February 2.

While the UN attempted to implement this resolution, the UAR persisted in her pro-Gizenga, anti-Western and anti-UN propaganda. As regards the UN, she differentiated between the Charter and the organization as such, which she said she respected, and the UN's executive body which she denounced as a tool of Western imperialism. The UAR denounced the Tananarive and Coquilhatville conferences at which the non-Lumumbist Congolese leaders sought a solution for their country. Meanwhile she exchanged ambassadors with Stanleyville. The central government, headed by President Kasavubu, was even denounced for trying to implement the Security Council resolutions, on the grounds that it wanted to seize the Katanga riches for its American backers. The UK, which opposed the use of force against the Katanga secessionist regime headed by Tshombe, was denounced for coveting these riches for herself. The differences between the US and the UK on this topic were described as a falling out of thieves.

In August, following a series of contacts, a coalition government was formed under the premiership of Cyrille Adoula, with Gizenga as Second Vice Premier. The UAR, however, kept her Ambassador at Stanleyville, and when Gizenga failed to take up his post, and later resumed his feud with the central government, the Cairo information media again supported his stand on the grounds that the West sought to dominate the Congo through the central government.

In autumn, a shift of emphasis became noticeable in the UAR's pronouncements concerning the Congo. After the death of Hammarskjöld, attacks on the UN executive ceased. Attacks on the US became also much less frequent and, with the Katanga secession now becoming the main issue, Cairo directed its attack on Britain, France, Belgium, Rhodesia and—as a matter of course—Israel. This development must also be seen in the wider context of the UAR's foreign relations at the time, namely the trend towards a more neutral line between the USSR and the US (for which see Synopsis, p 632 a).

WITHDRAWAL OF UAR CONTINGENT FROM THE CONGO SEEN AS MOVE TO AID STANLEYVILLE

[The 550-man-strong UAR battalion, commanded by Agid (Col.) Sa'ad ad-Din ash-Shadhili, was to be withdrawn from the UN command following a decision announced on Dec 6 1960 by the UAR, Ceylon and Yugoslavia to withdraw their contingents from the UN force in the Congo (see MER 1960, p 32). The decision was later endorsed at the Casablanca conference (Jan 4-7). The projected withdrawal of the contingents of the UAR, Ceylon, Yugoslavia, Guinea, Indonesia and Morocco would have reduced the 19,000-man-strong UN force by about 3,700 men.]

On Jan 22 the UAR officially asked the UN SG to arrange for the withdrawal of its contingent by the end of the month. UAR sources explained that the UAR refused to be partner to what was happening in the Congo and did not want the African countries to be held responsible for crimes committed against the Congo with the support of the UN forces. (Akrum, Jan 23; R. Cairo, Jan 23-1MB, Jan 24; Hayat, Jan 24)

On Jan 25 the SG called the UAR, Indonesia and

Morocco expressing his regret over their insistence on repatriating their troops despite former appeals [e.g. Dec 14, 1960] to reconsider the decision. On Jan 26 the SG made public his former messages in which he pointed out that the withdrawal might result in a serious weakening of the force, and even bring about its liquidation. The SG repeated his former warnings that this might cause "the likelihood in the Congo of immediate civil war degenerating into uninhibited tribal conflict and the complete disintegration of the remaining fabric of national unity." (USIS, Jan 27; UN Doc. A/4800)

Abdel Nasser instructed Umar Lutfi, UAR representative in the UN, to reject the SG's appeal. The UAR forces were returned to Cairo, in an airlift operation by US transports assigned to the UN forces, between Jan 31 and Feb 6 (Ahram, Jan 28, 31, Feb 5, 6). Hassanain Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, denied that the UAR had betrayed the UN in withdrawing its troops. On the contrary, the UN had betrayed its principles, and brought about its own failure. (Ahram, Feb 3)

[Both UAR and Western sources implied that the move was intended to support the Lumumbist forces.] The AAPSO, in an extraordinary session held in Cairo on Jan 21-22, adopted a resolution on the Congo which *inter alia* invited the governments which had announced the withdrawal of their troops to put them at the disposal of the "legitimate government of Stanleyville" (NCNA, Jan 23 [25]). The *New York Times* wrote that the withdrawals were "plainly aimed at weakening the UN army and creating power vacuums that the Lumumba forces and their foreign backers might fill." The paper claimed that, "in what appeared to be an arrangement between the UAR and the Gizenga regime," pro-Lumumba forces had advanced into the area of Equateur Province which the UAR troops were about to evacuate (NYT, Jan 30). Col. Shadhili, the commander of the UAR contingent in the Congo, said in a press conference upon his arrival in Cairo in Feb that following the withdrawal of the UAR forces the door was open for an invasion of Equateur Province by Gizenga's forces in Orientale Province. (MENA, Feb 4 [6])

ALLEGED UAR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO STANLEYVILLE GOVERNMENT

At the beginning of Jan it was reported that Pierre Mulele, representing the Stanleyville "Central Government" in Cairo, had asked Abd al-Hakim Amer, Vice President of the UAR, for military and financial assistance. (MER 1960, p 32)

President Kasavubu, in communications to the SG of Jan 7 and 14, complained, among other things, that a UAR aircraft had landed at Lisala on Dec 31 1960 without clearance from the Congolese authorities (UN Year Book, 1960, p 79). On Jan 17 an official source at Leopoldville stated that a UAR Ilyushin transport plane had landed at Gemena, Equateur Province, on Jan 16 and had been detained and searched by Congolese [pro-Leopoldville] forces who boarded it after a brief struggle with UAR soldiers stationed in the region. The aircraft contained arms, ammunition and propaganda material intended for the Lumumbist forces. (R. Cairo, Jan 17-18; IMB, Jan 18; R. Elisabethville, Jan 17 [19]; Ha'aretz, Jan 18)

UAR sources denied this statement and claimed that the plane had landed 15 days before with UN authorization and that news agencies had repeatedly carried the same report since the aircraft's arrival in the Congo (R. Cairo, Jan 17-18; IMB, Jan 18; Ahram, Jan 19). Later in Jan, Egyptian sources, quoting reports that Ilyushin 14

planes were pouring in from the UAR with supplies to the Lumumbists, carried a denial by the MENA editor to the effect that these reports were repetitions of "former lies" on this topic. (Eg. Gaz., Jan 26; R. Cairo, Jan 25 [27])

The *New York Times* correspondent in Leopoldville, however, persisted in reporting through Jan that there was "plenty of evidence that weapons and other supplies are flowing from the UAR into Orientale Province by air and land." (NYT, Jan 30; see also Jan 8, 25)

On Jan 24 President Kasavubu asked the SC to consider his complaint of flagrant interference by the UAR in the domestic affairs of the Congo. The *New York Times* noted in this connection the charges made—and denied—of arms supplies from Egypt. (UN Year Book 1960, p 79; NYT, Jan 25)

At the same time the AAPSO set up in Cairo an international Congo Aid Committee, with a UAR chairman. Other members were "the Congo" [Stanleyville], Guinea, the USSR, People's China, Algeria, Ghana, Mali, Japan, Indonesia, Morocco, India and the Sudan. (Tasi in English, Jan 24 [26])

On Feb 7 in the Security Council, Variste Loliki, the Congo representative, repeated the charges against the UAR. He said that para. 5 of the Casablanca Conference (Jan 4-7) resolution on the Congo [reserving for participating states "the right to take appropriate action" if the purposes and principles which justified the presence of the UN Operational Command in the Congo were not realized and respected] was a thinly disguised threat of direct intervention, if not of aggression. He asked the SC to consider whether such direct intervention by the UAR was not already a fact. He alleged that Czechoslovak arms and ammunition had been captured in the Congo and that they had been brought in by the UAR, by land and by air. Referring to the AAPSO session in Cairo, he said the UAR was calling peaceful peoples in Asia and Africa to join it in aggressive activity by sending arms and volunteers. He asked the countries which had decided to withdraw their contingents from the UN force not to leave their arms behind. He also repeated the charges of UAR aircraft landing clandestinely in the Congo, and added that the UAR contingent had behaved as if it were in a conquered country. Umar Lutfi, the UAR delegate, denied Loliki's assertions. (S/PV, 932; Eg. Gaz., Feb 9)

A Cairo Radio commentator said Kasavubu was "afraid of the UAR activities aimed at freeing the African continent from the shackles of imperialism." (R. Cairo, Jan 25-18B, Jan 26)

Secretary of State Dean Rusk was reported to have stated on Feb 15 that the UAR had supplied some arms and ammunition to Stanleyville. (Times, Feb 17; see also further below)

On March 19, the Stanleyville government mission in Cairo announced the establishment of an air transport company, "Transports Aeriens Congolais." (MENA, March 19 [21])

REACTION TO MURDER OF LUMUMBA

Hammariskjold's Resignation Demanded, Western Powers Held Responsible. [On Jan 17 it was announced in Leopoldville that Patrice Lumumba had been transferred to Katanga from Thysville camp together with General Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito, both of whom held office during his premiership. The SG protested this move to President Kasavubu and Mr. Tshombe. He also stated that he had received reliable reports on the "brutal mishandling" of the three men during their transfer.]

[The UAR pressed for Lumumba's release and attacked the UN for its lack of action]. On Jan 26 the UAR, Ceylon, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco and Yugoslavia made a joint request for a meeting of the Security Council to take up "alarming recent developments" in the Congo. They also protested to the Council that Lumumba and some of his officials had been treated brutally. (*UN Doc. A/4800; NYT, Jan 28*)

On Feb 13 the murder was announced in Katanga of Lumumba, Mpolo and Okito by villagers, 210 miles northwest of Elisabethville. Three days earlier the Katanga authorities had announced that the three men had escaped from prison. In a letter to the SG, the UAR and a number of [neutralist] countries expressed their concern that this news was published as a prelude to the announcement of their death. (*UN Doc., A/4800*)

[The Katangese President announced that he would oppose any UN inquiry and that the matter was outside the competence of the UN.]

[Pro-Lumumbist and anti-Belgian demonstrations occurred on Feb 14-16 in a number of East-European and Afro-Asian capitals as well as in some Western capitals. The most violent scenes took place in Moscow, Cairo and Belgrade.] In Cairo, a "funeral procession" for Lumumba, organized by students, among them a large number of Africans, developed into a riot in which the Belgian Embassy and the Ambassador's residence were sacked and set on fire. The mobs also attacked and stoned the UN local headquarters and the British and the US embassies, and smashed windows of the USIS premises, the American Library and the UN office in Cairo. (*Mid. Mir., Feb 18*; see also: The UAR-Belgium, The UK, The USA)

On Feb 13 an official UAR statement, issued by Abd al-Qādir Hātim, said *inter alia*: "The UAR sincerely feels that responsibility for Lumumba's blood falls on the imperialist authorities. The agents in the Congo, such as Moïse Tshombe, were only tools in their hands. Sharing this responsibility with them is the UN authority in the Congo, which from the beginning betrayed its mission and collaborated with imperialism..." (*R. Cairo, Feb 13 [15]*). For over a week the UAR information media maintained a massive attack on the UN, SG Hammarskjöld, "Western imperialism" and "Congolese stooges" and charged them with the responsibility for the murder. A theme frequently reiterated was that Lumumba had died only to live again in an anti-imperialist movement. Reactions in other countries and demonstrations in Cairo and Damascus were described at length. Following are some examples: "Those who killed Lumumba are not a group of villagers... the killer is European imperialism represented by Belgium, France, Britain, the USA and indeed the UN which sent its forces there to protect the people from imperialism but protected imperialism from the people... Today we do not weep for Lumumba. We weep for the UN, its Charter and its honour..." (*Gumhuriya, Feb 14; R. Cairo, Feb 14 [15]*). The African people had lost confidence in Hammarskjöld, a Cairo paper asserted (*Aham, Feb 14*); instead of a judge he had become a party in the Congo and soiled his hands with blood, another added. (*Rus al-Yusuf, Feb 20*)

On Feb 14, the USSR demanded the dismissal of SG Hammarskjöld [whom its representative had a day earlier charged with responsibility for Lumumba's murder] (*UN Doc., A/4800*). [The UAR did not follow the USSR's lead at the UN.] The UAR information media, however, called for Hammarskjöld's departure. *Al-Ahrām* of Feb 14 headed a front page article: "Let Hammarskjöld Go!"

(*Aham, Feb 14*; see also *BBCM, Feb 15* for a survey of UAR comments). At the same time, however, UAR sources pointed out that it was not the UN itself that was under attack from the UAR, which continued to respect the UN Charter, but the way its executive organization had behaved in the Congo: "Free people have the power to differentiate between the UN and its executive body." "Congolese events have opened their [the people's] eyes to the weakness of the executive machinery of this international organization because of its submission to the influence of certain states and policies..." (*Akhbar, Feb 16; R. Cairo, Feb 16 [18]*)

Abdel Nasser said in Damascus on Feb 21: "The USA's support of Kasavubu after the murder of Lumumba is evidence of its complicity with Kasavubu in the treacherous crime." (*Nasser's Speeches, p. 99*)

The themes set out above were also contained in the resolutions of a joint rally of the National Union and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo on Feb 15 (*R. Cairo, Feb 15 [17]*). Representatives of African offices in Cairo accused imperialism of responsibility for the murder and called for the recognition of the Gizenga government (*R. Damascus, Feb 14 [15]*). Streets and squares in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said were renamed after Lumumba. (*MENA, Feb 15 [17]; Aham, Feb 24, 28*)

Belgium broke off diplomatic relations with the UAR on Feb 25 following the sacking and burning of the Belgian Embassy and the Ambassador's residence. (For details, see: The UAR-Belgium)

A meeting of the Casablanca group at Accra, from Feb 19-24, was mostly occupied with the Congo problem. FM Mahmūd Fawzi represented the UAR. (See p. 54 a)

On Feb 20 Abdel Nasser sent messages to President Kennedy, PM Khrushchev and PM Macmillan concerning the UAR's point of view on the Congo and Lumumba's murder; they warned of "the dire consequences" of Lumumba's death. (*Hayat, Feb 21, 22*)

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH STANLEYVILLE US CENSURE OF UAR POLICY

Diplomatic Relations Established With Stanleyville Regime. [In Dec 1960 President Kasavubu declared the UAR ambassador *persona non grata* and expelled the UAR embassy staff from Leopoldville. Pierre Mulele opened a "Middle East Bureau of the Congo" in Cairo, representing the Stanleyville government of Lumumba and Gizenga. (See MER 1960, pp 30, 32.)]

On Feb 13, following Lumumba's murder, Abdel Nasser informed the leaders of the Casablanca Bloc countries, and the Presidents of Yugoslavia, India and Indonesia, of the UAR's full recognition of the Gizenga government as the Congo's "legitimate and national government." He also referred to an agreement, announced a day earlier, to open in Cairo an office of the representative of the Gizenga government and a UAR office in Stanleyville. MENA said this agreement had been already implemented. The first Stanleyville representatives would be Mulele and Bernard Salumu [former secretary to Lumumba and District Commissioner of Stanleyville] (*MENA, Feb 12, 14 [14, 16]; Aham, Feb 14*). The Cairo mission was described by *Al-Ahrām* as the principal channel of the Stanleyville government's contacts with the outside world. The mission was distributing all outgoing mail from the Stanleyville government. (*Aham, Feb 17*)

Izvestia lauded the UAR's recognition of the Gizenga regime as well as its attitude on the Lumumba issue,

stating that "in the noble struggle for world peace the Soviet Union and the UAR have a common attitude to many important international issues..." (*Tass in English*, Feb 22 [SU, 24]; see also R. Moscow in Arabic, Feb 19 [SU, 21])

In March Salumu was appointed Ambassador to the UAR on behalf of the Stanleyville government. He presented his credentials on April 13 (*Ahram*, March 7; *Hayat*, April 14). On May 27 Mamdūh Gubbah presented his credentials as UAR ambassador to Gizenga at Stanleyville. Gubbah stated at the ceremony that the UAR's policy was one of a full and constant support for Gizenga's "legitimate national government," and that it would offer aid to the great Congolese people in all fields. (*R. Cairo*, May 27 [30]; *Ahram*, May 28)

US Warning to UAR; Detention of US Diplomat in Cairo. An announcement made by President Kennedy, on Feb 15, against unilateral intervention in the Congo, was reportedly interpreted by Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, as a warning to the UAR as well as to the USSR. Rusk was reported to have told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in a closed meeting on Feb 15 that the UAR was closely coordinating its activities with those of the USSR and had supplied some arms and ammunition to the opposition faction in Stanleyville led by Gizenga. Rusk said he hoped the UAR would recognize the grave danger to its independence and that of other African countries in the Soviet attack on the UN. (*Times*, Feb 17)

The UAR asked the USA for a clarification of Rusk's statement (*Hayat*, Feb 18). The UAR press and radio reacted by declaring that no threat would deter the UAR from following a policy based not on dependence on any other country but on its own conscience. It made a counter-charge that the Americans had collaborated with the colonialists in paying Mobutu's troops and in setting up a foreign legion. Hassanein Haykal denied that the UAR was coordinating its line of action with that of the USSR. He charged the US with directing the UN Secretariat so as to serve the US imperialist policy and enable it to achieve its ends under the protection of the UN flag, and with following a policy in the ME of pressure and threats vis-à-vis the UAR and the small liberated states. (*BBCM*, Feb 18; *R. Cairo*, Feb 16, 17 [18, 20]; *V of A*, Feb 17 [20]; *Ahram*, Feb 17, 24)

On Feb 18 the press attaché at the US embassy in Cairo was detained by security police for over ten hours and accused of distributing leaflets which, an official UAR statement said, "detailed the viewpoint of the imperialists on the Congo, and attacked states supporting Mr Lumumba." A US spokesman said the pamphlets contained excerpts from recent speeches on the Congo and Africa by President Kennedy and Ambassador Stevenson. A copy was blown out of the window of the attaché's car, and he was then immediately arrested. The spokesman said the attaché had distributed only such material as would have been issued by USIS to newspapers as a matter of course. (*Mid. Mir.*, Feb 25)

THE UAR AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

[The UAR, being at the time a member of the Security Council, took an active part in its deliberations, and sponsored a number of resolutions.]

On Feb 14, following the murder of Lumumba the USSR submitted a draft resolution calling for the dismissal of the SG, the disbanding of all military units under the command of Tshombe and Mobutu, the re-

moval of Belgian troops and the discontinuation of UN operations in the Congo. (*S/4706*; *S/PV*, 942)

On Feb 17 the UAR, Ceylon and Liberia submitted a draft resolution urging the UN to take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent civil war in the Congo, including—in the last resort—the use of force. It also urged the immediate evacuation of all Belgian and other foreign military personnel and political advisers not under UN command and the prevention of the departure of such personnel for the Congo, called for an immediate and impartial investigation into the circumstances of the death of Lumumba and his colleagues and punishment for the perpetrators of those crimes, urged the convening of Parliament and the taking of necessary protective measures to this end, and urged that Congolese armed units should be reorganized with a view to their exclusion from the country's political life (*S/4741*). A score of African and Asian states were reported to be behind the resolution, made public after days of intensive backstage consultations in which Nigeria and India were among non-members of the Council who played key advisory roles. (*Jer. Times*, Jordan, Feb 19)

A second draft resolution, sponsored by Liberia, Ceylon and the UAR on Feb 20, would have authorized the use of force to prevent further arrests and assassinations of Congolese political leaders (*S/4733*). The resolution was spurred by the SG's announcement at the SC on Feb 20 that six political leaders of Orientale had been executed by the South Kasai authorities. (*S/PV*, 940)

On Feb 20 the Soviet draft resolution was rejected by eight votes to one (USSR), with Ceylon and the UAR abstaining. The first three-power resolution was adopted by nine votes to none with France and the USSR abstaining. In the preceding debate the US, the UK, Turkey and other countries made certain reservations, namely that though the SG was not mentioned in the resolution, it was he who was to implement it, and that there must be no use of force until all efforts to seek agreement by peaceful means had failed. The Soviet representative said he had abstained because the resolution did not provide a radical enough solution, but even so it was a first step in the direction recommended by the USSR. The second three-power resolution failed to obtain the seven affirmative votes required for adoption. There were no votes against, but five members—Turkey, the UK, the US, France and China—abstained. (*S/PV*, 942)

UAR Follow-Up. *Al-Akhbar* of Feb 24 said that the SC resolution of Feb 21 was the UN's last chance and that the world was watching closely to see how the SG would take it. It added that the UN should have sufficient forces to deal with Tshombe's and Mobutu's resistance to the disarming of their troops (*BBCM*, Feb 25). Cairo Radio claimed that the approval of the resolution by the West was meant to be "a cover while still pursuing the objective of retaining the Congo as a base of Belgian influence and consequently of Western influence." (*R. Cairo*, Feb 24 [27])

There were frequent charges that foreign military personnel, Belgian, French and American, continued in the Congo, contrary to the SC resolution. Britain was accused of recruiting troops in Kenya to be sent to the Congo (*R. Cairo*, March 7, 8 [9]; *V of Free Africa* in Swahili, Feb 27 [March 1]; *Akhbar*, March 8). In March, following clashes between Mobutu's forces and the UN, which subsequently abandoned some areas, including the Matadi harbour, Cairo Radio accused the UN of failing to implement the SC resolution because of irresolution

and lack of fighting power. (*R. Cairo, March 8-IMB, March 8*)

The Feb 21 resolution was approved by the GA at its resumed 15th session (March 7-April 22). In addition, the Assembly adopted on April 15 three resolutions submitted by India, Pakistan and other Asian and African countries. The UAR voted for the first resolution which demanded the withdrawal of all Belgian personnel from the Congo, abstained on the second resolution which called on Congolese authorities not to attempt a solution by force and decided to appoint a seven-man conciliation commission to assist in the solution of the Congo problem, and voted for the third resolution proposing the establishment of a four-member investigation commission. (For details see *Table: UN Voting Record*)

Difference with India Over Congo Policy Denied. [Following the Feb 21 resolution, the SG appealed to African States, including the UAR and other member states which had provided contingents of the UN force, to provide new or additional troops. Consequently India dispatched in March an armoured brigade group of 3,000 men.] An Indian source wrote that Abdel Nasser had raised no objections to this measure. (*Times of India, March 7*)

The Voice of the Arabs referred to a BBC broadcast which maintained that the dispatch of Indian forces to the Congo, after the UAR had withdrawn hers, was a proof of divergent policies by Abdel Nasser and Nehru. The Cairo commentator maintained that conditions had changed since the UAR withdrawal. "When the UAR forces were fully withdrawn from the Congo there was not a single Indian soldier working under the UN command in the Congo... Only after obtaining assurances from the UN that the [UN] resolutions would be carried out did Nehru agree to send his forces to the Congo..." The station denied any disagreement between Nehru and Abdel Nasser. (*V of A, March 22 [24]*)

THE UAR AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO

[Background: The UN Conciliation Commission, in its interim report of Feb 16, said it considered it desirable to convene a summit meeting of Congolese political leaders at a neutral place. It also advocated the enlarging of the Ileo government in Leopoldville into a national government, and the convening of Parliament without delay.]

On Feb 28 Ileo, Tshombe and Kalonji (of Kasai), the three anti-Lumumbist leaders, signed a pact aimed at solving the Congo's problems without outside interference, and announced that a Congolese round table conference would take place at Tananarive, Madagascar. The conference (March 8-12) took place without the participation of Gizenga or other Lumumbist leaders, though they had been invited, and decided to turn the Congo into a confederacy under the presidency of Kasavubu. An additional conference, to work out details, opened at Coquilhatville on April 24, again without participation of the Lumumbists. Agreement was reached on the formation of the United States of the Congo, with greater powers vested in the central government than was envisaged at Tananarive.

At Coquilhatville a split occurred between Tshombe and the rest over Kasavubu's acceptance of the SC Feb 21 resolution (announced April 17) which was at the beginning rejected by both Leopoldville and Katanga. Tshombe was arrested and charged with crimes against the state. In mid-June Tshombe was freed and signed

an agreement with Ileo whereby he agreed to reunite Katanga with the rest of the Congo; on his return to Elisabethville, however, he repudiated his agreement and reiterated his intention to maintain Katanga's separate existence.

Meanwhile contacts had been going on since the Tananarive conference, between the Leopoldville government and Gizenga. Consequently, on July 25 the Congolese Parliament convened, with all parts of the Congo, except Katanga, represented. A new government was formed by Cyrille Adoula, and received a new unanimous vote of confidence by the Chamber of Deputies. Gizenga was given the post of Second Vice Premier; he, however, did not come to Leopoldville to take up his post and—a visit by Adoula to Stanleyville having proved abortive—he formed a new party in that city, with the aim of ridding the Congo of "pro-Western elements."

Condemning Tananarive and Coquilhatville Conferences. The UAR press and radio denounced the Tananarive conference plan: The US and the "imperialists from Europe" had called this "stooze conference" and approved its decisions because they wished to split the country in order to rule it and exploit its riches. The American imperialists, said a Voice of Free Africa broadcast in Swahili, wished to succeed the British and the Belgians in ruling Africa. A Cairo Radio commentary referred to the UAR's intention to request an emergency meeting of the SC to discuss the latest developments in the Congo and the failure to carry out the Council's resolutions there. Cairo Radio also noted that Moscow Radio had attacked the Tananarive resolutions. (*R. Cairo press review, March 13 [14]; R. Cairo, March 15-IMB, March 15; VFA in Swahili, R. Cairo, March 13 [15]*)

As regards the Coquilhatville conference, Cairo attacked both Kasavubu and Tshombe but nevertheless welcomed the trend towards the "inevitable unity of the Congo." (For sources, see below.)

President Kasavubu Described As Stooze of US. A Cairo Radio broadcast described the conflict between Kasavubu and Tshombe as a reflection of the falling out of thieves, namely the colonial powers [USA and Belgium] over the booty [Katanga]. This also explained the change in Kasavubu's stand towards centralization: It was the result of the US's aspiration to liquidate the Belgian influence in Katanga and to gain control over the province by putting its administration under the central government of Kasavubu. Kasavubu's implementation of the SC resolution of Feb 21 regarding the trial of Lumumba's murderers, Cairo said, was aimed only at getting rid of Tshombe and attaining control over Katanga and its uranium fields which were coveted by his foreign supporters. Kasavubu himself was partner to the murder, the station claimed. In summoning Parliament Kasavubu aimed at enticing its members into coming to Leopoldville so he could arrest whomsoever he wanted, and pressure the rest for a sham approval of his constitution. He planned to disarm Katanga's forces, but not his own. (*R. Cairo, May 14, 19 [16, 23]*)

Meanwhile in a letter dated May 16 to the SG, Gizenga requested that Parliament should be convened at Kamina, which should be reinforced by units from the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan and Togo. (*UN Doc. A/4800*)

Continued Support for Gizenga. In June, on the occasion of the Congo independence day, Abdel Nasser announced his support for Gizenga's intentions to reconquer "all the lost parts of the Congo." (*Ahram, July 1*)

On July 5 Lumumba's widow arrived in Cairo and was accommodated with her children in a villa which formerly belonged to a Belgian businessman. (*Ahram*, July 6)

Six UAR doctors arrived in Stanleyville for a tour of duty. (*Anwar*, Beirut, July 16)

On July 23 Mrs. Gizenga arrived in the UAR for a short stay and conveyed her husband's greetings to the people. (*MENA*, July 24 [25])

UAR Ambassador Remains in Stanleyville After Establishment of Leopoldville Coalition Government. When the Adoula Government was formed, *Al-Ahram* said, it was expected that the UAR would re-establish its Stanleyville embassy in Leopoldville and present new credentials to President Kasavubu if Gizenga were to join the government. *Al-Ahram* wrote that since the beginning of the crisis the main plank of the UAR Congo policy had been non-interference and the welcoming of any measure designed to bring stability and unity to the Congo. Thus the UAR would welcome Gizenga's joining the Adoula government.

On Aug 14 Gizenga's Ambassador Salumu flew to Stanleyville at the request of the UAR to clarify Gizenga's attitude. The UAR was to adopt its policy according to the answer given. At the same time the UAR joined several Afro-Asian countries in asking the UN SG to delay recognition of the Adoula government until the attitude of Gizenga was made clear. (*Ahram*, Aug 11, 12, 14, 15, 16)

Despite repeated announcements of the intended transfer, however, the UAR Ambassador to Congo was still in Stanleyville at the end of 1961 and planned to transfer the embassy in Jan 1962. The appointment of a new ambassador was also envisaged (*Ahram*, Sept 22, Nov 2, Dec 23, 24). A Belgian source wrote that PM Adoula had suggested the appointment of a new Ambassador; this was understood to imply that Adoula did not want "an Egyptian mercenary for an Ambassador, but a diplomat committed in principle to non-interference in the internal affairs of the Congo." (*Le Soir*, Brussels, Dec 27)

[In the meantime the UAR maintained contacts with both Stanleyville and Leopoldville.] In Aug Tshombe accused the Gizenga regime of having received arms and ammunition from the UAR. He said he had notified the UN that the arms arrived in Stanleyville in four plane-loads on Aug 5 (*R. Leopoldville*, Aug 12 [15]; *Jer. Post*, Aug 13). In Aug Col. Lessa, the Chief of Staff of General Lundula (Commander of the Congolese National Army of Orientale Province), visited Cairo with a military mission (*L'Esor*, Aug 12). (In Nov General Lundula pledged allegiance to the President of the Republic.) In Dec Julien Kasongo visited Abdel Nasser in Cairo on behalf of PM Adoula. (*Ahram*, Dec 10)

Cairo Radio's Swahili programme at the end of Nov said that Gizenga had realized the motive for the West's sudden shift of support from Katanga to the central government. It was aimed first at gaining control of the entire Congo and secondly at countering the danger of Adoula coming to terms with the eastern powers. Realizing this, Gizenga went to Stanleyville to renew the struggle, begun by Lumumba, to unite the Congo and counter the imperialist threat. The majority of Congolese, who supported Gizenga, had also seen through the Western trick. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, Nov 30 [Dec 2])

At the beginning of Dec, Yusuf as-Siba'i, the Egyptian SG of the AAPSO, accused the UN forces of organizing "campaigns of torture against the Congolese nationals struggling in Stanleyville, Kivu, and elsewhere." Siba'i also accused NATO members of supplying the Katanga

forces with arms (see below) and assisting opposition to Congolese military operations aimed at putting an end to Katanga's secession. He called for the withdrawal of UN and foreign forces from the Congo. (*MENA*, Dec 2 [5])

UAR Holds Britain, France, Belgium Responsible For Katanga Secession; "Imperialist Powers" Charged With Responsibility For Death of Hammarskjöld. In condemning the Katanga secession, the UAR accused Britain of opposing the UN decisions in the Congo, and of pursuing an imperialist policy in Africa along with France [both opposed the use of force by the UN in Katanga], and Roy Welensky of Rhodesia. Zionism and Israel were similarly accused of supporting Katanga. (*R. Cairo*, Sept 5 [8]; *VFA in Swahili*, Sept 19 [22]; *R. Cairo*, Sept 24 [26]; *VFA in Swahili*, Dec 7 [11]; *R. Cairo in Amharic*, Dec 13 [15]). (The US, on the other hand, was denounced as the chief backer of Kasavubu.)

Upon Hammarskjöld's death, President Abdel Nasser, in a message of condolence to the King of Sweden, lauded the SG for exerting "extraordinary efforts to enhance the prestige of the position he occupied." In a message to the President of the UN GA he charged the "imperialist powers" who "plotted against the UN mission in the Congo" with the responsibility for Hammarskjöld's death and added that the "challenge which the UN is facing... is the destruction of the imperialist attempt to separate Katanga." (*R. Cairo*, Sept 24 [26])

The UAR radio and press took up these themes and called for the continuation of the late SG's activity against the separation of Katanga. Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Rhodesia were charged with supporting Katanga. (*R. Cairo*, Sept 20 [22], 23, 24, 25 [26]; *VFA in Swahili*, Sept 20 [22])

The UAR denounced the ceasefire agreement between the UN and Tshombe as "tantamount to a retreat on the battlefield and a semi-official recognition of Katanga's secession." (*R. Cairo*, Oct 15 [17])

On Nov 14 the UAR, Ceylon and Liberia submitted a draft resolution by which the SC would, *inter alia*, authorize the SG to take vigorous action, including the use of force, for the detention or deportation of all foreign mercenaries and other "hostile elements" as laid down in the resolution of Feb 21, and to take measures to prevent the entry of such elements or of war material, demand that all secessionist activities in Katanga cease forthwith, and declare full and firm support for the central government of the Congo.

While all Council members expressed opposition to secessionist activities in Katanga and to foreign interference in the Congo, several representatives voiced reservations about certain provisions of the draft resolution. France opposed the use of force, the US and Britain suggested that the resolution should not be confined to the problem of Katanga (a reference to the defiance of the central government by the Gizenga forces in Orientale Province). On Nov 20 the three sponsors submitted a revision of their draft resolution, according to which the SC would among other things declare that all secessionist activities were contrary to the Loi Fondamentale and Council resolutions, while specifically demanding that such activities then taking place in Katanga cease forthwith. The resolution, with US amendments and Soviet sub-amendments, was adopted by nine votes with France and the UK abstaining. (*UN Year Book*, 1961)

Cairo Radio welcomed the resolution. It claimed, however, that the UN secretariat was at the same time trying to solve the Katanga chaos in favour of the British and the French. (*R. Cairo in Hausa*, Dec 6 [9]).

NATO, OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

AUSTRALIA

Diplomatic Representation Raised. (See also MER 1960, p. 552) In Feb it was announced in Cairo that the UAR and Australia had decided to raise their respective diplomatic missions to ambassadorial level and that the UAR would establish an embassy in Canberra. (*R. Cairo*, Feb 10-IMB, Feb 12; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 11)

The Australian minister in Cairo presented his credentials as ambassador on April 15 (*R. Cairo*, April 16-IMB, April 16); the Egyptian ambassador left for Australia in July. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 6)

Negotiations for the conclusion of a trade and payments agreement between the two countries were to start early in 1962. (*Akhbar*, Aug 21; see also *Ahram*, Oct 17)

AUSTRIA

In Jan an Austrian trade mission visited both regions of the UAR (among other Arab countries). (*Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 16, Feb 2)

In Feb an exhibition of Austrian graphic art was shown in Cairo. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 15, March 1)

On July 1 Austria and the UAR signed an agreement on the release of Austrian property in the Egyptian R., sequestered on the outbreak of World War II. (*Ahram*, *Eg. Gaz.*, July 2)

Austria offered a number of scholarships for police officers for a one-year course in crime detection. (*Gumhuriyah*, Sept 25)

In Nov an Austrian scientific delegation arrived in Cairo to prepare a survey on fishing, mineral and other resources of the Red Sea. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, Nov 25)

BELGIUM

[UAR-Belgian relations deteriorated as a result of the Congo crisis. The UAR nationalized several Belgian companies in Egypt on the grounds that Belgium was responsible for the expulsion of the UAR ambassador from Leopoldville. MER 1960, p. 31]

UAR Rejects Belgian Note. On Feb 15 it was reported in Cairo that a Belgian note, submitted recently, had been returned to the ambassador without comment, because it was couched in terms that were unacceptable to a post-revolutionary government. In the note Belgium accepted the nationalization of Belgian property in the UAR, and asked for negotiations over the evaluation of the property. It also contained a reference to the Montreux Convention of 1936, alluding to the foreign capitulations. After the rejection of his note, the Belgian ambassador decided to leave for Brussels for consultations. (*Ahram*, Feb 15; *Arab Obs.*, Feb 19)

Belgian Embassy Sacked; Anti-UAR Demonstrations in Brussels. On Feb 15, thousands of demonstrators protesting the murder of Patrice Lumumba sacked the Belgian embassy and the ambassador's residence in Cairo and set fire to them. Three days later the Belgian consulate in Alexandria was attacked (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 16, 19). The Belgian government protested, and demanded the punishment of the perpetrators and compensation. (*Manar*; *Ahram*, Feb 23)

In Brussels anti-UAR demonstrations took place on Feb 16, 17 and 18. Students hurled stones and bottles and smashed the UAR embassy windows. The ambas-

sador protested. (*BBC in Arabic*, Feb 16-IMB, Feb 17; *Ahram*, Feb 18; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 20)

On Feb 19 the Belgian government warned its citizens against going to the UAR because of the latter's inability to guarantee the elementary security of persons and property. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 20)

Relations Broken Off; All Belgian Property in UAR Sequestered. On Feb 25 Belgium broke off diplomatic relations with the UAR "after the UAR government had rejected all Belgian protests over the attack on the Belgian embassy in Cairo." The Swiss embassy was asked to look after Belgian interests in the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Sunday Times*, Feb 26)

On Feb 26 all Belgian property in the UAR was sequestered. The properties of 49 companies and 300 Belgian residents were affected. Belgian residents were expelled and given a week to leave the country. The first group of Belgians left Egypt on Feb 27. (*Ahram*, Feb 27, 28; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 28)

The UAR ambassador and embassy staff in Brussels left Belgium on March 4. Yugoslavia agreed to look after the UAR's interests in Belgium. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 5, 7)

In Sept-Oct UAR papers reported Belgian endeavours to re-establish diplomatic relations with the UAR (*Ahram*, Sept 23; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, Oct 2). [By the end of the year relations had not yet been resumed.]

CANADA

In April a group of graduates of the Canadian Military College visited the UAR on a tour of military installations. They also visited the Arab League HQ. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 27; *R. Cairo*, April 20-IMB, April 21)

DENMARK

Danish FM Visits UAR. (Note: For Denmark's relations with the Syrian Region before the break-up of the UAR, see under: Syria.)

On Feb 24, Jens Otto Krag, the Danish Foreign Minister, and his wife arrived in Cairo on a six-day official visit in return of the visit made by Dr. Mahmud Fawzi to Denmark in Dec 1959. He toured both regions of the UAR and the Gaza strip where he inspected the Danish forces participating in the UNEF, and was received by President Abdel Nasser. His talks with the President and with the UAR Foreign Minister, it was reported, concerned the relations between the two countries as well as international problems and particularly Afro-Asian affairs, the Congo problem and the Casablanca Conference. (*Ahram*, Feb 24, 25; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 26-28, March 1-3; *Mid. Mir.*, March 4)

Various Contacts. In July it was reported that the two countries had agreed to exempt their respective nationals from entry and transit fees as of July 15. (*Anwar*; *Eg. Mail*, July 15)

In Oct it was reported that Denmark had approved a UAR request to open a tourist and information office in Copenhagen. (*Akhbar*, Oct 31)

FRANCE

UAR Stand Against France. [Throughout the year UAR spokesmen and information media condemned France for her stand on Algeria and cast doubt upon French in-

tentions in regard to negotiations with the Algerian Provisional Government. (See pp 174 ff) The Bizerta crisis provided another instance for UAR attacks upon France. French "neo-imperialism" in Algeria and the Afro-Malagasi union also came under constant UAR attack, and so did France's close relations with Israel. (For details, see index.)]

Terminating Custodianship of French Property in Egypt. On Feb 8 MENA reported that "it has been decided to take the necessary steps to terminate and raise the custodianship of French nationals' properties in Egypt." (MENA, Feb 8 [10])

Espionage Charges Against Members of French Assets Mission. [Background: The activities of the French Assets Mission, established in Cairo to deal with questions concerning French property seized after the Suez Campaign in 1956, were governed by the 1958 Zurich agreement between France and the UAR which gave the mission "the necessary facilities to execute its mission." Furthermore, the UAR Government, in a note of April 23, 1959, addressed to the Swiss embassy as having charge of French interests, and in a presidential decree published in the *Official Gazette* of Sept 16, 1959, granted the members of the mission immunity from jurisdiction, and inviolability to the building and archives of the mission. See also MER 1960, p 530; *Monde*, Dec 8]

On Nov 25 the French Foreign Ministry disclosed that the head of the Mission, and three of its members, had been arrested on Nov 24 by the UAR authorities on espionage charges. The French statement denied these charges, added that the mission enjoyed juridical immunity, and asked through the Swiss Government [as having charge of French interests in the UAR] for their immediate release. (NYHT, Nov 27; *Monde*, Nov 28)

On Nov 26 Cairo announced the arrest on Nov 24 of André Mattei, the head of the mission, and four of its members, a French lawyer, a Greek journalist, a journalist of Italian origin and four Egyptian citizens. MENA alleged that they had carried out espionage, conspired to assassinate Abdel Nasser, fomented disorder in Egypt preparatory to an Israeli attack, used the facilities of the Swiss embassy to issue pamphlets attacking the regime, and the Swiss diplomatic bag for illegal currency operations. A French intelligence specialist in terrorist attacks had visited the UAR in connection with the above plans. On Nov 27 and 28 Cairo sources reported "confessions" made by the arrested diplomats which allegedly substantiated the above charges. (Ahrum, Eg. Gaz., Nov 27-29)

On Nov 28 and Dec 4 four of the mission's members appeared in filmed interviews on Cairo television. They did not admit to any of the above charges; they said they had sent reports on economic and political matters to Paris. One of them said he had not been compelled by force to sign his "confession." (Times, Nov 29; Ahrum, Nov 29, Dec 5; Mid. Mir., Dec 2, 9; R. Cairo, Nov 27-29 [28-30]; IMB, Nov 28-30)

On Nov 28 the Swiss government protested against the accusation that Switzerland had supported the Frenchmen in espionage and subversive activities and demanded an immediate denial of these accusations (R. Cairo, Nov 28 [30]). A UAR spokesman declared that the charges against Switzerland were not made by the UAR but were included in the "confessions" of the detained Frenchmen. He added that the UAR had hoped that the Swiss government would investigate its officials, who were included in the "confessions." (R. Cairo, Nov 28 [30])

On Dec 5 the bill of indictment in respect of four French officials arrested in Cairo and a fifth abroad was published. All five were charged with: (1) communicating intelligence to a foreign state in order to harm the country; (2) paying money and providing facilities to other persons for this purpose; (3) inciting towards the overthrow, hatred, and contempt of the UAR regime; (4) disseminating subversive propaganda with the aim of harming the public interest; (5) gathering, for the benefit of France, military, political and economic information about the country in return for money payments and other advantages; conducting propaganda against the state in order to harm its military, political, and economic position in implementation of the French government's policy of seeking to overthrow the established regime in the country; (6) planning to assassinate the President of the Republic as one of the means of achieving this objective.

Six other persons, among them Adli Andraos [a well known Egyptian Coptic intellectual] and Adil Thabit, editor of *The Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, were charged with having supplied the Frenchmen with political and economic information. (R. Cairo, Dec 6 [7])

On Dec 7 the text of a French note circulated among the members of the UN was made public. It denounced the arrests as constituting both a flagrant breach of international usage and a violation of the diplomatic immunity provided for mission members. It said the accusations made against the French representatives were false and incredible and stated that if the UAR brought the diplomats to trial it would bear "responsibility for an act without precedent in the history of the law of nations." The note listed a number of legal arguments in refutation of the UAR assertion that the detained mission members did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. (*Monde*, Dec 8)

On Dec 11 another French note was circulated among UN members, saying that a French offer to submit the UAR accusation to a process of settlement in conformity with the UN Charter and the normal procedures of international law, i.e. by recourse to reconciliation or arbitration by an international judge, had remained unanswered. (*Monde*, Dec 12)

A UAR note circulated among the UN members stated that the juridical immunity accorded unilaterally by the UAR to the mission's members whilst performing their duties did not extend to their persons; the members of the mission did not hold diplomatic cards and were not registered on the UAR diplomatic list; and the "French spies" had departed from the terms of their mission by their subversive activities against the UAR's sovereignty and security. (Ahrum, Dec 14)

On Dec 14 Cairo reported that the UK and "some other Western countries" had interceded on behalf of the "French spies" but their approaches had been rejected, as only Switzerland, which represented French interests in the UAR, had a right to interpose in this matter. (Ahrum, Dec 14)

On Jan 15, 1962, the trial opened before the Supreme State Security Court in Cairo. The accused were represented by 24 Egyptian lawyers with two French lawyers taking part as advisers. On Jan 21, 1962, the court, after lengthy legal argument, rejected the stand of the defence that the court was not competent to try the accused diplomats as they enjoyed diplomatic immunity. The court then proceeded to examine the defendants, all of whom pleaded "not guilty." They stated that their "confessions" had been extracted by force. They said

they had been flung on the ground, stripped, beaten on the neck, and left for hours in a dungeon, prevented from sleeping, and threatened with death or torture.

The prosecution rejected these allegations as lies and asked the Court to impose a penalty of hard labour for life on all of them. (*Ahram*, Jan 14-16, 18, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31, Feb 4, 11, 14, March 18, 20, 25, April 5, 1962; *Monde*, Jan 4, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, Feb 4, 5, 6, 13, 18, 25, 28, March 4, 6, 13, 14, 15, 20, 24, 26, April 3, 4, 5, 1962)

On April 7 the prosecution asked the court to suspend the trial indefinitely for higher considerations connected with the public interest. The court ordered the release of the defendants (*R. Cairo*, April 7, 1962 [April 9, 1962]). *Al-Ahram* said that the release of the French "spies" was in implementation of Abdel Nasser's statement that the Algerian cease-fire agreement had opened the way for an Arab-French rapprochement. (*Ahram*, April 8, 1962)

UAR Sees France a Major Enemy. In an article in Dec, Muhammad Hassanin Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, classified the enemies of the UAR as follows: (1) Britain and France "which are CETO members" (sic); (2) Iran and Turkey, the ME CETO members; (3) Arab countries with Western ties. These enemies were now planning concerted action to deal the UAR a deadly, or at least a "semi-deadly" blow, seeing as they did in the break-up of the UAR an opportunity to shape the future of the ME to their own taste. France appeared to be in command of the operation. While Britain preferred a secondary and masked role, France did not care to hide her face. France considered Cairo responsible for the eclipse of her interests and prestige in the ME. She also hoped to achieve easier terms in an Algerian settlement if the Algerians lost their main source of support in Cairo. In addition, Israel was pressing France to eliminate the danger from Cairo before an Algerian settlement, which might bring to an end the struggle between France and the Arabs. Thus France had assumed the leading role in the operation against Egypt. She first assumed that Egypt had been weakened to such an extent by the Syrian coup that the regime could be overthrown even by a minor operation; this was what the French Assets Mission had set out to do. This assumption having proved wrong, France was now planning the assassination of Egyptian personalities, a list of whom had been prepared in Paris. In addition France—with Britain—was expected to try and exert economic pressure on the UAR and to conduct psychological warfare against her. (*Ahram*, Dec 22; *R. Cairo*, Dec 22 [29])

UAR Takes Over French Schools and Orders French Teachers to Leave. Under the terms of the Zurich agreement of 1958 three French secondary schools in Cairo and Alexandria were reopened and the French government sent some 300 teachers to Egypt to work in these and other schools.

On Dec 26, after the arrest of the French diplomats, the three schools were again sequestered but the teachers were requested to remain at their posts. On Dec 29 the French Government ordered 125 teachers to return home because of worsening conditions in Egypt. But before the orders reached the UAR the Ministry of Education ordered the French teachers to leave the UAR for "insulting the UAR and Arab nationalism." The French teaching staff in the Catholic schools, who were priests, nuns and nurses, were exempted from this order. A first group of about 40 teachers left Alexandria at the end

of the year. (*Ahram*; *Daily Telegraph*, Dec 30; *NYT*, Jan 2, 1962)

GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Cairo-Bonn Clash Over East German Consulate in Damascus. On May 12 it was announced in Damascus that the UAR had approved the elevation of the East German trade mission in Damascus to consulate. (*Mid. Mir.*, May 13, 20)

The West German ambassador in Cairo, in an official *démarche*, expressed his government's surprise at this decision, while a German spokesman said in Bonn that President Abdel Nasser had personally reassured the German ambassador in 1959 that there would be no change in the status of the East German representation in the UAR. [East Germany had had a consulate-general in Cairo since 1959.] (*Times*, May 15)

On May 15 Cairo radio quoted a responsible source to the effect that reports of Bonn's reaction had caused "great surprise" in Cairo. The source denied that the opening of the Damascus consulate constituted a break of a promise given earlier to the West German government, and stated that Bonn's reaction to the measure "could probably be regarded as a threat." The policy of the UAR towards Germany and its people stemmed from a desire for mutual cooperation and "not from involvement in promises which were not made or from a threat of pressure which had no effect" (*R. Cairo*, May 15 [17]). *Al-Ahram* saw "the hand of Zionism" in West German press comments, which, the paper declared, did not reflect the official views in Bonn. (*Ahram*, May 15)

The same day the GFR ambassador was received by Vice-President Ahd al-Latif al-Baghdadi. According to MENA Baghdadi expressed the UAR's dissatisfaction at "statements and reports contradicting the truth" which had been published in Bonn, and said that the UAR was ready to cancel the visit of its [economic] delegation (see below) if the "threatening tone" continued, because it did not bow to threats. *Al-Ahram* added that the ambassador had not been received by the President [though it did not say that he had asked for an audience]. (*R. Cairo*, May 16 [18]; *Ahram*, May 17; *Arab Obs.*, May 21)

On May 16 it was announced in Bonn that the ambassador in Cairo and the consul in Damascus had been recalled for consultation. (*Ahram*, May 17)

On the same day an official source in Cairo said that the UAR had on various occasions stressed that it did not think of recognizing two German states, and that the opening of a consulate in Damascus was complementary to the exchange of consular representation between East Germany and the UAR. The Bonn version that the UAR had stated that it would not extend its formal relations with East Germany beyond the consulate-general in Cairo was untrue. At the beginning of 1961 the UAR informed the GFR—in reply to a question—that it did not think of recognizing two German states. That was all. (*R. Cairo*, May 16 [18]; *Arab Obs.*, May 21)

During the following days UAR papers continued to comment on the issue, saying *inter alia* that Germany had stronger political and economic interests in the Arab countries than vice versa, and rejecting "economic threats." (*Ayyam*, May 17; *Ahram*, May 18)

On May 26 it was announced in Bonn that the German ambassador in Cairo and the consul-general in Damascus were due to return to their posts. (*Hayat*, May 27)

On June 17 the ambassador was received by President Abdel Nasser. He renewed the invitation to Vice-Pres-

sident Baghdadi to visit Germany. He explained his government's attitude regarding the East German consulate in Damascus. (*Ahram*, June 18)

German Financial Aid. On June 25 a UAR economic delegation, headed by Vice-President Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, arrived in Bonn on a two-week official visit. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 26)

The delegation conferred with Dr Erhard, the Minister of Economy, toured the industrial centres and established contacts with German industrialist and businessmen. The delegation paid a protocol call on President Heinrich Lübke, to whom it handed an invitation from Abdel Nasser to visit the UAR. It was also received by Chancellor Adenauer. (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, June 26, 27; *Eg. Mail*, July 1)

On July 5 it was announced that a protocol of an economic agreement had been signed providing for German aid to the UAR as follows:

1) DM500m. to cover the foreign exchange cost of the Euphrates dam in the Syrian region. The loan was for 20 years at 3 3/4% interest. Repayment would start in the sixth year. The GFR undertook to set up an international consortium to finance any extra amount needed to construct the dam. If by the end of 1963 the amount invested would be less than DM100m. the balance would be used to finance industrial projects on the same conditions as under (2). (For more information on the Euphrates project, see pp 163 b, 512.)

2) DM150m. to finance basic projects (dams, bridges, roads, etc.) to be agreed upon by both sides. This loan was for 12-16 years at 3% interest.

3) The GFR government agreed to give guarantees of loans (credits) to the UAR [by German private firms] up to DM250m. for 9-10 years, this to include the unused balance of the loans agreed upon in 1958. Moreover the GFR would guarantee loans to the UAR to the amount of DM150m. for seven years. All the loans [credits] would be given at international market interest rates.

The two parties also agreed to increase GFR imports from the UAR, especially cotton; to encourage German tourism to the UAR; to cooperate in establishing hotels and other tourist facilities in the UAR, and to carry out research on the Qatara Depression project. (*Ahram*, July 7; *VEFRPA*, No. 89/25, June; *EFSPA*, No. 43, July)

UAR-German Bank Project. In Aug it was reported in Cairo that the GFR had agreed in principle to the establishment of a UAR-German Bank for Reconstruction, to finance industrial projects in the UAR (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Gumhuriyah*, Aug 23). Later on it was reported that certain German banks had offered to invest in the bank. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 6)

Technical Assistance. On Feb 2 three technical assistance agreements were signed in Cairo whereby the GFR would grant DM65m. (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*) or DM8m. (*EFSPA*) to provide equipment, scientific instruments and experts for a central metrology and materials testing institute, a petroleum research centre, and for a training institute for precision instrument workers. The UAR would invest a similar amount in providing materials, employees and workers. (*MENA*, Feb 2 [W 9]; *Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, Feb 3; *EFSPA*, No. 38, Feb)

In Feb two German nuclear physicists discussed in Cairo the requirements for establishing an institute for nuclear research in the UAR (*West German Press Agen-*

cy, Jan 30 [W Feb 2]). Cairo radio said they had studied the building of an atomic reactor "of enormous capacity." (*R. Cairo*, Feb 8-10B, Feb 8)

In Feb the Egyptian Economic Development Organization signed an agreement with two German firms, providing for technical assistance in the search for mineral ores in Egypt. German technicians would survey the sites where copper, zinc and lead deposits had been found and advise on their commercial exploitation. (*MEED*, Feb 17)

In June an agreement was reached between the UAR National Research Centre and the GFR authorities whereby German manufacturers of scientific instruments would supply the UAR with their newest productions, especially for atomic energy research. (*Ahram*, June 30)

The GFR invited UAR scientists to visit West German institutes to compare notes with their German colleagues. (*Eg. Mail*, July 1)

Technical Assistance: Training in Germany. In Jan it was announced that 300 Egyptian and Syrian students were to attend a one-year course in modern agricultural techniques in the GFR. (*R. Cairo*, Jan 30 [W Feb 9])

In June it was announced in Cairo that the GFR had offered Egypt 50 scholarships "for a 15-month course in electricity, radio and civil engineering." (*R. Cairo*, June 20 [W 29])

In July it was announced that 80 UAR students, the first of 1,500 from evening and industrial training institutes, were to leave for Germany for two years' training in mechanical, electrical and motor industries. Each student would receive a monthly payment of £E40 from the factory (*R. Cairo*, June 28 [W Aug 3]). *Al-Ahram* put the figure at 1,700 and the period at 3 years. (*Ahram*, Aug 5, Nov 25)

In Oct it was reported that there were over 4,000 UAR students studying in German industrial, technical, agricultural and academic institutions (*Akhbar*, Oct 13). Another source put the figure at 5,000. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Oct 30)

In Nov it was reported that German industrial enterprises were ready to employ regularly 3,500 UAR workers. (*Masa'*, Nov 17)

Press and Information. In May a delegation of German journalists toured the UAR. (*Ayyam*, May 11-13)

A Syrian press delegation visited Germany in June on an official invitation. (*ANA*, May 28 [30])

On Dec 5 over 100 journalists and radio and television reporters attended a symposium on UAR-German cooperation arranged by the GFR embassy in Cairo. There were lectures on German-UAR cooperation. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 7)

Tourism. 16,150 German tourists visited the UAR during Jan-Oct. (*Ahram*, Nov 19)

In Dec a German delegation arrived in Cairo for negotiations on technical aid in constructing hotels and encouraging tourism. (*Ahram*, Dec 15)

Cultural Ties. On March 1 a group [number not mentioned] of UAR secondary school teachers left for Germany for a two-year study course in the German language. 30 UAR teachers were expected to return to Cairo shortly to teach the German language in primary and secondary schools (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 2). In Oct the German embassy in Cairo opened three centres to teach the German language. (*Akhbar*, Oct 4)

In April the German ambassador in Cairo handed the

UAR Minister of Education documents of a gift of 200 TV sets "to increase the present strong cultural ties between the two countries." (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 20)

The instruments of ratification regarding the establishment of a UAR-German committee to supervise the execution of the cultural agreement of Dec 1960 (see MER 1960, p. 529), were exchanged on April 20. (*Ahram*, April 22)

Various Contacts and Aid; Visits, Gestures of Friendship. On March 14 it was reported in Cairo that the GFR had decided to contribute DM1m. to salvage the Nubian relics. (*Ahram*, March 15)

On March 25 Werner Schwarz, GFR Minister of Agriculture, Food and Forestry, arrived in Cairo to participate in the opening of the German Pavilion at the Cairo International Agricultural Fair. The Minister presented the UAR Minister of Agriculture with a mobile workshop and a unit for agricultural guidance as a symbol of friendship. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 24, 27)

On March 29 a 19-member GFR parliamentary delegation arrived in Cairo on a five-day visit. (*Ahram*; *Hayat*, March 30)

In Aug an interview with Abdel Nasser appeared on Hamburg television. (*Ahram*, Aug 14)

In Sept a group of Egyptian police officers visited Germany at the invitation of the Federal government (*Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 7). On Nov 4, 35 German police officers arrived in Cairo on a reciprocal visit. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 5)

The GFR offered to help with Egypt's anti-hilharzia campaign. (*MENA*, Nov 13 [W 23])

West German Scientists Working On Military Missiles Development for UAR. See p. 225 b.

GREECE

Greek Ministers, Crown Prince Visit Egypt, Greek Community, Economic Talks. The Greek Merchant Marine Minister visited the UAR in Dec 1960-Jan 1961. He discussed the promotion of marine transport between the two countries and closer cooperation in tourism. An agreement was signed for the establishment of a committee of experts to discuss details. The Minister also visited the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and institutes of the Greek community in Alexandria. (*MENA*, Dec 30 1960 [Jan 3, 1961]; *R. Cairo*, Jan 3, 7-IMB, Jan 4, 8)

In April the Greek Minister of Commerce visited Cairo for commercial talks (*R. Cairo*, April 4-IMB, April 5). He had a 35-minute audience with President Abdel Nasser. In a press interview the Minister expressed his admiration of the President's efforts and achievements in the economic and social fields and his "satisfaction over the kind sentiments" expressed by the President towards Greece and the Greek community in the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 7, 8)

On April 13 Crown Prince Constantine of Greece arrived in Cairo on a four-day official visit. In addition to state ceremonies, he visited the Greek community in Alexandria. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 13-18)

Greek Decorations For UAR Vice-President. In June Vice-President Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi was decorated by the Greek ambassador in Cairo in the name of the King of Greece. (*Akhbar*, June 9)

Greek Bank Taken Over by Egyptian. The Egyptian Ahli Bank was to take over, as of July 1, the Greek Public Bank (Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said) (*Ahram*, June

11). [This transfer was made before the issue of the banks nationalization decree (July 20).]

UAR Military Mission in Greece. In June a UAR military mission arrived in Salonika to visit units of the Third Army Corps. (*R. Athens*, June 22 [24])

Trade and Payments Protocol. A UAR mission went to Athens in July to negotiate the renewal of the trade and payments agreement and the promotion of tourism (*Masra*, July 20). Later on it was reported that a protocol providing for increased trade exchange had been signed. (*Ahram*, Aug 9)

Greek-UAR Friendship Association. On July 21, Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din, the UAR Minister of the Interior, inaugurated the residence of the UAR-Greek Friendship Association. Earlier reports said that the Greek Minister of the Interior would be invited to attend the ceremony. (*Ahram*, July 7, 22)

Nationalization Measures Affect Greek Community; Greek FM to Egypt. [The July revolutionary decrees which *inter alia* nationalized over 400 private enterprises, in whole or in part, seriously affected the Greek community in Egypt, which had extensive commercial interests.]

On Aug 5 Evangelos Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister, arrived in Cairo on an unofficial mission to discuss the impact of the nationalization measures on Greeks living in the UAR (*Hayat*, Aug 6). He had a meeting with President Abdel Nasser, who "explained to him in detail the policy of his country at the present time." He also had talks with leaders of the Greek community on the new legislation and facilities requested by Greek nationals who intended to leave the country for good. At Alexandria airport, he told reporters that he was "fairly satisfied," and that he had been assured that no obstacles would be put in the way of Greeks working in Egypt provided that the companies employing them kept within the law. He also stated that friendship with the UAR was a basic element of Greek foreign policy. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 7, 8, 11; *Hayat*, Aug 11; *Mid. Mir.*, Aug 12)

Exodus of Greek Community. *The Times* reported in Dec that 500 Greek refugees from Egypt were landing at Piraeus weekly, "penniless and desperate. They are the remnants of a once prosperous community rapidly driven out by President [Abdel] Nasser's nationalization measures." Emigrants were allowed to take with them only ££20 each and a few personal possessions.

An official of the association of Greek refugees from Egypt in Athens said: "More than 36,000 of us came to Greece since 1952. Others emigrated to Canada, Australia, and South Africa. By next March the 155-year-old Greek community of Egypt, which numbered 140,000 people in 1940, will have been totally dispersed and ruined." This official estimated the value of Greek private property in Egypt at about ££120m; most of it had been confiscated. Greek communal property, such as schools, hospitals and legacies, was worth "more than ££255m." This had not yet been touched and the Greek government had been urged to take swift action to protect this wealth.

The tragedy of the refugees had aroused indignation and resentment at what in Greece was regarded as the ingratitude of the Egyptians, the correspondent wrote. He added, "it is perhaps ironical that Greece should have hitherto pursued policies in staunch support of President Nasser precisely in order to safeguard the well-being and

interests of Greeks living in Egypt." At present 40,000 Greeks remained in Egypt, the correspondent added. (*Times*, Dec 29)

ITALY

Italian Parliamentary Mission. On Jan 3 an Italian parliamentary mission arrived in Cairo on an official visit. (*R. Cairo*, Jan 3-IMB, Jan 4)

On Feb 15 the speaker of the Italian Senate arrived in Cairo on a short official visit. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 15; *R. Cairo*, Feb 16-IMB, Feb 16)

Economic and Trade Relations. In Jan an Italian economic mission, including businessmen, industrialists and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, visited both regions of the UAR. They were received by President Abdel Nasser (*R. Cairo*, Jan 9, 19-IMB, Jan 10, 20; *Akhbar*, Jan 11, 17). The leader of the mission told the press that he would recommend to his government to increase credit facilities to the UAR and provide technical assistance on the condition that procurement orders for industrial projects be placed with Italian firms. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 19)

On March 8 a UAR economic delegation left for Rome to discuss with the Italian authorities credit facilities for UAR procurements (*R. Cairo*, March 8-IMB, March 9). The Egyptian Region Minister of Economy declared that the delegation had reached a basis for agreement on cooperation between the Central Bank of Egypt and the Italian Central Bank on the regulation of Italian capital investment in the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 23)

At the end of March expansion of trade and credit facilities were further discussed in Cairo by the Italian Foreign Trade Minister, Mario Martinelli. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 23, 29; *Ahram*, March 27)

In April a trade and payments protocol for one year was concluded by a UAR-Italian Committee established under the 1959 trade agreement. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 19, 29)

Cultural Relations, Technical Assistance. Italy put three scholarships at the disposal of the UAR Ministry of Agriculture. (*Akhbar*, July 9)

In Aug the Egyptian Region Minister of Education approved the cultural agreement with Italy. (*Masa*, Aug 22)

Fiat Assembly Plant. According to a contract signed on March 30, the Italian Fiat Company was to build at the cost of £E6.4m. a car assembly plant near Cairo. The contract provided for the manufacture of 10,000 Fiat 1100 cars a year, with the right to produce also the Fiat 600, 1800, 2100 and the jeep 1101 at a later stage. 80% of the components would initially be imported from Italy. Locally manufactured parts were eventually to reach 96% of the total. (*Mid. Mir.*, April 1; *MEED*, April 14)

Petrochemical Plant. On April 3 a £E10m. contract for a plant for the carbonization of mazout and petroleum substances at Suez was signed between the UAR five-year plan authority and the Italian firm S.T.Y.P. of Rome. The plant would begin production in the second half of 1963 and annual value would be £E24m. Another £E10m. was "to be used for the project's appurtenances." (*R. Cairo*, April 3 [W 6])

On April 19 an agreement on cooperation in fishing was signed in Rome. It envisaged the establishment of a company with UAR and Italian capital, which would fish in Egyptian waters with Italian crews and vessels

and have free access to Egyptian ports (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 20). The vessels would fly the UAR flag. (*Ahram*, April 29)

Credit Agreement: Fiat, ENI Participation in UAR Projects. In Sept. Dr. Aziz Sidqi, the UAR Minister of Industry, obtained in Italy agreement to extend the following credits: (1) \$50m. from Ital-Africa Co. for industrial projects—repayable over five years, at 4% interest; (2) \$50m. from the Fine Meccanica Co. repayable over nine years at 4% interest; (3) \$50m. from Fiat Co. for purchase of equipment from the company, [the connection between this agreement and the one on the assembly plant recorded above could not be ascertained]; (4) \$50m. from Italian oil concern ENI for a second drilling machine to accelerate oil exploitation in Gull of Suez (see also below). (*EFSPA*, No. 45, Sept)

Agreement With ENI. On Nov 14 two agreements were signed in Cairo between the UAR Ministry of Industry and Mr. Enrico Mattei, president of ENI. Under the terms of the first agreement, ENI undertook to supply credit facilities up to \$50m. for a petrochemical plant (on which see above) as well as drilling exploration and research equipment, to be repaid either in cash or in oil. The second agreement granted exploration and drilling concessions to Compagnie Orientale des Pétroles d'Egypte in two new areas: the Red Sea Coast and the Nile Delta from Rosetta to the Suez Canal, covering a total area of 26,000 sq. km. ENI would hold up to 50% of the company's capital and receive 25% of the profits, the other 75% going to the UAR. The company would bear all the prospecting costs of the operation. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 14 [16]; *Ahram*, Nov 15)

NETHERLANDS

Cultural Relations. On Jan 15 a three-month exhibition "Five Thousand Years of Egyptian Art" closed in Amsterdam. (*Mid. Mir.*, Jan 21)

On Feb 13 the Dutch Minister of Arts and Science arrived in Cairo at the invitation of Egypt. (*MENA*, Feb 13 [W 16])

Dutch Credit. On May 4 in Cairo the Minister of Industry signed an agreement with Dutch businessmen to extend a £E5m. credit to the UAR at 5% interest for the purchase of industrial machinery in the Netherlands. (*Ahram*, May 5)

Various Contacts. On May 7 a UAR aviation delegation signed in The Hague a new aviation agreement between the UAR and the Netherlands replacing the existing agreements with Egypt and Syria by a single agreement with both. (*R. Hilversum*, June 30 [W, July 6]; *Eg. Gaz.*, July 4; *Ahram*, July 8)

In July, 12 engineers and employees of the UAR General Petroleum Authority left for the Netherlands for training in the Caltex refinery plants, at the Dutch firm's expense. (*Gumhuriyah*, July 11)

NORWAY

Norwegian Defence Minister, Trade Mission Visit Cairo. On Jan 10 the Norwegian Defence Minister, Nils Handal, on his way to Ethiopia, stopped in Cairo on a five-day visit (*Ahram*, Jan 10-11). He met with General Muhammad Ibrahim, Minister of State for War Affairs, and visited the Norwegian troops with UNEF in the Gaza Strip. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 12, 14, 16)

On Feb 28 a trade delegation led by Arne Skang.

the Norwegian Minister of Trade, arrived in Cairo on an 11-day visit (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 24, March 8; Ahram, Feb 25, 28, March 3*). It was reported that the delegation proposed to export to the UAR aluminium and iron goods against UAR cotton yarn and textiles, citrus fruit and vegetables. It suggested also the establishment of a permanent UAR exhibition in Norway and the promotion of tourism between the two countries. (*Eg. Gaz., March 2*)

Scientific Cooperation. On April 11 an agreement on scientific cooperation in the field of atomic energy for peaceful purposes between the UAR and Norway was signed in Cairo. The atomic energy commissions in both countries would cooperate in building a radioactive isotopes centre in Cairo. The agreement also provided for the training of UAR experts in the production and use of radioactive isotopes and providing the UAR with experts in these fields. (*MENA, April 11 [W 20]*)

PORTUGAL

Trade and Payments Protocol. On May 18, a trade and payments protocol between Portugal and the UAR was signed in Cairo. It amended the lists of commodities that could be exchanged. It included, *inter alia*, a most favoured nation clause and provided for mutual credit facilities up to \$1m. The protocol was for one year and subject to renewal. (*Eg. Gaz., May 19*)

SPAIN

In April a Spanish delegation led by the Minister of Agriculture spent one week in the Egyptian region. They had talks on "the development of agricultural cooperative relations between the two countries." (*Eg. Gaz., April 10*)

SWEDEN

Various Contacts; Gestures of Friendship. In Feb a former President of the Swedish-Egyptian Society and its former secretary were presented with UAR decorations for fostering good relations between Sweden and the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 11*)

Later the King of Sweden bestowed decorations on four UAR engineers as a token of appreciation for their "close and excellent collaboration" with Swedish engineers in executing important orders within the High Dam hydro-electric scheme. (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 27*)

On Sept 16 an exhibition of "5,000 Years of Egyptian Art" was opened in Stockholm in the presence of King Gustav Adolf and Queen Louise. The proceeds were to go to the fund for the preservation of ancient monuments in the area to be flooded by the Aswan High Dam. (*Eg. Gaz., Sept 18*)

President Abdel Nasser sent the King of Sweden a message of condolence on the death of the UN SG Dag Hammarskjöld, and cabled his best wishes on the King's birthday anniversary. (*Eg. Gaz., Sept 24, Nov 12*)

SWITZERLAND

Various Contacts. In Jan 30 Swiss physicians were due to arrive in the UAR on a professional tour. (*Ahram, Jan 11*)

In July a UAR delegation was to tour Switzerland to study the tourist industry. (*Ahram, July 10*)

In Oct it was announced that the Swiss government had agreed to look after Turkey's interests in the UAR following the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Turkey. (*Eg. Gaz., Oct 7*)

In reply to a request to explain Israel endeavours to obtain heirless funds deposited in Swiss banks against the names of Jews, the Swiss government informed the UAR of the draft bill in this respect. (*Ahram, Sept 25*; see also p 317 a)

Swiss Embassy Accused of Aiding French Spies. On Nov 24 the head of the French assets mission in Cairo, together with three other members, were arrested on charges of espionage. UAR newspapers reported that the "spies" had used the facilities of the Swiss embassy to prepare pamphlets attacking the regime and using the Swiss diplomatic bag for illegal currency operations. (The Swiss embassy had represented French interests in Cairo since relations between Egypt and France were broken off in 1956.) The Swiss government protested against the accusations and demanded an immediate denial. An official UAR spokesman commented that the charges against Switzerland were not made by the UAR but by the detained Frenchmen. He added that the UAR had hoped that the Swiss government would investigate the officials mentioned. (*Ahram, Nov 27-29; R. Cairo, Nov 28 [30]*)

THE UNITED KINGDOM

"Combating British Imperialism." [While direct relations between the UAR and the UK improved with the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the extension of sizable British private credits to the UAR, Cairo continued to "combat British imperialism." The main UAR targets were the British positions in Southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf as well as in East Africa. Cairo also accused the UK of plotting against the UAR, both before and after the Syrian secession. For details, see index.]

UK Attacked on Arms Sales to Israel. On Jan 31 MENA, commenting on a Reuter dispatch that a ship loaded with 14 Centurion tanks and other military equipment had left Britain en route for Israel, said that "UK arms for Israel" were nothing strange. Britain had created Israel and had provided her all along with armaments. The Arabs were "surprised to hear British spokesmen openly admit this crime," but the Arabs "are vigilant and strongly determined to resist Israel and its supporters and collaborators." (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 1*)

Release of British "Spy." On Feb 6 the UAR authorities released from prison James Zarh, a 42-year-old Maltese British subject, who had been sentenced in 1957 to 10 years imprisonment on espionage charges. *Al-Ahram*, writing two days earlier on the forthcoming release, said it was intended to express the UAR's appreciation of the attitude of Prof. Arnold Toynbee, the noted British historian, in defending the Arab cause in a public debate with Yacov Herzog, the Israeli ambassador in Montreal, on Jan 31. (*Ahram, Feb 4, 7*)

A British Foreign Office spokesman warmly welcomed this action which would "help still further the improvement in relations" following the exchange of ambassadors. (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 7*)

Ambassadors Exchanged; Cairo: Struggle Against Imperialism Continues. The re-establishment of diplomatic relations was finally agreed upon in Jan. (For details see MER 1960, pp 534-537)

On Feb 1 the British consulate in Alexandria was reopened. (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 2*)

On March 24 Muhammad al-Kuni presented his cre-

dentials as UAR ambassador to the Court of St. James. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 25)

On March 14 Harold Beeley, the British ambassador, arrived in Cairo, and on March 29 he presented his credentials to President Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram*, March 15, 30)

[The Cairo press welcomed the ambassador as an improvement in UK-UAR relations but made it clear that London had still a long way to go to win Cairo's confidence.] *Al-Gumhuriyah* wrote that "if London succeeded in winning Cairo's confidence, it would perform a miracle and win very very much" (*Gumhuriyah*, March 15). *Al-Akhbar* wrote that if the UK wished to open a new era in its relations with the UAR, it must understand the new position of the Arab world, and of the UAR. It should understand the UAR policy of positive neutrality and abstain from obstructing the UAR's independence and freedom of political action in regard to Arab and African countries. (*Akhbar*, March 16)

Muhammad Hassanain Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram* [and unofficial spokesman for President Abdel Nasser] wrote that Beeley faced "an unenviable task," since tension between Cairo and London, which had been abating since 1956, had recently been aggravated. "London knows perfectly well that Cairo sees imperialism as its enemy, and that war against imperialism is inexorable," Haykal wrote. "On the other hand Cairo knows perfectly well that imperialism will seize any opportunity to destroy nationalism, as witness Suez, as witness Lumumba... We cannot overlook the bitterness of defeat felt in London after the aggression against Egypt... nor Britain's connivance with Israel." Diplomacy, said Haykal, was basically a continuation of war by peaceful means. "But that does not change the nature of the struggle, which is like that of day against night. Letters of credence and the opening of champagne bottles at embassy receptions will not dispel the lingering smoke of the battlefield." (*Mid. Mir.*, March 25 quoting *Ahram* of March 18 [apparently March 17])

UAR Students in UK Universities. On April 30, the British Association of Universities announced that 304 UAR students had enrolled in British Universities for the academic year 1960/61. (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 1)

British Private Credit to UAR. On May 4 a private credit of £20m, repayable over five years at 5 per cent interest, was made available to the UAR under an agreement signed in Cairo between Dr Aziz Sidqi, the UAR Minister of Industry, and Sir Charles Denman, Director of the British merchant banking firm of C. Tennant, Sons and Co. A clause in the agreement provided for the extension of the credit up to £50m, if the initial agreement proved satisfactory. The credit would serve for the purchase of machinery and equipment in the framework of the UAR's five-year industrialization plan. (*Ahram*, May 4, 5; *MEED*, May 12)

"Abdel Nasser's Suspicion of Britain Still Lively": This was the impression gained by a *Times* correspondent who interviewed the President in May. The impression left by the Suez campaign was still deep. In answer to a question whether there was bound to be mistrust "for a generation at least" Abdel Nasser said "not necessarily." However, Abdel Nasser continued, the real chance for a new start was in 1954 when even an attempt had been made on his life because he favoured agreement with Britain; this chance had been lost. He expressed his conviction that Britain had supported the Communists in

Iraq in order to keep the country divided. He did not regard British support for Communists more absurd than that "Britain should have chosen to attack with Israel in 1956." Ultimately, the President said, relations between the two countries would be determined by Britain's attitude to the Arabs and Israel. "We feel," he said, "that you are on the side of Israel," which received from Britain tanks and submarines. But, he said, "Britain is a big power and should be fair and just." (*Times*, May 15)

British Refusal to Allow UAR Consulate in Aden and Persian Gulf. On May 16, Hussein Dhu al-Fiqar Sabri, Deputy Foreign Minister, addressing the National Assembly, criticized Britain for rejecting the UAR's request for establishment of consulates in Aden and Kuwait. In Aden, the reasons given by the UK were hostile broadcasts and UAR activities in the area. As for Kuwait the British explained that the Ruler had agreed in principle to a consulate but that Kuwait lacked the necessary administration. The fact was, however, Sabri said, that Britain wished to conceal her imperialistic activities in these areas. (*R. Cairo*, May 17 [19])

UAR Minister of Industry in UK. On Aug 21 Dr Aziz Sidqi, Minister of Industry, arrived in London at the head of a four-man industrial mission, to discuss the participation of the British government as well as private firms in the implementation of industrial projects in the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 22)

Civil Aviation Agreement; Tourism. On Aug 4 a British-UAR civil aviation agreement was initialled in Cairo. (*Ahram*, Aug 5)

Representatives of the British tourist industry visited the UAR in Sept at the invitation of United Arab Airlines, with the aim of encouraging British tourism in the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 17)

Recognition of New Syrian Regime. On Oct 13 the UK recognized the Syrian Government. [The recognition came some days after that of the USSR, the US and a number of Arab and other countries.] *The Times* remarked that the accusations made after the Syrian coup that Britain had somehow engineered the coup "could be regarded as a matter of common form, but it was natural that the British government should not thereafter take the lead in recognizing the new regime." (*Times*, Oct 14)

Understanding on Scientific Cooperation. In Dec it was reported that an agreement on scientific cooperation had been reached between the UAR and the UK. This would include the exchange of scientists, experts and technicians for research work in British institutions, participation of British experts and scientists in UAR scientific conferences and the supply of British scientific publications to the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 11)

Britain Attacked as Enemy of UAR. In an article in Dec Muhammad Hassanain Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, classified the enemies of the UAR as follows: (1) Britain and France "which are CENTO members"; (2) Iran and Turkey, the ME CENTO members; (3) Arab countries with Western ties. These enemies were now planning concerted action to deal the UAR a deadly, or at least a "semi-deadly" blow, seeing as they did in the breakup of the UAR an opportunity to shape the future of the ME to their own taste. France appeared to be

in command of the operation while Britain preferred a secondary and marked role, just as it had in the Congo. In the Congo, because of its interests in Katanga and Northern Rhodesia, Britain worked against the UN, co-operated with Tshombe and "in spite of all appearances" was "responsible for the blood of Lumumba, of Hammarikjold, of the UN troops, and of all the bloodshed" there. In the ME Britain might try to apply "hidden economic pressure" on Egypt, and participate in psychological warfare against her. She also might hide behind "her man in the ME, the child king" in Amman, and manipulate him just as she had done in the case of Tshombe, "her man in the Congo." (*Ahram*, Dec 22; *R. Cairo*, Dec 22 [29])

British Property Released. In Dec MENA stated that the property of 80% of British subjects sequestered in Oct 1956 had been released. The release of property of the remaining 20% had been delayed because of failure to submit the documents and information required by the authorities. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 23)

THE UNITED STATES

Synopsis; References: At the beginning of the year, relations between the UAR and the US sharply deteriorated over their divergent policies on the Congo crisis. (pp 636 ff). During this period the UAR also demonstrated apprehensions lest the policy of the new US administration, under President Kennedy, prove detrimental to her interests, especially in regard to the Arab-Israel conflict (pp 194-5).

First signs of a clearing of the political atmosphere appeared in the spring, and from mid-summer on relations between the two countries noticeably improved. In March, President Kennedy opened an exchange of correspondence with President Abdel Nasser. In the same month he appointed as ambassador to Cairo a personality long associated with Egypt. In May Kennedy sent to Abdel Nasser and other Arab heads of state letters dealing mainly with the Arab-Israel conflict, which expressed the wish for understanding and friendship with the Arab countries and a readiness to extend economic assistance. President Abdel Nasser responded with a frank expression of his views (pp 197 ff). In May-June a rather acrimonious public debate took place between the Soviet Union and the UAR—though not on the official level—over the treatment of Communists by the latter; it was remarked in the UAR and elsewhere that this episode served to show the UAR's independence of the USSR (pp 654 ff). In July it was announced that the US had approved the sale to the UAR of a number of experimental rockets (p 225). At the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Sept), President Abdel Nasser—who was one of its sponsors—took a moderate stand, which in the eyes of Western observers contrasted favourably with the more extreme attitude of such countries as Ghana, Cuba, Indonesia and Iraq; President Abdel Nasser also expressed his regret at the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, announced on the eve of the conference (pp 56 ff).

During the last four months of the year friendly contacts between the two countries grew in a variety of fields, including official visits.

Economic assistance to the UAR continued throughout the year—apparently unaffected by the political crisis—and grew in volume. This assistance was primarily designed, a US official declared, to keep the UAR from being completely dependent on Soviet assistance (see below).

The UAR's anti-American policy in Africa also continued throughout the year though anti-US propaganda markedly declined in volume in its second half. In the autumn months Cairo broadcasts continued to advise African states against ties with the US (e.g. p 676 b), and sharply anti-US pronouncements were made by UAR spokesmen on various occasions, as e.g. at the AAPSO Executive Committee meeting in Gaza in Dec (p 45 b). Nevertheless, by this time the hunt of Cairo's "struggle against Western imperialism" had turned, for the time being, against the UK and France, who were charged with supporting the Katanga secession in the Congo (p 641 h) and with hostile designs in the ME (p 649 b).

The UAR voting record at the UN General Assembly showed a low rate of coincidence with the US against a high one with the Communist countries. At the 15th session 20.6% of the UAR's votes coincided with those of the US as against 70.1% with the Communist countries; at the 16th session, the figures were 14.4% and 67.2% respectively; (p. 7.)

Anti-American Attitudes. Following are some samples of anti-US attitudes taken by the UAR during the first half of the year, in addition to those referred to in the synopsis.

A Cairo weekly listed Hawaii [which had joined the US as the 50th state in March 1960] among the countries due for liberation and independence during 1961. (*Musawwar*, Dec 30, 1960)

Satisfaction was expressed at Saudi Arabia's decision not to renew the Dhahran agreement. *Al-Gumhuriyah* referred to this decision as the liquidation of an imperialist base of aggression. (*Gumhuriyah*, March 19; *R. Cairo*, March 19 [21])

The UAR strongly condemned the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt in Cuba. Demonstrations against "American imperialism" and "Kennedy's massacre in Cuba" took place in UAR cities (see p 690 h). The UAR cancelled concerts due to be given in Cairo and Alexandria by an American orchestra in protest against "US intervention in Cuba." (*Mid. Mir.*, April 22)

US Approaches, Various Friendly Contacts. After he stepped down from the presidency, Gen. Eisenhower sent Nasser a message in which he said that his acquaintance with him had made him understand the "national personality" (*shakhiyyah wataniyah*) of the UAR which was the foundation of her power and greatness. (*Ahram*, Jan 27)

On March 20 it was disclosed in Washington that President Kennedy and President Abdel Nasser had exchanged correspondence a fortnight previously; the contents of the letters were not disclosed. (*Mid. Mir.*, March 25)

On March 23 it was announced that Dr. John S. Badeau, President of the Near East Foundation of New York, had been appointed as American Ambassador at Cairo, in place of F. Reinhardt who was transferred to Rome. Badeau served at the American University in Cairo from 1936-1953, the last eight years as its president. (*R. Cairo*, March 23-IMB, March 23; *NYT*, April 12). Dr. Badeau presented his credentials to Abdel Nasser on July 19. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 20)

On March 27 a group of 37 US officers and cadets arrived at Cairo for a two-day visit at the invitation of the UAR Military Academy. (*Ahram*, March 28)

On April 1 the Cairo branch of the First National City Bank of New York, "the only American bank operating in Cairo," was by agreement transferred to the National Bank of Egypt. (*NYT*, April 4)

On April 7, President Kennedy asked Congress to allocate \$10m. for the preservation of antiquities located in the inundation area of the Aswan High Dam. (*NYT*, April 8)

On May 8 the UAR Ambassador at Washington was received by President Kennedy. "Speculation among diplomats" had it that letters between Presidents Abdel Nasser and Kennedy might have been exchanged at the meeting, and the possibility explored of "restoring relations... to a better basis." (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 10)

President Kennedy's letters to Abdel Nasser and other Arab heads of state of May 11 have been referred to in the synopsis, above.

UAR-USSR Tension Seen Contributing To Improving Relations. On June 7 *The New York Times* Cairo correspondent quoted "officials of the UAR" as denying that "the campaign of criticism by the Soviet press" (see synopsis above) necessarily meant the Arabs were "entering a pro-US phase"; "we [the Arabs] cannot do that because of your [American] Israel policy." All the same, the correspondent added, one month before a directive had been sent to newspapers in Cairo to desist from assailing the US. "This move came prior to Cairo's retorts to the Soviet press campaign." On June 25 the correspondent quoted "diplomatic sources in Beirut" as saying that Kennedy's letters of May 11 together with "Abdel Nasser's exchange of attacks with the Soviet press [had] served to halt the deteriorating trend in US-Arab relations"; in consequence, the State Department was considering an invitation to Abdel Nasser to pay an official visit to Washington (*NYT*, June 8, 26). However, on June 27, the State Department denied that such a plan was "at present under active consideration." (*NYT*, June 28)

Further Friendly Political Gestures, Tourism, Trade. In July-Aug. over 1,000 tons of insecticide were flown from the US to Cairo in an emergency airlift at the request of the UAR, in order to save the Egyptian cotton crop. (*NYT*, Aug 8)

The UAR decided to open in Sept six additional tourist offices in the US. (*MENA*, Sept 7 [W 14])

President Kennedy's speech at the UN on Sept 25 (*NYT*, Sept 26) met with guarded approval in Cairo: it was "important" and it pointed to an "improvement in the international atmosphere" which was said to be ultimately due to the Belgrade conference. (*R. Cairo*, Sept 26 [28]; *Gumhuriyah*, Sept 26)

[In its attitude towards the break-up of the UAR and the new Syrian regime the US showed regard for Egyptian susceptibilities; see p 513 al.]

In Oct the Director of the UAR Desert Development Institute went to the US to visit the Tennessee Valley Project while the Director of the US Subterranean Waters Department came on a visit to Cairo. (*Akhbar*, Oct 6; *MENA*, Oct 25 [27])

Mutual Visits. During Sept-Nov a number of UAR ministers visited the US.

In Sept Dr Muhammad Khalil, UAR Minister of Communications, went to the US on a three-week visit. He conferred with the Secretary of Commerce and the President of the Export-Import Bank, and visited postal and communications establishments. Cairo Radio said he had welcomed the participation of American business circles in the development of the UAR transport and communication systems. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 1, 7; *R. Cairo*, Sept 27-IMB, Sept 28)

Dr Kamal Ramzi Astino and Jamal al-Sufi, UAR Mi-

nisters of Supply, also visited the US in Sept. They had talks on US economic aid, and agreements were reached for aid under PL 480 (see below: Economic Assistance). Dr Astino later stated that he had also asked the US for a loan of 70 scientists—agronomists, geologists, nuclear physicists among others—and had been promised an early reply. (*Gumhuriyah*, Sept 8; *Ahram*, Sept 10, Oct 9; *Akhbar*, Oct 10)

In Nov Dr Tharwat Ukashah, UAR Minister of Culture and National Guidance, attended the opening of the Tutankhamen exhibition at Washington and had talks at the State Department. (*Eg. Mail*, Nov 4, 22; *MENA*, Nov 15 [17])

In Oct, the UAR was visited by several US personalities: Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (*Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 18); Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, on a tour of the ME and other countries, who discussed among other topics the US contribution to the protection of the Nubian monuments (*NYT*, Oct 20; *Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 22, 24); and Senator W. Stuart Symington, on an informative visit. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 24-IMB, Oct 24)

On Oct 21 a delegation of 12 Egyptian television workers and journalists was to visit the US as guests of the American press (*Akhbar*, Oct 4), and, at the end of the month, 34 American journalists came to Cairo at the invitation of the Information Department. (*Ahram*, Oct 30)

Favourable Change in US Attitude Seen in UAR [Towards the end of Nov a Cairo press commentary put into relief the change of atmosphere that had taken place during the year.] *Ruz al-Yusuf* speculated that the recent visits of American personalities were a prelude to the determination of a new stable US ME policy. This new US attitude was the outcome of an understanding, born out of the Belgrade conference, that non-alignment stood in most cases for genuine independence, and that USSR aid did not impair the freedom of action of its recipients (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Nov 29). (For an American evaluation at the same time of the importance of US economic aid for the UAR, see below, Economic Assistance.)

Egyptian Interest in Muslim and Arab Affairs in US. The Minister of Waqf appointed Dr Mahmud Yusuf ash-Shawarbi of Cairo University, envoy of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in the US, to the post of Director of the Islamic Cultural Center in New York. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 2, 4)

In Feb James Muhammad Khalil, (an American of Lebanese extraction), President of the Muslim Communities Union in the US and Canada, visited the UAR (*R. Cairo*, Feb 25 [28]; *Akhbar Sa'ah*, July 19). A conference of Arab emigrants in the US and Canada took place in Cairo in July (see p 116.) In Oct James Ansara, SG of the Arab Immigrants Clubs Associations in North America, arrived in Cairo "to coordinate action between the UAR and Arab emigrants." (*Ahram*, Oct 17)

US Economic Assistance. By Nov 1961, US economic assistance to Egypt since the revolution in 1952 had reached the sum total of \$586m. according to the US embassy in Cairo. It was noted that most Egyptians were unaware of the extent of this aid. (*NYT*, Nov 13)

In Aug an Administration representative testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee defined the principles of US aid to the UAR as follows: The US had not attempted to match the level of Soviet assistance, but had sought to maintain friendly relations with the UAR and to provide assistance at a reasonable level. US aid contributed to development and kept the UAR from being

completely dependent on Soviet bloc economic assistance and therefore unduly dependent on Soviet good will.

Programmed economic assistance to the UAR was as follows: In US fiscal year 1960, \$90,021,000 of which \$61,700,000 under PL 480 and \$28,321,000 as economic aid under the mutual security programme. The figures for 1961 were \$78,447,000, \$76,200,000 and \$2,247,000 respectively. (US Senate, Committee of Appropriations, Foreign Assistance 1962, Washington 1961, pp 283, 297, 299)

According to a later official US source, actual figures for US supplies under PL 480 were higher: Sales agreements signed during US fiscal year 1960 amounted to \$72.7m., 1961—\$72.8m., 1962—\$165.8m. (*Operations Report, Dec 31, 1962, AID, FY 1963*)

Surplus food supplied to the Egyptian R. under PL 480 was to be paid for in local currency; 65% of the payment would be relented to the UAR, repayable over 30 years at 4% interest, while 15% would be given to the Egyptian region as an outright gift, for development projects to be approved by both governments. The agreement

providing for the 15% grant was signed in Cairo on Feb. 13. (*Eg. Gaz., Feb 14, 19; EFSPA, No. 41, May; VEFSPA No 88/24, May*)

Agreements under PL 480 and for other aid were concluded throughout the year [regardless of political developments] (for details see tables, pp 78-9).

A *New York Times* despatch on the agreement of Nov 10 for the supply to Egypt of \$20.7m. worth of US food stuffs under PL 480 said the agreement found the Egyptians "in exceptional immediate need." The primary reason was the failure of the cotton and maize crops, due to various natural causes. Behind this was "Abdel Nasser's social revolution" with its "sharp shift to a state-controlled economy," which entailed a demand for new sources of foreign aid. While one opinion was that the US should in consequence reconsider its policy of economic aid, the paper also quoted "other Western diplomats" who held that Abdel Nasser was "attempting considerable social reforms... no more than the Kennedy administration recently called on some Latin Americans to do..." (*NYT, Nov 13*)

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

COMMUNIST VIEWS ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UAR

[See also below: "May-June: The Great Propaganda Campaign."]

UAR's Call for Arab Unity—"Disguise of Egyptian Colonialism." An outright attack on the Egyptian-Syrian union, and on the UAR's contribution to Arab unity in general, was made by the Syrian CP leader, Khālid Bakdash, in a discussion on "The Agricultural Question And The National Liberation Movement" published in *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma (World Marxist Review)* in Jan. "The experience of the nearly three years that have passed since the formation of the UAR," wrote Bakdash, "has taught the peasants and all Syrians that the union imposed on them has no sound basis, that the policy of the Cairo Government is wreaking havoc with the slogan of Arab unity and Arab nationalism; this slogan is being utilized to push Egyptian nationalism, which is the embodiment of the expansionist, jingoist features of the Egyptian big bourgeoisie." Bakdash called "for a radical revision of the fundamental principles underlying the union, for liberation from Egyptian colonialism..."

A Soviet commentator, I. Plyshevsky, writing on the anti-colonial movement in Africa in the same journal in July, stated *inter alia*: "The African peoples, reaching out toward unity, ... have before them the deplorable example of Egypt and Syria. As is generally known, union in this case amounted to the subordination of Syria to Egypt. The African peoples can hardly accept such association." (*World Marxist Review, Jan, July*)

The Persecution of Communists by "Nasser's Gendarmes." [The "repression and persecution of democrats" in the UAR figured prominently in the UAR-USSR propaganda campaign of May-June. Except during these two months, however, the denunciation of the UAR's treatment of political opponents was, as in 1960, left largely to international Communist sources.]

In April *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* published a report signed M.O. which stated that well-known intellec-

tuals and trade union leaders as well as "hundreds of other patriots are subjected to brutal torture and incarcerated in conditions especially designed to break their will and undermine their health."

A report by Farid Shukri on the death of Farajallah al-Hilu, the SG of the Lebanese CP, was published under the heading "Foul Murder" in the July issue of the same journal, [i.e., several weeks after the Soviet information media had stopped their campaign concerning the Hilu affair—see below.]

In Aug a report said that "Communists and patriots languishing in Syrian prisons are at present subjected to tortures which in their brutality exceed anything experienced by the prisoners in over two years of imprisonment." Political prisoners were being forced by "Nasser's gendarmes" to sign statements in which they "heap dirt on the CP and declare their loyalty to the Nasser regime." They were told that legal procedure would not apply to them and that, if they refused to sign the statements, death was "inevitable." "The rulers of the UAR," the article went on, "organize these savage reprisals against Communists and democrats in Syria in order to suppress the growing national struggle against the existing regime in the UAR."

An open letter by a GDR schoolteacher protesting to Abdel Nasser against the persecutions was published in Sept. (*Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, April, July, Aug, Sept*)

UAR Regime a "Dictatorship," Not "National Democracy." (See below, under: The Great Propaganda Campaign.)

On Nationalization: "UAR Far From Socialism." In Aug, an article in *Pravda* by V. Mayevskiy following his recent visit to the UAR surveyed the impact of economic reforms in general and of the nationalization and agrarian decrees of July in particular. Referring to the land re-

form measures of previous years, Mayevskiy wrote that they "only partly changed the situation in the villages." There were "many landowners who still own large areas of land," while "millions of fallahin" remained landless and poverty-stricken. Moreover, the bourgeoisie had "consolidated its positions" and the state had been "undermined by the illegal activities of financial monopolies, speculations, bribery, corruption." All this, Mayevskiy claimed, "has given rise to deep discontent."

As regards the latest economic decrees Mayevskiy said that they were "welcomed by the working people" of the UAR who "want to believe" that the decrees signify the "strengthening of the national economy and the state sector, and the weakening of the dictates of big private

capital, [and] a further attack on the position of the big landowners..." However, it remained to be seen whether these "hopes" would be realized, or whether they would be thwarted "by the reactionary forces which will undoubtedly attempt to put a spoke in the wheel." In the meantime, said Mayevskiy, the UAR's social and economic policy was not only "far removed from Communism"; it was "also far from building socialism." The author did not wish "to lessen the importance of the President's decrees," but they must not be confused with "real socialism." There was "only one real socialism, based on the Marxist-Leninist teaching and proved by the great experience of the Soviet land and of other socialist countries." (*Pravda*, Aug 24)

THE USSR

POLITICAL RELATIONS

(January-May)

Soviet Mission to the Afro-Asian Council. A delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee attended the extraordinary session of the AAPSO Council which opened in Cairo on Jan 21. A message from PM Khrushchov was read at the opening session of the conference. (*Tass in English*, Jan 16 [SU 18]; *Pravda*, Jan 22)

Khrushchov Invited to UAR. In Dec 1960 it was reported from Cairo that Vice President Amer had renewed Abdel Nasser's invitation to PM Khrushchov to visit the UAR, and, in Feb 1961, that the visit had been discussed with V.S. Semenov, the Soviet Deputy FM, during the latter's visit to Cairo (see below). Khrushchov had finally decided to accept the invitation; the exact date of the visit was to be settled within the coming weeks (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Dec 26, 1960, Feb 27, 1961). Khrushchov had previously accepted invitations from several other African countries, and it was believed he would visit at least five African countries by June (*Jer. Post*, Jan 20). [The visit did not materialize during the year.]

Soviet Ministerial Visits. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V.S. Semenov, visited the UAR for four days at the end of Jan on his way to a UN conference at Addis Ababa, and again in Feb, when he attended the National Day celebrations in Damascus. Semenov told newsmen in Cairo he had come in order "to strengthen the existing friendship" between the UAR and the Soviet Union. He conferred with Abdel Nasser, as well as with the vice-presidents and a number of ministers. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 28; *MENA*, Feb 21 [23]; *Izvestia*, Feb 24)

On March 23 a Soviet delegation led by M.A. Lesechko, First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, arrived in Cairo to attend the opening of the International Agricultural Fair. (*Izvestia*, March 25; *Pravda*, March 30)

On April 11 V.G. Bakayev, the USSR Minister of Merchant Marine, arrived in Suez on board a Soviet ship en route to Odessa from Hodeida, Yemen. He visited Port Said where he placed a wreath on the monument of the victims of the "1956 aggression against Egypt" and called on the Governor who recalled the friendship which linked the two "hero-cities" of Port Said and Stalingrad (*Hayat*, April 12; *Tass in English*, April 12 and *R. Moscow in Arabic*, April 13 [SU 15]). N.D. Poutsev, the USSR Minister of Communications,

also visited the UAR in April. He conferred with the Southern R. Minister of Communications, and was received by Abdel Nasser. (*MENA*, April 11, 16 [13, W 20])

Khrushchov: UAR-Soviet "Correspondence of Viewpoints." In a message to Abdel Nasser on the occasion of the UAR National Day, Khrushchov "noted with pleasure the correspondence of viewpoints of the Soviet and UAR Governments on such important questions of our time as the struggle for the consolidation of general peace, for disarmament and for the complete liquidation of the system of colonialism." In his reply Abdel Nasser "noted with satisfaction that relations of cordiality and cooperation and a spirit of mutual cooperation exist between the Soviet Union and the UAR." (*Pravda*, March 15)

Abdel Nasser: Gagarin Flight "Victory For Peace." On the occasion of the first successful manned space flight, launched by the Soviet Union, Abdel Nasser sent a message to PM Khrushchov, in which he expressed the UAR's "profound admiration... for this remarkable accomplishment of the Soviet people—a victory for mankind everywhere... and therefore a victory for peace." This was confirmed by the fact that the Soviet Union had taken the opportunity to make "a new and warm appeal for agreement on disarmament." (*R. Cairo*, April 12 [14]; *Pravda*, April 15)

The universality of the Soviet space achievement and its contribution to peace was also the theme of UAR radio and newspaper comments: "Man's latest victory," said Cairo Radio, "means the winning of peace without war and... the defeat of the imperialists and warmongers, the enemies of the people, of human progress and of freedom... a certain victory for all peoples." (*R. Cairo*, April 14 [17])

Al-Akhbar urged US-USSR cooperation in space. Referring to the secrecy with which each of the two powers treated its space research, the paper argued that "now that the Soviet Union has been proclaimed the winner, the secrecy is no longer understandable." (*Akhbar*, April 16; see also *Akhbar*, *Gumhuriyah*, April 13; *Arab Obs.*, April 23)

The second Soviet manned space flight, that of Titov in Aug, was similarly acclaimed in the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, Aug 6, 7 [9])

UAR Parliamentary Mission to USSR. A UAR parlia-

mentary delegation led by Anwar as-Saadat, President of the National Assembly, arrived in Moscow on April 27, for a 14-day visit at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet. Before leaving Cairo Saadat declared that this was the first such visit and a "sign of cooperation and friendship between two countries which have different regimes but which make common efforts for the sake of the maintenance of world peace and the welfare of humanity." (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 28; *Pravda*, April 28)

Members of the delegation toured Leningrad, Tashkent and Stalingrad and met various Soviet leaders. On May 3 the delegation was received by PM Khrushchov, and had what a *Tass* release described as a "warm and friendly discussion." The delegation left the USSR on May 12 when Saadat sent a letter to Khrushchov, published in *Pravda* four days later, in which he thanked him, among others, for "the spirit of friendship, brotherhood and understanding which you displayed during our talks," and assured him that "nothing in the world can now break that friendship founded on mutual understanding and sincerity." (*Pravda*, April 30, May 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16). [Three weeks later, however, it transpired that Khrushchov had at that meeting sharply criticized the UAR regime; see below.]

POLITICAL RELATIONS THE GREAT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND THE KHRUSHCHOV-SAADAT ENCOUNTER (May-June)

The Campaign Opens—The Case of Riyad al-Turk. Several reports of the imprisonment and "brutal treatment" by the UAR authorities of Communists and "militant democrats" appeared in the world Communist press in the beginning of the year, and some of these were reproduced without comment in Soviet newspapers. (*Pravda*, Jan 20; *Trud*, Feb 5)

On May 20 *Trud* carried a report from the Lebanese Communist paper *As-Nida'* alleging the death "as the result of savage torture" of Riyad al-Turk, a Syrian Communist leader who had been under arrest in Syria. (*Trud*, May 20)

Two days later the UAR Deputy Foreign Minister drew the attention of the Soviet ambassador in Cairo to this "false report" which had originated in "biased newspapers." (*R. Cairo*, May 23-*IMB*, May 24)

Moscow View on "UAR Dictatorship": No "National Democracy." In an article on "The National Democratic State" published in *Kommunist* at the end of May, B. Ponomarev, then a departmental head and later Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, listed the UAR among the newly independent nations which had resorted to dictatorship and did not, therefore, qualify as "national democracies." "The national democratic state," wrote Ponomarev, "is a state repudiating dictatorial and despotic methods of government. Historical experience has shown that, after achieving national independence, a clique of the bourgeoisie and landowners seek to establish a reactionary, anti-democratic order in the country... The UAR authorities are more and more frequently resorting to reactionary and terrorist punitive measures against valiant anti-imperialist fighters, and foremost representatives of the working class and the popular masses. Trials follow one after another; hundreds of selfless fighters for national independence and democracy are in exile or in prison." (*Kommunist*, Nov 8, 1961)

Soviet Warning: "Cut Not The Tree That Provides The Shade." [An article signed "Observer," thus stressing its official inspiration, published in *Pravda* on May 31, and employing language of a vengefulness and forthrightness unprecedented in Soviet writings about the UAR, gave a new edge to what had hitherto been no more than indirect Soviet admonitions.] Charging that two Egyptian papers, *Al-Ahram* and *Al-Musawwar*, had "simultaneously (strange coincidence?) put their columns at the disposal of the vilest anti-Soviet slander," the *Pravda* author referred to UAR socialism as "a society in which exploiters rule and people make speeches about democracy while progressive people languish in torture chambers for their political beliefs." After recalling the economic and political support which the Soviet Union had extended to the UAR, the writer reminded "freedom-loving Arabs" of their proverb: "Cut not the tree that provides the shade." It only remained to be wondered, concluded the article, "who ordered this anti-Soviet music... who paid for it?" (*Pravda*, May 31; the articles referred to could not be found in *Al-Ahram* or *Al-Musawwar* of the first five months of the year.)

A Further Charge—The Case of Farajallah al-Hilu. On the same day *Pravda* also reported a statement by the Lebanese CP according to which the SG of the Party, Farajallah al-Hilu, had died in a Syrian prison as the result of torture. (On the Hilu case, see p 391 b.) On June 2 and 3 *Pravda* published protests concerning the killing of Hilu. (*Pravda*, May 31, June 2, 3)

Cairo Radio, addressing itself solely to the Lebanese source of the charge and making no reference to the Soviet Union, dismissed the report of Hilu's death as "a false allegation." (*R. Cairo*, May 31 [June 2])

Cairo Takes Up The Challenge: No Interference In Internal Affairs Will Be Tolerated. Cairo first took public notice of a "Soviet propaganda campaign" on June 4, when Cairo Radio broadcast a MENA commentary according to which "informed Arab circles have expressed their surprise at the organized campaign directed against the UAR by official Soviet propaganda." It was felt, said MENA, that the UAR's silence had been going on "far too long" and had been "misinterpreted" by the Soviet Union. The commentary noted that "the current campaign actually began last January" when the Communist press began publishing reports concerning imprisoned Communists in the UAR. When the UAR authorities notified the Soviet Union that the report of Riyad al-Turk's death was untrue, it was expected "that following this friendly and patient attempt the Soviet propaganda machine would adopt a wise and responsible policy." Instead, the USSR had "departed from any logic in its attack on the UAR" and had revived the "old story" concerning Hilu. Referring to the *Pravda* article of May 31, the commentary went on: "In fact, since the campaign of slander against the UAR has reached this point, it is no longer a passing incident which can be met with silence. It is... a continuation of attitudes which Arab public opinion has been trying its best to forget—a continuation of the attack on Arab unity... It went beyond that in an attempt to influence relations between the Soviet and UAR peoples." [The UAR reaction concerned not only the Soviet publications recorded above but also attacks on the Egyptian-Syrian union made by non-USSR Communists and especially Khalid Bakdash, the exiled Syrian Communist leader.] "Informed circles," warned MENA in conclusion, "see this course adopted by Soviet propaganda as a mistake

with grave consequences, whatever its purpose." (*R. Cairo, June 4* [6])

Three comments by *Al-Gumhuriyah* of June 5-6, broadcast by Cairo Radio, asked why the Soviet attack should have been launched while fruitful friendship existed between the two states and at a time when the UAR was attacking "Anglo-American imperialism in all its forms." The truth in regard to Hilu and Turk had been made available to the USSR. Why then did the attacks continue; perhaps "they think our silence was fear?" If so they were gravely mistaken. Moscow was in fact requesting the UAR to grant "absolute freedom of action to the Communist parties." It was challenging the UAR's sovereignty and dignity. But relations must be based on equality without subservience and submission. The UAR would not allow any interference in her affairs. Moscow, however, did not understand and accept the "constructive spirit of positive neutralism." It interpreted it as some kind of alignment with its camp and imagined that the UAR would pay the price of alignment. And was it not surprising that the attacks should coincide with the opening in Cairo of the preparatory conference of non-aligned states? (*Gumhuriyah, June 5, 6; R. Cairo, June 5* [6])

Riyād at-Turk Appears Before Press. On the following day, June 5, the Syrian authorities produced Riyād at-Turk at a press conference in Damascus. He was said to be a leading Syrian Communist, born in Homs in 1930, who had re-entered Syria from the Lebanon with false identity papers in the autumn of 1960 and was currently awaiting trial. Turk denied having been tortured in prison. (*R. Cairo, June 6-IMB, June 7; Arab Obs., June 11*)

Al-Ahrām called on *Pravda* to repudiate the false report of Turk's death: "Will the newspaper whose name means 'truth' in Russian live up to its name?" (*Ahrām, June 7*)

Soviet Protests About Hilu Continue. Reports of protest meetings and messages concerning Hilu's death continued to appear in the Soviet press until June 10. Pilgrimages by the Lebanese public to Hilu's birthplace were reported on June 4 (*Trud*) and June 7 and 8 (*Pravda*); protest articles in the Lebanese press, including "bourgeois" newspapers, were reported in *Pravda* on June 4 and 10; a message of sympathy from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Lebanese CP expressing "profound condolences in connection with the death of the faithful son of the Lebanese people," and a similar message to Hilu's widow from the Committee of Soviet Women, were published in *Pravda* on June 9. (*Mizan, June 9; NYT, June 6*)

UAR Counter-Campaign Intensifies. Cairo Sees Arab Unity, Independent Neutralist Policy. [At the same time Cairo's counter-campaign mounted in intensity with every day that passed.]

Cables of protest from Arab trade unions, professional associations and other public organizations were reported pouring into UAR newspaper offices and were given the widest publicity. One such cable said: "Destiny has shown you to be imperialists and also agents of world Zionism, suckled on Marx the Jew." (*Eg. Gaz., June 13; BBCM, June 7-15*)

A second *MENA* commentary, broadcast from Cairo on June 5, differed from the first in claiming that the Soviet campaign had started not in Jan but at the time of the unification of Egypt and Syria, and in declaring that it was not the UAR which had been surprised by

the Soviet campaign, but the USSR which had been surprised by the strength of the UAR reaction. (*BBCM, June 7*)

A third *MENA* commentary broadcast from Cairo on June 6 noted:

1) In the "recent stage" of the campaign, the "official Soviet propaganda machinery" had launched 157 attacks on the UAR.

2) "Other organs of an official nature," in addition to official Soviet press sources, had participated in the campaign. Even Arabs studying in the USSR had been used to serve Soviet propaganda, though "luckily these students were very few."

3) In addition, the organs of other Communist parties, "which accepted [positions of] subservience" had been used. Foremost among these was the Lebanese CP. The commentary described the Soviet campaign as an "aggressive attack" representing "a climax of psychological warfare," which had two major objectives: (1) "To strike at the unity between Egypt and Syria." (2) "To attack 'our independent policy, so that it would not be a living example for the new nations.'" (*BBCM, June 8*)

"What are the motives for this black Communist hatred of the UAR?" asked *Al-Akhbār* of June 6. The Soviet attack had nothing to do with the UAR's repression of "subversive Communist activities," and most certainly not with Riyād at-Turk, who was enjoying a state of health that "would be envied by the thousands of inmates of Siberia and other places." The real motive, said *Al-Akhbār*, was to subvert the UAR's neutralist policy.

Two days later, on June 8, *Al-Akhbār* referred to "the spate of invective poured out by the Soviet media against us, our principles, our policy and our system," and declared that there could be no stronger and more eloquent reply to the campaign of lies than the statement by Khrushchov to the *New York Times* of Oct 11, 1957 in which he had stated his willingness to cooperate with Abdel Nasser despite the fact that "he throws all the Communists in his country in gaol." (*Akhbār, June 8, 8*)

Cairo Publishes Khrushchov-Saadāt Encounter: Khrushchov's Criticism of UAR Regime, Arab Nationalism. On June 9, at the height of the propaganda campaign, Cairo published what was described as the text of an address delivered by PM Khrushchov on May 3 to the UAR parliamentary delegation led by Anwar as-Saadāt, as well as the reply sent by Saadāt after the delegation's return to the UAR.

The "disputed topics" raised by Khrushchov in his address were the following: 1) "We are Communists and you are not connected with that word. But history will teach you. We are not the ones to teach you. If our people live better than you under the Communist banner, then how can you declare yourselves averse to Communism? The people will tell you to get out." 2) "Nationalism is not the pinnacle of happiness... You may think that I want to transform you from Arab nationalists into Communists. Naturally I do not propose to do this now, but I feel that some of those who are present here will be Communists in the future, because life imposes itself on men. Communism consists of ideas and ideas cannot be buried in prisons." 3) "You say that you seek socialism. But you do not know much about the socialism that leads to Communism. As a scientific phenomenon socialism is the first step to Communism... If you want socialism then you must not say that you are averse to Communism. You are placing yourselves in a critical po-

sition and have fallen into the imperialist trap." (R. Cairo, June 9 [10])

A *New York Times* correspondent had reported a day earlier that Khrushchov was said to have told Saadât: "We can hardly have confidence in your Abdel Nasser when he is losing his grip on the country and not solving his country's problems." (NYT, June 8)

Anwar al-Saadât's reply sought to refute Khrushchov's strictures "with similar frankness." The "logical construction" of Khrushchov's statement concerning living standards, said Saadât, invited the question whether capitalism was not superior to Communism, since it still provided higher living standards for its people. As regards the transformation of Arab nationalists into socialists, Saadât expressed the hope that Khrushchov's words were also not intended to apply to the future and "that the word 'now' which occurred in your statement was only used figuratively." The UAR, too, believed that ideas cannot be fought with prisons—this would be evident "if the measures adopted by our revolution were to be compared with the measures adopted by other revolutions." Lastly, Saadât said, the UAR did not believe that history progresses "along the blind alley of which capitalism is the beginning and Communism is the imperative end." The view of capitalism and communism as the only available alternatives was an error commonly made by imperialism, Saadât noted.

(Soviet sources did not report the Khrushchov-Saadât exchange—beyond the statement at the end of the visit (quoted above)—either before or after it was made public in the UAR.)

In an introduction to the Khrushchov-Saadât exchanges, Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahrâm*, stated that the UAR parliamentary delegation had immediately decided on the need for a reply to Khrushchov, but had preferred to wait until returning to Cairo for consultations. Three days after his return to Cairo from the Soviet Union, Saadât had completed his reply. Among the reasons which then prompted further delay, Haykal cited the Soviet Union's own silence in the matter, and a request made by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister at a meeting with the UAR chargé d'affaires in Moscow that the matter should not be taken up again, lest it turn into an open crisis. In his letter to Khrushchov Saadât also stated that on hearing Khrushchov's speech he "felt that we ought to make some immediate remarks in defence of our view." However, he thought "such action would be outside the limits of our task as a parliamentary delegation," and he did not wish to "convert our meeting with you into an ideological controversy" (*Ahrâm*, June 9; R. Cairo, June 9 [10]). [The date on which Saadât's reply was finally sent to Moscow was not given in UAR reports.]

Cairo: USSR Also Benefits From Aid To UAR, Campaign Proved UAR's Non-Alignment. On June 9 Cairo Radio broadcast a summary of an article in *Al-Gumhuriyah*. Its author took issue with *Pravda*'s reference to the Arab proverb about the need to preserve the tree that gives the shade. "*Pravda*, of course, is hinting at Russian loans to us," said the author, but the UAR treated the Soviet Union as one treated a hank: "The benefit which the hank gets from the client is not less than the benefit which the client obtains from the bank." (R. Cairo, June 9 [12]; *Gumhuriyah*, June 9)

Al-Ahrâm suggested a proverb of its own. Noting that the allegations concerning Hilu's death had already appeared in the London *Daily Worker* two years previously, *Al-Ahrâm* recalled the adage, "If you are a liar then

you had better have a good memory," and went on: "But they lie and lie while their memory is weak." (*Ahrâm*, June 12)

The *Arab Observer* reported continued mass protests against the "vile campaign of calumny," and declared that the campaign, despite its ill intentions, had done the UAR more good than harm, for it had proved to the world, and especially to the delegates of the non-aligned states meeting in Cairo "how genuine the UAR's policy of neutrality and non-alignment is." (*Arab Obs.*, June 18)

A UAR "responsible authority" was quoted as saying that "we are putting our case, as it were, before the Asians and Africans at the neutralists' conference so they can see that power politics are practised by both sides..." He complained that the Russians "were for us when we were acting against the imperialists," but had grown more and more intolerant of the UAR's independent policy. "More and more they look at neutralism the way John Foster Dulles did," he said. "They say, 'the choice is between liberty and imperialism.'" (NYT, June 7)

Western Appraisals: UAR Attacks Soviet Propaganda Organs, Not Government; UAR Position Strengthened Among Non-Aligned. The *Daily Telegraph* correspondent reported that diplomats in Cairo regarded the current Soviet-UAR propaganda battle as having more foundation than previous clashes of this type. (*Daily Telegraph*, June 6)

Western embassies in Cairo were reported to believe that the UAR would drop its campaign as soon as the USSR showed signs of doing so. It had been noted that in contrast to the UAR's anti-Western campaigns, the current UAR attack on the Soviet Union was directed against Soviet propaganda organs and did not extend to the Soviet government. The opinion in diplomatic circles in Cairo was that the USSR had decided to intensify its campaign against the UAR out of annoyance at the UAR's part in arranging the neutralists' conference projected for Sept in Yugoslavia. Whatever the cause, the effect had been to strengthen Abdel Nasser's position among the non-aligned states. (*Scotsman*, June 17)

Another Western observer also remarked that the UAR preferred to see "the dispute with the Soviet press" kept below the official government level so as not to involve the names of Khrushchov and Abdel Nasser. (NYT, June 8)

The Campaign Subsides; Pravda Call To Preserve Friendship. On June 13, i.e. six days after *Al-Ahrâm* had challenged *Pravda* to print the "truth" concerning Riyâd al-Turk, a report of the latter's meeting with the press was published in *Trud* (*Trud*, June 13). Cairo Radio described the *Trud* report as a "retreat" on Moscow's part. (R. Cairo, June 14-JMB, June 14)

On June 17, *Pravda* published a lengthy article by I. Aleksandrov under the title "In Whose Interest Is This?" The author asserted that the contents of the *Pravda* article of May 31 which had been "permeated with solicitude for maintaining and improving the relations between our two countries" had been given a "distorted interpretation" in the UAR. It appeared, said Aleksandrov, that "MENA, which is the official agency of the UAR, also did not study the full text of this article." Noting that statements concerning Hilu's death had also been published by non-Communist sources, the author said: "Why then is the publication of similar material in the Soviet press regarded as interference?" The policy

of the Soviet Government was one of non-interference in other countries' affairs, but this did not prevent "public opinion and the press in the Soviet Union from expressing views on this or that event." After declaring that the Soviet people would "always raise their voice for the protection of victims of tyranny," Aleksandrov pointed out that the UAR's anti-Soviet press campaigns "are not proper and can never please anybody except the imperialist circles in the West, which have been working for years to drive a wedge in the relations of the Soviet Union and the UAR." In conclusion, the author noted: "Soviet-Arab friendship has endured the test of time... The Soviet Union cherishes this friendship, and therefore the Soviet Union is striving for its development and consolidation in the future. We should like to believe that the UAR is also striving for this." (*Pravda*, June 17)

On June 16 messages from Khrushchov and Brezhnev to Abdel Nasser on the occasion of the Muslim New Year, in which the Soviet leaders expressed their hope for continued friendship and cooperation with the UAR, as well as Abdel Nasser's reply reciprocating these sentiments, were published in Cairo, and two days later in Moscow. (*Ahram*, June 16; *Pravda*, June 18)

Also on June 18, Abdel Nasser received the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo at the latter's request. (*MENA*, June 18 [20])

There was an echo of the charges concerning Hili's death when *Asiya i Afrika Segodnya* published in Sept a "requiem" in Hili's memory by the Egyptian poet Nagib Surur. (*Mizan*, Dec)

POLITICAL RELATIONS

(July-October)

New UAR Ambassador Delays Taking Up Post. Muhammad Awad al-Kuni, UAR Ambassador in Moscow, left the Soviet Union in Feb to take up his appointment as UAR Ambassador in London (*Pravda*, Feb 18). In March it was reported that the new UAR Ambassador to Moscow, Murad Ghallib, formerly Ambassador to Congo, would take up his post at the end of March (*Ahram*, March 6). In April it was reported that Ghallib would leave for Moscow in time to attend the May Day celebrations (*Ahram*, April 4; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, April 17). Nothing further was heard of the matter until June when it was stated in Cairo that Ghallib's departure for the USSR had been postponed, with no reason given [but probably in connection with the propaganda campaign]. Ghallib finally arrived in Moscow on July 1 and presented his credentials on July 12. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, June 12; *Pravda*, July 2; *Izvestia*, July 13)

"Important" Letter from Khrushchov. In Aug it was reported from Cairo that the Soviet Ambassador had handed Abdel Nasser an "important political letter" from Khrushchov. The contents of the letter, said to be 14 pages long, were not revealed. (*MENA*, Aug 13 [15])

UAR Reaction to Soviet Nuclear Tests. On Aug 31, the eve of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, the USSR announced its intention to resume nuclear tests. In his speech at the conference Abdel Nasser expressed his "shock" at this step. An authoritative Cairo comment said Abdel Nasser had acted at a hint from Khrushchov. (For details, see pp 63 b-64 a.)

[UAR reaction to the Soviet Union's explosion of the 50-megaton plus bomb on Oct 23 was rather more critical.] A radio commentary said it made "observers won-

der why the Soviet Union should intentionally boast about the magnitude of its nuclear tests." US observers regarded the Soviet tests as aiming "at exploiting human fear... and hence at forcing humanity to accept anything imposed by the Soviet Union" as regards a nuclear tests agreement. The USSR may also intend "to exert pressure on the West to make it accept solutions of the Berlin, Laotian, Vietnamese and other issues," and "to deepen the gap between the Western allies" in respect of these questions. The broadcast recalled that "a similar campaign of threats" had taken place some years previously, when the USSR had announced its possession of inter-continental ballistic missiles. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 1 [3])

The *New York Times* reported that while there had been no official comment in Cairo, opinion there had become "increasingly critical" of the Soviet nuclear tests. (*NYT*, Nov 1)

Cairo Reaction to Soviet Recognition of Syrian Secession.

On Oct 9, two days after Soviet recognition of the break-away regime in Syria, the UAR Ambassador in Moscow, Murad Ghallib, was received by Khrushchov at his own request (*Pravda*, Oct 10). It was reported in Cairo that Khrushchov explained to the Ambassador the reasons for USSR recognition of the new Syrian regime. (*Pravda*, Oct 10; *Musanawer*, Oct 27)

The *New York Times* correspondent reported that "Egyptians were hurt, though not completely surprised, that the Soviet Union had moved ahead of the Western powers in offering diplomatic relations to those Abdel Nasser had branded tools of the 'imperialists' and of 'reactionary machinations'." The Cairo press had reported Soviet recognition "factually and prominently." And though there was "some puzzlement over the implications," the UAR press and radio had prepared the public for the possibility of Soviet recognition. (*NYT*, Oct 9; see also *Ahram*, *Gumhuriyah*, Oct 8)

POLITICAL RELATIONS

CAIRO ATTACKS ON COMMUNISM; PRESS AND RADIO RECRIMINATIONS

(October-December)

[Following the break-up of the UAR (Sept 28), the UAR press, in articles, in *post mortem* analyses on the Egyptian-Syrian union and in attacks on the Syrian regime, also criticized the Arab Communists, terming them enemies of Arab nationalism and collaborators with imperialism. The USSR was described as motivated by self-interest only in extending aid to the Arabs and she was even said to have reached an understanding with Britain on a common policy in the area. Soviet radio commentators reacted sharply to these articles.]

Haykal: Ousting of Communists From Nationalist Ranks A Major Achievement of the UAR. In one of his articles on the Egyptian-Syrian union, Muhammad Hassanin Haykal, chief editor of *Al-Ahram* [and official spokesman for President Abdel Nasser], wrote that the ousting of the Communists from the Arab national ranks was one of the "three victories" achieved under the union. Before the establishment of the union, during the phase of the purely anti-imperialist struggles, the Communists had stood in the nationalist ranks but at the point of union they parted ways. Haykal also mentioned that during the period of internal strife in Syria which preceded the union, the USSR—like the other great powers—had not kept aloof from this struggle; the USSR then supported

Egypt against the Baghdad pact and, at the same time, it backed the Syrian CP as a nucleus for the advancement of Communism in the Arab East. (*Ahram*, Oct 13; *R. Cairo*, Oct 13 [16])

Some days later, a Moscow Radio commentator took issue with *Al-Ahram* for having published "evil statements" designed to "mislead readers" in respect of certain parts in the CPSU Draft Programme dealing with nationalism and democracy. The broadcast warned that "such wicked distortions will not help to consolidate the friendship between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Oct 16 [SU 18])

Cairo Paper: Communists—The Enemies of Arab Nationalism. Moscow: Dirty Slander. In an article of Nov 13 on the Syrian situation, the *Cairo Al-Masā*, said experience had shown that the Communists, when finding themselves frustrated in their bid for power in an Arab country, preferred that it remain in a wretched state and under imperialist influence. They opposed the Arab nationalist movements, they fought the UAR and they cooperated with imperialism. Their aim was to raise doubt in the people's mind as regards the leader in their struggle, Gamāl Abdel Nasser. (*Masā*, Nov 13)

A Moscow Radio commentator, speaking of this "libelous and malicious" article which tried "to impose on the reader the idea that the Communists are the enemies of the Arab nation and the Arab liberation movement," said that this "dirty slander" was prompted by the magnitude of the interest which the CPSU Programme had aroused among the Arab peoples. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Nov 17 [SU 20])

Cairo Paper: British-Communist Agreement To Frustrate Arab Nationalism. Moscow: Paper Financed by U.S. An article in the *Cairo Al-Akhbar* of Dec 8, entitled "The Local Communists And Our Nationalist Setback," said *inter alia*: "Since Macmillan's visit to the USSR [Feb 21-March 3, 1959] and his agreement with her leaders on a common political design, the Arab nation has suffered from the consequences of the pact between the local Communists and the agents of Britain and their coming together with her imperialistic policy in one front against Arab nationalism and comprehensive Arab union." (*Akhbar*, Dec 8)

Moscow Radio reacted the next day. Such "malicious fabrications," said the commentator, were no rare phenomena in *Al-Akhbar*; US dollars had killed the sense of national dignity in the paper's "scribblers." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Dec 9 [SU 12])

Haykal: Soviet Support Motivated by Self-Interest, UAR Stands Alone in Battle. Moscow: Haykal Serves Imperialism. On Dec 15, Hassanin Haykal, in an article headed "We Face The Battle Alone," made the point—among others—that USSR as well as local Communist aid in the past battles of the Egyptian revolution and Arab nationalism had been given out of self-interest. The UAR had no right to blame the USSR for this attitude but it must remember how things stood. The Soviet Union, like any other great power, had its own interests and plans of operation; these might coincide with those of the UAR as in the Suez crisis when Egypt battled Western imperialism, or they might clash as in 1959 when the UAR opposed the "Communist attempt to control Iraq." As to the "Communist elements in the area"—"they wanted to use their hostility towards imperialism during the Suez crisis for activities beyond Suez... so that afterwards they would have something impressive and

effective to say"; they and the reactionaries who also gave their support during the crisis, were similarly motivated. Haykal recalled the clash between Arab nationalism and the Communist parties of Iraq and Syria in 1958-9 in which the first prevailed; the extent of the victory was symbolized by Khālid Bakdash having become "like a wandering Jew." (*Ahram*, Dec 15; *R. Cairo*, Dec 15 [18])

A week later Moscow Radio sharply criticized Haykal's "ugly and unsavoury article," in which he had tried "to deny the great importance of the cooperation between the socialist states and the Arab countries in the struggle of the Arabs for liberation and a better life," and had done "his utmost to make the ideas of the Communists appear contrary to the interests of the Arabs." The experience of past Soviet support for the Arabs, as well as the CPSU Programme, showed that Communist ideas were in "complete accord" with Arab national aspirations; Haykal's "cheap fabrication" did not deceive any one. "In whose interest is he trying to harm the co-operation between the socialist states and the Arab countries? The only answer to this question is: imperialism..." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Dec 16 [SU 20])

Soviet Veto of Kuwait UN Membership Interpreted As "Blow" at Abdel Nasser. On Nov 30 the Soviet Union vetoed the UAR-sponsored membership of Kuwait in the UN (S/PV 984, Nov 30). The *New York Herald Tribune*, in an editorial entitled "Moscow Slaps Nasser's Face," saw the Soviet veto in the Security Council as "obviously a blow at President Nasser." Khrushchov, said the paper, was antagonized by all three of Abdel Nasser's "postures": that of the Arab nationalist "who seeks Egyptian hegemony over the ME"; that of "high priest of neutralism"; and that of "the theoretician who thinks there is a non-Communist road to socialism" (*NYHT*, Dec 3). [There was no official UAR comment on the USSR veto. No editorial comment appeared on this topic in major Cairo papers.]

MILITARY RELATIONS

MIG Aircraft for UAR. Israel press and radio sources, quoting a dispatch by the Beirut correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, reported in March that the UAR had received a squadron of some 15 MIG-19 jet fighters from the USSR. (*R. Israel in English*, March 10 [W 16]; *Ha'Oretz*, March 12)

In Nov there were reports of UAR efforts to acquire more advanced Soviet jet fighters—MIG 21—capable of matching the performance of the US "Starfighter" and the French "Mirage-3" (*Ha'Oretz*, Nov 14). The *New York Times* referred to reports of UAR pilots training in the Soviet Union and added that according to reports the UAR "recently received new MIG jet fighters from the USSR." (*NYT*, Dec 31)

Acquisition of Naval Units from the USSR; Visit of Soviet Naval Delegation. At the end of Dec the arrival of a number of Soviet- and Czechoslovak-built vessels for the UAR navy was reported in the Cairo and foreign press. According to the *Cairo Al-Masā* the UAR navy had become "the most powerful striking force in the Eastern Mediterranean," as the result of the latest naval acquisitions from the Eastern bloc. French press reports said the new naval units consisted primarily of submarines but also included some minesweepers (*Masā*, Dec 26; *Monde*, Dec 27; *Figaro*, Dec 27). "One or two destroyers" were also believed to be included. (*NYT*, Dec 31)

The arrival of these acquisitions coincided with the visit in the UAR of Admiral S.G. Gorskoy, C-in-C of the Soviet navy.

From Dec 12-25 Admiral Gorskoy, at the head of an eight-member naval delegation, toured UAR naval installations, attended naval exercises and was received by Abdel Nasser and FM Amer; the latter was presented with a sword bearing the insignia of the Soviet navy. Tass reported that Vice-Admiral Sulayman Izrat, Commander of the UAR navy, had expressed to Gorskoy "hearty gratitude for the disinterested assistance the Soviet Union was rendering to the UAR with the object of strengthening the defence of the UAR." A Western paper said that a UAR request for the supply of additional Soviet submarines was discussed during the Admiral's visit. (*MENA, Dec 12 [15]; Tass in English, Dec 13 [SU 15]; MENA; R. Cairo, Dec 20 [22]; MENA, Dec 25 [W 28]; Scotsman, Dec 18*)

Reports of Soviet Naval Base in the UAR Denied. In Dec it was reported by Israel and Western sources that the UAR and the Soviet Union had agreed on the establishment of a Soviet naval base in the UAR to replace the Soviet base at Valona. Admiral Gorskoy's visit to the UAR was said to be connected with the project. (*Ha'aretz, Dec 27; Daily Telegraph; Figaro, Dec 27; "Voice of the Free" in Arabic, Dec 28 [30]*)

The reports were denied from Cairo as "a fantastic manoeuvre," "a fabricated story," and "a transparent Israel campaign based on naive imagination." (*MENA, Dec 27 [29]; Mid. Mir., Dec 30*)

The Scotsman said the reports of Soviet bases were discounted by authoritative sources. The USSR would undermine its whole campaign against Western foreign bases, these sources pointed out, if it sought bases in the UAR. The Tel-Aviv Ha'aretz noted that the granting of a Soviet base would run counter to the logic of Abdel Nasser's policy which was founded on playing off the two world blocs against one another; however, the paper did not preclude the possibility that the provision of refuelling and maintenance facilities for Soviet ships in UAR ports may have been under discussion. (*Scotsman, Dec 18; Ha'aretz, Dec 28*)

Reports of New UAR-USSR Arms Deal. At the end of Dec an Israel paper reported that discussions currently held in Moscow between the UAR Ambassador and the Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister, A. Mikoyan, were believed to turn on a new arms deal. The prospect of further Soviet arms supplies to the UAR could be inferred from Abdel Nasser's speech of Dec 23 in which he had said that the UAR was in the process of "doubling" her armed forces. (*Ha'aretz, Dec 26*)

ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID (EGYPT)

[No new aid agreement was concluded by the two countries during 1961. All projects mentioned below were executed in the framework of previous agreements.]

Scope of Aid, Industrial Enterprises, Shipyard, Power Plant. In April an official USSR source was quoted to the effect that the USSR was assisting in the construction of over 90 industrial and other enterprises in the UAR. Among these were 11 "engineering" enterprises, four factories for oils and lubricants, six chemical and pharmaceutical plants, four factories for agricultural produce and three textile plants. (*Gumhuriyah, April 21*)

In the same month the UAR Central Minister of Industry stated that the USSR was participating in 53

UAR industrial enterprises to the value of close on ££47m. (*Eg. Gaz., May 1*)

In Feb it was announced that the USSR would supply machinery, equipment and technical assistance for a pharmaceuticals plant of the Nasr Medical Chemicals Company. The total cost of the factory was estimated at ££3m.; it was to employ some 1,000 workers and supply 90% of local needs. The installation of the Soviet equipment was scheduled to begin in mid-1962. (*R. Cairo, Feb 14 [W 23]; R. Cairo, Feb 14-IMB, Feb 15; MEED, Feb 24*)

Miscellaneous Projects. In Feb the director of the central military workshops went to the USSR for discussions concerning the Alexandria shipyard project. (*Ahram, Feb 17; see also MER 1960, p 85*)

In March it was reported that Soviet experts were designing two extension plants to the Helwan steel mills, namely an ore-processing plant for the enrichment of iron ore mined at Aswan and a new rolling mill with an initial capacity of 200,000 tons. (*MEED, March 24*)

Also in March a contract was signed with the USSR for the construction of a 75,000 kw. power station at Suez. A team of UAR experts was due to leave for the USSR in April in connection with the project. (*Gumhuriyah, March 15; Ahram, April 10*)

Atomic Centre. In March it was reported from Moscow that a nuclear physics laboratory had been opened in the UAR Atomic Centre [at Inshas] and that the testing of the first accelerator of fundamental particles with a power of 2.5m. electron volts had been started. Soviet specialists had participated in the installation of the laboratory. (*R. Moscow, March 23 [W 30]*)

The testing of the 2,000 kw nuclear reactor at Inshas (see MER 1960, p 85) was begun on July 27. The reactor was manufactured in the USSR in accordance with an agreement of July 12, 1956, and a team of Soviet experts, headed by A.G. Orekhov, assisted in its installation as well as in the training of UAR personnel. The Chairman of the UAR Atomic Energy Commission declared that the reactor was intended for the production of radioactive isotopes and research in nuclear physics and biology. (*Tass, July 28 [W Aug 3]; MEED, Aug 4*). In Oct it was announced that the reactor had begun full-capacity operations. (*Izvestia, Oct 10*)

Prospecting and Mining. In Feb it was reported that oil deposits had been discovered on the Red Sea coast, with the aid of Soviet specialists and equipment. (*R. Moscow, Feb 23 [SU, 25]*)

In March Moscow reported the discovery of iron and uranium deposits with the aid of Soviet experts and especially equipped USSR-supplied aircraft. Another Moscow report said that thorium had been found in the Eastern desert. (*R. Moscow, March 24, 25 [30]*)

In April it was announced that seven UAR experts from the Qina mining centre would be sent to the USSR for training and the acquisition of training equipment for the technical school at Qina. (*Jaridah Ramiyah, April 16; Akhbar, May 7*)

In May it was reported that agreement had been reached on the supply of Soviet equipment for deep-sea oil prospecting in the Red Sea (*Akhbar al-Yawm, May 6*), and a UAR official went to Moscow for further talks regarding the import of oil drilling and mining machinery from the USSR. (*Akhbar, May 15*)

In June four Soviet geological experts were expected in the UAR; one was a specialist in under-water oil

drilling; the others would assist UAR engineers in the new Sinai coal mines (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, June 3). [On the discovery of coal deposits in the Sinai Peninsula, see MER 1960, p. 85.]

In Nov it was reported that a team of Soviet and UAR geologists were preparing to conduct a survey of water resources along the north-western coast. (*Ahram*, Nov 23)

In Dec a report from Moscow stated that "the world's first seismographic ship" was being constructed in the Ukraine for the UAR; it would be completed in 1962 and used for oil and gas prospecting in the Red Sea. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Dec 15 [SU 20])

Study Tours; Visits; Technical Assistance. In Dec 1960 it was reported that 50 UAR scientists would be sent to the USSR in Jan for advanced training in different fields of science, including nuclear physics and engineering. (*Ahram*, Dec 25, 1960)

Three Soviet scientists arrived in Cairo in Jan for an expected six-week stay to do research on the black spots that had appeared in Egyptian cotton. (*Gumhuriyah*, Jan 23)

Two Soviet experts arrived in Cairo in Jan for an expected two months stay for work in crystallography at the National Research Centre. (*Ahram*, Jan 29)

In March it was announced that four UAR railway experts would leave for a six-week visit to the USSR to inspect railway installations and materials contracted for by the UAR. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, March 21)

THE ASWAN HIGH DAM

Soviet Statement on Progress of Work. On the first anniversary of the inauguration of the Aswan construction project, *Izvestia* published a statement by the First Deputy Chairman for Foreign Economic Relations, I.V. Arkhimov, in the course of which he remarked that the main attention of the Egyptian and Soviet specialists in 1960 had been devoted to the setting up of the building site and a network of roads, the organization of water and electricity supplies and the construction of various subsidiary undertakings. At the same time work on the diversion canal was carried out and by the end of 1961 3.5m. cubic metres of earth would have been extracted. "The most diverse construction equipment was brought to Aswan from the Soviet Union... Up to a hundred Soviet enterprises were engaged in the deliveries... Soviet and Egyptian specialists are in charge of the work. By the end of the year they numbered 330. About 3,000 Egyptian workers are also taking part in the construction work." (*Izvestia*, Jan 10; *Mizan*, Feb)

Supreme Soviet Ratifies Aswan Agreement. On Jan 25 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified the agreement of Aug 27, 1960 on Soviet economic and technical assistance to the UAR in the construction of the Aswan High Dam (*Pravda*, Jan 27). The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Cairo on March 2. (*R. Cairo*, March 2-IMB, March 3)

Electric Power Installations. In Nov contracts were signed in Cairo which provided for the design by Soviet experts of a high-voltage electricity grid, including a transformer station to connect the electric power station at Aswan with Cairo, Tanta and Alexandria. The value of the contracts was given as over ££2.6m. (*R. Moscow*, in *Arabic*, Nov 28 [SU, Dec 1]; *Ahram*, Nov 28; *MEED*, Dec 8). [A Soviet team of experts came to Cairo in April in this connection.]

UAR Office for High Dam Affairs Opened in Moscow. A special UAR liaison office to supervise the manufacture and shipment of Soviet equipment for the Aswan High Dam was opened in Moscow in the spring (*Ahram*, April 24, July 1). [Reports of equipment dispatched from the USSR for the High Dam were published sporadically in the Soviet and UAR press throughout the year.]

UAR Criticized for Lack of Publicity. An account of a tour of the Aswan High Dam for foreign journalists, published in *Izvestia* of Sept 14, criticized the UAR authorities for their alleged failure to accord adequate publicity to the project in general and to Soviet assistance in particular. The writer recorded the reply he received from an official of the UAR Information Ministry when he "tactfully hinted" at the lack of publicity: "[He] admitted as an indisputable truth: 'Just now there is nothing to say about it; after all the building has not yet been finished.'" "It is clear," the writer went on, "that this point of view, most unfortunately, was not confined to [this official]."

Similar criticism was voiced in a *Pravda* article of the same date. (*Mizan*, Oct)

CULTURAL RELATIONS

For the terms of the UAR-USSR cultural cooperation agreement for 1961/62, see MER 1960, p. 86.

Russian And Arabic Language Teaching. A Soviet source said that the Russian language courses, organized by Russians at the Cairo Higher School of Foreign Languages in 1957, had proved extremely popular. At the end of 1960 there were more than 150 students taking these courses. The first students would graduate in 1961 and be qualified to work as Russian translators and secondary school teachers. (*Mizan*, Feb)

In Jan it was reported that a lecturer from Ayn Shams University had been appointed to teach Arabic at Moscow University (*Akhbar*, Jan 11); another left Cairo in July to teach Arabic literature there. (*Gumhuriyah*, July 5)

In Oct it was reported that a lecturer from Moscow University had arrived in the UAR in order to teach at Asyut University and to supervise the Soviet-equipped workshops of the University's engineering faculty. (*Masa*, Oct 25)

In Nov it was reported that five students had arrived in the UAR to study Arabic at Cairo University. (*Masa*, Nov 22)

UAR Television Specialists in USSR. The deputy director of UAR television visited Moscow in Jan for talks on the exchange of television programmes.

Ten television specialists were expected to arrive in Moscow on Jan 7 (*R. Moscow*, Jan 4-IMB, Jan 5). A UAR television delegation arrived in Baku on Feb 6 to study local television services. (*R. Baku in Arabic*, Feb 6 [SU, 9])

Soviet Cultural Mission. A Soviet cultural mission, led by M.I. Makhmutov, Minister of Education of the Tatar Autonomous SSR, visited the UAR in Jan. (*Tass in English*, Jan 7 [SU 10]; *R. Damascus*, Jan 13 [16])
USSR Artists; Film Week. The Bolshoi Ballet toured the UAR in Feb; they performed in Cairo, Alexandria and Damascus. (*Pravda*, Feb 3, 4, 17; *ANA*, Feb 25 [W, March 2])

The Soviet composer Aram Khachaturian gave a series of concerts in the Egyptian R. in May. (*Tass*, May 3 [W 11]; *Pravda*, May 7)

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The Armenian Republic State Dance Ensemble performed in Alexandria in Nov. (*Pravda*, Nov 14)

A Soviet film week was held in Cairo in Oct. The films were seen by a total audience of some 30,000. The *Pravda* correspondent in Cairo reported that the film "Communist," shown in Cairo under the title "A Fighter for a Better Life," had received particular acclaim. (*Pravda*, Oct 11)

UAR Visits and Study Tours in USSR. Tharwat Uki-shah, Egyptian R. Minister of Culture and National Guidance, stated in March that 22 officials of the Ministry were to go to the USSR for one-year study courses in such fields as theatre, documentary films, music, plastic arts and printing, starting from April. (*Gumhuriyah*, March 19)

The rectors of the universities of Cairo, Alexandria,

Damascus and Aleppo left at the end of Aug on a three-week tour of academic institutions in the Soviet Union. The tour was under the terms of the UAR-USSR cultural agreement. (*Musawwar*, Aug 30)

UAR Shows in USSR. The UAR national folk dance ensemble toured Moscow, Leningrad and Tiflis in Aug. (*Pravda*, Aug 23, 25)

A UAR film festival was held in Moscow and Tiflis in Nov. (*Pravda*, Nov 14; *R. Moscow in Arabic*, Nov 25 [SU, 28])

Soviet Archaeological Mission. A group of Soviet archaeologists went to Egypt in Dec, for research in the region expected to be flooded by the waters of the Aswan Dam. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Dec 1 [SU, 4])

OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

ALBANIA

Albania. In May it was reported that an Albanian offer to negotiate a trade agreement with the UAR was being studied by the UAR authorities. (*Gumhuriyah*, May 5)

In Dec, the UAR Ambassador in Albania was recalled for consultations on developments in Albania. (*MENA*, Dec 14 [6])

BULGARIA

Note: For Bulgaria's relations with the Syrian R. before the break-up of the UAR, see under: Syria.

Economic Relations. In Feb Sofia Radio reported that Bulgaria's trade with Egypt and Syria had expanded from \$1.2m. in 1953 to \$13.7m. in 1957. [Figures for 1958-60 were not given.] Bulgaria's biggest import item from both countries was cotton—over 3,000 tons in 1957 and over 4,000 tons in 1959. (*R. Sofia*, Feb 4 [EE 8])

On April 12 the Bulgarian Ambassador was received by UAR Vice-President Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi "in connection with certain measures designed to expand economic relations between the UAR and Bulgaria." (*BTA in English*, April 12 [EE 14])

Political Relations. On Oct 11 *MENA* reported that a Bulgarian delegation, headed by the Deputy-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was due to visit the UAR as part of a tour of ME countries. Two days later *Al-Akhbar* reported that the visit had been cancelled. The omission of the UAR from the delegation's itinerary, which included Iraq, Tunis and Syria, was seen by *The Scotsman* as "evidence of the Soviet bloc's currently unfriendly attitude towards President Abdel Nasser's Egypt." (*MENA*, Oct 11 [13]; *Akhbar*, Oct 13; *Scotsman*, Dec 13)

CHINA PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

Trade. A protocol extending the Chinese-UAR trade agreement for the third year was signed in Cairo on Feb 3, providing, as formerly, for trade to the value of ££15m. each way. (compare MER 1960, p 88) The UAR would import, among other goods, meat, tea, coffee, minerals, chemicals, metals and machinery in return for cotton and cotton products. China, a major importer

of UAR cotton in 1960, had made no purchase of cotton since the beginning of the current season, it was reported. (*Gumhuriyah*, Feb 6; *R. Cairo*, Feb 5 [W 9]; *MEED*, Feb 10)

The value of UAR exports was reported to have increased from ££500,000 in 1955 to ££11.8m. in 1959. UAR imports from China rose in the same period from ££32,000 to ££8.3m. (*Gumhuriyah*, Jan 23)

A first export shipment of 17,000 tons of UAR petrol left Suez for China on April 14. (*MENA*, April 14 [17])

Miscellaneous. The Deputy Chairman of the All-China Students' Federation went to Cairo in Feb to attend the conference of the General Union of Students of the UAR. (*NCNA*, Feb 5 [FE, 7])

The Chinese Deputy Minister of Agriculture headed a delegation to the International Agricultural Fair which opened in Cairo on March 25 (*NCNA*, March 18 [FE, 21]). On April 26 the Chinese Pavilion, the largest at the Fair, was gutted by a fire ascribed to an accident. (*NYT*, April 27; *Mid. Mir.*, April 29)

In April it was reported that the Chinese Embassy in Cairo had succeeded in finding a vice-consul on its staff who had disappeared five weeks previously under mysterious circumstances. The UAR security services had been requested to assist in the search. (*MENA*, April 6 [8])

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Note: For Czechoslovak relations with the Syrian R. before the break-up of the UAR, see under: Syria.

Economic Cooperation, Trade. In Jan it was reported that a new oil refinery plant with a daily capacity of 3,000 tons was to be erected at the Suez government refineries by the Czechoslovak Techno-Export organization. A similar plant was to be constructed at Alexandria. (*Akram*, Jan 13)

In Feb, a Czechoslovak economic mission, led by the Minister of Foreign Trade, F. Krajcir, visited Cairo. *MENA* quoted the Minister as stating that Czechoslovakia had "in the past few years" supplied the UAR with a number of complete factories that were already in full operation. These included a cement factory, a

ceramics factory, equipment for the shoe and rubber works in Tahrir Province and for the oil refinery at Suez, two furnaces for iron and steel foundries and 50 automatic looms for the Misr Textile Company. A 1,000,000 ton oil refinery unit was being built with Czechoslovak equipment. Czechoslovakia had also supplied two turbine generators, 14 electrical power units, water installations, 1,000 tractors, sugar cane pressing machines and mills, as well as equipment for a salt refinery in Alexandria. The value of UAR-Czechoslovakia trade in 1961 was expected to reach £E30m. Czechoslovakia was currently the largest single buyer of Egyptian cotton. (*MENA*, Feb 18, 22 [W, Feb 23, March 2]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 17, 26)

The UAR Central Minister of Industry, Dr. Aziz Sidqi, stated on April 30 that Czechoslovakia was participating in 13 projects of the current UAR industrialization programme; the total value of Czechoslovak contracts was £E3,565,700. (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 1)

In March the signing of a UAR-Czechoslovak contract was reported for the supply of equipment for the electrification of 34 Egyptian villages; agreement was also reached on the construction of two power plants at Talha. The cornerstone of the Talha project was laid in July. The station would have a capacity of 40,000 kw and cost £E4,250,000. (*Gumhuriyah*, March 14, July 26)

In Sept it was reported that Czechoslovakia would extend a credit of £E8.7m. to the UAR for the purchase of machinery under the current economic cooperation agreement. About £E1m. of the above would go to the Syrian R. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Sept 4)

Trade talks were held in Nov when the Czechoslovak Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Dr. Kohout, visited Cairo. It was agreed that trade exchanges between the two countries would be based on world prices and that each would refrain from re-exporting its imports from the other. Czechoslovak purchases of UAR cotton, which had dropped to 33,613 kantars in Sept and Oct, the two months of the current cotton season, as compared with 142,879 kantars in the same months of 1960, were also discussed and it was decided to negotiate specific quotas in the beginning of 1962. Agreement was reached on the import of wood pulp from Czechoslovakia to the value of £E500,000. (*Gumhuriyah*, Nov 14; *MEED*, Nov 24; *R. Cairo*, Nov 13-14; *IMB*, Nov 14)

Cultural Relations. In April-May a Czechoslovak scientist trained 40 scientists in his method of defining matter through electrical analysis. (*MENA*, March 7 [W 16])

A Czechoslovak scientist attended the centenary celebrations of the Egyptian Institute of Oriental Studies. (*R. Brodskova*, March 20 [EE 23]; *CTK in English*, May 2 [EE 4])

An exhibition of drawings and photographs was opened at the Czechoslovak Cultural Centre in Cairo on March 16 (*Czechoslovak Press Service*, March 16 [W 23]). Czech language evening classes were scheduled to open at this Centre on Oct 1. (*Maso*, Sept 16)

A team of Czechoslovak archaeologists went to the UAR in April to continue work in the area to be flooded by the Aswan High Dam lake. (*CTK in English*, April 11 [EE 13])

A UAR delegation was due to attend an international congress on cooperation in Prague in June-July. (*Akkor*, June 2)

An exhibition of Egyptian crafts was to be held in Czechoslovakia in Jan 1962. (*Gumhuriyah*, Nov 15)

Czechoslovak Parliamentary Delegation in UAR. The delegation visited the UAR in April and was received by President Abdel Nasser. (*R. Cairo*, April 4 [6]; *MENA*, April 12 [14]; *Akkor*, April 7)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Note: For GDR relations with the Syrian R. before the break-up of the UAR, see under: Syria.

Political Relations, Ministerial Visits. (*Note:* The GDR had no formal diplomatic relations with the UAR or any other Arab country.)

Heinrich Rau, the GDR Deputy PM and Minister of Trade, visited the UAR from Jan 24-31 at the invitation of President Abdel Nasser. Following his meeting with the President, Rau stated that he was in "complete accord" with him on the resolutions of the Casablanca Conference, and added: "We agree with you completely that Israel is a prop and an agent of imperialism in this area." Asked about his reaction to reports of an Israel atomic bomb, Rau said that "if this is true it is a catastrophe for humanity." Rau also stated that the GDR might participate in the implementation of some of the projects under the second five-year plan and had agreed to buy Egyptian cotton and cotton products under the £E32m. trade agreement. [See also MER 1960, p 87.] Specific subjects covered in Rau's discussions with various UAR Ministers were cooperation in maritime transport, the purchase of ships by the UAR and the training of UAR personnel in the GDR as well as the dispatch of GDR instructors to the UAR.

Commenting on the visit, the *Egyptian Gazette* described Rau as the "representative of a government which from the day of its existence has been struggling for peace and understanding among the people." (*MENA*, Jan 29 [31]; *ADN in German*, Jan 25 [EE 26]; *R. Cairo*, Jan 31 [W, Feb 9]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 25, 30, Feb 8; *Arab Obs.*, Feb 5)

The UAR Minister for Municipal and Rural Affairs, Muhammad Abu Nusayr, visited the GDR in March for one week at the head of an official delegation. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 12)

The GDR Minister of Agriculture, Hans Reichelt, arrived in Cairo at the head of an official delegation for the opening of the International Agricultural Exhibition. On his return to the GDR Reichelt stated that he had agreed with the UAR on wider cooperation in the realm of agriculture. (*ADN in German*, March 21, 22 [EE 23, 24]; *Deutschlandsender Home Service*, March 30 [EE, April 4]; *Eg. Gaz.*, March 24)

The appointment of Ambassador Wolfgang Kiesewetter as GDR Plenipotentiary to the Arab States with headquarters in Cairo was announced on March 16. (*Mid. Mir.*, March 18)

The elevation of the GDR trade mission in Damascus to the status of Consulate-General was announced on May 12. This was followed by a clash between Bonn and Cairo over the issue. (See above: The GFR.)

The GDR Minister of Reconstruction and Development, Ernst Scholz, arrived in the UAR in Dec for a five-day official visit. He had talks with President Abdel Nasser and others. (*Mid. Mir.*, Dec 9; *Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 8, 11)

Trade and Aid. In Jan discussions took place in Cairo concerning GDR participation in developing the UAR's transport and communications network within the framework of the second five-year plan. (*ADN in German*, Jan 16 [EE 18])

The GDR Deputy PM and Minister of Trade, Heinrich Rau, stated following his visit to the UAR in Jan [see above] that the UAR was the GDR's biggest overseas trading partner. The current trade agreement with the UAR which provided for £E32m. worth of trade in 1961 exceeded the 1960 target by £E4m. Actual trade in 1960 had totalled £E23m. In addition to cotton and cotton products the GDR would buy tropical fruit and shoes from the UAR. (*Arab Obs.*, Feb 5; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 6, 8; *ADN in German*, Feb 4 [EE 8]; see also tables of trade, pp 82-7.)

In Feb a group of ten UAR television employees returned to Cairo from a two-month study tour of the East Berlin television studios. (*Gumhuriyah*, Feb 11)

In Feb a Misr Bank executive was due to leave for the GDR to purchase equipment for an ink factory. (*Ahram*, Feb 24)

In March, following the visit of Muhammad Abu Nusayr to the GDR [see above], it was reported that the GDR would supply equipment for municipal projects in the Egyptian R. to the value of £E2m. Payment would be made over a period of five years at 2.5% interest. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 12; *MENA*, March 11 [W 16])

In April it was reported that the UAR had concluded a £E24m. contract for the purchase of 100 mobile power units from the GDR. (*MENA*, April 5 [W 13])

The complete equipment for an artificial insemination station was presented by the GDR as a gift to the UAR at the conclusion of the International Agricultural Fair in Cairo (*R. Cairo*, April 30 [W, May 4]). GDR scientists gave a series of lectures on agricultural problems at UAR scientific institutions. (*Akhbar*, April 20)

It was officially announced in Cairo in April that the GDR was participating in 23 UAR industrial development projects to the value of £E6,588,006. (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 1)

In Nov GDR experts arrived in Cairo for negotiations concerning the extension of the Damamhur power station. The cost of the project was given as £E6m. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, Nov 4)

Release of UAR Students. Two UAR students who had been sentenced by a GDR court to imprisonment of eighteen months and three years on a charge of attempting to smuggle a family from the GDR to West Germany, were released after spending eighty days in prison. (*MENA*, Dec 1 [2])

HUNGARY

Note: For Hungary's relations with the Syrian R. before the break-up of the UAR, see under: Syria.

Economic Cooperation, Trade. In Oct, a UAR official discussed in Budapest the strengthening of economic relations in general and the utilization of Hungarian credits in particular. The outstanding Hungarian credit was reported to be £E8m. (In Dec 1960, Hungary extended to the UAR a credit of £E6m. [See MER 1960, p 88].) £E2m. worth of these credits would be utilized for the purchase of railway carriages (*Masa*, Oct 13). Two weeks earlier the Egyptian R. Minister of Communications, accompanied by railway officials, had arrived in Hungary (*MTI in French*, Sept 29 [EE, Oct 4]). Sixty railway carriages from Hungary had been expected in Alexandria at the beginning of the year. (*Ahram*, Jan 26)

Three tug boats of 1,000 hp each were scheduled for delivery to the UAR from Hungary in 1961-62 (*Ahram*, Dec 12, 1960). A 1,400-passenger ship, on order for the UAR, was launched from a Hungarian shipyard, it was

reported in Oct. Two vessels of 1,400 tons capacity each were under construction for the UAR at a cost of some £E500,000 each. (*Masa*, Oct 2)

Study Courses; Training. A hundred and twelve Arab students were to study agronomy in Hungary during 1961, under the terms of the technical scientific cooperation agreement; 86 students from an Egyptian agricultural college arrived in Hungary in March. (*MTI*, March 9 [EE 11])

The Hungarian language was to be taught as a basic course at UAR technical training institutions, it was announced in April. (*Ahram*, April 25)

Six Hungarian engineers were signed on to teach at the Shibin al-Qawm School of Engineering, near Cairo, for a period of two years beginning in 1961. (*MTI*, Sept 13 [EE, Sept 14])

In Nov, 84 UAR students arrived in Budapest for ten months of industrial training. (*MTI*, Nov 10 [EE 14])

A four-week exhibition of Hungarian scientific instruments was opened in Cairo on March 25. (*Masa*, March 26)

NORTH KOREA

A North Korean Government delegation led by the Minister of Education visited the UAR in July-Aug and on July 31 concluded an agreement on the establishment of consular relations and the promotion of cultural exchanges between the two countries. It was also agreed to have N. Korean newspaper correspondents permanently in Cairo. (*KCNA*, Aug 2, *NCNA*, Aug 3 [EE, 4])

POLAND

Note: For Poland's relations with the Syrian R. before the break-up of the UAR, see under: Syria.

Economic Relations. In Jan the Trade Counsellor at the Polish Embassy in Cairo declared that his country was prepared to extend credit facilities for industrial development projects in the UAR (*Akhbar*, Jan 15). The offer was discussed at meetings between the Counsellor and the UAR Central Minister of Industry in April and June. (*R. Cairo*, April 15 [W 20]; *Eg. Gaz.*, June 20)

In Feb a Polish delegation, led by the Minister of Shipping, visited the UAR for talks on cooperation in maritime affairs in general and the fishing industry in particular. (The visit followed that of a UAR delegation to Poland in Nov 1960—see MER 1960, p 88.) On Feb 23 an agreement was signed under which Polish experts would study the prevention of erosion in the Egyptian coastal zone, and draft plans for the reopening of the Damietta Strait. Poland would also assist in the establishment of vocational centres for fishermen in the UAR and train UAR fishermen in Poland. The UAR would buy fishing boats and fishery equipment in Poland. Supplementary agreements for individual projects would be concluded later on. (*R. Warsaw*, Feb 5 [EE 8]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 24)

In March it was reported that a team of Polish technicians would shortly begin work on the repair of the canal linking the lakes north of the Delta to the Mediterranean, so as to facilitate the free flow of fish from the sea into the lakes. (*Masa*, March 31)

In March, it was reported that three petroleum tankers which the UAR had bought in Poland for the UAR would "sail shortly." (*Ahram*, March 18)

A group of Polish experts began a survey of the site of Gaza port, it was reported in May. (*R. Cairo*, May 24 [W, June 1])

In Sept it was reported that a factory for the manufacture of dyeing and printing materials would be built at Ismailiya by a Polish engineering company at a cost of £E5m. It was planned as the nucleus of an organic chemicals industry and would have a potential annual output of over 2,000 tons of chemical dyes and of about 2,000 tons of by-products. (MEED, Sept 8)

Cultural Relations. In Jan an exhibition of archaeological finds, excavated by a Polish expedition at Tall Atrib in Lower Egypt, was opened at the Polish National Museum in Warsaw (PAP in English, Jan 7 [EE 10]). In Feb it was reported that a team of Polish archaeologists had uncovered important finds in Kom al-Dik Square in the centre of Alexandria. A Polish archaeological team had also worked in Sudanese Nubia, in an area due to be flooded by the Aswan dam lake. In the next few years Polish teams would work simultaneously in six sectors in Egypt and Syria. A Polish film team was expected to arrive in the UAR in March to film work on the various sites. (PAP in English, Feb 2 [EE 4])

The Education Minister for the Egyptian R., Ahmad Nagib Hashim, received the Rector of Warsaw University on Jan 19. They discussed cultural relations. (R. Cairo, Jan 19 [W 26])

The Vice-Chairman of the Polish State Council, Prof. Oskar Lange, arrived in Cairo at the end of Feb on a week's visit. He was to give a series of lectures on economic planning. (R. Warsaw, Feb 27 [EE 28])

RUMANIA

Note: For Rumania's relations with the Syrian R. before the break-up of the UAR, see under: Syria.

Rumanian Offer to Participate in UAR Industrialization. Proposals for participation in the UAR five-year industrialization programme were submitted by the Rumanian government to the UAR, it was reported in May. (Ruz al-Yusuf, May 15)

Purchase of Ships Negotiated. In June representatives of Rumanian shippers visited Alexandria and conducted negotiations concerning the sale of cargo vessels to the UAR. (Masa, June 29)

NORTH VIETNAM

On April 9 a North Vietnamese trade mission, headed by Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem, arrived in Cairo after a tour of African countries to conduct talks on increasing trade, and to amend the existing agreement including credit facilities within the limit of £E100,000. President Abdel Nasser received the mission, and accepted an invitation to visit North Vietnam in the coming year. (R. Cairo, April 11 [W 20]; NCNA, April 15 [EE 19])

Cairo Radio reported that a "businessmen's delegation" would go to North Vietnam to conclude trade deals there and market Arab products, and to study Vietnamese production. (R. Cairo, April 11 [W 20])

MENA reported that the Vietnamese FM had proposed to the deputy FM of the UAR, Dhu al-Fiqar Sabri, that the UAR recognize his government, with representation at embassy or legation level, that the commercial office in Cairo should become a consulate-general, "or" that the UAR should simultaneously recognize both the North and South Vietnam governments. Sabri told him the last proposal would mean increasing cold-war tension but he would discuss the other two proposals. (MENA, April 14 [15])

In May, it was reported that the North Vietnam

commercial office in Cairo had been transformed into a consulate-general. (Ahram, May 13)

YUGOSLAVIA

Abdel Nasser-Tito Meetings; Coordination of Non-Alignment Policy. President Abdel Nasser and Tito met three times during the year: in April in Egypt, when they jointly issued invitations for a conference of non-aligned countries; in Sept in Belgrade during this conference, and in Nov in Cairo, when they conferred with PM Nehru of India on questions of non-alignment policy. (For details see p 56 ff.)

Economic Cooperation; Yugoslav Aid. (For economic cooperation with the Syrian R. see under: Syria.)

On Jan 10 an agreement on economic and industrial cooperation was signed at Belgrade between Yugoslavia and the UAR, by their respective Ministers of Industry. Yugoslavia granted the UAR a credit of \$20m to buy Yugoslav industrial plants, machines and spare parts (Eg. Gaz., Jan 10, 11; MEED, Jan 13; Arab Obs., Jan 15; see also MER 1960, p 554). On Jan 19 the first contracts under the agreement were signed in Cairo. (MENA, Jan 20 [W 26]; MEED, Jan 27)

In March the first session of the Yugoslav-UAR joint committee for economic cooperation took place in Cairo. The Yugoslav delegation was headed by Mijalko Todorovic, Deputy Chairman of the Federal Executive Council [i.e., one of the four vice-presidents of the Republic]; the UAR team—by Abd al-Latif al-Baghaddadi, Vice-President and Central Minister of Planning. (The establishment of this committee was announced in the joint communiqué of Presidents Abdel Nasser and Tito following their meeting in Brioni in June 1960. See MER 1960, p 553.) On March 21 agreements were signed, covering (1) the future working of the joint committee which was to meet at least once a year; (2) further projects to be financed by the Yugoslav \$20m. credit (see above); (3) an annex to the existing industrial cooperation agreement, extending it to the Syrian R.; (4) measures for cooperation in economic planning, the exchange of experts, and agriculture. (R. Cairo, March 11-IMB, March 12; Eg. Gaz., March 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24; Tanyug, March 21 [EE 23]; MEED, March 24)

In July a contract was signed for the construction by a Yugoslav firm of an agricultural tractor factory in Helwan. (R. Cairo July 20 [W 27]; MEED, July 28; MEED, July 26, 1963)

In Aug it was announced that in Oct Baghdadi would attend a meeting of the joint committee in Belgrade (Eg. Gaz., Aug 25). [The visit had not materialized by the end of the year.]

Agreement on Nuclear Research. On April 6 the UAR and Yugoslavia signed an agreement in Cairo on cooperation in the fields of nuclear research and processing nuclear raw materials; the agreement also provided for UAR experts to study in Yugoslavia and for a joint commission to prospect for uranium ore in the UAR. (Tanyug, April 5 [EE 7]; Mid. Mir., April 8)

Ministerial, Parliamentary and Other Visits. During the year a number of Yugoslav ministers visited the UAR: in Jan the Ministers of Education and Foreign Trade (Eg. Gaz., Jan 16, 18; Akhir Sa'ah, Jan 25); in April the Minister of Agriculture; in Dec the Minister of Communications (R. Cairo, April 5, Dec 11-IMB, April 6, Dec 12). For the visit to Cairo in March of Vice-President Todorovic—see above. The UAR Minister of Industry visited Belgrade in Jan (see above), and the UAR

Minister of Education in May. (*Tanyug*, May 10 [EE 13], 22 [EE 24]).

The Director-General of the Yugoslav News Agency (*Tanyug*), visited Cairo in March. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 13; *Eg. Mail*, March 18)

From June 26-July 7 a UAR parliamentary delegation visited Yugoslavia at the invitation of the People's Assembly; the delegation was received by President Tito.

On June 26 a delegation of UAR pressmen arrived on a visit to Yugoslavia. In July a similar delegation from Yugoslavia arrived at Cairo for a 10-day visit. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 27, 28, July 6; *Gumhuriyah*, July 19; *R. Damascus*, July 5-IMB, July 6; *Tanyug*, July 7, 8 [EE 12])

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Appointed Ambassador to Cairo. On Oct 12 Dr Jozse Brilej, Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, presented his credentials as his country's new ambassador to the UAR. Dr Brilej was a former ambassador to the UK and permanent representative of his country at the UN. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug. 2, 3, Oct 13)

Yugoslavia to Represent UAR Interests in Turkey. Following the severing of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Turkey in Oct, it was announced that Yugoslavia would look after the UAR's interests in Turkey. (*Ahram*, Oct 15)

NON-ARAB ME COUNTRIES

CYPRUS

Diplomatic Representation. The first UAR ambassador to Cyprus presented his credentials to President Makarios on Jan 14. President Makarios expressed his wish for cooperation with the UAR and added: "The fact that many Cypriots are living in your country is proof of the friendship, goodwill and faith that exists between our two countries." (*MER* 1960, p 552; *Ahram*, Jan 11, 15; *Cyprus Mail*, Jan 15)

Cyprus' first ambassador to the UAR presented his credentials to Abdel Nasser on March 28. (*R. Cairo*, March 28-IMB, March 29)

Cyprus Supports Algeria on UAR Appeal. On Jan 9 the Cyprus House of Representatives, in response to an appeal by the UAR National Assembly, passed a resolution supporting the Algerian insurgents and condemning the "inhuman handling" of the Algerians by the "occupying power." The House divided on community lines, the Greek members voting in favour and the Turkish members against. A Turkish draft resolution would have had the House expressing its sympathy with the demands of the Algerian people for freedom and hope for a "just solution." (*Cyprus Mail*, Jan 10)

UAR Denies Pressure on Cyprus Regarding Relations with Israel. On Feb 25 the UAR embassy in Nicosia described as "completely unfounded and false" reports that the ambassador had made representations to Cyprus over the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cyprus and Israel. (*See MER* 1960, p 181-2.) Nevertheless, the statement continued, "the UAR truly believes that any widening of the scope of relations between Israel and countries friendly to the UAR, such as Cyprus, may harm relations between them and the UAR." (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 26)

Cyprus President Visits UAR. Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, paid an official visit to the UAR from June 3-10. He was accompanied by his Foreign Minister, among others. He had several talks with President Abdel Nasser and visited industrial, military, agricultural and social establishments. He also met with the Rector of Al-Azhar and the Coptic Pope. (*Ahram*, June 4-10)

A *Times* correspondent remarked that while there was no prearranged agenda, both Presidents Makarios and Abdel Nasser were plainly in the position of wanting something from the other. The Egyptians would much like to see Cyprus becoming less favourably disposed to-

wards trade with Israel and Israel tourism in the island. The opinion had been expressed in Egypt that this loophole in the Arab boycott of Israel was a poor return for the support expressed by Cairo during EOKA days; and at least some of the Cypriot community in Egypt, anxious for their future under the Egyptianization regime, subscribed to this viewpoint. President Makarios would like to obtain assurances that the Cypriots in Egypt (now considerably fewer than the 15,000 a few years ago) would be permitted to continue gaining a livelihood in Egypt instead of adding to unemployment in Cyprus. (*Times*, June 5)

In an address to the UAR National Assembly, President Makarios spoke of the common struggle for liberty waged by the Egyptian and Cypriot peoples "who, with heroism and sacrifice, have dealt a devastating blow to foreign interference, exploitation and colonialism." (*Ahram*, June 6)

President Makarios told journalists that he had been deeply impressed by Abdel Nasser's personality and statesmanship, and by the UAR's industrial and agricultural reform policy. Answering a question on British bases in Cyprus, he emphasized his country's policy of non-alignment and that the people of Cyprus would never allow these bases to be used for launching attacks, particularly against the UAR. (*Ahram*, *Eg. Gaz.*, June 11; *R. Cairo*, June 10 [13])

An official communiqué issued at the end of the visit stated that the talks between the two Presidents had resulted in complete identity of views and in the consolidation of brotherly ties uniting the Arab and Cypriot peoples. The two Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, and declared themselves opposed to attempts to solve international problems through force or interference in internal affairs of states and in favour of disarmament and banning of nuclear tests. They declared the singleness of their countries' support of liberation movements "within and outside the UN"; they stressed that the Palestine question should be solved in accordance with the UN Charter "on the basis of the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." They advocated an Algerian settlement through negotiations on the basis of self-determination, and denounced racial discrimination. They recorded their satisfaction at the friendship between the two countries based on common objectives and attitude to world problems as well as on cooperation in all fields. The two sides agreed to increase trade between them and to conclude an agreement on facilitating mutual tourism,

as well as a technical cooperation agreement in the fields of agriculture, irrigation and dams. An understanding was reached regarding matters relating to Cypriots resident in the UAR. Abdel Nasser accepted an invitation to visit Cyprus. (*Eg. Gaz., Ahrām, June 11; Nasser's Speeches, pp 120 ff*)

A Cairo source wrote that following the agreements, UAR citizens would be allowed to visit Cyprus despite travel restrictions imposed in order to save hard currency. The UAR would import apples and other fruit from Cyprus, while Cyprus was expected to import more UAR products. (*Arab Obs., June 11*)

Cyprus and the Break-up of the UAR. In a telegramme to Abdel Nasser on the break-up of the UAR President Makarios said: "I am following with... regret the fateful events in Syria. I wish to assure you that my thoughts are with you in these critical moments." (*Cyprus Mail, Oct 3*)

Cypriot Turkish papers supported Syria; one of them said that while the Greek Cypriots had turned pro-Nasser after Makarios' visit to the UAR, the Turkish Cypriots had now recognized Syria (quoted in *Cyprus Mail, Oct 10, 11*). [Turkey was the second country, after Jordan, to recognize independent Syria, whereupon the UAR cut off diplomatic relations with her].

Cyprus recognized the Syrian Republic on Nov 3. (*Narr, Nov 5*)

Cooperation, Various Contacts. In June it was announced in Nicosia that visa formalities were to be abolished for citizens of Cyprus and the UAR wishing to visit the other country. Air services between the two countries, suspended since the Suez campaign, would be resumed at the end of June by United Arab Airlines and Cyprus Airways. (*Eg. Gaz., June 17*)

The UAR was one of seven countries officially participating in the 8th International Cyprus Fair in Nicosia in July. 150 UAR firms exhibited their products. (*Eg. Gaz., July 3*)

In Aug 50 Cypriot students toured Egypt in the framework of an exchange of student delegations. (*R. Cairo, Aug 19-IMB, Aug 20*)

In Oct it was reported that UAR dam building engineers were due to leave for Nicosia, to survey plans for dams in Cyprus. (*Ahrām, Oct 7*)

In Nov a UAR trade delegation was to discuss in Cyprus the export of UAR textiles and cement in exchange for dried fruit and other products. It would also propose to establish in Cyprus a UAR trade office. (*MENA, Oct 31 [W, Nov 9]; MEED, Nov 10*)

Cyprus Reported To Suggest Closer Cooperation. In Nov it was reported in Cairo that the Cypriot FM had recently written the UAR FM that Cyprus was looking forward to closer cooperation between the two countries by increasing official visits and tourism. The Cypriot ambassador had also suggested the publication in Cairo of a Cyprus-UAR monthly magazine in English, to deal with matters of interest to both countries. (*Ahrām, Nov 18*)

ETHIOPIA

[The UAR continued to voice support for Somali claims over parts of Ethiopia and it supported the secessionist movement in Eritrea which opposed the federation with Ethiopia. On the official level, however, the two countries maintained normal relations.]

Support For Somali Claims Over Ogaden Province. Cairo

Radio in Somali called for the "liberation" of Djibouti and Ogaden province in Ethiopia. "Ogaden is still under imperialist domination and Abyssinian imperialism is still with us." (*R. Cairo, Jan 11 [13]*)

On Jan 24 it was reported from Cairo that American officers and pilots had assisted the Ethiopians in recent clashes between Ethiopian forces and Somali tribesmen. (*R. Baghdad, Jan 24-IMB, Jan 25*)

The UAR students federation passed a resolution in support of the "unity of the Somali lands." (*Hayat, Feb 12*)

A member of the Greater Somali League was reported by Cairo Radio to have called on the Ethiopian government to agree to a plebiscite in the "occupied Somali territories." (*R. Cairo, Feb 24 [27]*)

A report from Mogadishu in the UAR press said that on April 4 the Ethiopian army had started a campaign of mass killings of Somalis in the border area. A Somali village which had requested to be "joined with the motherland of Somalia" had been completely destroyed with all its inhabitants (*Ahrām, April 14*). A Cairo paper compared the "Ethiopian campaign" to the happenings in Palestine where, the article said, the owners of the land had been expelled and replaced by the conquerors. A third of Ethiopia's territory was said to belong to Somalia, including Harar province. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, May 13*)

On May 16 the UAR ambassador in Addis-Ababa was requested to explain the demonstrations of Al-Azhar students in Cairo in front of the Ethiopian embassy; they had tried to attack the building and to set fire to the ambassador's car. (*BBC in Arabic, May 17-IMB, May 18; Falastin, May 18*)

A Cairo weekly had this to say on Ethiopia, among other things: "... Ethiopia also possesses the Haud area which was handed over to it by Britain in 1898 without the consent of its 200,000 Somali inhabitants. This has created tension along the border between the two states... The Somali Republic is asking for the return of the Haud area... Since the end of World War II, American influence has been creeping into Ethiopia to replace the British influence. American advisers control the country's economic—and political—life and there is a big American military base, called 'Radio Mina' there." (*Arab Obs., Aug 20*)

Commercial Relations. In Nov the UAR press reported that a trade delegation would go to Ethiopia (*Akhbar, Nov 3; Ahrām, Nov 21*) [but it had not left by the end of the year].

IRAN

Diplomatic Relations. [In July 1960, the UAR broke off diplomatic relations with Iran on the grounds of Iran's friendly relations with Israel and the Shah's allegedly "despotic, reactionary, corrupt and imperialist-dominated" government. (See MER 1960, pp 216-220).]

In March the UAR appointed an archivist as her only diplomatic representative in Tehran to take care of the UAR embassy building there. (*Ahrām, March 22*)

Cairo Propaganda Against Iranian Government. In Jan Cairo radio repeatedly commented on the elections in Iran describing them as "rigged," "undemocratic" and "corrupt." The Shah was accused of attempting to ensure that the election results would favour reaction and imperialism. (*R. Cairo, Jan 15 [17]; see also BDCM, Jan 17, 21, 24*)

In Feb the UAR General Federation of Students

passed a resolution in support of the "stand of the Iranian students' federation against the Iranian government's policy, which conflicts with the causes of freedom and democracy." (*R. Cairo, Feb 11 [14]*)

In comments following the resignation of Dr. Emami from the premiership and the appointment of Dr. Amini to this post, Cairo papers declared that "since heroic Mossadeq, not one statesman has come to power, who was able to confront the Shah" (*Gumhuriyah, May 12*); and that the Iranian people wanted to make up for "three hundred lost years" but the Shah was standing in their way. (*Akhbar, May 13*)

UAR Claims Iran Active Against Her. In March a Lebanese [pro-UAR] paper alleged that there was proof that an anti-UAR radio station, "The Voice of Free Egypt" broadcasting in Arabic to the Persian Gulf, was located in Isfahan. (*Hawadith, March 3*)

In April it was reported in Cairo that the UAR had approached the German embassy in Cairo, complaining of anti-UAR propaganda activities of the Iranian embassy in Bonn. The embassy produced documents showing that the German Foreign Ministry had already drawn the attention of the Iranian embassy to "those unfriendly activities against a friendly state" and had requested their cessation. (*Ahram, April 29*)

Iranian PM: UAR Must Initiate Rapprochement. On May 25 Dr. Amini told a Lebanese correspondent that Iran would welcome mediation between her and the UAR, but would not take the initiative, since Cairo had started the dispute. He suggested that a basis for Arab-Iranian political cooperation might be found in an Iranian-Arab common market. He added that his country had recognized Israel de facto 10 years ago, and that the close commercial relations between the two countries were the result of the Arabs' lack of interest in the Iranian market. (*Jaridah, May 27*)

Iran Recognizes Syrian Independence; Boycott of Iranian Ship in Suez Canal. Iran announced its recognition of the newly established Syrian Republic on Oct 2 [the day after Abdel Nasser cut off his relations with Jordan and Turkey, the two countries first to recognize independent Syria]. (*R. Tehran, Oct 2 [3]*)

A Cairo paper said that had there been diplomatic relations between the UAR and Iran they would have been severed. It ascribed the reason behind the Iranian move to the "Shah getting his own back for the peremptory manner in which the UAR broke off relations with Iran." (*Eg. Gaz., Oct 3*)

On Oct 5 an Iranian cargo ship which arrived from the Mediterranean was boycotted at Port Said by oil workers (*R. Cairo, Oct 6 [9]*). The same day the Iranian Foreign Ministry pointed out that the principle of free and unconditional passage through the Canal was secured under international commitments, "thus, the latest measure adopted by the Egyptian government, if repeated, will be an open violation of international law which that government has accepted." (*R. Tehran, Oct 5 [7]*)

Haykal Alleges Iran Conspires To Overthrow UAR Regime. On Dec 22, Hassanin Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram* [and unofficial spokesman for Abdel Nasser], alleged that three forces in the ME were coordinating their steps to deal the UAR a deadly "or at least a semi-deadly" blow: Britain and France, Iran and Turkey the ME CENTO members, and the Arab countries bound

to the West. The hostile attitude of Iran and Turkey towards the UAR, Haykal wrote, stemmed from the fact that having sold themselves to the West they wanted the Arab area to come under Western influence as well, because the Arab area constituted their natural hinterland and was vital for their defence. Also, they were afraid of the revolutionary example of the UAR and thus they cooperated among themselves, with Israel, and with the "tattered thrones" in the Arab world against any national liberation movement. (*Ahram, Dec 22; R. Cairo, Dec 22 [29]*)

Tehran Radio commented that Haykal's allegations were without foundation, although it was true that Egypt was now isolated from the Arab countries which once it had claimed to lead. Abdel Nasser's propaganda machine was talking about imaginary enemies because of the domestic failures of the UAR government and the defeat of its policies in the Arab world, particularly in Syria. (*R. Tehran, Dec 24 [29]*)

SOMALIA

[UAR relations remained closer with Somalia than with any other ME or African country. The UAR extended aid in the fields of defence, economy, education and others, and continued to support Somalia's irredentist claims. (See also MER 1960, p 549: Background and Synopsis.)]

Statements by Somali Leaders on Relations with UAR as Reported by UAR Sources. PM Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmarke: "UAR aid is the best we get; we welcome it as aid from one African Muslim state to another. I also wish to lay stress on the religious ties which have bound the UAR and Somali peoples for thousands of years." (*Akhbar, June 20*)

The Minister of Transport: "We trust in God and the UAR."

The Minister of Defence: "The UAR has given us support on a vital issue (the irredentist claims of Somalia) and we send our best wishes to that country and its heroic leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser." (*Akhbar al-Yawm, May 6*)

UAR Support for Somali Irredentist Claims. [Somali irredentist claims included French Somaliland, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Harar-Ogaden province of Ethiopia.]

In Feb the Arab Student Conference in Cairo adopted a resolution supporting the Somali people's desire for national unity. (*Ahram, Feb 12*)

In Sept a UAR mission was to go to Mogadishu, at Somalia's request, for technical studies on the border disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia and Kenya. (*Ahram, Sept 25*)

Ethiopia: On UAR support for Somali claims on Ethiopian territory, see Relations Between the UAR and Ethiopia.

French Somaliland: Following the decision of the French Somaliland Assembly to retain their present status in relation to France, Abdi Arr Hasan called on the people of French Somaliland to arouse themselves. He mainly attacked the elected representatives of the Assembly, demanding that they reconsider their decision, and the Somali civil servants whom he accused of always praising France. (*R. Cairo, Feb 15 [18]*)

A UAR journal wrote that the French authorities had banned all ideas of "union with the Somali Motherland," and mentioned the "distressing fact" that "some of the local population support French policy. These people should be taught a lesson." (*Musawwar, Aug 4*)

The Northern Frontier District of Kenya: [UAR propaganda was directed against the British authorities in Kenya, Cairo broadcasts in Somali and Arabic—but not in Swahili—supported the Somali claims. Such broadcasts ceased, apparently by the middle of the year when this policy began to clash with the UAR's support for Kenya. (see: Kenya.)] In March a Somali citizen broadcasting in Somali over Cairo Radio said that on a tour of Kenya he had met many of the responsible Somalis there who were struggling for freedom and union with the other Somalia. He added that the responsible leaders of "this brotherly East African country" were not against the aspirations of the Somalis, but the British were setting Africans against one another. (*R. Cairo, March 8 [10]*) In May and June the "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic for Somalis reported pan-Somali activities in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya against British imperialism. (*V of A, April 28 [May 1], June 23 [26]*)

UAR Broadcasts to Somalia. Cairo Radio had started its Somali service in March 1957. It was first run, among others, by Muhammad Nur Adeh, now employed by Mogadishu Radio. In Feb the service began a series of talks on "neo-colonialism," attacking the French Community and the British Commonwealth as devices for the economic infiltration of Africa. (*R. Cairo in Somali, Feb 28 [March 2] April 24 [26]*)

Diplomatic Relations. In Feb the UAR opened a consulate in Hargeisa in addition to the consulate in Mogadishu. (*Ahram, Jan 4, March 6*)

In April Mustafa Tawfiq, first UAR ambassador to Somalia, presented his credentials. (*MENA, April 4 [6]*)

Somalia was represented in Cairo by a chargé d'affaires, who stated in May that the first Somali ambassador to the UAR would be appointed soon. (*R. Cairo, May 25-IMB, May 26*)

Visits. The Somali Minister of Education, Ali Jerad Jama, visited the UAR in Dec 1960-Jan 1961 at the invitation of the UAR Government (See also MER 1960, p 551). (*Ahram, Jan 2, 8*)

A Somali parliamentary delegation visited the UAR in Feb (*Ahram, Feb 14*) and another one in Sept-Oct. (*R. Cairo, Oct 8 [10]*)

In April the Somali Minister of Agriculture, Ahmad Dualeh, visited the UAR to discuss UAR agricultural aid. He said that Somalia was interested in experts in irrigation, livestock and farming. (*Ahram, April 13*)

Ali Giunale Barale, the Somali Minister of Health, visited Syria in July and in Sept Egypt, where he was received by President Abdel Nasser. To the latter he conveyed a letter from the President of Somalia requesting medical assistance. (*R. Damascus, July 21-IMB, July 21; Ahram, Sept 10*)

The President of Somalia, Adan Abdullah Osman, arrived in Cairo on Oct 15 en route to Accra. He spent a day in Cairo and met President Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram, Oct 16*)

The Somali Minister of Defence visited Cairo in Nov. (See below: Military Relations.)

Ali Muhammad Hirave, the Somali Minister of Information, visited the UAR in Nov-Dec and signed an agreement with the UAR on information media—for details see below. (*R. Mogadishu, Nov 13 [15]; R. Cairo, Nov 24 [27], Dec 8 [11]*)

Somali PM Visits UAR: The Somali PM, Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmark, arrived in Cairo on May 23 on his way

to Prague and Moscow accompanied by the Ministers of Agriculture and Education and the directors of these and the Foreign Affairs ministries (*MENA, May 23 [25]; Hayot, May 24*). He returned to Cairo on June 4, on his way home, for a two-day stay and had talks with Abdel Nasser. The discussions covered the progress of Somali-UAR relations since Sharmark's visit to Cairo in Nov 1960, and the implementation of the agreements on trade and technical cooperation. It was agreed to increase trade and to extend the UAR's aid to Somalia's development projects. Political cooperation on the basis of a non-alignment policy was also discussed and it was agreed to support the forthcoming Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries. (*Ahram, June 5; R. Cairo, June 4, 5 [6, 7]; R. Damascus, June 6-IMB, June 7*)

Military Relations. UAR Aid. In March and April UAR freighters unloaded arms, including artillery, at Berbera and Mogadishu, under an agreement signed in Dec 1960. (*Ahram, March 18; Gumhuriyah, April 3*)

The Independence Day parade in Hargeisa included tanks and artillery donated by the UAR. The weapons were manufactured in the UAR. The crowds lining the route cheered Abdel Nasser, a UAR source reported. (*Ahram, July 4*)

In Oct Mogadishu Radio announced that a party of 18 Somali army officers had left for Cairo to undergo training in the UAR for six months; another party would go to the UAR for officers' training and yet another—to attend various military schools. (*R. Mogadishu, Oct 3 [W 12]*)

Shaykh Ali Abdi Isma'il Sa'id, the Somali Minister of Defence, visited the UAR from Nov 6 to Nov 24 at the head of a military delegation. He was received by President Abdel Nasser, met army commanders and visited military installations and factories. He also visited Al-Azhar, from where he had graduated in theology in 1958. He stated that UAR military aid was instrumental in creating a Somali army to protect the country from imperialism; all border problems, however, would be settled peacefully, without Africans shedding African blood. (*R. Cairo, Nov 6, 14, 24 [8, 16, 27], 13 [14] [W 23]; MENA, Nov 12 [W 16]; R. Mogadishu, Nov 16 [18]; Ahram, Nov 9, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22*)

The army officers accompanying the Minister remained in Cairo. (*Ahram, Nov 29*)

A 30-member Somali military mission arrived in Cairo on Dec 25 for 3 months training. (*R. Cairo in Hebrew, Dec 26-IMB, Dec 27*)

Economic Relations, Loans, Aid. In Feb Hasan Abbas Zaki, the UAR Southern R. Minister of Economy, led a UAR mission to Somalia on a ten-day visit. The mission was to explore ways of implementing the 1960 economic agreement. (*MER 1960, pp 550-51*)

The experts in the mission studied the possibility of industrial and agricultural projects and further missions were to go to Somalia to survey and advise. Among projects planned were textile and sugar factories. (*Ahram, Feb 16; Hayot, Feb 18*)

Zaki signed several agreements with the Somali government. Under a protocol to the trade and payments agreement, signed by him, the UAR was to lend Somalia EE4m. at 2½% interest for projects to be defined by the Somali government. The loan was ratified by the UAR Assembly on June 9.

Zaki also signed agreements for livestock imports as well as oilseeds—an exceptional case since its import was prohibited. The central banks in Cairo and Mogadishu

dishu signed an agreement "on the technical measures for the implementation of the trade and payments agreement." (*MENA*, Feb 17 [W 23]; *R. Cairo*, June 10-*IMB*, June 11)

The UAR planned to set up a fruit canning plant in Somalia. (*Ahram*, March 6)

UAR experts were to help in the development of Somali agriculture, industry, ports, airfields and housing projects. (*Ahram*, March 1)

The Port Said Bank planned to open a branch office in Somalia. (*Ahram*, April 17)

In May a technical mission surveyed possible port sites on the Somalia coast. (*Gumhuriyah*, May 24)

The Governor of the Somalia Central Bank, Adli Adam, arrived in Cairo in Sept for financial talks. (*R. Cairo in Somali*, Sept 8 [11])

The UAR decided to participate in the Mogadishu Trade Fair. (*R. Cairo in Hebrew*, Sept 22-*IMB*, Sept 24)

The UAR Ministry of Industry completed plans for industrial development in Somalia. A mission was to leave in the future to begin implementation of the plan. (*Gumhuriyah*, Dec 8)

Agricultural Aid. Two veterinarians were flown to Somalia to fight a cattle epidemic there with the aid of UAR-manufactured vaccines. (*Ahram*, Nov 11)

The Somali Government decided to ask the UAR government to send experts on land reclamation. (*Musawwar*, Nov 17)

Information Agreement. (See also MER 1960, p 550.) During his visit to the UAR the Somali Minister of Information signed on Nov 22 an agreement with the UAR on information media, providing for mutual assistance in this field and for scholarships for Somalis to train in all aspects of information work. The agreement would come into effect early in 1962. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 22 [W 30])

Cultural Agreement. While visiting the UAR in Jan the Somali Minister of Education signed a cultural agreement with the UAR. It provided for (1) the strengthening of cultural intercourse between the two states; (2) technical assistance to Somali schools and institutions; (3) the setting up by the UAR of cultural centres in Somalia; (4) exchange of visits, publications and books; (5) scholarships for Somali students in UAR institutions. (*Ahram*, Jan 2, 8; *MENA*, Jan 7 [W 12])

Educational Assistance. Two UAR experts were to spend 6 months in Somalia organizing elementary, preparatory and high school curricula and planning textbooks together with Somali officials in accordance with the cultural agreement. (*Ahram*, March 7)

The Somalia Central Committee for Education asked the UAR for 100 teachers to replace foreign teachers working in Somali schools. (*Ahram*, May 6)

In May the Somali chargé d'affaires in Cairo said that about 300 Somali students were then studying in Cairo while a large number of Arab teachers were working in Somali schools. (*MENA*, May 27 [30])

In Aug 13 teachers from the UAR arrived in Hargeisa to work in the northern region of Somalia. (*R. Hargeisa*, Aug 18 [W 24])

In Oct eight Somali teachers were sent to the UAR to attend training courses sponsored by the UAR. (*R. Hargeisa*, Oct 19 [21])

Islamic Relations. The Somali Minister of Education,

who visited Cairo in Dec 1960-Jan 1961, requested in a meeting with the Rector of Al-Azhar to discuss the cooperation of the university in supplying Muslim needs, increasing the number of Al-Azhar graduates teaching in Somalia, granting more scholarships to Somali students and supplying books. (*Ahram*, Jan 2, 8)

The Shaykh of Al-Azhar was invited to participate in the Somalia independence celebrations in July, and lay the foundation stone for a religious college in Mogadishu to be affiliated to Al-Azhar. The college would comprise a school, a mosque and a library. Al-Azhar would supply the teachers for the college. [In 1960 the UAR set up a religious college in Borago in Northern Somalia.] (*Akhbar*, June 8; *Masa*, June 22)

In July the Rector of Al-Azhar gave instructions for the dispatch of Islamic religious and educational publications to the Islamic League in Mogadishu. (*V of A*, July 21 [W 27])

In Nov Hussein Shafi'i, UAR Minister of Social Affairs and Waqf, discussed with the Somali Defence Minister—then in Cairo—details of UAR aid in building two mosques in Somalia. (*Ahram*, Nov 10)

Legal Assistance. Somalia asked the UAR for legal experts to draft new penal codes, civil codes and civil status laws for Somalia. (*Ahram*, June 30)

Press, Radio, Films. The UAR was to send experts to work with the Somali newspaper *Barid al-Sumal*, and to prepare programmes for the Somali broadcasting service. (*Ahram*, Nov 23)

Three UAR films were shown every week at the Islamic Cultural Centre in Mogadishu, built by the UAR. (*Ahram*, Oct 5)

The UAR film "Al-Futuwwah" won the Mogadishu Prize at a film festival in December. (*Musawwar*, Dec 29)

Trade Unions Relations. In talks held in Cairo in May the SG of the ICATU and the President of the Somali Workers' Federation agreed to support the Arab and Somali workers' causes, and expressed their readiness to strengthen the ties between the Arab and Somali peoples. (*MENA*, May 18 [20])

UAR Aid to Flood Victims. Following floods in Somalia, the UAR donated £E15,000, four hundred food parcels, eight tons of medicines and 70 tons of dried milk. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 24, 26, [27, 29]; *R. Hargeisa*, Nov 27 [29]; *R. Cairo*, Dec 3-*IMB*, Dec 4; *MENA*, Dec 6 [8])

Somalia Support for Abdel Nasser after Syrian Secession. The President of Somalia congratulated Abdel Nasser on his stand on the Syrian secession from the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 4 [6])

The SNL-USP party demonstrated in Hargeisa, supporting Abdel Nasser and denouncing the Syrian secession. (*R. Hargeisa*, Oct 3 [5])

TURKEY

Note: On relations with the Syrian Region before the break-up of the UAR see under: Syria.

Following repeated reports during the first quarter of the year of its imminent departure (*Ahram*, Feb 10; *R. Cairo*, Feb 22, 28-*IMB*, Feb 22, March 1; *R. Cairo*, March 23 [W 30]), a UAR economic mission finally went to Turkey in June.

It signed a trade protocol providing for an increase in the volume of trade on either side to \$9m. per year.

(Compare with actual figures for 1960 trade: pp 82 ff.) (*R. Ankara*, June 7, 15, 21 [W 29]; *Gumhuriyah*, June 22)

Speedy Turkish Recognition of Syrian Secession; UAR Breaks Off Diplomatic Relations. Turkey was the second country after Jordan to recognize the newly established Syrian Government, on Sept 29. On Oct 1, President Abdel Nasser broke off diplomatic relations with both Turkey and Jordan on the grounds that they had committed an aggressive act against the UAR. (*Cumhuriyet*, Sept 30; *Ahram*, Sept 30, Oct 2)

On Oct 1, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that Turkey had recognized Syria after the Syrian armed forces had established full control over the country and after Abdel Nasser had publicly accepted the fact of Syria's withdrawal from the union. The recognition of neighbouring Syria and friendship with her was a necessity for Turkey and it was not intended as a hostile act against Egypt. Turkey regretted the Egyptian step, and the Turkish nation would preserve its friendship towards the Egyptian nation. (*R. Ankara*, Oct 1 [3])

The Egyptian oil workers decided on Oct 3 to boycott Turkish ships going through Suez. The Turkish oil workers asked the authorities for permission to boycott ships calling at Turkish ports, but this permission was not granted and Ankara Radio broadcast the following:

"Since economic and trade relations between Turkey and Egypt are to continue, despite the break in diplomatic relations, it is learnt that the Egyptian authorities will treat Turkish ships normally; as long as they do, the Turkish oil workers will load and unload Egyptian ships calling at Turkish ports." (*Cumhuriyet*, Oct 4, 6; *R. Ankara*, Oct 7 [10])

Switzerland agreed to represent Turkey's interests in the UAR and Yugoslavia the UAR's in Turkey. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 7; *Ahram*, Oct 15)

Propaganda; Turkey Charged With Conspiring Against UAR. On Oct 26, Ahmad Sa'id, replying to an *Ulus* article saying that there had been no democracy in Syria during the union with Egypt, asked what democracy there was in Turkey. He said that the reason for the Turkish propaganda machine's slanders of the UAR and its achievements was Turkey's animus against the UAR, caused by frustration of Turkish designs against Syria since 1957. (*Voice of Arabs*, Oct 26 [28])

In an article in Dec, Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, charged that Turkey was a partner—together with Britain, France, Iran and the pro-Western Arab countries—in a conspiracy to deal the UAR a "deadly blow," including the assassination of Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram*, Dec 22)

ASIAN COUNTRIES

AFGHANISTAN

In April a festival was held in Damascus in commemoration of al-Ghazali, the famous 11th century Muslim philosopher and mystic from Afghanistan. The Afghan ambassador said he considered the festival an important step towards closer cooperation between Afghanistan and the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 7)

In April Ghulam Haidar Adalat, the Afghan Minister of Agriculture, paid a week's visit to the UAR. He was received by President Abdel Nasser who asked him to deliver an invitation to the Afghan Premier Sardar Daud Khan to visit the UAR. Adalat stated that UAR agricultural experts were working in Afghanistan and that the UAR had promised to supply saplings as well as wheat, rice and mango seeds. (*R. Cairo*, April 15 [18]; *Ahram*, April 16)

On June 7 the Afghan Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, who attended the preparatory conference in Cairo of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, was received by Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram*, June 8)

BURMA

Economic Relations; Trade Agreement. In Jan it was reported that the UAR would sell to Burma textiles and would train Burmese workers in sugar and textile industries. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Jan 9)

On April 2 the first trade agreement between the two countries was signed in Cairo. The Burmese delegation, headed by the Minister of Trade, which concluded the trade agreement, discussed the purchase of cotton textiles and yarn, cement and other commodities. (*Ahram*, March 27; *MENA*, March 27, *R. Cairo*, April 2 [W 6])

U Nu Visit to the UAR. At the invitation of President Abdel Nasser, U Nu, PM of Burma, accompanied by a

Minister and a number of officials, visited the UAR from Dec 24-29. He held three meetings with President Abdel Nasser and visited the Aswan High Dam.

UAR publications stressed the increasing cooperation between the two countries in the economic field, their belief in the policy of non-alignment, and the socialist policy adopted by both. Some minimized the close relations between Burma and Israel.

The joint communiqué issued on Dec 29 said that the two sides had exchanged views on world problems and the international events which had taken place since the Belgrade Conference, in which the two leaders had participated. They reaffirmed their determination to work for the preservation of world peace and full disarmament, and to adhere to the policy of non-alignment, and the spiritual principles of the Bandung and Belgrade conferences. They declared their support for the liberation struggle of Africa and their absolute support for Algerian independence. They condemned colonialist policy in the ME and declared their support for the restoration of all the Arab people's rights in Palestine in accordance with the UN Charter and resolutions. (On the Palestine issue in this respect, see also p 330). At Burma's request, discussions had dealt with the UAR's socialist policy. The two sides expressed their wish to foster brotherly relations between the two countries in the political, economic, military and cultural fields. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 25, 29, 30; *Arab Obs.*, Dec 25; *Akhbar*, Dec 26; *Gumhuriyah*, Dec 30; *Ahram*, Dec 31; *R. Cairo*, Dec 29, 1961 [Jan 1, 1962])

CAMBODIA

Political and Military Relations. In Jan it was reported that the UAR legation in Cambodia had been elevated to the rank of embassy. (*R. Phnom Penh*, Jan 26 [FE 31])

On May 18 Maj-Gen. Lon Nol, the Cambodian Defence Minister, accompanied by three high-ranking officers, arrived in Cairo on a 12-day official visit. The mission was received by President Abdel Nasser, visited installations and the military industry, watched operations of UAR commandos, and toured the Syrian region. The head of the mission said they had gained "valuable knowledge in the military field for the benefit of the young Cambodian army." (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 18, 24, 26, 30, 31; *Gumhuriyah*, May 31; *Ahram*, May 18, 22, 23, 30)

In June the Cambodian Information Minister, in Cairo to attend the preparatory conference of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, was received by President Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram*, June 5)

Economic Relations. In May a delegation of UAR businessmen visited Cambodia. (*R. Cairo*, April 25 [W, May 4]; *Gumhuriyah*, May 10)

In Oct the Cambodian Minister of Trade and Economy discussed in Cairo the promotion of trade ties. He said he intended to return to Cairo in Nov for further discussions to put into operation the trade agreement "concluded last year" which provided for a trade volume of £E0.5m. (*Hayot*; *Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 13; *R. Cairo*, Oct 11 [W 19])

CEYLON

Trade Agreement; Political Relations. On Feb 6 a Ceylonese delegation headed by the Minister of Commerce arrived in Cairo for trade talks. On Feb 25 the instruments of ratification of the UAR-Ceylonese trade and payments agreements concluded on Dec 23 1960 were exchanged. The agreement foresaw an annual volume of trade of £E6m. and it included the most-favoured nation clause. The payments agreement provided for payment in sterling or other convertible currency.

It was also agreed that Ceylon would import from the UAR 50,000 tons of rice, 30,000 tons of cement and 100,000 lbs of yarn and textiles. It would export to the UAR 25,000,000 lbs of tea a year and an unspecified amount of rubber, coconuts and "by-products." It was reported in Cairo that of a total yearly import of 45 millions lbs of tea half came from India and the rest from China and Ceylon. The new agreement implied that Ceylon's share would be considerably increased at the expense of one or both of the other two suppliers. (*Ahram*, Feb 19, 25, 26; *Eg. Gaz.*; *Gumhuriyah*, Feb 26; *R. Cairo*, Feb 25 [W, March 2]; *Akhbar*, Feb 28)

The delegation went also to Damascus where they met President Abdel Nasser and extended to him an invitation from Mrs. Bandaranaike, PM of Ceylon, to visit the country. (*Ahram*, Feb 27, 28)

On March 5, during a brief stopover at Cairo Airport, Mrs. Bandaranaike stated that "relations between our two countries are steadily progressing and have been strengthened recently in the economic and political fields. The consolidation of these relations, based on confidence and friendship, will continue." The UAR FM thanked Mrs. Bandaranaike for her sentiments and conveyed to her the greetings of President Abdel Nasser [who was then in Syria]. (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, March 6)

In Sept it was reported that a UAR delegation had negotiated in Colombo the sale of petroleum products from the Horns refinery in exchange for Ceylon tea. (*Ayyam*, Sept 7; *Ahram*, Sept 18; *Nahar*, Sept 27)

Cultural Agreement. In Oct it was reported that a cultural agreement between the UAR and Ceylon had

been concluded "recently." (*Ahram*, Oct 2; *ANA*, Oct 14 [W 19]; *Gumhuriyah*, Oct 28)

HONG KONG

The first UAR Consul-General in Hong Kong was appointed in July. (*Ahram*, July 2)

In Oct a UAR trade mission visited Hong Kong (and India and Japan). (*Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 23, 25)

INDIA

PM Nehru Visits UAR; Differing Policies on Neutralism. PM Jawaharlal Nehru paid short stopover visits to Cairo in March and in Nov.

On March 19 Nehru stopped in Cairo on his way home from London, and conferred with President Abdel Nasser. He told the press that among the questions discussed with Abdel Nasser were the Congo, disarmament, Laos and the possibility of convening an Afro-Asian meeting. He left Cairo on March 21. (*R. Cairo*, March 21 [22]; *Ahram*, *Akhbar*, *Gumhuriyah*, March 20, 21)

[India and the UAR differed on the question of an Afro-Asian or neutralist meeting. The latter, the Belgrade Conference, was finally sponsored by Presidents Abdel Nasser and Tito. India, which opposed the forming of any "third bloc" or even the resemblance of one, joined them late and reluctantly. Three groups of neutralist opinion were seen to have emerged and to have found expression in the Belgrade conference: leftists, moderates and middle-roads, Nehru belonging to the second and Abdel Nasser to the third group. For details, see pp 56 ff.]

[There were also reports—which were denied—that the two statesmen differed on the Congo crisis. See p 540 a.]

[On Nov 19 Presidents Abdel Nasser and Tito and PM Nehru met in Cairo. Nehru was on his way home from the US. There were reports that Nehru had been an unwilling partner to this meeting. For details, see pp 70-1.]

Military Relations. On Feb 1 an Indian destroyer arrived at Latakia port on a five-day goodwill visit. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 2)

On Feb 7 Air Marshal Muhammad Sidqi Mahmud, Commander of the UAR Air Force, accompanied by a "big military mission," arrived in New Delhi on a two-week visit. It was intended to bring about closer cooperation between the UAR and the Indian armed forces, especially in scientific development and training. (*R. Cairo*, Feb 7-IMB, Feb 8; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 8-10)

Indian Visitors to UAR. In May-June the Indian Minister of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs visited the UAR. He discussed cultural and scientific as well as political relations between the two countries. (*Eg. Gaz.*, May 31, June 6; *R. Damascus*, June 4-IMB, June 5)

On Oct 15 the Vice-President of India, Dr S. Radhakrishnan, had a stopover at Cairo airport on his way to London. He was received and seen off by Vice-President Hussein ash-Shafi'i. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Oct 16)

UAR Personalities Invited to India. In June it was reported in Cairo that India had officially invited Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, C-in-C of the UAR armed forces, Gen. Ali Ali Amer, COGS, and Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysuni, Minister of Finance and Economy, to visit India. (*Ahram*, June 22)

UAR Economic Mission. In Sept a UAR mission went to New Delhi, to discuss the amendment of the trade

and payments agreement with a view to increasing the volume of trade exchange. (*Gumhuriyah*, Sept 27; *R. Cairo*, Oct 14 [W 19])

Expression of Political Support. Following the break-up of the UAR, PM Nehru sent Abdel Nasser a personal message praising his handling of the crisis. (*Ahram*, Oct 7)

On Dec 18 an official source announced in Cairo that the UAR fully supported India in its efforts to liberate Goa [which it invaded on Dec 18-19]. Later on it was reported that the UAR had informed the UN and other countries of its full support of India. (*Ahram*, Dec 19-21; *R. Cairo*, Dec 18 [20])

On Dec 30 it was reported that India had requested the UAR to take up with Portugal the release of five Indian passengers in transit detained in Lisbon. (*Daily Telegraph*, Dec 30)

INDONESIA

Indonesian FM Visits Cairo. On Jan 14 the Indonesian FM Subandrio, on his way home from Moscow, arrived in Cairo on a two-day visit. He was received by President Abdel Nasser and had talks with the UAR FM on current international questions, particularly the Congo, Laos, West Irian and Algeria. Back in Jakarta Subandrio declared that Abdel Nasser supported Indonesia's stand on West Irian. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 15, 16, 19)

Rector of Al-Azhar Visits Indonesia. On Jan 23 Mahmūd Shaltūt, Rector of Al-Azhar, on a tour of Far Eastern countries, arrived in Jakarta (*Ahram*, Jan 24). On Feb 7 a joint communiqué was issued, declaring that Al-Azhar and the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs had agreed on close cooperation in educational affairs in general and Islamic studies in particular. (*MENA*, Feb 8 [W 16]; *R. Damascus*, Feb 8-IMB, Feb 9)

Indonesian Call for Afro-Asian Conference. On March 19 Mrs Supeni, Indonesian Ambassador-at-Large, was received by President Abdel Nasser, to whom she delivered a special message from President Sukarno. She told the press that she was on tour delivering messages to the Heads of State of Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAR and Sudan, in which President Sukarno proposed the calling of a second Afro-Asian summit conference on the Bandung conference pattern (*Ahram*, March 18, 19, 20). [The UAR, however, preferred a neutralist meeting, and so did Yugoslavia. There followed consultations between the three countries and India. At the end of April Presidents Abdel Nasser and Tito jointly invited a number of heads of state to participate in a preparatory conference in Cairo. On May 12 it was reported that Sukarno had become co-sponsor of the conference. See pp 56 ff.]

President Sukarno Visits Cairo. On May 16 President Sukarno arrived in Cairo on a two-day visit. On the same evening he had a three-hour talk with President Abdel Nasser and with President Sekou Touré of Guinea, who was also on visit to the UAR. On May 18 a joint communiqué was issued [a short one in comparison with the Abdel Nasser-Touré communiqué issued the day before], which said that the three Presidents had conducted "cordial and frank talks" concerning international questions, mutual relations, the forthcoming conference of non-aligned countries, and support for liberation movements. The communiqué also reaffirmed previous joint communiqués issued by Sukarno and Abdel Nasser on

"major international issues." The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the cordial relations between their countries (*Ahram*, May 16, 17; *Eg. Gaz.*, May 17, 19). [The West Irian question was not mentioned. It may also be noted that in the Abdel Nasser-Touré communiqué the latter congratulated the UAR and Yugoslav Presidents—but not Sukarno—for calling the neutralist conference.]

Military Relations. On April 23 an Indonesian naval delegation headed by the Navy Minister and Chief of Naval Staff, arrived in Cairo on a three-day visit on their way to Belgrade. They were received by Abdel Nasser and Field Marshal Amer. (*MENA*, April 25 [W, May 4]; *R. Cairo*, April 26, 29-IMB, April 27, 30)

On July 8 General Abdul Haris Nasution, Indonesian Minister of National Security and Chief of Staff, arrived in Cairo at the head of a mission on an eight-day official visit. He toured military installations and units, met with Field Marshal Amer, and was received by President Abdel Nasser. He told the press of his admiration of the UAR armed forces, and his confidence in their ability to "repel any Israeli aggression." He also said he was deeply impressed by the UAR's industrial development. (*Eg. Gaz.*, July 9, 12, 14, 16, 17)

Field Marshal Amer was invited to visit Indonesia (*Ahram*, July 14). In Sept it was reported that the visit would start on Oct 5 (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Sept 13) [but it did not take place, presumably owing to the break-up of the UAR on Sept 28].

UAR Supports Indonesia Over West Irian. On Oct 28 the UAR informed Indonesia of her full support of Indonesia on West Irian. (*Ahram*, Oct 29)

Various Contacts, Visits, Technical Assistance. Indonesia was among the 23 countries which participated in the International Agricultural Fair which opened in Cairo on March 25. (*Ahram*, March 25, 26)

On Aug 27 the Indonesian Minister of Agrarian Reform arrived in Cairo on a week's visit to the UAR. (*Ahram*, Aug 28)

In Nov Egypt approved the sending of Egyptian teachers to teach at the Faculty of Medicine of Bandung University. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 27)

In Dec the Rector of the University of Alexandria said in Jakarta that Indonesia and the UAR were expected to cooperate in atomic research, starting the coming year, and that Indonesia, which was more advanced in this field, could help out the UAR with scientists. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 29)

JAPAN

Economic Contacts; Visits. (For economic contacts with the Syrian R. before the break-up of the UAR, see under Syria.) In Jan the Governor of the Bank of Japan discussed in the UAR the implementation of the trade agreement. (*R. Cairo*, Jan 28-IMB, Jan 29)

On June 30 a Japanese delegation arrived at Cairo on a two-week visit to examine possibilities for Japanese investments in development projects. (*R. Cairo*, July 1-IMB, July 2)

In Aug the Japanese President of Chambers of Commerce visited the UAR where he discussed Japanese participation in UAR industrial projects and the increase of trade exchange. (*Akhar*, Aug 7)

In Aug it was reported that the Bank of Tokyo had decided to close its Alexandria branch and to open an office in Cairo, in accordance with the July law on the

nationalization of banks in the UAR. (*Ahram*, Aug 20)

In Oct the UAR Minister of Supply, Kamal Ramzi Atino, visited Japan to discuss trade. He also reached an agreement for the posting of Japanese university teachers to Egyptian academic institutes. (*Ahram*, Oct 9)

Trade Agreement. On Nov 1 a trade agreement was signed in Tokyo constituting a new basis for the promotion of barter, trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 1 [W 9]; *Eg. Gaz.*, Nov 2)

Aviation Agreement. On Nov 30 an aviation agreement was signed in Tokyo permitting commercial airlines of each country to begin service to the other's capital. Japan Airlines was to open its Tokyo-Cairo service via the Southern route in June 1962. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 1)

Japanese Company to Dredge Suez. In July a Japanese company's offer to carry out dredging operations in the Suez Canal was accepted. (*Mid. Mir.*, July 22; *MEED*, July 28)

On Aug 31 a 5,000 h.p. Japanese-built dredger, the *Suez*, the biggest ever built for the Suez Canal Authority, was commissioned. (*MENA*, Aug 31 [W, Sept 7])

Miscellaneous Contacts. In Feb the conference of the UAR General Federation of Students passed a resolution supporting the Japanese students in their opposition to the US bases in their country. (*MENA*, Feb 11 [14])

The teaching of the Japanese language was to be introduced in the Cairo School for Languages in the 1961/2 academic year. (*Ahram*, April 10)

In Aug two Japanese parliamentary delegations arrived in Cairo, one to collect political and economic information on Japanese policy towards the UAR, and the other in the course of visiting a number of countries to study parliamentary regimes. (*Ahram*, Aug 5, 8; *Hayat*, Aug 30)

SOUTH KOREA

According to Cairo Radio a South Korean trade delegation headed by the Minister of Trade visited Cairo from July 29-Aug 4 for talks on economic and trade relations (*R. Cairo*, July 29 [Aug 2]). Al-Ahram reported at the same time on a "goodwill mission headed by a South Korean Foreign Ministry official." (*Ahram*, July 30, 31, Aug 1, 5)

In Dec it was reported that the two countries had agreed to open consulates in Cairo and Seoul. (*Ahram*, Dec 15)

LAOS

On March 23 Prince Souvanna Phouma, head of the Laos neutralist government, arrived in Cairo on a two-day visit during a world-wide tour to "explain the situation of Laos to friendly countries with a view to reaching a final settlement of the country's national problem."

Following a two-hour talk with President Abdel Nasser a joint communiqué was issued in Cairo on March 24 stating that the two leaders had agreed on the following points: (1) to revive the International Control Commission [in Laos] composed of India, Canada and Poland, to stop hostilities and prevent foreign interference; (2) to hold a conference of 14 countries, the Geneva conference member-states and five others, to enable Laos (a) to solve its internal problem; (b) to be neutral; (3) to support the aspirations of the people of

Laos and defend a policy of peace and neutralism. (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, March 24, 25)

A Cairo Radio comment denounced big-power interference [without mentioning East or West] in Laos' internal affairs. (*R. Cairo*, March 24-IMB, March 27)

On March 29, Mr. Beeley, the UK ambassador in Cairo, was quoted as having told the press that there was "great harmony of views" between the UK and the UAR concerning the Laos problem as affirmed by the joint communiqué. Both governments appreciated the dire need for ending hostilities in Laos, preparatory to a settlement with international guarantee of Laotian neutrality. (*R. Cairo*, March 29 [April 4])

A Tito-Abdel Nasser joint communiqué issued in Cairo at the end of President Tito's visit to Cairo on April 22 also stressed that the crisis in Laos must be solved on the basis of the independence and neutrality of this state without interference in its internal affairs. (*Ahram*, April 23)

MALAYA

Islamic Contacts. In Feb Shaykh Shaltūt, Rector of Al-Azhar, visited Malaya at the invitation of the government. (*Hayat*, Feb 12; *MENA*, Feb 16 [18])

The UAR granted five scholarships to Malayan students to study at Al-Azhar. (*Masa*, Aug 21)

Trade Agreement Envisaged. In June a Cairo source reported an announcement by the Malayan Minister of Commerce and Industry to the effect that a trade agreement would be signed shortly between the UAR and Malaya. Negotiations had been going on for some time; the UAR had offered to sell cotton, textiles, onions, silk and woollens against Malayan tin and rubber. In Aug the UAR Minister of Economy and Finance declared that a UAR economic delegation would leave for Malaya shortly to sign a new trade and payments agreement. In Dec the Malayan Minister of Commerce and Industry said the visit would take place in the coming months. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 10, Aug 29, Dec 8)

Miscellaneous. On April 3, the Malayan Premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, made a brief stopover at Cairo airport on his way home from London. He was greeted by the UAR Foreign Minister. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 4)

A Malayan Parliamentary delegation visited the UAR in Sept. (*Ahram*, Sept 26-28)

NEPAL

Diplomatic Relations. On July 19 Nepal's first ambassador to the UAR presented his credentials to President Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram*, July 20)

PAKISTAN

On May 31 Lt-Gen. Ifkhar Ahmed, Chairman of the Pakistani Economic Development Organization, arrived in Cairo for a two-week stay. He conducted talks on the strengthening of economic relations, as well as "Pakistan's participation in the execution of some industrial projects in the UAR." (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 2; *R. Cairo*, June 1-IMB, June 2)

In June it was reported that Pakistan had requested Al-Azhar to nominate one of its teachers to head a department at Karachi University. (*Ahram*, June 7)

In Dec a UAR delegation of scientists visited Karachi. They held talks on an agreement between atomic experts of the two countries for joint research work. They paid

a visit to the Pakistani atomic centre in Karachi and invited its head to visit the UAR. (*Gumhuriyah*, Dec 13; *R. Karachi*, Dec 13 [FE 15])

THE PHILIPPINES

In Feb Shaykh Shaltūt, Rector of Al-Azhar, participated in the second Islamic conference held in Mindanao. (*Ahram*, Feb 11; *Hayat*, Feb 12)

On Sept 8 the UAR nominated its Minister in Manila as its first ambassador to the Philippines. (*Ahram*, Sept 8)

SOUTH VIETNAM

Trade and Political Relations. In May a South Vietnamese trade delegation conducted talks in Cairo on the implementation of a trade agreement concluded in 1960

and a trade protocol for 1961. The head of the delegation, who delivered to President Abdel Nasser a message from President Ngo Dinh Diem, later stated that it had been agreed to exchange trade representatives and to strengthen cultural ties. He added that the UAR had not officially recognized South Vietnam; the exchange of trade representatives amounted to de facto recognition. (*Ahram*, May 3, 9, 12)

On Aug 5 it was reported in Cairo that Ngo Dinh Nhu, the brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his political adviser, had been invited to Cairo by UAR representatives in Rabat. He had not accepted the invitation but had agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (*Eg. Gaz.*, Aug 5). [Until the end of the year no such relations were established.]

AFRICA

AFRICA IN GENERAL

AFRICAN VERSUS ARAB "CIRCLES" IN UAR POLICIES

[At the beginning of the year the impression was widely held that the UAR had shifted the emphasis in her foreign policy efforts from the Arab "circle" to the African one. (There were three "circles" in Abdel Nasser's *Philosophy of the Revolution*, the two mentioned and the Islamic "circle.") This impression was caused by the UAR's involvement in the Congo conflict and the establishment of the Casablanca bloc on the one hand, and the impasse she had reached in her endeavour to unite the Arab countries under her leadership, on the other.]

Jordanian Attack on UAR Policy. At the beginning of Jan, Amman Radio sharply attacked the UAR's African policy. The commentary said that after having failed in the Arab "circle" Abdel Nasser had turned to the African "circle" with the same amount of success. He had enabled Israel to break the boycott siege and to penetrate Africa by means of her ships which sailed the Red Sea freely. (*R. Amman*, Jan 7-1MB, Jan 8; *Jer. Post*, Jan 22; *NYHT*, Jan 25)

Justification for UAR Concentration on Africa as Service to Arab Cause. The Beirut [pro-UAR] *Al-Sayyid* replied to Arab criticism on UAR policy in Africa. The paper confirmed that the UAR was now concentrating her efforts in Africa, even at the expense of Arab questions. The Congo problem was taking up most of the time and headlines in the UAR radio and press. The reason for this was that the UAR had an important position in the continent, and the African states had become a powerful bloc in the international area. The UAR therefore had to establish strong ties with the African countries. Congo was seen by the African countries as a symbol of their struggle for independence and by concentrating on the Congo the UAR could win their friendship. Another important reason for the UAR's interest in Africa was Israel's effort to break the boycott siege by stepping up her activities in Africa. In the Casablanca conference Abdel Nasser had made two important gains in Arab problems—Palestine and Algeria.

UAR interest and activity in Africa was actually in the service of the Arab cause and not at its expense. (*Sayyad*, Jan 12)

Problems of an Arab Leader in Black Africa; Dangers and Opportunities. Under the headline "Nasser Seeks Role in Africa", Joe Alex Morris Jr. wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* in Jan that Abdel Nasser was endeavouring to boost his prestige and influence in emerging independent Africa. Having met with little success in the first—or Arab—"circle," he was making a bid for the second. Here too, however, the record consisted of ups and downs, for two main reasons. The first was the rise of black African nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah who were willing to include the North African Arabs in their pan-Africanism but left no doubt that they thought African nationalism was basically black. The other reason was the inherent contradiction in present-day Africa: wooing one party involved the risk of alienating others. Additional checks on Abdel Nasser's success in Africa were his "obsession with Israel." This imposed a strain on his relations with the new African states which enjoyed Israeli aid and to which Israel was "hardly a problem." Furthermore, less than a century previously the Arabs were known and hated in black Africa as slavers who looted the continent. Thus, despite similar problems and the common bond of anti-colonialism it seemed unlikely that an Arab from Egypt would be able to gain the adulation of black Africa. On the other hand, if Abdel Nasser were wise enough to limit his objectives, his influence would become widespread in the continent as he was already admired as a revolutionary leader of the liberation movement in Africa, and had a natural advantage in the Islamized countries of central Africa. (*NYHT*, Jan 22)

"Egypt Can't Ignore Africa." In Aug, however, it was remarked that the common contention that Abdel Nasser had switched his attention to Africa after having been rebuffed in most of the Arab countries was an oversimplification. Nobody could ignore Africa and least of all Egypt, which was a part of it. The UAR could claim leadership there almost as a right, and few were in a

better position to teach newly independent states what they wanted to know. (*Times*, Aug 2)

[After the secession of Syria from the UAR, there appeared a second wave of press reports on a shift in the UAR's policy towards Africa, and an adjustment of its African policy to new circumstances.]

Policy Change after Break-up of UAR? At the end of the year reports originating in Cairo said that the UAR was changing its African policy. This change was said to be due mainly to (1) the split with Syria and (2) the result of past experience in the UAR's African policy, when it had often acted on one-sided information and faulty evaluation of the facts. In consequence of this reappraisal the UAR government would in future:

- 1) support evolutionary rather than revolutionary movements in Africa in order to avoid chaos;
- 2) adopt non-alignment in the case of locally opposed groups, particularly in non-independent states;
- 3) concentrate on safeguarding the Egyptian hinterland (Sudan, East Africa and Eastern Congo) against domination by either Communism or the West.

After the split with Syria it was expected that the UAR would strengthen its interest in Africa, because it was the Syrian insistence on the primacy of the "Arab struggle" which had impeded the full development of Abdel Nasser's African policy in the past.

The sources cited examples to illustrate the change in policy: the cessation of Cairo Radio attacks on Julius Nyerere, PM of Tanganyika, and on the Kenya leader Tom Mboya, and support of the Congolese central government of PM Adoula. In Zanzibar and the Kenya Northern Frontier District, where the Arabs and Somalis were rejecting African domination, Egyptian influence would be exerted to prevent a racial clash. (*Jer. Post*, (OFNS), Dec 3; *Jeune Afrique*, Dec 2-6)

The UAR and African Unity: Advocates Solidarity instead of Union. [The UAR did not voice support for an African political union as an immediate objective for independent Africa as did e.g. Presidents Nkrumah, Sekou Touré and Modibo Keita of the Casablanca bloc. In addition to the reasons for this attitude advanced by President Abdel Nasser (see below) it was probably necessary to avoid having to make a choice between Arab unity and African unity, or even having to declare which of the two was foremost in the interest of the UAR.]

After the success of the African revolution, an article in *Ruz al-Yusuf* said, African countries were in need of outside assistance but could accept it neither from the imperialist West nor Russia, so as not to breach their neutralism. The only way open to Africa was to cooperate with those African countries which had gained their independence earlier. A cooperative association of African states should be established on the principles of freedom and for the purpose of defending their independence. There was no intention of setting up federations or an all-embracing African union. This was unimportant and inopportune. After creating this framework, it would be easy for African states to accept outside assistance without fear for their independence or their neutralism. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 27)

In Aug. in a television interview, Abdel Nasser explained that the Africans interpreted the word "unity" in the same way as the Arabs. There should first be solidarity and cooperation. Eventually the goal of union would be reached. This would not be easy for the states of Africa to achieve, however, because there existed

different peoples in the continent. He advocated in principle regional unifications of small African countries. Nevertheless, achieving African solidarity was in itself a great victory. Abdel Nasser cited the Casablanca Charter as an example of the means to overcome obstacles in the way of closer relations in Africa. He concluded that the meaning and aims of African unity were solidarity, cooperation and brotherhood. (*Ahram*, Aug 14)

Israel as a Cause for UAR Activity in Africa. (For details of Arab and UAR anti-Israel activities in Africa, see pp 202-3)

[The importance attached by the UAR to Israeli activities in the African continent and the extent to which it caused greater UAR concentration in African affairs was reflected in Abdel Nasser's revolution anniversary speech of July 22.] He said that the UAR was working for the solidarity of Africa and continued: "This is because imperialism has enabled Israel to infiltrate into Africa to pave the way for its own re-entry." At first, the African leaders had been deceived but later they realized that Israel was "a product of the new imperialism..." (*Ahram*, July 23; *Nasser's Speeches*, pp 159-60)

UAR CLAIMS LEADERSHIP OF AFRICA

[As in 1960, the UAR press and radio stressed the UAR's mission in Africa as a pacemaker for the African independence movement, as leader and guide.] Some examples follow.

The UAR was described as the centre of the liberation movement which was spreading throughout the continent. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Jan 2)

Two factors had made independence and mutual relations possible in Africa and Asia, a Cairo broadcast in Hausa said. "First, the increasing general demand for freedom set some countries free. Secondly, the Suez crisis of 1952 (sic) set an example to patriots for launching a struggle to liberate Africa and Asia... After the UAR achieved its independence and became... free of any kind of colonial bonds, it set out to assist those countries in Africa and Asia still under colonial rule to attain their freedom..." (*R. Cairo in House to West Africa*, July 25 [31])

The peoples of Africa looked to Cairo to help them overcome disease. Only Cairo, the capital of Africa, could direct the war against sickness in the continent, together with the African states. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, Jan 25, May 3)

All Africans looked to Abdel Nasser as their hope for achieving freedom. Cairo was both Africa's largest city and a refuge for African leaders seeking independence. With its long history of defending freedom and protecting the persecuted, and with its rich moral and cultural inheritance, Cairo had become "the beacon of light radiating the faith to defend justice and the will to die for it." (*Akhbar*, March 24; *BBCM*, March 25)

The UAR requested to be represented at the WHO conferences for Africa as an observer. (The UAR belonged to the WHO regional committee for the ME.) At first, the WHO Executive refused but finally agreed to the UAR request, it was reported in Cairo. (*Ahram*, July 20)

THE UAR AND THE WORLD BLOCS IN AFRICA

[Throughout 1961 the UAR information media heavily attacked the western powers, usually under the general title of "imperialists." Colonial powers came in for the heaviest criticism and abuse, but the USA was also a

target. The Soviet Union, whose policy on the Congo question coincided on the whole with that of the UAR, was not subjected to criticism, but Communism occasionally was, in broadcasts to East Africa. At the same time, neutralism and non-alignment were continually advocated as the only possible policy for Africa.]

Against Christianity in Africa. In an article on imperialism, Hassanein Haykal, editor of *Al-Ahrâm*, said that imperialism had penetrated the continent in the wake of the missionaries. The missionaries maintained that they wished to contribute to Africa through religion. Instead of giving, however, they took, and took everything. Consequently, the saying went in Africa: When the imperialists came to Africa, they had the Gospel and the Africans possessed the land; years passed; now the Africans had the Gospel and the imperialists possessed all the lands. (*Ahrâm*, Feb 17; see also below: Islam and Arabism)

US Reported to See UAR-Soviet Coordination on Congo; UAR Denial. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb 15, according to reports from Washington, that the UAR was playing an active role in the explosive situation in Congo, was in close contact with the Soviet Union in coordinating its efforts, and had supplied some arms and ammunition to the Gizenga faction in Stanleyville. He went on to say that President Kennedy's statement in a press conference on the same day (to the effect that the US would defend the UN Charter by opposing any attempt by any government to intervene unilaterally in the Congo) was addressed to the UAR as much as to the USSR. (*Times*, Feb 17)

This was reported by Cairo Radio's home service, together with a comment that the US was well aware that the UAR's policy was completely independent. In a Swahili broadcast on the reported statement, Cairo Radio omitted the entire reference to the alleged UAR-Soviet cooperation and emphasized even more that the UAR was independent and non-aligned. (*BBCM*, Feb 18, 24)

On the other hand, publicity was given to a statement included in a report said to have been submitted to the US Congress in Feb to the effect that Abdel Nasser's policy in Africa—just as in the Arab world—was opposed to all attempts from both East and West to gain influence in the area. (*Ahrâm*, Feb 12)

At the same time, Hassanein Haykal took pains to refute the American contention that UAR policy went hand in hand with that of the Soviet Union, especially in African questions under discussion at the UN. He maintained that the UAR voted as she did in each case solely because it was consistent with her policy to do so. Enumerating issues on which the UAR and USSR votes had coincided and on which the US had taken the opposite stand, Haykal wrote: "In order to satisfy the US we would have had to support the continuation of colonialism... to abstain from supporting Congo's independence... to take part in the murder of Lumumba... Could we have taken a different stand in all these questions from the one we actually took?" (*Ahrâm*, Feb 24)

Against Western Influence in Africa. [The UAR advised the African states to dissociate themselves completely from the West, politically, economically and culturally. Africans suspected of being favourably inclined towards the West were termed "stooges." This line did not noticeably change during the year.]

After the setting up of what came to be known as the "Casablanca bloc," the UAR attacked plans for setting up a rival African bloc. The call of President Tubman of Liberia for such a conference was criticized on the grounds that the US was behind Tubman's initiative, aiming at creating a balance to equalize the Casablanca conference (*Rûs al-Yusuf*, March 6). (For details of the Casablanca and Monrovia conferences see pp 48 ff and pp 54 b-55 respectively).

In March it was reported that the UAR was studying a new plan intended to combat western influence in Africa. (*Rûs al-Yusuf*, March 13)

The American Peace Corps was attacked on the grounds that its aims were the enslavement of peoples. (*R. Cairo*, March 14 [16])

A plan to get a hold on the African markets was said to have been prepared by imperialism. The plan concerned an Assistance Fund allegedly offered by President Kennedy to African states which would agree to join European blocs. It was the UAR's duty to guard against such plotters. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, June 3)

In a speech at the economic committee of the Casablanca bloc the UAR Minister of Finance called on African states not to associate with the Common Market, whose aim was to exploit them and foil their attempts to set up competing industries. (*R. Cairo*, July 18 [20])

In Sept, in a talk on US "neo-colonialism" the Cairo "Voice of Africa" criticized the Nyasaland Malawi Congress Party (MCP) for welcoming Mennen Williams, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The MCP leaders hoped for US aid but in fact their "strange liking for the US" constituted a great danger, for the US policy in Africa served its own military and economic interests and was "opposed to the interests of Africa." The USA had military bases in Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya; it supported the policy of apartheid in South Africa; it was responsible for the Congo affair; it supported Portugal's "crimes of annihilation and mass murder" in Angola; and it supported France against Tunisia in the Bizerta crisis. The African peoples should beware of the dangers of US neo-colonialism. (*Voice of Africa*, Sept 10 [12])

In Oct a Cairo Radio talk counselled West African States to take the following action if they wished to be really independent and non-aligned: (1) cancel all connections with and commitments to imperialist states, specifically membership in the French community and joint defence treaties with Britain and the USA; (2) expel foreign capitalism represented by banks and investment companies; (3) refuse membership in the Common Market and join organizations for economic unity inaugurated by the Casablanca powers; (4) end the foreign cultural invasion, and gain freedom from cultural subordination in Europe. (*R. Cairo in English for West Africa*, Oct 12 [14])

On Dec 2, "Quit Africa" day, a large gathering in Cairo of representatives of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, African states and UAR institutions decided to warn the imperialist countries to quit Africa completely and declared total solidarity with all freedom fighters. (*Ahrâm*, Dec 3)

Samples of Cairo Anti-Western Broadcasts To Africa. [The following samples, in addition to those cited above, are typical of the motives and the language used in these broadcasts. The "Voice of Free Africa" did not identify itself as a UAR station.]

"The imperialist dogs continue their bestial actions. . .

Get out of Africa, you imperialist dogs... Africans want to regain their rights which you have stolen from them... The imperialists hate to see Africans in power. This is what forces them to train stooges in the Congo... There are stooges in Kenya. The whole of East Africa is full of stooges." (*Voice of Free Africa in Swahili, Feb 1 [3]*)

"The dogs, the pigs, the rulers—whatever they are, Belgians, Americans, British—have succeeded for a short time in forming their governments... Tihombe's government in Katanga, the Mobutu-Kasavubu government in Leopoldville..." (*Voice of Free Africa in Swahili, Feb 6 [8]*)

"If the Africans were united in Kenya today, our elder Jomo Kenyatta would have been freed. But the dogs, the imperialists, and the pigs, the settlers, have bought stooges like the KADU leaders..." (*Voice of Free Africa in Swahili, March 7 [9]*)

Against Communist Influence in Africa. [There were occasional broadcasts against Communist influence in Africa, mainly East Africa. They were few in comparison with the broadcasts against imperialism.]

Some African "agents" were accused of attempting to bring Communist influence into the continent. (*Voice of Free Africa, March 6 [8]*)

In March a commentator in Swahili said that besides imperialist support of "stooges" in Africa there was also the danger of Communism in East and Central Africa. There were stooges who were trying to introduce Communism there. "The imperialists from Europe and Communists of the world want to bring a cold war to East and Central Africa." (*Voice of Free Africa in Swahili, March 10 [13]*)

"If the Africans in Zanzibar had united, they would have succeeded in forming a government by Africans and for Africans. The imperialists, the British dogs, would never have played about with Africans. Communist stooges there would never have had a chance today to play about with Africans." (*Voice of Free Africa in Swahili, March 7 [9]*)

THE UAR AS CENTRE FOR AFRICAN NATIONALISTS

African Offices. On Jan 1 a Cairo source published the following list of African political offices in Cairo:

- 1) Zanzibar office, opened in Aug 1960, headed by Ali Sultan.
- 2) Uganda office, opened by John Kale in 1957.
- 3) Kenya office, opened by Odiambo Okello in 1958.
- 4) South Africa office, representing the African National Congress (ANC) opened in 1960 by M. L. Pilusu.
- 5) Northern Rhodesia office, opened after Kenneth Kaunda visited Cairo (in June 1960. See MER 1960, p 546). The office represented Kaunda's party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP).
- 6) Southern Rhodesia office, opened in Sept 1960 by the SG of SR's National Democratic Party, T. G. Si-lundike. (*Bima' al-Watan, Jan 1*)

In a statement by Okello in Oct, in the name of all African offices in Cairo, the three following offices were mentioned in addition:

- 7) Ruanda Urundi
- 8) South West Africa
- 9) Basutoland (*Ahram, Oct 8*)

[Political offices representing independent African states were not mentioned, although press reports in 1960 mentioned the existence of offices for Nigeria, Somalia,

Ethiopia (Eritrea), Mauritania, Cameroun and Equatorial Africa. It was not clear whether offices were closed after the countries concerned attained independence.]

Personal Problems of African Representatives. The Africans of the political offices, who were mostly concentrated in Cairo's Zamalek quarter, were interviewed on their life in the city. They complained of lack of social intercourse, especially with girls. They were lonely and contacts on the social level were limited to meetings with other Africans. Egyptian society was more or less closed to them. The Uganda representative, however, had married an Egyptian girl and had acquired through her many friends. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, May 1*)

African Offices; Political Declarations. [The African political offices frequently issued declarations to the press on political issues. The statements were not limited to African affairs but dealt with various international matters, e.g. support of the Casablanca conference (*Ahram; Gumburiyah, Jan 9*); support of Cuba (*Ahram, April 22*); and praise of Abdel Nasser's speech of Oct 5 on the break-up of the UAR. (*Ahram, Oct 8*)

EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE; MILITARY TRAINING

[Much publicity was devoted to UAR educational assistance, the award of scholarships and the despatch of UAR teachers. Implementation of projects in these fields lagged somewhat, however. For details see also under UAR relations with individual African countries.]

Military Training. In April it was reported that trainees from 33 African and Arab countries were studying in UAR military institutions "new techniques of warfare in the air, sea and on land," in addition to such subjects as arts, geography and history. (*Akhbar, April 28*)

Many African trainees were reported to be among the new officers who graduated from a war college course in June. (*Ahram, June 28*)

Scholarships, Teachers. In May it was reported that 150 scholarships would be accorded and 50 teachers sent to the African states. (*Ahram, May 2*)

In Aug, Doudou Gueye, SG of the Association of African Journalists, visited Cairo and discussed the award of 8 UAR scholarships to African journalists and radio employees. (*Akhir Sa'ah, Aug 9*)

The UAR Ministry of Education requested an allocation of an additional ££35,000 to defray the cost of teachers' missions to work in African countries, including Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. (*MENA, Feb 11 [W 16]; Ahram, Feb 12*)

5,000 UAR teachers were to pass examinations after which a number would be chosen for work in friendly states, including newly-independent states in Africa, in order to strengthen cultural relations between them and the UAR. (*Ahram, March 27*)

Institutions for Africans and the Study of Africa. On May 20 a first course was completed for African and Arab scientists in the medical application of radio-isotopes at the UAR institution for atomic energy. There were four Nigerians among the participants; all the others came from Arab countries. The course had been organized in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with a UAR request for

the establishment in Cairo of a ME regional radio-isotope centre for the Arab countries. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, May 17; *UN Year Book 1961*, p 593)

On Feb 5 the Labour Committee of the UAR National Assembly met to discuss the setting up of a training institute for workers as a counter-move to Israel's Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and Cooperation, established in 1960 (*MER 1960*, p 302) (*R. Cairo*, Feb 6-*IMB*, Feb 6). [No such institute was established during the year.]

In March it was reported that a demographical institute would be set up in Cairo, to serve African researchers who wished to study demographic problems of the continent (*Ahram*, March 14). [By the end of the year there was no report that the institute had been established.]

In April a report was published on heated discussions at the Cairo University Council on a suggestion to set up an institute for research into tropical vegetation. Some of the participants, including the dean, had maintained that there was no need at present for such an institute, and it was enough that the faculty of arts had inaugurated an institute for African studies in which the history and geography of the continent were being taught. On that note the discussion had ended. The writer of the report called for the establishment of the institute because the UAR had to train specialists in this field, as Israel was doing, so as to avoid embarrassment should she be called upon to supply such specialists to African countries. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, April 19)

It appeared later that the above mentioned institute for African studies at Cairo University had not yet been established. The preparatory committee had not even started work. Divisions of opinion on the matter had cropped up between the universities, as well as opposition to the idea on the part of some responsible persons in the university. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Sept 6)

An Afro-Asian Technical Institute started to function in Oct. First reports spoke only of African trainees. Graduates of secondary schools in the UAR and African countries would study agriculture, engineering and commerce for a two and a half year period. Those wishing to continue their studies could do so for a further period of two (or three) years in order to obtain their engineers' diploma. Teaching would be in English, French and Arabic. Reports on the number of students to be enrolled varied from 150 to 300, 100 of them from the UAR itself. On the day of opening, it was reported that 75 students had been accepted from Afro-Asian countries, including 27 from non-Arab African states. (*Akhbar*, June 13; *Ahram*, July 15, Aug 19, Sept 9, Oct 14; *R. Cairo*, in *Hebrew*, Oct 28-*IMB*, Oct 29)

African students in the UAR met with language difficulties in their studies. In May, the UAR Higher Council of Universities recommended that faculties teaching theoretical subjects arrange special courses in French or English. The faculty of law had already done so. (*Ahram*, May 28)

BROADCASTS AND PROPAGANDA

Broadcasts. [UAR broadcasts to Africa remained a principal instrument of policy in the continent and their importance grew with the addition of new transmitters and the extension in both time and languages of transmission.]

In Aug UAR broadcasts to Africa were as follows:

1) Broadcasts from "The Voice of Africa from Cairo":

Daily length of
programme
(minutes)

Language	
Swahili (East & Central Africa)	75
Amharic (Ethiopia & Eritrea)	45
Lingala (Congo)	45
English (West Africa)	45
Hausa (Guinea, Nigeria & Cameroons)	90
Somali	60
Sudanese dialects	15
English (East, Central & South Africa)	45
French (West Africa)	60
Fulani (West Africa)	60
A Central African language (Shona, or Lunda or Nyanja)	45
2) Broadcasts from "Voice of the Arabs":	
Arabic (for Somalia); on Fridays only	20
3) Broadcasts from "Voice of Free Africa" (which did not identify itself as a UAR station):	
Swahili	40
Total number of hours, daily:	10.25
Total number of languages	12

(*BBCM*, W Aug 10)

In April a new transmitter was installed in Cairo, which enabled broadcasts to Africa to be extended by 6 hours. The new antenna, located in Mansura, was said to be the tallest in all Africa and Asia, and the transmitter's power was said to be second only to those in the US and USSR. It was installed by technicians from Czechoslovakia. (*Ahram*, April 1; *Akhbar*, April 4)

On July 3, Cairo Radio celebrated the seventh anniversary of its Swahili broadcasts. (*R. Cairo*, July 3 [5])

In a speech at the UAR National Assembly, Abd al-Qādir Hātim, Minister of State, said that the UAR's broadcasting network had become an example to be followed by other peoples struggling for liberty and independence. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 7)

Information. In April it was reported that 30 information centres would be set up, most of them in Africa and Latin America. Each centre would be staffed by press, radio and television attachés. (*Ahram*, April 14)

In Oct press attachés were appointed at the UAR embassies in Mali and Nigeria. (*Ahram*, Oct 8)

In Oct it was decided to send a cultural exhibition of the UAR to tour Africa (*Ahram*, Oct 26). [No further reports on the matter were available.]

ISLAMIC ACTIVITIES

Al-Azhar Activities. In Jan, Mahmūd Shaltūt, the Rector of Al-Azhar, said that 3,000 foreign students were studying at the university and the number of Africans among them was steadily increasing. In one month alone—Dec 1960—94 African students had enrolled.

Defining the duties of the university's missionaries abroad, the Rector said that they spread the tenets of Islam, defended the religion against its enemies and fought against missionary movements which had been brought by imperialism into the continent. (*Ahram*, Jan 2)

In Jan the Islamic Congress decided to set up a special institution with the aid of Al-Azhar to direct activities against the enemies of Islam and against the "Zionist intention to falsify the Qur'ān" (*Hayat*, Jan

5; *BBCM*, Jan 6). [There was no report on the establishment of such an institution.]

In March, replying to criticism of Al-Azhar for having neglected the Muslims in Africa, the Rector said that Al-Azhar had started teaching foreign languages including English, French and Swahili and had set up a special institute to prepare religious emissaries for service abroad. Emissaries had already been sent to Somalia, Libya and Nigeria. For lack of funds, however, this and other projects had had to be abandoned. The Minister of Finance had drastically cut the university's budget estimate. (*Musiawar*, March 3)

On Oct 29 the Rector of Al-Azhar received a delegation from East Africa headed by Chief Abdullah Fundikira, Tanganyika Minister of Justice. They discussed the despatch of teachers, imams and religious publications to East Africa. (*Ahram*, Oct 30)

Plans for "Religious Attachés." "Voice of Islam" Broadcasting Station. In Jan it was reported that the UAR was planning to introduce "religious attachés" in some of its missions in Africa. They would make contact with Muslim leaders and organizations and serve as consultants on social, educational and cultural questions that Islamic institutions might help solve. Teachers and imams from Al-Azhar were to be sent to Africa with the primary task of converting the estimated 40 million pagans to Islam. This move was understood to have been prompted by the reports then circulating on the rapid spread of Islam in West Africa. (*NYT*, Jan 16)

During the same period the UAR Minister of Waqfs approved a plan for the setting up of "The Voice of Islam" radio station in Cairo. (*Ahram*, Jan 9)

[Neither of these two plans was reported to have materialized during the year.]

Activity in Connection with Pilgrimage. The SG of the Arab Federation of Trade Unions decided to invite two African leaders to the pilgrimage at the expense of the Federation. The leaders would pay a visit to Cairo after their pilgrimage. (*Ahram*, April 19)

Hasan Abbas Zaki, head of the UAR pilgrimage delegation to Mecca, was reported to have taken with him 5,000 copies of the Qur'an to be distributed among the pilgrims from Africa and Asia. (*Akhbar*, April 23)

Cairo Radio Broadcasts to Africa Glorify Islam; Depreciate Christianity, "European Culture." [Islam was a frequent topic in Cairo broadcasts to Africa. Talks were given explaining the tenets of Islam, its laws, feasts, history etc. to the listeners in African languages. Readings from the Qur'an and religious music were a permanent feature in the broadcasts. The contrast between Islam and European culture was stressed; the first was described as original, progressive and human, the second as degenerate and immoral.]

In Jan it was reported that the UAR had decided to push [in Africa] as hard as possible the argument that Christianity was European and western and therefore somehow tainted with imperialism. Islam, on the other hand, was to be represented as the natural faith for free Africa. (*NYT*, Jan 16)

Following are a few samples of broadcasts:

A religious talk in Swahili explained Islam as a world religion teaching the brotherhood of all peoples; another in Somali dwelt on the perils of self-indulgence and yet another in Swahili extolled the Prophet's leadership. (*R. Cairo*, April 14 [21]; June 9 [16])

A speaker in Hausa on the spread of Islam in Africa

said that in contrast with Christianity, which relied on aggressive proselytizing by missionaries, Islam had been propagated by West African natives who had visited the centres of Islamic learning and returned to teach their fellow countrymen. As a result, Islam had spread beyond expectation. (*R. Cairo*, May 17 [19]). [No such talks were broadcast to East Africa, where Islam had been introduced by conquerors and slave-dealers.]

In a talk broadcast to West Africa in Hausa, Cairo Radio said that Islamic culture had been the source of the European Renaissance, though later the progress of Muslims was retarded by economic and political vicissitudes. "Islam is a religion of civilization and calls for development... But there is a danger in the civilization of Europe, which practises immorality, and people must differentiate it from the true civilization and abstain from the former." (*R. Cairo*, July 21 [27])

Another talk, in Swahili, dwelt on the Crusaders' attempt to conquer and destroy Islam. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 27 [Nov 3])

African Views on Islam and Arabism. In an editorial on "Islamism and Pan-Africanism" *Le Courrier d'Afrique* said that Muslim countries like the UAR and Morocco who were increasingly declaring their solidarity with Africa were at the same time playing the Communist role in Congo by supporting such people as Lumumba and Gizenga. Were such countries really African? The editorial replied that until it was invaded by the Arabs, who carried out savage expeditions in the search of slaves and ivory, the northern part of the continent was inhabited by black Africans. At present Islam was penetrating in a different, but no less dangerous manner into the continent. Some countries—such as the UAR—wanted to become dominating through a new form of colonialism. Pan-Islam agitation by North African and other Muslim states was being taken advantage of by the Communist bloc to spread neo-Marxism and Communist propaganda. (*Le Courrier d'Afrique*, Feb 10)

In an interview in Bamako, Mali, Hampate Ba, an influential Islamic scholar and leader said that Islam's success in Africa was due partly to the fact that it disregarded colour. Hampate Ba said he wanted African Islam to be "universal," free of political influence and untouched by Arab nationalism. (*NYT*, March 20)

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

[UAR efforts to widen economic and trade relations with Africa continued in 1961. More economic missions toured the continent and trade agreements were concluded with African countries. The UAR also participated in the economic discussions with the Casablanca Charter states which aimed at creating an African Common Market—see p 56 a. See also UAR relations with individual African countries.]

Volume of Trade. The value of total UAR exports in 1961 to non-Arab African countries was \$4.8m. (1.04% of her total exports); imports stood at \$6.1m. (0.92% of her total imports). Somalia was Egypt's most important customer (\$1.6m.) followed by Guinea (\$1.0m.); Congo, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were the foremost exporters to Egypt. (See table of trade, p 86.)

Economic Mission. At the end of March an economic mission left Cairo to tour 13 African states (*Ahram Iqtisadi*, Feb 16). The delegation left Cairo for Addis Ababa on March 27 for a 4-day visit to Ethiopia (*R. Addis Ababa*, March 27 [W 30]) and went on to Ghana,

Togo and the Ivory Coast. (*R. Cairo*, April 29-*IMB*, April 30)

Economic Policy: Countering Imperialist Schemes. In Feb Hasan Abbās Zaki, the Southern R. Minister of Economy, explained the UAR's economic policy towards the newly-independent states as follows. These states had wrested their independence from imperialism which was nevertheless trying to maintain its hold on their economy by creating economic blocs such as the Commonwealth and the EEC, and also by giving them assistance through third countries such as Israel. As the UAR had experienced this process, she could help the new states to achieve complete independence and to withstand this pressure by the following means: (1) sending missions to study their needs and trade possibilities; (2) inviting representatives from these countries to the UAR; (3) opening commercial agencies, specifically in Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal; (4) holding permanent exhibitions; (5) participating actively in economic conferences and institutions in Africa, such as the Economic Commission for Africa, and encouraging the investment of Arab capital in these countries; (7) offering facilities to importers in these countries and aiding their governments in development plans. (*Ahram*, Feb 4)

Banking. In April it was reported that UAR banks were due to open branches in African countries. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, April 29)

In May the UAR Minister of Economy, Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysuni, discussed plans for setting up an Arab banking company for Asia and Africa. Qaysuni said that the aim was not the profit to be gained, but, "if we ourselves do not hasten to establish these banks, there are others who may forestall us" (*Ahram*, May 2, 22). [No report was available on the opening of UAR banks in African countries during 1961.]

Problems of Trade. In March two journalists who had toured Africa reported on UAR exports, their possibilities and problems. Their report contained the following points: (1) European countries were re-exporting to Africa agricultural produce which they had bought from the UAR. (2) Agreements and contracts signed by the UAR with African countries were not being properly implemented on account of failure on the part of UAR institutions to execute the terms of contracts as scheduled. (3) There were over 10,000 Arab merchants in Ghana and Nigeria who were ready to import UAR products but had received no encouragement and guidance from UAR representatives in those countries. (4) UAR cement exported to Africa had met with great success and was competing favourably with Israeli and other cement. (5) Means of transport to West Africa had to be developed in order to increase trade with the area. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, March 11)

Exports and Trade Representation in Africa. Out of 27 commercial bureaux to be opened by the UAR in the forthcoming budgetary year, 10 were to be in Africa. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 20)

The setting up of joint UAR-African export-import firms was being planned. (*Ahram*, Sept 18, 30)

In Oct it was reported that UAR tourist offices would be opened in Ghana, Somalia and Casablanca on Nov 1. (*Ahram*, Oct 4)

Reports in Nov said that "An-Nasr" Import-Export Co. would open bureaux in Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya,

Mali, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. Bureaux which had already been set up by the company would be expanded. These were situated in Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria and Somalia. (*Akhbar*, Nov 2; *Gumhuriyah*, Nov 9)

Transport. In Jan it was reported that a new shipping line between the UAR and Somalia would be opened. (*Hayat*, Jan 13)

In July a UAR ship arrived in Dakar, thereby inaugurating a new shipping line to West Africa (see MER 1960, p. 545). By Oct two UAR ships were carrying cement to Liberia and general cargo to other West African ports. (*Masa*, July 16, Oct 30)

In Nov it was reported that the General Institution for Maritime Transport had decided to set up a UAR-African shipping company whose vessels would ply between African ports. (*Ahram*, Nov 24)

A weekly flight to Lagos and Accra was to be inaugurated by United Arab Airlines on Feb 28. (*Ahram*, Feb 19; see also under: Ghana)

In April trials were carried out for a projected air service from Damascus to East Africa via Aden and Mogadishu. (*Ayyam*, April 2)

In Dec a UAR source said that talks on air agreements were being held with Nigeria, Mali and Senegal. (*R. Cairo in Hebrew*, Dec 31, 1961-*IMB*, Jan 1, 1962)

EAST AFRICA

Nile Waters. [During 1961 Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika—all of which were approaching independence—put forward claims to a portion of the Nile waters, the White Nile originating in their territories. Neither the Nile waters agreement of 1929 between Egypt and the UK nor the agreement of 1959 between Egypt and the Sudan provided for allocations for these countries.]

In April the Kenya Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation came to Cairo for talks on Kenya's request for a portion of the Nile waters. (*Ahram*, April 7)

It was later reported that all the three East African countries had requested discussions on the subject. (*Ahram*, April 10, 11)

UAR sources put the yearly quantity to be apportioned to the three countries at 1,750 million c.u.m. [out of an annual flow of from 40,000 to 150,000 million c.u.m.]. (*Ahram*, July 8, Aug 11)

In Oct informal talks on the question were held in Khartoum between representatives of the three countries and the joint UAR-Sudan Nile waters commission (established under the 1959 agreement). The outcome was not made public. In Nov it was reported that the discussions would be reopened in Jan 1962. It appeared that the sides could not reach agreement as to the volume of water to be allocated to the three East African countries. (*Ahram*, Oct 31; *Akhir Sa'ah*, Nov 29)

East African Federation Opposed. [Cairo was hostile to the project for an East African federation comprising Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, which was favoured by many East African leaders, particularly the Tanganyikan PM, Julius Nyerere.]

In March a UAR diplomat who had toured East African countries called the projected federation a British plot. In this way Britain hoped to extend the white settlers' dominating influence from Kenya to other territories. The national parties in East Africa were against the federation but some leaders, including Dr. Nyerere, had been influenced by British-American propaganda and supported the plan (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 27). Britain

also wanted to facilitate the setting up of bases in the area. The project was compared to the federation of shaykhdoms in the Persian Gulf, said to be planned by Britain. (*R. Cairo in Swahili, July 15 [18], July 29 [Aug 1]*)

Broadcasts. [Cairo broadcast to East Africa in Swahili both in its "Voice of Africa" programme and over the "Voice of Free Africa" which did not identify itself as a UAR station. These broadcasts attacked "British colonialism," and imperialism in general and its "stooges," and—occasionally—also Communism and its "stooges." The British and the imperialists were termed, as usual, "dogs and pigs." (See above: The UAR and the World Blocs in Africa: Samples of Cairo and Western Broadcasts; also: Broadcasts and Propaganda.)]

A "Voice of Free Africa" commentary in Swahili said that the disturbances in Zanzibar resulted from the British policy there of inciting leaders against each other, so that the British could maintain their rule. The latter were stirring up the Christian Africans against the Muslims in order to create disturbances. The commentator warned the Christians in Uganda not to mix religion with politics. He called for unity so that the "imperialist dogs" may be thrown out. (*Voice of Free Africa in Swahili, Sept 5, 6 [8]*)

British Charged with Obstructing UAR Diplomat's Movements. In March Dr. Abd al-Aziz Isahq, a UAR diplomat on a tour of East Africa, complained in Dar es Salaam of "disgraceful treatment" meted out to him. At Nairobi he had been detained at the airport for 14 hours without any explanation. Furthermore, he had had to cancel a visit to Zanzibar because a visa applied for four weeks earlier had not been received. (*Times, March 14*). He was not permitted to visit Uganda. (*Ahram, March 16*)

EX-FRENCH AFRICA

Attacks on African and Malagasy Union States. [The UAR press and radio accused the organization of ex-French African states of subservience to imperialism. This organization, the *Union Africaine et Malgache* (UAM), formed part of the French Community and comprised the following states: Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Malagasy Republic, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. These countries became also

known as the Brazzaville group after a conference they held in that city in Dec 1960 on the Congo problem. (See MER 1960, p 26.)

In a series of talks in Somali on "neo-colonialism," Cairo Radio attacked the French Community in Africa and the British Commonwealth as levers for neo-colonialism and for economic penetration into the continent. (*R. Cairo, Feb 28 [March 2]*)

In April a Swahili broadcast criticized the twelve states for being pro-French and for not voting with the Afro-Asian groups on the Algeria and Congo questions. (Compare voting record at UN, MER 1960, p 14 ff, this volume p 14 ff.) This policy was termed "a menace to the African states." (*R. Cairo in Swahili, April 6 [8]*)

The majority of the UAM states abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution on French atomic tests in the Sahara, calling for the denuclearization of Africa. Their abstention showed, *Al-Ahram* remarked, that these countries were "led by France as she wished." (*Ahram, Dec 8*)

The Yaounde Conference Criticized. *Al-Ahram* contrasted the Accra conference of Casablanca Charter states (April 6-11) with the UAM states' conference at Yaounde (March 27-30). The Accra conference was described as a democratic, open meeting, while at Yaounde a "secret society" was meeting which turned its back on Africa's burning problems such as Congo, Algeria, Kenya, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. This secret society had one leader, Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, "a friend of de Gaulle and his counsellor on African affairs. When Boigny tells the secret society, 'do this and thus,' they reply 'Amen'." The representatives meeting at Yaounde belonged to a new class in the UAM states whose interests were tied to imperialism.

The aim of the conference in Yaounde was to create a "bogy" of Communism and to devise ways and means of perpetuating French political and economic domination by establishing an Afro-Malagasy Economic Union [which was approved at the beginning] and devising a united foreign policy. Had each of the twelve countries determined its own foreign policy, the intention to unite would have been understandable, *Al-Ahram* remarked; "but one man determines them—Houphouët-Boigny, counsellor to the President of France on African affairs!" Another hidden intention of the conference was to create a bloc of the twelve states at the UN to counterbalance the Casablanca bloc, thereby dealing a blow to African unity. (*Ahram, April 14*)

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

ANGOLA

[In Feb-March Angolan nationalists started large-scale attacks on European settlements, thus starting the Angolan war.]

Mário Pinto de Andrade of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) sent Abdel Nasser a request for UAR assistance to the rebellion in Angola. (*MENA, June 1 [3]*)

"Angola Week" was celebrated in June throughout the UAR. (*R. Damascus, June 27 [29]*)

John Sifamba, head of the Geneva office of the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), visited Cairo in July. He later stated that he had "received all he asked for"

from the UAR which had pledged its support of the armed revolution against Portuguese imperialism. He said that he intended to open an Angola office in Cairo in Sept 1961 (*MENA, July 13 [14]*). [By Oct, no such office had apparently been established.]

UAR broadcasts, to the end of 1961, supported the Angolan rebels, attacked Portuguese policies in Angola and alleged arms supplies to Portugal by imperialists. (See *BBCM* for the period.)

CAMEROUN

[The UAR's ambivalent policy towards Cameroun continued in 1961. There was a shift towards better relations

with the government; the political exiles, however, continued to enjoy Cairo's hospitality.]

Official Relations. The UAR's first ambassador to Cameroun, Nagib as-Sadr [see MER 1960, p 545] presented his credentials to President Ahidjo of Cameroun at the beginning of Jan. (*Ahram*, Jan 7)

Cameroun's first ambassador to Cairo presented his credentials to President Abdel Nasser on Feb 2. He told a reporter of proposals to conclude trade, economic and cultural agreements between the UAR and Cameroun. He would also discuss the lack of direct air communications between the two countries as well as "the fate of the Cameroun politicians in Cairo." [See below: Contacts with Cameroun Opposition; also MER 1960, p 545.] (*Ahram*, Jan 6, Feb 3; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, Jan 23)

On July 11 the Cameroun Minister for Culture and Guidance arrived in Cairo for a few days' visit. (*Ahram*, July 12)

A trade and payments agreement was initiated in Cameroun in May (*Masa*, May 30) and signed in Cairo on Dec 19. Victor Kanga, the Cameroun Federal Minister of National Economy, who came for this purpose to Cairo, was received by President Abdel Nasser to whom he delivered a message of friendship from President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun.

The agreement stipulated payments in free currency, and included a most-favoured nation clause. "Volume of trade was fixed at a minimum value of £E125,000 per year." Cameroun was to import cotton and silk, manufactured products and oil products from the UAR and to export timber, livestock and hides. (*Akhbar*, Dec 17; *Ahram*, Dec 19, 20)

Cairo Contacts With Cameroun Opposition. In Jan two leaders of Cameroun's outlawed *Union des Populations Camerounaises* (UPC), Kingue Abel and Ernest Ouandie, arrived in Cairo where they denounced the Cameroun government's "cooperation with imperialism." (*Akhbar*, Jan 15)

In Feb *Al-Ahram* reported the arrival in Cairo of Mme Martha Mourié, widow of UPC leader Felix Mourié who had died of poisoning the previous year (MER 1960, p 545). Reportedly, she had escaped from a Cameroun prison. She told a tale of terror, concentration camps and torture of Mourié's followers. (*Ahram*, Feb 13)

The UPC was represented at the All-African People's Conference (AAPC) in Cairo (on which see p 46) by a delegation headed by Kingue Abel. Mme Mourié was introduced to the conference in the opening session by its UAR chairman. (*MENA*, March 26 [29])

ENTENTE COUNTRIES

Dahomey. A goodwill mission from Dahomey visited the UAR in Sept. (*R. Paris*, Sept 8 [12])

Niger. In April, Djibo Bakary [former vice-president of the Niger executive council; anti-French; was defeated in 1958 referendum and exiled in Oct 1959] was received by Abdel Nasser in Cairo. He said he was greatly impressed by his meetings with the UAR President. (*Ahram*, April 7; *Hayat*, April 8)

Upper Volta. In Aug the UAR appointed her first ambassador to Upper Volta. [The appointment was cancelled after the break-up of the UAR because the ambassador was a Syrian.] (*Ahram*, Aug 26)

Tharwat Ukāshah, the UAR Minister of Culture and

National Guidance, led his country's delegation at the independence celebrations of Upper Volta. (*Akhbar*, Dec 7)

FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

[The UAR supported the African nationalists in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, gave shelter to African nationalist leaders, and in broadcasts to Rhodesia advocated violence and revolution as the only effective means for the Africans to rid themselves of colonial rule. It criticized the Nyasaland leaders' friendly attitude to the US.]

Offices of Rhodesia African Leaders in Cairo. There were in Cairo a Northern Rhodesia Office, representing the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and a Southern Rhodesia Office, representing the National Democratic Party (NDP). (*Bina' al-Watan*, Cairo, Jan 1; see also MER 1960, p 546)

In Feb-March three African leaders from Northern and Southern Rhodesia visited the UAR: Kenneth Kaunda, leader of UNIP, his deputy, Matthew Chona, from Northern Rhodesia and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the NDP from Southern Rhodesia (*R. Damascus*, Feb 27-*IMB*, Feb 28; *Ahram*, Feb 17). They were received by President Abdel Nasser in Damascus on Feb 28 (*Ahram*, March 1). Kaunda later said that Abdel Nasser was a great leader in whom Africans saw a noble example in their struggle for freedom; he had expressed his support for freedom of Northern Rhodesia. (*Gumhuriyah*, March 2)

Cairo Broadcasts. Cairo Radio attacked "the Jew" Sir Roy Welensky, PM of the Federation, on his and the British government's stand at the recent talks on Northern Rhodesia in London. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, Feb 25 [28])

A [typical] talk broadcast by Cairo Radio in Nov in its "Northern Rhodesia Corner" contained the following points:

1) A strong attack on the Colonial Secretary, R. Maudling, "this chattering and blathering tool of British monopolist-capitalists," for having said that he would continue with the policy of hinging independence to the colonial territories at the pace and method best suited to the aspirations of their peoples and to serve their interests, and that before you can have justice you must have security.

2) After 70 years of exploitation it was the Africans' duty to "kick out all the European elements from Northern Rhodesia." "Only through bloodshed" would the British relinquish their hold. The many Northern Rhodesians who still hoped to achieve their goal gradually, by "being moderate and reasonable," laboured under a "terrible illusion."

3) In this colonial exploitation the US and Britain went hand in hand: "The English contribute their 500 years of experience in swindling the colonial peoples, while the Americans contribute the power of the dollar and the corrupted practices which today symbolize American rottenness all over the world."

4) Capitalism consisted of concentrating the means of production in the hands of the few and exploiting the many. The few were the settlers, and the only means of doing away with this "inhuman exploitation" was a "thorough revolution." The present state of affairs "will only alter when violence has put an end to this merciless and inhuman exploitation." (*R. Cairo in English*, Nov 5 [7])

Nyasaland: NCP Supported But Criticized For Friendliness Towards US. In March and April Cairo Radio broadcast two interviews with Kanyama Chiume of the Nyasaland Malawi Congress Party (MCP) who was on a visit to the UAR, at the same time participating in the All-African People's Conference (AAPC) which was then being held in Cairo. He described conditions in his country and his party's struggle for freedom under Dr Hastings Banda. He praised President Abdel Nasser by whom he had been received, and the AAPC. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, March 27, April 7 [March 29, April 10])

Cairo Radio welcomed the MCP success in the Nyasaland elections [on Aug 15] and especially Dr Banda's declaration [on Aug 16] that the election results were a direct mandate to secede from the Federation. Rule by the African people would wipe out the "he-goat imperialism of the Boer dogs in Nyasaland." The white population was afraid that after leaving the Central African Federation, Dr Banda would supply arms to Kaunda and Nkomo in the Rhodesias to help them free themselves of the Federation. (*R. Cairo*, Aug 16 [18]; *Voice of Free Africa*, Aug 17 [19])

In Sept the Cairo "Voice of Africa" criticized the MCP for welcoming Menner Williams, US Assistant Secretary of State. Terming the MCP's leaders' attitude to the US a "strange liking," the commentator said that they hoped for US aid. Their attitude, however, constituted "a great danger to its [Nyasaland's] independence and a clear disregard of the facts in Africa," because the US pursued "a policy in Africa based on defending her military and economic interests and, in general... opposed to the interests of Africa." (*R. Cairo Voice of Africa*, Sept 10 [12])

GABON

Musa Arafah, the UAR Minister of Works, led the UAR delegation at the independence celebrations of Gabon, in Aug. (*MENA*, Aug 2 [4])

GHANA

[At the beginning of the year Ghana and the UAR came together in the Casablanca conference, convened in the wake of the Congo crisis as a basically anti-Western grouping. Later, however, despite their formal cooperation in the Casablanca bloc there was a perceptible cooling in the political relations between the two countries. While the presidents of the other non-Arab states of the bloc—Guinea and Mali—visited the UAR during 1961, Nkrumah's projected visit did not take place. At the Belgrade conference Abdel Nasser and Nkrumah took divergent attitudes, the latter taking a stand closer to the Soviet Union. (See: The Belgrade Conference.) The anti-Israeli resolution of the Casablanca conference, sponsored by the UAR and endorsed after some hesitation by Nkrumah, had little noticeable effect on Israeli relations with Ghana.

[Ties in other fields continued to develop between the two countries.]

Ghana Foreign Minister in Cairo. On Jan 23 Ghana's FM, Ako Adjei, arrived in Cairo. He had talks with Abdel Nasser and FM Fawzi. He said that President Nkrumah would shortly visit the UAR and declared that his government was bent on implementing the Casablanca conference decisions, especially in regard to Israel. Other topics discussed were the Congo and the strengthening of Ghana-UAR relations in general. (*MENA*, Jan 23 [25]; *R. Damascus*, Jan 23-IMB, Jan 24; *Ahram*, Jan 24)

Nkrumah's Visit to the UAR Fails to Materialize. A forthcoming visit of President Nkrumah was repeatedly announced. In addition to the Ghanaian FM's announcement (above), UAR sources reported in Feb that the visit was expected for June, and in June—for August (*Ahram*, Jan 24, Feb 24, June 23). [The visit did not take place during the year.]

In a message to Abdel Nasser on the break-up of the UAR Nkrumah said: "I am sure that with your well-known determination and reliable judgement, you will find a satisfactory solution to this regrettable episode." (*Ghanaian Times*, Oct 11)

Ministerial Visits; Communication Ties; Air Services, Telephone, Shipping Line. A UAR goodwill mission left for Accra in Jan to attend the inauguration of the Cairo-Accra air service. The delegation was headed by Muhammad Ibrahim, Minister of State for War Affairs, who said that he would discuss in Accra the question of an exhibition of products of the UAR military factories and facilities for the Ghanaian shipping line to Alexandria. (*Eg. Mail*, Jan 28; *R. Damascus*, Jan 30-IMB, Jan 31)

Mrs. Fayia Nkrumah, the [Egyptian born] wife of President Nkrumah, arrived in Cairo on the inaugural flight of Ghana Airways, Beirut-Cairo-Accra route (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 6, 16, 24; *Hayat*, Jan 19). [United Arab Airlines inaugurated a weekly flight on the Cairo-Lagos-Accra route in Feb.]

An agreement on the establishment of the service had been signed on Aug 29, 1960. (MER 1960, p 547)

Krobo Eduei, Ghanaian Minister of Communications, arrived in Cairo on Feb 9 heading a delegation on an official 5-day visit, in connection with the inauguration of the air service. He was received by Abdel Nasser on Feb 12. (*R. Cairo*, Feb 10, 13-IMB, Feb 10, 13)

In March a delegation representing the Ghana Black Star Line [formerly a joint Ghanaian-Israeli enterprise] held talks in Cairo on "the establishment of a [joint] shipping line for the two countries." (*Ghanaian Times*, March 22)

In May, on returning from a visit to Ghana, the UAR Minister of Communications said that an agreement had been reached in accordance with the Casablanca resolutions on the establishment of direct telephone communications between the two countries. (*Ahram*, May 4)

UAR Cultural Centres in Ghana. A new UAR cultural centre was being set up in Kumasi in addition to the existing one in Accra. It was to include a library of 13,000 books in Arabic and English. (*Akhbar*, March 14; See also MER 1960, p 547)

The Accra centre, which opened in June 1959, was designed to hold courses in Arabic for over 150 students "monthly." However, in one single month there had been no less than 650 applications. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, June 28)

Islamic Contacts. In April the Rector of Al-Azhar received Muhammad Anan (?), leader of the Muslim Youth Association in Ghana, who brought greetings from Muslims in Ghana and asked for religious books and missionaries. (*MENA*, April 11 [13])

In Aug Cairo Radio broadcast in Hausa an interview with Mallam Muhammad Mutawakil, a Muslim leader from Ghana. He said that Muslims should visit the UAR to learn from it. He described the opening of Islamic schools in Ghana. Asked about the creation of a "united Muslim religious entity" he said it was a "most encour-

aging movement." (*R. Cairo*, Aug 4 [11]; *Ahram*, Aug 4)

Writing in the Ghanaian *Ahanti Pioneer*, Labran Muhammad Ibrahim, General Secretary of the Ghana Muslim Council, commented that the broadcast over the Cairo "Voice of Africa" radio, stating that the Muslims in Ghana aspired to separate education for their children, was without foundation; separate education was contrary to Ghanaian policy, and if the Muslims of Ghana required any aid from Muslim countries the consent of the Ghana Government was required first. (*Courrier-Soudan, Bamako*, Aug 21)

Technical Assistance. Upon Ghanaian request a UAR civil aviation expert was to be employed as adviser and assistant to the Director of Aviation in Accra. (*Ahram*, Aug 13)

Ghana requested from the UAR an expert in rice-growing and another in cotton-growing. (*Ahram*, Oct 25)

GUINEA

Synopsis. The UAR strengthened its ties with Guinea on a basis of positive neutralism and anti-imperialism. The two countries cooperated in the Casablanca bloc. Following Sekou Touré's visit to the UAR in May, a large scale assistance programme to Guinea was launched by the UAR. However, much of it remained on paper and implementation was scanty compared with the plans. Abdel Nasser declined Touré's invitation to the UAR to join the projected Guinea-Ghana-Mali federation.

Diplomatic Representation. Guinea's ambassador to the UAR, Seydou Diallo, leader of the Union of Workers of Black Africa (UGTAN), presented his credentials to Abdel Nasser on April 13. He returned to Conakry the following day to prepare Sekou Touré's visit to the UAR. (*Ahram*, April 14, 15)

Sekou Touré's Visit to UAR. President Sekou Touré had intended to visit the UAR in 1960 but the tour was repeatedly postponed. (See MER 1960, p 547.) At the Casablanca conference in Jan Abdel Nasser invited Sekou Touré to visit Cairo in Feb (*Ahram*, Jan 7). The visit was postponed until the end of March and then again until May. (*Ahram*, Jan 20, March 10)

On May 7, before leaving for Cairo, Sekou Touré suggested in a speech that the UAR join the projected Ghana-Guinea-Mali union (*R. Cairo*, May 7-IMB, May 8). Cairo's response, it was reported, was cool, if polite, and Abdel Nasser was expected to tell his guest that cross-continental federations—as opposed to regional ones—were not then feasible. (*NYT*, May 10; compare also p 675 a, on the UAR approach to African unity.)

Sekou Touré arrived in Cairo on May 8. He was accompanied by his Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Works, Education, Trade and Internal Affairs. (*R. Cairo*, May 8-IMB, May 9)

Touré had talks with Abdel Nasser, toured the country, visited the Aswan High Dam site, armament and other industries, Port Said and the Suez Canal, military installations, social institutions, historical sites etc. He addressed a special session of the UAR National Assembly in which he praised warmly the achievements of the Egyptian revolution. (He also paid a one-day visit to Saudi Arabia.)

On May 16 he met Abdel Nasser and President Sukarno of Indonesia, who had arrived in Cairo. The three presidents discussed the international situation and the forthcoming conference of non-aligned nations.

The talks between the two sides resulted in four agreements: trade and payments, technical assistance, cultural exchange and military cooperation, signed by the two presidents on May 16. (For details see below.)

In a joint communiqué, issued on May 17 at the end of the visit, the two presidents affirmed their agreement on the essential problems facing their countries in Africa and the ME and reiterated their stand against both old and new style colonialism. They stressed the necessity for easing world tensions and "the struggle against underdevelopment," and advocated banning the use of force to solve international problems. They urged that steps be taken to end nuclear testing and advocated complete disarmament, which they saw as a means of releasing the energies and resources of mankind for an all-out war against poverty and backwardness. They agreed to work for African solidarity and true cooperation, and recognized the need to strengthen the Casablanca African Charter. They condemned France for nuclear testing in Africa, the UN for failing to ensure the unity of Congo under the Gizenga government, South Africa for its *apartheid* policy and Portugal for its Angola policy. They also condemned Israel as a bridgehead of imperialism in both its old and new forms in the ME, Africa and Asia. They supported Algerian independence and the rights of the Palestine Arabs. Abdel Nasser accepted Sekou Touré's invitation to visit Guinea. (*Ahram*; *Gumhuriyah*, May 8-13; *R. Cairo*, May 17 [19]; *Nasser's Speeches*, pp 107 ff, 113)

In Aug Touré was invited to attend the conference of Casablanca bloc leaders in Cairo, on the eve of the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries, but he did not participate owing to internal difficulties. (*Ahram*, Aug 12; *Hayat*, Aug 30)

Trade and Payments Agreement, ££6m. Credit To Guinea. The agreement signed on May 16 provided for an expansion of trade to a minimum level of ££2 million per annum. The parties were to accord each other most-favoured nation treatment and would permit the holding of exhibitions and fairs. The agreement provided for the opening of an account in Egyptian currency in the name of the Guinea Republic Bank at the Central Egyptian Bank through which each side would give the other credit facilities up to ££500,000. Both parties gave an assurance not to use transport in which Israel had direct or indirect interest.

An appendix to the agreement provided for a UAR loan to Guinea of ££6m. at 2½% repayable over 7 years. The loan was to be used to buy machinery, tools and factories, while the UAR would use the repayments on imports from Guinea.

A UAR-Guinean company with headquarters in Conakry was to be set up to implement construction, communications, irrigation and technical engineering projects, the capital to be shared equally by both countries. The agreement was valid for one year, renewable automatically. (*R. Cairo*, May 16, *NCNA*, May 18 [W 25])

The protocol of ratification was exchanged on July 4. The UAR planned to export to Guinea: cotton, linen, artificial silk, rice, vegetables and fruits, mining and industrial products, railway carriages, vehicles, glassware, pharmaceutical products and butagas cookers. Guinea was to sell the UAR: Coffee, palm oil, raw hides, rubber, aluminium and livestock. (*Cairo*, July 4 [W 13])

Hasan Abbās Zaki, the UAR Southern R. Minister of Economy, met Guinea's Minister of Trade for talks on July 9.

A UAR trade mission led by Finance and Economy

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Minister Qaysuni left for Guinea on July 14. (*R. Cairo, July 9-1MB, July 10; R. Cairo, July 14 [17]*)

In Aug the Guinean ambassador in Cairo said that Guinea and the UAR were "moving towards economic union." (*Ahram, Aug 12*)

Technical Assistance Agreement. The agreement, signed on May 16, provided for exchange of experts, technical missions and information; training programmes in the UAR and Guinea and a statistical survey of Guinea's development prospects. UAR experts would attend orientation courses in Cairo before leaving for Guinea to work in agriculture, industry and commerce. (*R. Cairo, May 16 [W 25]; Hayat, Sept 23*)

Cultural Exchange. Abdallah Touré, Director of Guinea's Radio and Information Bureau, visited the UAR in Jan. (*Ahram, Jan 20*)

Forty UAR teachers were to leave for Guinea in March. (*Ahram, March 2*)

The Guinean Minister of Information, the deputy Minister of Planning and the head of the Guinean Teachers' Union visited Cairo in April. (*MENA, April 5 [7]*)

The cultural exchange agreement, signed on May 16, provided for cooperation in science, art, education and sports. The UAR was to build institutions in Guinea, send teachers and grant scholarships to Guinean students, and encourage research into the history and geography of west Africa. Each country would arrange radio programmes describing the other people and its daily life. (*Ahram, May 17*)

In July it was decided to send 25 UAR teachers to teach in Guinean schools. (*Ahram, July 7*)

Fifty students from Guinea were studying in Cairo in 1961. (*Ahram, Dec 13*)

Military Cooperation Agreement. The instruments of ratification of this agreement, signed on May 16, were exchanged on July 3, when a military delegation from Guinea, headed by the Minister of Defence, visited the UAR. The delegation visited the UAR from July 1-9. (*R. Cairo, July 5 [7], 9 [11]*)

General Kita Nomandian, Commander of the Guinean Army, arrived in Cairo for talks on July 7. (*Ahram, July 8*)

A first consignment of light arms and half-track vehicles reached Conakry from the UAR in Nov. (*L'Espresso, Bamako, Nov 8*)

Support for UAR on Syrian Secession. Sekou Touré sent Abdel Nasser a message of support after the secession of Syria from the UAR. (*R. Cotonou in French, Oct 3 [9]*)

Cooperation in Communications and Construction. Guinea asked the UAR for 6 architects to work in Guinea. (*Ahram, June 1*)

An aviation agreement was signed in Conakry in June, by which a direct air route was to connect Cairo and Conakry.

The Guinea mission at the convention of air transport directors of the Casablanca bloc countries, meeting in Cairo in Oct, asked the UAR for civil aviation experts to direct Guinea's civil aviation.

In Dec it was reported that Guinea had decided to replace all Czech pilots with UAR personnel for its aircraft. (*MENA, May 21 [W 25]; Ahram, June 30; R. Rabat, Sept 4 [W 7]; Ahram, Oct 27, Dec 29*)

In Dec it was decided to send five railway and seven

road engineers to work in Guinea for two years. (*Ahram, Dec 23*)

Guinea and the UAR were to establish a joint shipping company. (*R. Rabat, Sept 4 [W 7]*)

Suez Canal Authority experts surveyed tidal problems in Conakry harbour in Aug, and the dredger *Ramiss* was to be sent in Dec to widen and deepen Conakry port. (*Ahram, Aug 24; MENA, Dec 4 [W 14]*)

Objection to Pan-Arabism. Emphasizing the difference between Guinea's view and that of the UAR, Mr. Leon Maka, Chief of the Guinean delegation to the All-African People's Conference in Cairo, objected to Pan-Arabism as detrimental to African unity, it was reported. (*Afrique Action, Tunis, April 3*)

KENYA

[In Feb, general elections in Kenya gave Africans a majority in the Legislative Council. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) won 18 seats against the 11 of the opposition Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU refused to form a government while Jomo Kenyatta, their leader, was in custody, and on March 18 KADU agreed to form a minority government. Kenyatta was released in Aug, and in Nov flew to London to demand independence for Kenya.]

[The UAR supported Somalia's claim to the Northern Frontier District of Kenya up to mid-1961, when this policy began to clash with the UAR's support for Kenyatta's policy of a unified Kenya. UAR broadcasts supported KANU and attacked KADU as well as Tom Mboya of KANU (who refused to join the UAR-sponsored All-African Trade Union Federation). Cairo Radio also denounced the Arab Party of the Kenya Coast and Mombasa, which called for the secession of the coastal strip from Kenya. On the other hand, Cairo described the proposed federation plan for East Africa as a British plot to ensure the perpetuation of their rule in the area. (See p 680 b.)]

Support for Somalia Irredentist Claims. (See The UAR-Somalia.)

Cairo Attacks on British. UAR propaganda generally described the white settlers in Kenya as "imperialists, dogs, pigs, old goats, bloodsuckers and sorcerers." They were accused of conspiring with the Governor of Kenya, Sir Patrick Renison, and with KADU leaders, who were described as stooges and "black Europeans," to divide Kenya by creating "many Tombos." The British authorities were accused of acts of terrorism against the African population. The broadcasts demanded the immediate removal of the "NATO bases" in Kenya to avoid "another Bizerta." The Asians in Kenya were described as British stooges. (See i.e. *VFA in Swahili, March 3, 5 [6]; R. Cairo in Swahili, June 6 [6], July 18 [20], Sept 5 [7], Dec 26 [28]*)

Support for Jomo Kenyatta. [The UAR supported Jomo Kenyatta, the KANU leader, who was imprisoned by the British authorities. UAR propaganda treatment of the Kenyatta case was similar to that accorded to Patrice Lumumba of the Congo.]

Cairo Radio sent "Jomo Kenyatta badges" to listeners who applied for them. Kenyans were asked to go on strike from Feb 1-3 in protest against Kenyatta's detention. The British and their "KADU stooges" were attacked for turning down Kenyatta's request to be released. The broadcasts demanded his release and his ap-

pointment as Chief Minister. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, Jan 9 [16], Jan 31 [Feb 2], March 2 [4], March 3 [6], March 14 [16], March 21 [23], April 4 [7], etc.)

The secretary of the Kenya office in Cairo, Wera Ambitho of KANU, thanked Abdel Nasser for supporting Kenyatta. (*Hayat*, Aug 10)

Upon Kenyatta's release on Aug 16, Abdel Nasser called his congratulations. He said that Kenyatta's struggle had proved that once the people were determined to attain their freedom they were bound to achieve their goals. The peoples of Africa would follow his example. He hoped that a new era would open in Kenya under Kenyatta's leadership and that the ties between the UAR and the people of Kenya would become stronger (*MENA*, Aug 18 [21]). (The UAR information media gave very extensive coverage to Kenyatta's release.)

Kenyatta was invited to visit the UAR. On Nov 15, during a stopover at Cairo airport on his way from London to Nairobi, he thanked Abdel Nasser for helping the Africans in their struggle for national liberation. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 15 [16])

UAR and Kenyan African Parties. [UAR broadcasts generally praised KANU and the Kikuyu Central Association.] James Gichuru, acting president of KANU, met Abdel Nasser in Cairo on Jan 14. (*MENA*, Jan 15 [17])

During the Feb elections UAR broadcasts called upon voters to support KANU. KADU was called upon to stand by KANU in its fight against the British.

When KADU agreed on March 18 to form a government UAR organs attacked that party for having broken its pledge not to cooperate with the British. Ronald Ngala, the KADU leader, was attacked as a "stupid stooge." (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, Feb 20 [22], March 11 [16], 22 [24]; *VFA*, March 5 [7], April 21 [25], 25 [28])

Kenya was represented at the All-African People's Conference (AAPC) in Cairo, which demanded the release of Jomo Kenyatta and attacked Harry Thuku [first president of KANU] who was described as a "stooge." Tom Mboya, who attended the conference, was interviewed on the radio [but later was attacked again in the UAR press—see below]. Ngala and Gichuru, who both attended the conference, were jointly received by Abdel Nasser who promised Ngala that the UAR would provide education facilities for the people of Kenya. (*Ahram*, March 31; *R. Cairo in Swahili*, March 28 [30], March 30, 31 [April 4])

However, attacks on KADU continued. In May broadcasts binned that KANU would bring down the KADU government, if necessary by force. Ngala was attacked as a "puppet" of the British, a traitor (*VFA*, May 15, 17, 18 [17, 19, 20]). Later KADU was advised to make its peace with KANU for the sake of Africa but attacks on it continued (*VFA and R. Cairo in Swahili*, Nov 28 [30]). When fights broke out between KANU and KADU members at the end of Nov, Ngala and Muliro were blamed for having incited the fights in the service of the imperialists. (*VFA*, Dec 1 [4])

Tom Mboya, the KANU and trade union leader, continued to be attacked in the UAR press as "an Americanized playboy" who was being used by US capitalism to gain control of Kenya after the British left. (*Rus al-Yusuf*, Oct 2; see also MER 1960, p 384)

Towards the end of the year Cairo Radio attacks on Mboya noticeably ceased, following a reappraisal of Cairo's African policy when it was decided to avoid taking sides between local political factions. (*Jer. Post*, Dec 3; *Jeune Afrique*, Dec 2-6)

Muslims, Arabs, Asians. Cairo Radio claimed that the

British segregated the Africans from the peoples of Arab or Asian origin and aligned the latter with Europeans although their aims were one with the Africans'. The Arabs had been in East Africa for over 500 years, and had intermixed with the Africans to the point where all distinguishing features had been eradicated. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, Jan 21 [24])

[This line did not prevent the "Voice of Free Africa" from sharply denouncing both Arabs and Asians for anti-nationalist and separatist policies.] "The imperialists, the dogs, the settlers in Kenya and their Arab and Asian stooges"—about 45% of the Asians—opposed the release of Kenyatta. The Arab Party of the Kenya Coast and Mombasa and its leader Abdillahi Nasser were denounced for advocating the separation of the coastal strip, including Mombasa, from Kenya. Abdillahi was compared with Tshombe of Katanga in his secessionist policy. (*VFA*, April 5 [7], Sept 12 [14])

In Aug the Rector of Al-Azhar received Shaykh Ali Gunda Seneda, the Chairman of the Kenyan Muslim Union, and agreed to accept 20 African students at Al-Azhar University (*MENA*, Aug 10 [W 17]). Seneda gave three talks over Cairo Radio. He said that he found all people equal in the UAR regardless of differences in religion. He urged the Muslims to convert others to the principles of Islam, the only true religion. He admitted that before coming to Cairo he had held different opinions on the political situation in Kenya, but now he realized that his previous convictions were hardly helpful in bringing freedom to Kenya. He called on Kenyans to unite under the leadership of Kenyatta. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, Sept 6, 7, 8 [8, 9, 11])

Khayr Muhammad Ali of Mombasa, representing the Kenya Coast People's Party, visited Cairo in Dec. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, Dec 12 [15])

UAR-Kenya Relations. On the question of Kenya's share in the Nile waters, see p 680 b.

The UAR planned to market its products in Kenya through a Sudanese company. (*MENA*, Nov 10 [16])

LIBERIA

[The different political courses followed by the UAR and Liberia were emphasized when the UAR's diplomatic representative in Liberia was requested to leave the country after having been accused of contacts with subversive elements.]

Air Service. The Liberian airline was to start an air service between Cairo and Liberia from April 1. (*Akher*, March 3)

Cultural Agreement. In March Liberia and the UAR signed a cultural agreement in Monrovia. The UAR also offered five scholarships to Liberia in fields to be suggested by the latter. (*Liberian Age*, March 27; *Ahram*, July 28)

Al-Ahram later gave the number of scholarships as eight and added that these were too few as many Liberian Muslims wished to send their children to study in the UAR, and Israel was offering Liberians "tens of scholarships" every year. (*Ahram*, Aug 16)

Arab Building Company. It was reported in Aug that the first Arab building contractor's firm had been set up in Monrovia. The owners were described as an Egyptian, a Palestinian Arab and a former Liberian minister. (*Ahram*, Aug 16)

Subversive Activities, UAR Diplomat Ousted. At the end of Sept the Liberian government announced the discovery of a pro-Communist plot. Several people were arrested and three of them were reported to have admitted striving to overthrow the government by revolution with the help of foreign embassy personnel; the Ghana embassy was specifically mentioned. The government imposed restrictions on the activities of all foreign diplomatic and consular missions. It also requested the UAR to recall Anwar Farid, Counsellor to the UAR embassy, who was then chargé d'affaires. Farid was accused of openly challenging the emergency powers granted to President Tubman by the Legislature and of meeting with Liberians who were arrested on charges of subversion. (*Liberian Age*, Oct 2; *Washington Post*; *Ha'aretz*, Oct 4; *Hayat*, Oct 5)

The UAR ambassador to Liberia, who had been on leave, returned to his post at once. (*Ahram*, Oct 5)

MALAGASY REPUBLIC

No Diplomatic Relations. In Feb Mahmūd Sālih, UAR Minister in Pretoria, flew to Madagascar to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was reported that the question "needed further study" (*Ahram*, Feb 18). [No diplomatic relations between the two countries were established by the end of the year.]

UAR Sees Madagascar as French Base. A Cairo reporter described Madagascar as a natural aircraft carrier in the hands of France. French teachers and text-books falsified Madagascar's history. The Malagasy government was levying all the taxes from the people, rather than from the large and rich French companies. France considered President Tsiranana moderate and loyal to France. (*Ahram*, Sept 24)

MALI

[Mali, which broke away from the Federation of Mali and Senegal in 1960 (see MER 1960, p 549), cooperated with the UAR in the Casablanca bloc. The UAR established diplomatic relations with Mali in 1961 and was host to President Keita on a state visit. Agreements on trade, technical assistance and cultural cooperation were signed but implementation lagged behind schedule.]

Diplomatic Relations Established. On March 29 Modibo Diallo presented his credentials as Mali's first ambassador to the UAR. (*Ahram*, March 30)

Amin Mahmūd Sāli, the UAR's first ambassador to Mali, presented his credentials in May. (*LEssor*, May 19)

Declarations of Friendship. Mali leaders praised the UAR and Abdel Nasser on many occasions. President Modibo Keita declared he was "impressed" by Abdel Nasser (*R. Cairo*, Jan 9-10MB, Jan 10) and said that his principles would "inspire freedom movements in Africa and other continents" (*Rus al-Yusuf*, Feb 6). Madeira Keita, the Minister of the Interior, noted that Mali was often attacked by "imperialists" for her cooperation with the UAR. He said that they often described Mali as "an agent of Abdel Nasser or of Soviet Communism." (*Ahram*, Feb 28)

Official Visits, Trade, Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agreements. A Mali economic delegation, headed by Madeira Keita, arrived in the UAR on Feb 26 for

talks on the implementation of the Casablanca resolutions and on the economic relations between the two countries. (*R. Cairo*, Feb 26 [28])

On March 5 three agreements were signed on trade, cultural cooperation and technical assistance. (For details see below.) (*R. Cairo*, March 5 [7]). [From the UAR the delegation went on to Moscow.]

The Mali Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Information visited the UAR at the beginning of May. (*Ahram*, May 1; *R. Damascus*, May 8-10MB, May 9)

In May a 16-member goodwill mission from the UAR visited Mali. (*R. Bamako*, May 17 [23])

Doudou Gueye, political adviser to President Keita and SG of the Permanent Committee of the African Journalists' Union, visited the UAR in July. (*MENA*, Aug 2 [4])

An 11-man Mali parliamentary delegation arrived in Cairo on Sept 14. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 16; *R. Cairo*, Sept 14-10MB, Sept 15)

Visit of Mali President, Modibo Keita. President of Mali, accompanied by Ministers and high officials, paid a state visit to the UAR from June 12 to 17, when he left for Belgrade. Keita visited UAR industrial establishments, the Aswan High Dam site, military installations, social institutions, etc. At a special session of the National Assembly Keita stressed the affinity between the UAR and Mali and praised UAR progress and its policy of non-alignment. Keita was lauded by the UAR press as "one of the world's champions of freedom, an African leader who has chosen positive neutralism rather than subservience to the French Community."

Keita held talks with Abdel Nasser "at which common understanding and mutual appreciation" prevailed. In a joint communiqué the two sides declared, amongst other things, that they (1) reaffirmed their determination to pursue their struggle against imperialism everywhere; (2) supported positive efforts to ban nuclear tests; (3) would continue to strive for African solidarity, co-operation and coordination; (4) supported the principles of the Casablanca charter; (5) supported the Algerian nationalists; (6) condemned French atomic tests on African soil; (7) denounced the UN's failure to implement its resolutions on the Congo, and supported the Giza regime; (8) condemned policies of racial segregation; (9) affirmed their support for the struggle for freedom in Angola and their determination to work for the liberation of all African territories under foreign domination; (10) condemned Israel "which forms a bridgehead for imperialism and endangers the security and safety of the ME and African and Asian states" and emphasised the need for a "just solution" to the Palestine problem, restoring "all rights of the Arab Palestinians in accordance with the UN Charter"; (11) reaffirmed their faith in positive neutralism and non-alignment and their support for the forthcoming Belgrade conference; (12) recognized the need for cooperation among states on a basis of equality, respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs of other states; (13) would strengthen their political, economic, cultural and military relations.

Abdel Nasser accepted Keita's invitation to visit Mali. (*Ahram*, June 13-18; *Eg. Gaz.*, June 16; *R. Cairo*, June 17 [19]; *Nasser's Speeches*, p 123 ff)

UAR Loan to Mali. On April 10 the UAR approved a loan to Mali of £E3m. at 2½% interest repayable over 7 years. (*R. Cairo*, April 10-10MB, April 10)

The sum was raised to £E6m. in the Abdel Nasser-Keita talks. The loan was to be used to purchase machinery and equipment from the UAR and for development projects. It was stipulated that the loan would in no way benefit Israel. This, noted a UAR newspaper, "closes another door for Israeli infiltration into Africa" while opening a new market for the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 17)

Trade Agreement. The trade agreement signed on March 5 between Mali and the UAR was based on the principle of equal trade exchanges between the two countries, encouraged the development of export and import facilities in respect of transit trade and envisaged permanent and temporary exhibitions. The UAR planned to sell Mali its textiles, industrial and agricultural products while buying animal and vegetable products. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 16)

A Mali trade delegation arrived in the UAR on Aug 25. (*Akhbar*, Aug 25)

In Nov the Mali ambassador conferred with the UAR authorities on ways and means of overcoming the difficulties which were hindering the implementation of the trade agreement. (*R. Cairo*, Nov 17-*IMB*, Nov 19; *MENA*, Dec 19 [21])

Radio-telephone and telegraph connections between Bamako and Cairo were opened in Dec. (*R. Cairo*, Dec 3-*IMB*, Dec 3; *Ahram*, Dec 5)

Technical Assistance. The technical assistance agreement signed on March 5 provided for: (1) UAR doctors, teachers, engineers, technicians and agricultural experts to serve in Mali; (2) construction by the UAR in Mali of premises for the Mali Parliament and civil service, schools, hospitals, housing, factories, hydro-electric dams and a road network. (*Eg. Gaz.*, June 17)

UAR transport experts visited Bamako in Aug to study the proposed road network. A contract was signed with the Mali government to build 500 km of roads (*R. Cairo*, Aug 14-*IMB*, Aug 14). A second team of experts was to go to Mali in Oct to study details of the projected road construction. (*Ahram*, Sept 3)

In Oct the UAR approved the sending of five doctors to Mali. (*Ahram*, Oct 10)

In Dec it was reported that the UAR had begun the construction of a hotel in Bamako. (*Ahram*, Dec 16)

At the end of Dec it was reported that the UAR ambassador to Mali had returned to Cairo to discuss a Mali request for experts, doctors and teachers. (*Ahram*, Dec 25)

Cultural Agreement. The cultural cooperation agreement signed on March 5 and ratified in July provided for: (1) exchange of information and results of research; (2) exchange of teachers; (3) scholarships for Mali students; (4) sports meetings. (*R. Cairo*, July 13 [W 20])

In Oct it was reported that the UAR would be invited to send teachers for the projected University of Mali. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Oct 9)

Ten Mali students arrived in Cairo in Nov on UAR scholarships, but found difficulty with the studies (held in Arabic) as they spoke French only. (*Ahram*, Nov 22)

Military Aid. The UAR gave Mali a gift of two trainer jet aircraft as the nucleus of a Mali Air Force. (*Ahram*, Sept 3)

NIGERIA

Diplomatic Relations. The UAR was represented in La-

gos by an ambassador. A consulate-general was opened in Sept in Kaduna, Northern Nigeria, and further consulates were planned for the other regions.

Nigerian sources hoped that an embassy would eventually be established in Cairo. [This had not been done by the end of the year.] The Nigerian ambassador to Britain visited Cairo at the end of Oct. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, April 7, Oct 16; *Ahram*, Aug 19, Oct 1; *R. Kaduna*, Sept 8 [13])

Political Relations in General. In April the Governor-General, Dr. Azikiwe, interviewed by a UAR correspondent in Lagos, said that his country wished to strengthen its relations with the UAR on the basis of mutual respect of each other's sovereignty. He also said that there was no room for rivalry over the leadership of Africa and Asia; their peoples should unite to deal with the tasks facing them. (*MENA*, April 30 [May 2])

In July the UAR ambassador disclaimed any territorial ambitions on the part of the UAR in Africa, and said it was not true that the UAR's main aim was, as had been alleged, to make Nigeria and other African states her satellites (*Daily Mail*, Lagos, June 28). In July the Cairo *Al-Akhbar* said in an article on the visit of the Northern Nigerian PM: "We are free from imperialist greed, but we are one with the new African nations in working to protect them and ourselves from imperialist evils, whatever form they may assume." (*R. Cairo*, July 13 [14])

Cairo Radio broadcasts in Hausa to Nigeria were described by the clandestine Arab (anti-UAR) radio station, "Voice of the Free," as "Communist inspired and harmful to Nigerian-Arab relations." (*Voice of the Free*, April 21 [24])

Official Visits. Dr. N. Azikiwe, the Governor-General, was supposed to visit the UAR in April [but the visit did not take place]. (*MENA*, April 5 [7])

The Federal PM, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was due to visit the UAR in Jan. The visit did not take place, and Abdel Nasser renewed the invitation in Nov. (*Ahram*, Dec 3, 1960, Nov 5, 1961)

Visit of Northern Region PM and Opposition Leaders. Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, PM of the Northern Region, accompanied by a number of Northern Nigerian ministers, visited the UAR from July 9-15. He toured the Helwan steel and arms plants and Al-Azhar and visited Damascus. He had talks with President Abdel Nasser on technical cooperation, expansion of trade and cultural exchanges, a projected congress of Islamic leaders and the setting up of joint UAR-Nigerian enterprises. (*R. Cairo*, July 10 [12]; *Ahram*, July 11, 12)

It was agreed to send UAR teachers to "schools and universities in Northern Nigeria" and to the "Kano School for Arabic Studies," at the same time sending Northern Nigerian students to Al-Azhar and vocational schools in the UAR. Bello invited Shaykh Shaltūt, Rector of Al-Azhar, to visit Nigeria. Bello said that he had not signed a formal agreement with the UAR because that was a matter for the Federal Government to decide. (*Hoyat*, July 16)

Questioned at a press conference in Cairo on the subject of Nigerian-Israeli relations, Bello's personal opinion was that the Israelis were "out for domination wherever they may be," but stressed that he was speaking only for the Northern Region, pointing out that "the Israelis had already got a footing in the East and West and the Federal Government cannot expel them overnight because it is only a coalition." (*R. Cairo*, July 16 [19])

Bello was criticized by the organ of the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, Western Nigeria, for having "attempted to leap into ME politics and drag Nigeria along with him." (*West African Pilot*, Enugu, June 7)

A group of opposition leaders in the Northern Nigerian Parliament, led by Hajj Ibrahim Imam of the Borno Youth Movement, associated with the Action Group, visited Cairo in Sept, during a tour of ME countries. Ibrahim Imam was later quoted as saying: "All the Nigerian people regard the UAR and its President as a beacon for the liberation of all the peoples of Africa, and its Muslim majority look to Al-Azhar for Islamic leadership." (*Ahram*, Sept 13; *Europe-Orient*, No. 205, Feb 6, 1962)

Chief Awolowo, the head of the opposition in Nigeria's federal parliament, later declared that African states should take the road of non-involvement in East-West disputes and non-partisanship in the Arab-Israeli dispute. (*West African Pilot*, June 29)

Nigerian Federal Ministerial Visits. Nigeria's Federal Minister of Health Ibrahim Waziri arrived in Cairo on Feb 16 for a five-day visit, and was followed by a health mission on Feb 26. (*MENA*, Feb 26 [28])

The Nigerian Federal Minister of Labour, M. Johnson, visited the UAR from July 26-31. (*Ahram*, July 29, 30, Aug 1)

Nigeria's Minister of Defence, Alhaji Muhammad Ribadu, toured the UAR in Aug. He visited UAR arms factories and met military leaders in Cairo. On his return he was presented by the UAR ambassador in Lagos with gifts of a rifle and a submachinegun, manufactured in the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, Aug 13-IMB, Aug 14; *Ahram*, Aug 14, Oct 23)

Alhaji Muhammad Inuwa Wada, Nigerian Minister of Works, visited the UAR in Oct. He toured the Aswan dam and other construction sites. (*R. Cairo* in *Hausa*, Oct 9 [18])

The Nigerian Federal Minister of Information, T. Benson, visited the UAR in Nov. In talks with Abd al-Qadir Hatim, the UAR Minister of State, it was agreed that the two countries would cooperate in radio and television, press, tourism and propaganda; the UAR was to train Nigerian journalists and radio staff, send television staff to Nigeria and supply electronic equipment from the UAR military industry for Nigerian television. (*Gumhuriyah*, Cairo, Nov 3)

Scientific Contacts. Four Nigerian scientists participated in a two-month training course in Cairo in the use of radio-isotopes. (*Daily Telegraph*, Lagos, March 5)

In Oct five UAR scientists visited Nigerian research institutes. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Cairo, Nov 1)

Economic Contacts. UAR journalists criticized UAR trade efforts in Nigeria: contracts to supply Nigerian merchants were not fulfilled on time, and Nigerian Arab merchants, while ready to deal in UAR goods, did not know what the UAR could supply, which indicated inactivity on the part of the UAR trade attachés. Trade possibilities were many; by March, 200,000 tons of UAR cement had been sold to Nigeria. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, March 11)

A 24-member UAR trade mission visited Nigeria in April and proposed an agreement whereby Nigeria would import cement, cloth and tools, and receive UAR technical assistance both in the form of engineers to work in Nigeria, and scholarships for Nigerians at UAR tech-

nical schools. (*West African Pilot*, April 10; *Hayat*, April 16)

The UAR reportedly offered Northern Nigeria a loan of £E3m. for development, repayable over 7 years at an interest of 2½%, "without strings." (*Associated Press*, Kaduna, July 23)

A UAR economic mission visited Nigeria in July and promised UAR investment in Nigerian spinning mills and cement plants. (*Ahram*, July 27)

Religious Contacts. A. Abubakar, principal of the School for Arabic Studies in Kano, visited Damascus in March to attend celebrations commemorating the birth of al-Ghazali. (*Daily Telegraph*, Lagos, March 24)

Al-Azhar curricula were to be adopted by "Nigerian colleges" (*Gumhuriyah*, May 2). The first six teachers from Al-Azhar left for Nigeria in Sept. (*Ahram*, Sept 19). The Rector of Al-Azhar, Shaykh Mahmūd Shaltūt, was invited to visit the Muslims in Nigeria. (*Ahram*, Nov 1)

Communications. An Accra-Cairo air service with a terminal at Lagos was inaugurated in March (*Akhbar*, March 3). United Arab Airlines offered pilgrimage flights from Lagos to Mecca (*West African Pilot*, April 26).

A UAR aviation mission visited Nigeria in Aug to sign an air agreement. However, the mission left without reaching agreement with the Nigerian authorities. (*Service*, Lagos, Aug 12, 26)

RUANDA URUNDI

(Ruanda Urundi, consisting of Ruanda and Burundi, continued throughout the year as a Trust Territory under Belgian administration.)

A permanent office of Ruanda Urundi was set up in Cairo, headed by Michel Rwagasana, of the Party of National Union, aided by Mr. Rutera. (*BAPP*, Feb 10)

Mwami Visits Cairo. Mwami (King) Kigeri V of Ruanda arrived in Cairo on Feb 24 from Morocco to expound the case for his country's independence (*Ahram*, Feb 24). [The Mwami's powers had been suspended and he had been exiled by the Belgian authorities; his case was under consideration by the UN.] He was received by Abdel Nasser (*R. Cairo*, Feb 27-IMB, Feb 28), and later expressed his appreciation of the support extended by the latter and by the Casablanca Conference to him and his country. (*R. Cairo*, March 2 [4])

Assassination of Prince Rwagasore. Prince Louis Rwagasore, PM of Burundi and son of the Mwami, was assassinated on Oct 13. Cairo Radio alleged that he had been killed by the Belgians who hated him for his role as leader of the People's Unity and Progress Party which had won the elections in the previous month. (*R. Cairo*, Oct 15 [17]; *R. Cairo* in *Sawahili*, Oct 21 [24])

SENEGAL

[On the political level UAR-Senegalese relations developed only slightly after the exchange of diplomatic representatives (while with Mali the UAR cooperated in the Casablanca bloc). The UAR concentrated its efforts in the Islamic field. Senegal's Prime Minister was reported to have criticized Arab nationalism, for which he was attacked in the Cairo press. In Aug there was an unconfirmed report of UAR arms supplies to the Senegalese opposition.]

Senegal's first ambassador to the UAR, Shaykh Ahmad Tijani, presented his credentials in April. The ambassador told the press that the Senegalese people were

the African people closest to the UAR; 97% of them were Arabic-speaking Muslims and Abdel Nasser's picture hung in every house (*Ahram*, April 14, 15). The UAR's first ambassador arrived in Dakar in May. (*Hayat*, May 13)

A UAR delegation headed by Hasan Abbās Zaki, the Southern R. Minister of Economy, attended Senegal's independence celebrations. He had talks on economic and cultural relations with President Senghor, and PM Mamadou Dia. (*Ahram*, April 2, 7; *MENA*, April 6 [8])

Mamadou Dia and Arab Nationalism. In Jan the Cairo *Rûz al-Yûsuf* severely criticized PM Mamadou Dia's opinions on Arab nationalism as expressed in his book *African Nations and World Solidarity*. Dia had described Arab nationalism as weak, aggressive, based on hate and cutting itself off from the West. *Rûz al-Yûsuf* said these were the "sentiments of a black de Gaulle" which were "devilish, accursed and full of venom." (*Rûz al-Yûsuf*, Jan 30)

Islamic and Arab Contacts. Shaykh Ibrahim Niyasse, described as "Shaykh al-Islām in Senegal" visited the UAR during March-April. He was reported to have said that West African Muslims had started "to fight Israeli penetration," that he was going to Cairo to discuss UAR aid to Muslims in West Africa, and that imperialism had fought against the spread of Arab culture among Muslims in the area, but had failed.

In Cairo he met the Rector of Al-Azhar who promised to send teachers and books to Senegal and to accept students from there at the university. He was received by President Abdel Nasser and met with UAR ministers in Cairo and Damascus. Before leaving the UAR on April 25, Niyasse said he had reached agreement with the UAR on the strengthening of cooperation, the exchange of religious delegations, and the increase of the number of Senegalese students in religious institutions in Cairo. (*Akhbar*, March 7; *Ahram*, March 11, 17, 27; *R. Damascus*, April 3, *R. Cairo*, April 13, 25-*IMB*, April 4, 14, 26)

In April, before he arrived to take up his post, the UAR ambassador to Senegal was elected by the Arab Club in Dakar as its president. (*Akhbar*, April 11)

In June the UAR ambassador to Senegal and Senegal's ambassador to the UAR took part in a religious congress of the Tijaniyah, one of the largest Muslim sects in Senegal. The congress passed resolutions requesting the government to consider Arabic as an official language to be taught in schools, as French was. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, June 28)

It was subsequently reported that the government had decided to introduce the teaching of Arabic in five primary schools. (*Ahram*, Sept 23)

The Waqfs Ministry donated 4,000 books, including copies of the Qur'an and books on religious subjects, to Senegal. (*Ahram*, July 16)

In Aug Al-Azhar decided to accept a number of students from Senegal and to send teachers of Islam and Arabic there. (*Ahram*, Aug 7)

In Nov five teachers left for Senegal for a period of two years. (*Ahram*, Nov 4)

UAR Smuggling of Arms to Senegal? In Aug it was reported that 50 boxes directed to the UAR ambassador in Senegal had aroused the suspicion of the Senegalese authorities who requested that they be opened for inspection. The UAR embassy refused permission and lodged a protest. A short time later a similar consignment

arrived in Dakar. The UAR embassy immediately requested its reshipment, explaining that it had arrived in Senegal by mistake. The consignment allegedly contained arms for the opposition in Senegal. (*Figaro*, Aug 8)

SIERRA LEONE

Diplomatic Relations; Visits. In Jan the UAR's first consul in Sierra Leone left Cairo to take up his post. (*R. Cairo*, Jan 25-*IMB*, Jan 25)

Later, an embassy was established and a UAR chargé d'affaires in Freetown took up his post. (*Daily Mail*, Freetown, Sept 2)

A UAR delegation headed by a minister attended the Sierra Leone independence celebrations. (*Ahram*, April 22)

In Nov A. M. Margal, the Sierra Leone Minister for Natural Resources, paid a two-day visit to Cairo. (*Ahram*, Nov 11, 13)

Arab and Islamic Ties, Technical Assistance. The UAR Waqfs Ministry was to send recordings of the Qur'an to the Sierra Leone broadcasting station upon her request. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, Jan 28)

A UAR Minister attended the Sierra Leone independence celebrations. Upon his return to Cairo he said that the people of Sierra Leone were very sympathetic to the UAR and there was a large Arab community in the country, devoted to Arab nationalism. The UAR had sent Arabic language teachers there on Sierra Leone's request. (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, June 28)

The UAR chargé d'affaires in Freetown said the UAR had granted 23 scholarships to Sierra Leoneans, including ten for professional training at a total cost of ££15,000. Eleven students had already left for the UAR. (*Daily Mail*, Freetown, Sept 2)

SOUTH AFRICA

Republic of South Africa. [The UAR supported the Africans of South Africa and severed diplomatic relations with the Republic. Cairo Radio in English broadcast a regular Saturday programme to South Africa, "Elwazi Labantu," introduced by Mwandisi L. Pilisi of the SA United Front. The UAR tried to establish contact with SA Muslims.]

When South Africa announced it would leave the British Commonwealth [it became a republic with effect from May 31], the UAR press and radio saw this as a victory for Africans who had created in the Commonwealth an atmosphere which could not tolerate the apartheid policy. (*Akhbar*, March 17; *VFA*, March 17 [20])

On May 30 the UAR announced the severance of relations with the South African Republic on the grounds that it represented only a minority of the population (*R. Cairo*, May 30 [June 1]). Cairo Radio said, "This act is tantamount to a new pact uniting true Africans in South Africa with the UAR people... and it shows that the road from the Cape to Cairo has united the peoples of these countries" (*R. Cairo* in *Sawahili*, June 5 [7]). Favourable reaction to the rupture came—among others—from the South Africa office in Cairo (headed by Pilisi) and the Indian embassy in the UAR (*MENA*, May 30, *VFA*, May 31 [June 1]). The South African Minister to the UAR was given 10 days to leave the country. The UAR Minister in South Africa was recalled. (*Hayat*, June 1)

The South African PM Verwoerd came under attack in UAR broadcasts: He "must know that he is facing the wrath of all 20m. (sic) inhabitants of this continent... Those who wish to live by the sword, Verwoerd and the

imperialists, shall also die by the sword." (*R. Cairo in English, Sept 9* [13])

The government of South Africa twice refused entry to delegations from Al-Azhar and delegations for Awqaf. (*Akhhbar al-Yaum, July 29*)

The Rector of Al-Azhar received Muhammad Makki, a South African Muslim leader and editor of the *Moslem Digest* of Durban. (*Akhhbar al-Yaum, Nov 10*)

South West Africa. [Formerly a League of Nations Mandated Territory, administered by the Union (later Republic) of South Africa, South West Africa was later annexed by it and the apartheid policy was applied. The question of the Territory was under consideration by the UN which proclaimed the right of the people of SWA to independence and called for the withdrawal of South African forces from the Territory.]

Sam Nujoma of the SWA People's Organization welcomed the UAR's action in severing its diplomatic relations with South Africa (*MENA, May 30* [June 1]). The SWA People's Organization had an office in Cairo. (*Akhhbar, Oct 8*)

The UN Commission on SWA [which was refused permission by the Republic of South Africa to enter the Territory] heard evidence from SWA refugees in Cairo [as well as in Accra and Dar es Salaam]. (*Akhhbar, July 22*)

Basutoland. [A British High Commission Territory.] The Basutoland National Congress Party opened an office in Cairo which was to organize propaganda activities in favour of Basuto independence. (*Akhhbar, Sept 2*)

TANGANYIKA

(For UAR criticism of PM Nyerere of Tanganyika over his sponsorship of an East African federation see p 680 h.) The All-African People's Conference (AAPC) steering committee met in Dar es Salaam in Jan. Fu'ad Galal, who headed the UAR delegation, conveyed Abdel Nasser's message to the committee. (*R. Cairo, Jan 25-IMB, Jan 25*)

In March Amri Abedi Kaluta, chairman of the Tanganyika African National Parliamentary Party and member of the Tanganyika delegation to the All-African People's Conference (AAPC) in Cairo, met the Rector of Al-Azhar and asked him to send religious teachers to Tanganyika and grant scholarships to students from that country. (*MENA, March 23* [25])

In March the UAR appointed a consul in Dar es Salaam. (*Akhhbar, March 24*)

Zuberi Mtemvu, leader of the opposition Tanganyika African National Congress Party, visited Cairo in Jan, April and Dec. His first visit was to study possibilities of setting up a Seminar for African Studies in Tanganyika with UAR aid. (From Cairo Mtemvu flew to Peking. His second visit came after a trip to East Germany.) (*Rus al-Yusuf, Jan 16; R. Cairo in Swahili, April 15* [18]; *Gumhuriyah, Dec 29*)

Abdullah Fundikira, Tanganyika's Minister of Justice and head of the East Africa Society, discussed religious assistance to his country with the Rector of Al-Azhar. (*MENA, Oct 29* [31])

A UAR delegation headed by a minister attended Tanganyika's independence celebrations in Dec. (*Akhhbar, Dec 7*)

TOGO

A UAR economic mission was to visit Togo in the course of an African tour. (*R. Cairo, Feb 9-IMB, Feb 9*)

Abdel Nasser congratulated Sylvanus Olympio upon

his election as President of Togo. He hoped that Togo would work with the other African states for strengthening the freedom and sovereignty of the continent. (*Akhhbar, April 17*)

The Togo Minister of the Interior was to visit the UAR in Oct and to tour police and army establishments. (*Akhhbar, Sept 26*)

UGANDA

Ties With Uganda Opposition; Uganda Office. John Kakonge, member of Uganda's Legislative Council and SG of the [opposition] Uganda People's Congress, visited Cairo as a delegate to the AAPC. (*MENA, April 5* [7])

In May it was reported that Anis Jum'a of Uganda had reached the UAR. He had studied at Al-Azhar and worked in the Uganda office in Cairo. He was sent to Uganda where he engaged in subversion. After capture and imprisonment he escaped with some cell-mates to Kenya and Somalia, where the Greater Somali League Party helped them to return to the UAR. Jum'a told the UAR press that he intended to return to Uganda and renew his subversive activities against the British authorities. (*Masa, May 4*)

Dr. B.N. Kununka of the Uganda National Congress (UNC) [opposition based in Buganda] visited Cairo in Oct. He said that he admired Abdel Nasser as a statesman, and attacked British policies in Uganda. (*MENA, Oct 9* [11])

[The UNC continued to maintain an office in Cairo. See also MER 1960, p 552.]

In Nov the Kenya authorities reportedly seized the passport of Paul Sokasi [of the UNC office], Uganda's representative at the AAPSO. He was on his way to Gaza, via Nairobi and Cairo. (*R. Cairo, Nov 21* [23])

Constitution Criticized. The proposed Uganda constitution, [drawn up by a conference of Uganda leaders and British representatives in London in Sept-Oct] and especially the proposed federal structure, was described as an "amazing study in the genius of British imperialism." (*Akhhbar, Oct 27*)

ZANZIBAR

(Background. After the Jan 1961 elections the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), supported mainly by the Arab population, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), which received assistance from Ghana and Tanganyika, and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) were unable to form a government. Elections were held again in June when rioting broke out during which scores of Zanzibaris—almost all Arabs—were killed and hundreds injured. The ZPPP and the ZNP, whose alliance won the elections, formed a government.)

Support for ZNP. UAR broadcasts supported the ZNP as the only party which had made successful attempts to raise the standard of education and culture in Zanzibar by opening many schools and obtaining scholarships in the UAR. The party's leader had made Zanzibar's voice heard in African and Asian conferences, which the other parties had never attempted; some of their leaders had actually advocated that the British continue to rule Zanzibar. (*R. Cairo in Swahili, Jan 14* [23])

Shaykh Ali Muhsin Bahwani, Zanzibar's Minister of Education, [and leader of the ZNP] met Kamal ad-Din Hussein in Cairo on April 4, on his way back from Indonesia. The two Ministers discussed UAR cultural assistance to Zanzibar. (*Akhhbar, April 5*)

[The UAR radio and press praised Ali Muhsin as an

ardent nationalist and referred to him as the "leader of the Zanzibar people," throughout the year.]

Abd ar-Rahmān Muhammad Ibo Sālih, SG of the ZNP, visited Cairo in Sept. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, Sept 12)

Cairo Minimizes Zanzibar Racial Tensions. Cairo broadcasts claimed that the Zanzibar riots in June had been

falsely represented by the British as "caused by colour and religion," in order to divide and rule. But in fact there were no pure Arabs in East Africa; all were native to the region. Also, the fighting was between rival parties and not rival races. The people of Zanzibar should be reconciled and stop the bloodshed. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, June 3, 10 [6, 13])

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

ARGENTINA

On April 4 it was announced that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on seven Argentine personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

On June 1 the UAR officially invited President Arturo Frondizi to visit the UAR (*R. Cairo*, June 2-*IMB*, June 2; *NYT*, June 4). [An invitation had also been made a year earlier. See *MER* 1960, p 542.]

On July 5 the UAR ambassador in Buenos Aires was authorized to sign a cultural agreement with Argentina comprising the usual provisions. (*Ayyam*, Damascus, July 7)

BOLIVIA

In April it was announced in Cairo that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on the President of Bolivia, and on other Bolivian personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

On Sept 14 it was announced that the UAR and Bolivia had decided to raise the diplomatic representation between them to ambassadorial level. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 15)

The newly appointed UAR ambassador to Bolivia left for his post on Sept 28; the Bolivian ambassador in Cairo presented his credentials on Dec 20. (*Gumhuriyah*, Sept 28, 29; *Eg. Gaz.*, Dec 21)

BRAZIL

Note: On Brazil's relations with the Syrian R. before the break-up of the UAR, see under: Syria.

President Abdel Nasser bestowed high UAR decoration on Brazilian personalities including the President, the Foreign Minister and the Governor of São Paulo. (*Gumhuriyah*, Jan 7)

In Aug a Cairo-Rio de Janeiro air service was opened. A delegation of Brazilian journalists who arrived on the inaugural flight were received by President Abdel Nasser and handed him a message from the President of Brazil. (*Ahram*, Aug 15)

In Aug a group of Brazilian businessmen toured both regions of the UAR and had talks on the expansion of trade relations. They said that they hoped that eventually the two countries would conclude a trade agreement. (*R. Damascus*, Aug 12, 13-*IMB*, 13, 14; *Akhbar*, Aug 16; *Ahram*, Aug 19)

In Aug Brazil granted one year scholarships to students from the UAR, among other African countries. (*Havanna Prensa Latina*, Aug 25 [W 31])

CHILE

The Chilean ambassador in Cairo presented his credentials on Feb 1, two years after the former ambassador had left his post. (*Ahram*, Feb 2)

On Feb 3 a Chilean cultural mission arrived in Cairo on an official visit. (*R. Cairo*, Feb 3-*IMB*, Feb 5; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 8, 9)

President Jorge Alessandri of Chile cabled Abdel Nasser his best wishes on the third anniversary of the establishment of the UAR. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 27) while the latter congratulated the former on the occasion of Chile's National Day. (*Eg. Gaz.*, Sept 19)

On April 4 it was announced that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on Chilean personalities, including the President and the Foreign Minister. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

On Nov 26 a Chilean Senator, leader of the Agricultural Workers' Party and Chairman of the Foreign Trade Council, arrived in Cairo for a week's visit. (*Gumhuriyah*, Nov 27, 28)

COLOMBIA

In Dec 1960 it was announced that diplomatic relations would be established at ambassadorial level.

In Jan it was reported that Colombia's first Ambassador to the UAR had been nominated, and would arrive in Cairo in the near future (*R. Cairo*, Dec 21, 1960-*IMB*, Dec 22, 1960; *R. Damascus*, Jan 6-*IMB*, Jan 8; *Ahram*, Jan 7). (Compare with the report in *MER* 1960, p 543 that the Colombian Ambassador to Cairo had already presented Abdel Nasser with a decoration on Dec 21, 1960. The actual state of affairs could not be established.)

On March 13 the Colombian "Minister Plenipotentiary" in Cairo presented Foreign Minister Fawzi and his Deputy, Hussein Dhu-al-fiqar Sabri, with decorations conferred on them by the President of Colombia. (*Eg. Gaz.*, March 13-14)

On April 4 it was announced that President Abdel Nasser had conferred high UAR decorations on four Colombian notables. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

COSTA RICA

On April 4 it was published that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on two Costa Rican personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

CUBA

UAR Buys Cuban Sugar. Io Jao the UAR signed a contract with the Cuban government to import 10,000 tons of Cuban refined sugar. (*MENA*, Jan 12 [W 19])

UAR Decorations to Cuban Personalities. In April it was announced that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on nine Cuban personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

UAR Denounces Bay of Pigs Invasion Attempt. [Background: On April 17 a force of armed Cuban exiles, with the unofficial support of the US, landed in the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) in Las Villas province in an attempt to invade Cuba and overthrow Dr. Castro's regime. After three days' fighting the Cuban forces overcame the invaders.]

On the day of the landing Abd al-Qādir Hātīm, UAR Minister of State, stated that the UAR government "strongly condemns the aggression to which the Cuban people are exposed" and said that the UAR supported the Cuban people in their battle for independence. The UAR Government affirmed its strong opposition to "every attempt of foreign interference by any country in the affairs of another country." (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 18)

The Cairo *Voice of the Arabs* charged the US with imperialistic intentions in Cuba, and said that the purpose of the invasion was to destroy Cuba's independence, so that the US could exploit Cuba's resources; it was also a warning to other Latin American countries not to follow the road to liberation taken by Cuba (*V of A*, April 18-IMB, April 19). Cairo radio accused President Kennedy personally of planning and executing the invasion. (*R. Cairo*, April 18 [20])

President Abdel Nasser sent a cable of support to Premier Castro. President Abdel Nasser and Tito (who was at the time in the UAR) discussed the issue. On April 19 the two Presidents made a joint declaration condemning the invasion and declaring the determination of the governments and peoples of Yugoslavia and the UAR to take all available measures and to extend all possible help in stopping foreign intervention in Cuba and in protecting the country's independence. (*Eg. Gaz.*, April 19, 20)

On April 19 large scale demonstrations in support of Cuba organized by the National Union took place in Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus and other places. The demonstrators carried banners denouncing "American imperialism," and demanding an end to "Kennedy's massacre in Cuba." Armed police sealed off the US embassy and broke up the ranks of demonstrators marching on the building. (*Ahram*, April 20, 21; *Hayat*, April 20)

During April 18-20 the Cairo broadcasting services made the invasion their main subject second to President Tito's visit to the UAR. They quoted the Cuban radio for reports on the fighting and Moscow radio's comments. (*BBCM*, April 20-22; *IMB*, April 19-23)

Visits. In June Raul Roa, the Cuban FM, attended the preparatory meeting in Cairo of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. On June 8 he was received by President Abdel Nasser. (*Ahram*, June 4, 9)

In July a UAR delegation went to Havana to convey best wishes to the government on the Cuban revolution anniversary. (*MENA*, July 23 [25]; *Eg. Gaz.*, July 24)

UAR Represents Cuba in Philippines. In Oct the UAR agreed to a Cuban request to look after its interests in the Philippines. (*Ahram*, Oct 5, 6)

ECUADOR

On April 4 it was published that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on two Ecuadorian personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

First UAR Ambassador in Ecuador. On July 14 the newly appointed UAR ambassador in Ecuador, the Syrian Rāshid al-Kaylāni, arrived in Quito. (*Gumhuriyah*, May 4; *Ahram*, July 15)

On Oct 12 Kaylāni placed himself and his embassy at the disposal of the new Syrian government (*Ayyam*, Oct 14). Later it was reported that the UAR had requested the intervention of the Ecuadorian government in restoring the UAR embassy building to the Egyptian chargé d'affaires. (*Ahram*, Nov 25)

UAR Recognizes New Regime in Ecuador. On Nov 21 it was announced in Cairo that the UAR had recognized the newly installed regime in Ecuador. (*Ahram*, Nov 22)

EL SALVADOR

In April it was announced in Cairo that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on El Salvador's President and its Foreign Minister. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

In May it was announced in Cairo that the UAR had decided to raise its representation in El Salvador to that of embassy with a resident ambassador. (*Ahram*, May 4)

HONDURAS

On April 4 it was announced that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on two Honduran personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

MEXICO

In Jan a Mexican goodwill mission touring African countries visited Cairo. The mission was received by President Abdel Nasser who expressed his intention to visit Mexico during the current year when he would extend his invitation to the Mexican President to visit the UAR (*Hayat*, Jan 27; *Eg. Gaz.*, Jan 31). The head of the mission told the press that the Arab Federation of Trade and Industry had been invited to Mexico and that discussions on a trade agreement were currently being held. The contacts made by the mission for cooperation in the field of trade, agriculture, culture and industry would be continued through diplomatic channels. (*MENA*, Jan 30 [Feb 1])

In April it was announced that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on eight Mexican personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

In Aug a UAR aviation mission left for Mexico to negotiate an aviation agreement. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, Aug 26)

PANAMA

On April 4 it was published that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on seven Panamanian personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

On Sept 18 the Panamanian Vice-President and Minister for Social Affairs stayed in Cairo for two days, on his way to Istanbul. (*R. Damascus*, Sept 19-IMB, Sept 21; *Ahram*, Sept 20)

URUGUAY

On April 4 it was announced in Cairo that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on various Uruguayan personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

On Sept 25 Uruguay's first ambassador to the UAR presented his credentials. Formerly representation had been at the level of ministers. (*Eg. Gaz.*, *Ahram*, Sept 26)

VENEZUELA

In Jan the former Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Mr. Erica, paid a two-week visit to the UAR on an official invitation. (*Ahram*, Jan 21; *Eg. Gaz.*, Feb 9)

In April it was published in Cairo that President Abdel Nasser had bestowed high UAR decorations on nine Venezuelan personalities. (*Jaridah Rasmiyah*, April 4)

Abdel Nasser accepted an invitation to visit Venezuela in the autumn (*R. Cairo*, May 2 [3]). [The visit did not materialize.]

THE MUTAWAKILITE KINGDOM OF YEMEN

(Al-Mamlakah al-Mutawakkiliyah al-Yamaniyah)

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SYNOPSIS

Unrest and violence continued to characterize Yemeni political life throughout 1961.

In March Imam Ahmad was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt by officers; other attempts on his life were reportedly made in February and August, and a plot against the Imam and Crown Prince Badr was reportedly uncovered in December.

These events served to emphasize the question of succession to the throne, for which there were two contenders, Crown Prince Sayf al-Islam Muhammad al-Badr, the Imam's son, and Sayf al-Islam al-Hasan, the Imam's brother. Badr had the support of the Imam but apparently of few others. Hasan, Yemen's representative at the UN, enjoyed the support of powerful Zaydi tribes. Imam Ahmad endeavoured to retain all real power in his hands but at the same time wished to establish Badr firmly as his successor. Thus in June, while recovering from his wounds, the Imam made Badr officially responsible for "supervising the government" but retained the powers of decision for himself. In October he confirmed Badr as Crown Prince. Towards the end of the year, when Badr returned from a journey abroad, he was accorded much official and organized acclaim. On the other hand, Hasan—who spent some months at home—reportedly refused a request of the Imam to swear allegiance to Badr, in which attitude he was supported by Zaydi tribes, especially the Hashid.

Both Badr and Hasan were assumed to have some mild reforms in mind but no basic change in the regime. During 1961 the first beginnings of modernization were seen in the economic sphere: the establishment of a number of institutions and companies, prompted by the completion of the Russian-built Ahmadî Port at Hodeida and the building of the first motor roads with Eastern and US aid. A modern-type "army" was also founded, in addition to several "armies" already in existence.

The opposition to the regime was widespread but split into many factions.

First, there were the age-old tensions between the

Zaydi north and the Shāfi'i south, between the Qahianites and the ruling Hashimites, as well as tribal feuds, and enmity between powerful tribes and the Imam.

Then there were disaffected army officers who participated in all the more substantial plots, and disaffected officials and rebel youth.

Abroad there were the "Free Yemenis" with their centre in Aden and some leaders in Cairo. This oldest of all Yemeni opposition organizations was torn by internal strife and became largely ineffective. Thus additional opposition groups sprang up in Aden, with pro-UAR but perhaps also with pro-Ba'ath leanings. Some of the "Free Yemenis," such as Abd ar-Rahmān al-Baydāni and Muhsin al-Ayni, began to strike out on their own. All these groups and individuals welcomed the dissolution of the United Arab States—the federation between Yemen and the UAR—which, in their view, augured a further weakening of the regime.

All evidence, however, indicated that none of these factors was strong enough to take over power by itself and that there were no programmes for a new regime truly based on Yemeni reality, beyond the yearning for a better life and the apparently widespread desire for a republic.

Observers of the Yemeni scene thought it was only the masterful personality of Imam Ahmad—skilled in holding the balance between the disruptive forces and inspiring a mythical fear in his subjects—which held together the disintegrating fabric of Yemen's archaic body politic. None of the forces in sight was thought to be strong enough either to perpetuate the present regime or to build a new one, for although there was desire for change, tradition still held its sway over the population, and the innumerable dissensions criss-crossing Yemeni society prevented any effective concentration of power.

Thus, observers concluded, civil strife was likely to follow the Imam's death, with world powers and Arab countries intervening, and Yemen becoming another Laos or Congo.

THE REGIME

THE ROYAL HOUSE

"Imam Ahmad—The Only Support of Stability." Writing at the beginning of the year on the struggle for power in Yemen, *Al-Hayāt's* "Arab, elder statesman" wrote that Imam Ahmad was not only the absolute ruler of the country but also the only guarantee of continued stability; without him the future was uncertain. (See also p 793 for the chaos expected in Yemen after the Imam's disappearance from the scene.) Therefore the forces struggling for power were careful not to endanger the

position of the Imam himself and struggled mainly among themselves. (*Hayat*, Jan 22)

Commenting on the Imam after the attempt on his life in March, *The Times* noted his "courage" and "ruthlessness." His "physical presence inspires fear as well as respect. So does his absence..."; when he was in Rome [in 1959] the local authorities in Yemen reportedly succeeded in checking an incipient revolt by making the population believe that his return was imminent. People who had come up against the Imam "grudgingly

admitted that as far as the art of ruling goes, he is a "natural." He had met with considerable skill the challenge of the opposition, which aimed at modernization and looked to Abdel Nasser, by allowing foreign technicians—mainly Russians and Chinese—into the country and by joining in a federation with the UAR. He had, however, not moved from the belief that Yemen must remain isolated from the rest of the world and that the Imam was the only real authority in the country. (*Times*, April 1)

It was reportedly believed widely in Yemen that Imam Ahmad, who had so often escaped death at the hand of assassins, was endowed with supernatural powers of survival, that he was "stronger than death." His last escape only served to strengthen this belief. (*Ayyam*, April 30)

Anti-Corruption Measures. The Imam set up a special commission to fight corruption and consulted the Ulama' about employing severe forms of punishment such as whipping and imprisonment (*Fat. Jaz.*, Jan 16, see also MER 1960, p 394). In a further attempt to stop corruption, the Imam barred access to the Royal Diwan to various officials who had misused their privileges and accepted bribes from Yemenis applying for a Royal hearing. This had led to "misunderstandings" between the Imam and his subjects. (*Fat. Jaz.*, Aug 26)

Disciplining The Courtiers? The following story appeared in an Aden paper, from a correspondent in Ta'izz: While "still ill and temperamental," the Imam had been irritated by a continuous stream of complaints regarding misconduct by the staff of the court. Enquiries having proved to no avail, the entire staff was locked inside the Court for three days, on the Imam's orders, with only water to sustain them. Thereafter a marked decrease was noted in the complaints reaching the Imam. (*Aden Chr.*, Sept 21)

Transferring Powers to Crown Prince Badr. [During the year, though he endeavored to keep all the reins of government firmly in his hands, the Imam apparently came to rely more and more on his son, Badr. This development was speeded up by the attempt on the Imam's life in March, when he was severely wounded (see below: The Opposition).] Though at the beginning of May the Imam was discharged from hospital and returned to Ta'izz (*Ayyam*, May 11), in August he had to undergo an operation. (*Saba*, Sept 7)

Rival Pretenders For Succession; Crown Prince Badr Versus Prince Hasan. [The two major rivals for the throne of Yemen were the Crown Prince Sayf al-Islam Muhammad al-Badr and his uncle, the Imam's brother, Sayf al-Islam al-Hasan. Primogeniture in itself was an innovation of Imam Yahya, who named his eldest son, Ahmad, Crown Prince. Traditionally, the candidate for the Imamate, chosen from among the Sayyids or descendants of the Imam Ali, was required to prove himself. In fact, Crown Prince Ahmad succeeded to the Imamate in 1948, following the assassination of Imam Yahya, only after crushing the Free Yemeni revolution and ousting his brother, Sayf al-Haq, who had joined the rebels and set himself up as a kind of constitutional Imam.]

"Badr Lacking Public Support." Badr was considered to be desirous of cooperation with the East in the development of Yemen, to be an admirer of the UAR and to trust the younger elements in Yemen.

He was reported to lack public support. Since 1959,

when for four months he had ruled the country whilst his father was undergoing medical treatment in Rome, Badr had been living in semi-isolation. Badr's main support was apparently the Imam himself. The Zaydi tribes supported Hasan. (*Hayat*, Jan 22, April 2)

Wide Powers Conferred on Badr. In Feb, Badr, having quelled plots against him in Dec 1960 (see MER 1960, p 396), left Yemen to undergo medical treatment in Italy (*Hayat*, Feb 28). He was accompanied by a few friends "who remained loyal to him after most of his supporters had either left him or been jailed," namely Shaykh Ali Hussein al-Wajih [a Yemeni merchant from Aden], Brig. Yahya Gharas al-Ban and Brig. Abdallah adh-Dhahabi. (*Hayat*, April 2)

On hearing of the attempt on the Imam's life, Badr flew back to Yemen (*Hayat*, March 31). It was reported that he was encouraging visitors to his father to express their allegiance to himself as well. (*Fat. Jaz.*, May 1)

On June 25 the Imam conferred on Badr "wide powers" including "supervision of the affairs of Yemen." In all matters requiring specific decisions, he was to refer to the Imam. Appointed as his assistants were Zayd Ibn Yahya Aqabat [former Minister of Agriculture], Muhammad Ibn Yahya Mutahhir, Qadi Abdallah ash-Shimahi, Qadi Muhammad Ibn Yahya al-Haddad and Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Kasbi [Governor of San'a]. The appointments were made on the recommendation of ministers and tribal leaders. Badr was to receive the general public several hours daily at his office in Ta'izz. (*Falastin*, June 27; *Saba*, June 29)

The reports of the appointment gave the impression that Badr had been made Prime Minister, causing speculation in the press: "Diplomatic circles expect the appointment to stir up opposition in the Yemen" (*Ahram*, June 26). Badr "has a reputation as a neutralist, with a strong attachment to the UAR." (*NYT*, June 27)

An Aden paper added that Badr was busy receiving diplomats and arbitrating in public disputes in contrast with the secluded life of Prince Hasan (who was at the time in Yemen, see below). (*Aden Chr.*, June 29)

Sayf al-Islam al-Hasan—Supported By Zaydi Tribes. Prince Hasan, Yemen's representative at the UN, returned from the US in June (*Saba*, June 15). Earlier, he had denied all reports of a misunderstanding between himself and the Crown Prince, and said his relations with the Imam and Badr were "completely normal." (*R. Baghdad*, June 10-JMB, June 11)

There were widely differing versions of the reasons for his return to Yemen as well as his views on internal affairs.

Some said he had been invited by the Imam to return and linked this development to attempts to mediate between them. (*Jihad*, June 11; *Ahram*, June 12)

On the other hand, it was reported that the official reason for his return to Yemen was his mother's illness and that he was very anxious to return to New York. An [unfriendly] Cairo source reported that Hasan was put into seclusion by the Imam and never left his house except on Fridays. (*Haq'a*, Cairo, July 13)

The Imam, it was reported, asked Hasan to swear allegiance to Badr as Crown Prince "to avoid trouble in the future." Hasan reportedly responded "by demanding the formation of a new government and the overhaul of the financial administration and that ministers be made responsible 'to the people' [instead of to the Imam]. He reportedly deplored the 'chaos, unhappiness, and confusion' reigning in Yemen and pointed to the example

of Abdel Nasser who had given workers a share in profits, whilst Yemeni workers received "starvation wages."

Hasan, it was further reported, did not swear allegiance to Badr. In this attitude, he apparently enjoyed the support of the Hashid shaykhs whom he had met in San'a at the end of Aug. Among the shaykhs he received were Shaykh ad-Dahlimi of the Adhr clan ("the largest of the Hashid clans"), Shaykh Hamid Nahir, Shaykh A'idh Qawbah and Hajj Da'us. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 24, 27, 30*)

[Hasan won the support of the Zaydis, especially the tribesmen, during the years he spent amongst them as Governor-General of the northern provinces. He was appointed to this post by his brother, the Imam Ahmad in 1948, after the rebellion; later he was appointed Yemen's representative at the UN, a post he still held in 1961.]

Hasan left Yemen in Sept for Belgrade, to represent the Imam at the conference of non-aligned countries (*Fat. Jaz., Sept 2*). He then continued on to New York to resume his duties at the UN. His presence in Yemen was described by *Aden Chronicle* as "a source of embarrassment to the Imam." (*Aden Chr., Oct 21*)

In Nov it was reported that in an interview with an Aden journalist in New York, Hasan had said that reform in Yemen would at first be a very slow process. "Until we reach a take-off stage we will have to go slow." The people were not accustomed to change, let alone drastic revolutions in their way of life; another difficulty was the expense involved in a "nation-building programme" in a country that was "lacking in almost everything." (*Aden Chr., Nov 9*)

In Nov it was rumoured that Hasan's son Abdallah had been arrested in Ibb. (*Fat. Jaz., Nov 11*)

Badr Confirmed as Crown Prince. Badr embarked during the summer on what was described as "an energetic programme of interviews" and also sat in judgement in public disputes. (*Aden Chr., July 29*)

He left Yemen at the end of Sept for Zurich to continue medical treatment. (*Jihad, Oct 1*)

The Imam formally confirmed Badr as Crown Prince in a speech on Oct 13, calling upon the people to be loyal to him (*Saba, Oct 19*). Reports that the Imam had abdicated (*R. Damascus, Oct 13-IMB, Oct 13*) were subsequently denied. (*R. Amman, Oct 14-IMB, Oct 14; Falastin, Oct 15*)

Badr left Europe in Nov, stopping in Cairo for talks with Abdel Nasser (*Sa'at al-Arab, Nov 14-IMB, Nov 14*). He continued on to Hodeida and Ta'izz and reached San'a on Dec 13. His return was marked by public festivities and lavish praise was heaped upon him by the Yemeni press and radio. In San'a the Crown Prince declared his devotion to the homeland, his aspirations for its progress, his hatred of foreign imperialism and of its traitorous lackeys at home. (See e.g. *R. San'a, Dec 1, 6, 8, 12, 13 [4, 9, 11, 14, 16]; Saba, Nov 30, Dec 28*)

THE ARMED SERVICES, SECURITY AND POLICE

The Victorious Royal Regular Army (*al-jaysh al-muza'far an-nizami al-maleki*). This was Yemen's standing army, nominally composed of several brigades (*liwa'*), each including three infantry battalions (*lawi*), with supporting artillery, tank and machine-gun units. In 1958 its strength was estimated at about 20,000 men. Its main duties were the maintenance of internal security, the enforcement of tax-collection and policing as necessary. It was originally organized on Ottoman lines. Service was for life, and the average age was therefore high; demobilization could be bought by suitable payment. Equipment included Krupp

cannons, Mauser rifles, Hotchkiss machine-guns and Russian-supplied arms, such as T34 tanks.

Part of this force was assigned as a Royal Guard (*al-ukjah*) of 600 men. (*The Yemen, Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London, Feb 1958; Le Yemen, La Documentation Française, 1956; and background information*)

The C-in-C of this army in 1961 was Muhammad Ibn Hasan ad-Darmin; Commander of the Royal Guard was Muhammad Mar'i (*Nasr, May 18*). Its headquarters were in San'a. (*Saba, June 15*)

Following popular protest the government announced it would refrain from using the army to collect tribute in kind. The army would be called out in future for such duty only in cases of default in payment. (*Fat. Jaz., Jan 21*)

In Oct, units of the Victorious Army with tanks and artillery paraded in San'a on the occasion of the anniversary of the Imam's accession to the throne. (*Nasr, Oct 26*)

Maj-Gen. Ahmad al-Anasi, commander of the Ta'izz garrison, reviewed a parade in the main square of Ta'izz. The soldiers "demonstrated their ability to defend the country against external aggression." (*Saba, Dec 14*)

The Defence Army (*jaysh ad-difa*). This force was set up by an ex-officer of the Ottoman army, Lieut-Col. Tahsin al-Faqir, who trained groups of Yemeni tribesmen in four-month training courses. It was claimed that over 50,000 men, all of them Zaydis, had been given basic military training by 1940. An Iraqi military mission gave this force some further training in 1940-43. In 1943 it was nominally organized in one brigade of infantry supported by one battalion of machine-guns. Estimates of its strength varied considerably but, during the last few years, it probably stood at about 3,000 men. Trained tribesmen were transferred to the reserves, known as *al-jaysh al-barrani* (see below). (*Qalb al-Yemen by Lieut-Col. Muhammad Hasan, member of Iraqi military mission to the Yemen, 1940-43, Baghdad, 1947 and miscellaneous sources*)

C-in-C of the Defence Army in 1961: (Gen.) Abd al-Qadir Ibn Abdallah Abu Talib (*Nasr, May 18*). [Politically, this army was considered loyal to Crown Prince Badr.]

The Reserve Army (*al-jaysh al-barrani*, literally: The External Army). [This force was the emergency reserve and theoretically included all able-bodied tribesmen, some of whom received training in the Defence Army (see above).]

The National Army (*al-jaysh al-watani*). In 1960 the Imam ordered the formation of a modern army, to be known as the National Army, to defend the country against "the greedy ones who lie in wait and to 'liberate' the parts of the homeland held by the colonialists." A first group of Yemeni youth completed training in San'a. Their officers, also Yemenis, were trained at the UAR military college, cadets and NCOs at the Yemeni military college in San'a. These officers were reported as training the army in modern methods and in the use of modern light and heavy weapons including Russian T-34 tanks, armoured cars, howitzers, field artillery, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns. There was also a signals unit. The recruits had not served previously in either the Victorious Army or the Defence Army.

The intention was said to be inculcation of military discipline, a high morale and a sense of loyalty to the officers.

The Imam appointed Col. Muhammad Abd al-Khaliq Hajar to command this army. He had graduated from the Iraqi military academy in Baghdad in 1937, held various posts in the Yemeni armies, and served as staff officer on the Military Committee of the Arab League. Whilst in Cairo, he attended the UAR Staff College and was later re-assigned to Yemen to his new command. (*Fat. Jaz., Jan 13; Aden Chr., Jan 19*)

The Air Force, Meteorological Service. [The Yemeni air force was equipped with Russian Yak 11 piston-engined fighter aircraft. There were no indications that any newer type of aircraft had been delivered.]

Commander of the air force and Director of the Yemeni Airways Company: Brig. Ghali Ibn Ahmad al-Jarmuzi. (*Saba, Dec 28*)

Director of Hodeida Airport: Muhammad al-Faqih. (*Saba, March 6*)

Commander of Pilots and Parachutists Schools (opened in 1960) and of the NCO school: Col. Muhammad Salih al-Ulaifi. (*Narr, March 26*)

Four officers who were to set up meteorological stations in Ta'izz, Hodeida and San'a under the supervision of a Russian expert, returned in 1961 from training in the USSR. (*Narr, April 20*, names given)

Parachute School. The first course of Yemeni parachutists graduated in March at the Parachutists School, where they had been trained by Russian instructors. They numbered 50 men, divided into platoons of ten each. In April they jumped from 5,000 feet to a target near Hodeida. The Imam Ahmad ordered the expansion of the school, and the selection of new recruits. (*Narr, March 26, April 20; Falastin, April 12; Saba, April 13; R. San'a, April 9, 11, 18 [W 13, 20, 27]*)

The Navy. [Several coastguard vessels constituted a nucleus of a Yemeni navy.] Sixty cadets at the military academy in San'a were to leave for Russia to train on coastguard vessels there. They were to return after six months, accompanying three motor boats given to Yemen by Russia. (*Fat. Jaz., May 8*)

UAR Military Aid. UAR experts were reportedly reorganizing the Yemeni armies. (*R. Cairo in Hebrew, July 24, 1960-IMB, July 25, 1960; see also above: The National Army.*)

In June Brig. Ahmad al-Anasi [subsequently promoted and appointed commander of the Ta'izz garrison of the Victorious Army] returned to Yemen from Cairo, where he had talks with President Nasser on behalf of the Yemeni army. (*Saba, June 29*)

In Aug UAR military experts were reported to have arrived in Ta'izz to advise on fortifications in Shaykh Sa'id on the heights overlooking the straits of Bah al-Mandeb. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 12*)

USSR Military Aid; Decay of Russian Equipment. [In 1956 a small air arm was built up with Russian and Czech aid and some T-34 tanks and light artillery were supplied. Most of the equipment remained immobile and much of it became unserviceable.] Russia sent instructors to Yemen to train Yemeni soldiers in parachuting and the use of Russian arms. (*Times, July 27, 1960; Kilah, Aden, Dec 18*)

In Jan 16 Yemeni army officers arrived in Hodeida with their men to take over radio-equipped vehicles which had arrived on a Russian ship. (*Saba, Jan 9*)

In May it was reported in Aden that 11 Russian ex-

perts had arrived in Yemen to check the military equipment bought from Russia at a cost of 9.5 million dollars. It had begun to rust and decay, and the Russians, it was reported, hoped to save at least part of the arms and train Yemenis in their maintenance. (*Fat. Jaz., May 24*)

Later the Imam reportedly ordered an inspection of arms in the Hajja arsenals. Some of the rifles were found to have suffered from insects and rust. Most of them were Russian-made. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 12*)

A [hostile] source said the Imam was refraining from handing over newly arrived Czech arms to the army for fear they would be used in revolt against him. (*Akhbar al-Yaum, Dec 30*)

Political Opposition of Army Officers. See below: Opposition to the Regime.

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND PROJECTS

[With the completion of Ahmadi port at Hodeida and the progress in road construction linking the country's main centres, with the aid of the USSR, China and the USA (see: Foreign Relations), the first signs appeared in 1961 of the beginnings of modern economic institutions and development.]

Projected Companies. In Feb it was reported that the Minister of Public Works met with a group of leading merchants in Hodeida. They agreed "in compliance with his Majesty's desire" to explore the possibilities of establishing a transport company and a network of road communications linking the whole country. A committee was set up to start the formation of an electricity company. Other proposals were for a water corporation in view of the water shortage, the establishment of a Yemen Bank and the minting of new currency to replace the Maria Theresa Thalers. (*Aden Chr., Feb 9*)

Transport Company. The Passengers Road Transport Company Ltd. was founded in Feb. Shares were floated in Yemeni towns. In Sept it was reported that the company was "working hard" to link up Hodeida and San'a with other towns by bus service. (*R. San'a, Feb 14 [W 23]; Narr, March 26; R. San'a, Sept 3 [7]*)

Factories. In Feb Amin Qasim Muhammad Sultan (a Yemeni entrepreneur from Aden) received from the Imam a permit to establish a number of enterprises to "boost the country's economy." Amongst these were metal works and a fruit and vegetables canning factory in Hodeida. (*Saba, Feb 6*)

In Dec Badr discussed the projected national company to set up cement factories. (*San'a, Dec 21 [W 82]*)

Ministry of Trade Proposed. A Ministry of Trade was to be set up with its head office in Hodeida and would comprise departments of foreign exchange control and foreign trade. (*Narr, April 6*)

Electricity Company. [A contract for the supply of electricity and water to San'a was granted in June to a company headed by Sayyid Ali Abdallah al-Amrili.] In July it was reported that the Imam had "approved the conversion of the Government Electricity Company into a national company." (*R. San'a, July 26 [W Aug 3]*)

Fuel Company. In Aug it was reported that a Royal Charter for a national fuel corporation had been issued to Crown Prince Badr on the following conditions: (a) all shareholders to be Yemenis; (b) the entire subscribed

capital to be Yemeni; (c) the charter of the corporation to be renewed every 30 years "to safeguard the public from exploitation"; (d) in order that the public might benefit, profits should not exceed 10%. (*Aden Chr., Aug 17*)

A Royal decree provided, *inter alia*, that the company had the right to import and sell fuel and was responsible for its distribution throughout Yemen. It had to maintain a local six months reserve; storage tanks would be situated at Hodeida; the Foreign Ministry would be supplied with copies of all offers received by the company from abroad. (*R. San'a, Sept 7 [9]*)

In Oct the company discussed oil imports with foreign suppliers, Soviet and Western. (*Aden Chr., Sept 14*)

Airline. In Aug the Imam issued a decree setting up a Yemeni Airline to operate domestic and international services to be financed by Yemeni capital only and operated by the government. (*NCNA, Aug 10 [W 17]; Aden Chr., Aug 17*)

Chamber of Commerce. In Nov it was reported that the Imam had ordered the establishment of a chamber of commerce in Hodeida with branches in other Yemeni towns. (*R. San'a, Nov 27 [W Dec 7]*)

TRIBAL AFFAIRS

Tribal Conferences. After the attempt on the Imam's life (March 26), tribal leaders were summoned to Hodeida. Such summonses, it was reported, could be made only in the event of the death of the Imam or for a renewal of allegiance (*Mid. Mir., April 8*). Bakil and Khawlan shaykhs were specifically mentioned by an Aden paper, which added that the summonses were issued by Badr and did not carry the Imam's seal. (*Fat. Jaz., May 8*)

In June, it was reported, the Imam held another tribal leaders' conference in Ta'izz, from which Hashid and Bakil shaykhs were "conspicuously absent." [The Zaydi tribes, and especially the Hashid, were reported to show support for Amir Hasan, the Imam's brother and a contender for the succession. See above: The Royal House: Sayf al-Islam al-Hasan.] (*Aden Chr., June 8*)

Miscellaneous. In Feb the al-Azaniyah tribes returned to Sawma'ah near Al-Bayda, having earlier fled after skirmishes with Protectorate forces. They were granted financial resettlement aid by the governor of Al-Bayda, Salihi Ibn Naji ar-Ruwayshān. (*Saba, Feb 2*)

In Aug a dispute over land rights led to fighting between Zurayka tribesmen and Sabiha villagers in Al-Hajjal. Qadi al-Jindari governor of Al-Hajariyah, tried to mediate between the two sides. The Imam sent the Zurayka tribe 15 new rifles. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 6*)

The tribesmen of Markha also received extra allotments of rifles and ammunition from the Imam "in addition to the monthly wages he was paying them." The purpose was to strengthen security in the area which was torn by traditional strife between the Sidah [those claiming descent from Muhammad] and the tribes. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 31*)

In Nov Naqib Pasha Ibn Zub'ah, a chieftain of one of the Nihm tribes of Upper Yemen, escaped from Ar-Radi' prison near San'a and fled to Bayhan. (*Aden Chr., Nov 16*)

Eight shaykhs of the Hashid and Bakil tribes were reportedly arrested in San'a and Ta'izz on suspicion of foul play and travelling without permission. They were said to be divided between supporters of Crown Prince Badr and Prince Hasan. (*Aden Chr., Nov 30*)

THE OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME

ATTEMPTS ON THE LIFE OF THE IMAM

Alleged Attempt By Members of Royal Guard. On Feb 11 the Imam was said to have been slightly bruised in a collision between his car and an armoured vehicle of the Royal Guard. Amongst others, the drivers of the two vehicles were arrested and interrogated. (*Fat. Jaz., Feb 27; Ahram; Falastin; Hayat, Feb 21*)

In April Ahmad ash-Shāmi, who had participated in the investigation on the attempt on the Imam's life in March, reportedly told MENA that the crash had been a deliberate attempt to assassinate the Imam. (*Hayat, April 12; the Ahram version of the interview, April 12, does not record this sentence.*)

Attempt by Officers. On the night of March 26, the Imam was shot and wounded at the Hodeida hospital where he had gone for examinations and to visit the wounded soldiers who had been with him at the time of the car accident-assassination attempt described above.

Three men took a direct part in the attempt, it was later revealed by Ahmad ash-Shāmi, who participated in the investigation tribunal. They were Lieut. Muhammad al-Alafi, the hospital security officer, Lieut. Abdallah al-Liqyah of the Hodeida Port Fire Brigade and Lieut. Muhi al-Hindawāna (Army).

Lieut. Alafi led the Imam into a prepared ambush. The Imam had informed the hospital director of his coming visit. When the members of the Royal Guard

who preceded the Imam arrived at the hospital, Lieut. Alafi asked them not to enter, saying this was the wish of the Imam, and they complied. A little later the Imam arrived and entered the building accompanied by four of his special guards. Inside the hospital, the three officers opened fire on the Imam from different directions. His guards fled. The Imam was hit by one bullet in the shoulder and two in the thigh; as he fell he also hit his head on the ground. The assailants scattered.

Alafi took cover in a house, from which he opened fire at his pursuers, killing one of them and wounding two. Finally he shot himself. Al-Liqyah and Hindawāna were arrested. (*Ahram; Hayat, April 12; MENA, April 11 [13]*)

An Aden paper claimed that Alafi was an educated man and an ardent nationalist. He had studied [in the military college] under Jamāl Jamil, the Iraqi officer who had played a prominent part in the abortive revolution of 1948. Alafi had been one of the officers whom Amir Hasan had compelled to attend the execution of Jamil. (*Ayyam, April 30*)

Hashid Tribe Involved? According to a Lebanese source, the assassination attempt was thought to be an act of blood vengeance by the Hashid tribe. In 1960 the Imam had executed Hāmid al-Ahmar, the Head Shaykh (*shaykh al-mashayikh*) of the Hashid tribal federation (*qabīlah*). The reason for this execution reportedly was, that the

Hāshid (as well as the Baqil) were supporting Hasan against Badr for the succession to the throne (*Hawadith, March 31*). Ahmad ash-Shāmi later stated that in searches in the houses of suspects, important documents were found on the 1959 plot by Ibn al-Ahmar, the Hāshid Shaykh, against the Imam; more names of persons connected with that plot were thus discovered (*Hayat, Ahram, April 12; MENA, April 11 [15]*). [Shāmi did not directly connect the Hāshid with the assassination attempt nor did *Al-Hawadith* offer any proof for its statement. No report was available as to whether the accused were Hāshidis. For the Imam-Hāshid feud, compare MER 1960, pp. 394-5]

Investigation Tribunal, Executions. A special tribunal, headed by Crown Prince Badr, was set up to investigate the attack; it comprised six officers and six civilians, including Ahmad ash-Shāmi as personal representative of the Imam.

There were many arrests, figures quoted ranging from 40 to 200. (*R. San'a, March 29 [April 4]; R. Amman, March 30 [April 4]; Fat. Jaz., March 31; Hayat, April 12*)

On April 9, the Cairo office of the Imam announced that five Yemenis had been sentenced to death for complicity in the attack (*NYT, April 11*). On May 20 Hindawana and Liqyah were publicly beheaded in Ta'izz. (*Saba, May 21; R. San'a, May 21 [23]*)

Rumour Campaign: The Imam's Health. [For some weeks after the assassination attempt, rumours spread (and were apparently encouraged by various opposition circles) that the Imam's condition was extremely serious or even that he had died. The regime strove to convince the population that this was untrue.]

On March 29, a message by Badr, in the name of the Imam, was broadcast over San'a Radio in order to "enlighten [the people] about the safety of the Imam and Islam, and so that you may not be misled by the falsehoods of the evil-mongers"; the Imam had "escaped unharmed except for slight injuries" (*BBCM, April 4*). The next day *Saba*, the Ta'izz paper, even wrote that the Imam was not hurt at all (*Saba, March 31*). [There were many subsequent reports and announcements designed to emphasize that the reins of government were firmly in the hands of the Imam.]

At the end of April two Yemeni opposition groups in Aden, the (Free) Yemen Union and the Greater Yemen Association (see below: Opposition Abroad) spread a rumour through the Aden paper *Al-Yaqazah* to the effect that the Imam had died. (*ANA, April 29 [May 2]*)

On May 4 San'a Radio broadcast, for the first time since the assassination attempt, a speech by the Imam himself. He said he deliberately made his voice heard "so that you may be left in no doubt about my health." He still had some wounds left but did not intend to go abroad for treatment [as had also been rumoured]. He denounced the "charges made by interested parties that the Imam rules Yemen by blood and iron. May God stifle ... these liars." (*Aden Chr., May 11*)

On May 8 the Imam, accompanied by Badr, returned from Hodeida to Ta'izz. (*Ayyam, May 11*)

More Attempts on the Imam's Life Reported. In Aug it was reported that a soldier of the Imam's bodyguard had plotted to blow up the royal palace in Ta'izz where the Imam was in residence. He had deposited with the Royal Guard a box which he said contained money but in fact contained explosives. The guards' suspicions were aroused and they arrested the soldier who committed suicide on the spot. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 13*)

In Dec a plot against the Imam and the Crown Prince was reportedly discovered by the police who arrested the conspirators and confiscated arms, ammunition and foreign currency. (*Gumhuriyah, Dec 14*)

POLITICAL OPPOSITION OF ARMY OFFICERS

(See also above: Attempts on the Life of the Imam)

Col Jayfi. In May it was reported that Col. Hamūd Ibn Hamūd al-Jayfi (spelt also al-Jā'ifi), accompanied by a sergeant, and a private soldier, had escaped from Ghamdān prison to Bayhan. In Aug, Jayfi left Aden for Rome for medical treatment.

Col. Jayfi graduated from the military academy of Baghdad. On his return to Yemen, he led a campaign against the Dīhāgh tribes and won the battle of Hamara, during which he was wounded. He was later appointed commander of the San'a military college. At the time of the 1948 coup d'état the Imam appointed him Director of General Security in Ta'izz province. Later, the revolutionary government ordered him to go to Aden. After the counter-coup he was jailed for nearly eight years in Hajja. His health having suffered, he was transferred to a hospital following personal intervention by Badr who, from 1955, appointed him to various posts.

According to reports quoted in *Al-Jihād*, Jayfi was arrested at the end of 1960 after a plot against Crown Prince Badr had been discovered in Dec (see MER 1960, p. 396). According to *Fatāt al-Jazirah*, he had taken no part in the political struggle but his enemies had alleged that he had been supporting Badr and plotting against the Imam. (*Jihād, Jordan, May 18; Fat. Jaz., June 1, Aug 14*)

In Jan the arrest was reported of ten men who had been discharged from the army after "the incident which led to the deaths of Qādi al-Jahari and his brother." A search revealed dynamite in their possession and a secret hideout in San'a. (*Fat. Jaz., Jan 20*)

OTHER DISSENSIONS AND OPPOSITION INSIDE YEMEN

Shāfi'i-Zaydi Split. According to *Al-Hayāt's* "Arab elder statesman," a group existed in the south which wished to separate the Shāfi'i south from the Zaydi north of the country. (*Hayat, Jan 22*)

Qahtāni-Hāshimi Differences. The above-mentioned source said a "Qahtāni nationalist movement" existed, especially amongst the educated youth, which would like to see the Imam's family, which was of "Adāni-Hāshimi" stock, "return to Hijaz whence they had come." (*Hayat, Jan 22*; and the Qahtāni-Hāshimi differences, see MER 1960, p. 394.)

Factionalism. In March, an article in *Saba* on "the duty of youth" called for a fight against "factionalism" (*at-tafrīqah*) spread by "unscrupulous and inhuman people." (*Saba, March 2*; for another article in the same vein, see *Nasr, March 26*.)

Qādi Ahmad as-Siyāghī, Governor of Ibb, left his post in May on hearing of the Imam's arrival in Ta'izz and travelled to Dhala in the Aden Protectorate to seek political asylum (*Aden Chr., May 11*). He later arrived in Aden (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 14*). Siyāghī was said to support Prince Hasan and to oppose Crown Prince Badr. (*Jihād, Jordan, May 15*; on Siyāghī's dispute with the Imam, see also MER 1960, p. 394.)

Manifestations of Dissension; Terror; Arrests. In May it was reported that a bomb had exploded in the late Imam

Yahya's residence in San'a, which now housed the Treasury; two guards were killed. Bombs also exploded in the government house at Ibb as well as in "Hamām ash-Shifā' Palace" [no dates mentioned]. (*Fat. Jaz., May 20*)

After the Imam's return to Ta'izz [from Hodeida hospital] vigilance was increased and eight students were arrested on charges of conspiracy. (*Fat. Jaz., May 20*)

Clandestine leaflets were reportedly circulating in Yemen [no date given]. (*Fat. Jaz., April 14*)

[In May?] Dr Fadlallah and Yūsuf Wabbah, a merchant, were arrested in Ta'izz on charges of conspiracy. (*Fat. Jaz., June 1*)

[In June?] leaflets printed in Aden and calling for insurrection were circulated in Ta'izz. (*Saba, June 15*)

In Aug it was reported that secretly printed leaflets had been circulated in Yemen, calling for civil revolt, "down with Badr and Hasan," and the formation of a national popular government. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 6*)

In Aug citizens of Ibb now residing in Aden, protested in a cable to the Imam against "the sanguinary events" which had taken place in Ibb, and the imprisonment of Ibb citizens without trial. It was reported that on Aug 11 and 12 business in Ibb was suspended and nobody was allowed in or out of the town. (*Fat. Jaz., Aug 12*)

Demonstrations on Breakup of the UAR. Public demonstrations were held in Ta'izz, San'a and Hodeida in protest against Syria's secession from the UAR. It was thought to be a new phenomenon in Yemeni public life for the government to allow such demonstrations. (*Fat. Jaz., Oct 5*)

Arrests Reported After Dissolution of Federation. At the end of Dec [after the formal dissolution of the UAR-Yemen federation] a [pro-UAR] paper reported that many arrests had been made in Yemen. All nationalist, pro-Nasser elements were under surveillance. (*Hawadith, Dec 29*)

OPPOSITION ABROAD: THE FREE YEMENIS

Background Note: Nu'mān and Zubayrī. [In 1944 certain disaffected Yemeni leaders went to Aden. They included, among others, al-Mutī Ibn Dūmaj, Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad Nu'mān (a Shāfi'i—see MER 1960 p 396), Sayyid Zaki al-Makki and Qādi Muhammad Mahūd az-Zubayrī (a Zaydi). In 1945 they founded a movement called "The Free Yemenis" (*al-yamaniyyūn al-ahdār*) later called the "Yemeni Union (*al-ittihād al-yamani*)" and formed a company called "The Greater Yemen Association" (*jam'iyyat yaman al-kubra*) to print propaganda. Zubayrī edited a newspaper, *Sawt al-Yaman*, which was clandestinely distributed in Yemen.

The Free Yemenis participated in the revolution during which Imam Yahya was killed. Nu'mān and Zubayrī served as ministers in Abdallah al-Wazīr's short-lived revolutionary government. Following the counter-coup, both went into exile and were latterly residing in Cairo. In 1960 Nu'mān went to Aden but was expelled, reportedly in response to a request by the Imam who suspected Nu'mān of complicity in a recent outburst of terror in Yemen; he returned to Cairo. (For further details, see MER 1960, pp 157-8, 396-7, 399.)

At the beginning of the year, an Aden paper described Nu'mān as "Leader of the Free Government of Yemen." (*Fat. Jaz., Jan 2*)

Free Yemen Premises in Aden Searched. Following the Imam's protests in Dec 1960 that Yemeni dissidents in Aden were responsible for the recent terrorist activities

in Yemen, and a visit to Aden by Ronald Bailey, British chargé d'affaires in Ta'izz, Aden spokesmen were reported to have expressed their determination to try and prevent Yemeni terrorists from using the Colony as an operational base. (Compare MER 1960, p 399.)

On Dec 31, 1960, police searched the premises of the Yemeni Union and the house of the Union's president, Hajj Muhammad Ali al-Aswadi, who later stated that nothing incriminating had been found in his house. (*Mid. Mir., Jan 7*)

Free Yemen Programme: Constitutional Government; No Mention of Arab Nationalism. In April the Yemeni Union and the Greater Yemeni Association issued a statement of aims over the signatures of Aswadi, President of the Union, and Abd al-Karīm al-Anasī, Acting President of the Association. The statement said it was futile to assume—as many did—that a change of rulers alone would favourably affect the situation in Yemen, for the foundations of the regime were rotten; there was no popular constitutional regime (*niḍm dūstūrī sha'bi*) nor any law to limit the powers of government.

Therefore both "popular organizations" had taken the same determined stand "with the masses of the people until the Yemeni nation (*al-ummah al-yamaniyah*) will achieve all its aspirations for social justice, prosperity, goodness, knowledge, good government, true equality between all parts of the people, until the Yemeni nation may take its place in the community of advanced nations." "Both organizations will support any popular constitutional government stemming from the hearts of the people." "God is the guarantor of rule, and there is no government except that of the people." [It may be noted that the statement made no mention of the terms republic, Arab nationalism or an Arab nation.] (*Ayyam, April 18*)

Rift in Yemeni Union; Aswadi President, Radicals' Break-away. The visit to Aden of Ahmad Nu'mān in 1960, it was later reported, was for the purpose of reconstituting the Union—the Union's general committee had been inactive for four years—and he was also instrumental in founding the Yemeni Bilqis College at Shaykh Uthmān in the Western Protectorate. Nu'mān, however, was criticized by the more radical elements of the Union in Aden, who claimed he was not working wholeheartedly for the liberation of Yemen. [Compare also a description of Nu'mān as "a past revolutionary"—MER 1960, p 396.] After his return to Cairo [in June 1960] Muhammad Ali al-Aswadi assumed leadership as the Union's president. (*Aden Chr., July 13*)

Aswadi had lived in Aden for the past 13 years and was described as one of the Colony's leading figures. He had played an important part in the 1948 coup in Yemen but had not been given a post in the al-Wazīr government. (*Mid. Mir., Jan 7*)

Nu'mān—Zubayrī Leadership Attacked as Inefficient, Corrupt. In June the struggle inside the Yemeni Union apparently came to a head. An Aden paper (probably speaking for the Yemeni "radicals") attacked the Union's leadership for its inefficiency and corruption and said the Union never had any concrete programme. Mentioning Nu'mān and Zubayrī (though not explicitly accusing them), the paper alleged that huge funds had been wasted. Funds had been collected by Yemenis in Aden—who mainly came from Lower Yemen [populated by Shāfi'is]—as well as by Yemenis in Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Europe and America. Funds had been used for the provision of bodyguards for the leaders, a printing press for *Sawt al-*

Yaman, for "high policy manoeuvres," for premises for the Greater Yemen Association and aid to political prisoners in Yemen. There was no accounting for the sums which had probably disappeared into investments, trade, etc. for private profit. This had led to unceasing friction between the "sincere nationalists" and the "opportunists." The leadership had sided with the opportunists as a victory for nationalism in Yemen would mean the end of a lucrative enterprise. The sincere nationalists had now gathered together but were faced with active opposition on the part of the entrenched leadership. The paper appealed to these leaders to be content with the profits they had made and allow "true nationalist elements" to get on with the job. (*Ayyam*, June 6)

Elections, Compromises, Continued Struggle. [Sources available were insufficient to provide a coherent picture of the developments inside the Union; the one fact which emerged clearly was that the rift was not healed.]

In June Aswadi, President of the Union, announced in an Aden paper that in view of the continued inactivity of the Union, elections would be held on July 22 "to avoid the chaos and favouritism which would otherwise have occurred in such a situation." Membership cards would be issued to founding members and to generous donors to the cause, whilst other members were requested to pay their dues before the elections, otherwise they would lose their right to vote. The voting register would be kept by the President. Legal steps would be taken to prevent unconstitutional voting. (*Ayyam*, June 22)

Some days later, Muhammad Abdallah Ali al-Fasil, writing in *Al-Ayyam*, deplored the fact that the "sincere nationalists" had compromised with the "cunning scoundrels" in order to preserve unity of leadership in the Union, at the price of acquiescing in their corruption. But the clock could not be turned back. The cause was no longer confined to the financial activities of a few but had spread to include labourers, teachers and scholars. (*Ayyam*, June 25)

According to a [rather abstruse] report, elections to the presidency of the Union were held on July 9 [and not on July 22 as announced]. The police intervened to put an end to a dispute that might have turned into violence. The report said that Aswadi was elected President [but the style of the report is such that this could be a reference to his election in 1960. Aswadi had been President at least since the end of 1960—see above]. (*Aden Chr.*, July 13)

According to the Union's constitution, the Executive was to be elected by the General Committee, which should be composed of Yemenis only, and for one year. The General Committee which should have met twice yearly, had not convened since 1957. The present Executive was therefore declared unconstitutional [by the radicals] and was called upon to tender its resignation. (*Aden Chr.*, July 13)

On Aug 1, Ali al-Ahmadi, S.G. of the Union, called a meeting of the General Committee (*hay'ah ammah*) of the Union on Sept 2 to elect a new Executive (*hay'ah idariyah*). (*Fat. Jaz.*, Aug 1)

In mid-Sept the headquarters of the Union in Crater, Aden, were closed down by court order. The background to this development was the strife within the Union. As to the actual reasons, one version was that on Sept 16, Aswadi, backed by Abd al-Warith, tried to have 100 of his supporters admitted to the Union, having overruled the Executive's claim to vote their admission. The opposition to Aswadi was led by Ahmadi and Muhammad

Ahmad Nu'man [the son of Ahmad Muhammad Nu'man]. A fierce argument led to a riot (*Aden Chr.*, Sept 21). The other version had it that the opposition wished to arrange a celebration inside the headquarters but was prevented by Aswadi (*Fat. Jaz.*, Sept 19). According to both versions, the four leaders above-mentioned were arrested and later released on bail.

Free Yemenis and the Dissolution of the UAR; "The Yemeni Liberation Movement" in Cairo. According to a Cairo source, Free Yemenis danced in the streets of Aden on hearing of Cairo's decision to dissolve the federation with Yemen [in the hope that this would herald the downfall of the Imam]. (*Musawwar*, Dec 29)

At the end of Dec, after a lapse of three years, Zubayri resumed his broadcasts over Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" station, speaking in the name of the "Yemeni Liberation Movement in Cairo." He said it was the "ancient mentality which dominates authority in the Yemen" and was represented by the ruler, which was corrupting the life of the "Yemeni Arab people." It was the situation thus created which forced the masses to rejoice at the abrogation of the union. He called on the people to rise and restore dignity to Yemen and unity between the north and the south [i.e. Aden], which had been disrupted by the imperialists. (*BBCM*, Dec 29; *Fat. Jaz.*, Dec 31)

Criticism of the Union. Muhammad Hamid Awlaqi [there are Awlaqi shaykhdoms in the Western Protectorate, Aden], writing in an Aden paper, deplored the factionalism evident in the Yemeni Union, and noted with regret that it seemed to be part and parcel of the Yemeni way of life. He also pointed out that Adenis had always supported the Yemeni nationalists while the latter had never troubled to return the favour. (*Ayyam*, June 25)

Abd ar-Rahman al-Baydani (on whom see below) wrote in 1962, before the revolution, that the Free Yemenis lacked a revolutionary plan, and a political, economic and social ideology, nor had they done anything for the people except exacerbate their hatred of the Imam. They had been solely negative in outlook, using old-fashioned party methods which caused many to turn away from them. In their claims to be the sole ones qualified to rule, they were no different from the Imam himself. (*Abd ar-Rahman al-Baydani: Arrar al-Yaman, Kutub Qawmiah*, Cairo, 1962, p 23)

UAR Aid To "Free Yemeni" Students. The UAR Students Union was said to have extended financial aid to Yemeni students living in Aden and affiliated to the Free Yemeni Union. (*Ibid*, p 208)

OTHER YEMENI OPPOSITION IN ADEN

Pro-UAR Youth Group. In April it was reported that an "Organization of Arab Youth" (*munazzamat ash-shabab al-arabi*) had been recently established in the Tawahi district of Aden. A statement formulated after a protracted debate called for the liberation of N. and S. Yemen from imperialism and reaction, and demanded that any liberated area immediately join the UAR. The platform was to be published shortly [no names were mentioned in this report]. (*Ayyam*, April 7)

"Free Progressive Arab Party" (*hizb al-ahrar al-arabi at-taqadumi*). In May, in a "Declaration to the Arab People of Yemen," the constituent body of such an organization announced its establishment in "Shaykh Uthman, Arab Aden," stating that it believed in the principle of "liberating our Arab Nation from the Persian Gulf to

the Atlantic Ocean." It called upon Yemeni youth to dedicate itself to rescuing the Arab Nation from its present sorry state and to bring about its liberation and unity. The founding members said they were not interested in personal gain nor were they trying to hide behind resounding slogans [probably a reference to the "Free Yemenis"], and promised to remain true to their ideals. (*Ayyam*, May 19)

Aden Trade Union Congress. [The programme of the UAR-orientated Congress, the major local political force in Aden Colony, was the unification of Aden and Yemen under a democratic regime and union with the UAR. There was a large Yemeni element amongst the trade union members. See MER 1960, pp 384-8; this vol. pp 436 ff.]

In March the "Nationalist Bureau" (*maktab qaumi*) of the ATUC established a "Northern [i.e. Yemeni] Branch" (*shu'bat ash-shimali*). It also appointed Muhsin al-Ayni, a prominent Yemeni political exile, to an important post. (For details see below: Muhsin al-Ayni.) (*Ayyam*, March 16)

Tribal Leaders in Aden. Shaykh Sinān Abu Luhūm, who had taken refuge in Aden in 1960 (MER 1960, p 397), declined a verbal promise of safe conduct back into Yemen from Bayhan. He demanded a written pardon from the Imam before returning from exile. (*Fat. Jas.*, Feb 2)

Qādi Muhammad Abdallāh ash-Shāmi succeeded in persuading three tribal leaders who had fled to Bayhan to return to Yemen following guarantee of a royal pardon. (Compare MER 1960, p 377; *Jihad*, Jordan, Feb 14.)

OTHER OPPOSITION ABROAD

Baydāni. At the beginning of 1961 the Yemeni Union in Aden published a lecture given by Abd ar-Rahmān al-Baydāni in Dortmund, West Germany, in which he attacked the present Yemeni regime. [Baydāni, a Shāfi'i, was a veteran of the Free Yemeni movement. He was said to have unsuccessfully attempted to enlist Egyptian support for a revolution in Yemen in 1953, and British support in 1955. He was further said to have denounced to the Imam the Englishman with whom he had been in contact in 1955, as having tried to instigate a revolt. Baydāni was then appointed by the Imam as Ambassador to Bonn, reportedly as a reward for his show of loyalty. Later, he was transferred as Ambassador to Sudan. He resigned this post in 1960 and became active as a political exile against the Imam's regime.]

In his lecture, Baydāni warned West Germany not to make agreements with Yemen, claiming that the present government was not likely to observe its obligations. A positive change in the situation in Yemen, already foreseeable, would make cooperation possible on a basis of trust. Baydāni also spoke of the situation in Yemen and of his proposals for reform. (*Fat. Jas.*, March 5)

Baydāni's Reform Programme. In his book *Secrets of Yemen*, written before the 1962 Yemeni coup d'état, Baydāni set out, under the heading "The Aims of the People," a programme for a new regime in Yemen as follows:

1. a return to the true law (*shari'ah*) of Islam after the Hāshimī Imams had abused it for the past thousand years; cessation of feuds between all elements of the nation; abolition of racial discrimination between the Hāshimītes [to which the Hamid ad-Din dynasty belonged]

and the people, Zaydis and Shāfi'is; promulgation of a law explaining the rights and duties of the citizen; no act to be regarded as criminal except as defined by law; no punishment except after fair trial according to law;

2. establishment of a Yemeni republic; elections for a representative assembly (*majlis niyābi*) which would elect the president of the republic;

3. realization of the aims of Arab nationalism, in order that the Arab nation might retrieve its glory [Arab union not mentioned];

4. realization of social justice;

5. establishment of a powerful national army;

6. abolition of injustices: (a) freeing of tribal hostages; (b) abolition of *zakāt* (tax) assessment and collection and making the payment of *zakāt* voluntary; (c) increase in availability of foodstuffs and encouragement of coffee-bean and other exports; (d) abolition of payment for medical treatment in hospitals and of all "health taxes"; (e) abolition of forced labour; (f) abolition of the one-fifth tax, compulsory charity and road tolls;

7. raising the standard of living: (a) comprehensive economic planning and encouragement of agriculture, industry, trade and other productive occupations; (b) improved service conditions for the army, police and officials in order to strengthen the state in its drive towards work, production and construction; (c) an educational policy to be based on the economic plan: free schooling for all; vocational training; grants to students unable financially to devote themselves to study; (d) providing the proprietors of "special enterprises" with know-how, capital and customs protection in consonance with public interest; (e) facilitating the return of emigrants to Yemen; (f) the state to provide work for all unemployed with prompt payment of salaries [there was no mention in the programme of labour affairs, trade unions, etc.];

8. the state to attain self-sufficiency by the following means: (a) land reclamation and development; (b) confiscation of lands held by the ruling family; (c) income from oil and mineral imports and "such other projects sponsored by the new state as are not taken up by individuals"; (d) fair customs tariffs; progressive income tax exempting low incomes. (*Abd ar-Rahmān al-Baydāni: Aḥdār al-Yaman, Kutub Qaumiyyah, Cairo, 1962, pp 129-31*)

Muhsin al-Ayni. In Jan Ayni, a former private secretary to Crown Prince Badr, was ordered by the Aden authorities to leave Aden, following Yemeni representations. Ayni left Aden on Jan 20 for Cairo. (*Hayat*, Jan 21; *Fat. Jas.*, Jan 22, 23)

Ayni, aged 30, a graduate in law and economics from Cairo University, was known as a "Free Yemeni" and for the previous 18 months had lived in Aden where he taught at the Islamic College, wrote a book, "Plots Against Yemen" (*mu'amarāt ala-al-yaman*), which was banned in all Arab countries, and also translated a book on Yemen from French. (*Hayat*; *Ayyam*, Jan 21; *Fat. Jas.*, Jan 22, 23)

Ayni participated in the Conference of Arab Lawyers in Cairo in Feb as a representative of "Yemeni Aden."

In March Ayni was chosen by the "National Bureau" (*maktab qaumi*) of the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC) as head of its newly-formed Committee for Arab Relations. He appeared also under the title of Permanent Representative of the ATUC in Cairo and the Arab countries. Ayni represented the "Federation of Arab Workers" [International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions?] [May Day?] celebrations in East Germany. (*Ayyam*, Feb 15, March 16, 23, May 19)

THE DANGERS OF CHANGE ANARCHY PREDICTED

"After the Imam—Chaos." It was widely assumed that after a possible collapse of the Imam's rule, by his forcible removal or otherwise, Yemen might be plunged into a state of chaos.

Thus, *Al-Haydi's* "Arab elder statesman" observed that Cairo had been fostering groups of young Yemeni nationalists, but had not encouraged them to take action for fear that the collapse of the Imam's rule would plunge the country into a state of chaos which would be difficult to arrest, while providing opportunities for "British and Saudi Arabian expansionism." (*Hayat*, Jan 22)

A British observer, writing in 1960, said that Yemen lacked both the social and economic prerequisites for transformation into a "new style nationalist state." "The alternative to theocratic absolutism in the Yemen is not Arab Nationalism but anarchy. Even had Crown Prince Badr succeeded in ousting his father's adherents in the summer of 1959 he would have been forced to employ the same methods of rule as his father or see the Shāfi'i tribes revolt against Zaydi rule, and retreat into inter-tribal anarchy." (*D.C. Watts: New Threats to Britain's Strategic Position in West Asia, Aden and Somalia: International Relations Journal of the David Davies Memorial Institute, London, Vol. 2 No. 2, Oct 1960, p 88*)

The Resistance To Change. After the attempted assassination of Imam Ahmad in March, *Aden Chronicle* commented that his death could be a prelude to disorder and civil war. Observing that violence was the only way to bring about political change in autocratically-ruled Yemen, the writer cautioned that nevertheless in this,

"one of the world's most outmoded states," "change, if and when it comes, must be introduced with utmost care..." The resistance of a deeply entrenched hierarchy and retinue would have to be overcome. "Immense governmental prestige and power are required to convince the masses as well that any political, economic and social change is going to do them good, given faith and patience" (*Aden Chr.*, April 6). Communism, "religious dissension and resultant divisions among the tribes" were liable to result from the Imam's death. (*Aden Chr.*, May 11)

Prospects For "Another Congo." A gloomy prediction of the fate of Yemen if the Imam were eliminated appeared in another *Aden* paper: The dark ages would come to life, civil strife would erupt; fanatical tribalism would rear its head; Yemen would be turned into a battlefield of the cold war, and the Arab countries themselves would intervene. Yemen, divided among warring factions and leaders, would become a new Congo or Laos.

This was not too pessimistic a picture, the writer said; the present regime had grown out of the deep divisions in the country and the same divisions made its continued existence still possible. The Imam perhaps kept the balance between the various forces but at the same time he destroyed the state from within. However, there was no new leadership capable of rallying the country after the elimination of the Imam and the dissensions which had been encouraged under the Imam's regime would yield bitter fruit.

The "free Arab countries" and especially the UAR should be on the alert, though they should not intervene as long as the Imam was alive. (*Ayyem*, April 9)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYNOPSIS

In December the UAR (Egypt) dissolved the United Arab States, its federation with Yemen, on the grounds of incompatibility of the regimes and ineffectiveness. Just as the establishment of the federation, on the Imam's initiative, some three years and ten months earlier, followed upon the Egyptian-Syrian union, so did the dissolution follow upon the latter's breakup. The dissolution was preceded by the publication of a poem by the Imam, in which he denounced the policy of nationalization of property—an obvious, though indirect, criticism of President Abdel Nasser. The federation had never been implemented and Cairo commented that the Imam had never intended it to be more than a means of forestalling a civil uprising and perpetuating his regime. The dissolution made no difference to Yemen's international status as she had never given up any attributes of sovereignty or independent diplomatic representation.

Yemen's relations with the other Arab countries were generally friendly, especially so with Saudi Arabia and Jordan (the two other remaining Arab kingdoms in the ME); with Jordan she established diplomatic relations (see p 158 b).

In the international field Yemen continued to pursue a policy of neutrality and to enjoy its fruits in the form of aid. Yemen was represented at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (pp 56 ff) and at other neutralist and Afro-Asian gatherings.

Communist aid continued. The Russians completed the

construction of Ahmadi port at Hodeida and continued other economic and technical as well as military assistance. In November the Chinese completed the construction of the Hodeida—San'a road; no reports were received of any new Chinese projects. Yemenis continued to study in Russia and China. Both countries repeatedly received warm praise from Yemeni spokesmen and in the press. Ties also developed between Yemen and other Communist countries: East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Rumania, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia.

US aid was designed to provide an alternative to exclusive Yemeni dependence on the Communist countries. The US continued with road building and water supply projects and made a grant of wheat. A number of Yemenis were granted scholarships for study in the USA. An independent American operator was granted an oil concession in Yemen.

Relations with the United Kingdom continued to centre on Aden, which Yemen claimed as part of her territory. However, as already pointed out in MER 1960 (p 397), the more immediate concern of the Imam was with the Yemeni opposition in Aden which he suspected of responsibility for terrorist activities in Yemen. It was reported that Yemen and the UK achieved an understanding on this question. According to a hostile source, the Imam had agreed in return to withhold aid from the rebels in Aden Protectorate.

As to Yemen's relations with other countries, her technical cooperation with Western Germany is worthy of

note, as well as the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and Somalia, Yemen's neighbours across the Red Sea.

THE USSR

Political Relations; Denunciation of "Western Imperialism." [Relations between Yemen and the USSR remained cordial throughout the year, with both sides repeatedly reaffirming their intention to continue cooperation based on true friendship.]

Yemen's dispute with Britain over Aden was cited as a foremost example of its struggle against imperialism. A *Pravda* article assured the Yemeni people of the continued "moral support" of the Soviet Union in this connection. (*Pravda*, Jan 31)

An *Izvestia* commentary said there had been many reports about American infiltration in Yemen "through the so-called US aid and the so-called experts." Yemen had been told by the US that all the experts must be regarded as diplomats. Thus a number of bulldozer drivers arrived in Yemen carrying diplomatic passports. These experts cost Yemen so much that they would swallow up the greater part of the alleged US aid. (*R. Moscow*, Jan 5 [SU 7])

On the occasion of Yemen's National Day, a message from President Brezhnev and PM Khrushchov to the Imam expressed the "profound sympathy" of the Soviet people "for the just struggle of the Yemeni people against the intrigues of the imperialist powers, for the strengthening of the national independence of their country and the further consolidation of its political and economic independence." (*R. Moscow*, Oct 18 [SU 20])

In Nov a Yemeni paper criticized the USSR for developing atomic weapons instead of using available funds to aid developing countries. The paper upheld the example of West Germany as a country which the USSR could emulate. (*Saba*, Nov 16)

Hodeida (Ahmadi) Harbour Completed. The construction of the Soviet-built harbour at Hodeida on the Red Sea coast was officially completed at the end of March (see also MER 1960, p 398). The port was named Ahmadi in honour of the Imam. A Soviet delegation, headed by V.G. Bakayev, the Minister of Merchant Marine, arrived at Ahmadi Port on March 30 in a Soviet ship. He was received by Amir Sayf al-Islam Abd ar-Rahman (the Imam being indisposed following the attempt on his life a week earlier) who praised Yemeni-Russian friendship "established on a basis of sincere and pure cooperation of which this port is the magnificent fruit."

On April 2 the port was officially handed over to Yemen. (*Pravda*, April 2; *Izvestia*, April 4, 9; *Nasr*, April 6)

The completion of the project was prominently reported in the Soviet press which contrasted the "enthusiastic" welcome accorded to the Soviet delegation with the unfriendly attitude allegedly displayed by the local population towards the US torpedo boat "Strong" which had earlier entered Ahmadi port "uninvited" and "ungreeted." (*Izvestia*, May 6)

The Yemeni press praised the Russian aid: The agreement had been fulfilled to the letter, the Russian experts had worked devotedly, Russia had proved that she respected the sovereignty of every state and had only aimed at cooperation and friendship between the two countries. Russia treated all countries, great and small, as equals. (*Nasr*, April 6, 13)

In an exchange of messages with the Imam, PM Khrushchov emphasized that Soviet aid had no "selfish

aims" and recalled that the USSR and Yemen had maintained cordial relations for more than thirty years. (*Pravda*, April 12)

Minister Bakayev, writing in *Pravda*, pointed out that the building of Ahmadi port would allow Yemen to free herself of dependence on the port of Aden, a dependence which had hitherto enabled the British to "shackle" Yemen's national aspirations and, at the same time, to make "huge profits" at Yemen's expense.

Both Bakayev and G. Pyatskii, director of the Soviet construction team at Ahmadi, writing in *Izvestia*, stressed the climatic and topographic difficulties encountered by Soviet planners and engineers. The lack of skilled local manpower was a further hindrance, successfully overcome by the training of native personnel in Yemen as well as in the Soviet Union. (*Pravda*, March 25; *Izvestia*, March 26)

According to a Russian source, the cost of the port came to about 60 million roubles. The port comprised three dry cargo wharfs and an oil jetty capable of handling 300,000 tons of cargo annually, including 100,000 tons of fuel products, and of accommodating ships displacing up to 10,000 tons. The entire equipment of the port, stated to be among the most modern in the world, including storage tanks, gantry cranes, power and radio stations, repair workshops and other facilities, was manufactured in the Soviet Union and supplied under a long-term credit. (*International Affairs*, Sept; *R. Moscow*, April 8 [SU 10]; *Time*, April 14; *Saba*, July 13)

The Yemeni newspaper *Saba* was quoted to the effect that Yemeni personnel trained in the Soviet Union would handle the general work of the port whilst Soviet technicians would continue to maintain various facilities (*R. Baghdad*, Feb 20 [W 23]). In April the Yemeni Minister of Navy said that "many young Yemenis" including pilots, had returned from training courses in Russia and were ready to take up the running of the port (*Saba*, April 13). In Oct 60 Yemeni trainees were due back from the Soviet Union. (*Aden Chr.*, Oct 9)

Originally some 300 Soviet specialists were directly engaged in the construction of the port (see MER 1960, p 398). The return of 50 Soviet technicians to the Soviet Union was reported in the Egyptian press in June. (*Haq'iq*, June 1; *Akhir Sa'ah*, June 14)

Bab al-Mandeb Bunkering Port Project. In Jan and April negotiations were reported between Yemen and the USSR for the construction of a fuel bunkering port on the Yemeni coast near the Bab al-Mandeb straits. It was commented that such a port would challenge the monopoly hitherto enjoyed by Aden port in this area. (*MENA*, Jan 13 [16]; *Haq'iq*, April 20)

Agreement Reported on Hodeida-Ta'izz Road Project. In March Yemen and Russia were reported to have signed an agreement for the construction of a road between Hodeida and Ta'izz. The necessary equipment was expected to reach Hodeida shortly. (*Saba*, March 16)

Soviet Aid in General. In July, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the economic cooperation agreement between the USSR and Yemen, a Russian embassy official in Ta'izz listed the following items of Russian assistance: the construction of Ahmadi Port which had cost some 60 million roubles; a longterm loan for an oil storage project [at Ahmadi port]; 15 Soviet physicians were working in San'a, Ta'izz and Hodeida; 20 places had been allocated to Yemeni students in Russian academic institutions; 20 Yemenis had gone to Russia to

study the Russian language; 61 students had successfully completed nautical training [and training in port facilities] in Odessa; 5 Soviet crews were operating Yemeni civil aircraft. *Saba* highly praised the cooperation with the Soviets. (*Saba*, July 15)

[It may be noted that there is no mention in this list either of the Bab al-Mandeb port project or of the Hodeida-Ta'izz project which had been reported on earlier in the year.]

Soviet Red Cross Aid. The Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies sent a shipment of 1,500 tons of cement, 50 tons of flour and 10,000 metres of cotton cloth for the relief of the victims of a fire in Hodeida (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, Feb 14 [SU 16]). A broadcast from San'a expressed appreciation for "this noble humanitarian gesture" and underlined its significance for relations between the Soviet Union and Yemen. (*R. San'a*, March 22 [25]; *Nasr*, March 26)

Soviet Military Aid. See p 697

Trade—Oil. It was reported in Oct that negotiations were taking place for the purchase by Russia of some 1,500 tons of Yemeni coffee, nearly half the country's annual crop, in exchange for Russian sugar and cement.

The same source reported that Soviet experts had been called in to advise the Fuel Supply Company, founded in Sept, on storage and distribution matters. (*Aden Chr.*, Oct 5)

The company discussed oil imports with foreign suppliers: the Soviet Oil Organization, Shell, Caltex and Standard [7] quoted prices and were asked what aid they would offer the Yemeni company.

The Russians had built the oil storage tanks at Ahmadi port, *Aden Chronicle* reported, and had been convinced that they would be awarded the oil supply contract. The quotations given by the western companies were low, in an attempt to curtail Soviet influence in Yemen. (*Aden Chr.*, Sept 14; *R. San'a*, Oct 25 [27])

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Yemeni Muslim Delegation To China Favourably Impressed; Expressions of Friendship. A Yemeni Muslim delegation led by Sayyid Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Zabarah left Peking on Dec 31, 1960. The delegation spent one month in China touring Islamic establishments and was received by Mao Tse-tung. (*NCNA*, Dec 31, 1960 [FE, Jan 4, 1961])

Both Zabarah and another member of the delegation, Muhammad Ibn Yahya al-Haddad, reported at home that they had met many Chinese Muslims and had seen them enjoying full religious freedom; Muslims were to be found in high political and other positions. In the communes and elsewhere, Haddad said, he had found freedom of speech, enthusiasm and devotion to work; the women took part in the creative activity which was China's hallmark. (*NCNA*, Feb 6 [FE 9]; *Saba*, March 16)

An article in the Yemeni *An-Nasr* reportedly hailed the friendship between the Yemeni and Chinese peoples, praised the modesty of the Chinese people and said that the Yemenis had a feeling of fellowship towards the Chinese whose achievements they admired. (*NCNA*, Aug 9 [FE 11])

In messages to the Imam and the Crown Prince on the occasion of Yemen's National Day, Chairman Liu Shao-chi and Premier Chou En-lai expressed the hope that "the close cooperation between the two countries will

become stronger and develop daily." (*R. Peking*, Oct 11 [FE 14])

Aid; Hodeida-San'a Road Completed. Prince Hasan, Yemeni representative at the UN, told a journalist that the aid from China was not a gift, as commonly thought, but a long-term loan. (*Aden Chr.*, Nov 9)

The construction of the Hodeida-San'a road, begun with the assistance of China in 1959, was completed in Nov [see also MER 1960, p 398]. Some 230 km in length, the road links the interior of the country with the Russian-built Ahmadi port at Hodeida. (*NCNA in English*, Dec 12 [W 14]). [In Dec the road was finally opened to traffic throughout its full length.]

Trade. A Chinese trade fair opened in Ta'izz on Jan 7; it had been arranged previously in Hodeida and San'a. At the opening ceremony, the Commercial Counsellor of the Chinese legation expressed his satisfaction at the cooperation that marked relations between China and Yemen "despite American intrigues." (*Saba*, Jan 19; *ANA*, Jan 22 [24]; *NCNA*, Feb 1 [FE 9])

Students in China—And Their Problems. In Feb it was reported that six of the 70 Yemeni students studying in Peking had returned to Yemen and complained that as part of their study course in Peking they had been compelled to study Marxism-Leninism. The Imam was said to have instructed a member of a Yemeni delegation visiting China to investigate the complaint. (*R. London*, Feb 23-IMB, Feb 24)

In Dec a letter from a Yemeni student in China said that 54 Yemenis were studying there, seven road-construction and 47 various trades of textile manufacturing. The writer urged that better qualified students be chosen in future; they should have secondary education, know at least one foreign language and, last but not least, they should be devout Muslims, strong in their faith and convictions so that they may not be led astray by the "currents of depraved civilization." (*Saba*, Dec 14)

OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

German Democratic Republic. In Jan Qadi Abdallah al-Hajari, Yemeni Minister of Communications, arrived in the GDR for a three-week study-tour. He reportedly told the press that the cooperation with the GDR had already brought great benefits to Yemen's telephone and telegraph services. (*ADN*, Jan 18 [EE 20]; *Saba*, Feb 2)

On Nov 21 Crown Prince Badr received the GDR Ambassador to the UAR. According to a GDR report, they discussed the German problem and relations between the two countries in a friendly atmosphere. (*ADN*, Nov 22 [EE 24])

Czechoslovakia. In April the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Cairo presented his credentials to the Imam as his country's first Minister to Yemen. (*Ahram*, Feb 2, March 25; *R. Cairo*, April 20-IMB, April 20)

North Korea. A North Korean trade mission visited Yemen between Dec 28, 1960 and Jan 14, 1961 and was received in audience by the Imam. On Jan 11 a trade agreement as well as a protocol for the exchange of trade representatives was signed. North Korea would export machinery, chemicals and textile fabrics in exchange for coffee, cotton, leather and various agricultural products. A joint communiqué stated that the discussions had also turned on the need for the "strengthening of friendly relations between the two countries in the course

of the struggle for world peace and against imperialism." (KCNA, Jan 16 [FE 19]; R. San'a, Jan 17 [19], Saba, Feb 2)

Rumania. The Rumanian Ambassador to the UAR, Constantin Stanesco, was accredited as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in the Yemen. (R. Bucharest, May 25 [EE 27])

North Vietnam. A trade agreement and a protocol for the exchange of trade representatives was signed between North Vietnam and Yemen in Feb. (R. San'a, Feb 7 [W 16]; VNA, Feb 28 [FE March 1])

Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav economic delegation arrived in Yemen on Jan 13 for commercial talks with the government and merchants. The Yemeni side also raised the question of cultural ties. (Saba, Feb 2)

The Yugoslav Ambassador to Cairo served also as non-resident Minister to Yemen. (Ahram, June 27)

THE UNITED KINGDOM

(Aden)

Talks, Cooperation on: Aden Border Problems, Tribal Warfare, Subversive Activity. On Jan 1, Ronald Bailey, British chargé d'affaires in Yemen, returned to Ta'izz, bearing with him, it was reported, assurances of Britain's goodwill towards Yemen. On his return, it was reported, Bailey engaged in "cordial discussion with a high ranking official" but according to a UAR source his request for a meeting with the Imam was not met. (Mid. Mir., Jan 7; Ahram, Jan 9)

Bailey had gone to Aden in Dec 1960 to consult on matters relating to a possible connection between recent bomb explosions in Yemen and Yemeni exiles living in Aden. Allegations emanating from Cairo that Bailey had been expelled were denied. (MER 1960, p 399)

Aden spokesmen were reported to have said that the authorities had assured Bailey of their determination to try and prevent Yemeni terrorists from using the Colony as an operational base. Proof of this was provided by a search of the premises of the Yemeni Union in Aden (Mid. Mir., Jan 7). [This anti-Imam Yemeni organization of political exiles continued to be active in the Colony throughout the year; see above.] According to a British source, Britain had agreed to curb the activities of the Yemeni exiles "if and when they are proved to be hostile to Yemen." (Scotsman, Feb 3)

An anti-Imam source said later that Britain and the Imam had reached a non-aggression agreement and the Imam had agreed to withhold aid from the rebels in Aden Protectorate. (Hurriyah, Beirut, quoted by Aden Chr., March 9)

On Jan 22 an official announcement from the Federation of the Amirates of the South [Western Aden Protectorate] reported a border-clash between Yemen and Bayhan tribes. 40 Yemen tribesmen had crossed the border into Bayhan and opened fire on Kurrah village, but had been repulsed. (ANA, Jan 22 [24])

On Jan 26 Sharif Hussein Ibn Ahmad al-Hubayli, Federal Minister of the Interior, and Mr Trevaakis, British advisor to Western Aden Protectorate, left for Bayhan, accompanied by Qādi Muhammad ash-Shāmi, representative of the Imam in Bayda, "to investigate border incidents and make peace between Yemeni and Aden border tribes." (ANA, Jan 26 [28])

In Feb Qādi ash-Shāmi went to Aden and continued his talks with Trevaakis. The talks were to deal with

Yemeni exiles in Aden as well as "deported Yemenis." Shāmi had already persuaded three tribal Yemeni leaders to return to Yemen. (Scotsman, Feb 3; R. Amman, Feb 5 [7]; ANA, Feb 13 [15]; Jihad, Jordan, Feb 14)

Aden Rebel Leader Takes Refuge in Yemen. In June Sultan Muhammad Ibn Aydarus, Sultan of Lower Yafi, who was leading a rebellion against the Aden authorities (MER 1960, p 391), took refuge in Yemen where he was reportedly active in organizing a united rebel command in the protectorate. He was received by the Imam. (For details see p 442 b)

In Aug, Aydarus' presence in Yemen was reportedly discussed among other "matters of mutual interest" at a meeting between Naqib Sālih Ruwayhān, Governor of Bayda, Yemen, and the deputy British agent, E.R. Johnson, at Mukairas. (Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4)

Aydarus left Yemen for Jedda in Oct. (R. Cairo, Oct 14 [17])

Yemen Claims Sovereignty Over Aden. [Yemen continued to claim sovereignty over Aden Colony and Protectorate, which it consistently termed "Southern Yemen" or "occupied Yemen." (The same claim was also made by Yemeni opposition groups in Aden and Cairo and the Aden Trade Union Congress, though they opposed the Imam and his regime and wished to establish a republic; see pp 437 a, 701 b.)] At the same time, Yemeni spokesmen repeatedly claimed that not only were the British attacking Yemeni "freedom fighters" in "occupied Yemen" [a reference to the tribal rebellions, especially in Yafi; see pp 442-3] but they were also violating Yemeni airspace and carrying on a subversive warfare inside "independent Yemen." In Feb the Yemeni representative reportedly complained of such activities at the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference in Baghdad. (R. San'a, Jan 11 [13], Jan 17 [19], Feb 17, 20; Hayat, Feb 9; MENA, Aug 22 [23])

Yemen spokesmen repeatedly stated that Yemen would refuse to recognize the independence of Aden and would oppose its admission to the Arab League; Aden could become independent only through union with Yemen. (Aden Chr., June 27, Nov 30; Hayat, Aug 5)

Prince Sayf al-Islam al-Hasan, Yemen representative at the UN, was quoted by an Aden journalist to the effect that Aden might have "her own independent administration" in the event of "independence from British rule. She may, however, continue to cooperate with Yemen." (Aden Chr., Nov 9)

THE UNITED STATES

US Aid Policy. In Aug an Administration statement to the Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, said that the "modest" US aid programme to Yemen served to provide an alternative to exclusive Yemeni dependence on the "Sino-Soviet bloc" which had provided more than \$40 million in economic assistance. Present aid came under the heading of "supporting assistance" only; no overall development programme was likely for many years to come. In an answer to a question, the Administration representative said US assistance related to some key roads and to community water supply "and to like projects which we feel reach the people—and the public impact has been very good." He emphasized that Yemen was in a "very strategic location."

The economic aid programme for US fiscal year 1960 amounted to \$2,986,000; for 1961, \$4 million. (Foreign Assistance Appropriation for 1962, US Senate, Washington, 1961, pp 287, 294, 297, 299)

Food Grant. In Sept it was reported that an agreement had been signed in Washington by which the US granted Yemen 7,000 tons of food grain. (*Saba*, Sept 7)

Road Building, Water Supply. Throughout the year there were reports on the progress of construction of the Mocha-Ta'izz-Sana'a road with the aid of American technical personnel and equipment. In Oct 1,200 Yemeni labourers were reported to be working on the project. (cf MEK 1960, pp 399-400; *K. Sana'a*, March 23 [25], April 1 [W 6], June 7 [W 15]; *Aden Chr.*, June 6, Aug 3, Oct 12)

Earlier, a Ta'izz paper commented that, unlike the Chinese on the Hodeida-Sana'a road, the Americans were making only slow progress, and even the Russians, who were shortly to start building the Hodeida-Ta'izz road, might catch up with them. (*Saba*, March 16)

In April friction was reported between the Americans and Yemeni tribes who protested against the construction of the road, claiming that it would imperil their camel transport business. As a result work had been slowed down. (*Aden Chr.*, April 13)

Twenty Yemenis were sent to the US for training in the operation of road-building equipment. (*Saba*, Aug 10; *Aden Chr.*, Aug 3)

In Aug it was reported that the water supply project for Ta'izz, which was being built with US aid, was nearing completion. (*Aden Chr.*, Aug 3)

Oil Concession. An independent American operator, John W. Mecom of Houston, Texas, was granted an oil concession covering the same area which was allocated in 1959 to American Overseas Investment Corp. There had been no reports on operations by the latter company and the concession had apparently been cancelled. The concession covered 10,000 sq. miles in the coastal region and included offshore waters; provision was made for a five-year exploration period, followed by 30 years of development. The agreement was signed for Yemen (in Feb ??) by Amir Badr who later in the year also attended the ceremony marking the beginning of the first drilling.

In Aug it was reported that Mecom had struck oil near Salif, but in Oct it was reported from Aden that he had struck water there and now intended to move his drilling equipment to Zaydiyah. (*Aden Chr.*, March 2, June 6, Oct 12; MEED, March 31; *Petroleum Times*, April 21, Aug 11; *R. Sana'a*, June 6, 7, 11 [W 15])

American School. A US school was operating in Ta'izz. The pupils were children of American personnel and of the diplomatic corps, and Yemenis, among them "nine royal children." The US chargé d'affaires said in July that there were 25 pupils, most of them Yemenis. There

were many requests for enrolment and it was intended to enlarge the school. (*Saba*, July 27; *Aden Chr.*, Sept 21)

Scholarships. Ten Yemenis were studying in the US on American scholarships and five others had now been awarded scholarships, it was reported in Aug. (*Nasr*, Aug 31)

OTHER COUNTRIES

German Federal Republic. In May it was reported that a Yemeni mission would make a 15-day visit to West Germany. (*Ahram*, May 1)

On Oct 2 the two countries signed an agreement on "technical cooperation in the economic field." (*R. Sana'a*, Oct 2 [4])

Ethiopia. In March 50 Yemenis, expelled from Ethiopia, were drowned when their Yemeni ship capsized in the Red Sea. (*Hayat*, March 22)

In Aug Amir al-Hasan Ibn Sayf al-Islam al-Hasan was appointed Minister to Ethiopia (*Nasr*, Aug 17); the Ethiopian Minister presented his credentials to Crown Prince Badr in Sept. (*Nasr*, Sept 28)

Italy. Crown Prince Badr went to Italy for medical treatment, whilst Italian surgeons came to Yemen to treat Imam Ahmad after the attempt on his life in March. [The Imam had gone to Italy for prolonged medical treatment in 1959.] (*Aden Chr.*, March 3; *R. Baghdad*, March 30-IMB, March 31)

Indonesia. Ahmad Pasha, Yemeni Minister to the UAS Federal Council, visited the Yemeni community in Indonesia, "numbering 100,000 souls." (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, April 29)

Philippines. A two-man delegation, "representing the Muslims of the Philippines," on a tour of Arab and Muslim countries, visited Yemen in Dec. They reportedly carried a letter from the President of the Philippines to Imam Ahmad. (*Saba*, Dec 28)

Somalia. In Feb Yemen raised its representation in Somalia from consulate to legation. (*Saba*, March 2)

Sweden. A Swedish firm was engaged in mineral prospecting in Yemen. In June it was reported that they had found gold-containing rock. (*Musawwar*, Feb 17, June 2; *Aden Chr.*, March 3)

A Swedish company was reported to have been granted oil-prospecting rights in the province of Zabid. (*Akhbar*, Cairo, Oct 13)

INDEXES

INDEXES

NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Explanatory Notes:

- (1) The letters a, b, after the page number indicate the left-hand and right-hand columns of the text respectively.
- (2) Page numbers in bold type indicate principal references.
- (3) Two types of cross references are used: a) The one in capital letters indicates a main heading; b) the other, in small letters, indicates a sub-heading appearing under the same main heading.

ABBREVIATIONS:

Afg	— Afghanistan	FM	— Foreign Minister	Pol	— Poland
Alg	— Algeria	Fra	— France	Port	— Portugal
Arg	— Argentina	GDR	— German Democratic Republic	RU	— Ruanda Urundi
Aus	— Austria	GFR	— German Federal Republic	Rum	— Rumania
Austl	— Australia	Gha	— Ghana	Sal	— El Salvador
Bel	— Belgium	Gre	— Greece	Sa	— Saudi Arabia
Bol	— Bolivia	Gua	— Guatemala	Sen	— Senegal
Braz	— Brazil	Gui	— Guinea	Sierra L	— Sierra Leone
Bulg	— Bulgaria	Indon	— Indonesia	Som	— Somalia
Bur	— Burma	I	— Iraq	Sp	— Spain
Camb	— Cambodia	Ir	— Iran	Su	— Sudan
Cam	— Cameroon	Is	— Israel	Swe	— Sweden
Can	— Canada	It	— Italy	S	— Syria
CAR	— Central African Republic	Ivory C	— Ivory Coast	Tang	— Tanganyika
Cey	— Ceylon	J	— Jordan	Thai	— Thailand
Col	— Colombia	K	— King	Tu	— Tunisia
Congo B	— Congo Brazzaville	L	— Lebanon	T	— Turkey
Congo L	— Congo Leopoldville	Li	— Libya	UAR	— United Arab Republic
Cos	— Costa Rica	Liber	— Liberia	UK	— United Kingdom
CPR	— China People's Republic	Malagasy R	— Malagasy Republic	Up Volta	— Upper Volta
Cyp	— Cyprus	Maur	— Mauritania	Uru	— Uruguay
Cz	— Czechoslovakia	Mex	— Mexico	USA	— United States of America
Dah	— Dahomey	Mor	— Morocco	USSR	— Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Den	— Denmark	Neth	— Netherlands	Ven	— Venezuela
Ecu	— Ecuador	Nor	— Norway	Y	— Yemen
Eth	— Ethiopia	P	— President	Yug	— Yugoslavia
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- (1) For general explanatory notes and abbreviations, see p 710.
- (2) The definite article "al" in the Arabic names has been omitted.
- (3) Where there is no family name, the name of the father is given first, e.g.: Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Abdallah.
- (4) Detailed references are given for heads of state or government, and in some cases, also foreign ministers.
- (5) The reference "Personal" comprises references by the subject himself and by others to the subject's personality, leadership, etc.

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